The assault on Amin's palace: the most spectacular foreign special operation of the USSR. Participants in the storming of Amin's palace talk about changing pieces on the political chessboard

Chapter 2. Assault on the Taj Beg Palace After the bathhouse on December 27, 1979, me and V.V. At noon, the wheelman once again went to see his leadership. B.S. Ivanov contacted the Center and reported that everything was ready. Then he handed the receiver of the radiotelephone to me. Yu.V. spoke. Andropov. - Will you go yourself? -

Chapter 30. Amin’s hands were untied... Amin’s hands were untied, and Taraki’s supporters began to be shot openly, without hesitating anyone. Two ministers were killed right in their offices. One was shot from a sniper rifle from the roof of a neighboring house and at the same time

Assault On April 25, 1945, the assault on the capital of the Third Reich began. Even before our assault began, Berlin was destroyed by American and British aircraft. By the end of April, the Berlin garrison was surrounded by a steel ring of our troops. We understood that there, in the center of Berlin, we had buried

However, it is incorrect to consider this evening as the first episode of the epic that began. Rather, it was the culmination of events that happened much earlier. Over the years, I have questioned those directly involved about these events. So this is, if you like, some experience of an exclusive political investigation.

CIA agent?

In the autumn of that memorable year, the security forces and intelligence services of the Soviet Union were more than widely represented in Kabul. Even then, long before the deployment of troops, representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs openly worked there, and our military advisers looked after almost every Afghan major. The largest generals from the Ministry of Defense, from Lubyanka, as well as senior party officials from Old Square regularly visited Afghanistan. In addition, the foreign intelligence and GRU residencies, which had reliable sources in all structures of Afghan society, at all levels of power, had been active there for a long time.

That is, Moscow did not experience a shortage of information about what was happening beyond Pyanj, and could well influence the situation.

The coup that took place in April 1978 brought to power the People's Democratic Party, which was strongly influenced by the CPSU. On the one hand, this pleased our leaders, on the other, it brought them headaches, because the Afghan comrades immediately began to literally tear each other to pieces, a fierce factional struggle unfolded in the party, while both groups raced to swear love and loyalty to their “Soviet friends.” . Which of them is closer to true Marxism, who is right, who should I bet on? The most interesting thing is that our responsible officials from different departments who oversaw Afghan affairs gradually became disengaged: many military personnel began to sympathize with the “Khalqists” (Taraki, Amin), and the Lubyanka officers liked the “Parcham” wing (Karmal, Najibullah).

Things became much more complicated in September, when Prime Minister Amin first isolated and then destroyed the Secretary General and head of state Taraki. Now Amin himself has become the main one in Afghanistan. After this, repressions against “apostates” within the party became even more brutal. And another misfortune made itself felt more and more clearly: detachments of Islamic partisans - still poorly armed and scattered - continually attacked local authorities, approaching Kabul. A serious danger loomed over the April revolution.

Boris Ponomarev,
then Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate member of the Politburo:

Our security officers suspected Amin of having connections with American intelligence. Perhaps they were alarmed by the fact that he once studied in the USA. In the summer and autumn of 1979, we increasingly began to receive information that Amin was mercilessly cracking down on the “Parchamists” and generally undesirable people. Because of this, the revolution appeared in some unattractive light. Our leadership decided that this was not possible.

A. K. Misak,
then Minister of Finance of Afghanistan:

No, Amin was never a CIA agent. He was a communist. He loved Stalin very much and even tried to imitate him. I cannot deny his talent as a major organizer, however, I will make a reservation that he sought to achieve progress in everything very quickly, right now. He was vain: for example, he starred in a feature film, playing in it the role of an underground hero, that is, himself.

Sh.Jawzjani,
then a member of the Politburo PDPA Central Committee:

Amin's portrait cannot be painted with just one paint. He was a courageous man, full of energy, very sociable and popular. In politics he took extreme left positions. Dogmatist. He contributed in every possible way to his cult and was absolutely intolerant of dissent, eradicating it mercilessly. He worshiped his teacher Taraki, but as soon as he turned out to be an obstacle in his path, he destroyed the teacher without delay. He proposed organizing Afghanistan according to the Soviet model, insisted on including the thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our constitution. Your advisors managed to dissuade him from such obvious stupidity.

Alexander Puzanov,
then Soviet ambassador in Kabul:

Amin... This, I tell you, was a smart man. Energetic, exceptionally efficient. I knew him as a military, statesman and political figure. From May 1978 to November 1979, hardly a day passed that we did not meet. Taraki considered him the most capable and devoted student, and was in love with him. And with all this, he is a cruel and merciless executioner. When we realized that Amin’s repressions could no longer be stopped, we sent an extremely frank encrypted telegram to the Center about this.

Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky,
then General Staff officer:

I once asked former CIA director Admiral Turner, "Was Amin your agent?" He, as befits the rules of the game, avoided a direct answer and only said that “the Americans are credited with doing so many things that they simply are not able to do.” As for my opinion, I doubt that the Afghan leader is working directly for American intelligence.

Yes, if Amin was someone’s agent, he most likely collaborated with the KGB, as did all the other prominent figures in the PDPA. In the files of our foreign intelligence he appears under the operational pseudonym Kazem. But the clouds over him - especially after the murder of Taraki - were gathering. Brezhnev was not only annoyed by the sudden change of power in Kabul, he was furious. Leonid Ilyich just recently, in September, received the Afghan Secretary General in Moscow, hugged him, discussed plans for building a bright future, and then some adventurer Amin appears, and now he will have to kiss and discuss plans. No, that won't do. Brezhnev, of course, sent a telegram of welcome to the new leader (oh, the crafty rules of bureaucratic life!), but plans were already brewing in Moscow to decisively “correct the situation.”

Killing cannot be pardoned

On November 12, 1979, senior Soviet leaders (only members of the Politburo and one candidate - B.N. Ponomarev) held a secret meeting at which they approved Andropov's plan to eliminate Amin. The cautious leaders, understanding the delicacy of the moment, entrusted the secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Chernenko, with keeping the minutes of their meeting. This is the only case when a truly fateful decision was recorded by hand, in one copy and mysteriously entitled “To position in “A”.

This paper did not talk about sending troops; they were initially supposed to be pushed to the border and deployed there just in case. The operation itself to change power was planned to be carried out using the forces and means available in Afghanistan. From that time on, Amin's days were numbered.

But first the “clearing” had to be cleared.

Alexander Puzanov:

Suddenly I received a telegram signed by Gromyko: “Given your repeated requests to be relieved of your post as ambassador in Kabul, you are being transferred to another job.” Strange, I didn’t make any requests. Well, what can I say... Everything was clear. On November 21, he flew to the Union.

***

Most likely, Puzanov’s unexpected recall was a purely distracting maneuver, since Amin, who considered him a friend of the “Parchamists,” many times asked to replace our diplomat with another, more flexible one. So they went to meet him halfway, to lull him to sleep, to dispel suspicions. And the embassy was now headed by the former secretary of the Tatar regional committee F.A. Tabeev, who, having presented his credentials to Amin, immediately began discussing with the Afghan leader the details of his upcoming official visit to Moscow. Amin had been asking for such a visit for a long time, and now the Soviet side agreed (another red herring).

Fikryat Tabeev:

Amin felt a clear dislike for our Central Asian republics, where, in his opinion, the construction of socialism was too delayed. He said: “We will manage it in ten years.” Once he could not resist a poorly hidden threat: “I hope you will learn the right lessons from the activities of your predecessor.” Almost a month ago new job nothing special happened. We were preparing Amin's visit to Moscow. All our departments represented in Afghanistan at that time supported Amin’s leadership.

***

Moreover, many supported not just formally, but with obvious sympathy for the new Afghan leader. Among them were the chief military adviser, Lieutenant General L.N. Gorelov and adviser to the main department, Major General V.P. Zaplatin.

Lev Gorelov:

When Andropov asked my opinion about Amin, I said this: “Strong-willed, efficient, but at the same time cunning and insidious. He carried out a number of repressions. He repeatedly asked to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan, including for personal protection. He really wants to meet with Brezhnev ". Apparently they didn't like my grades. At the beginning of December I was recalled to Moscow. Other military leaders also fell out of favor, who did not share the opinion of the leadership - especially regarding the possible introduction of our contingent: Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, commander Ground forces Pavlovsky.

Vasily Zaplatin:

At a meeting with Defense Minister Ustinov in October, we reported that Amin respects the Soviet Union, that we must keep in mind its great capabilities and use them in our interests. There was no talk of sending troops. We have confirmed that the Afghan army itself is capable of resisting the rebel forces. And on December 10, I was called back to Moscow, and, one might say, I was insidiously lured out of Kabul by deception. A general from the General Staff calls over a closed connection and says: “Your daughter has applied to the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request to meet with her father, that is, with you. Her request has been granted. You should immediately fly to Moscow. The plane has already been sent for you.” I never returned back to Afghanistan.

***

Now only those of our people remain in the Afghan capital who would, without hesitation, carry out any order from the Center. The “first violins”, undoubtedly, were the representatives of Lubyanka: the adviser to the chairman was General B.S. Ivanov, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) - General V.A. Kirpichenko, head of the KGB representative office in the DRA - General L.P. Bogdanov, resident V.I. Osadchiy. A little later they will be joined by the head of the Department of Illegal Intelligence and Special Operations, General Yu.I. Drozdov. From the Ministry of Defense, the operation was prepared by the new chief military adviser S.K. Magometov, deputy Airborne Forces Commander N.N. Guskov and representative of the General Staff E.S. Kuzmin.

The very “forces and means available in Afghanistan” with which to eliminate the unwanted regime were based in the capital and at the Bagram airbase and consisted of a GRU special forces detachment (the famous “Muslim battalion”), a parachute battalion, KGB special forces groups and about fifty border guards guarding our embassy. True, at the beginning of December another battalion of paratroopers landed.

On December 10, at the board of the Ministry of Defense D.F. Ustinov instructed the General Staff to form a new army group - the future 40th Army or, as it was initially called for camouflage, a “limited contingent.” At the same time, Babrak Karmal and his team, the core of which were the “Parchamists,” were being prepared for the ascension to the throne. A special person from Lubyanka was hastily sent to Czechoslovakia, where Karmal was hiding from the killers of Hafizullah Amin. In November, the entire core of the future new leadership of Afghanistan was brought to Moscow from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Densely surrounded by Soviet comrades - advisers, security guards, cooks, doctors, Amin was actively preparing for his visit to Moscow and the long-awaited meeting with Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. He could not even imagine in his worst nightmare that other Soviet comrades had a completely different idea of ​​the immediate future of the Afghan leader. The verdict had already been passed, and there were only a few hours left before the execution.

History of poisoning

Alexander Lyakhovsky:

It was planned to neutralize Amin and his nephew Asadullah, who headed the KAM security service, with the help of an agent planted in their environment in advance. He had to mix a special agent into their food. They hoped that when it began to operate, panic would arise in the palace, our units would move out of Bagram and quietly do their job. At noon on December 13, the event was held using special equipment. The units were given the command to capture the "Oak" facility (Ark Palace in the center of Kabul, where the residence of the head of state was then). But soon the command “Hang up” followed. The fact is that the poison had no effect on Amin at all, and his nephew felt unwell only the next morning. Asadullah was sent for treatment to the USSR. After the change of power, he first ended up in Lefortovo prison, and then was deported to Afghanistan and shot by the “Parchamists.” As for Amin, experts subsequently explained that the poison was neutralized by Coca-Cola. By the way, when General Bogdanov reported the embarrassment to Andropov, he called his deputy, who was in charge of science and technology, and ordered to urgently correct the matter with these so-called “special means.”

***

Perhaps that failure saved the lives of not only two Afghans, but also many of our officers and soldiers. After all, literally a handful of paratroopers and special forces were aimed at the palace, which was guarded by two thousand selected guardsmen. A telegram was sent to Moscow from representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of Defense that it was impossible to eliminate Amin with the available forces. Military support is required.

B. Karmal and his associates were secretly sent back to the USSR. Until better times. The next attempt was scheduled for December 27.

By that time, Amin had moved to the outskirts of the capital to the Taj Beg Palace, which had just been renovated by the Germans especially for him, standing on the top of a low hill. Our paratroopers, the “Muslim battalion” and special forces were brought up to the palace in advance under the guise of guarding it. Much more forces were provided this time. But the scenario remained the same now: first - poison, then - assault.

Shah Wali,
then member of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs:

On December 27, Amin invited all the country's top leadership to his place for lunch. The formal occasion was the return from Moscow of the Secretary of the Central Committee Panjsheri, who reported that the Soviet comrades had promised to provide extensive military assistance to Afghanistan. At the same time, Amin looked triumphantly at the guests: “Everything is going great. I constantly contact Comrade Gromyko by phone, and we are jointly discussing the issue of how best to formulate information for the world about providing us with military support.” After the second courses, the guests moved to the next room, where the tea table was set. And then the inexplicable happened: almost simultaneously everyone felt bad: people fell off their feet and literally passed out.

A.K. Misak:

I also remember asking Amin worriedly: “Perhaps they slipped something into our food? By the way, who is your cook?” “Don’t worry,” the owner answered. “Both the cook and my guards are Soviet.” But Amin himself also looked very pale. Only Panjsheri looked with surprise at our torment: he was the only one of all who ate almost nothing, because he was on a diet at that time.

Alexander Shkirando,
then the translator is in the group military advisors:

That day I was with the Afghans in the palace. We talked and drank tea. After lunch, on the way out, I meet my housemate Misha Shkvaryuk - he is a military doctor, served as an adviser to the head of the Kabul hospital. "Misha, where are you going?" - “Yes, they invited me to comrade Amin. Something is not good for him.” And with Misha there are two more Soviet doctors and our nurses. They actually saved Amin then: they washed out his stomach, gave him IVs, and administered saline. But this “special medicine,” apparently, somehow affected me: in the evening the temperature rose to 40 degrees, they could barely pump it out. Then I spent more than three months in hospitals.

Colonel General Valery Vostrotin,
then commander of the airborne company:

Somewhere in mid-December, our 9th company, together with the “Muslim battalion,” was transferred closer to the Taj Beg Palace, supposedly to guard Amin. On December 27, General Drozdov from the KGB gathered us. “Amin is a CIA agent,” he said. “Your task is to destroy him and prevent the forces loyal to him from approaching the palace.” They poured us a little vodka. Time "H" was postponed several times. Finally, at 19.30 I heard the signal "Storm-333". We got into combat vehicles and began to move towards the object.

Shah Wali:

At the time of the assault, in addition to the Afghans, there were your doctors, translators, and KGB advisers in the palace who were responsible for Amin’s safety. As far as I know, one doctor was killed. My wife died. Amin's young sons were killed and his daughter was wounded. They killed many more. But all these people, as well as Amin himself and his entourage, could have surrendered without firing a single shot. At night, Kabul radio reported that by decision of the revolutionary court, Amin was sentenced to death and the sentence was carried out. And in the morning I was arrested.

Alexander Lyakhovsky:

The Soviet doctors who were in the palace hid wherever they could. At first they thought that the Mujahideen or supporters of Taraki had attacked. Only later, when they heard Russian obscenities, did they realize that they were acting on their own. The doctors saw Amin walking along the corridor, covered in the reflection of the fire. He was in shorts and a T-shirt, holding bottles of saline solution in his arms, held high, wrapped in tubes, like grenades. The military doctor, Colonel Alekseev, ran out of cover, first of all pulled out the needles, pressed the veins with his fingers to prevent blood from oozing, then led Amin to the bar. But then a child’s cry was heard, and from somewhere in the side room, smearing his tears, the five-year-old son of the Secretary General came out. Seeing his father, he rushed to him and grabbed him by the legs. Amin pressed his head to himself, and the two of them sat down against the wall.

***

Here, at this wall, the dictator met his death. The doctors hid in the conference room. Alekseev survived, but another colonel, Kuznechenkov, was unlucky: some special forces soldier jumped into the hall, fired a blind burst from a machine gun and killed the doctor on the spot.

The battle in the palace lasted 43 minutes. The Zenit and Grom groups lost four killed, the Muslim battalion and paratroopers lost fourteen people. By the way, most of them died due to a misunderstanding: the 103rd Division, which came to help, without understanding the situation, opened fire on its own. It all ended when General Drozdov was told over the radio: “The boss is finished.”

However, everything was just beginning. But we didn't know that yet.

Andrey Alexandrov-Agentov,
then assistant L.I. Brezhnev:

On the morning of December 28, I called Andropov: “Yuri Vladimirovich, how will we respond to the latest requests of the Afghan leadership? What will we answer to Amin?” And he told me: “Which Amin? Karmal has already been there since last night. And our troops are in Kabul.”

The widow Amina and their daughter, after serving several years in a Kabul prison, then left for the USSR. They wanted to live only in this country, which their husband and father idolized so much. The daughter graduated from the Rostov Medical Institute.

The Taj Beg Palace, after its major renovation, housed the headquarters of our 40th Army. Then he suffered greatly during the internecine fighting in Kabul and especially under the Taliban. Now the palace is under the responsibility of Canadian troops, who promise to restore it.

“I wouldn’t like to, but I have to”
Yu. Andropov

Sh The tour of Amin's palace (Dar-ul-aman) was held under the code name “Agate”.
The operation was developed by Department 8 of Directorate “S” (illegal intelligence) of the KGB of the USSR (the head of the department was KGB Major General V.A. Kirpichenko). It was this operation that preceded the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan (Operation Storm-333). Amin was guarded very seriously, but the Alpha team, Zenit and paratroopers destroyed the President of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin and his numerous Afghan guards.

Amin's rise to power occurred after in September 1979, the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on his orders. An illegal, unconstitutional coup took place. Then terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, former supporters of Taraki. The repressions also affected the army.

The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. The KGB received information about Amin's connection with the CIA.

The operation was not decided upon until the end of November, but when Amin demanded that the Soviet ambassador A.M. Puzanov be replaced, KGB Chairman Andropov and Defense Minister Ustinov insisted on the need to replace Amin with a leader more loyal to the USSR.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance (in total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such requests).

At the beginning of December 1979, the “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a GRU special forces detachment, specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan.

Officers of "Grom" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev conducted reconnaissance of the area. Not far from the palace there was a restaurant (casino), where senior officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. It was higher than the palace and from there the Taj Beg was clearly visible. Under the pretext of ordering places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the special forces inspected the approaches and firing points.

The palace is a well-defended structure. Its thick walls were able to withstand artillery strikes. The area around is targeted by tanks and heavy machine guns.

On December 16, an imitation attempt was made on Amin's life. He remained alive, but the security was reinforced by a “Muslim battalion” from the USSR.

On December 25, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. The division also included GRU special forces.

Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, other important facilities in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

Direct supervision of the assault and elimination of Amin was carried out by KGB Colonel Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov. Operation Agat was supervised by the head of Department 8 of the KGB (sabotage and intelligence of foreign special forces units), Vladimir Krasovsky, who flew to Kabul.

The participants in the assault were divided into two groups: “Thunder” - 24 people. (fighters of the Alpha group, commander - deputy chief of the Alpha group M. M. Romanov) and Zenit - 30 people. (officers of the special reserve of the KGB of the USSR, graduates of KUOS; commander - Yakov Fedorovich Semyonov).

The attackers were dressed in Afghan uniforms without insignia with a white bandage on their sleeves. The password for identifying our own people was the shouts “Yasha” - “Misha”.

In order to sound mask the advancing armored personnel carriers, a few days before the assault, not far from the palace, they began to drive a tractor in a circle so that the guards would get used to the noise of the engines.

STORM

Plan "A". On December 27, Amin and his guests were poisoned at dinner. If Amin had died, the operation would have been cancelled. All those poisoned lost consciousness. This was the result of a special KGB event (the main cook of the palace was Mikhail Talibov, an Azerbaijani KGB agent, served by two Soviet waitresses).

The products and juice were immediately sent for examination, and the cooks were detained. A group of Soviet doctors and an Afghan doctor arrived at the palace. Doctors, not aware of the special operation, pumped Amin out.

We started plan "B". At 19:10, a group of Soviet saboteurs in a car approached the hatch of the central distribution center of underground communications communications, drove over it and “stalled out.” While the Afghan sentry was approaching them, a mine was lowered into the hatch and after 5 minutes an explosion occurred, leaving Kabul without telephone communication. This explosion was also the signal for the start of the assault.

Fifteen minutes before the start of the assault, the fighters of one of the groups of the “Muslim” battalion saw that Amin’s guards were on alert, the commander and his deputies were standing in the center of the parade ground, and the personnel were receiving weapons and ammunition. Taking advantage of the situation, the scouts captured the Afghan officers, but the Afghans did not allow them to leave and opened fire to kill them. The scouts accepted the battle. The Afghans lost more than two hundred people killed. Meanwhile, snipers removed the sentries from the tanks dug into the ground near the palace.

At the same time, two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” of the “Muslim” battalion opened fire on Amin’s palace and on the location of the Afghan tank guard battalion (to prevent its personnel from approaching the tanks).

Four armored personnel carriers went to break through, but two vehicles were hit. The density of fire was such that the triplexes on all infantry fighting vehicles were blown apart, and the bulwarks were pierced on every square centimeter.

The special forces were saved by their body armor (although almost all of them were injured) and the skill of the drivers, who brought the cars as close as possible to the doors to the building. Having burst into the palace, the attackers “cleared” floor by floor, using grenades in the premises and firing from machine guns.

Viktor Karpukhin recalls: “I didn’t run up the stairs, I crawled up there, like everyone else. It was simply impossible to run there, and they would have killed me three times if I had run there. Every step there was conquered, much like in the Reichstag. Compare "It's probably possible. We moved from one shelter to another, shot through the entire space around, and then to the next shelter."

In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100 - 150 people) steadfastly and bravely resisted, but the God of War was not on their side.

When Amin learned of the attack on the palace, he ordered his adjutant to inform the Soviet military advisers about it, saying: "The Soviets will help."
When the adjutant reported that it was the Soviets who were attacking, Amin in a rage threw an ashtray at him and shouted “You’re lying, it can’t be!”

Amin himself was shot dead during the storming of the palace. According to the recollections of the participants in the assault, he was lying near the bar in Adidas shorts and a T-shirt (according to other sources, he was taken alive and then shot on orders from Moscow). Also during the assault, his two young sons were killed by stray bullets.

Although a significant part of the soldiers of the security brigade surrendered (in total about 1,700 people were captured), some of the brigade's units continued to resist. In particular, the “Muslim” battalion fought with the remnants of the third battalion of the brigade for another day, after which the Afghans went into the mountains.

Simultaneously with the assault on the Taj Bek Palace by KGB special forces groups with the support of paratroopers of the 345th Parachute Regiment, as well as the 317th and 350th regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, the general headquarters of the Afghan army, a communications center, KHAD buildings and Ministry of Internal Affairs, radio and television. Afghan units stationed in Kabul were blocked (in some places it was necessary to suppress armed resistance).

Amina's palace and the Alpha team return to the USSR after the operation.

During the assault on Taj Beg, 5 KGB special forces officers, 6 people from the “Muslim battalion” and 9 paratroopers were killed. The head of the operation, Colonel Boyarinov, also died (from a stray bullet, when it seemed the danger had passed). Boyarinov seemed to have a presentiment of death; before the operation he was depressed, which was noted by his subordinates. Almost all participants in the operation had injuries of varying severity.

WITH opposite side Kh. Amin, his two young sons and about 200 Afghan guards and military personnel were killed. The wife of Foreign Minister Sh. Vali, who was in the palace, also died. The widow Amina and their daughter, wounded during the assault, after serving several years in a Kabul prison, left for the USSR.

The killed Afghans, including Amin's two young sons, were buried in a mass grave not far from the palace. Amin was buried there, but separately from the others. There was no tombstone placed on the grave.

The KGB operation was included in the textbooks of the intelligence services of many countries around the world. As a result, four servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (one posthumously). In total, about four hundred people were awarded orders and medals.

The Pravda newspaper wrote on December 30 that “as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, together with his henchmen, appeared before a fair people’s court and was executed.”...

Info and photos (C) Internet

“It just so happened that it was I who eliminated Hafizullah Amin...”

“They called us at night, spent the whole night collecting special weapons, preparing for loading... Why we flew to Kabul, I learned from my colleagues in Bagram. They told me about preparations for the assault. There, on the territory of the military airfield, we met ours - Yuri Izotov’s group, under whose protection were Babrak Karmal and other members of the government. They lived there, at the airfield, in caponiers, and everything was arranged so secretly that neither I nor anyone from my group knew about Karmal’s presence. If there had been a leak, Amin's people would have shut them all down. So everything was VERY serious. The jokes are over. Or us - or we...

When we saw the object that was to be taken by two platoons, we immediately became quiet. We were confronted by 200 Amin’s guards, who occupied a well-protected “tough nut.” The palace was taken by the following forces: 500 people (battalion) of the GRU - “Musbat” and KGB special forces. The task of the “musbat” is to carry out external blocking. Some of their fighters also actually sat behind the levers of the combat vehicles - ordinary conscript soldiers, mainly of Tajik and Uzbek nationality. There were 48 of us, KGB special forces soldiers. 24 officers from Grom and 24 from Zenit.

They began to prepare for battle. Over the course of several days, in order to dull the vigilance of the palace guards, we accustomed the guards to the noise of car engines, deliberately drove back and forth at night, and practiced disembarking from infantry fighting vehicles on the move. The guardsmen answered questions with reasoning that they were conducting exercises. 2 days before the assault, we settled into the barracks, changed into the issued uniform of the Afghan army, sewed additional pockets for grenades and magazines on it... We split into groups of five, each carrying 45 kilos of ammunition, and sat in the cars. We - the Grom group - were sitting in infantry fighting vehicles, the Zenit soldiers were in armored personnel carriers. There were nine cars in total. Five for Grom and four for Zenit. On the day of the operation, I was worried and jittery. None of our people had any real experience of military operations... We drank 150 grams. Before boarding the equipment, I went into seclusion to tune in. I said goodbye to my family and loved ones, just in case. One of my commanders, Balashov, teased me just before the jump: “Right now let’s see how saboteurs behave in battle!” This made me angry.

The assault begins at 19.00. Immediately the first car was hit at the very top, before leaving for the upper platform at the Taj Beg. The second “armor” pushed her, and I was riding in the third. In total, the guards burned two of our armored personnel carriers and damaged one infantry fighting vehicle. Perhaps our five were lucky that they managed to “drive the limousine” right up to the porch, almost driving up to the steps! They took out the entrance doors from the BMP turret gun (one second), dismounted (two seconds) and jumped under the visor (another three seconds). I was the first to land. Then we covered the landing (half a minute), then, under fire from the guards, we infiltrated into the palace hall (five minutes, or even less). During the battle, time passed unusually slowly. Every jerk, every throw from column to column, from corner to wall - these seconds, they were so long, my legs didn’t want to move, and I still remember some columns, because I looked at them and thought - I’ll have time to run to cover up?

The fight itself in the hall took another five minutes. It was necessary to act quickly. Swiftly!

In the beginning there was chaos. We were all unfired. When you shoot live at people, and they shoot at you, when you run past your corpses, when you slip on their blood... How many guardsmen did I kill in battle then? I don’t remember, honestly... Maybe five, maybe more... Knowing that our strength was getting smaller every second (we already had killed and seriously wounded), I immediately ran up the main staircase to the second floor. Kolomeets was running after me. Not reaching the top of the flight of stairs two steps, I was forced to lie down: the fire was dense, and grenades fell like cucumbers. Some, however, did not explode... The Afghans with whom we fought were athletic guys, two meters tall, many were trained at the Ryazan Airborne School. One such athlete was removed from “The Fly” by Anisimov before my eyes. He shot from below, from a distance of 15 meters. A tall Afghan machine gunner, sitting on the balcony with a light machine gun, fell with a roar onto the floor of the marble hall. After the fall, he... rose to his full height, walked four meters to the porch, sat down near the column and died there.

I threw a grenade at the door of the Council of Ministers meeting room. It was located to the left of the glass door of the dictator's personal chambers. I didn’t calculate the force of the throw, the grenade hit the wall and bounced towards me. Fortunately, the bracket did not allow it to roll smoothly, and the explosion went into the column. I was only shell-shocked and doused with marble chips. The Kolomeets could not stand the tension and ran downstairs. I don’t blame him, of course, especially since he was wounded in battle. Turning over onto my back, I began shooting while lying down, from bottom to top, at the guardsmen; this duel continued for another half a minute. Then I looked around and realized that on the spot in front of the entrance to the second floor terrace I was left... alone. I continued to shoot until I ran out of ammunition. I immediately found a dead corner where bullets and shrapnel could not reach. Hiding behind the walls and taking advantage of the fact that the rapid-fire Shilka, which was firing from outside, did not allow the guards in this area to stick their heads out, I “tweeted” cartridges into the magazine from the bag. I equipped five or six magazines from the bag, and then Golov, Karpukhin, Berlev and Semenov climbed up the stairs...

So, there were five of us at this door, and we had to act. Move on. Until the guards thought of taking up a perimeter defense and crushed us. I kicked out the glass door and threw a grenade inside. A deafening explosion. Then immediately a wild, heart-rending, piercing female cry of “Amen! Amine! Amen!”, scattered across the corridors and floors. Jumping into the room, the first I saw was Amin’s wife. She sobbed loudly while sitting over the corpse of the dictator. There was no longer any doubt that Hafizullah Amin was dead. He was lying on the floor, wearing only shorts and a T-shirt. He lay on his side, in a pool of his own blood, twisted and somehow small. The room was dark, we shined flashlights and made sure everything was ready. It just so happened that my grenade exploded in the very depths of the small room, killing Amin himself, who was hiding behind his women and children, and wounding his household. I remember that in addition to Amin’s family, in the room we found our nurse from the team of Soviet doctors assigned to the dictator after the attempt to poison him...

If the guards had taken up a perimeter defense and managed to hold out until their fifth arrived tank army, then we would have had a very difficult time, but almost immediately after the liquidation of Amin, his guards began to give up. They were seated in the hall, on the floor, squatting, hands on the back of their heads. And they filled the entire hall and lobby...

To officially identify Amin’s corpse, we invited our Afghan comrades Gulyabzoy and Sarvari, whom I was later ordered to take out of the palace at any cost and deliver to our embassy. It took us three hours to do this. We're tired. Either the BMP stalls, or we get lost. Then, after their speech on Kabul radio, in which they spoke about the “victory of the people over the bloody dictator,” we tinkered with them for three more days until we returned to our location.

The Kabul operation of the KGB special forces entered the history of the world's intelligence services. The history of the department had never known anything like this before. Nevertheless, such was the political will of the leadership of our state. Now I believe that there was no need to go there, to Afghanistan. And now I wouldn't go there. I feel sorry for the Soviet guys who laid down their heads “beyond the river” for ten years, and those who were crippled in a foreign country and then forgotten by our state.

I was decommissioned from the military in 1982 with the rank of senior lieutenant. After my dismissal, I couldn’t find a job for three years. First I went to work at a factory. Again as a welder. Then he got a job in the security service of a hotel. I kept silent about my work in the KGB special forces for twenty years.

I later heard a story that if the assault failed, there was an order to cover the palace itself with “Grad” and everyone who would be there. I don't know if this is true or not. Many of us believe in this. There was also a rumor that the plane we were flying home with was supposed to be shot down. Well, so as not to leave witnesses... On the other hand, why didn’t they shoot it down? And the assault itself, the battle itself with the guards, without clearing, took about forty minutes, an hour at most. But it seemed like an eternity to me. There were few of us. The only advantages of the KGB special forces on the evening of December 27, 1979 were only speed, Russian swearing and luck. I often remember that evening in December. Many of the KGB special forces consider December 27 to be their second birthday.

* * *
“In the hospital we danced with joy that we survived the hell near Kabul...”

Repin Alexander Georgievich, colonel of the KGB of the USSR, work in the KGB - from 1974 to 1998, detective officer as part of the second set of Group “A” since 1978.

At the time when the Kabul epic began, I was in the rank of ensign and I was only 26 years old. I, like most of my colleagues in the Group, was born in peacetime, and I only imagined what war was from films about the Great Patriotic War; I had no combat experience. I was called to the department by alarm. Everyone was gathered in Lenin’s room and it was announced that we were going on a business trip. Each was given a bottle of vodka and a set of equipment: body armor, reinforced ammunition, a machine gun, a pistol. I also received the SVD sniper rifle. We took quite a lot of warm clothes, because the previous shift told us: “The warmth won’t wait for you there.” To tell the truth, the nights in winter in Afghanistan are very cold, and in addition to dressing very warmly, we warmed ourselves up to sleep with vodka. We departed on board Andropov from Chkalovsky, just before departure Seryoga Kuvylin managed to take a photo of us, despite the prohibitions of the special officers. He filmed us later - there, in Bagram and in Musbat. If it weren't for him, there wouldn't be any historical memory about the Kabul operation. I was flying on the plane next to Dima Volkov, who later died in battle, in Kabul. Some of our vodkas were printed on the plane. Before landing, the Tu-154 suddenly turned off all the landing lights. We sat down in complete darkness. A minute before the wheels touched the Bagram takeoff, Romanov commanded everyone: “Charge!” This was the very first sign that something serious was awaiting us. However, they sat down safely, “normally,” as they say.

The next day after our arrival, we went to shoot the weapons. My teacher was Golovatov. He prepared me well. I understood that the entire outcome of the operation could depend on the effectiveness of the sniper. I already knew that in rarefied mountain air a bullet flies along a different trajectory, as if being attracted to the ground, so before work it was necessary to understand what the excess was and make adjustments on the sights. We accomplished this. They settled us in one of the Musbat barracks. The food in the battalion was well organized, and I remember that I slept wonderfully all the nights I spent near Kabul. There was nothing to worry about. When the entire future Politburo of Afghanistan was brought to the Musbat on the evening of December 26, they were not shown to anyone. I had no idea who was being delivered. Everyone was hidden in a separate room, in the most inconspicuous corner of the battalion's location. In addition to the external security of the “musbat” itself, guards were also posted around the perimeter of the room where persons unknown to us were hidden. V. Grishin and I were assigned to guard duty for the night. I remember that it was very cold that night, and we were blackly envious of our employees N. Shvachko and P. Klimov, who locked themselves together with the unknown people from the inside and, as we suspected, drank tea or something stronger with them. So the night passed. The next day, Romanov finally told us that an order had been received to storm the residence of the President of Afghanistan, the Taj Beg Palace, and destroy the “X-Man” who was in the palace. No special political work was carried out, no one was gathered and no lectures were given, but they simply said that “unhealthy forces” were rushing to power in a country friendly to us and we needed to help stop them. Before this, there had already been “quiet” conversations throughout the battalion that we would storm the beautiful palace, located on the mountain, right above us, a 15-minute drive along the serpentine road, and they joked about the topic of assault ladders. We even began to put them together, according to Romanov’s order. Mikhail Mikhailovich also gave instructions to “drive” the equipment so that the palace guards would get used to the noise of military vehicles, and to conduct reconnaissance. I didn’t take all this seriously then, due to my youth. No, I understood that real combat work lay ahead, that it would be necessary to shoot, including at living targets, and I was ready for this. But until the very moment of landing from the infantry fighting vehicle, I had no idea what kind of hell awaited us. On the evening of December 27, we set off for the Taj Beg. I sat furthest out of the car. Together with me were Major Romanov, Captain II Rank Evald Kozlov, G. Tolstikov, E. Mazaev and one of the opposition leaders A. Sarvari - a future member of the Afghan government.

Thirty years have passed. This is now clear to everyone. And then... I had no idea what a barrage of fire would fall on us, and I was completely unprepared for the development of the situation. When landing, I noticed that Kozlov was landing without a bulletproof vest. Now I think that he knew more than us and assumed that we didn’t care... c. I was in armor, wearing a Tigov helmet, armed with a machine gun, a pistol, an RPG-7 and an SVD, which I never took out of the BMP. As soon as we approached the palace, several thousand invisible men armed with hammers surrounded our infantry fighting vehicle and began loudly hammering on the armor. It was a hail of bullets that rained down on us. For several moments we sat in the armor and listened to these “hammers”. Then Romanov gave the command: “To the car!”, and I, obeying the order, pressed the button, opened the hatch and literally fell out onto the asphalt. As soon as I touched the ground, something hit my legs painfully and warm water flowed down my left shin. I didn’t attach any importance to this right away. The body mobilized to complete the task - it was necessary to extinguish enemy firing points and cover their attackers. Zhenya Mazaev and I immediately opened fire from machine guns from behind the parapet at the windows of the palace. It was about 25 meters to the building's porch, and I saw the results of my work. A guardsman fell out of two windows after I fired at them. We worked for about fifteen minutes. Then Romanov again commanded: “To the car!” He decided to jump on his armor to the very porch of the palace. I took a step and suddenly my legs gave out. I sank to my right knee and tried to get up, but neither the right nor the left would listen to me. I shouted to Mazaev: “Zhenya! I can’t go!” Then they left in an infantry fighting vehicle to the main entrance, and I was left alone in an open, shoot-out place, still 25 meters from the palace. I realized that I was seriously wounded by a grenade that exploded right under my feet. Out of anger, I fired all five RPG-7 shots at the windows of the palace, after which I somehow began to hobble towards its walls. I walked on my knees. Everything around was rumbled and crackled. The Shilkas were attacking from behind, and the defenders of Taj-Bek in front. How this hell didn’t kill me, I can’t imagine. I reached the side porch. Gena Kuznetsov was sitting on the steps, also wounded in the legs. He was apparently still seriously shell-shocked, because he spoke inadequately. I knew about the order not to provide assistance to the wounded until the main task was completed and wanted to leave him there and move to the main entrance, but he began to persuade me not to abandon him and help. I started bandaging him. As it turned out later, out of excitement (this was the first time I was treating a real wound), I perfectly bandaged both his wounded and absolutely healthy leg! (The doctors then laughed heartily in the first aid station). Yes, in this hell I was also inadequate...

Imagine: I gave part of my equipped ammunition to a soldier from the “musbat”, who was especially fiercely eager to fight and “watered” the palace, telling everyone that “they, these ones from the palace, killed their brother” and that now he would “tear everyone " I also gave something to Kuznetsov, and I went to recharge myself... to the platform, brightly lit by the palace searchlight. An ideal target - and I didn’t realize the illogicality of my actions! Only after Fedoseev’s loud swearing brought me back to reality, I returned to Gennady and already equipped the stores there, behind the columns. There were still ten meters left to the main entrance, which we - two disabled people, Kuznetsov and Repin - still managed to overcome with little effort. At the very entrance we were met by colleagues from Zenit and said: “Let's row to Emyshev!” Kuznetsov stayed with Petrovich, whose arm was torn off at the very beginning of the battle in the hall, and I hobbled to the main staircase, where I again ran into a delighted Mazaev. He smiled at me and shouted: “And Mikhalych (Romanov) told me that you’re already fucked!” I felt funny too. I thought: “I’ll live a little longer.”

It has already become known that “The Main One” is finished. The guards began to surrender. Romanov ordered me to go to the hospital along with the other wounded - Baev, Fedoseev and Kuznetsov. Together with us was the body of the Soviet doctor Kuznechenkov, who was killed during the assault. On the way, as expected, we got lost and almost drove into the barracks of Amin’s guards. But that is not all. At the entrance to the embassy, ​​we were fired upon by our own paratroopers. Vigorous Russian swearing came to the rescue again! In the Soviet embassy itself, disturbed like a beehive and turned into a temporary medical battalion, everyone was on their ears. The wives of our diplomats cried, looking at the wounded special forces. We were operated on, and the next day we were sent on a special flight to Tashkent.

We celebrated the New Year 1980 in Uzbekistan. We had a good walk then! Local comrades from the KGB department for Uzbekistan provided us with every possible assistance in this, creating all the conditions. And then they let us go! There, in the hospital, my friends and I began to realize WHAT it was! Forgetting about our injuries, we danced with joy that we had survived the December hell near Kabul. Seryoga Kuvylin, not paying attention to his foot, crippled by the BMP tracks, “roasted” the hopak! The next day his leg hurt, but it was nothing... It was funny with Gena Kuznetsov: we rolled him out in a wheelchair into the corridor to set the table in the ward, and forgot about the hungry and sober Gennady! He yelled and knocked at us from the corridor - it was no use! They remembered about him when everyone had already drunk!

Two days later, just before the operation, I fainted in the corridor. He walked and fell. I woke up already on the operating table, where they were supposed to remove the remaining small fragments from my legs. By the way, everything was never deleted. Seven left.

* * *
The ending follows...

Operation Agat was prepared and carried out by the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense. The assault group was dressed in Afghan uniforms without insignia. On the eve of the attack, Amin and his guests were previously poisoned by a KGB agent, the chief cook of the presidential palace, and they even temporarily lost consciousness. The assault on Amin's palace began on the evening of December 27. A mine exploded in a manhole in a sewer system knocked out all telephone communications in Kabul. The assault forces included snipers, armored vehicles, and anti-aircraft guns were operating around the palace. Stormtroopers burst into the building and cleared every floor. Amin did not believe until recently that he was attacked by Soviet “shuravi”. As a result of the assault, Amin was killed and most of his guards were captured. In parallel with the palace, our troops captured the General Staff of the Afghan Army and other objects of strategic importance during the violent overthrow of the government. The new leader of the country, Babrak Karmal, was brought to Kabul, and the Soviet Union officially announced that Moscow’s protege had taken power due to the massive discontent of the Afghan people with the policies pursued by the late Amin.