The Soviet Union is a great socialist power. Figures and facts

The Great Patriotic War ended in victory, which the Soviet people had been seeking for four years. Men fought on the fronts, women worked on collective farms, in military factories - in a word, they provided the rear. However, the euphoria caused by the long-awaited victory was replaced by a feeling of hopelessness. Continuous hard work, hunger, Stalinist repressions, renewed with new strength, - these phenomena darkened the post-war years.

In the history of the USSR the term “cold war” appears. Used in relation to the period of military, ideological and economic confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It begins in 1946, that is, in the post-war years. The USSR emerged victorious from World War II, but, unlike the United States, it had a long road to recovery ahead of it.

Construction

According to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the implementation of which began in the USSR in the post-war years, it was necessary first of all to restore the cities destroyed by fascist troops. More than 1.5 thousand were injured in four years settlements. Young people quickly acquired various construction specialties. However, there was not enough labor - the war claimed the lives of more than 25 million Soviet citizens.

To restore normal work hours, overtime work was canceled. Annual paid holidays were introduced. The working day now lasted eight hours. Peaceful construction in the USSR in the post-war years was headed by the Council of Ministers.

Industry

Plants and factories destroyed during the Second World War were actively restored in the post-war years. In the USSR, by the end of the forties, old enterprises started operating. New ones were also built. The post-war period in the USSR is 1945-1953, that is, it begins after the end of the Second World War. Ends with the death of Stalin.

The recovery of industry after the war occurred rapidly, partly due to the high working capacity Soviet people. Citizens of the USSR were convinced that they had a great life, much better than the Americans, existing under the conditions of decaying capitalism. This was facilitated by the Iron Curtain, which isolated the country culturally and ideologically from the whole world for forty years.

They worked a lot, but their life did not become easier. In the USSR in 1945-1953 there was a rapid development of three industries: missile, radar, and nuclear. Most of the resources were spent on the construction of enterprises that belonged to these areas.

Agriculture

The first post-war years were terrible for the residents. In 1946, the country was gripped by famine caused by destruction and drought. A particularly difficult situation was observed in Ukraine, Moldova, in the right-bank regions of the lower Volga region and in the North Caucasus. New collective farms were created throughout the country.

In order to strengthen the spirit of Soviet citizens, directors commissioned by officials shot a huge number of films telling about happy life collective farmers. These films enjoyed wide popularity, and were watched with admiration even by those who knew what a collective economy really was.

In the villages, people worked from dawn to dawn, while living in poverty. That is why later, in the fifties, young people left villages and went to cities, where life was at least a little easier.

Standard of living

In the post-war years, people suffered from hunger. In 1947 there was, but most goods remained in short supply. Hunger has returned. Prices for ration goods were raised. Nevertheless, over the course of five years, starting in 1948, products gradually became cheaper. This somewhat improved the standard of living of Soviet citizens. In 1952, the price of bread was 39% lower than in 1947, and for milk - 70%.

Availability of essential goods did not make life much easier ordinary people, but, being under the Iron Curtain, most of them easily believed in the illusory idea of best country in the world.

Until 1955, Soviet citizens were convinced that they owed Stalin for victory in the Great Patriotic War. But this situation was not observed throughout the entire region. In those regions that were annexed to the Soviet Union after the war, there were far fewer conscious citizens, for example, in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine, where anti-Soviet organizations appeared in the 40s.

Friendly States

After the end of the war, communists came to power in countries such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR. The USSR established diplomatic relations with these states. At the same time, the conflict with the West has intensified.

According to the 1945 treaty, Transcarpathia was transferred to the USSR. The Soviet-Polish border has changed. After the end of the war, many former citizens of other states, for example Poland, lived in the territory. With this country Soviet Union concluded a population exchange agreement. Poles living in the USSR now had the opportunity to return to their homeland. Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians could leave Poland. It is noteworthy that at the end of the forties, only about 500 thousand people returned to the USSR. To Poland - twice as much.

Criminal situation

In the post-war years in the USSR, law enforcement agencies launched a serious fight against banditry. Crime peaked in 1946. During this year, about 30 thousand armed robberies were recorded.

To combat rampant crime, new employees, as a rule, former front-line soldiers, were accepted into the ranks of the police. It was not so easy to restore peace to Soviet citizens, especially in Ukraine and the Baltic states, where the criminal situation was most depressing. During the Stalin years, a fierce struggle was waged not only against “enemies of the people,” but also against ordinary robbers. From January 1945 to December 1946, more than three and a half thousand gang organizations were liquidated.

Repression

Back in the early twenties, many intellectuals left the country. They knew about the fate of those who did not manage to escape from Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, at the end of the forties, some accepted the offer to return to their homeland. Russian nobles were returning home. But to another country. Many were sent immediately upon their return to Stalin’s camps.

In the post-war years it reached its apogee. Saboteurs, dissidents and other “enemies of the people” were placed in the camps. The fate of the soldiers and officers who found themselves surrounded during the war was sad. At best, they spent several years in camps, until which the cult of Stalin was debunked. But many were shot. In addition, the conditions in the camps were such that only the young and healthy could endure them.

In the post-war years, Marshal Georgy Zhukov became one of the most respected people in the country. His popularity irritated Stalin. However, put behind bars folk hero he didn't dare. Zhukov was known not only in the USSR, but also beyond its borders. The leader knew how to create uncomfortable conditions in other ways. In 1946, the “aviators’ case” was fabricated. Zhukov was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and sent to Odessa. Several generals close to the marshal were arrested.

Culture

In 1946, the struggle against Western influence began. It was expressed in the popularization of domestic culture and the ban on everything foreign. Soviet writers, artists, and directors were persecuted.

In the forties, as already mentioned, a huge number of war films were shot. These paintings were subject to strict censorship. The characters were created according to a template, the plot was built according to a clear pattern. Music was also strictly controlled. They played exclusively compositions praising Stalin and the happy Soviet life. This did not have the best effect on the development of national culture.

The science

The development of genetics began in the thirties. In the post-war period, this science found itself in exile. Trofim Lysenko, a Soviet biologist and agronomist, became the main participant in the attack on geneticists. In August 1948, academicians who made a significant contribution to the development national science, lost the opportunity to engage in research activities.

Completion of the Great Patriotic War became a huge relief for the inhabitants of the USSR, but at the same time it presented a number of urgent tasks to the government of the country. Issues that had been postponed during the war now needed to be resolved urgently. In addition, the authorities needed to provide housing for the demobilized Red Army soldiers, to provide social protection victims of the war and restore destroyed economic facilities in the western USSR.

The first post-war five-year plan (1946–1950) set the goal of restoring pre-war levels of agricultural and industrial production. Distinctive feature recovery of industry was that not all evacuated enterprises returned to the west of the USSR; a significant part of them were rebuilt from scratch. This made it possible to strengthen industry in those regions that before the war did not have a strong industrial base. At the same time, measures were taken to return industrial enterprises to the schedules of peaceful life: the length of the working day was reduced and the number of days off increased. By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, all major industries had achieved pre-war production levels.

Demobilization

Although a small part of the Red Army soldiers returned to their homeland in the summer of 1945, the main wave of demobilization began in February 1946, and the final completion of demobilization occurred in March 1948. It was stipulated that demobilized soldiers would be provided with work for a month. The families of those killed and disabled during the war received special support from the state: their homes were primarily supplied with fuel. However, in general, demobilized soldiers did not have any benefits in comparison with citizens who were in the rear during the war.

Strengthening the repressive apparatus

The apparatus of repression, which flourished in the pre-war years, changed during the war. Intelligence and SMERSH (counterintelligence) played a key role in it. After the war, these structures filtered prisoners of war, ostarbeiters and collaborators returning to the Soviet Union. The NKVD bodies on the territory of the USSR fought organized crime, the level of which increased sharply immediately after the war. However, already in 1947, the security forces of the USSR returned to repressing the civilian population, and at the end of the 50s, the country was shocked by high-profile trials (the doctors' case, the Leningrad case, the Mingrelian case). In the late 40s and early 50s, deportations of “anti-Soviet elements” were carried out from the newly annexed territories of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic states: intelligentsia, large property owners, supporters of the UPA and “Forest Brothers”, representatives of religious minorities.

Foreign policy guidelines

Even during the war years, the future victorious powers laid the foundations of an international structure that would regulate the post-war world order. In 1946, the UN began its work, in which the five most influential states in the world had a blocking vote. The entry of the Soviet Union into the UN Security Council strengthened its geopolitical position.

At the end of the 40s, the foreign policy of the USSR was aimed at creating, strengthening and expanding a bloc of socialist states, which later became known as the socialist camp. The coalition governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia that emerged immediately after the war were replaced by single-party ones, monarchical institutions were eliminated in Bulgaria and Romania, and pro-Soviet governments in East Germany and North Korea proclaimed their own republics. Shortly before this, the communists took control of most of China. USSR attempts to create Soviet republics in Greece and Iran were unsuccessful.

Intra-party struggle

It is believed that in the early 50s, Stalin planned another purge of the highest party apparatus. Shortly before his death, he also reorganized the party's management system. In 1952, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) became known as the CPSU, and the Politburo was replaced by the Presidium of the Central Committee, which did not have the position of General Secretary. Even during Stalin’s lifetime, a confrontation emerged between Beria and Malenkov on the one hand and Voroshilov, Khrushchev and Molotov on the other. The following opinion is widespread among historians: members of both groups realized that the new series of trials was directed primarily against them, and therefore, having learned about Stalin’s illness, they took care that he would not receive the necessary medical care.

Results of the post-war years

In the post-war years, which coincided with last seven During the years of Stalin's life, the Soviet Union transformed from a victorious power into a world power. The USSR government managed to relatively quickly rebuild the national economy, restore state institutions and create a bloc of allied states around itself. At the same time, the repressive apparatus was strengthened, aimed at eradicating dissent and “cleansing” party structures. With the death of Stalin, the process of development of the state underwent dramatic changes. The USSR entered a new era.

After the end of World War II, the course of the history of the Soviet state was influenced by rather complex processes of internal life and especially events related to international factors.

Therefore, in order to more objectively analyze this period, it is advisable to begin the presentation with a description of the international situation of the country in the post-war years.

After World War II, the USSR, which made the main contribution to the defeat of fascism, turned into one of the leading world powers, without which it became impossible to resolve any serious issue of international life. During these years, the USSR had diplomatic relations with more than 50 countries of the world. His international authority steadily grew. At the same time, the situation in the world was completely different from what the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition had planned at the end of the war: two different political lines, two opposite platforms. One of these platforms was defended by the Soviet Union and the countries formed at the end of the war, which were called people's democracies. The second was represented by the United States of America and its allies - England, France, etc. The Soviet Union in the post-war years, although it itself was in great need of many things, provided great assistance in economic development to its allies.

At the end of the 1950s, for example, only under long-term agreements, our country provided assistance to the countries of the socialist community in the construction of more than 620 large industrial facilities and 190 individual workshops and installations. The largest supplies of equipment were carried out to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. In China, with the participation of the USSR, 291 enterprises were built, in Poland - 68, in Romania - 60, in Bulgaria - 45, in North Korea - 30, etc. Without delving further into these subjects, let us return to the first post-war years, when the relations between the two political blocs will worsen.

The development of contradictions between these blocs led to the fact that world history at the end of 1946 it made another zigzag, returning to the track of military-political confrontation. The idea and practice of universal peace, not having had time to establish themselves, began to be actively destroyed by opposing forces.

The United States, which assumed a leadership position as a result of a change in the “balance of power” in the capitalist world, assumed the role of the dominant force in the capitalist world after the war.

The increased economic and military capabilities of the United States as a result of the war instilled confidence in the American ruling circles that both Western and Central and South-Eastern Europe represented a “vacuum of power”, by filling which the United States could secure a leading position in the post-war system of international relations and implement a policy of pressure towards the USSR.

From then on, the so-called cold war between the USSR and the USA and their allies.

The question of emergence and beginning cold war between former allies and especially the question of who or which side is to blame for its outbreak is an extremely important topic. To this day there is no clear answer to these questions. In the extensive literature published in the post-war years and in Lately, we see different interpretations and assessments of who first started the Cold War and what its consequences were. Some authors, including domestic historians, believe that the roots of the Cold War should be sought in the pre-war policies of the former allies, as well as in the events of the end of World War II. Without going into the details of this process, we will try to briefly express our point of view, taking into account the aspect of presentation that we have identified in this chapter. To be extremely objective, it should be noted that the Cold War did not break out suddenly and not out of nowhere. She, apparently, was born in the crucible of World War II. The term “Cold War” was put into circulation in 1947. The concept of the Cold War included a state of political, economic, ideological and other aspects of pronounced confrontation between states, between countries, between two systems. The Cold War gained wide scope after W. Churchill’s speech on March 5, 1946 in Fulton, Missouri (USA), at Westminster College. We must take into account the importance of this speech for understanding the causes of the Cold War, as well as J.V. Stalin’s response to it, published in the newspaper Pravda in mid-March 1946.

Churchill's Fulton speech is considered one of the key moments of the beginning of the Cold War. This speech was coordinated in detail with the White House, primarily with the US President of those years, G. Truman. Moreover, Truman and Churchill arrived in Fulton on the presidential train. The latter personally described Truman's reaction to Churchill's speech in a message to Prime Minister Attlee of England and Foreign Minister Bevin. As Churchill reported, “he (i.e., Truman) told me that the speech, in his opinion, was delightful and would do nothing but good, although it would make noise.” It really made a lot of noise on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, the reaction in the USA itself, in England and in other European countries turned out to be contradictory, revealing the unwillingness at that time to immediately go so far in the Anglo-American counteraction to the USSR. At the same time, the Fulton speech was a serious alarm signal for Stalin, a challenge from his former allies that could not be left unanswered. In his response in Pravda on March 14, 1946, Stalin spoke rather harshly about Churchill’s speech and its possible consequences.

Churchill’s speech resurrected the image of an old enemy, half-forgotten during the war years, and the abstract threat new war acquired a very real face, calling for vigilance and combat readiness. However, it was impossible to go too far. Therefore, in his answer, Stalin carefully measures the ratio of anxiety and confidence, speaks of vigilance and at the same time about endurance. This is how he himself formulated the essence of his address to the country in a May (1946) conversation with Polish leaders: “Churchill’s speech is blackmail. His goal was to intimidate us. That’s why we responded to Churchill’s speech so rudely... Churchill could not be allowed to intimidate our people.”

Speaking about the beginning of the Cold War and its consequences, I would like to cite quite interesting observations and generalizations of famous Russian historians L.A. Bezymensky and V.M. Falin, who tried to give an objective assessment of these processes. Back in the late 1980s. they wrote in the article “Who started the Cold War”: “Today we have the opportunity to reconstruct, day by day and even hour by hour, the chronology of the Truman government’s selection of the seeds of the Cold War, which gave rise to many poisonous shoots. Let us turn to authentic American documents - the diaries of President G. Truman, the “long telegram” of J. Kennan from Moscow to Washington, the developments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and its divisions - the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Joint Military Planning Committee (JMCP) ), as well as the National Security Council (NSC) established in 1947.

October 9, 1945 OKNSH (document 1545) sounds the alarm. The Soviet Union is credited with “the ability to capture all of Europe now or by January 1, 1948,” with “40 divisions.” Together with Europe, it costs Moscow nothing to include Turkey and Iran “in its sphere of influence.” Obedient performers endow the USSR with the potential to reach and cross the Pyrenees with one throw, and in Asia to capture China.

At the same time, the drafters of the memorandum highlight the “weaknesses” of the USSR, emphasizing the lengthy time frame for overcoming them:

“a) Military losses in manpower and industry, a rollback from developed industry (15 years).

• b) Lack of technical forces (5-10 years).
• c) Lack of strategic air forces (5-10 years).
• d) Absence navy(15-20 years old).
• d) Poor condition railways, military transport - systems and equipment (10 years).
• f) Vulnerability of oil sources, vital industrial centers for long-range bombers.
• g) Absence of an atomic bomb (5-10 years, possibly earlier).
• h) Resistance in occupied countries (for 5 years), etc.”

The first document in an extensive series of developments directly aimed against the USSR was a memorandum (of the joint intelligence agency USA) September 3, 1945, i.e. from the day following the official end of World War II.

It would be possible to cite many other facts of similar content, but these are sufficient to make sure who is the main culprit for the outbreak of the Cold War. It marked the beginning of an arms race unprecedented in world history and the creation of two military-political blocs. One more important circumstance of that period should be borne in mind. The American nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 meant the emergence of a superpower in the world that had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This monopoly was liquidated in 1949 by the Soviet Union, which by that time had managed to create its own atomic bomb, and in 1954 - a hydrogen one. However, in the late 1940s - early 1950s. The United States had an arsenal of nuclear weapons, which long time exceeded the nuclear arsenal of the USSR.

The “doctrine of massive retaliation” developed by the United States in 1954 was supposed to ensure not only “containment”, but also the “throwback of communism.” The possibility of using nuclear weapons against the USSR was allowed. And even in 1974, the US military-strategic doctrine allowed for the “conduct of separate nuclear operations” in the event of an escalation of conflict in any region of the world. However, in 1982, NATO members declared that nuclear weapons would only be used in response to an attack.

During the Cold War, the military-strategic doctrine of the USSR was based on the idea that its defensive structure, including strategic weapons, should be built taking into account the impressive military potential of the United States and NATO. For the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, the essence of defensive sufficiency was determined by the need to maintain these forces at such quantitative and qualitative levels as to have reliable means of delivering a retaliatory strike in any conditions, even the most unfavorable ones, in the event of a nuclear attack.

Under the conditions of the Cold War and the economic blockade by the United States and Western countries, in 1949 the Economic Conference of representatives of the people's democracies (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia) decided to create the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In 1950, the German Democratic Republic joined the CMEA, in 1962 - the Mongolian People's Republic, in 1972 - Cuba, in 1978 - the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. For settlements between socialist countries, and then with capitalist states, a clearing system of non-cash payments for goods and services was used, based on the offset of mutual claims. Due to the post-war strengthening of the ruble, as well as growing inflation in Western countries the determination of the ruble exchange rate based on the dollar was stopped and from March 1, 1950, the gold content of the ruble was established.

Under the conditions of the Cold War, competition between two superpowers and two economic strategies began: the United States - with an economic strategy of exporting capital to all countries and the Soviet Union - with an economic strategy of centralized distribution of investments for the development of leading industries.

During the Cold War, the rules of the game in the international arena were simplified to the extreme. The over-ideologization of interstate relations gave rise to a black and white vision of the world, which was clearly divided into “us” and “strangers,” “friends” and “enemies.” Every “win” by the United States was automatically considered a “loss” by the USSR, and vice versa. From the point of view of the main participants in the confrontation, the quintessence of foreign policy wisdom was expressed by the old slogan: “He who is not with us is against us.” In accordance with this logic, each country had to clearly define its place on one side or the other in this global confrontation.

As you know, after the end of World War II, the political map of the world changed significantly. The defeat of fascist regimes and the military defeat of Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan significantly reduced the forces of international reaction. England, France and some other countries emerged from the war noticeably weakened. In Europe, one after another, Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fell away from the capitalist system. In Asia, the peoples of China managed to do this, North Korea and North Vietnam. The population of these 11 states was more than 700 million people.

The victory of the revolution in a number of countries in Europe and Asia led to the emergence on the globe of a very significant group of states with the same type of economic basis - public ownership of the means of production, the same state system, and a single ideology - Marxism-Leninism.

The expansion after World War II of the community of countries that took the socialist path of development did not lead to a weakening of ideology. Most of these countries were also drawn into the orbit of confrontation.

The confrontation between the two systems ultimately led to construction of the "Iron Curtain" the policy of almost complete severance of foreign trade, scientific, technical, cultural, social and personal ties between them.

As a result of the process of political disengagement, many of the agreements adopted at the end of the war and the institutions created to maintain peace and cooperation ceased to operate. Work at the UN on fundamental issues of disarmament and peace was paralyzed.

Western powers, led by the United States, created the military-political organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in 1949. Then successively in 1954 and 1955. two more blocks emerged

(SEATO and SENTO). The United States, Great Britain and France have involved another 25 countries in Europe, the Middle East and Asia in these military groups.

In turn, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Albania signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in May 1955 in Warsaw. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was created.

In the West, the emergence of NATO was explained by the “Soviet threat,” carefully emphasizing the defensive and peacekeeping role of this organization. And in the Soviet Union, not without reason, they believed that it was the formation of the NATO bloc that created a threat to its security and that the creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization in 1955 was only a means of neutralizing this threat.

One of the most important problems that arose in international relations as a result of the Second World War was the “German question”. At the Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2, 1945), the heads of government of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain adopted decisions on the demilitarization of Germany, which stipulated that as the conditions for unconditional surrender and the decisions of the conference were fulfilled, the German people themselves should determine the path of their socio-economic And government structure. To achieve the stated goals, a temporary regime of quadripartite occupation was established in Germany.

However, the United States and other Western powers set a course for the split of Germany. As a result, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed in 1949. After this, in October 1949, another German state was formed in the eastern part of Germany - the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Soon after the death of I.V. Stalin (March 3, 1953), a period of “thaw” began in international relations for some time. In 1955, all foreign troops were withdrawn from Austria, and a peace treaty was concluded with it. In the same year, for the first time in the last 10 years, a meeting was held between the USA and the USSR at top level. And yet this was only the beginning of detente, which was subsequently to gain strength and irreversibility.

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), the dismantling of the “Iron Curtain” began, the most acute manifestations of the Cold War were overcome, and economic, political and cultural ties between the USSR and capitalist countries began to be established.

Nevertheless, conflict situations between the two blocs continued.

The new Soviet leadership, which came to power after Stalin’s death, sought a turnaround, a “thaw” in international relations.

In January 1954, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR was held in Berlin. The range of issues discussed was wide: Indochina, Korea, German problems, collective security in Europe. As Western representatives touted the defensive nature of NATO, the Soviet government put forward a proposal for the possible entry of the Soviet Union into NATO. At the same time, the USSR proposed concluding an agreement on collective security in Europe with US participation. However, all Soviet proposals were rejected by the West.

In July 1955 (10 years after Potsdam), the heads of the great powers - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France - met again in Geneva. The focus of the meeting was on the interconnected German question and the question of European security. But here, too, the Western powers blocked Soviet proposals to conclude a collective security treaty in Europe, continuing to insist on the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany and the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO.

In 1955, the Soviet government decided to return to their homeland all German prisoners of war in the USSR. In September 1955, German Chancellor K. Adenauer arrived in Moscow. As a result, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Germany. West Berlin remained a hotbed of tension in Europe, so in 1958 the USSR proposed declaring it a free city. But this proposal was rejected by the West, as was the Soviet opinion on the need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.

In July 1961, the first meeting of N. S. Khrushchev with the new US President D. Kennedy took place in Vienna. It was decided to establish a direct telephone connection between the Kremlin and the White House. The situation in Berlin has deteriorated again. And then, on August 12, 1961, a concrete wall was erected around West Berlin overnight and border checkpoints were established. This caused even greater tension both in Berlin itself and in the international situation as a whole.

The primary task of the Soviet Union in the foreign policy sphere was the struggle for peace and disarmament. In an effort to reverse the dangerous course of events, the USSR for the period 1956-1960. unilaterally reduced the size of its Armed Forces by

4 million people. In March 1958, the Soviet Union also unilaterally stopped testing all types of nuclear weapons, thereby expressing the hope that other countries would follow its example. However, this manifestation of goodwill did not find a response from the United States and its NATO allies.

In the fall of 1959, the first ever visit of the head of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev to the USA took place. It was agreed with US President D. Eisenhower that the heads of government of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France would meet in May 1960 in Paris. However, this important meeting did not take place. A few days before, a Soviet anti-aircraft missile shot down at an altitude of over 20 km a US U-2 manned spy plane, which was crossing our entire country from south to north along the Ural meridian. The pilot of the plane, Powers, bailed out and was detained at the landing site. Such an unfriendly act on the eve of the summit meeting was regarded by the Soviet side as an attempt to disrupt the meeting, and the USSR refused to participate in it.

Thus, the post-war system created “according to the blueprints” of Yalta and Potsdam was not a European peace order, but a mode of mutual balancing based on the nuclear weapons of the superpowers, the delimitation of the spheres of interest of the USSR and the USA, and the confrontation between the two military-political allied structures of NATO and the Warsaw Department. Western Europe served as an instrument of the American strategy of “containing” the USSR, and Eastern European countries played the role of the “strategic forefield” of the USSR. Therefore, at different stages of post-war history, the results of social transformations did not always coincide with the original plans and intentions. In 1945-1947, when the new order in the countries of people's democracy was just being established, development was carried out in line with the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, and its course was relatively independent.

At the first stage of development of these countries, such factors as national specifics and traditions (preservation of elements of private property, multi-party system) were to some extent ensured. However, later such features were practically reduced to nothing and their presence became more and more formal. For many countries, the chosen development model turned out to be ineffective both politically and economically, which led to a discrepancy between the proclaimed high goals socialism and very modest achievements.

Of all the wealth of practice of socialist construction in the USSR, Eastern European countries ultimately turned not to NEP, but to the theory and politics of the 1930s. - the period of the cult of personality. Therefore, in these countries, serious mistakes were made in promoting industrialization and collectivization; imposing a rigid centralized directive economic mechanism; increasingly widespread administrative-command methods of managing the economy and society as a whole. Authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes everywhere have become an obstacle to the economic and technical progress of their countries, a brake on integration processes within the CMEA framework.

The autumn of 1956 was difficult in the international aspect. The exposure of the personality cult of J.V. Stalin at the 20th Party Congress gave rise to crises in the pro-Stalin leadership of a number of countries in Eastern Europe; caused massive popular movements in Poland and Hungary, where the situation escalated to the extreme.

In the 1960-1970s. The international situation fluctuated first one way and then the other. At times this situation led to clashes and even military action.

The international situation in these years was generally characterized by instability and the growth of a whole group of contradictions that created serious tension.

In the 1970s was still preserved the reality of a nuclear disaster. The buildup of nuclear missile weapons on both sides was becoming uncontrollable.

Western ruling circles, together with the military-industrial complex, set a course for a rapid increase in their military power, trying to create the potential to “contain” the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet leadership took retaliatory measures to increase its military-strategic potential. Using a powerful economic base and advanced advances in science and technology, the USSR and its allies achieved approximate parity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries by the early 1970s. However, the threat of war not only did not recede, but due to the excessive glut of weapons it became more obvious.

The world community has begun to understand that a global nuclear war is fraught with catastrophic, unpredictable consequences, and therefore the policy of confrontation is becoming an unacceptable risk in the nuclear age.

In such a situation, the leadership of the USSR and the USA took a step towards some agreements in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, partially improve the international situation. The Soviet Union and the United States signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War (1971), which supplemented the previously reached agreement on establishing a direct line of communication between Moscow and Washington, London and Paris, which together was supposed to reduce the risk of accidental (unauthorized) the outbreak of nuclear war.

Despite the measures taken, international tension remained.

The Soviet leadership, without radically changing its foreign policy course, sought to achieve a turn away from the Cold War, from tension in the international situation to détente and cooperation.

During these years, the Soviet Union made over 150 different proposals aimed at ensuring international security, ending the arms race and disarmament. They created the appropriate political atmosphere. However, many of them could not be implemented then. The arms buildup continued unabated, despite the nuclear testing treaty and closer contacts between the superpowers after the Cuban crisis. The USSR hoped to reduce the US's large advantage in strategic missiles. Between 1960 and 1980, expenditures on weapons of the two blocs increased almost fivefold, although there were already more than enough weapons to completely and repeatedly destroy humanity. At the same time, arms exports to third world countries tripled. By 1970, the destructive power of the superpowers was approximately 1 million times greater than the two bombs dropped on Japan. For every person on Earth there were 15 tons of explosives. Research has also shown that in the event of a nuclear war, the sun's rays would not be able to penetrate the dark clouds and radioactive dust, and thus a “nuclear night” would destroy all life on earth. The only hope was that the superpowers would understand: in a nuclear war there would be no winners and it would become collective suicide. This way of thinking is called “mutual destruction”, or “balance of terror”.

With the advent of intercontinental missiles, the relative strategic invulnerability of the United States is irrevocably a thing of the past. As the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Yu. Kvitsinsky noted, already at the beginning of 1960, the Minister of Defense in the Eisenhower government, Gates, speaking before a congressional commission, was forced to admit that the United States did not have protection from our intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads, and the commander of the strategic US aviation General Power stated that the USSR “could actually wipe out our entire impact force within 30 minutes." Thus, the US plans to transform the territory of the USSR into a “lunar landscape” with impunity became pointless.

Seeing that the Soviet Union began to commission dozens and hundreds of new launchers for its strategic missiles, the Americans were forced to offer the USSR negotiations on a comprehensive limitation and reduction of both delivery systems for offensive strategic weapons and defense systems against ballistic missiles. Such negotiations began in November 1969 in Helsinki, and the resulting treaty became SALT I. The USSR very quickly created its own warheads. In 1979, a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was signed in Vienna, based on the principles of equality and equal security, which paved the way for significant reductions in strategic weapons.

Despite the military-political confrontation between the two systems, the strengthening of detente and adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence are gradually becoming a trend against thermonuclear war. In practice, its result was the signing between the USSR and the USA of an indefinite Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973).

Soviet-American relations began to change, which gave rise to an improvement in the international climate. Great efforts had to be made to convene a pan-European Security Conference. The leaders of 33 European countries, the USA and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference in Helsinki (August 1975). Its signing 30 years after the end of World War II established the principles of the inviolability of borders in Europe; respect for the independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity of states; renunciation of the use of force and the threat of its use; non-interference in each other's internal affairs, which became the international legal basis for overcoming the Cold War.

Somewhat earlier (1971), the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France concluded a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, recognizing it as an independent city. The borders of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia were recognized as inviolable.

In 1973, an agreement was concluded to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam. Through joint efforts, we managed to eliminate the most dangerous source of international tension in Southeast Asia.

The emerging light in international detente and changes in political map world was affected by the fact that the ruling circles in the West called for a “freeze” of relations with the Soviet Union and for a more “tough course” towards it in order to once again restrain the advance of “communism”. Influential forces in the West began to focus on continuing the arms race in the hope of wearing down the USSR and other socialist countries and regaining lost military superiority.

In general, the first half of the 1970s. showed the possibility of mitigation international situation, strengthening relations of peaceful coexistence between states with different political systems, including the development of cooperation between them. At the same time, it also revealed that if the status quo is violated, especially in the political sphere, relations between the USSR and the USA immediately worsen. Therefore, the consequence of this is another round of the arms race.

The confrontation intensified sharply due to the deployment of troops Soviet troops to Afghanistan in December 1979. The political leadership dragged the Soviet Union into extremely difficult conflict situation, which entailed great sacrifices at both sides. The majority of UN member countries not only did not support this action, but also demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The further course of events led to a worsening of the international situation. In response to the deployment of American missiles in Europe, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. A new stage of the arms race began, as a result of which Europe found itself in the role of a hostage.

The Soviet leadership once again began to put forward peace proposals. They were supposed to implement confidence-building measures in Europe and Asia, resolve the conflict around Afghanistan, limit and reduce strategic weapons and, as a first step, introduce a mutual moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

However, the proposals put forward by the Soviet leadership were not successful.

In 1983, the United States began placing its missiles in Western Europe. The Soviet Union took similar actions, which required additional material costs. The increase in arms spending in socialist countries met with a far from ambiguous response.

Confrontational relations also developed with China during these years. In February 1979, China took military action against Vietnam. The Soviet Union declared that it would fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Cooperation of the USSR with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The general situation in the world and the situation in socialist-oriented countries left their mark on their relationship.

Some socialist countries tried to get out of this situation on their own, focusing on Western states. The situation was getting worse. Attempts were made to intensify cooperation between socialist countries, primarily in the economic, scientific and technical fields. A qualitatively new task was outlined: to turn the current decade into a period of intensive industrial, scientific and technical cooperation.

Based on this, in 1985, the Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA member countries until the year 2000 was adopted. The solution to this program was, in the opinion of its authors, to help strengthen the position of socialism in the world community. But, as practice has shown, approximately 1/3 of the program did not meet the requirements of the world level of development of science and technology. The program in its initial implementation turned out to be not one that could bring about scientific and technological progress.

The post-war USSR has always attracted the attention of specialists and readers interested in the past of our country. Victory Soviet people in the most terrible war in the history of mankind has become finest hour Russia of the twentieth century. But at the same time, it also became an important milestone, marking the onset of a new era - the era of post-war development.

It so happened that the first post-war years (May 1945 - March 1953) turned out to be “deprived” in Soviet historiography. In the first post-war years, a few works appeared extolling the peaceful creative work of the Soviet people during the Fourth Five-Year Plan, but naturally did not reveal the essence of even this side of the socio-economic and political history Soviet society. After Stalin’s death in March 1953 and the subsequent wave of criticism of the “cult of personality,” even this plot turned out to be exhausted and soon forgotten. As for the relationship between government and society, the development of a post-war socio-economic and political course, innovations and dogmas in foreign policy, these topics were never developed in Soviet historiography. In subsequent years, the plots of the first post-war years were reflected only in the multi-volume “History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union”, and even then fragmentarily, from the point of view of the concept of “restoring what was destroyed by the war.” National economy countries".

Only at the end of the 80s. publicists, and then historians, turned to this complex and short period history of the country in order to look at it in a new way, to try to understand its specifics. However, the lack of archival sources, as well as the “revelatory” attitude, led to the fact that the place of one half-truth was very soon taken by another.

As for the study of the Cold War and its consequences for Soviet society, these problems were not raised during that period.

A breakthrough in the study of the post-war USSR came in the 90s, when archival funds became available higher authorities state power, and, most importantly, many documents of the highest party leadership. Opening materials and documents on history foreign policy The USSR led to the appearance of a series of publications on the history of the Cold War.

In 1994, G. M. Adibekov published a monograph devoted to the history of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties (Cominform) and its role in the political development of Eastern European countries in the early post-war years.

In the collection of articles prepared by scientists from the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Cold War: New Approaches. New Documents” developed such new topics for researchers as the Soviet reaction to the “Marshall Plan”, the evolution of Soviet policy on the German question in the 40s, and the “Iranian crisis” of 1945–1946. etc. All of them were written on the basis of the latest documentary sources identified in previously closed party archives.

In the same year, a collection of articles prepared by the Institute was published. Russian history RAS "Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War (1945–1985): A new reading." In it, along with the disclosure of private aspects of the history of the Cold War, articles were published that revealed the doctrinal foundations of Soviet foreign policy in these years, clarified the international consequences of the Korean War, and traced the features of the party leadership foreign policy THE USSR.

At the same time, a collection of articles “USSR and the Cold War” appeared under the reaction of V. S. Lelchuk and E. I. Pivovar, in which for the first time the consequences of the Cold War were studied not only from the point of view of the foreign policy of the USSR and the West, but also in connection with the influence that this confrontation had on the internal processes taking place in the Soviet country: the evolution power structures, development of industry and agriculture, Soviet society, etc.

Of interest is the work of the author’s team, combined in the book “Soviet Society: Emergence, Development, Historical Finale” edited by Yu. N. Afanasyev and V. S. Lelchuk. It examines various aspects of external and domestic policy USSR in the post-war period. It can be stated that the understanding of many issues was carried out here at a fairly high research level. The understanding of the development of the military-industrial complex and the specifics of the ideological functioning of power have made significant progress.

In 1996, a monograph by V.F. Zima was published, dedicated to the origin and consequences of the famine in the USSR in 1946–1947. It also reflected various aspects of the socio-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership of the USSR in the first post-war years.

An important contribution to the study of the formation and functioning of the Soviet military-industrial complex, its place and role in the system of relationships between government and society was made by N. S. Simonov, who prepared the most complete monograph on this issue to date. He shows in it the growing role of “military production commanders” in the system of power in the USSR in the post-war period, and identifies priority areas for the growth of military production during this period.

Leading specialist in the field of complex analysis economic development USSR in the post-war years and developments public policy V.P. Popov showed himself in this area during these years, publishing a series of interesting articles, as well as a collection of documentary materials that were highly appreciated by the scientific community. The summary result of his many years of work was a doctoral dissertation and a monograph on these issues.

In 1998, the monograph by R. G. Pikhoi “The Soviet Union: the history of power” was published. 1945–1991." In it, the author, using unique documents, shows the features of the evolution of government institutions in the first post-war years, asserts that the system of power that emerged in these years can be considered as a classic Soviet (or Stalinist).

E. Yu. Zubkova has established herself as a well-known specialist in the history of the reform of Soviet society in the first post-war decades. The fruit of her many years of work studying the moods and everyday life of people was her doctoral dissertation and monograph “Post-war Soviet society: politics and everyday life. 1945–1953."

Despite the publication of the listed works over the last decade, it should be recognized that the development of the history of the first post-war years of Soviet society is just beginning. Moreover, there is still no single conceptually homogeneous historical work in which comprehensive analysis accumulated historical sources across the entire spectrum of socio-economic, socio-political, foreign policy history of Soviet society in the first post-war years.

What sources became available to historians in last years?

Some researchers (including the authors of this monograph) got the opportunity to work in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (formerly the archive of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee). It contains a wealth of material on all aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state and its top leadership, as well as the personal funds of the leaders of the CPSU. Notes from members of the Politburo on specific issues of economic development, foreign policy, etc. make it possible to trace around what problems of post-war development disputes flared up in the leadership, what solutions to certain problems were proposed by them.

Of particular value are the documents from J.V. Stalin’s personal fund, which include not only his correspondence, but also all the major decisions of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers of the USSR - the key institutions of state power. The authors studied the history of the leader’s illness, which sheds light on pages of the history of power and political struggle in the highest spheres of party and state leadership in the early post-war years that were inaccessible to researchers.

In the State Archive Russian Federation(GARF) the authors studied documents of the highest bodies of state power - the Council People's Commissars(Council of Ministers) of the USSR, a number of ministries. Great assistance in the work on the monograph was provided by documents from the “special folders” of I. V. Stalin, L. P. Beria, V. M. Molotov, N. S. Khrushchev, which contain particularly important materials on issues of domestic and foreign policy.

In Russian state archive socio-political history (RGASPI), the authors studied numerous files with the protocols of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, and a number of departments (f. 17). A special place was occupied by documents from the funds of I. V. Stalin (f. 558), A. A. Zhdanov (f. 77), V. M. Molotov (f. 82), G. M. Malenkov (f. 83), containing unique documents and materials on key issues of domestic and foreign policy.

A special place was occupied by the documents of Stalin’s correspondence with the top party leadership during his vacations of 1945–1951. It is these documents and working materials for them that make it possible to trace what has so far been inaccessible to researchers - the mechanisms for making key political decisions in matters of domestic and foreign policy.

The memoirs of participants in the events of those years - V. M. Molotov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. S. Khrushchev, S. I. Alliluyeva, I. S. Konev, A. G. Malenkov, had great food for thought and the author’s analysis. S. L. Beria, P. K. Ponomarenko, N. S. Patolicheva and others.

The authors believe that the conclusion, traditional for the literature of previous years, that the main content of the first post-war period was “the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR during the Fourth Five-Year Plan” is methodologically unjustified. The main thing was something else - the stabilization of the political regime, which during the war years managed not only to survive, but also to noticeably strengthen. At the same time, the absence of legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of supreme power inevitably led to an intensification of the struggle for power between various groups and specific individuals. This is especially clearly visible during the period under study, when the aging leader increasingly sent his former favorites into disgrace and promoted new ones. Therefore, when studying the mechanisms of power in 1945–1953. We proceeded from the fact that, along with constitutional and statutory bodies, it is necessary to carefully study those that were not officially specified anywhere, but played a key role in making the most important decisions. These were the “fives,” “sevens,” and “nines” within the Politburo in 1945–1952. and the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee in 1952–1953. On specific examples and the documents in the monograph show how and why changes occurred in the country's leadership in 1946–1949, what can explain the rapid rise and no less rapid fall of the “Leningrad group”, what are the reasons for the unsinkability of the Malenkov-Beria tandem. Based on the documents studied, the authors argue that only Stalin’s death stopped a new wave of changes in top leadership in the spring of 1953. The circumstances of Stalin’s last illness and death raise even more questions, which the book also gives a fundamentally new assessment on the basis of previously completely closed documents.

The monograph provides a detailed description of the USSR's position in the world that changed after the war. The authors depart from the traditional assessment of previous publications, according to which the West was responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War. At the same time, they do not share the positions of those historians who place responsibility for the many years of confrontation solely on the Stalinist leadership of the country. Documents show that the origins of the Cold War lie in the fundamentally different national interests of the USSR and Western countries, which took shape back in the final stage Second World War. The divergence of Allied positions was inevitable. It could only have other forms.

The monograph notes that the turning point in East-West relations was 1947, after which the focus on military force in relations between former allies became the main instrument of policy. Stalin, who launched a war in the late 40s, did not rule out a new war with the West (this time with the USA). large-scale military training for the coming collision.

The development of the country's economy was also subordinated to this main vector. The over-militarization of almost all sectors of the economy could not but lead to increased disproportions in its development, and in the long term - to the collapse of the Soviet economic system based on non-economic coercion.

At the same time, the entire second half of the 40s. passed under the sign of economic discussions and disputes in scientific circles and in the country's leadership on the issue of ways and direction of economic development. It was not excluded limited use material incentives to work. True, it should be noted that the use of market levers throughout Soviet history was never of a strategic nature. They began to be used in conditions when the traditional Soviet economic model did not provide the required returns, and as the commodity market became saturated, they were just as quickly phased out. The first post-war period was no exception. The emphasis planned by N.A. Voznesensky on light and food industry, rather than heavy industry, never took place (although, as follows from the documents, Voznesensky’s opponents, Malenkov and others, also agreed with this approach, and later adopted this strategically correct slogan ).

The monograph shows that the stabilization of power during the war raised the question of the role and purpose of official ideology in a different way, in which a certain shift in emphasis has been noted. Public sentiment associated with the expectation of changes for the better has also changed significantly.

this work, of course, does not pretend to reflect all the diversity of materials and points of view available today on the post-war USSR. Each of the subjects and directions raised in it can become the topic of a specific special historical study.

We express gratitude for the help to the archive workers - S. V. Mironenko, T. G. Tomilina, K. M. Anderson, G. V. Gorskaya, V. A. Lebedev, A. P. Sidorenko, N. A. Sidorov and etc. We are very grateful for the useful and qualified advice that influenced our work on the book from famous scientists - A. O. Chubaryan, V. S. Lelchuk, N. B. Bikkenin.

On May 8, 1945, in the Berlin suburb of Karshorst, the act of unconditional surrender of Germany was signed. Second World War ended. The Third Reich fell under attack Soviet army and Anglo-American troops, who simultaneously launched an offensive from the East and West. Italians, French, Germans, Poles and Belgians celebrated the victory over fascism.

Most Europeans had only a vague idea of ​​what the post-war world would be like. The Second World War, which lasted 6 years, became the most destructive in human history. More than sixty countries with a population of 1.7 billion people were drawn into it. About 100 million people were put under arms. In Europe, industry worked overtime to meet military needs. During the war years, about 653,000 aircraft, 287,000 tanks, and 1.041 million guns were produced in Germany, England, the USA and the USSR.

The United States played a role in the war effort against Nazi Germany in Western Front. Now Washington was preparing to take the lead in creating a new Europe. Thanks to military supplies and loans, the United States not only received high profits, but also managed to make many countries dependent on economic aid.

Two months after the defeat fascist Germany An event occurred in the world that radically changed the entire system of international relations. On August 6 and 9, 1945, American heavy bombers dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The use of nuclear weapons was a brutal revenge for Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and a stern warning to potential US adversaries.

The USSR's response was not long in coming: Soviet scientists accelerated work on the creation of an atomic bomb. A hitherto unheard of arms race began. In the event of a direct military conflict between the USA and the USSR with the use of atomic weapons, the consequences for all life on earth could be catastrophic. The impossibility of open war forced both sides to look for other methods of struggle for world domination.

A direct consequence of the confrontation between the two systems was the disintegration of Germany into two states - the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany for many decades turned into a huge military base for the US and its allies. The USSR controlled the domestic and foreign policy of the GDR, providing it with significant and often disinterested economic support. In essence, neither America nor the Soviet Union ever aimed at complete mutual destruction. The creation of a new world order was based on what had been known since the time Ancient Rome principle of “divide and conquer”.

As is known, the Truman Doctrine laid the foundation for the new foreign policy of the United States. On March 12, 1947, US President Harry Truman delivered his now famous speech at a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives. Note that this happened shortly after Stalin’s refusal to join the Bretton Woods agreement, according to which the dollar became the world reserve currency, replacing gold and consolidating the global economic dictatorship of the United States.

The main points put forward by Truman were as follows: “The United States must support free peoples who are resisting the aggression of an armed minority or outside pressure... I believe that our assistance should be primarily economic and financial, which will lead to economic stability and thus provide its influence on political processes." In essence, the Truman Doctrine turned out to be relevant for American foreign policy in the new 21st century.

In the post-war years, Washington skillfully used economic leverage over Europe in order to strengthen its military-political influence on the continent. On June 5, 1947, US Secretary of State J. C. Marshall, during a speech at Harvard University, proposed European states a new program for reconstruction and development after World War II with the help of American money. France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and a number of other countries agreed to take part in the Marshall Plan.