From the Caucasus to Berlin, Otar Chechelashvili from an early age watched the flights of mountain eagles and envied their ability to soar in the sky for a long time. “How can a person gain wings?” the boy thought. When Otar grew up, he gained wings and learned to fly. First at the flying club. Then within the walls

The main staircase to the Reichstag. There are 15 victory rings on the barrel of a broken anti-aircraft gun. In 1954, the damaged Reichstag dome was demolished because it could spontaneously collapse. In 1995, work began on the construction of a new dome. Today, to take a walk in the new glass dome, tourists line up no less than the line that once was at the Lenin Mausoleum.

In February 1945, Hitler declared Berlin a fortress, and already in April, Nazi propaganda stated that Festung Berlin was the culmination of the fighting on the eastern front and should become a mighty bastion against which a furious wave of Soviet troops would crash. Soviet historiography liked this statement about “Fortress Berlin” so much that it enthusiastically picked it up, multiplied it and formed the basis of the official version of the storming of the capital of the Third Reich. But this is propaganda and pathos, and the real picture looked somewhat different.

Theoretically, the assault on Berlin could take place from two opposite directions: from the West - by the Allied forces and from the east - by the Red Army. This option was the most inconvenient for the Germans, because it would require dispersing troops in different directions. However, in the hands of the German leadership there was a top secret Allied plan - "Eclipse" ("Iclipse" - eclipse). According to this plan, all of Germany had already been divided in advance by the leadership of the USSR, England and the USA into occupation zones. The clear boundaries on the map indicated that Berlin was falling into the Soviet zone and that the Americans were to stop at the Elbe. Based on the captured plan, the German command could have strengthened its positions on the Oder with troops from the west, but this was not done adequately. Contrary to the popular version, the troops of Wenck's 12th A did not actually turn their backs on the Americans and did not completely expose their defenses in the west, until the Fuhrer's order of April 22, 1945. Keitel recalled: “For several days in a row, Heinrici insistently demanded that Steiner’s SS tank group and, in particular, Holste’s corps be subordinated to him to cover the southern flank. Jodl was categorically against it, rightly objecting to Heinrici that he could not ensure the protection of his flanks due to the rear cover of Wenck’s army.” But these are particularities, and the most blatant example of Hitler’s tactical recklessness is the transfer of the bulk of troops from the Ardennes not to the Oder, where the fate of Berlin and Germany was decided, but to a secondary site in Hungary. The looming threat to Berlin was simply ignored.

The total area of ​​Berlin was 88,000 hectares. The length from west to east is up to 45 km, from north to south - more than 38 km. Only 15 percent was built up, the rest of the space was occupied by parks and gardens. The city was divided into 20 districts, of which 14 were external. The inner part of the capital was most densely built up. The districts were divided among themselves by large parks (Tiergarten, Jungfernheide, Treptower Park and others) with a total area of ​​131.2 hectares. The Spree River flows through Berlin from southeast to northwest. There was a developed network of canals, especially in the northwestern and southern parts of the city, often with stone banks.

The general layout of the city was distinguished by straight lines. The streets, intersecting at right angles, formed many squares. The average width of the streets is 20-30 m. The buildings are stone and concrete, the average height is 4-5 floors. By the beginning of the storm, a significant portion of the buildings had been destroyed by bombing. The city had up to 30 train stations and dozens of factories. The largest industrial enterprises were located in the outer regions. The ring railway passed through the city.

The length of metro lines is up to 80 km. Subway lines were shallow, often going outside and running along overpasses. At the beginning of the war, 4.5 million people lived in Berlin, but massive bombing carried out by the Allies in 1943 forced an evacuation, reducing the population to 2.5 million. The exact number of civilians in the capital at the start of urban fighting is impossible to determine. Many Berliners evacuated to the east of the city returned home as the Soviet army approached, and there were also many refugees in the capital. On the eve of the battle for Berlin, the authorities did not call on the local population to evacuate, since the country was already overcrowded with millions of refugees. Nevertheless, everyone who was not employed in production or in the Volkssturm could freely leave. The number of civilian population in different sources ranges from 1.2 million to 3.5 million people. Probably the most accurate figure is around 3 million.

Commandant of the Defense of Berlin, Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann (in a trench)

In the winter of 1945, the tasks of the Berlin defense headquarters were concurrently carried out by the headquarters of Wehrkeis III - 3rd Corps District, and only in March did Berlin finally have its own defense headquarters. As commander of the defense of the capital, General Bruno Ritter von Haonschild was replaced by Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann, his chief of staff was Oberst Hans Refior, the head of the operational department was Major Sprotte, the chief of supply was Major Weiss, the chief of artillery was Oberstleutnanat Plateau, the chief of communications was Oberstleutnant Ericke, Chief of Engineering Support - Oberst Lobeck. Propaganda Minister Goebbels received the post of Reich Commissioner for Defense of Berlin. Strained relations immediately developed between Goebbels and Reimann, because Dr. Joseph unsuccessfully tried to subjugate the military command. General Reiman repelled the civil minister's attempts to command, but made himself an influential enemy. On March 9, 1945, a plan for the defense of Berlin finally appeared. The author of the very vague 35-page plan was Major Sprott. It was envisaged that the city would be divided into 9 sectors named from “A” to “H” and diverging clockwise from the ninth, central sector “Citadel”, where government buildings were located. The citadel was supposed to be covered by two defense areas "Ost" - around Alexanderplatz and "West" - around the so-called Kni (Ernst-Reuther-Platz area). Oberst Lobeck was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying out defensive engineering work under the direction of the Reich Defense Commissioner. Quickly realizing that one engineering battalion could not build much, the command consulted with Goebbels and received assistance from 2 Volkssturm battalions, specially trained for construction work, and most importantly, workers from the civil construction organization "Todt" and the Reichsarneitsdienst (Labor Service). The latter turned out to be the most valuable help because they were the only ones who had the required equipment. Military engineers and engineering departments were sent to sector commanders for specific work.

Fortification work in the Berlin direction began back in February 1945, when a Soviet breakthrough to the capital was looming. However, contrary to all logic, fortification activities were soon curtailed! Hitler decided that since the Red Army did not dare to march on the weakly defended capital, the Soviet troops were completely exhausted and would not be able to carry out large-scale operations in the near future. While the Soviets were intensively building up their strike forces, the OKW and OKH leadership remained in blissful inaction, expressing solidarity with the Fuhrer. Engineering and defense work was restarted only at the very end of March, when the main human and material potential was already involved in the Battle of the Oder, where the German front in the east finally collapsed.

To build a large-scale fortification system around and inside one of the largest cities in Europe, a clear organization and understanding of who is in charge of the construction, who is responsible for the planning and who is building was required. There was complete chaos in this matter. Formally, the defense of Berlin was the responsibility of the Commissar of Defense of Reich and also the Commissar of Defense of Berlin and at the same time the Minister of Information and Propaganda - a civilian, Dr. Goebbels, but in reality the defense of the capital was up to the military, who was represented by the military commandant of Berlin, General Reimann. The general rightly believed that since it was he who would lead the defense, it was he who should be responsible for the construction of fortifications, on which he would have to fight tomorrow. Goebbels had a different opinion. Here a dangerous dualism of influences arose. The ambitious Goebbels was too zealous about his position and tried too actively to dominate the army. The army men, seeing the complete incompetence of the Minister of Propaganda, tried to protect their independence from civilian encroachments. They already had a gloomy example when SS Reichsführer Himmler decided to command Army Group Vistula from January 24, 1945, and this despite the fact that Reichsführer cannot be called civilian. When collapse was imminent, on March 20, 1945, Himmler urgently handed over the reins of the army group to Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici and happily washed his hands of it. In Berlin the stakes were higher. A paradoxical situation arose - 10 kilometers from Berlin, the military could build anything they wanted, but mostly on their own. And inside the 10-kilometer zone and in the capital itself, construction was subordinated to Goebbels. The irony is that Goebbels had to build reserve positions precisely for the military, with whom he was not particularly willing to consult. As a result, fortifications around and in the capital itself were built completely incompetently, without the slightest understanding of tactical requirements, and their poor quality is worthy of special mention. Moreover, materials and personnel of combat units were taken for useless construction, but the military was involved as workers, and not as the main customer. For example, many anti-tank obstacles were erected around the city, which were of little use or even interfered with the movement of their own troops, and therefore required their destruction.

The Nazis optimistically planned to recruit up to 100,000 people for defensive work, but in reality the daily number barely reached 30,000 and only once reached 70,000. In Berlin, enterprises that also required workers continued to operate until the last moment. In addition, it was necessary to provide daily transportation for tens of thousands of workers involved in the construction of defensive lines. The railway around the capital was overloaded, subjected to powerful air raids and operated intermittently. When the work site was far from the railroad tracks, people had to be transported by buses and trucks, but there was no gasoline for this. To overcome the situation, local residents of nearby settlements were involved in the construction of remote borders, but they could not always provide the required number of workers for large-scale work. In the beginning, excavators were used for earth-moving work, but fuel shortages quickly forced the abandonment of mechanized labor. Most workers generally had to bring their own tools. The shortage of entrenching tools forced the authorities to publish desperate calls in newspapers for the population to help with shovels and picks. And the population showed amazing affection for their shovels and did not want to give them up. Desperate haste and a shortage of building materials soon forced people to abandon the construction of reinforced concrete structures. Mines and barbed wire were available in very limited quantities. In any case, there was no longer any energy or time left for large-scale work.

The defenders of Berlin also had problems with ammunition. At the beginning of the urban fighting in Berlin there were three large ammunition depots - the March warehouse in the Volkspark Hasenheide (southern sector of Berlin), the Mars warehouse in Grunewald Park on Teufelssee (western sector) and the Monika warehouse in the Volkspark Jungfernheide (northwestern sector). When the fighting began, these warehouses were 80% full. A small amount of ammunition was stored in a warehouse in the Tiergarten park area. When the threat of a Soviet breakthrough from the north arose, two-thirds of the Monica warehouse's supplies were transported by horse-drawn transport to the Mars warehouse. However, on April 25, disaster struck - the Marta and Mars warehouses fell to the Soviet troops. Initially, there was confusion among the defense leadership about the warehouses; for example, the chief of artillery at Reiman’s headquarters had not even heard of them. Reiman's main mistake was that instead of many small warehouses in the city itself, they organized three large warehouses in the outer sectors, where they quickly fell to the enemy. Perhaps Reiman was afraid that his superiors would take away the ammunition from him in favor of other troops and therefore did not advertise this issue even at his headquarters, preferring to stock up outside the city, away from the eyes of his superiors. Reiman had something to fear - he was already deprived of troops and robbed like a stick. Later, the warehouses would probably go to the 56th Tank Corps when it retreated to the city. On April 22, 1945, Hitler removed Reimann from his post as commander of the Berlin Defense Region, which added to the general confusion. As a result, the entire defense of Berlin took place in conditions of a severe shortage of ammunition among its defenders.

The defenders also couldn’t boast of food. In the Berlin area there were civilian food warehouses and Wehrmacht warehouses. However, the command was unable to establish the correct distribution of supplies under the current conditions. This once again confirms the very low level of organization and planning for the defense of Berlin. For example, on the southern bank of the Teltow Canal there was a large food warehouse near Klein-Machnow, behind the outer defensive perimeter. When the first Soviet tank broke into the warehouse area and stopped literally a few hundred meters away, Volksturmists from the opposite northern shore immediately visited the guards. Even under the enemy’s nose, the warehouse guards vigilantly and fearlessly drove away the ever-hungry Volkssturmists, because they did not have the appropriate invoice. However, the enemy did not get even a crumb - at the last moment the warehouse was set on fire.

A sufficient supply of food was accumulated in civilian warehouses so that the population could feed itself autonomously for several months. However, the supply of the population was quickly disrupted, since most of the food warehouses were located outside the city and quickly fell into the hands of Soviet troops. However, the distribution of the meager food remaining within the city continued even during urban battles. It got to the point that in the last days of the defense of Berlin, the defenders were starving.

On April 2, 1945, OKH head Jodl ordered General Max Pemsel to urgently fly to Berlin. However, due to bad weather, he arrived only on April 12 and learned that it was the day before that they wanted to appoint him commander of the defense of Berlin, but he was late. And Pemzel was happy. In Normandy, he headed the headquarters of the 7th Army and was well versed in fortification. Leaving the capital, the general assessed the Berlin fortifications simply: “extremely useless and ridiculous!” The same is said in the report of General Serov dated April 23, 1945, prepared for Stalin. Soviet experts stated that within a radius of 10-15 km from Berlin there are no serious fortifications, and in general, they are incomparably weaker than those that the Red Army had to overcome when storming other cities. It was under these conditions that the German garrison needed to repel an attack from two Soviet fronts...

However, what was the Berlin garrison that stood guard over the capital of the Reich and Adolf Hitler personally? But he didn’t represent anything. Before the withdrawal of 56 TK to Berlin from the Seelow Heights, there was practically no organized defense of the city. The commander of the 56th TC, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling, saw the following: “Already on April 24, I was convinced that defending Berlin was impossible and from a military point of view was pointless, since the German command did not have sufficient forces for this, moreover, by April 24, the German command did not have a single regular formation at its disposal in Berlin, for with the exception of the Gross Deutschland security regiment and the SS brigade guarding the Imperial Chancellery.

All defense was entrusted to units of the Volkssturm, police, fire department personnel, personnel of various rear units and service levels."

Moreover, defense was impossible not only numerically, but also organizationally: “It was clear to me that the current organization, i.e., division into 9 sections, was unsuitable for a long period of time, since all nine commanders of sections (sectors) did not even have staffed and cobbled together headquarters.”(Weidling).

The Berlin Volksstrum learns how to use Faustpatrons. Not every Volkssturmist has undergone such training, and most saw how this weapon fires only in battle with Soviet tanks.

In fact, the entire defense structure of more than two million Berlin was based on the pitiful remnants of the 56th Panzer Corps. On April 16, 1945, on the eve of the Berlin operation, the entire corps numbered up to 50,000 people, including the rear. As a result of bloody battles on the out-of-town defensive lines, the corps suffered huge losses and retreated to the capital greatly weakened.

By the beginning of the fighting in the city itself, the 56th TK had:

18.Panzergrenadier-Division - 4000 people

"Muncheberg" Panzer Division - up to 200 people, artillery and 4 tanks

9. Fallschimjager Division - 4000 people (on entering Berlin, the division consisted of about 500 people, and was replenished to 4000)

20. Panzergrenadier Division - 800-1200 Human

11. SS "Nordland" Panzergrenadier Division - 3500-4000 people

Total: 13,000 - 15,000 people.

Armored personnel carrier SdKfz 250/1 of the company commander of the Swedish volunteers of the SS Nordland division, Hauptsturmfuhrer Hans-Gosta Pehrsson. The car was hit on the night of May 1-2, 1945, when it participated in an attempt to escape from Berlin across the Weidendamer Bridge and further along Friedrichstrasse, where it was captured. To the right of the car lies the dead driver - Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson. Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson himself was wounded, but managed to escape and hide in a residential building, where he spent two days in a closet. Then he went outside and met a woman who promised to help him with civilian clothes. However, instead of help, she brought with her conscientious soldiers and Pehrsson was captured. Fortunately for him, he had already changed his SS jacket for a Wehrmacht jacket. Soon Pehrson escaped from Soviet captivity, took refuge in a residential building and got hold of civilian clothes. After some time, he met his Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin (SS-Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin) and together with him made his way into the British occupation zone, from where they made their way home to Sweden. Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson returned to his homeland with the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class and 5 wounds.

SS-Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson

Thus, at first glance, the capital was defended by 13,000-15,000 regular army troops. However, this is on paper, but in reality the picture was depressing. For example, 20 Panzergrenadier Divizion already on April 24, 1945 consisted of 80% Volkssturmists and only 20% military. Can 800-1200 people be called a division? And if 80% of them are old people and children, then what kind of regular army formation is this? But in Berlin, such metamorphoses happened at every step: formally a division was fighting, but in reality it was a small group of military personnel or a bunch of untrained children and old people. 20 Panzergrenadier Divizion, due to its weakness, was sent to the 5th sector to positions along the Teltow Canal to meet Wenck's 12 A.

In the 9. Fallschirmjager Division the situation was no better. All over the world, airborne troops have always been considered the elite. And according to documents, a division of elite airborne troops fought in Berlin. A terrifying picture. But in reality, 500 battle-worn paratroopers were urgently relieved by whom, it’s not hard to guess. This is the elite and this is the division...

The 11th Volunteer Division "Nordland" remained the most combat-ready formation. Paradoxically, it was foreigners who played a significant role in the defense of Berlin.

As part of the 56th TC, the remnants of the 408 Volks-Artillerie-Korps (408th People's Artillery Corps) also departed to Berlin; the numerical strength that reached the capital is not exactly known, but it is so small that Weidling did not even mention it among his troops . 60% of the guns that ended up in Berlin had almost no ammunition. Initially 408. Volks-Artillerie-Korps consisted of 4 light artillery battalions, two heavy artillery battalions with captured 152mm guns and one howitzer battalion with four howitzers.

In the foreground is a deceased SS Hauptsturmführer, next to him is an FG-42 Model II airborne rifle and an airborne helmet. The photo was taken at the intersection of Chaussestrasse (ahead) and Oranienburgerstrasse (right), near the Oranienburger Tor metro station.

It is more difficult to determine the remaining forces in the garrison. During interrogation, Weidling testified that when his corps entered the city: “All defense was entrusted to units of the Volkssturm, police, fire department personnel, personnel of various rear units and service levels.”. Weidling did not have an accurate idea of ​​these forces, which were unsuitable for combat: “I think that Volkssturm units, police units, fire departments, anti-aircraft units numbered up to 90,000 people, in addition to the rear units serving them.

In addition, there were Volkssturm units of the second category, i.e. those who joined the ranks of the defenders already during the battles and as certain enterprises were closed".

90,000 children-elderly-firefighting-rear troops, not counting their rear, look simply grotesque and do not fit in with other sources. And this is against the backdrop of a meager number of troops of the 56th Tank Corps. Such a suspicious discrepancy with other assessments raises serious doubts about the reliability of Weidling’s words, or rather those who compiled the interrogation report. And the interrogation was conducted by Comrade Trusov, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The same front that could not take Berlin in the promised 6 days; systematically missed the deadlines for the offensive; failed not only the capture, but even the exit to the outskirts of Berlin for Lenin’s birthday, and yet on April 22, a red flag should have been flying over Berlin for a day already; failed to crush the remnants of the garrison by the May 1st holiday. With all this, the average daily losses of the Red Army in the Berlin operation were the highest during the entire war, although Comrade Trusov stated that the front command had a complete understanding of the enemy and his forces in advance. On May 2, Soviet troops finally captured Berlin, but three times later than promised. How can you justify yourself to Stalin? This is probably why the idea of ​​overestimating the enemy’s strength was born. However, at the expense of whom? Regular formations are easy to account for and verify, but the Volkssturm leaves an unlimited field for maneuver - here you can attribute as much as you like and say that civilians simply fled, not wanting to experience the hospitality of Soviet captivity. It is worth especially noting that by that time the Red Army had developed the practice of colossally overestimating German losses, which sometimes became the reason for the corresponding proceedings. In the end, Weidling did not sign the interrogation report with a lawyer, if he signed it at all. But Weidling did not emerge from Soviet captivity alive... Helmut Weidling died in the second building of the Vladimir prison.

defenders of Berlin...

Let's look at the Volkssturm in more detail. Before Weidling, the defense of Berlin was commanded by Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann (not counting two precocious generals) and under him the recruitment of the militia took place. Reimann quite reasonably believed that he would need 200,000 trained military personnel to defend the capital, but only 60,000 Volkstrumists were available, of which 92 battalions were formed. The Germans joked that those who were taken to the Volkssturm already those who can walk more can walk. There is only a grain of joke in this joke (*Hitler's decree about VS). The combat value of this "army" was below any criticism. As the commander of the Bergewald infantry division, Lieutenant General V. Reitel, noted: “The Volkssturm is great in concept, but its military significance is very insignificant. The age of the people, their poor military training and the almost complete lack of weapons play a role here.”

Propaganda. In short pants against Soviet tanks, and grandpa will cover you if he doesn’t lose his glasses.

Formally, General Reiman had at his disposal 42,095 rifles, 773 submachine guns, 1,953 light machine guns, 263 heavy machine guns, and a small number of field guns and mortars. However, the use of this motley arsenal could be very limited. Reiman stated the armament of his militia as follows: “Their weapons were produced in all the countries that Germany fought with or against: Italy, Russia, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway and England. Finding ammunition for no less than fifteen different types of rifles and ten types of machine guns was practically impossible. a lost cause." Those who had Italian rifles turned out to be the luckiest, because they received up to 20 rounds of ammunition per person. The shortage of ammunition reached the point that it was necessary to adjust Greek cartridges for Italian rifles. And going into battle with non-standard, customized cartridges against the regular Soviet army is not the best prospect for untrained old people and children. On the first day of the Soviet offensive, each Volkssturmist with a rifle carried an average of five rounds of ammunition. There were enough Faust cartridges, but they could not compensate for the lack of other weapons and the lack of military training. The combat value of the Volkssturm was so low that regular units, severely exhausted by battles, often simply disdained to be replenished at the expense of the militia: “When the question arose about replenishing my division at the expense of the Volkssturm, I refused it. The Volkssturmists would have reduced the combat effectiveness of my division and would have introduced even more unpleasant diversity into its already rather motley composition.”(Lieutenant General Reitel). But that's not all. Weidling testified during interrogation that the Volkssturm had to be replenished with people as various enterprises were closed. With the signal "Clausewitz Muster" another 52,841 militia could be called up within 6 hours. But what should we arm them with and where can we get cartridges for our rich collection of foreign weapons? As a result, the Volkssturm was divided into two categories: those who had at least some weapons - Volkssturm I and those who did not have them at all - Volkssturm II. Of the 60,000 child-elderly militias, only one third were considered armed - about 20.000 . The remaining 40,000 unarmed militia could not fight and seriously replenish losses. If the Soviet army had good reserves, and, in extreme cases, could throw transporters into battle, then the militia could not afford this. They already went into battle with only five rounds of ammunition, having in their mighty reserve 40,000 unarmed old men and children. Having honestly shot his meager “ammunition”, the Volkssturmist could not borrow cartridges from his fellow soldier - their rifles were different.

Militia battalions were formed not according to the military scheme, but according to party districts, so the quantitative composition of the motley battalions could differ greatly. Battalions could be divided into companies. Party members or reservists who were untrained in military affairs became commanders. Not a single battalion had its own headquarters. It is noteworthy that the Volkssturm did not even receive allowances, did not have field kitchens, and had to find its own food. Even during the battles, the Volkssturmists ate what the local residents served them. When the battles took place away from the place of residence of the Volksturmists, they had to eat whatever God provided, that is, from hand to mouth. They also did not have their own transport or means of communication. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that formally the entire leadership of the Volkssturm was in the hands of the party, and only after the code signal “Clausewitz,” which meant the beginning of the assault on the city, the militias were to come under the direct subordination of General Reimann.

A dead German soldier on the steps of the Reich Chancellery. Please note that he is not wearing shoes, and his feet are tied with a rope and a stick. Boxes with German awards are scattered on the steps. There are several different Soviet propaganda photographs of this site known. It is possible that the deceased was placed there for the sake of a “successful” shot. There were practically no battles for the Reich Chancellery itself. In its basements there was a hospital with approximately 500 seriously wounded SS soldiers, as well as a bomb shelter with many civilian women and children, who were then subjected to abuse by the Red Army. The Soviet military occupation power soon demolished the Reich Chancellery building and used the stone blocks of decorative cladding to build a monument to itself in Berlin.

All military training of the Volkssturmists consisted of classes on weekends from approximately 17.00 to 19.00. During the classes, Volksturm became familiar with the design of small arms and Panzerfausts, but practice firing happened extremely rarely and not for everyone. Sometimes three-day courses were practiced in SA camps. In general, the preparation of the militia left much to be desired.

Initially, it was intended to use the Volkssturm in the rear against small enemy breakthroughs or a small enemy that had infiltrated through the defenses, to localize paratroopers, to guard rear positions and protect fortified buildings. There was nothing for them to do on the front line. When the battles moved to the territory of the Reich, the Volkssturm were forced to begin to be deployed on the front line, first as auxiliary units, and then in the clearly uncharacteristic role of front line defense. In Berlin, the unarmed Volkssturm II had to remain behind the front line occupied by the poorly armed Volkssturm I and wait until someone was killed before taking its weapon. A grim prospect for children and the elderly. However, in some sectors this was the case.

If the average militiaman shoots once per minute, the battle will not last long. It is not difficult to imagine with what accuracy untrained children and old people shot their cartridges. When given the opportunity, these “5-minute soldiers” simply deserted or surrendered without a fight.

On April 25, 1945, providing Stalin with Serov’s report dated April 23, 1945, Beria made an annex that demonstrated the combat effectiveness of the Volkssturm. Thus, the German defensive line 8 km from Berlin was held by the Volkssturm, recruited in February 1945 from men 45 years of age and older. For 2-3 people without military training there was one rifle and 75 rounds of ammunition. The Germans had the dubious pleasure of watching for an hour and a half as units of the 2nd Guards. The TA were preparing to attack, but the militia did not fire a single artillery or mortar shot. All that the Volkssturm opposed to the Soviet tank army were a few single rifle shots and short bursts from a machine gun.

After the battles, the Soviet 5th Shock Army assessed their opponents as follows: “In Berlin, the enemy did not have field troops, much less full-fledged personnel divisions. The bulk of his troops were special battalions, schools, police detachments and Volkssturm battalions. This affected the tactics of his actions and significantly weakened the defense of Berlin.”.

The commander of the Vistula Army Group, Generaloberst Heinrici, and the Minister of Armaments, Speer, perfectly understood the drama and hopelessness of the situation. From a military point of view, defending in a large city with many canals and strong buildings would be much easier than on the outskirts of the countryside. However, this tactic would lead to enormous senseless suffering for the residents of the capital of more than two million. Based on this, Heinrici decided to withdraw as many troops as possible from Berlin to practically unprepared positions, even before the start of fighting in the city. This meant that troops would have to be sacrificed, but with the same outcome of the battle, the suffering of millions of citizens could be avoided and destruction could be minimized. The leadership of Army Group Vistula believed that with such a giveaway game, the first Soviet tanks would reach the Reich Chancellery by April 22. Heinrici even tried to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Theodor Busse's 9th Army to the capital, and supposedly in order to save the LVI Panzer Corps proposed to send it to the south. On April 22, 1945, the 56th Tank Corps received an order from the 9th Army to join it south of the capital. German generals were clearly withdrawing their troops from Berlin. Hitler ordered Weidling to lead the corps to Berlin, however, Weidling wanted to go south. Only after the Fuhrer's order was duplicated on April 23 did the 56th TC begin to retreat to the capital. Soon, Field Marshal Keitel demoted Hanritsi for sabotage and invited him, as an honest general, to shoot himself, but the traitor Heinrici met old age safely, and Keitel was hanged by the victors.

Frey radar in Tiergarten. In the background is the Victory Column in honor of the victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. Between this column and the Brandenburg Gate on the East-West highway there was an improvised runway, the construction of which was prevented by Speer.

On the afternoon of April 18, General Reimann was shocked by an order from the Reich Chancellery to transfer all available troops to Busse's 9th Army to strengthen the second line of defense of Berlin. The order was duplicated by a telephone call from Goebbels. As a result, 30 militia battalions and an air defense unit left the city. Later, these formations practically never retreated to Berlin. This was such a serious blow to the Volkssturm, which could at least somehow defend the capital, that Lieutenant General Reiman said: “Tell Goebbels that all possibilities for defending the capital of the Reich have been exhausted. The Berliners are defenseless.”. On April 19, 24,000 Volkssturm remained in Berlin with a huge shortage of weapons. Although the Volkssturm could be replenished numerically by the beginning of urban battles, the number of armed soldiers remained unchanged.

Given the acute shortage of weapons and ammunition in the capital, Minister of Arms and Ammunition Speer tried to make his contribution to the defense of “Fortress Berlin”. When Reimann tried to equip an airstrip in the city center, between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column, Speer began to oppose him in every possible way. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Arms and Ammunition, as well as Speer's Berlin apartment, were located on Pariserplatz just outside the Brandenburg Gate. The Minister of Armaments summoned General Reiman and scolded him under the ridiculous pretext that during the construction of the runway, bronze street pillars were being demolished and trees were being cut down at a distance of 30 meters on each side of the roadway. The discouraged general tried to explain that this was necessary for landing transport planes. However, Speer said that Reiman has no right to touch the pillars. The showdown reached Hitler. The Fuhrer allowed the pillars to be demolished, but forbade the cutting of trees so as not to cause harm appearance center of the capital. But Speer did not let up and through his efforts the pillars remained unshakably in place. With the start of urban fighting, the Minister of Armaments was no longer in the capital (as were most of the militias) and the pillars were finally removed. It was on this strip, already in the midst of street fighting, that on the evening of April 27, Hana Reich's Fi-156 plane landed, delivering General Ritter von Greim. The Führer summoned von Greim to appoint him as commander of the Luftwaffe in place of Goering. At the same time, Grime was wounded in the leg, and the plane was severely damaged. Soon, on a specially arrived Arado-96 training aircraft, Reitsch and von Greim flew out of Berlin right in front of the Red Army soldiers. The same airstrip brought meager air supplies to besieged Berlin. In addition to the epic with the runway, the architect Speer also prevented the bridges from being blown up. Of the 248 bridges in Berlin, only 120 were blown up and 9 were damaged.

One of the last photographs of Hitler. To the left of the Fuhrer is the head of the Hitler Youth, Reichsjugendfuhrer Arthur Axmann, who issued the order to use children in the battles for Berlin.

After the Volkssturm, the second largest category were firefighters, transport workers and all kinds of official authorities and institutions. They account for about 18,000 people. On April 19, this category consisted of 1,713 police officers, 1,215 members of the Hitler Youth and RAD and Todt workers, about 15,000 military logistics personnel. At the same time, the Hitler Youth was a different story. On April 22, 1945, Goebbels stated in his last printed address to the people: “A fourteen-year-old boy crawling with his grenade launcher behind a destroyed wall on a scorched street means more to the nation than ten intellectuals trying to prove that our chances are zero.” This phrase did not go unnoticed by the leader of the Hitler Youth, Arthur Axmann. Under his strict leadership, this National Socialist teenage organization was also preparing to go through the crucible of battles. When Axmann told Weidling that he had given the order to use children in battles, instead of gratitude he was met with obscene expressions containing the semantic message to let the children go home. The ashamed Axmann promised to withdraw the order, but not all the children who had already left for position received it. Near the bridge in Pichelsdorf, the Hitler Youth experienced the full might of the Soviet army.

One of these Volkssturmist children in Berlin was 15-year-old Adolf Martin Bormann, the son of Martin Bormann, Hitler’s deputy in the party and personal secretary. The boy received his first name in honor of his godfather, Adolf Hitler. It is noteworthy that Martin-Adolf celebrated his fifteenth birthday just two days before the start of the Battle of Berlin. When the battle for the city was coming to a tragic end, Borman Sr. ordered the adjutant to kill his son so that he would not be captured and become an object of insults and bullying. The adjutant disobeyed his superior and after the war, Martin Adolf became a Catholic priest and then a teacher of theology.

The Berlin garrison also included the SS security regiment "Gross Deutschland" (9 companies). However, after the fighting near Bloomberg, in the highway area northeast of the capital, only 40 survivors of the entire regiment, that is, out of about 1,000 people, returned to the city.

Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, commandant of the Citadel. On April 6, 1941, on the first day of the Yugoslav campaign, he was wounded during an air raid and lost a foot, but remained in service. To escape severe pain in his leg, he became addicted to morphine. Frequent pain and morphinism affected his character. After one heated conversation with the head of the officer department of the SS personnel service, he lost his position and was sent to the psychiatric ward of a military hospital in Würzburg. Soon Mohnke returned to service and made a career, receiving 6 very honorable awards and becoming a Brigadefuhrer on January 30, 1945. He spent 10 years in Soviet captivity and was in solitary confinement until 1949. Released on October 10, 1955. Died at the age of 90 on August 6, 2001 in the town of Damp, near Eckenförde, Schleswig-Holstein.

And finally, the central 9th ​​sector "Citadel", was defended by SS Kampfgruppe Mohnke numbering about 2000 people. The defense of the Citadel was led by Colonel Seifert, but the government area inside the Citadel was under the responsibility of SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, whom Hitler personally appointed to this position. The government area included the Reich Chancellery, the Fuhrer's bunker, the Reichstag and adjacent buildings. Mohnke reported directly to Hitler and Weidling could not order him. Kampfgruppe Mohnke was urgently created on April 26, 1945 from scattered units and rear SS units:

remnants of the two-battalion security regiment of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division (LSSAH Wach Regiment), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Kaschula

training battalion from the same division (Panzer-Grenadier-Ersatz- & Ausbildungs-Bataillon 1 "LSSAH" from Spreenhagenn 25 km southeast of Berlin), commander Obersturmbannfuhrer Klingemeier. The day before, part of the 12 companies of the training base in Spreenhagen left as part of the "Falke" regiment to the 9th Busse Army. The remainder of the personnel was sent to Berlin and included in the Anhalt regiment.

Hitler Guard Company (Fuhrer-Begleit-Kompanie), commander of Hitler's adjutant Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Gunsche

Himmler's Security Battalion (Reichsfuhrer SS Begleit Battalion), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Franz Schadle

Brigadeführer Mohnke brought the scattered and small SS forces into two regiments.

1st Regiment "Anhalt" of Kampfgruppe "Mohnke", named after the commander of Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt (SS-Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt). When Anhalt died, on 04/30/45 the regiment was renamed after the name of the new commander - “Wal” (SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Kurt Wahl). The regiment consisted of two battalions, manned by personnel from the Wachbataillon Reichskanzlei, Ersatz- und Ausbildungsbataillon "LSSAH", Fuhrerbegleit-Kompanie, Begleit-Kompanie "RFSS".

The regiment fought in the following positions:
1st battalion - railway station on Friedrichsstrasse, along the Spree, Reichstag, Siegesallee lines
2nd Battalion - Moltkestrasse, Tiergarten, Potsdamer Pltatz.

2nd Regiment "Falke" of Kampfgruppe "Mohnke". Formed from disparate rear authorities.
Fought in the following positions: Potsdamer Platz, Leipzigstrasse, Ministry of the Air Force, Friedrichsstrasse Railway Station.

Sometimes Soviet and Western sources mention the Charlemagne division among the defenders of Berlin. The word "division" sounds proud and implies quite a lot of soldiers. This needs to be dealt with. After bloody battles in Pomerania, out of about 7,500 people of the 33rd Grenadier Division of French volunteers "Charlemagne" (33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne (franzosische Nr. 1), approximately 1,100 survived. They were gathered in Macklenburg for replenishment and reorganization, but After brutal unsuccessful battles, the will to fight was so low among many that the volunteers were released from their oath. However, about 700 people decided to fight to the end. After the reorganization, one two-battalion regiment remained - Waffen-Grenadier-Rgt. der SS "Charlemagne ". 400 people who no longer wanted to fight were taken to Baubataillon (construction battalion) and used for earthworks. On the night of April 23-24, 1945, Hitler received an order from the Reich Chancellery to use all available transport and immediately report to Berlin. Personal order of the Fuhrer addressed to this to a small weakened unit, was in itself an extremely unusual matter.The division commander, SS-Brigadeführer Krukenberg, urgently formed a stormbattalion (Franzosisches freiwilligen-sturmbataillon der SS "Charlemagne") from combat-ready units of the 57th Grenadier Battalion and the 6th Company of the 68th Grenadier Battalion , to these were added units of the division training school (Kampfschule). Henri Fenet became the battalion commander. The assault battalion departed in 9 trucks and two light vehicles. However, two trucks were never able to reach their destination, so only 300-330 people arrived in Berlin. This was the last reinforcement to reach the capital by land before the city was surrounded by Soviet troops. At the Olympic Stadium, the storm battalion was immediately reorganized into 4 rifle companies of 60-70 people each and subordinated to the Panzer-Grenadier Division "Nordland" (11. SS-Frw.Panzer-Gren.Division "Nordland"). Weidling immediately removed the commander of this division, SS Brigadeführer Ziegler, who was in no hurry to arrive at Weidling's disposal and replaced him with the decisive Krukenberg. Highly motivated French volunteers made an invaluable contribution to the defense of the city - they accounted for about 92 destroyed Soviet tanks out of 108 destroyed in the Nordland division's sector. It can be said that these soldiers were in the right place at the right time, despite the fact that they suffered huge losses in a hopeless battle. On May 2, 1945, near the Potsdam train station, about 30 surviving people from Charlemagne were captured by the Soviets.

After Charlemagne, the last meager reinforcements arrived on the night of April 26th. Naval school cadets from Rostock, in the amount of one battalion of three companies, were transported to Berlin by transport planes. The battalion "Grossadmiral Donitz" of Commander Kuhlmann was placed at the disposal of Brigadeführer Mohnke. The sailors took up defensive positions in the park near the Foreign Ministry building on Wilhelmstrasse.

Formation began on February 22, 1945 Panzer-Kompanie (bodenstandig) "Berlin"(special tank company "Berlin"). The company consisted of damaged tanks whose engines or chassis could not be repaired, but were suitable for use as bunkers. In two days, by February 24, 1945, the company received 10 Pz V and 12 Pz IV. The crew at fixed firing points was reduced by two people, to the commander, gunner and loader. Soon the company was reinforced with several pillboxes with turrets from Panther tanks. It was the so-called Panther Turm, which was already in service and used in the West, in particular on the Gothic Line. The bunker consisted of a Panther tower (sometimes specially made for such a bunker, and a concrete or metal section under the tower, dug into the ground. The bunker was usually installed at major intersections and could be connected by an underground passage to the basement of a neighboring building.

Flakturm. In front of the tower, two torn-up ISs froze in a surprisingly symmetrical manner. Berlin's three anti-aircraft towers were powerful centers of defense.

In Berlin there was the 1st Air Defense Division "Berlin" (1."Berlin" Flak Division), as well as units of the 17th and 23rd Air Defense Divisions. In April 1945, anti-aircraft units consisted of 24 12.8-cm guns, 48 ​​10.5-cm guns, 270 8.8-mm guns, 249 2-cm and 3.7-cm guns. From November 1944, in searchlight units, all enlisted men were replaced by women, and prisoners of war, mostly Soviet, were used in auxiliary roles, as ammunition carriers and loaders. At the beginning of April 1945, almost all anti-aircraft artillery was consolidated into anti-aircraft strike groups and withdrawn from the city to the outer defensive perimeter, where it was used mainly to combat ground targets. There are three anti-aircraft towers left in the city - in the Zoo, Humboldhain, Friedrichshain and two heavy anti-aircraft batteries in Temelhof and on Eberswaldstrasse. By the end of April 25, the Germans had 17 partially combat-ready batteries, including turret batteries. By the end of April 28, 6 anti-aircraft batteries survived, containing 18 guns and 3 more separate guns. By the end of April 30, Berlin had 3 combat-ready heavy batteries (13 guns).

At the same time, anti-aircraft towers served as bomb shelters for thousands of civilians. There were also artistic treasures, in particular Schliemann's gold from Troy and the famous figurine of Nefertiti.

The defenders of Berlin received unexpected help during the assault on the city. April 24-25, 1945 Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249 under the command of Hauptmann Herbert Jaschke, received 31 new self-propelled guns from the Berlin Alkett plant in Spandau. That same day, the brigade was ordered to move west to the Krampnitz area to participate in the attack against the Americans on the Elbe. However, a counterattack on the Allies occurred before the arrival of Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249, so the brigade remained in Berlin, near the Brandenburg Gate. In the capital, the brigade fought in the area of ​​Frankfurterallee, Landsbergstrasse, Alexanderplatz. On April 29, 1945, the fighting moved to the area of ​​the Higher Technical School, where the brigade command post was located. On April 30, only 9 StuG remained in the brigade, which fought their way back to Berliner Strasse. After the fall of Berlin, 3 surviving self-propelled guns and several trucks managed to escape from the city and reach Spandau, where the last self-propelled guns were knocked out. The remnants of the brigade were divided into two groups. A group led by commander Hauptmann Jaschke came out to the Americans and surrendered, and the second group was destroyed by Soviet troops.

The city's defense was strengthened by 6 anti-tank and 15 artillery divisions.

In the matter of the size of the Berlin garrison, the testimony of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 56th Panzer Corps, Siegfried Knappe, plays a huge role: "The report [...] states that other units in Berlin were equivalent to two to three divisions and that the Waffen SS were equivalent to half a division. All together, according to the report, about four to five divisions consisting of 60,000 men with 50-60 tanks ".

In the early 50s, the American Command in Europe asked former German military personnel to compile an analysis of the defense of Berlin. This document comes to the same numbers - 60,000 people and 50-60 tanks.

In general, despite all the differences, figures from most independent sources converge on a common indicator. There were definitely not 200,000 defenders in Berlin, much less 300,000.

The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Marshal of the Armored Forces P. Rybalko, stated directly: “If the Cottbus group [of the enemy] had united with the Berlin one, it would have been a second Budapest. If in Berlin we had 80 thousand people [of the enemy], then this number would then have increased to 200,000 and it would not have taken us 10 days to solve the problem of capturing Berlin.".

For comparison, the Soviet army involved the city itself in the assault 464,000 people and 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

footnotes and comments

1 Cornelius Ryan - The Last Battle - M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2003

3 April 22, 1945 Hitler removed Lieutenant General Reimann from the post of commander of the defense of Berlin for defeatist sentiments. It was rumored that Goebbels had a hand in this, who, trying to expand his influence, invited Reiman to move to his command post. Reimann rejected the Reich Minister's proposal under the obviously far-fetched pretext that if two leaders of the capital's defense were at the same command post, then there was a danger that an accidental explosion could decapitate the entire defense. As Reiman later noted, the anti-aircraft tower in the Zoo could in fact withstand a direct hit from almost any bomb. Instead of Reimann, Hitler appointed Colonel Keeter (Ernst Kaeter), whom he immediately promoted to major general. Before this, Keeter was the chief of staff of the army’s political department and thereby earned the confidence of the leader. However, in the evening the Fuhrer took command of the defense of Berlin, in which he was to be assisted by his adjutant Erich Barenfanger, who was urgently promoted to the rank of major general. And finally, on April 23, Hitler entrusted the defense of the capital and practically his life to the commander of the 56th TC, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling.

4 Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London -- Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

5 http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm (GARF 9401/2/95 pp.304-310)

6 Beevor E. - The Fall of Berlin. 1945

7 Ilya Moshchansky. Tankmaster, No. 5/2000

sources

V. Keitel -- 12 steps to the scaffold... -- "Phoenix", 2000

Antonio J Munoz -- Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS-- Paladin Press, November 1991

Gottfried Tornau, Franz Kurowski -- Sturmartillerie (Gebundene Ausgabe)-- Maximilian-Verl., 1965

History of the Second World War 1939-1945-- M., Military Publishing House 1975

Antony Beevor's website (http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm)

Dr. S. Hart & Dr. R. Hart -- German Tanks of World War II -- ,1998

Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London-- Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

de La Maziere, Christian -- The Captive Dreamer

Littlejohn, David -- Foreign Legions of the Third Reich

Tony le Tissier -- With Our Backs to Berlin-- Sutton Publishing, May 1, 2001

Robert Michulec -- Armor Bettles on the Eastern Front- Concord, 1999

The German Defense of Berlin--U.S. Army European Command. Historical Division, 1953

Antonio J Munoz -- Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS; Kurowski, Franz and Tornau, Gottfried -- Sturmartillerie

Peter Antill - Berlin 1945- Osprey, 2005

Helmut Altner -- Berlin Dance of Death-- Casemate, April 1, 2002

Tony Le Tissier -- With Our Backs to Berlin-- Sutton Publishing; New edition, July 16, 2005

Thorolf Hillblad, Erik Wallin -- Twilight of the Gods: A Swedish Waffen-SS Volunteer's Experiences with the 11th SS-Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, Eastern Front 1944-45-- Helion and Company Ltd., May 2004

Wilhelm Willemar, Oberst a.D. -- THE GERMAN DEFENSE OF BERLIN-- Historical Division, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, 1953

Reichsgesetztblatt 1944, I / Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. 1939-1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Documenten. 3.durchgesehene und erganzte Auflage. Wehr-und-Wissen Verlagsgesselschaft. Darmstadt, 1959 / World War II: Two views. - M.: Mysl, 1995
(http://militera.lib.ru/)

Before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the zones of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. To this end, on April 14, after a 15-20-minute fire raid, reinforced rifle battalions from divisions of the first echelon of combined arms armies began to operate in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front. Then, in a number of areas, regiments of the first echelons were brought into battle. During the two-day battles, they managed to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and capture separate sections of the first and second trenches, and in some directions advance up to 5 km. The integrity of the enemy defense was broken. In addition, in a number of places, the front troops overcame the zone of the most dense minefields, which should have facilitated the subsequent offensive of the main forces. Based on an assessment of the results of the battle, the front command decided to reduce the duration of artillery preparation for the attack of the main forces from 30 to 20 - 25 minutes.

In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the night of April 16 by reinforced rifle companies. It was established that the enemy was firmly in defensive positions directly along the left bank of the Neisse. The front commander decided not to make changes to the developed plan.

On the morning of April 16, the main forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts went on the offensive. At 5 o'clock Moscow time, two hours before dawn, artillery preparation began in the 1st Belorussian Front. In the zone of the 5th Shock Army, ships and floating batteries of the Dnieper Flotilla took part in it. The force of the artillery fire was enormous. If during the entire first day of the operation the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front spent 1,236 thousand shells, which amounted to almost 2.5 thousand railway cars, then during the artillery preparation - 500 thousand shells and mines, or 1 thousand cars. Night bombers of the 16th and 4th Air Armies attacked enemy headquarters, artillery firing positions, as well as the third and fourth trenches of the main defense line.

After the final salvo of rocket artillery, the troops of the 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards, and 69th armies, commanded by generals V.I. Kuznetsov, N.E. Berzarin, V.I. Chuikov, moved forward, V. Ya. Kolpakchi. With the start of the attack, powerful searchlights located in the zone of these armies directed their beams towards the enemy. The 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 47th and 33rd Armies of Generals S.G. Poplavsky, F.I. Perkhorovich, V.D. Tsvetaev went on the offensive at 6:15. Bombers of the 18th Air Army under the command of Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov struck the second defense line. With dawn, the aviation of the 16th Air Army of General S.I. Rudenko intensified the fighting, which on the first day of the operation carried out 5,342 combat sorties and shot down 165 German aircraft. In total, during the first 24 hours, pilots of the 16th, 4th and 18th Air Armies flew over 6,550 sorties and dropped over 1,500 tons of bombs on enemy control points, resistance centers and reserves.

As a result of powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the enemy suffered great damage. Therefore, for the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully. However, soon the Nazis, relying on a strong, engineering-developed second line of defense, put up fierce resistance. Intense fighting broke out along the entire front. Soviet troops sought to overcome the enemy's stubbornness at all costs, acting assertively and energetically. In the center of the 3rd Shock Army, the greatest success was achieved by the 32nd Rifle Corps under the command of General D.S. Zherebin. He advanced 8 km and reached the second line of defense. On the left flank of the army, the 301st Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel V.S. Antonov, took an important enemy stronghold and the Verbig railway station. In the battles for it, soldiers of the 1054th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel H.N. Radaev, distinguished themselves. The Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion, Lieutenant G. A. Avakyan, with one machine gunner, made his way to the building where the Nazis were holed up. Throwing grenades at them, the brave warriors destroyed 56 fascists and captured 14. Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

To increase the tempo of the offensive in the zone of the 3rd Shock Army, the 9th Tank Corps of General I. F. Kirichenko was brought into battle at 10 o’clock. Although this increased the force of the attack, the advance of the troops was still slow. It became clear to the front command that combined arms armies were not able to quickly break through enemy defenses to the depth planned for introducing tank armies into battle. What was especially dangerous was that the infantry could not capture the tactically very important Zelovsky heights, along which the front edge of the second defensive line ran. This natural boundary dominated the entire area, had steep slopes and in all respects was a serious obstacle on the way to the capital of Germany. The Seelow Heights were considered by the Wehrmacht command as the key to the entire defense in the Berlin direction. “By 13 o’clock,” recalled Marshal G.K. Zhukov, “I clearly understood that the enemy’s defense fire system here had basically survived, and in the battle formation in which we launched the attack and were conducting the offensive, we would not be able to take the Zelovsky Heights.” (624) . Therefore, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov decided to introduce tank armies into battle and, through joint efforts, complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone.

In the afternoon, the 1st Guards Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov was the first to enter the battle. By the end of the day, all three of its corps were fighting in the zone of the 8th Guards Army. However, on this day it was not possible to break through the defenses on the Seelow Heights. The first day of the operation was also difficult for the 2nd Guards Tank Army of General S.I. Bogdanov. In the afternoon, the army received orders from the commander to overtake the infantry battle formations and strike at Bernau. By 19:00, its formations reached the line of the advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, but, having encountered fierce enemy resistance, they could not advance further.

The course of the struggle on the first day of the operation showed that the Nazis were striving to hold the Seelow Heights at any cost: by the end of the day, the fascist command brought forward the reserves of the Vistula Army Group to reinforce the troops defending the second line of defense. The fighting was extremely stubborn. During the second day of the battle, the Nazis repeatedly launched violent counterattacks. However, the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov, who fought here, persistently moved forward. Soldiers of all branches of the military showed massive heroism. The 172nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 57th Guards Rifle Division fought courageously. During the assault on the heights covering Zelov, the 3rd battalion under the command of Captain N.N. Chusovsky especially distinguished itself. Having repelled an enemy counterattack, the battalion broke into the Seelow Heights, and then, after a heavy street battle, cleared the southeastern outskirts of the city of Seelow. In these battles, the battalion commander not only led the units, but also, drawing the fighters along with him, personally destroyed four Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. Many soldiers and officers of the battalion were awarded orders and medals, and Captain Chusovskoy was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Zelov was taken by the troops of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps under General V. A. Glazunov, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 11th Guards Tank Corps under Colonel A. Kh. Babajanyan.

As a result of fierce and stubborn battles, by the end of April 17, the troops of the front’s strike group had broken through the second defensive line and two intermediate positions. Attempts by the fascist German command to stop the advance of Soviet troops by bringing four divisions from the reserve into battle were unsuccessful. Bombers of the 16th and 18th Air Armies attacked enemy reserves day and night, delaying their advance to the line of hostilities. On April 16 and 17, the offensive was supported by ships of the Dnieper military flotilla. They fired until the ground forces moved beyond the firing range of the naval artillery. Soviet troops persistently rushed towards Berlin.

The front troops also had to overcome stubborn resistance, striking on the flanks. The troops of the 61st Army of General P. A. Belov, who launched the offensive on April 17, crossed the Oder by the end of the day and captured a bridgehead on its left bank. By this time, formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army crossed the Oder and broke through the first position of the main defense line. In the Frankfurt area, troops of the 69th and 33rd armies advanced from 2 to 6 km.

On the third day, heavy fighting continued deep in the enemy defenses. The Nazis brought almost all of their operational reserves into the battle. The exceptionally fierce nature of the struggle affected the pace of advance of the Soviet troops. By the end of the day, their main forces had covered another 3-6 km and reached the approaches to the third defensive line. Formations of both tank armies, together with infantrymen, artillerymen and sappers, continuously stormed enemy positions for three days. Difficult terrain and strong enemy anti-tank defenses did not allow the tankers to break away from the infantry. The front's mobile forces have not yet received operational space to conduct rapid maneuvering operations in the Berlin direction.

In the 8th Guards Army zone, the Nazis offered the most stubborn resistance along the highway running west from Seelow, on both sides of which they installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns.

The slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front posed, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the implementation of the plan to encircle the enemy's Berlin group at risk. As early as April 17, the Headquarters demanded that the front commander ensure a more energetic offensive by the troops under his command. At the same time, she gave instructions to the commanders of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian Fronts to facilitate the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front. The 2nd Belorussian Front (after crossing the Oder) received, in addition, the task no later than April 22 with the main forces to develop an offensive to the southwest, striking bypassing Berlin from the north (625), so that in cooperation with the troops of the 1st The Ukrainian Front will complete the encirclement of the Berlin group.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front demanded that the troops increase the pace of the offensive, artillery, including high-power artillery, be pulled up to the first echelon of troops at a distance of 2 - 3 km, which was supposed to facilitate closer interaction with infantry and tanks. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in decisive directions. To support the advancing armies, the front commander ordered the more decisive use of aviation.

As a result of the measures taken, the troops of the strike group broke through the third defensive line by the end of April 19 and in four days advanced to a depth of 30 km, gaining the opportunity to develop an offensive towards Berlin and bypassing it from the north. In breaking through the enemy's defenses, the aviation of the 16th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground forces. Despite unfavorable meteorological conditions, during this time she made about 14.7 thousand sorties and shot down 474 enemy aircraft. In the battles near Berlin, Major I.N. Kozhedub increased the number of enemy aircraft shot down to 62. The famous pilot was awarded a high award - the third Gold Star. In just four days, in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, Soviet aviation carried out up to 17 thousand sorties (626).

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front spent four days breaking through the Oder defensive line. During this time, the enemy suffered great damage: 9 divisions from the first operational echelon and a division: the second echelon lost up to 80 percent of their personnel and almost all military equipment, and 6 divisions advanced from the reserve, and up to 80 different battalions sent from the depths, - over 50 percent. However, the front troops also suffered significant losses and advanced more slowly than planned. This was due primarily to the difficult conditions of the situation. The deep construction of the enemy’s defense, occupied in advance by troops, its large saturation with anti-tank weapons, the high density of artillery fire, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft, continuous counterattacks and reinforcement of troops with reserves - all this required maximum effort from the Soviet troops.

Due to the fact that the front’s strike group launched an offensive from a small bridgehead and in a relatively narrow zone limited by water obstacles and wooded and swampy areas, the Soviet troops were constrained in maneuver and could not quickly expand the breakthrough zone. In addition, the crossings and rear roads were extremely congested, which made it extremely difficult to bring new forces into the battle from the depths. The pace of the offensive of the combined arms armies was significantly influenced by the fact that the enemy defenses were not reliably suppressed during artillery preparation. This especially concerned the second defensive line, which ran along the Zelovsky Heights, where the enemy withdrew part of the forces from the first line and brought up reserves from the depths. It did not have much impact on the pace of the offensive and the introduction of tank armies into the battle to complete the breakthrough of the defense. Such use of tank armies was not provided for by the operation plan, so their interaction with combined arms formations, aviation and artillery had to be organized during combat operations.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed successfully. On April 16, at 6:15 a.m., artillery preparation began, during which the reinforced battalions of the first echelon divisions advanced directly to the Neisse River and, after transferring artillery fire, under the cover of a smoke screen placed on a 390-kilometer front, began crossing the river. The personnel of the forward units were transported along assault bridges built during the period of artillery preparation and using improvised means. Not many were transported along with the infantry. a large number of escort guns and mortars. Since the bridges were not yet ready, some of the field artillery had to be waded using ropes. At 7:05 a.m., the first echelons of bombers from the 2nd Air Army attacked enemy resistance centers and command posts.

The battalions of the first echelon, quickly capturing bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. The sappers of one of the units of the 15th Guards Separate Motorized Assault Engineer Battalion showed exceptional dedication. Overcoming barriers on the left bank of the Neisse River, they discovered property for the assault bridge, guarded by enemy soldiers. Having killed the guards, the sappers quickly built an assault bridge, along which the infantry of the 15th Guards Rifle Division began to cross. For their courage and courage, the commander of the 34th Guards Rifle Corps, General G.V. Baklanov, awarded the entire personnel of the unit (22 people) the Order of Glory (627). Pontoon bridges on light inflatable boats were erected after 50 minutes, bridges for loads up to 30 tons - after 2 hours, and bridges on rigid supports for loads up to 60 tons - within 4 - 5 hours. In addition to them, ferries were used to ferry tanks in direct infantry support. In total, 133 crossings were equipped in the direction of the main attack. The first echelon of the main attack group completed the crossing of the Neisse an hour later, during which the artillery fired continuously at the enemy defenses. She then concentrated her attacks on enemy strongholds, preparing an attack on the opposite bank.

At 8:40 a.m., troops of the 13th Army, as well as the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies, began breaking through the main defensive line. The fighting on the left bank of the Neisse became fierce. The Nazis launched fierce counterattacks, trying to eliminate the bridgeheads captured by Soviet troops. Already on the first day of the operation, the fascist command threw up to three tank divisions and a tank destroyer brigade into battle from its reserve.

In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the front commander used the 25th and 4th Guards Tank Corps of Generals E.I. Fominykh and P.P. Poluboyarov, as well as forward detachments of tank and mechanized corps of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Corps armies (628) . Working closely together, combined arms and tank formations by the end of the day broke through the main line of defense on a 26 km front and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

The next day, the main forces of both tank armies were brought into battle. Soviet troops repelled all enemy counterattacks and completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense. In two days, the troops of the front's strike group advanced 15 - 20 km. Part of the enemy forces began to retreat across the Spree River. To support the combat operations of the tank armies, most of the forces of the 2nd Air Army were brought in. Attack aircraft destroyed the enemy's firepower and manpower, and bomber aircraft attacked his reserves.

In the Dresden direction, troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army under the command of General K. K. Sverchevsky and the 52nd Army of General K. A. Koroteev after the entry into battle of the 1st Polish Tank and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Generals I. K. Kimbara and I.P. Korchagina also completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and, in two days of fighting, advanced up to 20 km in some areas.

The successful offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front created for the enemy the threat of a deep bypass of his Berlin group from the south. The Nazis concentrated their efforts to delay the advance of Soviet troops at the turn of the Spree River. They also sent the reserves of Army Group Center and the withdrawn troops of the 4th Tank Army here. However, the enemy's attempts to change the course of the battle were unsuccessful.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the night of April 18, the front commander assigned the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies under the command of Generals P. S. Rybalko and D. D. Lelyushenko the task of reaching the Spree, crossing it on the move and developing the offensive directly to Berlin from the south. The combined arms armies were ordered to carry out previously assigned tasks. The front's Military Council drew special attention to the commanders of the tank armies to the need for rapid and maneuverable actions. In the directive, the front commander emphasized: “In the main direction, use a tank fist to push forward more boldly and decisively. Bypass cities and large populated areas and not get involved in protracted frontal battles. I demand that you firmly understand that the success of tank armies depends on bold maneuver and swiftness in action” (629). On the morning of April 18, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies reached the Spree. They, together with the 13th Army, crossed it on the move, broke through the third defensive line on a 10-kilometer section and captured a bridgehead north and south of Spremberg, where their main forces concentrated. On April 18, troops of the 5th Guards Army with the 4th Guards Tank and in cooperation with the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps crossed the Spree south of the city. On this day, the aircraft of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division, three times Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A.I. Pokryshkin, covered the troops of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, 13th and 5th Guards Armies, which crossed the Spree. During the day, in 13 air battles, the division pilots shot down 18 enemy aircraft (630). Thus, favorable conditions for a successful offensive were created in the zone of action of the front’s strike group.

Front troops operating in the Dresden direction repelled strong enemy counterattacks. On this day, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of General V.K. Baranov was brought into battle here.

In three days, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 30 km in the direction of the main attack. Significant assistance to the ground forces was provided by the 2nd Air Army of General S.A. Krasovsky, which during these days carried out 7517 sorties and shot down 155 enemy aircraft (631) in 138 air battles.

While the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts were conducting intense combat operations to break through the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were completing preparations for crossing the Oder. In the lower reaches, the bed of this river is divided into two branches (Ost- and West-Oder), therefore, the front troops had to overcome two water obstacles in succession. In order to create the best conditions for the main forces for the offensive, which was scheduled for April 20, the front commander decided on April 18 and 19 to cross the Ost-Oder River with advanced units, destroy the enemy's military outposts in the interfluve and ensure that the front's attack group formations would occupy an advantageous starting position.

On April 18, simultaneously in the zones of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies under the command of generals P.I. Batov, V.S. Popov and I.T. Grishin, rifle regiments of the first echelon divisions on improvised and light crossing means, under the cover of artillery fire and smoke screens crossed the Ost-Oder, in a number of areas overcame the enemy defenses in the interfluve and reached the bank of the West Oder River. On April 19, the units that crossed continued to destroy enemy units in the interfluve, concentrating on the dams on the right bank of this river. Substantial assistance to the ground forces was provided by the aviation of the 4th Air Army of General K. A. Vershinin. It suppressed and destroyed enemy strongholds and firing points.

By active operations in the Oder interfluve, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had a significant influence on the course of the Berlin operation. Having overcome the swampy floodplain of the Oder, they took an advantageous starting position for crossing the West Oder, as well as breaking through the enemy defenses along its left bank, in the area from Stettin to Schwedt, which did not allow the fascist command to transfer formations of the 3rd Tank Army to the 1st Tank Army. Belorussian Front.

Thus, by April 20, generally favorable conditions had developed in the zones of all three fronts for the continuation of the operation. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed the offensive most successfully. During the breakthrough of the defense along the Neisse and Spree, they defeated the enemy reserves, entered the operational space and rushed to Berlin, covering the right wing of the Frankfurt-Guben group of Nazi troops, which included part of the 4th Panzer and the main forces of the 9th Field Armies. In solving this problem, the main role was assigned to tank armies. On April 19, they advanced 30 to 50 km in a northwestern direction, reached the area of ​​Lübbenau, Luckau and cut off the communications of the 9th Army. All enemy attempts to break through from the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg to the crossings of the Spree and reach the rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were unsuccessful. The troops of the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies under the command of Generals V.N. Gordov and A.S. Zhadov, moving west, reliably covered the communications of the tank armies, which allowed the tankers the very next day, without encountering serious resistance, to overcome more 45 - 60 km and reach the approaches to Berlin; The 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov advanced 30 km.

The rapid offensive of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, as well as the 13th Armies, by the end of April 20, led to the cutting off of Army Group Vistula from Army Group Center, and enemy troops in the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg found themselves semi-encircled. A commotion began in the highest circles of the Wehrmacht when they learned that Soviet tanks had reached the Wünsdorf area (10 km south of Zossen). The headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces and the general staff of the ground forces hastily left Zossen and moved to Wansee (Potsdam region), and some departments and services were transferred by plane to Southern Germany. In the diary of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command for April 20, the following entry was made: “For the highest command authorities, the last act of the dramatic death of the German armed forces begins... Everything is done in a hurry, since you can already hear Russian tanks firing from cannons in the distance... Depressed mood" (632).

The rapid development of the operation made a quick meeting of Soviet and American-British troops realistic. At the end of April 20, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent a directive to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, as well as the commanders of the Air Force, armored and mechanized forces of the Soviet Army. It stated that it was necessary to establish signs and signals for mutual identification. By agreement with the allied command, the commander of the tank and combined arms armies was ordered to determine a temporary tactical demarcation line between the Soviet and American-British units in order to avoid mixing of troops (633).

Continuing the offensive in the northwestern direction, the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front by the end of April 21 overcame enemy resistance in individual strong points and came close to the outer perimeter of the Berlin defensive area. Considering the upcoming nature of the fighting in such a large city as Berlin, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to strengthen the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P. S. Rybalko with the 10th Artillery Corps, 25th artillery division breakthrough, the 23rd anti-aircraft artillery division and the 2nd fighter aviation corps. In addition, two rifle divisions of the 28th Army of General A. A. Luchinsky, brought into the battle from the second echelon of the front, were transported by motor transport.

On the morning of April 22, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, having deployed all three corps in the first echelon, began an attack on enemy fortifications. Army troops broke through the outer defensive perimeter of the Berlin region and by the end of the day they began fighting on the southern outskirts of the German capital. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front had broken into its northeastern outskirts the day before.

Operating to the left, the 4th Guards Tank Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko by the end of April 22 also broke through the outer defensive contour and, reaching the Zarmund-Belits line, took an advantageous position to connect with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and complete the encirclement together with them. the entire Berlin enemy group. Its 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards armies, had by this time reached the line of Belitz, Treuenbritzen, Tsana. As a result, the path to Berlin for enemy reserves from the west and southwest was closed. In Treuenbritzen, tank crews of the 4th Guards Tank Army rescued from fascist captivity about 1,600 prisoners of war of various nationalities: British, Americans and Norwegians, including the former commander of the Norwegian army, General O. Ryge. A few days later, soldiers of the same army liberated from a concentration camp (in the suburbs of Berlin) the former Prime Minister of France E. Herriot, a famous statesman who back in the 20s advocated Franco-Soviet rapprochement.

Taking advantage of the success of the tankers, the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards Armies quickly advanced westward. In an effort to slow down the advance of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front towards Berlin, on April 18 the fascist command launched a counterattack from the Gorlitsa area against the troops of the 52nd Army. Having created a significant superiority in forces in this direction, the enemy tried to reach the rear of the front’s strike group. On April 19 - 23, fierce battles broke out here. The enemy managed to penetrate the positions of Soviet and then Polish troops to a depth of 20 km. To help the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army, the 4th Guards Tank Corps were transferred and up to four aviation corps were redirected. As a result, the enemy suffered great damage, and by the end of April 24, his advance was suspended.

While formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out a rapid maneuver to bypass the German capital from the south, the strike force of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked directly on Berlin from the east. After breaking through the Oder line, the front troops, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, moved forward. On April 20, at 13:50, the long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army fired the first two salvos at the fascist capital, and then systematic shelling began. By the end of April 21, the 3rd and 5th Shock Armies, as well as the 2nd Guards Tank Army, had already overcome resistance on the outer perimeter of the Berlin defensive area and reached the northeastern outskirts of the city. By the morning of April 22, the 9th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Havel River, on the northwestern outskirts of the capital, and, in cooperation with units of the 47th Army, began crossing it. The 1st Guards Tank and 8th Guards Armies also advanced successfully, and by April 21 they had reached the outer defensive perimeter. On the morning of the next day, the main forces of the front's strike group were already fighting with the enemy directly in Berlin.

By the end of April 22, Soviet troops had created the conditions to complete the encirclement and dissection of the entire Berlin enemy group. The distance between the advanced units of the 47th, 2nd Guards Tank Army, advancing from the northeast, and the 4th Guards Tank Army was 40 km, and between the left flank of the 8th Guards and the right flank of the 3rd Guards Tank Army - no more than 12 km. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having assessed the current situation, demanded that the front commanders complete the encirclement of the main forces of the 9th Field Army by the end of April 24 and prevent its withdrawal to Berlin or to the west. In order to ensure the timely and accurate implementation of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front introduced his second echelon into the battle - the 3rd Army under the command of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General V.V. Kryukov. In cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they were supposed to cut off the main forces of the enemy’s 9th Army from the capital and encircle them southeast of the city. The troops of the 47th Army and the 9th Guards Tank Corps were ordered to speed up the offensive and, no later than April 24-25, complete the encirclement of the entire enemy group in the Berlin direction. In connection with the advance of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the southern outskirts of Berlin, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the night of April 23 established a new demarcation line for it with the 1st Belorussian Front: from Lübben to the northwest to the Anhalt station in Berlin.

The Nazis made desperate efforts to prevent their capital from being encircled. On the afternoon of April 22, the last operational meeting was held in the Imperial Chancellery, which was attended by W. Keitel, A. Jodl, M. Bormann, G. Krebs and others. Hitler agreed with Jodl's proposal to remove western front all troops and throw them into the battle for Berlin. In this regard, the 12th Army of General W. Wenck, which occupied defensive positions on the Elbe, was ordered to turn its front to the east and advance to Potsdam and Berlin to join the 9th Army. At the same time, an army group under the command of SS General F. Steiner, which operated north of the capital, was supposed to strike the flank of a group of Soviet troops that was bypassing it from the north and northwest (634).

To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. Completely ignoring the actual state of affairs, the German command hoped that this army would attack from the west, and Steiner’s army group from the north, to prevent the complete encirclement of the city. The 12th Army, turning its front to the east, on April 24 began operations against the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies, which were occupying defenses at the Belitz-Tröyenbritzen line. The German 9th Army was ordered to withdraw west to link up with the 12th Army south of Berlin.

On April 23 and 24, fighting in all directions became particularly fierce. Although the pace of advance of the Soviet troops slowed down somewhat, the Nazis were unable to stop them. The intention of the fascist command to prevent the encirclement and dismemberment of their group was thwarted. Already on April 24, the troops of the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front linked up with the 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front southeast of Berlin. As a result, the main forces of the 9th and part of the forces of the enemy's 4th Tank Army were cut off from the city and surrounded. The next day after the connection west of Berlin, in the Ketzin area, the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front with the troops of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Berlin enemy group itself was surrounded.

On April 25, a meeting between Soviet and American troops took place. On this day, in the Torgau area, units of the 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army crossed the Elbe and established contact with the 69th Infantry Division of the 1st American Army that had arrived here. Germany found itself divided into two parts.

The situation in the Dresden direction also changed significantly. The counterattack of the enemy's Görlitz group by April 25 was finally thwarted by the stubborn and active defense of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army. To strengthen them, the defense line of the 52nd Army was narrowed, and to the left of it, formations of the 31st Army, which arrived at the front under the command of General P. G. Shafranov, deployed. The released rifle corps of the 52nd Army was used in the area of ​​its active operations.

Thus, in just ten days, Soviet troops overcame the enemy’s powerful defenses along the Oder and Neisse, encircled and dismembered his group in the Berlin direction and created the conditions for its complete liquidation.

In connection with the successful maneuver to encircle the Berlin group by troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, there was no longer a need to bypass Berlin from the north with the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front. As a result, already on April 23, Headquarters ordered him to develop the offensive in accordance with the original operation plan, that is, in the western and northwestern directions, and with part of his forces to strike bypassing Stettin from the west (635).

The offensive of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began on April 20 with the crossing of the West Oder River. Thick morning fog and smoke sharply limited the actions of Soviet aviation. However, after 9 o'clock visibility improved somewhat and air support increased for ground forces. The greatest success during the first day of the operation was achieved in the zone of the 65th Army under the command of General P.I. Batov. By evening, it captured several small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, transporting there 31 rifle battalions, part of the artillery and 15 self-propelled artillery units. The troops of the 70th Army under the command of General V.S. Popov also operated successfully. 12 rifle battalions were transported to the bridgehead they captured. The crossing of the West Oder by troops of the 49th Army of General I. T. Grishin turned out to be less successful: only on the second day they managed to capture a small bridgehead (636).

In the following days, front troops fought intense battles to expand bridgeheads, repelled enemy counterattacks, and also continued to cross their troops to the left bank of the Oder. By the end of April 25, formations of the 65th and 70th armies completed the breakthrough of the main defense line. In six days of fighting they advanced 20 - 22 km. The 49th Army, taking advantage of the success of its neighbors, in the morning of April 26, crossed the West Oder with its main forces along the crossings of the 70th Army and by the end of the day had advanced 10 - 12 km. On the same day, in the zone of the 65th Army, troops of the 2nd Shock Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky began crossing to the left bank of the West Oder. As a result of the actions of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 3rd German Tank Army was shackled, which deprived the Nazi command of the opportunity to use its forces for operations directly in the Berlin direction.

At the end of April, the Soviet command focused all its attention on Berlin. Before its assault, party-political work unfolded with renewed vigor among the troops. Back on April 23, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front addressed an appeal to the soldiers, which said: “Before you, Soviet heroes, is Berlin. You must take Berlin, and take it as quickly as possible, so as not to give the enemy time to come to his senses. For the honor of our Motherland forward! To Berlin!" (637) In conclusion, the Military Council expressed full confidence that the glorious warriors would fulfill the task entrusted to them with honor. Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations used any respite in the battles to familiarize everyone with this document. Army newspapers called on the soldiers: “Forward, for complete victory over the enemy!”, “Let us hoist the banner of our victory over Berlin!”

During the operation, employees of the Main Political Directorate negotiated almost daily with members of military councils and heads of political departments of the fronts, listened to their reports, and gave specific instructions and advice. The Main Political Directorate demanded that the soldiers be made aware that in Berlin they were fighting for the future of their Motherland, of all peace-loving humanity.

In newspapers, on billboards installed along the route of movement of Soviet troops, on guns, and vehicles there were inscriptions: “Comrades! Berlin's defenses have been breached! The desired hour of victory is near. Forward, comrades, forward!”, “One more effort, and victory is won!”, “The long-awaited hour has come! We are at the walls of Berlin!

And the Soviet soldiers intensified their attacks. Even wounded soldiers did not leave the battlefield. Thus, in the 65th Army, more than two thousand soldiers refused to be evacuated to the rear (638). Soldiers and commanders applied daily for admission to the party. For example, in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, 11,776 soldiers (639) were accepted into the party in April alone.

In this situation, special care was taken to further increase the command staff's sense of responsibility for carrying out combat missions, to ensure that officers did not lose control of the battle for a minute. All available forms, methods and means of party political work supported the initiative of the soldiers, their resourcefulness and audacity in battle. Party and Komsomol organizations helped commanders timely concentrate efforts where success was expected, and the communists were the first to rush into attacks and drag their non-party comrades along with them. “What kind of fortitude and desire to win it was necessary to have in order to reach the goal through a devastating barrage of fire, stone and reinforced concrete barriers, overcoming numerous “surprises”, fire bags and traps, engaging in hand-to-hand combat,” recalls a member of the Military Council 1- of the Belorussian Front, General K. F. Telegin. - But everyone wanted to live. But this is how a Soviet person was brought up - the common good, the happiness of his people, the glory of the Motherland are more valuable to him than anything personal, more valuable than life itself” (640).

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that demanded a humane attitude towards those ordinary members of the National Socialist Party who are loyal to the Soviet Army, the creation of local administrations everywhere, and the appointment of burgomasters in cities.

When solving the problem of capturing Berlin, the Soviet command understood that they could not underestimate the Frankfurt-Guben group, which Hitler intended to use to relieve the blockade of his capital. As a result, along with increasing efforts to defeat the Berlin garrison, the Headquarters considered it necessary to immediately begin eliminating the troops surrounded southeast of Berlin.

The Frankfurt-Guben group consisted of up to 200 thousand people. It was armed with over 2 thousand guns, more than 300 tanks and assault guns. The forested and swampy area it occupies is about 1500 square meters. km was very convenient for defense. Considering the composition of the enemy group, the Soviet command involved the 3rd, 69th and 33rd Armies and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 3rd Guards and 28th Armies, as well as the Rifle Corps of the 13th Army in its liquidation 1st Ukrainian Front. The actions of ground troops were supported by seven aviation corps; Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, and in artillery by 3.7 times. Since the bulk of Soviet tanks at that time were fighting directly in Berlin, the forces of the parties were equal in number.

In order to prevent a breakthrough of the blocked enemy group in the western direction, the troops of the 28th and part of the forces of the 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive. On the paths of a probable enemy attack, they prepared three defensive lines, laid mines and created rubble.

On the morning of April 26, Soviet troops launched an offensive against the encircled group, trying to dissect and destroy it piece by piece. The enemy not only put up stubborn resistance, but also made repeated attempts to break through to the west. Thus, units of two infantry, two motorized and tank divisions struck at the junction of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies. Having created a significant superiority in forces, the Nazis broke through the defenses in a narrow area and began to move west. During fierce battles, Soviet troops closed the neck of the breakthrough, and the part that broke through was surrounded in the Barut area and almost completely liquidated. Aviation provided great assistance to the ground forces, which during the day carried out about 500 sorties, destroying enemy manpower and equipment.

In the following days, fascist German troops again tried to connect with the 12th Army, which in turn sought to overcome the defenses of the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th armies operating on the outer front of the encirclement. However, all enemy attacks during April 27-28 were repelled. Considering the likelihood of new attempts by the enemy to break through to the west, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front strengthened the defense of the 28th and 3rd Guards Armies and concentrated its reserves in the areas of Zossen, Luckenwalde, and Jüterbog.

At the same time (April 26 - 28), troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were pushing back the encircled enemy group from the east. Fearing complete liquidation, the Nazis again tried to break out of the encirclement on the night of April 29. By dawn, at the cost of heavy losses, they managed to break through the main defensive line of Soviet troops at the junction of two fronts - in the area west of Wendisch-Buchholz. On the second line of defense, their advance was stopped. But the enemy, despite heavy losses, stubbornly rushed to the west. In the second half of April 29, up to 45 thousand fascist soldiers resumed attacks on the sector of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 28th Army, broke through its defenses and formed a corridor up to 2 km wide. Through it they began to retreat to Luckenwalde. The German 12th Army attacked from the west in the same direction. There was a threat of a union between two enemy groups. By the end of April 29, Soviet troops with decisive actions stopped the enemy’s advance at the Sperenberg-Kummersdorf line (12 km east of Luckenwalde). His troops were dismembered and surrounded in three separate areas. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of large enemy forces into the Kummersdorf area led to the fact that the communications of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies, as well as the 28th Armies, were cut off. The distance between the advanced units of the breakthrough group and the enemy 12th Army advancing from the west was reduced to 30 km.

Particularly intense fighting broke out on April 30. Ignoring losses, the Nazis continued their offensive and advanced 10 km to the west within a day. By the end of the day, a significant part of the troops that had broken through was eliminated. However, one of the groups (numbering up to 20 thousand people) on the night of May 1 managed to break through at the junction of the 13th and 4th Guards Tank Armies and reach the Belitsa area, now only 3 - 4 km separated it from the 12th Army . To prevent these troops from further advancing westward, the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army promoted two tank brigades, a mechanized brigade, a light artillery brigade, and a motorcycle regiment. During the fierce battles, the 1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps provided great assistance to the ground troops.

By the end of the day, the main part of the enemy's Frankfurt-Guben group was eliminated. All hopes of the fascist command for the unblockade of Berlin collapsed. Soviet troops captured 120 thousand soldiers and officers, captured more than 300 tanks and assault guns, over 1,500 field guns, 17,600 vehicles and a lot of various military equipment. The enemy lost 60 thousand people (641) in killed alone. Only small scattered groups of the enemy managed to penetrate through the forest and escape to the west. Part of the troops of the 12th Army that survived the defeat retreated to the left bank of the Elbe along bridges built by American troops and surrendered to them.

In the Dresden direction, the fascist German command did not abandon its intention to break through the defenses of Soviet troops in the Bautzen area and go to the rear of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Having regrouped their troops, the Nazis launched an offensive on the morning of April 26 with four divisions. Despite heavy losses, the enemy did not reach the goal and his advance was stopped. Stubborn fighting continued here until April 30, but there was no significant change in the position of the parties. The Nazis, having exhausted their offensive capabilities, went on the defensive in this direction.

Thus, thanks to stubborn and active defense, Soviet troops not only thwarted the enemy’s plan to go behind the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front, but also captured bridgeheads on the Elbe in the area of ​​Meissen, Riesen, which later served as a favorable starting area for an attack on Prague.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Berlin reached its climax. The garrison, continuously increasing due to the attraction of the city population and retreating military units, already numbered 300 thousand people (642). It was armed with 3 thousand guns and mortars, 250 tanks. By the end of April 25, the enemy occupied the territory of the capital along with its suburbs with a total area of ​​325 square meters. km. The eastern and southeastern outskirts of Berlin were most fortified. The streets and alleys were crossed by strong barricades. Everything was adapted to the defense, even destroyed buildings. The city's underground structures were widely used: bomb shelters, metro stations and tunnels, drainage collectors and other objects. Reinforced concrete bunkers were built, the largest ones for 300 - 1000 people each, as well as a large number of reinforced concrete caps.

By April 26, troops of the 47th Army, 3rd and 5th Shock, 8th Guards Combined Arms, 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In total, they included about 464 thousand people, over 12.7 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers, up to 2.1 thousand rocket artillery installations, about 1,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.

The Soviet command abandoned an offensive along the entire circumference of the city, as this could lead to excessive dispersal of forces and a slowdown in the pace of advance, but concentrated efforts on individual directions. Thanks to this unique tactic of “driving” deep wedges into the enemy’s position, his defense was dismembered into separate parts, and troop control was paralyzed. This method of action increased the pace of the offensive and ultimately led to effective results.

Taking into account the experience of previous battles for large populated areas, the Soviet command ordered the creation of assault detachments in each division as part of reinforced battalions or companies. Each such detachment, in addition to infantry, included artillery, tanks, self-propelled artillery units, sappers, and often flamethrowers. It was intended for action in any one direction, which usually included one street, or for the assault of a large object. To capture smaller objects, assault groups consisting of a rifle squad to a platoon, reinforced with 2 - 4 guns, 1 - 2 tanks or self-propelled artillery units, as well as sappers and flamethrowers, were allocated from the same detachments.

The start of operations by assault detachments and groups, as a rule, was preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation. Before attacking a fortified building, the assault force was usually divided into two groups. One of them, under the cover of tank and artillery fire, burst into the building, blocked the exits from the basements, which served as shelter for the Nazis during the artillery barrage, and then destroyed them with grenades and bottles of flammable liquid. The second group cleared the upper floors of machine gunners and snipers.

The specific conditions of combat operations in a large city determined a number of features in the use of military branches. Thus, artillery destruction groups were created in divisions and corps, and long-range groups were created in combined arms armies. A significant part of the artillery was used for direct fire. The experience of previous battles has shown that tanks and self-propelled artillery can only advance if they work closely with the infantry and under its cover. Attempts to use tanks independently led to heavy losses from artillery fire and faustpatrons. Due to the fact that during the assault Berlin was shrouded in smoke, massive use bomber aviation it was often difficult. Therefore, the main forces of bomber and attack aircraft were used to destroy the Frankfurt-Guben group, and fighter aircraft carried out an air blockade of Hitler’s capital. The aircraft carried out the most powerful strikes on military targets in the city on April 25 and on the night of April 26. The 16th and 18th Air Armies carried out three massive strikes, involving 2,049 aircraft.

After the Soviet troops captured the airfields in Tempelhof and Gatow, the Nazis tried to use Charlottenburgstrasse to land their planes. However, these enemy calculations were also thwarted by the actions of the pilots of the 16th Air Army, who continuously patrolled over this area. Attempts by the Nazis to drop supplies to the encircled troops by parachute were also unsuccessful. Most of the enemy transport planes were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft as they approached Berlin. Thus, after April 28, the Berlin garrison could no longer receive any effective assistance from outside. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. By the end of April 26, Soviet troops had cut off the Potsdam enemy group from Berlin. The next day, formations of both fronts penetrated deeply into the enemy’s defenses and began fighting in the central sector of the capital. As a result of the concentric offensive of the Soviet troops, by the end of April 27, the enemy group was compressed into a narrow zone (it reached 16 km from east to west). Due to the fact that its width was only 2 - 3 km, the entire territory occupied by the enemy was under the continuous influence of fire weapons of the Soviet troops. The fascist German command sought to provide assistance to the Berlin group by any means possible. “Our troops on the Elbe,” noted in the OKB diary, “turned their backs on the Americans in order to alleviate the situation of the defenders of Berlin with their offensive from the outside” (643). However, by the end of April 28, the encircled group was divided into three parts. By this time, attempts by the Wehrmacht command to assist the Berlin garrison with external attacks had completely failed. The political and moral state of the fascist troops fell sharply.

On this day, Hitler subordinated the general staff of the ground forces to the chief of staff of the operational leadership, hoping to restore the integrity of command and control. Instead of General G. Heinrici, accused of unwillingness to provide assistance to the encircled Berlin, General K. Student was appointed commander of Army Group Vistula.

After April 28, the struggle continued unabated. Now it flared up in the area of ​​the Reichstag, the battle for which began on April 29 by the troops of the 3rd Shock Army. The Reichstag garrison, consisting of 1 thousand soldiers and officers, was armed with a large number of guns, machine guns and faust cartridges. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various barriers were erected, and machine gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

The task of capturing the Reichstag building was assigned to the 79th Rifle Corps of General S.N. Perevertkin. Having captured the Moltke Bridge on the night of April 29, units of the corps on April 30, by 4 o'clock, captured a large resistance center - the house where the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Nazi Germany and the Swiss Embassy were located, and went directly to the Reichstag. Only in the evening, after repeated attacks by the 150th and 171st rifle divisions of General V.M. Shatilov and Colonel A.I. Negoda, soldiers of the 756th, 674th and 380th rifle regiments, commanded by Colonel F.M. Zinchenko, Lieutenant Colonel A D. Plekhodanov and the chief of staff of the regiment, Major V. D. Shatalin, burst into the building. The soldiers, sergeants and officers of the battalions of captains S.A. Neustroev and V.I. Davydov, senior lieutenant K.Ya. Samsonov, as well as individual groups of Major M.M. covered themselves with unfading glory. Bondar, captain V.N. Makov and others.

Together with rifle units, the valiant tankmen of the 23rd Tank Brigade stormed the Reichstag. The commanders of the tank battalions, Major I.L. Yartsev and Captain S.V. Krasovsky, the commander of the tank company, Senior Lieutenant P.E. Nuzhdin, the commander of the tank platoon, Lieutenant A.K. Romanov, and the assistant commander of the reconnaissance platoon, Senior Sergeant N.V. Kapustin, tank commander senior lieutenant A. G. Gaganov, driver mechanics senior sergeant P. E. Lavrov and foreman I. N. Kletnay, gunner senior sergeant M. G. Lukyanov and many others.

The Nazis put up fierce resistance. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out on the stairs and in the corridors. The assault units, meter by meter, room by room, cleared the Reichstag building of fascists. The fighting continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, holed up in basement compartments, capitulated only on the night of May 2.

Early in the morning of May 1, on the pediment of the Reichstag, near the sculptural group, the Red Banner, presented to the commander of the 150th Infantry Division by the Military Council of the 3rd Shock Army, was already waving. It was erected by scouts of the 756th Infantry Regiment of the 150th Infantry Division M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria, led by the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Lieutenant A.P. Berest, with the support of company machine gunners I.Ya. Syanov. This Banner symbolically embodied all the banners and flags that, during the most fierce battles, were hoisted by the groups of Captain V.N. Makov, Lieutenant R. Koshkarbaev, Major M.M. Bondar and many other soldiers. From the main entrance of the Reichstag to the roof, their heroic path was marked with red banners, flags and flags, as if now merging into a single Banner of Victory. It was a triumph of victory, a triumph of the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, the greatness of the feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the entire Soviet people.

“And when the red banner, hoisted by the hands of Soviet soldiers, soared over the Reichstag,” said L. I. Brezhnev, “it was not only the banner of our military victory. This was the immortal banner of October; it was the great banner of Lenin; it was the invincible banner of socialism - a bright symbol of hope, a symbol of freedom and happiness of all peoples!” (644)

On April 30, Hitler's troops in Berlin were actually divided into four isolated units of different composition, and command and control of the troops was paralyzed. The last hopes of the fascist German command for the liberation of the Berlin garrison by the forces of Wenck, Steiner and Busse were dissipated. Panic began among the fascist leadership. To evade responsibility for the atrocities committed, Hitler committed suicide on April 30. In order to hide this from the army, fascist radio reported that the Fuhrer had been killed at the front near Berlin. On the same day, in Schleswig-Holstein, Hitler's successor, Grand Admiral Doenitz, appointed a “provisional imperial government”, which, as subsequent events showed, tried to reach contact with the United States and England on an anti-Soviet basis (645).

However, the days of Nazi Germany were already numbered. The position of the Berlin group by the end of April 30 became catastrophic. At 3 o'clock on May 1, the chief of the general staff of the German ground forces, General Krebs, by agreement with the Soviet command, crossed the front line in Berlin and was received by the commander of the 8th guards army General V.I. Chuikov. Krebs reported Hitler's suicide, and also conveyed a list of members of the new imperial government and a proposal from Goebbels and Bormann for a temporary cessation of hostilities in the capital in order to prepare the conditions for peace negotiations between Germany and the USSR. However, this document said nothing about surrender. This was the last attempt by the fascist leaders to split the anti-Hitler coalition. But the Soviet command figured out this enemy plan too.

Krebs' message was reported through Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The answer was extremely short: to force the Berlin garrison to immediately and unconditionally capitulate. The negotiations did not affect the intensity of the fighting in Berlin. Soviet troops continued to actively advance, striving for complete capture of the enemy capital, and the Nazis offered stubborn resistance. At 18:00 it became known that the fascist leaders rejected the demand for unconditional surrender. By doing this, they once again demonstrated their complete indifference to the fate of millions of ordinary Germans.

The Soviet command gave the troops the order to complete the liquidation of the enemy group in Berlin as soon as possible. Within half an hour, all the artillery hit the enemy. The fighting continued throughout the night. When the remnants of the garrison were dismembered into isolated groups, the Nazis realized that resistance was useless. On the night of May 2, the commander of the defense of Berlin, General G. Weidling, announced to the Soviet command the surrender of the 56th Tank Corps, subordinate directly to him. At 6 o'clock, having crossed the front line in the 8th Guards Army, he surrendered. At the suggestion of the Soviet command, Weidling signed an order for the Berlin garrison to stop resistance and lay down their arms. Somewhat later, a similar order on behalf of the “provisional imperial government” was signed by Goebbels’ first deputy, G. Fritsche. Due to the fact that the control of Hitler's troops in Berlin was paralyzed, the orders of Weidling and Fritsche could not be communicated to all units and formations. Therefore, from the morning of May 2, individual enemy groups continued to resist and even tried to break out of the city to the west. Only after the order was announced on the radio did mass surrender begin. By 15:00 the enemy had completely ceased resistance in Berlin. On this day alone, Soviet troops captured up to 135 thousand people (646) in the city area.

The above figures convincingly indicate that the Nazi leadership attracted considerable forces to defend its capital. Soviet troops fought against a large enemy group, and not against the civilian population, as some bourgeois falsifiers claim. The battles for Berlin were fierce and, as Hitler’s general E. Butlar wrote after the war, “cost great losses not only to the Germans, but also to the Russians...” (647).

During the operation, millions of Germans became convinced from their own experience of the humane attitude of the Soviet Army towards civilians. Fierce fighting continued on the streets of Berlin, and Soviet soldiers shared hot food with children, women and the elderly. By the end of May, the entire population of Berlin had been issued food cards and food distribution was organized. Even though these standards were still small, the residents of the capital received more food than recently under Hitler. Before the artillery salvoes had died down, work began on establishing the city's economy. Under the leadership of military engineers and technicians, Soviet soldiers, together with the population, restored the metro by the beginning of June, and trams were launched. The city received water, gas, electricity. Life was returning to normal. The intoxication of Goebbels's propaganda about the monstrous atrocities allegedly inflicted on the Germans by the Soviet Army began to dissipate. “The innumerable noble deeds of the Soviet people will never be forgotten, who, while still holding a rifle in one hand, were already sharing a piece of bread with the other, helping our people overcome the terrible consequences of the war unleashed by the Hitler clique and take the destinies of the country into their own hands, clearing the way for those enslaved and enslaved by imperialism and fascism to the German working class...” - this is how 30 years later the Minister of National Defense of the GDR, General G. Hoffmann, assessed the actions of Soviet soldiers (648).

Simultaneously with the end of hostilities in Berlin, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to regroup in the Prague direction to complete the task of completing the liberation of Czechoslovakia, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front moved westward and by May 7 reached the Elbe on a wide front .

During the assault on Berlin, a successful offensive by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was launched in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg. By the end of May 2, they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and the next day, having advanced to the line of Wismar, Schwerin, and the Elbe River, they established contact with the 2nd British Army. The liberation of the islands of Wollin, Usedom and Rügen ended the offensive operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Even at the final stage of the operation, front troops entered into operational-tactical cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: fleet aviation provided effective support to ground forces advancing in the coastal direction, especially in the battles for the Swinemünde naval base. The amphibious assault landing on the Danish island of Bornholm disarmed and captured the Nazi troops stationed there.

Destruction Soviet Army Berlin enemy group and the capture of Berlin were the final act in the fight against Nazi Germany. With the fall of the capital, it lost all possibility of waging an organized armed struggle and soon capitulated.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, won a world-historical victory.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 12 tank, 11 motorized divisions and most of the Wehrmacht aviation. About 480 thousand soldiers and officers were captured, up to 11 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, as well as 4.5 thousand aircraft were captured as trophies.

Together with Soviet soldiers, soldiers and officers of the Polish Army took an active part in the defeat of this group. Both Polish armies operated in the first operational echelon of the Soviet fronts, 12.5 thousand Polish soldiers took part in the assault on Berlin. They hoisted their national banner above the Brandenburg Gate next to the victorious Soviet Red Banner. It was a triumph of the Soviet-Polish military partnership.

The Berlin operation is one of largest operations Second World War. It was characterized by exceptionally high intensity of struggle on both sides. Poisoned by false propaganda and intimidated by cruel repressions, the fascist troops resisted with extraordinary tenacity. The degree of fierceness of the fighting is also evidenced by the large losses of Soviet troops. From April 16 to May 8, they lost more than 102 thousand people (649). Meanwhile, American-British troops along the entire Western Front lost 260 thousand people (650) during 1945.

As in previous battles, in the Berlin operation, Soviet soldiers showed high combat skill, courage and mass heroism. More than 600 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was awarded the third, and Marshals of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and K.K. Rokossovsky the second Gold Star medal. The second Gold Star medal was awarded to V. I. Andrianov, S. E. Artemenko, P. I. Batov, T. Ya. Begeldinov, D. A. Dragunsky, A. N. Efimov, S. I. Kretov, M. V. Kuznetsov, I. X. Mikhailichenko, M. P. Odintsov, V. S. Petrov, P. A. Plotnikov, V. I. Popkov, A. I. Rodimtsev, V. G. Ryazanov, E. Y. Savitsky, V. V. Senko, Z. K. Slyusarenko, N. G. Stolyarov, E. P. Fedorov, M. G. Fomichev. 187 units and formations received the names Berlin. From the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts alone, 1,141 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, many units and formations were awarded orders of the Soviet Union, and 1,082 thousand participants in the assault were awarded the medal “For the Capture of Berlin”, established in honor of this historic victory.

The Berlin operation made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of Soviet military art. It was prepared and carried out on the basis of comprehensive consideration and creative use of the rich experience of the Soviet Armed Forces accumulated during the war. At the same time, the military art of the Soviet troops in this operation has a number of features.

The operation was prepared in a short time, and its main goals - encircling and destroying the main enemy group and capturing Berlin - were achieved in 16-17 days. Noting this feature, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky wrote: “The pace of preparation and implementation of final operations indicates that the Soviet military economy and the Armed Forces had reached a level by 1945 that made it possible to do what would previously have seemed a miracle” ( 651)

The limited preparation time for such a large operation required new, more effective forms and methods of work from commanders and staffs of all levels. Not only in fronts and armies, but also in corps and divisions, a parallel method of work of commanders and staffs was usually used. At all command and staff levels, the rule developed in previous operations was strictly observed to provide troops with as much time as possible for their immediate preparation for combat operations.

The Berlin operation is distinguished by the clarity of its strategic plan, which was fully consistent with the assigned tasks and the peculiarities of the current situation. It is a classic example of an offensive by a group of fronts carried out with such a decisive goal. During this operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of wars.

The simultaneous offensive of three fronts in a 300-kilometer zone with the delivery of six strikes pinned down the enemy’s reserves, contributed to the disorganization of his command, and in a number of cases made it possible to achieve operational-tactical surprise.

Soviet military art in the Berlin operation was characterized by the decisive massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks, the creation of high densities of suppression means and deep echeloning of combat formations of troops, which ensured a relatively quick breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the subsequent encirclement and destruction of his main forces and the preservation of overall superiority over enemy throughout the entire operation.

The Berlin operation is very instructive in its experience of the varied combat use of armored and mechanized forces. It involved 4 tank armies, 10 separate tank and mechanized corps, 16 separate tank and self-propelled artillery brigades, as well as more than 80 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. The operation once again clearly demonstrated the feasibility of not only tactical, but also operational massing of armored and mechanized troops in the most important areas. The creation of powerful success development echelons in the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (each included two tank armies) is the most important prerequisite for the successful conduct of the entire operation, which once again confirmed that tank armies and corps, when used correctly, are the main a means of developing success.

The combat use of artillery in the operation was characterized by its skillful massing in the directions of the main attacks, the creation of artillery groups at all organizational levels - from regiment to army, centralized planning of an artillery offensive, wide maneuver of artillery, including large artillery formations, sustainable fire superiority over the enemy .

The art of the Soviet command in using aviation was manifested primarily in its massing and close interaction with ground forces, to support which the main efforts of all air armies, including long-range aviation, were directed. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation firmly maintained air supremacy. In 1,317 air battles, 1,132 enemy aircraft (652) were shot down. The defeat of the main forces of the 6th Air Fleet and the Reich Air Fleet was completed in the first five days of the operation, and subsequently the rest of the aviation was finished off. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation destroyed the enemy's defensive structures, destroyed and suppressed its firepower and manpower. Working closely with combined arms formations, it struck the enemy day and night, bombarded his troops on the roads and on the battlefield, when moving them out of the depths and when leaving encirclement, and disrupted control. The use of the Air Force was characterized by centralization of its control, timely relocation, and continuous increase in efforts in solving basic tasks. Ultimately, the combat use of aviation in the Berlin operation most fully expressed the essence of that form of warfare, which during the war was called an air offensive.

In the operation under consideration, the art of organizing interaction was further improved. The foundations of strategic interaction were laid even during the development of its concept through careful coordination of the actions of the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces in the interests of successfully solving the main operational-strategic tasks. As a rule, the interaction of the fronts within the framework of the strategic operation was also stable.

The Berlin operation provided interesting experience in the use of the Dnieper military flotilla. The skillfully executed maneuver from the Western Bug and Pripyat to the Oder deserves attention. In difficult hydrographic conditions, the flotilla completed a more than 500-kilometer journey in 20 days. Some of the flotilla's ships were transported by rail over distances exceeding 800 km. And this took place in conditions when on the route of their movement there were 75 operational and destroyed crossings, railway and highway bridges, locks and other hydraulic structures, and in 48 places it was necessary to clear the shipping channel. In close operational-tactical cooperation with ground forces, the ships of the flotilla solved various tasks. They took part in artillery preparation, assisted the advancing troops in crossing water barriers and actively participated in the battles for Berlin on the Spree River.

Political bodies showed great skill in ensuring the combat activities of troops. The intense and purposeful work of commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations ensured an exceptionally high morale and offensive impulse among all soldiers and contributed to the solution of the historical task - the victorious end of the war with Nazi Germany.

The successful conduct of one of the last operations of the Second World War in Europe was also ensured by the high level of strategic leadership and the military leadership of the commanders of the fronts and armies. Unlike most previous strategic operations, where coordination of the actions of the fronts was entrusted to representatives of the Headquarters, in the Berlin operation the general command of the troops was carried out directly by the Supreme High Command. Headquarters and the General Staff showed particularly high skill and flexibility in the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. They promptly set tasks for the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces, clarified them during the offensive depending on changes in the situation, organized and supported operational-strategic interaction, skillfully used strategic reserves, and continuously replenished the troops with personnel, weapons and military equipment.

Certificate high level Soviet military art and the skill of military leaders in the Berlin operation was a successful solution to the complex problem of logistics support for troops. The limited preparation time for the operation and the large expenditure of material resources, due to the nature of the hostilities, required great tension in the work of the rear agencies of all levels. Suffice it to say that during the operation, troops on three fronts consumed over 7,200 wagons of ammunition and from 2 - 2.5 (diesel fuel) to 7 - 10 (aviation gasoline) front-line fuel refills. The successful solution of logistics support was achieved mainly due to the sharp approach of material supplies to the troops and the widespread use of road transport to transport the necessary supplies. Even during the period of preparation for the operation, more material was transported by road than by rail. Thus, 238.4 thousand tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants were delivered to the 1st Belorussian Front by rail, and 333.4 thousand tons were delivered by road transport of the front and armies.

Military topographers made a great contribution to ensuring the combat operations of troops. The military topographic service promptly and completely provided the troops with topographic and special maps, prepared initial geodetic data for artillery fire, took an active part in deciphering aerial photographs, and determined the coordinates of targets. Only the troops and headquarters of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were issued 6.1 million copies of maps, 15 thousand aerial photographs were deciphered, the coordinates of about 1.6 thousand support and artillery networks were determined, and 400 artillery batteries were geodetic referenced. In order to support combat operations in Berlin, the topographic service of the 1st Belorussian Front prepared a relief plan of the city, which turned out to be of great help to the headquarters in preparing and conducting the operation.

The Berlin operation went down in history as the victorious crown of the difficult and glorious path that the Soviet Armed Forces, led by the Communist Party, traversed. The operation was carried out with full satisfaction of the needs of the fronts with military equipment, weapons and logistics. The heroic rear provided its soldiers with everything that was necessary for the final defeat of the enemy. This is one of the clearest and most convincing evidence of the high organization and power of the economy of the Soviet socialist state.

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Everything seems to be clearer than ever with the capture of the den of fascism by Soviet troops, if you do not take into account the discrepancy in the assessment of the number of opposing opponents and their losses, weapons and military equipment that took part in the battles for Berlin

“The defense of Berlin is very poorly organized, and the operation of our troops to capture the city is developing very slowly,” Zhukov convinced the army commanders in a telegram dated April 22, 1945 (Note 1*)
“The number and strength of the formations that defended the capital of the German Reich in these April days... were so insignificant that it is even difficult to imagine” - Theo Findal, Norwegian journalist for the Aftenposten newspaper (Oslo), eyewitness to the siege of Berlin (Note 22* )
“... it feels like our troops worked on Berlin with taste. While passing, I saw only a dozen surviving houses” - Stalin 07/16/1945 at the Potsdam Conference of the Heads of the Three Allied Powers (Note 8*)

BRIEF INFO: Berlin's population in 1945 was 2-2.5 million people, area 88 thousand hectares. This area, the so-called Greater Berlin, was only 15% built up. The rest of the city was occupied by gardens and parks. Greater Berlin was divided into 20 districts, of which 14 were external. The development of the outer areas was sparse, low-rise, most houses had a wall thickness of 0.5-0.8 m. The border of Greater Berlin was the ring motorway. The innermost areas of the city were most densely built up within the boundaries of the ring railway. Approximately along the border of the densely built area was the perimeter of the city’s defense system, divided into 9 (8 and one internal - Note 28*) sectors. The average width of streets in these areas is 20–30 m, and in some cases up to 60 m. The buildings are stone and concrete. The average height of the houses is 4–5 floors, the thickness of the walls of the buildings is up to 1.5 m. By the spring of 1945, most of the houses were destroyed by Allied bombing. Sewage, water and electricity supplies were damaged and did not work. The total length of the metro lines was about 80 km. (Note 2* and 13*). In the city there were more than 400 reinforced concrete bunkers for 300-1000 people (Note 6*). 100 km. was the total length of the Berlin front and 325 sq.m - the area of ​​​​the besieged city at the time of the start of the assault
- on 03/06/45, General H. Reimann, commandant of Berlin (until 04/24/45 - Note 28 *), stated that no measures were taken to protect the city from the assault, there was no plan, no line of defense, and in fact there was no there were troops. Worse, there were no food supplies for the civilian population, and there was simply no plan for the evacuation of women, children and the elderly (Note 27*). According to General G. Weidling, the last commandant of Berlin, on April 24, 1945, Berlin had food and ammunition supplies for 30 days, but the warehouses were located on the outskirts, in the center there was almost no ammunition or food, and the more the ring of the Red Army narrowed around the defenders of the city, the more difficult the situation with ammunition and food became, and in the last couple of days they were left almost without both (Note 28*)
- communication between individual defensive sectors, as well as communication with the defense headquarters, was worthless. There was no radio communication, telephone communication was maintained only through civilian telephone wires (Note 28)
- 04/22/45, for unknown reasons, 1400 Berlin fire brigades were ordered to move from the city to the West, the order was subsequently canceled, but only a small number of firefighters were able to return (Note 27*)
- on the eve of the assault, 65% of all large factories and plants, which employed 600 thousand people, continued to function in the city (Note 27*)

More than 100 thousand foreign workers, mostly French and Soviet citizens, were present on the eve of the storming of Berlin (Note 27*)
- in accordance with previously reached agreements with the USSR, the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at the beginning of April 1945 finally stopped at the turn of the Elbe River, which corresponds to a distance of 100-120 km. from Berlin. At the same time, Soviet troops were at a distance of 60 km from Berlin (Note 13*) - fearing that the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition would violate their previously assumed obligations, Stalin ordered the assault on Berlin to begin no later than April 16, 1945 and take the city in 12 15 days (Note 13*)
- initially, on April 14, 1945, the Berlin garrison consisted of 200 Volkssturm battalions, the Greater Germany security regiment, one anti-aircraft division with reinforcement units, 3 tank destroyer brigades, a special tank company "Berlin" (24 T-VI and T- tanks V not moving, as well as individual towers mounted on concrete bunkers), 3 anti-tank divisions, defense armored train No. 350, which totaled 150 thousand people, 330 guns, 1 armored train, 24 tanks not moving (Note 12*) . Until April 24, 1945, according to the last commandant of the city, General G. Wedling, there was not a single regular formation in Berlin, with the exception of the “Greater Germany” security regiment and the SS Mohnke brigade, which guarded the Imperial Chancellery and up to 90 thousand people from the Volkssturm , police, fire department, anti-aircraft units, except for the rear units serving them (Note 28*). According to modern Russian data for 2005, Weidling had 60 thousand soldiers at his disposal, who were opposed by 464 thousand Soviet troops. On April 26, 1945, the Germans took the last step to stop the enemy (Note 30*)

According to Soviet data, the encircled garrison of Berlin on April 25, 1945 numbered 300 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, 250 tanks and self-propelled guns. According to German data: 41 thousand people (of which 24 thousand were “Volkssturmists”, 18 thousand of whom belonged to the “Clausewitz call” from the 2nd category and were in a state of 6-hour readiness). In the city there was the Munichenberg Panzer Division, the 118th Panzer Division (sometimes called the 18th Panzergrenadier Division), the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, units of the 15th Latvian Grenadier Division, and air defense units (Note 7* and 5*). According to other sources, in addition to the Hitler Youth and Volkssturm, the city was defended by units of the 11th SS Division "Nordland", the 32nd Grenadier Division of the Waffen-SS "Charlemagne" (a total of about 400 French - data from Western historians), a Latvian battalion from the 15th Grenadier Waffen-SS divisions, two incomplete divisions of the 47th Wehrmacht Corps and 600 SS men of Hitler’s personal battalion (Note 14*). According to the last commandant of Berlin, on April 24, 1945, the city was defended by units of the 56th Tank Corps (13-15 thousand people) consisting of: 18th MD (up to 4000 people), the Muncheberg division (up to 200 people, division artillery and 4 tanks ), MDSS "Nordland" (3500-4000 people); 20th MD (800-1200 people); 9th ADD (up to 4500 people) (Note 28*)
- The 102nd Spanish company as part of the SS Grenadier Division "Nordland" fought in the Moritz Platz area, where the buildings of the Reich Ministry of Aviation and Propaganda were located (Note 24*)
- 6 Turkestan battalions from eastern volunteers took part in the defense of the city (Note 29*)

- the total number of defenders was approximately 60 thousand and consisted of various units of the Wehrmacht, SS, anti-aircraft units, police, fire brigades, Volkssturm and Hitler Youth with no more than 50 tanks, but a relatively large number of anti-aircraft guns, including 4 anti-aircraft air defense towers (Note 20*); the number of Berlin defenders is 60 thousand with 50-60 tanks (Note 19*), a similar estimate is given by Z. Knappe, head of the operational department of the 26th Tank Tank, and not 300 thousand according to official Soviet data. The book “The Fall of Berlin” by English historians E. Reed and D. Fisher provides figures according to which on April 19, 1945, the military commandant of Berlin, General H. Reimann, had 41,253 people at his disposal. Of this number, only 15,000 were soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. Among the rest were 1713 (12 thousand - Note 27 *) police officers, 1215 "Hitler Youth" and representatives of the labor service and 24 thousand Volkssturmists. Theoretically, within 6 hours a conscription could be put under arms (Volkssturm units of the 2nd category, which were supposed to join the ranks of the defenders already during the battles, and as certain enterprises were closed - Note 28 *), called "Clausewitz Muster", numbering 52,841 people. But the reality of such a call and its combat capabilities were quite conditional. In addition, weapons and ammunition were a big problem. In total, Reiman had at his disposal 42,095 rifles, 773 submachine guns, 1,953 light machine guns, 263 heavy machine guns and a small number of mortars and field guns. Standing apart among the defenders of Berlin was Hitler's personal guard, numbering about 1,200 people. The number of Berlin defenders is also evidenced by the number of prisoners taken during the capitulation (as of 05/02/45, 134 thousand military personnel, military officials and military police officers were captured (surrendered or arrested? - editor's note) (Notes 5* and 7 *).The size of the Berlin garrison can be estimated at 100–120 thousand people (Note 2*).

Norwegian journalist Theo Findal from the Aftenposten newspaper (Oslo), an eyewitness to the siege of Berlin: "... Undoubtedly, the basis of Berlin's defense was artillery. It consisted of light and heavy batteries, which were united into weak regiments... Almost all the guns were foreign production, and therefore the supply of ammunition was limited. In addition, the artillery was almost immobile, since the regiments did not have a single tractor. The infantry units of the defenders of Berlin were not distinguished by either good weapons or high combat training. The Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth were the main forces of local self-defense. They could not be considered as combat units. Rather, they could be compared with paramilitary units of the people's militia. All age groups were represented in the Volkssturm - from 16-year-old boys to 60-year-old men. But most often the bulk of the units The Volkssturm consisted of elderly people. As a rule, the party appointed unit commanders from its ranks and only the SS brigade of SS Brigadeführer Mohnke, which exercised command power in the city center, was well equipped and distinguished by high morale" (Note 22 *)
- at the end of the assault on the city, 84 out of 950 bridges were destroyed (Note 11*). According to other sources, the defenders of the city destroyed 120 bridges (Note 20* and 27*) out of the existing 248 city bridges (Note 27*)
- Allied aviation dropped 49,400 tons of explosives on Berlin, destroying and partially destroying 20.9% of the city's buildings (Note 10*). According to the Red Army rear services, the allies for three last year The war dropped 58,955 tons of bombs on Berlin, while Soviet artillery fired 36,280 tons. shells in just 16 days of assault (Note 20*)
- Allied bombing of Berlin reached its peak in early 1945. 03/28/1945 The 8th Army of the US Air Force, based in England, struck with 383 B-17 aircraft with 1038 tons of bombs on board (Note 23*)
- 02/03/45 alone killed 25 thousand Berlin residents as a result of an American raid (Note 26*). In total, 52 thousand Berliners died as a result of the bombing (Note 27*)
- The Berlin operation is listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the bloodiest battle of our time: 3.5 million people, 52 thousand guns and mortars, 7,750 tanks, and 11 thousand aircraft took part in it on both sides (Note 5*)
- the assault on Berlin was carried out by units of the 1st, 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with the support of warships of the Baltic Fleet and the Dnieper River Flotilla (62 units). From the air, the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by the 2nd VA (1,106 fighters, 529 attack aircraft, 422 bombers and 91 reconnaissance aircraft), the 1st Belorussian Front - by the 16th and 18th VA (1,567 fighters, 731 attack aircraft, 762 bomber and 128 reconnaissance aircraft), the 2nd Belorussian Front was supported by the 4th VA (602 fighters, 449 attack aircraft, 283 bombers and 26 reconnaissance aircraft)

1st Belorussian Front consisted of 5 combined arms armies, 2 shock and 1 guards armies, 2 guards tank armies, 2 guards cavalry corps, 1 army of the Polish Army: 768 thousand people, 1795 tanks, 1360 self-propelled guns, 2306 anti-tank guns, 7442 field guns (caliber from 76mm and above), 7186 mortars (caliber 82mm and above), 807 Katyusha ruzo
2nd Belorussian Front consisted of 5 armies (one of them was shock): 314 thousand people, 644 tanks, 307 self-propelled guns, 770 anti-tank guns, 3172 field guns (caliber 76mm and above), 2770 mortars (caliber 82mm and above), 1531 ruzo " Katyusha"
1st Ukrainian Front consisted of 2 combined arms, 2 guards tank and 1 guards armies and the army of the Polish Army: 511.1 thousand people, 1388 tanks, 667 self-propelled guns, 1444 anti-tank guns, 5040 field guns (caliber from 76mm and above), 5225 mortars (caliber from 82mm and above), 917 ruzo "Katyusha" (Note 13*)
- according to other sources, the assault on Berlin was carried out by units of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, which included 464 thousand soldiers and officers, 14.8 thousand guns and mortars, almost 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as, (Note 19*) - at least 2 thousand Katyushas. 12.5 thousand Polish troops also took part in the assault (Note 7 *, 5 *, 19 *)
- in the Berlin operation, in addition to the armies of three fronts, units of the 18th VA long-range aviation, air defense troops, the Baltic Fleet and the Dnieper military flotilla were involved, which totaled 2.5 million people, 41.6 thousand guns and mortars, 6250 tanks and self-propelled guns, 7.5 thousand aircraft. This made it possible to achieve superiority in personnel - by 2.5 times, in tanks and artillery - by 4 times, in aircraft - by 2 times (Note 7 * and 25 *)
- for every kilometer of advance of the 1st Belorussian Front, which carried out the main combat mission, there were on average 19 tanks and self-propelled guns, 61 guns, 44 mortars and 9 Katyushas, ​​not counting infantry (Note 13*)
- 04/25/1945 500 thousand German group was cut in two - one part remained in Berlin, the other (200 thousand, more than 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 2 thousand guns and mortars) - south of the city (Note 7 *)

On the eve of the assault, 2000 aircraft of the 16th and 18th VA launched three massive attacks on the city (Note 5*). On the night before the assault on Berlin, 743 Il-4 (Db-3f) long-range bombers carried out a bomb attack, and in total more than 1,500 long-range bombers were involved in the Berlin operation (Note 3*)
- 04/25/45 674 long-range bombers of the 18th VA alone (ex-ADD of the Red Army Air Force) attacked Berlin (Note 31 *)
- on the day of the assault, after artillery preparation, two strikes were carried out by 1,486 aircraft of the 16th VA (Note 22). Ground forces during the assault on Berlin were also supported by 6 air corps of the 2nd VA (Note 7*)
- During the battle, almost 2 million gun shots fell on Berlin - 36 thousand tons of metal. Fortress guns were delivered from Pomerania by rail, firing shells weighing half a ton into the center of Berlin. After the victory, it was estimated that 20% of the houses in Berlin were completely destroyed, and another 30% - partially (Note 30*)
- According to the Soviet command, up to 17 thousand people with 80–90 units of armored vehicles managed to escape from Berlin. However, few managed to reach the German positions in the north (Note 4*) According to other sources, a group of 17 thousand people left Berlin for the breakthrough, and 30 thousand from Spandau (Note 5*)

Losses of the Red Army during the seven days of the assault on Berlin: 361,367 people killed, wounded or missing, 2,108 guns and mortars, 1,997 tanks and self-propelled guns lost (Note 19* and 22*), 917 combat aircraft (Note 5* and 7* ). According to other sources, losses amounted to 352 thousand people, of which 78 thousand died (9 thousand Poles), 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 527 aircraft (Note 19*). According to modern estimates, in the battles for Berlin, the total losses of the Red Army amounted to about 500 thousand people
- in 16 days of fighting in Berlin (04/16-05/02/1945), the Red Army approximately lost only 100 thousand people killed (Note 20*). According to the newspaper "Arguments and Facts" 5\2005, the Red Army lost 600 thousand, while according to G. Krivosheev in his work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Statistical study" irretrievable losses in the Berlin strategic offensive operation amounted to 78.3 thousand (Note 21*). According to modern official Russian data for 2015, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army during the storming of Berlin amounted to 78.3 thousand people, and the losses of the Wehrmacht were about 400 thousand killed and about 380 thousand captured (Note 25*)
- losses amounted to more than 800 tanks out of 1200 that took part in the assault on Berlin (Note 17*). The 2nd Guards TA alone lost 204 tanks in a week of fighting, half of which were due to the actions of faustpatrons (Note 5* and 7*)
- 125 thousand civilians died during the capture of Berlin in 1945 (Note 9*). According to other sources, about 100 thousand Berliners became victims of the assault, of whom about 20 thousand died of heart attacks, 6 thousand became suicides, the rest died directly from shelling, street fighting or died later from wounds (Note 27*)
- due to the fact that the demarcation line between the advancing Soviet units was not established in a timely manner, Soviet aviation and artillery repeatedly struck at their own troops to the deputy head of the secret department of the OGPU, Yakov Agranov. (Note 5*)
- the Reichstag was defended by a garrison of up to 2,000 people (1,500 of whom were killed and 450 captured), mostly parachuted by cadets of the naval school from Rostock (Note 6*). According to other sources, about 2.5 thousand defenders of the Reichstag died and about 2.6 thousand surrendered (Note 14*)

04/30/41, on the eve of suicide, Hitler signed and brought to the Wehrmacht command an order to break through troops from Berlin, but after his death, by the evening of 04/30/41 it was canceled by the “Goebbels government”, which demanded that the city be defended according to the latter - from the post-war interrogation of the latter Chief of Defense of Berlin, General Weidling (Note 28*)
- during the surrender of the Reichstag, the following trophies were taken by Soviet troops: 39 guns, 89 machine guns, 385 rifles, 205 machine guns, 2 self-propelled guns and a large number of faustpatrons (Note 6*)
- before the storming of Berlin, the Germans had about 3 million “Faustpatrons” at their disposal (Note 6*)
- defeat by the Faustpatron caused the death of 25% of all destroyed T-34s (Note 19*)
- : 800 gr. bread, 800 gr. potatoes, 150 gr. meat and 75 gr. fat (Note 7*)
- the claim remains unconfirmed that Hitler ordered the floodgates on the Spree River to be opened to flood the section of the metro between Leipzigerstrasse and Unter der Linden, where thousands of Berliners were sheltering at the stations (Note 5*). According to other information, sappers of the SS division "Nordland" on the morning of 05/02/45 blew up a tunnel under the Landwehr Canal in the Trebinnerstrasse area, the water from which gradually flooded a 25-kilometer section of the metro and caused the death of about 100 people, and not 15-50 thousand, as it was According to some data, it was previously reported (Note 15*)

The tunnels of the Berlin metro were repeatedly blown up during the assault on the city by Soviet sappers (Note 16*)
- during the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8, 1945), Soviet troops expended 11,635 wagons of ammunition, including over 10 million artillery and mortar ammunition, 241.7 thousand rockets, almost 3 million hand grenades and 392 million cartridges for small arms (Note 18*)
- Soviet prisoners of war released from the Berlin Moabit prison (7 thousand - Note 30*) were immediately armed and enlisted in the rifle battalions that stormed Berlin (Note 20*)

NOTES:
(Note 1*) - B. Belozerov "Front without borders 1941-1945."
(Note 2*) - I. Isaev "Berlin '45: The Battle in the Lair of the Beast"
(Note 3*) - Yu. Egorov "Airplanes of the S.V. Ilyushin Design Bureau"
(Note 4*) - B. Sokolov "Mythical war. Mirages of the Second World War"
(Note 5*) - Runov "Assaults of the Great Patriotic War. Urban battle, it is the most difficult"
(Note 6*) - A. Vasilchenko “Faustniks in battle”
(Note 7*) - L. Moshchansky "At the Walls of Berlin"
(Note 8*) - B. Sokolov "Unknown Zhukov: portrait without retouching in the mirror of the era"
(Note 9*) - L. Semenenko "The Great Patriotic War. How it happened"
(Note 10*) - Ch. Webster "Strategic bombing of Germany"
(Note 11*) - A. Speer "The Third Reich from the Inside. Memoirs of the Reich Minister of War Industry"
(Note 12*) - V. But “Battle of Berlin” part 2 “Science and Technology” magazine 5\2010
(Note 13*) - V. But "Battle of Berlin" part 1 magazine "Science and Technology" 4\2010
(Note 14*) - G. Williamson “SS is an instrument of terror”
(Note 15*) - E. Beaver "The Fall of Berlin. 1945"
(Note 16*) - N. Fedotov “I remember...” Arsenal-Collection magazine 13\2013
(Note 17*) - S. Monetchikov “Domestic mounted anti-tank grenade launchers” magazine “Brother” 8\2013
(Note 18*) - I. Vernidub “Victory Ammunition”
(Note 19*) - D. Porter “World War II - a steel shaft from the East. Soviet armored forces 1939-45"
(Note 20*) - "Encyclopedia WW2. Collapse of the Third Reich (spring-summer 1945)"
(Note 21*) - Yu. Rubtsov "Penalties of the Great Patriotic War. In life and on the screen"
(Note 22*) - P. Gostoni "The Battle of Berlin. Memoirs of eyewitnesses"
(Note 23*) - H. Altner “I am Hitler’s suicide bomber”
(Note 24*) - M. Zefirov "Aces of WW2. Allies of the Luftwaffe: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria"
(Note 25*) - Yu. Rubtsov “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” (Moscow, 2015)
(Note 26*) - D. Irving “The Destruction of Dresden”
(Note 27*) - R. Cornelius "The Last Battle. Storm of Berlin"
(Note 28*) - V. Makarov “Wehrmacht generals and officers tell...”
(Note 29*) - O. Karo “Soviet Empire”
(Note 30*) - A. Utkin “Storm of Berlin” magazine “Around the World” 05\2005
(Note 31*) - collection "Russian Long-Range Aviation"

Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich (1896-1974)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

He was in a difficult relationship with Marshal Konev, whom during the Berlin operation he perceived as a competitor in the “race for Berlin.”

“A stern, tough business man,” the sergeant characterizes Zhukov. “Eighty kilograms of trained muscles and nerves. A bundle of energy. An ideal, brilliantly tuned mechanism of military thought! Thousands of error-free strategic decisions circulated in his brain with lightning speed. Coverage - capture! Encirclement - defeat! Pincers - forced march! 1.5 thousand tanks to the right! 2 thousand planes to the left! To take the city, it is necessary to “involve” 200 thousand soldiers! He could immediately name the numbers of our losses and the losses of the enemy in any proposed operation. He could, without a doubt, thoughts of sending a million or two to their deaths. He was a military leader of a new type: he ruined people without number, but almost always achieved victorious results. Our great commanders of the old type were even better at ruining millions, but did not particularly think about what would come of it, so "How simply they didn't know how to think. Zhukov is full of energy, he is charged with it, like a Leyden jar, as if electric sparks are pouring out of him."

After the end of the war, Zhukov headed the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (into which the troops of the 1st BF were transformed), as well as the Soviet military administration in Germany. In March 1946, Stalin appointed him to the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense (Stalin himself was the minister). However, already in the summer of 1946, Zhukov was accused of misappropriation large number trophies, as well as exaggerating one’s own merits. He was removed from his posts and sent to command the troops of the Odessa Military District. After Stalin's death he was returned to Moscow. From February 1955 to October 1957 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. He exercised military leadership in the suppression of the anti-communist uprising in Hungary in 1956. At the end of 1957, on Khrushchev’s initiative, he was expelled from the party’s Central Committee, removed from his posts and sent into retirement.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich (1897-1973)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

He dreamed of taking Berlin, ahead of Marshal Zhukov, which he openly admitted: “approving the composition of the groupings and the direction of attacks, Stalin began to mark with a pencil on the map the demarcation line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. In the draft directives, this line went through Lübben and further a little south of Berlin. Drawing this line with a pencil, Staley suddenly broke it at the city of Lübben, located about 60 kilometers southeast of Berlin. He broke it and did not lead further.<…>Was there an unspoken call for competition between the fronts in this break in the demarcation line at Lübben? I admit this possibility. In any case, I don’t rule it out. This can be all the more acceptable if we mentally go back to that time and imagine what Berlin was like for us then and what a passionate desire everyone, from soldier to general, felt to see this city with their own eyes, to take possession of it with the power of their weapons. Of course, this was also my passionate desire. I’m not afraid to admit it now. It would be strange to portray oneself in the last months of the war as a person devoid of passions. On the contrary, we were all filled with them then."

After the completion of the Berlin operation, Konev deployed the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to rush to Prague, where he ended the war.

At the end of the war in 1945-1946. - Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Austria and Hungary. In 1946, he replaced Zhukov, who had fallen into disgrace, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. In 1957, he supported the expulsion of Zhukov from the party Central Committee. During the Berlin crisis of 1961 - Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 5th Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. The first Soviet commandant of Berlin.

On April 21, Berzarin's army crossed the Berliner Ring and approached the eastern outskirts of the Reich capital. It fought its way towards the city center through the areas of Lichtenberg and Friedrichshain. On May 1, the advanced detachments of the 5th UA were the first of the Soviet units to reach the Reich Chancellery building, located on Vossstrasse, and took it by storm.

Marshal Zhukov appointed Berzarin as commandant of Berlin on April 24. And already on April 28, when fighting was still in full swing in the city, the general began creating a new administration, issuing Order No. 1 “On the transfer of all power in Berlin to the hands of the Soviet military commandant’s office.” Berzarin did not remain commandant for long. On June 16, 1945, he died in a car accident. Nevertheless, in less than 2 months of his management of the city, he managed to leave a good memory of himself among the Germans. Mainly because he managed to restore public order on the streets and provide the population with food. A square (Bersarinplatz) and a bridge (Nikolai-Bersarin-Brucke) are named in his honor in Berlin.

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 2nd GvTA crossed the Berliner Ring and broke into the northern outskirts of the city. On April 22, the advanced units of the army, having bypassed Berlin from the north, reached the Havel River and crossed it. On April 25, units of the 2nd GvTA and 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) linked up west of Berlin with the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement ring around the city. Other formations of the 2nd GvTA approached the Berlin-Spandauer-Schiffarts canal on April 23 and crossed it the next day. On April 27, the main forces of the army crossed the Spree, entered the Charlottenburg area and moved southeast towards the Tiergarten. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, units of the 2nd GvTA united with units of the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov).

After the end of the war, Bogdanov commanded the armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and from December 1948 - the armored and mechanized forces of the entire USSR. In 1956 he was dismissed.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Katukov's army attacked Berlin from the south-east, supporting the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov). She fought in the area of ​​Neukölln and Tempelchow. It advanced in a fairly narrow zone, limited by several streets.

Therefore, it suffered significant losses from enemy artillery and cartridges. On April 28, units of the 1st GvTA reached the Potsdam station area. Since April 29, fighting took place in Tiergarten Park. On May 2, it united there with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Vasily Kuznetsov).

After the war, Katukov continued to command his army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 3rd UA crossed the Berliner Ring and entered the northern and northeastern outskirts of Berlin. Passed through the areas of Pankow, Siemensstadt, Charlottenburg, Moabit. Beginning on April 29, units of the 3rd UA stormed the area of ​​government buildings on Königsplatz. On the morning of May 2, we united in Tiergarten with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov).

At the end of the war, Kuznetsov continued to command the 3rd Shock Army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

The 4th GvTA advanced in the direction of Potsdam, covering Berlin from the southwest. On April 23, the army reached the Havel River and captured the southeastern region of Potsdam - Babelsberg. On April 25, units of the 4th GvTA crossed the Havel and west of Berlin joined forces with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing from the north.

Thus, the encirclement ring around the German capital closed. On April 27, the 4th GvTA took Potsdam, and on April 29, Peacock Island on the Havel River. In addition, Lelyushenko’s army had to repel a counterattack by Walter Wenck’s 12th Army on the approaches to Potsdam. Lelyushenko’s army did not have the chance to fight in densely built areas of Berlin, so its losses were lower than those of other armies. On May 4, after the end of the Battle of Berlin, it was sent to Prague.

After the war, Lelyushenko commanded various military districts. Then he was dismissed. In 1960-1964. headed DOSAAF.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990)

In April-May 1945 - lieutenant general, commander of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Lucinsky's army attacked Berlin from the south. On April 23, she approached the Teltow Canal, and then, together with the 3rd GvTA (Pavel Rybalko), fought in the western part of Berlin.

After the end of World War II in Europe, Lucinsky was sent to the Far East. There he commanded the 36th Army during the war with Japan in August 1945.

Perkhorovich Franz Iosifovich (1894-1961)

In April-May 1945 - Lieutenant General, Commander of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

During the Berlin operation, the 47th Army captured Berlin from the northwest and occupied the urban area of ​​Spandau. On April 25, west of Berlin, together with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov), it united with the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement ring around the German capital. On April 30, in front of the forces of the 47th Army, the Spandau citadel.

After the war, Perkhorovich continued to command his army. Since 1947, he headed the department at the General Staff of the Ground Forces. In 1951 he was dismissed.

Rybalko Pavel Semenovich (1894-1948)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Rybalko’s army was attacking Berlin from the south. By April 22, she reached the Teltow Canal. On April 24, she crossed it and entered the areas of Zehlendorf and Dahlem. Then she fought in Schöneberg and Wilmensdorf.

After the war, Rybalko continued to command his army. In 1947, he was appointed commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the USSR.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

He became widely known during the Battle of Stalingrad. His 62nd Army (renamed the 8th Guards Army after the battles of Stalingrad) fought fierce street battles in the city for several months. The experience of such battles was very useful to her during the storming of Berlin.

The 8th Guards Army attacked the capital of the Reich from the eastern and southeastern directions with the support of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Mikhail Katukov). With battles it occupied the areas of Berlin Neukölln and Tempelhof. On April 28, the 8th GvA reached the southern bank of the Landwehr Canal and reached the Anhalt station. On April 30, Chuikov’s advanced units were 800 meters from the Reich Chancellery. On May 1, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Hans Krebs, came to Chuikov’s headquarters and reported Hitler’s suicide and conveyed Goebbels and Bormann’s proposal for a temporary ceasefire. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, the 8th Guards Army united with units of the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov) and the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov). That same morning, at Chuikov’s headquarters, General Helmut Weidling wrote an order for the surrender of the Berlin garrison.

After the war, Chuikov continued to command his army. In 1949-1953 was commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. Under Khrushchev he became a marshal (1955), and in 1960-1964. served as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (1960-1964).