Menu
For free
Registration
home  /  Our children/ When will there be a Soviet Union. Years of existence of the USSR, features, history and interesting facts

When will there be a Soviet Union? Years of existence of the USSR, features, history and interesting facts

What if the Soviet Union returned? It was one of the most influential empires in history. On December 28, 1922, after a conference attended by delegations from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other republics, the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was announced. The Soviet Union repulsed Nazi aggression during World War II and then collapsed. What if the Soviet Union were reborn today?

First, we must identify the countries that will be part of the modern Soviet Union. It will include the following states: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Soviet Union will be a very large country and, of course, the largest republic in terms of area will be Russia, whose area is larger than that of Pluto. The Soviet Union would be larger in area than Australia, Antarctica, and South America combined, making it a state larger than three entire continents. Such a colossal territory will create a large time difference between the two ends of the Soviet Union, when in one part of the country it will be 11 pm and in the other it will be noon.

Context

I want to return to the USSR

London Review of Books 01/06/2018

CIS - the last exhalation of the USSR

EurasiaNet 12/15/2017

But the USSR still hasn’t gone anywhere

Delfi.lv 09/26/2017 Population

The total population of the Soviet Union will be 294.837 million people. It will be the fourth most populous country after the United States, which is currently in third place. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union had approximately the same population size in 1991, 293,048,000, indicating weak population growth since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The majority of citizens of the Soviet Union will be Russians (about 46% of the total population), with Ukrainians and Uzbeks taking a respectable second place. Russian would be the most widely spoken language in the Soviet Union, spoken by approximately 58% of the population. To recreate the Soviet Union, we must return to the memory of the Communist Party as the only legitimate party with absolute power. Religious people will be able to perform their rituals only in religious centers and will not be able to do this in public. However, only 12% of the population will be atheist or non-religious, but the vast majority of the population, about 54%, will be Orthodox Christians, 3% Catholic, 24% Sunni, 3% Shia and 4% will be from other religions.

Economic and political situation

Speaking about the status and political organization of the Soviet Union, we must guess that its capital will be in Moscow. In addition, the Soviet Union would have a number of large, influential cities, such as St. Petersburg, which would be renamed Leningrad, Kyiv in the Ukraine, and Minsk in Belarus. The economy will be quite strong - GDP will be about two trillion dollars. Currently, Russia ranks 12th in terms of economic development. By joining the Soviet Union, it would move into eighth place in the world, ahead of countries such as South Korea and Canada. The per capita income level will be relatively low, at $6.8, which would place the Soviet Union in 76th place ahead of Bulgaria. The military budget of the Soviet army will be $80 billion, which will put it in fourth place after Saudi Arabia, China and the United States.

However, this will not be a big problem, since the number of troops will compensate for the funding gap. It will have the second largest number of troops after China, with about 1.43 million. There will be about 2.88 million in reserve. And in total there are about 4.32 million people ready for military action, which is equal to the population of New Zealand. The total strength of the Soviet army would be the same as that of the Chinese army, and 42% greater than that of the Americans. The Soviet army would have the largest arsenal of weapons in the world, with a total of 7,300 missile warheads, while the US would only have 6,970 warheads. In addition, the Soviet Union would become the largest oil-producing country, ahead of Saudi Arabia and the United States. It will produce approximately 12.966 million barrels of oil.

Could he be even stronger? Of course, if we add to the Soviet Union all the regions that once belonged to the Russian Empire. Let's add Finland, half of what is now Poland and all of Alaska. This would increase the population of the Union to approximately 496.313 million, thereby overtaking the United States. The economic situation will improve: GDP will reach $2.541 trillion, which will move the country to sixth place. Thus, it will overtake France and India, but will yield to Great Britain and Germany.

Finally, if the Soviet Union is revived, it will not be much stronger than last time. It will have the largest number of missile warheads in the world, the second largest army, and will become a leader in oil production. There would likely be no alliance between the Soviet Union, the US and NATO, so the Soviet Union would seek alliances in Africa and Asia.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Soviet Union in the mid-1950s - early 1960s. "The Great Decade of Thaw."

The XX Congress of the CPSU (February 14-25, 1956) and especially the report at it by N. S. Khrushchev “On the cult of personality and its consequences” gave impetus to the process of renewal of society, marked the beginning of the debunking of the social myths of Stalinism, the formation of a new social consciousness, relatively free from dogmas and ideological stereotypes. This period in the life of the country was called the “thaw” (based on the novel of the same name by I. Ehrenburg).

At the same time, the new line was carried out by people who were themselves a product of the Stalin era and accomplices of his atrocities. There was no consistency in Khrushchev’s report in exposing the criminal nature of Stalin’s activities and, especially, the regime of personal power he created. Even less consistent was the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of June 30, 1956. “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences.” The evils of the command-administrative authoritarian system of the “party state” were ultimately reduced to a cult of personality, and all the blame for the crimes was placed on Stalin and a number of people from his circle. It was emphasized in every possible way that the cult of personality did not and could not change “the social nature of the advanced socialist social and state system.”

It should be noted that socialism, in the understanding of the country’s political leaders in the second half of the 1950s, corresponded to the state-political system in the USSR, which continued to exist without Stalin and his repressive apparatus, having been formed by them. The removal of some figures from Stalin's entourage from the party leadership seemed to remove responsibility for crimes from other party leaders and from the party as a whole.

The changes that took place in the state system in 1956-1964 were insignificant. Bodies of Soviet power at all levels continued to function under the leadership and control of the party, remaining to a large extent a legal cover for the dictatorship of the partyocracy.

The highest authority in the country, as before, was formally the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Since 1953, the legendary Stalinist People's Commissar K. E. Voroshilov became the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, and since 1960 - L. I. Brezhnev. At sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, pre-prepared documents were unanimously approved. The Presidium of the Supreme Council, which, in accordance with the Constitution, performed all the functions of the Council between its sessions, not only acted under the leadership of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, but also largely duplicated it in terms of the composition of its members.

A characteristic feature of the activities of government bodies during the period under review was the transfer of part of the legislative functions from the center to the localities. In May 1956, the management of judicial institutions and justice bodies was transferred to the republics, and therefore the USSR Ministry of Justice was abolished. The laws adopted at the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 1957 and December 1958 expanded the rights of the union republics in the field of legislation. Their jurisdiction includes: legislation on the structure of the courts of the union republics, the adoption of civil, criminal and procedural codes (while retaining the center's responsibility for establishing the foundations of the relevant legislation, mandatory for all republics); issues of regional, regional, administrative-territorial structure.

According to the “Regulations on the Supreme Court of the USSR” (February 1957), the powers of the Supreme Courts of the union republics were expanded. By the decision of the sixth session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR in February 1957, the national autonomy of the Balkar, Chechen, Ingush, Kalmyk and Karachay peoples, abolished during the war, was restored. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored as part of the RSFSR, and the Kalmyk Autonomous Region was formed, which in 1958 became an autonomous republic. The Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was transformed into the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Cherkess Autonomous Region into the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region.

Not only representatives of the party and state bureaucracy began to be involved in work in the Soviets, but also, to a greater extent, workers, collective farmers and intellectuals who had not previously been associated with the apparatus. This, on the one hand, updated the composition of government bodies, and on the other hand, complicated the position of opponents of N.S. Khrushchev’s course. In March 1957, more than 1.5 million deputies were elected to local Soviets, among whom more than 60% were workers and collective farmers (in 1955 - 55%). The number of representatives of these social categories also increased in the elections to the Supreme Council of the fifth convocation in February 1958 - up to 60% against 40% in the Supreme Council of the fourth convocation.

At the same time, the strengthening of elements of self-government was stimulated, which at the grassroots level could eventually replace administrative-bureaucratic units. They had to exert democratic pressure on the entire structure of state power, intensify its work, and reorient it towards taking into account the needs of the country's population.

The second half of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s became a period of a surge in social activity in various regions of the country. A large number of public organizations arose that resolved individual local issues: street and block committees, public assistance commissions at house managements, police assistance teams, parent councils at schools and house managements, sanitary squads, club councils, boards of trustees at orphanages, councils of labor veterans and etc. Elements of communal self-government arose in them.

From the very beginning of Khrushchev's activity as the real leader of the party and government, the party and state bureaucracy was his secret enemy. Khrushchev could not do without her in running the state, but he also did not want to be a puppet in her hands. He tried to place the bureaucracy within an inconvenient framework. Stalin pursued a similar policy. Khrushchev, unable to use the system of repression, constantly looked for other ways to solve this problem. An important step in this direction was the provision for mandatory discussion of candidates for elective positions and limiting the duration of office to two terms. These measures contributed to some democratization of society. In the resolution of January 22, 1957 “On improving the activities of the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies and strengthening their ties with the masses,” the CPSU Central Committee proposed discussing nominated candidates at meetings of workers and collective farmers. Naturally, this did not mean freedom of elections for voters, but it somewhat limited the influence of the party-state apparatus in nominating candidates, and therefore caused discontent among the bureaucracy.

Khrushchev made more serious attempts at modernization in the sphere of executive power, the highest body of which was still the Council of Ministers. In 1956, N.A. Bulganin was appointed its chairman, but in 1958 he was replaced in this post by Khrushchev, and his deputies were

A. N. Kosygin, A. I. Mikoyan and D. F. Ustinov.

One of the first steps of the new government was to transfer some rights from the center to the localities. The percentage of contributions for certain types of taxes to republican budgets increased (1956). A number of union ministries were reorganized into union-republican ones (communications, education, etc.). The number of all-Union ministries and departments decreased (from 30 in 1953 to 23 in May 1957) while the Union-Republican ones increased (from 21 to 29).

In accordance with the Law “On further improvement of the organization of industry and construction management” adopted by the Supreme Council on May 10, 1957, the management of industry and construction was transferred from a sectoral one (through ministries and departments) to a territorial principle. In each economic administrative region, a national economic council (sovnarkhoz) was formed, reporting directly to the Council of Ministers of the union republic. This sharply limited the possibilities of intervention by the local party apparatus in economic activities. 105 economic councils were created, 141 all-union, union-republican, and republican ministries were abolished. The implementation of a unified centralized policy in the development of the most important sectors of the national economy, the development of current and long-term plans and control over compliance with state discipline in the supply of products remained with the USSR State Planning Committee.

The 1957 reform included the idea of ​​administrative decentralization - moving the functions of operational management to the level of national economic councils on the basis of territorial-economic complexes. However, the transition to organizational forms of management based on the territorial principle did not solve the problem of proportional and balanced development of the country's national economic complex. The USSR State Planning Committee actually turned into the central element of the management system, and centralized planning became the main mechanism for taking into account the sectoral aspect in economic development.

The reorganization of the management system gave a certain impetus to the development of the economy: as a result of the removal of departmental barriers and ensuring greater efficiency of management, the growth rate of national income increased, specialization and cooperation on the scale of administrative and economic regions intensified, and the process of technical reconstruction of production accelerated. Significant savings were achieved by reducing the cost of the administrative apparatus. But soon the reform began to falter. Many economic councils were repeatedly enlarged, and numerous sectoral committees were created in the center. In June 1960, the republican Council of National Economy was formed, in March 1963 - the Supreme Council of the National Economy, in June 1963 - the Council of the National Economy of the USSR.

The system of national economic planning also became more complex: in February 1959, the State Scientific and Economic Council of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was organized; Since December 1963, the mechanism of territorial planning has been developed through planning commissions of large economic regions of the USSR.

After Khrushchev was removed from all government and party posts in October 1964, the reform began to wind down, and by the early 1970s the previous structure of executive power was restored.

One of the main political institutions of Soviet society during the period under review was the CPSU. All major decisions in the state were made with the participation and leadership of the party. The CPSU was divided into three levels: the rank and file, which had virtually no opportunity to influence the development of party policy; the party bureaucracy - the backbone of the party - actually implemented policy; the top of the party had power and made decisions.

Trying to rely on the force opposing the partyocracy, Khrushchev stimulated, to some extent, internal party democracy. The importance of party meetings increased and the responsibility of the elected delegates increased (although everything was still determined by the apparatus), the number of conferences and congresses increased (three congresses were held from 1956 to 1961), and the number of CPSU members nominated for leadership positions from grassroots organizations increased. In 1962, based on the decisions of the November plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the restructuring of party bodies was carried out along the production principle: independent industrial and rural party organizations were created. There was a frequent change of management personnel. However, in general, democratization affected the party less than society as a whole; the party bureaucracy firmly held power in its hands and did not intend to give it up.

The political struggle took place mainly in the Presidium of the Central Committee and in the Central Committee of the CPSU. The congresses acted as original heralds of ideas and concepts adopted by the governing bodies. The outcome of the struggle in the Presidium and the Central Committee of the party was decisive for the entire political situation in the country. At the same time, in 1956-1964. The role of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee increased, which was of particular importance in the internal party struggle for power between Khrushchev and his opponents.

In 1956, opposition to Khrushchev and the course he pursued emerged. The discontent of his former comrades increased sharply after Khrushchev's report at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress. The group of Khrushchev’s opponents at the top of the party apparatus was headed by V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov and L. M. Kaganovich.

In June 1957, the struggle turned into open confrontation: on June 18, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev was charged with economic voluntarism, undermining the authority of the CPSU in the international communist movement due to the exposure of Stalin’s personality cult. The Presidium, by seven votes against three (A.I. Mikoyan, M.A. Suslov and A.I. Kirichenko), decided to remove Khrushchev and appoint Molotov to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee. However, Khrushchev was supported by a significant part of the renewed apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, the army led by G.K. Zhukov, and the KGB. At the plenum of the Central Committee on June 22-29, the actions of Khrushchev’s opponents were defined as factional and anti-party: V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich and D. T. Shepilov, who “joined them,” were removed from the Presidium and Central Committee of the CPSU. N.A. Bulganin was severely reprimanded; he was subsequently removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and also removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee. Thus, for the first time in many years, the plenum of the Central Committee acted as a decisive force in the ongoing battle between party leaders.

The next act in the political struggle was displacement of G. K. Zhukov from the post of Minister of Defense and removal from the Presidium of the Central Committee. N.S. Khrushchev feared his popularity and influence. In the resolution adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee on October 29, 1957, “On improving party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy,” Zhukov was accused of “violating Leninist, party principles of leadership of the Armed Forces, pursuing a line to curtail the work of party organizations, political agencies and Military Councils, to eliminate the leadership and control over the Army and Navy by the party, its Central Committee and the government.”

In 1959, the extraordinary XXI Congress of the CPSU took place, convened to consider and approve the seven-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR. The congress stated that socialism in the USSR had won a “complete and final victory.” The conclusion of this thesis was the assertion that the Soviet Union entered a period of extensive construction of communism. The Seven Year Plan was seen as an important step towards creating the material and technical base of communism. The XXII Congress of the CPSU (October 1961) became a logical development of the ideas of the previous party forum.

At this congress, a new Program of the CPSU was approved - the program for building communism. The tasks set in the third Party Program, especially the achievement within 10-20 years of superiority in production per capita over the leading capitalist countries, the elimination of hard physical labor, the achievement of an abundance of material and cultural goods, seemed realistic to many, including Khrushchev. our country. The focus on improving living standards, democratizing society, and developing state administration into public self-government raised the economic and political activity of broad sections of the people. At the same time, the reforms proclaimed at the XXI and XXII Congresses of the CPSU did not affect the foundations of the command-administrative system. Qualitatively new tasks of domestic and foreign policy, party building were proposed to be solved with the help of the old political and economic mechanism, often using voluntaristic methods. As a result, many subjective mistakes were made, which complicated the country’s entry into a new stage of development and largely compromised Khrushchev’s undertakings.

The course pursued by Khrushchev, his style and methods of leadership caused discontent among the party and state apparatus, as well as economic managers and the corps of directors. As a result of thoughtless and numerous reorganizations and reductions in law enforcement agencies, career officers and generals, as well as many authoritative employees of state security agencies, were also in opposition to Khrushchev.

In the absence of a clear legislative mechanism for changing the country's leadership, the removal of Khrushchev was secretly prepared by a group of the party and state elite from the beginning of 1964. The most active role in organizing the conspiracy against the party leader was played by the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A. N. Shelepin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR N. G. Ignatov, first secretary of the Kharkov regional committee of the CPSU N.V. Podgorny and head of the KGB V.E. Semichastny. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, since 1960 and at the same time the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took a wait-and-see attitude and was directly involved in the preparation of the conspiracy at the final stage.

On October 12, 1964, during Khrushchev’s vacation in Sochi, in the Kremlin at an extended meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, M. A. Suslov and A. N. Shelepin raised the issue of removing the country’s leader from all his posts. N. S. Khrushchev, who was urgently summoned to Moscow, was charged with departing from the principles of collective leadership, voluntarism and rough administration. Almost all members of the Presidium spoke out against him, with the exception of A. I. Mikoyan, who avoided speaking. On October 14, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee relieved Khrushchev of his duties as first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “due to his advanced age and deteriorating health.”

At the October plenum of the Central Committee, it was recognized as inappropriate to further combine the duties of the party leader and the head of the government. L. I. Brezhnev became the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A. N. Kosygin became the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

December 26, 1991 is the official date of the collapse of the USSR. A day earlier, President Gorbachev announced that, for “reasons of principle,” he was resigning from his post. On December 26, the Supreme USSR adopted a declaration on the collapse of the state.

The collapsed Union included 15 Soviet Socialist Republics. The Russian Federation became the legal successor of the USSR. Russia declared sovereignty on June 12, 1990. Exactly a year and a half later, the country's leaders announced secession from the USSR. Legal "independence" December 26, 1991.

The Baltic republics were the first to declare their sovereignty and independence. Already on 16 1988, the Estonian SSR declared its sovereignty. A few months later in 1989, the Lithuanian SSR and the Latvian SSR also declared sovereignty. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania even received legal independence somewhat earlier than the official collapse of the USSR - on September 6, 1991.

On December 8, 1991, the Union of Independent States was created. In fact, this organization failed to become a real Union, and the CIS turned into a formal meeting of the leaders of the participating states.

Among the Transcaucasian republics, Georgia wanted to secede from the Union the fastest. The independence of the Georgian Republic was declared on April 9, 1991. The Republic of Azerbaijan declared independence on August 30, 1991, and the Republic of Armenia on September 21, 1991.

From August 24 to October 27, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan declared their withdrawal from the Union. Besides Russia, Belarus (left the Union on December 8, 1991) and Kazakhstan (withdrew from the USSR on December 16, 1991) took the longest to declare their secession from the USSR.

Failed attempts at independence

Some Autonomous Regions and Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics also previously tried to secede from the USSR and declare independence. They eventually succeeded, albeit together with the republics that these autonomies were part of.

On January 19, 1991, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was part of the Azerbaijan SSR, tried to secede from the Union. After some time, the Nakhichevan Republic, as part of Azerbaijan, managed to leave the USSR.

Currently, a new union is being formed in the post-Soviet space. The unsuccessful project of the Union of Independent States is being replaced by integration in a new format - the Eurasian Union.

Tatarstan and Checheno-Ingushetia, which had previously tried to leave the USSR on their own, left the Soviet Union as part of the Russian Federation. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic also failed to gain independence and left the USSR only together with Ukraine.

Pogosova Yuliana 08/10/2017 at 7:19

In December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. This event took everyone by surprise, right down to the ruling elite of the United States, which received an unexpected pleasant gift for Christmas. Vladimir Putin described the collapse of the USSR as “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” Could this disintegration have been avoided? Today it is generally accepted that by the end of 1991 there was no way to preserve the USSR in the form in which it had existed since 1922.

According to the already established opinion, the collapse of the Union occurred as a result of political, economic and socio-cultural processes that have occurred in the country since 1986. But until now, scientists and public figures are wondering what would have happened if the Soviet Union had not collapsed, would it have been able to function fully in the twenty-first century?

The agreement on the collapse of the USSR and on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was signed on December 8, 1991 in Viskuli near Brest (Belarus) by the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin, the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich. The agreement was based on Article 72 of the USSR Constitution and came as a surprise to the entire population of the USSR.

On December 21, a declaration on the goals and principles of the CIS was signed in Almaty. The Declaration confirmed the Bialowieza Agreement, indicating that with the formation of the CIS, the USSR ceases to exist. Then eight more republics joined the CIS: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Georgia joined the CIS in December 1993.

And before that, on March 17, 1991, a popular referendum was held in nine Soviet republics. The overwhelming majority of voters voted to preserve the federal system of the Soviet Union. As a result of the referendum on April 23, 1991, the Soviet central government signed an agreement with nine republics. If this treaty had been implemented, the USSR would have become a federation of independent republics with one president, an army and a common foreign policy. By August 1991, nine republics, with the exception of Ukraine, had approved the draft of a new treaty. It is possible that the USSR could have continued to exist in this form, but various political forces prevented this.

In his effort to liberalize some aspects of government, Gorbachev effectively weakened government controls, which led to economic and political chaos, as well as the rise of nationalist and separatist movements in many republics. But what would have happened if Gorbachev had managed to implement his set of reforms? What if the Soviet Communist Party could maintain control over political ideology?

Such a precedent has already taken place. In 1921, following the victory of the Soviet state over the Tsarist and anti-Bolshevik forces in the civil war of 1918-1920, the New Economic Policy was adopted. Thanks to the NEP, the country's economy almost completely recovered and reached its pre-war level. But then, in 1928, the NEP was canceled by Joseph Stalin. If this had not happened, the light industry and agriculture sectors would now be in private ownership, and the mines and heavy industry would be in the hands of the state.

To implement such a scenario in the late 1980s, Gorbachev needed to convince his fellow communists that his new policies would not undermine the party's reputation. At that time, the trust of the Soviet population in party slogans and the governance of the country was minimal. Nevertheless, judging by the results of the March referendum in 1991, many republics of the USSR still considered themselves part of a single state.

Under the new economic plan, medium and large enterprises would remain in the hands of the state, but people would be able to carry out small-scale economic activities, especially in agriculture. The government could issue small commercial loans, thus creating an entrepreneurial class, and most of these entrepreneurs could be party members so that the government would keep an eye on its most active citizens.

Thanks to this approach, the population would become more concerned about economic gain and profit, as happened, for example, in China, and think less about politics. Soviet society in the mid-80s was already ready for economic reforms. And such an economic transformation would make it possible to maintain a controlled state.

How could this new country compete internationally with the United States, Western Europe and China? Perhaps, over time, a new union would have emerged after the countries of Eastern Europe left the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps the new USSR would reduce its presence in Africa and Latin America as a likely temporary measure until the country's economy was reformed.

It is difficult to predict how relations between the new USSR and China, which would become its direct competitor, would develop. Perhaps they would find options for cooperation. The Chinese model of state capitalism turned out to be quite effective, so by analogy one can imagine a model of Soviet capitalism. The leadership of the new country would have to be firm and strong, capable of making tough decisions at the state level. The Chinese also had to make this choice in 1989, when the military crushed the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. They decided to maintain the existing government system.

Most likely, it was impossible to save the Soviet Union at that time - due to the introduction of agents of Western influence into the power elite of the country, the existence of internal mechanisms and political processes that prevented the achievement of any agreements. But it is possible that a reformed Soviet Union will be created in the near future through the formation of a series of economic, military and political alliances with former Soviet republics.

The Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and the close cooperation between the Russian and Armenian militaries clearly confirm the desire to revive some Soviet traditions in much of the post-Soviet space. Perhaps the USSR could not survive, but scenarios of its possible existence in a reformed form will continue to worry historians and social scientists for a very long time.

The main goal of the USSR's foreign policy in the 1920s was to strengthen its political position in the international arena and expand economic ties.

At the party congress in March 1920, Lenin spoke about the need to “maneuver in our foreign policy.” On February 2, 1920, the first peace agreement with Estonia was signed. Peace treaties were signed by Soviet Russia with Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland. The Soviet state emerged from the international isolation of the civil war period. In 1920, negotiations were held with the British government and companies interested in orders for Soviet Russia. On March 16, 1921, an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was signed in London. A new turn in foreign policy affected relations with eastern countries. In February 1921, treaties were signed with Afghanistan and Iran, and on March 16, 1921, the day the Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed, an agreement was concluded with Turkey.

At the beginning of 1922, the Soviet and German governments received an invitation to participate in an international conference, which opened on April 10 in Genoa. The conference failed partly due to the positions of France and Great Britain, who were unable to reach an agreement with Russia regarding Soviet debts and obligations. The Soviet government was, in principle, ready to recognize the pre-war debts of the Russian state, but only if large foreign loans were provided. At the same time, Russia refused to cancel the decrees under which foreign enterprises were nationalized, although under certain conditions it agreed to return their enterprises to foreign firms in the form of concessions. But it was not possible to bring the parties’ positions closer together at the conference. On April 16, a Soviet-German agreement was signed in Rapallo on the restoration of diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties, and mutual renunciation of claims. Germany became the first major country to recognize Soviet Russia.

1924 was the year of recognition of the USSR. Diplomatic relations were established with England, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Greece, Mexico, France, China, and in 1925 - with Japan. The exit from international isolation was the main result of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the first half of the 20s. Of the great powers, only the United States remained in the position of political non-recognition of the USSR.

In the second half of the 1920s, the foreign policy course of the Soviet government was aimed at strengthening its international prestige, developing economic cooperation with capitalist countries, and solving the problems of disarmament and international security. In 1926, a non-aggression and neutrality treaty was signed with Germany. In 1927, the USSR made an official statement - a declaration on the need for attempts at disarmament. But the international situation in the late 20s - early 30s changed significantly.

The deep global economic crisis that began in 1929 caused serious internal political changes in all capitalist countries. In some, he brought to power forces that sought to carry out broad internal reforms of a democratic nature. In others, the crisis contributed to the formation of anti-democratic regimes that used social demagoguery in domestic politics simultaneously with the unleashing of political terror, the intensification of chauvinism (the policy of persecution, oppression of other peoples) and militarism. It was these regimes that became the instigators of new military conflicts. Hotbeds of international tension began to form at a rapid pace. One developed in Europe due to the hegemonic claims of the Japanese militarists.

Taking these factors into account, the Soviet government defined new tasks for its foreign policy: refusal to participate in international conflicts, especially those of a military nature; recognition of the possibility of cooperation with democratic Western countries to curb the aggressive aspirations of Germany and Japan (the policy of “appeasement”); the struggle for the creation of a collective security system in Europe and the Far East. At the international conference on arms reduction and limitation, the USSR delegation put forward 3 proposals: a project for general and complete disarmament or partial disarmament, which provided for the complete destruction of the most aggressive types of weapons; a draft declaration on the definition of the attacking party (aggressor); turning the disarmament conference into a permanent “peace conference”. None of these proposals were accepted by the Geneva Conference. It completed its work in June 1934, having to its credit two main decisions - the recognition of Germany’s right to “equality” in armaments and the “quality disarmament” plan, which provided for the maximum numbers of ground and air armed forces of only European countries. During the conference, 2 future initiators of a new world war - Japan and Germany - withdrew from the League of Nations, and in September 1934 the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations and became a permanent member of its council.

And even earlier, at an international economic conference, the USSR signed the Convention on Determining the Aggressor with 10 states. An aggressor was a state that declared war on another state, invaded its territory without declaring war, bombed its territory or established a naval blockade.

In the first half of the 1930s, the USSR achieved further strengthening of its position in the international arena. At the end of 1933, the United States recognized the USSR, and diplomatic relations were established between the two countries.

Since 1933, the USSR had been negotiating the Pacific Pact with the United States, which was aimed at containing Japanese aggression in the Pacific Ocean. The draft pact put forward by the USSR provided for its participants to be the USSR, the USA, China and Japan, i.e. powers with interests in the Pacific region. By mid-1937, negotiations had finally reached a dead end due to the US refusal to support not only the plan, but also the idea of ​​its creation. In June 1937, Roosevelt stated that he considered a strong US Navy to be the only guarantee of security in the Pacific. At the same time, the normalization of political relations between the USA and the USSR had a beneficial effect on bilateral trade and economic relations.

However, in the mid-30s, in the foreign policy activities of the Soviet leadership, there was a departure from the principle of non-interference in international conflicts. In 1936, the USSR provided assistance to the Spanish Popular Front government with weapons and military specialists to fight General Franco. This, in turn, received broad political and military support from Germany and Italy. France and England adhered to neutrality. The United States shared the same position, prohibiting the Spanish government from purchasing American weapons. The Spanish Civil War ended in 1939 with a Franco victory.

The policy of “appeasement” pursued by the Western powers towards Germany, Italy and Japan did not produce positive results. International tensions increased. In 1935, Germany sent troops into the demilitarized Rhineland; Italy attacked Ethiopia. In 1936, Germany and Japan signed an agreement directed against the USSR. Relying on German support, Japan launched a large-scale military operation against China in 1937. The territorial claims of Hitler's Germany were especially dangerous for the preservation of peace and security in Europe. In 1938-1938 Germany began to implement its aggressive plans to “expand living space.” In March 1938 it occupied Austria. Western countries pursued a policy of concessions to Nazi Germany, hoping to create a reliable counterweight against the USSR and direct its aggression towards the Soviet state. The culmination of this policy was the Munich Agreement between Germany, Italy, England and France on the separation of the Sudetenland (populated by Germans) from Czechoslovakia. In March 1939, Germany captured DC. territory of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak army was disarmed without resistance, its weapons and equipment were transferred to the German armed forces.

Thus, the main direction of the policy of the Soviet state in the 20s was the fight against the diplomatic blockade and strengthening its position in the international arena. Having concluded the treaties of 1920-1921. with bordering countries, the Soviet state began a long process of diplomatic recognition. The country's foreign policy in the 30s was built not only on the basis of internal tasks, but also depending on the state and development of international relations.