Interstate relations between Russia and Germany. Russian-German relations at the present stage The Cold War era

Wikipedia article
Among the countries of the European Union, Germany is considered one of the countries with which Russia traditionally has the most friendly and fruitful relations.
Angela Merkel (German Chancellor since 2005) is more skeptical of Russia than her predecessors in this post, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder. Having become chancellor, she made it clear that she would return Germany’s main foreign policy orientation to the United States, and that Russia needed to be treated more distantly, albeit pragmatically.

A book about Russian-German relations in the twentieth century has been presented (May 30, 2015 - www.istpravda.ru)
Yesterday, in the building of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the joint work of the Russian and German teams of authors “Russia - Germany. Milestones of joint history. 20th century” was presented.

A Russian-German historical collection has been published (March 11, 2015 - Rossiyskaya Gazeta - rg.ru)
Finally, the fruit of many years of work of the Russian-German historical commission, founded by the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin and ex-Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl in 1997, has seen the light of day. On Tuesday evening, the third volume of the collection, dedicated to the history of the 20th century, was solemnly presented in a full hall of the Berlin State Library. Scientists from Russia and Germany assessed all significant events of the 20th century. But disagreements arose regarding a number of episodes of the Second World War.

“On fourteen of the twenty topics, we came to a consensus,” notes Doctor of Historical Sciences Horst Müller. “One article was published on them, whether it was originally presented by a Russian or a German author. On the remaining six topics, we presented one article on each side. This allows the reader to choose a position that interests him and shows the dialogue between historians that exists in our countries."

The unification of Germany and the policies of Bismarck (1871-1890). From Bismarck's resignation to 1918

Russian-German relations from the unification of Germany to the end of the First World War (rossgerm.ru)
The first chancellor of a united Germany, Otto von Bismarck, defended the need to maintain good relations with Russia, but most German politicians had a negative attitude towards their eastern neighbor.
In 1887, the Russian-German “Reinsurance Treaty” was signed, guaranteeing mutual neutrality in case of war.
In 1890, Bismarck was dismissed and the young Emperor Wilhelm II refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty.

Vladimir Degoev. Russia and Bismarck. (magazines.russ.ru)
In 1871, the German Empire appeared in the center of the continent, on the border with Russia. It was naive to hope that it would behave in the same way as Prussia, modest in size and military-economic capabilities. While politely listening to Berlin's assurances of eternal gratitude for its invaluable assistance in the fateful issue of German unification, St. Petersburg still thought more about new threats for itself and tried, based on them, to build its own European strategy.

The previous policy, oriented towards supporting Prussia, needed adjustment, the nature of which depended not on Germany’s emotional statements, but on its real behavior towards Russia and Europe. Whose side - St. Petersburg or Vienna - will she take in Balkan affairs, and how far do her plans extend in the Rhineland and other regions?

Iron Chancellors: Bismarck and Gorchakov (ricolor.org)
There are moments in international politics when such factors as the intellectual, strong-willed and ethical qualities of statesmen acquire dominant importance. This most often happens in periods when the old structure of international relations suddenly falls apart, and the new one does not have time to mature not only in the systems of interstate treaties, but also in the heads of presidents and emperors. One of these periods occurred between 1856 and 1890.

Exacerbation of Russian-German relations (1871-1917) (All History.rf)
Germany, step by step, pursued a policy of aggravating relations with Russia. All this anti-Russian policy of Bismarck ultimately turned against Germany. Germany's refusal to provide loans to Russia pushed the latter to obtain a financial loan in France.

The role of dynastic relations in the history of Germany and Russia
Why did German princesses most often become the wives of Russian tsars and grand dukes? First of all, because of his Lutheran faith, which allowed him to freely move or change it to another. While the Roman Catholic Church did not welcome renunciation of their faith. The brides of the Russian Grand Dukes certainly had to convert to Orthodoxy. This was a requirement.
The tradition of Russian-German dynastic ties dates back to Peter I, who was married first to Evdokia Fedorovna Lopukhina from a famous Russian boyar family, and then to the daughter of a Livonian inhabitant, Ekaterina Skavronskaya (future Empress Catherine I). “Peter definitely wanted to interbreed his son with one of the German royal families. Tsarevich Alexei did not dare to resist his domineering father.

Russian-German relations and bilateral contacts between Moscow and Berlin have always aroused keen, often wary interest of the international community.

Russian-German relations and bilateral contacts between Moscow and Berlin have always aroused keen, often wary interest of the international community. Taking into account the history of at least the last century and a half, such attention to the processes taking place between the two largest powers of the continent is quite justified: the stability and trajectory of development of European civilization, its ability to find optimal answers, decisively depend on the nature and degree of mutual understanding between Russians and Germans to modern challenges and threats.

Despite all the undeniable and growing importance of Russia’s ties with Western multilateral integration structures, such as the European Union and NATO, as well as international financial and economic associations (OECD, Paris Club, etc.), in which Germany is an active member and largely determines policy in the Russian direction, we dare to say that bilateral cooperation between our countries in recent years has not only not lost its significance, but has also acquired a new quality - a course has been taken towards a strategic partnership that can become the locomotive of the formation of a truly united “Greater Europe”.

But what should be the basis of a “strategic partnership”? What should be its practical content and why, in our opinion, this term can rightfully be applied to the nature of the relations developing between Russia and Germany, more precisely, to the level of relations to which both sides should objectively strive?

In our opinion, this is the commonality or proximity of interests and long-term goals of the respective states and peoples, an understanding of the fact that the implementation of these interests and goals is very difficult, if not impossible, without the participation of a partner, and even more so in spite of it. In other words, it is conscious interdependence. Here we would also include a general assessment of those challenges that require the unification of two or more states in the more or less distant future.

Strategic partnership presupposes: the presence of pragmatic relations, free from the burden of major unresolved problems; the ability of the political leadership of both countries to think forward, in historical connection, to avoid momentary temptations in the name of achieving far-reaching goals; deep knowledge and respect for each other, equality, trust, mutual assistance.

There were precedents for attempts to establish a strategic partnership in Russian-German history. As one of, perhaps, the most striking examples, let us name the “Rapallo policy”, around which heated discussions among international relations specialists have not subsided for several decades, the next surge of which we predict at the end of April, when it will be 80 years since the signing of the famous treaty. (Let us immediately make a reservation that, from our point of view, the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, contrary to existing opinion, is not a “continuation of Rapallo on a new historical stage of development.” Documents and subsequent steps of both countries indicate that the August-September 1939 agreements between Moscow and Berlin were purely tactical actions for them - due to the significant divergence of interests and goals mentioned above.)

A feature of the current stage of relations between our countries, which is fundamentally different from the Rapallo stage, which began with the unification of Germany, in which Russia again played a decisive role, is the desire of both Moscow and Berlin to develop cooperation between themselves as transparently as possible, while maintaining unconditional fidelity to their allied obligations , as well as the non-direction of this cooperation against third countries, the intention to integrate Russian-German ties into a broader international, primarily Euro-Atlantic, context.

To date, a solid legal foundation for creative and active interaction has been created between the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany, which has stood the test of time. Its cornerstone is the so-called “big” Treaty of 1990 on Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation - a unique and in many ways not yet exhausted its potential document, covering almost all fundamentally important areas of relations - from joint actions to ensure international peace and the fight against terrorism ( !) to cooperation in the economic, humanitarian and cultural spheres.

The regulatory framework of the partnership includes a significant array of long-term agreements - from the Agreement on the development of large-scale cooperation in the field of economics, industry, science and technology (valid until 2010) to such specific documents as agreements on the exchange of confidential information and on a direct encrypted line connections between the Kremlin and the Federal Chancellor's Office.

Year after year, the mechanism of strategic partnership between Russia and Germany is gaining momentum and becoming more and more multifaceted. Regular meetings and telephone contacts between the leaders of the two countries are now taken for granted. The annual two-day Russian-German interstate consultations at the highest level are firmly established in the international calendar - dense and extremely specific negotiations between the heads of key ministries and departments under the auspices of the President of Russia and the Chancellor of Germany. Let us remember that this form of negotiations first began to be practiced by German diplomacy in relations with Germany’s closest European allies, primarily France.

In addition to ordinary working relations through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “routine” contacts were added through the ministries of economics, finance, culture, and internal affairs. The current international situation has stimulated the intelligence services of both countries to cooperate. The exchange of confidential information takes place through the offices of official representatives of security agencies created in recent years in Russia and Germany.

An effective lever for resolving monetary and economic problems, including debt, as well as a generator of non-standard ideas in the field of new investment projects, was the High-Level Working Group on Strategic Issues of Economic and Financial Cooperation, formed in 2000 and reporting directly to the President and Chancellor (its members include: “profile” deputy ministers of economy, finance, industry and science, foreign affairs). The Russian-German Cooperation Council, headed by the Ministers of Economics of Russia and Germany and uniting numerous representatives of state and private business operators, has transformed into a kind of “exchange of ideas” in the trade and economic sphere.

Finally, a very important component of the emerging mechanism of strategic partnership was the organization of dialogue between civil societies of the two countries on the basis of the public discussion forum “St. Petersburg Dialogue” created by the President and Chancellor. Among its founders are authoritative representatives of the intelligentsia of Russia and Germany, who are not indifferent to how relations between future generations of Russians and Germans will develop, and are ready to contribute to the final overcoming of the clichés of the Cold War period still present in the public consciousness, as well as new prejudices and negative cliches, sometimes created under the influence of tendentious information.

To be sustainable and, therefore, long-lasting, a partnership between countries must rest on three, preferably equal, pillars. These are the political sphere, trade and economic ties and cultural and humanitarian exchanges. The incompleteness of one of these supports can, in a certain situation, shake the entire structure.

Areas of coincidence or significant similarity in the political interests of Russia and Germany are obvious today. This is, first of all, ensuring international and regional stability, including in the context of the existence of a global terrorist threat. There is no doubt that, acting jointly or on parallel courses, Moscow and Berlin are able to make a significant contribution to the formation of a new international security system that provides reliable protection to their citizens and is based on the fundamental principles of international law.

Among our common most important priorities are the timely prevention of potential crisis hotspots and promoting progress in resolving long-standing conflicts in Europe (the Balkans, Transcaucasia) and its immediate environment (primarily in the Middle East). Taking into account Berlin’s declared readiness to generally assume greater responsibility in international affairs (the example of Afghanistan confirms this), the potential for cooperation, including bilaterally, is objectively increasing. It is significant, in particular, that the interaction between the foreign policy departments of Russia and Germany and the coordination of approaches to the most important international problems in the last one and a half to two years have not only become the norm, but are also acquiring an increasingly substantive, applied character.

Not the last place in this series is occupied by the issues of the disarmament dossier. It is quite obvious that the topic of strategic stability with an emphasis on strategic offensive arms and missile defense has long gone beyond the scope of purely Russian-American relations. This is natural, since it concerns the security of all states, as well as issues of, say, non-proliferation or radical reduction of various types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The above examples, of course, only partially cover the current Russian-German agenda. We have many compatible positions on various international issues, including the fight against trans-border organized crime, a civilized solution to migration problems, maintaining environmental safety, preventing the emergence of an excessive gap in the living standards of neighboring states, and much more. Of course, like any partners and even close allies, our views on tactics and mechanisms of action here may differ in some ways, and in a number of aspects there are serious disagreements. However, it is extremely important that the search for a balance of interests is being carried out by Moscow and Berlin on an equal and constructive basis, on the basis of a single system of civilizational values.

Berlin cannot fail to understand that Russia is a “stabilizer” of Eurasia and Germany’s “window” into this region. Moscow is aware that Germany is one of the key countries of the Old Continent for Russia. It is on this basis that in recent years the interaction between Russia and Germany in the political field has developed, and in an ascending manner: from the unification of Germany and the unprecedented withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory in a number of parameters (military, financial, economic) to Russia’s entry into the G8 ” and the beginning of the process of establishing qualitatively new relations with the European Union and NATO, which would have been impossible without the active support of Germany.

We believe that today it is more obvious than ever that the experience of the past and the interests of all European states dictate the need to include Russia and Germany in a single system of coordinates in the field of security. The new philosophy of cooperation between Russia and NATO and the EU being developed, including its military-political component, opens up a historic chance for this. Moscow would like to sincerely count on Berlin’s far-sighted and truly partner-like approach to this work.

In the decades since World War II, Russia and Germany have traveled a difficult path. The laying of joint wreaths last year - for the first time in history - by the President of the Russian Federation and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Piskarevskoye cemetery in St. Petersburg and in Berlin's Tiergarten clearly reflects the final choice of our peoples in favor of sincere reconciliation and good neighborliness. Today this choice is firmly entrenched in the minds of the vast majority of Russians and Germans. Moscow again trusts Germany and sees it as a reliable and responsible partner. They hope that the foreign policy guidelines being developed in Berlin are oriented not at Russia’s temporary economic weakness, but at a future strong Eurasian power bordering and closely cooperating with the European Union.

Obviously, there is no need to subject to a detailed analysis the nature of their interaction in the economic sphere, which is vital for both countries, especially in the future. The complementarity of our economies today largely determines the development of close business relations with Germany. The Russia-EU dialogue on energy security issues in the 21st century, initiated by Moscow and Berlin, speaks volumes. Indeed, the fuel and energy component dominates 90 percent of our trade, covering about a third of gas consumption and a quarter of Germany's oil supply. It is also well known that Germany is not only Russia’s largest creditor, but also the main supplier of machinery and equipment to the Russian market. But to reduce everything to a rather unattractive, especially in the era of globalization, scheme of simple exchange of raw materials for equipment would be short-sighted.

The problems that the former USSR accumulated over decades in foreign trade (not only with Germany) cannot be solved overnight. Here it is necessary for both parties to work together, to use non-standard ways and mechanisms.

A serious burden for the rising Russian economy, of course, is the huge external debt (by the way, Russia regularly fulfills its obligations to creditors and over the past ten years has paid over $12 billion to Germany alone, half of which is interest). In Berlin they declare their readiness - in the event of a sharp deterioration in the macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy - to reconsider their tough approaches in the Paris Club. This is, of course, an important stabilizing factor. However, a truly partnership approach, I think, could be more cooperative. It is also a pity that Germany is not so consistent on the issue of foreign assets of the former USSR and for the past decade, citing the well-known objections of Ukraine, has categorically refused to transfer foreign real estate belonging to it to Russia. Unlike, by the way, from many of its partners in the European Union.

Over the past years, a strong framework has been created in Russian-German economic cooperation, which is capable - the events of 1998 are an example of this - to withstand severe overloads and can serve as a springboard for moving forward. Against the general background of a decline in the global economic situation in 2001, Russian-German trade maintained its positive dynamics, reaching an estimated level of 47.5 billion marks (+14.5 percent) with a positive balance for Russia of 15 billion marks - an unrealistic guideline for many of our other leading partners.

And, nevertheless, the real potential of Russian-German economic cooperation, in our opinion, can be fully revealed only through multi-vector cooperation in knowledge-intensive and high-tech industries. Only then will it become truly strategic. This, in our opinion, is understood by many partners in Germany who are serious about entering the Russian market for a long time, realizing that today’s courage will pay off handsomely tomorrow.

Russia has “breakthrough” developments that we are ready to implement together with European, primarily German, concerns, for example, in the aviation sector and space. Russian mathematicians and programmers, engineers and physicists, biologists and geneticists (“cheap” but highly qualified) offer modern Russian technologies, jointly patent them and promote them to international markets. For us, this is an alternative to “brain drain”; for the European Union, it is a chance to secure for ourselves, together with Russia, a worthy place in the competition with other world economic centers of power. So far we are only at the beginning of the journey here.

Things are not easy in the vital investment area. Overtaking all its competitors in terms of accumulated capital investments in the Russian economy ($6.5 billion, or 18 percent of their total volume), Germany is significantly inferior in terms of direct investment ($1.4 billion), occupying only fifth place. These figures pale even more, being several times lower in comparison with the investment activity of Germany, for example, in the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, in China or a number of Latin American countries.

Correcting this situation, of course, also depends on how quickly Russia goes its part in creating a favorable climate for foreign investors. The movement on our part has undoubtedly begun, and Russia has the right to count on the counter movement and activity of German capital.

We have no doubt: if we manage to get away from the ideological stereotypes of the times of confrontation, if we think strategically, then the benefits from the implementation of joint large investment projects will be mutual. We include among them not only bilateral initiatives with Berlin, but also large trans-European, including mainline transport projects with the European Union.

And finally, about the third, no less important spiritual and psychological aspect of the strategic partnership, its demographic, cultural and humanitarian components.

Russian and German cultures, as parts of pan-European culture, are equivalent, self-sufficient and at the same time complementary and mutually enriching. Russian literature, music, painting became an organic part of German society, and vice versa.

It is gratifying that the Russian-German partnership today is not limited exclusively to the interstate level of relations, but is actually developing in breadth and depth. Most of the federal states of Germany maintain stable and very intensive ties with the regions of the Russian Federation, more than 80 pairs of cities in Russia and Germany, about 330 universities in both countries are united by partnerships. The volume of these connections is also characterized by 150 regular flights operated weekly between our countries.

The following figures are also eloquent: over 2 million people for whom Russian is the main, native language, have moved over the past ten years for permanent residence in Germany from the countries of the former USSR. About 20 million people (including family members), most of whom live in Russia, served or worked in East Germany and retain the warmest feelings about this country. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Germans are familiar with the life of Russians first-hand and have long-standing friendly contacts in Russia.

A special place in the formation of an objective image of the partner country, the development of truly strong contacts between people - the most important pillar of bilateral relations, is the issue of direct communication between Russians and Germans, which presupposes knowledge of the language of their neighbors. Today, about 200 thousand people study Russian in Germany, more than 4 million people study German in Russian schools and universities. The potential of those who know and understand the language in both countries is much greater.

I. B. Bratchikov, D. E. Lyublinsky

Russian-German relations are an important factor in European and global politics, influencing the solution of many world problems.

The first official visit to Germany by Russian President Vladimir Putin took place in June 2000. In turn, the first visit of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his wife to Russia took place on January 7, 2001 and was informal.

Since 2001, the Russian-German dialogue has acquired the character of constant consultations at the highest level, including all pressing issues of our time.

After the election of Angela Merkel to the post of Federal Chancellor of Germany in November 2005, the intensity of contacts between the two countries at the highest level did not decrease. Meetings between the leaders of the two countries took place several times a year, during which not only relations between Russia and Germany were discussed, but also processes taking place in the world, and opinions were exchanged on issues of international relations.

The importance of relations with Germany for Russia continued after the election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russian President in 2008. In June 2008, Germany became the first European state to welcome Dmitry Medvedev as President of Russia.

In November 2009, the President of Russia took part in celebrations in Berlin in connection with the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall; on May 9, 2010, the German Chancellor attended the celebration of the 65th anniversary of the Victory in Moscow.

Also, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Berlin at the summit of the Normandy Four leaders and at negotiations on the situation in Syria. In 2017, the leaders of the two countries held several telephone conversations.

Since 1998, as a rule, Interstate Consultations (IGC) have been held annually at the highest level with the participation of members of the governments of both countries. The last 14th round of the IGC took place on November 16, 2012 in Moscow. The next IGCs scheduled for April 2014 were postponed at the initiative of the German side due to the Ukrainian crisis.

In 2000, on the initiative of the President of Russia and the Chancellor of Germany, a High-Level Working Group on Strategic Cooperation in the Field of Economics and Finance (HWG) was established.

In 2003, by decision of the leaders of the two countries, a bilateral High-Level Working Group on Security Policy Issues (HLWG) was created.

Contacts are regular at the level of foreign ministers. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has developed close and friendly relations with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who held this post in 2005-2017. According to Sergei Lavrov, their dialogue “was invariably constructive in nature, aimed at building a positive agenda for relations between Russia and Germany and close cooperation between our countries in the international arena.”

On February 16, 2017, on the sidelines of informal consultations between the G20 foreign ministers in Bonn, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the new German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel. On February 18, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel (Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France) was on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference for the first time.

On March 9, 2017, in Moscow, a meeting was held between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Vice-Chancellor, Federal Foreign Minister of Germany Sigmar Gabriel, who visited Russia for the first time in his new capacity as head of the foreign affairs department. The ministers discussed the schedule of upcoming political contacts and the current state of Russian-German relations.

Russia and Germany are participants in the Normandy process and, along with France and Ukraine, co-authors of the Minsk Document. The countries regularly interact on Afghanistan and Libyan settlement issues.

In the context of the Ukrainian events, official Berlin has taken a course towards reducing or completely freezing the dynamics of development of bilateral interaction in almost all areas. The German side initiated the cancellation of the next round of the IGC, regular meetings of the AWG, RGVU, and blocked the work of other formats.

Germany was in the forefront of supporters of the introduction of sectoral sanctions against Russia by the EU as a “punishment” for the “annexation” of Crimea and “destabilization” of the situation in Ukraine.

The next Russian-German Conference of partner cities is scheduled to be held on June 28-30, 2017 in Krasnodar.

In 2017-2018, a cross Russian-German Year of Regional and Municipal Partnerships will be held under the patronage of the heads of foreign affairs departments of the two countries.

The possibility of continuing the practice of holding bilateral cross-years is being discussed.

There are an Intergovernmental Commission on the Affairs of Russian Germans, a Mixed Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, a Joint Commission on the Study of the Contemporary History of Bilateral Relations, a Russian-German Council for Youth Cooperation, and other joint bodies.

On German territory there are more than three thousand Soviet military graves, on which 760 thousand Russian/Soviet citizens rest. The German side maintains Soviet military graves in accordance with the intergovernmental Agreement on the care of war graves of December 16, 1992.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

Germany has traditionally been an ally of Russia, but at the beginning of the twentieth century, the paths of these two great powers radically diverged due to a number of reasons caused by the peculiarities of the era itself. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the balance of power in the international arena changed dramatically. The geopolitical aspirations of the great powers: Great Britain, France and Russia, on the one hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the other, led to unusually intense rivalry. In the growing rivalry, each of the great powers pursued its own interests. In the 80s of the nineteenth century, relations between Russia and Germany slowly but steadily deteriorated. After the founding of the German Empire in 1871, relations with Russia were cold. This was caused by German support for Austria-Hungary and German resistance to the expansion of Russian influence, including in the Balkan Peninsula. In 1887, the Union of Three Empires collapsed. France, which sought to overcome its foreign policy isolation, tried to take advantage of the growing tension in Russian-German relations.

The result of all the measures taken by Bismarck against Russia was a sharp deterioration in Russian-German relations. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was the organizer of the Berlin Congress, at which the results of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, beneficial to Russia, were significantly curtailed. This event caused growing hostility towards Germany and the entire German people in Russian society. Germany was presented as a ferocious militaristic power and one of the main opponents of Slavism. Bismarck, trying to put economic pressure on Russia, closed the tsarist government's access to the German money market. Then Russia turned to the French exchange for loans. And soon France becomes the largest creditor of the Russian Empire. The rapprochement between Republican France and Tsarist Russia was facilitated by the fact that there were no serious disagreements between them either on issues of European politics or colonial problems.

In the early 90s of the 19th century, the military-political rapprochement of the two countries found its legal form. In 1891, a consultative pact was signed between Russia and France, and in 1893, a secret military convention on joint actions in the war against Germany. The signing of this convention completed the formalization of the Franco-Russian alliance.

It seemed that the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance created a counterweight to the Tripartite Pact and thereby stabilized the situation in Europe. But the real emergence of this union only fueled the rivalry between the two blocs, which were now well-defined, since none of their leaders was going to sacrifice the interests of the financial oligarchy of their countries.

Consequently, the balance achieved in Europe was unstable. Therefore, both blocs sought to attract new allies to their side.

The new political situation affected Britain's position. Germany's territorial claims grew rapidly, the increase in its economic and military potential, and most importantly, the displacement of British goods from some markets by German ones forced British leaders to reconsider their traditional policy of “brilliant isolation.” In 1904, an Anglo-French agreement was signed on the division of spheres of influence in Africa. This agreement was called the Entente (from the French “Concord”). It opened up opportunities for broad cooperation between the two countries against Germany (although not a word was said about it in the document). The growth of Germany's foreign policy activity forced France and Great Britain to agree on military cooperation in 1906.

In order to finally determine Russia's place in the system of European unions, it was necessary to regulate relations with France's partner, Great Britain. In 1907, after lengthy negotiations with the assistance of France, it was possible to conclude an Anglo-Russian agreement on the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East. This agreement opened up the possibility of cooperation between Russia and Great Britain against Germany. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 completed the formation of a new military-political bloc, which went down in history as the Entente.

So, the regrouping of forces in Europe is basically completed. Europe has finally split into two opposing military blocs.

Germany failed to take advantage of the favorable situation created as a result of the weakening of Tsarist Russia in 1904 - 1906. German diplomacy could neither tear Russia away from France, nor upset the Anglo-French Entente, nor prevent Russia from joining this military bloc in 1907.

In 1242. There were extensive trade relations between northwestern Russia and northern Germany, and Novgorod and Pskov participated in the trade of the Hanseatic League. In 1410, Smolensk regiments took part in the Battle of Grunwald as part of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Germans in Muscovite Rus'

On January 29, 1894, a Russian-German trade agreement was concluded for a period of ten years, according to which both countries lowered duties on each other’s goods. The signing of the agreement was preceded by a tense trade war.

World War I

This was the first interstate agreement regulating relations between Germany and Russia after the end of the First World War. It was subsequently confirmed and expanded by other treaties, in particular the Berlin Treaty of 1926. By signing the Treaty of Rapallo, both the Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia, which were in international isolation, hoped to strengthen their positions in the international political arena. The signing was also important for the economies of the two countries: for Germany, Russia was a good market for industrial products that were boycotted by other European countries; For Russia, cooperation with Germany meant the only opportunity to build its own industry. For example, Germany supplied equipment for the development of Caspian oil fields. The benefit was mutual: Russia independently, without the help of other countries, develops oil fields; Germany is reducing its dependence on the UK and US oil cartels.

Despite the widespread belief that secret additional protocols on military cooperation were also signed at Rapallo, no additional or separate agreements were concluded. However, even before the Rapallo meeting, the Weimar Republic, which militarily had the right only to troops for “internal needs,” collaborated with Russia in this area. With the establishment of diplomatic relations, work in this direction was intensified: Germany received the opportunity to conduct military research activities and train its military specialists for aviation and tank forces, which it was prohibited from after the First World War under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles; Russia gained access to German military developments and the opportunity to train its military personnel.

As part of military cooperation, in 1925, a joint flight and tactical school was organized near Lipetsk on the basis of an existing airfield and facilities, the rental of which was free. Funding for the school's activities, as well as the reconstruction and construction of infrastructure, was carried out by the German side. Under the leadership of German specialists, over the 8 years of its existence, about 120 pilots for Germany and a comparable number of military specialists for the Soviet Union were trained and retrained.

On October 3, 1926, a document was signed on the creation of a joint tank school near Kazan, but practical training there began only in the spring of 1929. No more than 12 people studied at the school at a time. On June 20, 1933, the school was disbanded. During the operation of the school, up to 30 Reichswehr officers were trained for the German side. One of the Soviet graduates of the school was Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces S. M. Krivoshein.

Also in 1926, an agreement was signed on the creation of a joint chemical laboratory for military purposes (Tomka Object). In the Saratov region at the Tomka facility " methods of using toxic substances in artillery and aviation were tested, as well as means and methods for degassing contaminated areas».

Relations with the Third Reich

However, against the backdrop of events in 1938 (Anschluss of Austria, Munich Agreement, Anglo-German and Franco-German declarations of friendship and non-aggression, Vienna Arbitration) and 1939 (local war with Japan, failure of mutual assistance negotiations with England and France), the Soviet Union was forced revised his foreign policy, moving towards restoring relations with Germany. A trade agreement was concluded between the USSR and Germany in 1939, a Non-Aggression Treaty and a Treaty of Friendship and Borders were signed. After this, anti-German themes disappeared from Soviet propaganda for the next two years. At negotiations on November 12-13, 1940 in Berlin, Hitler invited V. M. Molotov to consider the issue of the USSR joining the Tripartite Pact and becoming a member of the Axis powers, although on the same day, November 12, Hitler gave the order: “ Regardless of the outcome of these negotiations, all previously envisaged preparations for the East should be continued.", and the development of the operation to attack the USSR entered its final stage. According to Molotov, " the meeting initiated by the fascist side was only an ostentatious demonstration" And " the inevitability of German aggression has increased incredibly, and in the near future» .

The Great Patriotic War

Cold War era

Policy

After defeat in the war, Germany was divided between the Allies into four occupation zones. On September 7, the Federal Republic of Germany was founded on the territory of the occupation zones of Great Britain, the United States and France, with its capital in Bonn. A month later in the Soviet sector - the German Democratic Republic with its capital in East Berlin. The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO, and the German Democratic Republic joined the Warsaw Pact. On 13 August, a wall was erected between East and West Berlin. Thus, "East Germany" became the USSR's main outpost in the Cold War.

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, which was considered one of the most combat-ready in the Soviet Army, was stationed on the territory of the GDR. Germany also became, perhaps, the most important center of activity for the State Security Committee in its confrontation with Western intelligence agencies. It was mainly in Germany that the exchange of arrested spies took place between the USA and the USSR (in this regard, the Glienicke Bridge became famous).

Current situation

Political relations

Economic cooperation

Germany is Russia's most important trading partner, accounting for 13.6 percent of all Russian foreign trade. Russia for Germany, based on absolute financial indicators, is the 10th most important trading partner and trade with it accounts for about 3% of the total figure. However, the import of Russian energy resources is of a strategic nature for Germany. Already today, Germany imports more than 30% of natural gas and 20% of oil from Russia, and according to experts, this share will increase even more in the future. Russia imports many mechanical engineering products from Germany.

Cooperation in the cultural sphere

Culturally, there is close cooperation between both states. 2003 was the year of Russia in Germany, and the year of Germany in Russia. Russia was the main country at the Frankfurt Book Fair. One of the periodically arising issues related to the cultural sphere is the question of the return to Germany of captured art taken by Soviet soldiers after the end of World War II.

The humanitarian direction of interaction between Russia and Germany is regulated by the Intergovernmental Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany on cultural cooperation of December 16, 1992, the Intergovernmental Agreement on the study of the Russian language in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German language in the Russian Federation of October 9, 2003, and the Intergovernmental Agreement in area of ​​youth cooperation dated December 21, 2004, as well as a number of interdepartmental documents.

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