EntranceThe Battle of Poltava in brief: the most important thing. Victory Day over the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava (1709) Participants in the Battle of Poltava 1709
The Battle of Poltava is the largest battle of the Northern War between Russian troops under the command of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII. It took place on the morning of June 27 (July 8), 1709 (June 28 according to the Swedish calendar) 6 miles from the city of Poltava in Ukraine (Left Bank of the Dnieper). The defeat of the Swedish army led to a turning point in the Northern War in favor of Russia and to the end of Sweden's dominance in Europe.
July 10th is the Day military glory Russia - Victory Day of the Russian army under the command of Peter the Great over the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava.
"Battle of Poltava". Fragment of Lomonosov's mosaic.
Background
After the defeat of the Russian army at Narva in 1700, Charles XII resumed military operations against the Saxon Elector and Polish king Augustus II, inflicting one defeat after another.
The conquest of Ingermanland, the founding by Peter I at the mouth of the Neva of the new fortified city of St. Petersburg (1703) and the successes of the Russians in Courland (1705) prompted Charles XII to decide, after the defeat of Augustus II, to return to action against Russia and capture Moscow. In 1706, Augustus II suffered a heavy defeat and lost the crown of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In June 1708, Charles XII began a campaign against Russia.
Peter I understood the inevitability of the Swedes' advance into the interior of Russia. After the Russian army avoided defeat at Grodno in 1706, shortly after the arrival of the tsar on December 28, 1706, a military council was held in the Polish town of Zholkiev. To the question, “...should we give battles with the enemy in Poland, or at our borders,” it was decided not to give (if such a misfortune happens, it is difficult to carry out a retreat), “and for this purpose it is necessary to give a battle at our borders, when there is a necessary need; and in Poland, at crossings, and in parties, also by stripping provisions and fodder, to torment the enemy, to which many Polish senators agreed.”
The year 1708 passed in clashes between the Swedish and Russian armies on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the battles of Golovchin, Dobro, Raevka and Lesnaya). The Swedes fully felt the “starvation” in provisions and fodder, which was greatly facilitated by the Belarusian peasantry, which hid grain, feed for horses, and killed foragers.
In the fall of 1708, Hetman I. S. Mazepa betrayed Peter and took the side of Charles, assuring him of the allied feelings of the Ukrainian population towards the Swedish crown. Due to illness and poor provision of food and ammunition, the Swedish army needed rest, so the Swedes from near Smolensk turned to the lands of Ukraine in order to rest there and continue the attack on Moscow from the south. However, the winter turned out to be difficult for the Swedish army, despite the fact that the Russian army on Ukrainian lands stopped the “scorched earth” tactics. Ukrainian peasants, like Belarusians, greeted foreigners with hatred. They ran into the forests, hid bread and feed for horses, and killed foragers. The Swedish army was starving.
By the time Charles’s army approached Poltava, it had lost up to a third of its strength and numbered 35 thousand people. In an effort to create favorable preconditions for the offensive, Karl decides to capture Poltava, which from a fortification point of view seemed “easy prey.”
Allies - Zaporizhian Cossacks
In October 1708, Peter I became aware of the betrayal and defection of Hetman Mazepa to the side of Charles XII, who conducted long negotiations with the king, promising him, if the Swedes came to the Hetmanate, up to 50 thousand Cossack troops, food and a comfortable wintering. On October 28, 1708, Mazepa, at the head of a detachment of Cossacks, arrived at Charles’s headquarters.
In response, A.D. Menshikov captured and ruined Baturin, the hetman’s headquarters, on November 2, 1708. In addition, Peter I amnestied and recalled from exile the Ukrainian colonel Semyon Paliy, accused of treason due to Mazepa’s slander, trying to enlist the support of the Cossacks.
On November 6, a new hetman was elected in Glukhov - at the insistence of Peter I, he became I. I. Skoropadsky.
In March 1709, the Cossacks of the Zaporozhye Sich went over to the side of the Swedes. The Russian cavalry detachment of Colonel Campbell (3000 sabers) sent to the south was unable to intercept the Zaporozhye Cossacks. On March 16, the Cossacks killed a Russian detachment in Tsarichanka and brought 115 captured Russian dragoons to the Swedes, but Campbell managed to break through to the north.
On April 11 (22), 1709, the Cossacks (Mazepa and Zaporozhye) took part together with the Swedes in the battle against the Russians at Sokolka. In response, the Russian detachment of Colonel P.I. Yakovlev burned Keleberda on April 16 (sparing only the church), Perevolochna on April 18, then the Old and New Kodak fortresses. Finally, on May 10, he approached the Sich. The first attack was unsuccessful, but on May 14, help arrived from Major General G.S. Volkonsky (Colonel I. Galagan), and the Sich was taken and destroyed.
The defeat of the Zaporozhye Sich raised the militant spirit of the Cossacks to defend their freedom, and the number of Cossacks under the king began to grow. However, the discipline of the Cossacks, according to the Swedes, left much to be desired: like any irregular army, they were unstable under fire from cannonballs and grenades. In the trenches near Poltava, “a night shelling with unusually large grenades forced the Cossacks to flee from work, because they were so afraid of grenades and cannons that they were ready to run from them to the ends of the earth.” The Swedes used them to guard prisoners and for excavation work, giving each person “half a carolina” (10 kopecks) per day of work. Given the traditionally high self-esteem of the Cossacks, this attitude caused them dissatisfaction.
As a result, from the many thousands of Ukrainian Cossacks (registered Cossacks numbered 30 thousand, Zaporozhye Cossacks - 10-12 thousand) about 10 thousand people went over to the side of Charles XII: about 3 thousand registered Cossacks and about 7 thousand Cossacks. But they soon began to flee from the camp of the Swedish army. King Charles XII did not dare to use such unreliable allies, of whom there were about 2 thousand left, in battle and therefore left them in the baggage train under the supervision of 7 cavalry regiments. Only a small detachment of Cossack volunteers took part in the battle.
Peter I, not fully trusting the Cossacks of the new hetman I. I. Skoropadsky, also did not use them in the battle. To look after them, he sent 6 dragoon regiments under the command of Major General G.S. Volkonsky.
A.E. Kotzebue. "Poltava Victory".
Siege of Poltava
While still with the main forces in Budishchi, on April 2 (13), 1709, Charles XII made a reconnaissance of Poltava, and on April 25 (May 6) he ordered General A. Sparra with 8 infantry regiments, an artillery regiment and the entire convoy to move from Budishchi to Poltava, General K G. Kreits with cavalry - move from Reshetilovka to Vorskla. The Russian detachment of K. E. Renne (7 thousand cavalry), sent to Poltava, was forced to retreat to the main army.
On April 27 (May 8), the Swedes sent another infantry regiment to Poltava - the Dalekarliysky, the next day the king himself came to Poltava. The Swedish command was complacent: Poltava did not look like an impregnable fortress. At the beginning of the siege, Field Marshal K. G. Rehnschild noted: “Are the Russians really so reckless and will defend themselves?” The next two days (April 28 and 29) they tried to take the weakly fortified city, in their opinion, by storm. After these unsuccessful attempts, siege work began on April 30 (May 11) (May 1 in the Swedish calendar).
E.V. Tarle counts the “struggle at the ramparts” of Poltava from April 6 (17), April 15 (26) the siege “became strong”, and the next day the shelling of Poltava from mortars began.
However, the siege, entrusted to Quartermaster General A. Gillenkrok, proceeded slowly and was carried out by a small number of troops (mainly Cossacks, which did not add to their enthusiasm: they considered being forced to use a shovel and a pick a humiliation). In addition, the Swedes did not have siege weapons, only field ones. Under the leadership of Colonel A. S. Kelin, its garrison of 4.2 thousand soldiers (Tver and Ustyug soldier regiments and one battalion each from three more regiments - Perm, Apraksin and Fechtenheim) and 2.6 thousand armed townspeople successfully repulsed a number of assaults.
A. Gillenkrok reports that one Cossack officer who served under Mazepa told him that Lieutenant Colonel Zilferhelm negotiated with the Cossack Colonel Levents, who was with the Russians in Poltava. This colonel wanted to give the Swedes an opportunity to attack Poltava by surprise. But the negotiations were unsuccessful. The Russian command found out about the negotiations, arrested and escorted the Cossack colonel out of the city. Tarle also reports about the betrayal of Colonel of the Poltava Cossack Regiment Ivan Levents.
From April to June, the Swedes launched 20 assaults on Poltava and lost more than 6 thousand people under its walls.
The garrison of Poltava at the beginning of the battle was 2,200 people.
Denis Martin. "Battle of Poltava" (1726).
Russian attempts to lift the siege
In early May, shortly after the siege began, A.D. Menshikov approached Poltava with part of the Russian army. Trying to help the garrison of Poltava, he planned to attack the trench covering the besieging Swedes, and in order to distract the enemy, he sent a detachment of Lieutenant General F. I. Belling against Oposhna. However, the sabotage attempt towards Oposhna on May 7 (18) failed. Other actions to alleviate the situation of the besieged (creation of a redoubt near the bridge across the Vorskla, construction of a dam) were also unsuccessful. At the same time, brigadier Alexei Golovin managed to lead 2 battalions (900 people) into the fortress on May 15 (26). After this, the Poltava garrison began to become more active and launched a series of forays, in one of which A. Golovin was captured.
On May 26 (June 6), B.P. Sheremetev arrived near Poltava with the main army; Thus, the entire Russian army gathered near the village of Krutoy Bereg in a fortified camp. The Swedes opposed the Russians with their line of fortifications, reinforced on the flanks with redoubts. All their assaults were still successfully repulsed by the besieged.
To weaken the enemy, Russian troops carried out frequent attacks on his location. The most significant was carried out by Lieutenant General I. Geinskin (6 dragoon regiments = 2500 sabers and the Astrakhan Infantry Regiment) against the village of Starye Sanzhary, where Russian prisoners taken in Veprik were kept. As a result, the Swedes were defeated and 1,200 Russian prisoners were freed. 2 guns and 8 banners were taken from the enemy, Russian losses were 60 killed and 181 wounded.
Crossing of the Russian army through Vorskla
On June 4 (15), Peter I arrived in the Russian army near Poltava. Soon at the military council it was decided to cross the Vorskla. However, thunderstorms and floods thwarted the king’s plans: an attempt to cross the fortified camp through difficult swamps on June 13 (24) failed.
Then on June 15 (26), Peter decided to cross Vorskla in another place; At the military council they decided to “rescue the city of Poltava without a general battle (as it was a very dangerous matter).” However, the very next day, at a new military council, Peter decided to give Charles XII a general battle.
Peter I sent General L.N. Allart to prepare a crossing south of Poltava, and K.E. Renne with three regiments of infantry and several regiments of dragoons - to the north, in the area of the village of Petrovka, and also continued the construction of the dam begun by Menshikov. Having learned about the Russian crossing through Vorskla, Charles XII sent Field Marshal K. G. Renschild against Renne, and he himself went against Allart. During reconnaissance on June 16 (27) (June 17 according to the Swedish calendar), on his birthday, the Swedish king was wounded in the leg, after which the Swedes returned to the camp.
On June 19 (30), the Russian army moved to the village of Chernyakovka, to the crossing site prepared by General Renne. The next day it crossed Vorskla and became a fortified camp near the villages of Petrovka and Semyonovka (8 versts north of Poltava).
On June 21 (July 2), the Swedish command, having received false news of the start of a Russian attack, formed its army in battle formation, and also launched another unsuccessful attack on Poltava. In the evening, Karl took the infantry to the Holy Cross Monastery, and Field Marshal K. G. Renschild took the cavalry to the other side of Poltava.
In an effort to gather as many troops as possible, Peter I ordered Hetman I. I. Skoropadsky and Ayuka Khan’s Kalmyks to join the main army. On June 24 (July 5), Skoropadsky’s Cossacks united with Peter’s army; The main forces of the Kalmyks were late for the battle.
On June 25 (July 6), the Russian army moved closer to Poltava and settled in a new fortified camp near the village of Yakovtsy. Going to attack a formidable enemy, Peter I dug in at every stop: he erected a tete-de-pont (bridgehead fortification) at Petrovka, created a fortified camp at Semyonovka, another 3 versts to the south, and also ordered the construction of 6 redoubts between the Yakovetsky and Malobudishchensky forests. All this was supposed to balance the tactical superiority of the enemy in the event of a surprise attack earlier than June 29.
V. Artamonov believes that the retranchement had the shape of an irregular polygon, as shown in the primary diagrams of General L. N. Allart of 1709 and the plan of J. Schwartz, and not a clear trapezoid or rectangle, as was later drawn on all the “ceremonial” diagrams. It probably consisted of four bastions and six redans connected by ramparts. The cavalry was placed in an open field between the Yakovchansky and Malobudishchensky forests behind six transverse redoubts. In the forest near Malye Budishchi, trees were cut down and rubble was made.
Having learned through a defector about the approach of reinforcements to the Russians in the form of Kalmyk cavalry and having lost the hope of receiving his own reinforcements (the refusal of the Turkish Sultan to enter the war against Russia and the impossibility of Stanislav Leschinsky and Krassov’s corps to come to the aid from Poland), Charles XII decided to attack Poltava again (22 June (July 3)), and after the failure of the assault (which cost the Swedes 1676 people, the Russians - 278 killed and 603 wounded) - give the Russians a general battle.
On June 26 (July 7), Peter, together with the generals, again inspected the field and the enemy camp and made another decision that influenced the outcome of the battle - to build 4 more longitudinal redoubts in the middle of the passage between the forests near the villages of Malye Budishchi and Malye Pavlenki. They were ordered to be built at night so that the enemy would not know about it.
Alexey Kivshenko. "Surrender of the Swedish Army."
Charles XII's plan for battle
At the military council of the Swedish command (in addition to Charles XII, Field Marshal K. G. Renschild, the king's first minister K. Pieper and the commander of the Dalecarlian regiment, Colonel Sigrot (Swedish) Russian) participated) it was decided to attack the Russian army. The plan included two stages and was based on the surprise of the attack and on the conviction that the Russian army, just like in the Battle of Golovchin, would be passive in the offensive and would mainly be on the defensive:
Early in the morning, under the cover of darkness, the Swedish infantry, unexpectedly for the enemy, begins an attack and breaks through to the rear of the Russians in the space between their redoubts, arranged between the Budyshchansky and Yakovetsky forests. This is followed by a strike from the Swedish cavalry against the Russian cavalry concentrated behind the redoubts.
At the second stage of the attack, the Swedes storm the Russian stronghold (retranchement) and at the same time their cavalry covers it from the north, thereby cutting off the retreat routes for the Russian troops, which ultimately should have led to their complete defeat.
This plan of the king was not communicated even to the closest persons from the main headquarters of the army. Not all commanders understood its meaning: some of them believed that we were talking about storming redoubts, others - about passing through the line of enemy fortifications.
Strengths of the parties
Swedish army
Charles XII had up to 37 thousand soldiers (including several thousand registered and grassroots Zaporozhye Cossacks). Having left 2 regiments with a small detachment of cavalry against Poltava and detached 4 cavalry posts (2 thousand) to occupy the crossings across the Vorskla from Poltava to Perevolochnaya, Charles XII was left with 26 infantry battalions, 22 cavalry regiments; only 25 thousand people.
Directly in the Battle of Poltava, about 8,000 infantry (18 battalions), 7,800 cavalry (14 cavalry regiments and a drabant corps = 109 squadrons) and about a thousand irregular cavalry (Vlachs) took part.
Russian army
The Russian army numbered, according to various sources, from 60 to 80 thousand soldiers.
25 thousand infantry took part directly in the Battle of Poltava, some of whom, even being present on the field, did not take part in the battle.
The Russian cavalry numbered about 21 thousand people (24 dragoon regiments, 3 horse-grenadier regiments and 2 separate squadrons). In addition, on the Russian side, a small detachment of Kalmyks took part in the battle (the only irregular formations used by Peter I directly in the battle).
Artillery
Charles XII had 41 guns (30 cannons, 2 howitzers, 8 mortars and 1 shotgun), but only 4 guns took part in the battle from the Swedish side. It is believed that the Swedes wasted all the charges during the siege of Poltava and were left without charges and gunpowder.
Englund writes that the artillery regiment under the command of Colonel Rudolf von Bünow had 28 guns: 16 3-pounder, 5 6-pounder, 2 16-pounder howitzers and 5 6-pounder mortars. However, the king's plan, which included a covert approach and a surprise attack on the Russian camp, excluded the use of heavy artillery, which is why Swedish artillery was practically not used in the battle.
In addition, the Swedish army of that time was characterized by an underestimation of artillery in battle; all emphasis was placed on a powerful attack by the Carolinas in close formation.
On the contrary, Peter I paid great attention to artillery. As a result, in the Battle of Poltava, the superiority of the Russians in material terms became overwhelming. Englund describes the participation of 102 Russian guns in the battle; according to the research of P. A. Krotov, there were 302 guns in the battle.
Some of the Russian guns were at their disposal military units; the artillery regiment (32 guns) was dispersed between the regiments. All Russian artillery was commanded by Lieutenant General Ya. V. Bruce.
The day before
On the eve of the battle, Peter I toured all the regiments. His short patriotic appeals to soldiers and officers formed the basis of the famous order, which demanded that soldiers fight not for Peter, but for “Russia and Russian piety...”
In turn, inspiring the soldiers, Charles XII announced that tomorrow they would dine in the Russian convoy, where great booty awaited them.
Progress of the battle
Advancement of the Swedish Army
At about 23.00 on the eve of the battle, the sleeping Swedes were awakened and ordered to form columns. The Swedish infantry (18 battalions under the command of Infantry General A.L. Levengaupt) formed into 4 columns: Major Generals A. Sparre, B.O. Stackelberg, K.G. Roos and A. Lagerkron.
The Swedish cavalry formed in 6 columns; Its right flank was commanded by Major General K. G. Kreutz, and its left flank by Major General H. Yu. Hamilton. Major General V.A. Schlippenbach led the advanced cavalry detachment (12 squadrons). The cavalry was commanded by Field Marshal K. G. Renschild; The wounded king entrusted him with overall command on the battlefield. Another 3 cavalry and 4 dragoon regiments and 3 thousand Cossacks were left to guard the camp and convoy.
However, the Swedes were delayed in forming columns and reaching their starting positions. Only at about 2 a.m. on June 27 (July 8) (June 28 according to the Swedish calendar) did the Swedish army move forward. As a result, the surprise was lost.
Church at the site of the battle
Swedish attack on the redoubts
The Swedes entered the field in front of the Russian redoubts at dawn. The Swedish infantry attacked the Russian redoubts, and the Swedish cavalry, galloping between them, attacked the Russian cavalry camped in the field behind the redoubts.
There are disagreements regarding the number of Russian infantry defending in the redoubts: encyclopedias report two battalions of the Belgorod regiment of brigadier S.V. Aigustov. Englund reports that the Belgorod, Nechaevsky and Neklyudovsky infantry regiments were in the redoubts (about 4,000 people, 14-16 3-pound guns and several more powerful guns), V. Artamonov - about six infantry regiments (4,730 people).
The Swedes managed to quickly capture the first two unfinished redoubts. No prisoners were taken. However, the third redoubt could not be taken on the move.
Meanwhile, the Russian dragoons, lined up in battle formation, under the command of A.D. Menshikov (K.E. Renne and R.H. Baur were also on the team) moved towards the Swedes. It is generally accepted that 17 dragoon regiments (10 thousand people with 13 guns) took part in the first phase of the battle on the Russian side; P. A. Krotov believes that the entire Russian cavalry (21 thousand) fought here.
V. A. Moltusov emphasizes that the cavalry battle took place on the line of transverse Russian redoubts, and that it was the support of the cavalry that allowed the Russian redoubts to fulfill their purpose. The Russian cavalry several times repulsed the attacks of the Swedish cavalry, which by the end of the battle lost 14 banners and standards. Then Charles XII ordered the Swedish infantry to move to the aid of the cavalry through the line of redoubts.
At about 4 a.m., Peter I ordered his cavalry to retreat to the main position near the fortified camp. However, Menshikov did not obey the tsar’s order and, wanting to finish off the Swedes at the redoubts, continued the battle. The prince informed that it was dangerous to deploy squadrons when the Swedish cavalry was nearby. It was possible to maintain the slow pace of withdrawal only with the support of infantry. Peter refused to send infantry, recalled Menshikov and handed command to R.H. Baur (Renne was already wounded by this time), who began to turn around the cavalry. What Menshikov feared happened: the riders had to take off at a full gallop for almost 3 km and rush past the retrenchment. The impression was that the Russian cavalry ran. The Swedish cavalry organized the pursuit, but K. G. Rehnschild returned the cavalry back, fearing to leave the infantry on the battlefield without cover.
And the Swedish infantry (10 battalions), having passed the line of redoubts, found themselves directly in front of the Russian fortified camp, while the Grenadier Battalion of the Life Guards suffered heavy losses from Russian artillery fire. Levenhaupt was about to launch an attack, but was stopped by an order to retreat to the Budishchensky forest and await the return of the cavalry and lagging infantry.
At this time, a cannonball from the Russian retrenchment smashed the stretcher of Charles XII, but the king himself was not injured.
Thus, there was a pause in the battle. High spirits reigned in the Swedish camp; those close to him congratulated the king on his victory. The Swedes believed that all that remained was to finish off the Russian army. Some of the Cossacks of Hetman I. I. Skoropadsky were going to go over to the side of the Swedes, but Prince Maximilian of Württemberg (German) Russian. felt he had no right to resolve this issue without the king.
The defeat of Roos
The passage of the line of redoubts threw the Swedish infantry into disarray. This was especially true for the column of Major General K. G. Roos: part of the battalions passed the line of Russian fortifications along with the rest of Levenhaupt’s infantry, the other part remained to storm the 3rd Russian redoubt. The assaulters were joined by battalions from neighboring columns. In total, Roos's detachment included 6 battalions.
The unprepared assault on the 3rd redoubt by the Swedes (not intending to storm the fortifications, they did not prepare ladders, fascines, ropes and other necessary equipment) led to large losses, especially among officers. The commander of the Dalekarli regiment, Colonel Sigrot (Swedish) Russian, died. and the commander of the Jonköpig regiment, Colonel von Buchwald, the commander of the Västerbotten regiment, Colonel Gideon Fok, was wounded. Of the 2,600 people at the beginning of the battle, about 1,500 remained in Roos’s detachment by this time. Having refused to storm the redoubt, Roos ordered a retreat to the Yakovets forest, while he lost sight of the main forces.
Peter I saw the separation of part of the Swedish infantry from the main forces and sent against it 5 infantry battalions under the command of Lieutenant General S. Renzel (Tobolsk and Koporye regiments of two battalions, as well as a battalion of the Felenheim regiment) and 5 dragoon regiments of Lieutenant General I. Gainskin.
Roos's detachment was joined by the cavalry of Major General V.A. Schlippenbach, which played the role of an advance detachment at the beginning of the battle. Schlippenbach went in search of the main army, but came across Russian cavalry and was captured. This was the first captured general of the Swedish army in the Battle of Poltava.
Soon Roos saw the Russians surrounding him in front of him. After a short but hot battle, the remnants of Roos's detachment (by this time 300-400 people) fled south through the forest to the Swedish fortifications near Poltava. Here the detachment took refuge in the so-called “Guards Trench” and soon surrendered to S. Renzel.
Decisive battle
Personal standard of Charles XII, captured during the Battle of Poltava ( Peter-Pavel's Fortress, Commandant's House, exhibition “History of St. Petersburg - Petrograd. 1703-1918")
After overcoming the line of Russian redoubts, there was a pause in the battle. The Swedish army was putting itself in order; her command was awaiting the return of its cavalry and infantry and knew nothing about the fate of Roos's detachment.
Tsar Peter, having lost sight of the Swedish army and not knowing the intentions of the Swedes, began to withdraw his troops from the retranchement: first, to hold the line of defense to the right of the fortification (north), 13 battalions were placed in two lines, on the left (south) - 10 battalions, also in 2 lines.
At about six o'clock in the morning, Peter led the entire army out of the camp and built it in two lines, having in the center the infantry under the command of Field Marshal B.P. Sheremetev and General A.I. Repnin, on the left flank the cavalry of General A.D. Menshikov, the cavalry of the right flank was commanded by R.H. Baur (before his arrival, the cavalry was commanded by Brigadier I.B. Weisbach). The Russian artillery was commanded by Lieutenant General Y. V. Bruce. A reserve of nine infantry battalions (Major General I. Ya. Ginter) was left in the camp.
I. F. Pavlovsky presented the following battle formation of the opposing troops in the decisive phase of the battle:
“The combat unit consisted of 40 infantry battalions, 17 cavalry regiments and all artillery, located in front and on the flanks of the redoubt in the following order: the division of Lieutenant General Prince Golitsyn, including 12 battalions and as part of the infantry regiments of Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Ingria and Astrakhan, were located on the right flank of the battle formation under the cover of 11 cavalry regiments of Lieutenant General Bauer; Among these units was the oldest, now dragoon, regiment, the valiant Nizhny Novgorod. Field Marshal Sheremetev was appointed head of the right flank of the position. Generals Weisbach, Schomburg and Boehm and Colonel Prince. Dolgorukov commanded various parts of the battle line.
In the center, in two lines, 16 battalions of the prince’s division were located. Repnina. The first line included 2 grenadier battalions, two battalions of the Kyiv regiment, two battalions of the Narva, one Shlisselburg, one Novgorod and one Butyrsky. The second line included two battalions of the Belgorod regiment and one battalion each of the Kyiv, Narva, Shlisselburg, Novgorod and Butyrka infantry regiments. Brigadier Augustov was appointed head of the first line, and Brigadier Felenheim was appointed the second. The sections of the position distributed between the brigadiers Nechaev, Lev and Polonsky were under the command of the head of the center - the tsar himself, who at the same time united the command of all the troops on the battlefield.
Book Repnin, remaining in position and directly directing the actions of his division, was also assigned to replace Peter in the event of his absence and to take command of the entire battle line if Sheremetev was killed.
The left flank consisted of 12 battalions of General Allart's division from the regiments of the Grenadier, Pskov, Siberian, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow and von Deldin, under the cover of 6 cavalry regiments of the generals Prince Volkonsky and Belling and Brigadier Bem, under the general command of the entire left flank of the cavalry general Prince Menshikov. The artillery was located between the regiments under the general command of Lieutenant General Bruce of the Artillery.
Of the 9 battalions left in the camp, three and parts of the combined teams, under the command of Colonel Golovin, were sent to occupy the Poltava Holy Cross Monastery with the purpose of entering into contact with the garrison of the Poltava fortress.”
At the decisive stage of the battle, the number of Russian cavalry was 7,709 “lower ranks” on the right flank and 4,459 on the left (a total of 12,168 people).
Field Marshal K. G. Rehnschild did not believe that the Russians were lined up for battle, and personally went out to make sure. However, the fact remained: the Russians betrayed their “passive tactics”, which cost them so dearly under Golovchin.
Without waiting for Roos’s detachment to approach, the Swedish infantry (10 infantry battalions; about 4,000 people) under the command of General A. L. Levengaupt lined up in one line (from right to left):
1st Life Guards Battalion
Grenadier Battalion of the Life Guards
Battalion of the Skaraborg Regiment
battalion of the Kalmar regiment
2nd Life Guards Battalion
3rd Life Guards Battalion
two battalions of the Uppland Regiment
Battalion of the Östgöt Regiment
2nd Battalion of the Nerke-Värmland Regiment
Two more battalions of the Westmanland Regiment under the command of Major General A. Sparre, with the support of the dragoons Nils Hielm, were sent to search for Ross’s detachment; they later returned to the battlefield.
The cavalry of the right flank (Major General K. G. Kreutz; 52 squadrons), due to the crowded conditions on the battlefield, stood not on the flank, but behind the Swedish infantry.
The cavalry on the left flank was still commanded by Major General H. Y. Hamilton.
The Russians stood so densely that the gaps between the battalions were about 10 m, and during these intervals the guns deployed into battle formations were rolled out. Trying to build their own line no smaller than the enemy’s line, the Swedes made gaps between the battalions of about 50 m. And still, the Russian line (about 2 km) exceeded the Swedish one in length (1.4-1.5 km).
However, the Swedish command was not embarrassed by the numerical superiority of the Russians: it emphasized the rapid attack of the Carolines, which was supposed to overthrow the enemy army and put it to flight. In addition, the difference in the breadth of the line could be compensated by the Swedes' advantage in cavalry.
At 9 o'clock in the morning the Swedish infantry line attacked the Russian infantry. The Swedes were first met with artillery fire, then the opponents exchanged rifle fire, after which they began hand-to-hand combat.
K. G. Kreutz's Swedish cavalry supported the attack with his infantry; 4 left-flank Russian battalions (Nizhny Novgorod and Grenadier regiments of brigadier de Buc) were forced to form a square, but A. D. Menshikov’s cavalry attacked the Swedes in the flank, frustrating their attack.
Encouraged by the presence of the king, the right wing of the Swedish infantry fiercely attacked the left flank of the Russian army. Under the onslaught of the Swedes, the first line of Russian troops began to retreat. The Kazan, Pskov, Siberian, Moscow (L.N. Allart's divisions), as well as the Butyrsky and Novgorod regiments of the left flank of A.I. Repnin's division, succumbed to enemy pressure. A dangerous gap in the battle formation formed in the front line of the Russian infantry: the Swedes, with a bayonet attack, “overthrew” the 1st battalion of the Novgorod regiment, captured over a dozen Russian guns, and turned some of them against the enemy. Russian historiography describes the feat of Tsar Peter I, who noticed this in time, took the 2nd battalion of the Novgorod regiment and, at its head, rushed into a dangerous place. The arrival of the king put an end to the successes of the Swedes and order on the left flank was restored.
While the right flank of the Swedish infantry broke through the front of the Russian army, its left flank did not even come into contact with the Russians. On the contrary, the Russian infantry of the right flank of Lieutenant General M. M. Golitsyn (the most experienced, including guards regiments) attacked the Swedish infantry and put it to flight. The cavalry of the Swedish left flank did not have time to support its own infantry and was soon put to flight, while the commander of the Nyland Cavalry Regiment, Colonel Anders Torstensson, was killed, and Major General H. Yu. Hamilton was captured.
The flight of the infantry of the Swedish left flank exposed the center of the battle formations. The Russian infantry increased pressure on the enemy, and the melting thin line of the Swedes broke, the gaps between the battalions reached 100-150 m. The flanks of the Russian army engulfed the Swedish battle formation. The Swedes were already tired of the intense battle. Both battalions of the Uppland Regiment standing in the center were surrounded and completely destroyed (out of 700 people, only 14 reached their own; Colonel Gustav Stiernhook and Lieutenant Colonel Arendt von Post were killed. Colonels Carl Gustav Ulfsparre (commander of the Skaraborg Regiment), Gustav Rank (commander of the Kalmar Regiment) and Georg Johan Wrangel (commander of the 2nd battalion of the Nerke-Värmland Regiment).Under the onslaught of Russian forces, the Swedes who had lost formation began a disorderly retreat, which by 11 o'clock turned into a real flight.
Destruction
Realizing the inevitability of defeat, the king, guarded by the drabants and cavalry of Major General K. G. Kreutz, left the battlefield, while passing back through the line of Russian redoubts (which were again occupied by the Russians), the king’s guard suffered heavy losses. The king's historiographer Gustav Adlerfelt died here.
Having reached the convoy in Pushkarevka (where there were about 7,000 cavalry and Cossacks loyal to Charles XII), the Swedish army began to put itself in order. Here two regiments joined the army, which led the siege of Poltava (during A.S. Kelin’s foray against the Swedes, the commander of the Södermanland regiment, Colonel Gabriel von Weidenheim, was killed).
In the evening, the Swedish army with the king headed south, to the crossing of the Dnieper. Quartermaster General A. Gyllenkrok was sent to the Dnieper. The rearguard was followed by a detachment of Major General K. G. Kruse.
On the battlefield, Field Marshal K. G. Renschild, Major General B. O. Stackelberg, Prince of Württemberg (German) Russian, commander of the North Skon Dragoon Regiment, Colonel Gustav Horn, were captured on the battlefield (except for Generals Schlippenbach, Roos and Hamilton) , commander of the Östgöt regiment, Colonel Anders Appelgren, commander of his own dragoon regiment, Colonel Nils Yllenstern. 137 banners and standards ended up in Russian hands. The king's 1st minister, Karl Pieper, and two secretaries of state were captured by a raid by the Poltava garrison.
One division of Allart captured 22 banners, including 6 banners of the Life Guards and 2 standards of the Horse Guards and Elm Dragoons.
The sounds of battle were still heard, and Peter I again built his army and began to celebrate the victory. The captured Swedish generals were invited to the festive tent; Field Marshal Renschild and the Prince of Württemberg had their swords returned. At the table, Peter drank to the loyalty and courage of the Swedes and to the health of his military teachers.
The pursuit
Already in the evening on the day of the battle, Tsar Peter sent 10 dragoon regiments of R. Kh. Baur and the Semenovsky Life Guards regiment of M. M. Golitsyn, mounted on horses, in pursuit. The next day, A.D. Menshikov with a company of the Life Squadron joined the pursuit.
Charles XII, trying to gain time, sent Major General Yu. A. Meyerfeldt to meet the Russians with a message: Minister Pieper was given the right to negotiate peace and the exchange of prisoners of war. However, this ruse delayed the Russians only for 2 hours.
Soon the remnants of the Swedish army were overtaken by the Russians and blocked at Perevolochnaya. Here, 16 thousand people surrendered, including 3 generals (Levenhaupt, Kreutz and Kruse), 11 colonels, 16 lieutenant colonels, 23 majors, 1 field commander, 12,575 non-commissioned officers and privates, as well as a large number of non-combatants.
Charles XII and Mazepa managed to escape. The Swedish king disappeared into the territory Ottoman Empire in Bendery. However, his detachment, sent to establish contact with the Swedish troops in Poland under General Krassov, was defeated near Chernivtsi by a Russian detachment, and Quartermaster General A. Gillenkrok was captured.
Soon after the battle, numerous executions of traitorous Cossacks began.
Losses of the parties
Swedish losses in the battle amounted to 9,224 people, 2,973 people were captured. (total 12,197 people).
Russian losses amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. In a mass grave near Poltava, “Brigadier Felenheim, Colonels Nechaev and Lov, Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov, Majors Kropotov, Ernst and Geld, 45 chief officers, 1293 corporals and privates, a total of 1345 people were buried.”
Lieutenant General K.E. Renne, Brigadier Ya. Polonsky, 5 colonels, 11 staff and 94 chief officers were wounded.
Results
As a result of the Battle of Poltava, the army of King Charles XII was so drained of blood that it could no longer conduct active offensive operations. The military power of Sweden was undermined, and in the Northern War there was a turning point in favor of Russia. At a meeting with the Saxon Elector Augustus II in Toruń, a military alliance between Saxony and Russia was again concluded. The Danish king also again opposed Sweden, and now, thanks to the acquired authority, it did not cost Russia either monetary subsidies or sending a military contingent.
Awards
Not only military personnel, but also civilians were awarded for the victory:
Peter I was declared the “first lieutenant general” and Schoutbenacht “from the blue flag.”
Field Marshal B.P. Sheremetev was gifted with estates. In addition to him, generals R. Kh. Baur, M. M. Golitsyn, I. Gainskin and G. S. Volkonsky received estates.
A.D. Menshikov was named the second Field Marshal General.
K. E. Renne received the rank of general from the cavalry.
Generals A.I. Repnin, L.N. Allart, S. Renzel and J.V. Bruce were awarded the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. Prince G. F. Dolgorukov was awarded the same order and the rank of Privy Councilor (Hemrat).
G.I. Golovkin received the rank of chancellor, P.P. Shafirov - sub-chancellor (vice-chancellor), I.A. Musin-Pushkin - privy councilor (geemrat).
N. G. von Werden became lieutenant general.
Buk, Alexey Golovin, A. S. Kelin, S. V. Aigustov, F. M. Shidlovsky, Ya. V. Polonsky, V. V. Dolgorukov, and later I. B. Weisbach were made major generals.
Ivan Golovin, G.P. Chernyshev, Boy, G.S. Kropotov and Adjutant General Chirikov were promoted to brigadier.
In honor of the battle, medals were struck for all the officers and soldiers who participated in it.
Triumph
The prisoners were first kept in the Oranienbaum fortress, then transported to Moscow, where on December 21, 1709 (January 1, 1710) they walked through the streets of the capital at the ceremonial entry of Peter I. On this day, a huge number of prisoners of war were paraded through the Russian capital - 22,085 Swedes, Finns, Germans and others taken during the 9 years of war.
Interesting Facts
22 representatives of the Wrangel family remained on the battlefield.
On July 8, all captured Swedes were questioned about entering the service of the Tsar. In the Russian army, two infantry regiments were formed from Swedish prisoners of war (they were stationed in Astrakhan and Kazan). A dragoon regiment of Swedes took part in Bekovich's expedition to Khiva in 1717.
Of the 23 thousand Swedish prisoners of war taken near Poltava and Perevolochnaya, only about 4,000 saw their homeland again. In some regiments that began the military campaign with thousands of personnel, about a dozen people returned home. As early as 1729, eight years after the end of the war and twenty years after Poltava, former prisoners continued to come to Sweden. Perhaps the most recent among them was guardsman Hans Appelmann: he returned in 1745, after 36 years of captivity.
Myths of the Battle of Poltava
Myth-making around the Battle of Poltava began soon after its end. Peter's speech before the battle was subjected to literary treatment. Thus, the famous text: “Warriors! The hour has come that will decide the fate of the Fatherland. So, you should not think that you are fighting for Peter, but for the state entrusted to Peter, for your family, for the Fatherland. And about Peter, know that life is not dear to him, as long as Russia lives, its piety, glory and prosperity,” most likely has a later origin (possibly processed by Feofan Prokopovich). The actual speech was different and more ordinary: “Do, brothers, as I will do, and everything, with the help of the Almighty, will be good. Victory, after labor, will be followed by peace.”
The bullet that hit Peter in the hat, in the myth, turned into three bullets that hit Peter’s hat, saddle and pectoral cross (the latter is intended to sacralize Peter’s participation in the battle).
Some myths were created by the writer of the mid-18th century P. N. Kryokshin, who, when describing the history of Peter I, supplemented the known facts with his own conjectures. Krekshin’s works were used by I. I. Golikov in his history of Peter, from where the fictions migrated to scientific historical literature, including the works of E. V. Tarle and modern historians. Among the myths created by Krekshin:
About dressing up the soldiers of the Novgorod regiment: as if Peter I used a tactical trick and, shortly before the battle, dressed the experienced soldiers of the Novgorod infantry regiment in the unpainted uniform of the young ones. Charles XII, knowing from a defector that the uniform of experienced fighters was different from that of young ones, led his army against the young fighters and fell into a trap.
About the breakthrough of the line of the 1st battalion of the Novgorod regiment and Peter’s salvation of the battle by introducing the 2nd battalion into battle. - In the marching journal of Peter I it is indicated that the second line of Russian infantry did not enter the battle.
About the ceremonial entry of Peter I into Poltava the day after the battle and his salute to Commandant A.S. Kelin. - According to the travel journal, the tsar entered Poltava only on the night of June 30, and the next morning he left for Perevolochnaya.
The participation of 2.6 thousand armed citizens of Poltava in repelling the siege is not confirmed by either Russian or Swedish sources and is also most likely a figment of Krekshin’s imagination.
Memory of an event
Soon after the victory, in December 1709, Peter I laid down the battleship Poltava in St. Petersburg (later several more warships of the Russian fleet bore the name Poltava); in 1710, in the same place in St. Petersburg, in honor of the battle that took place on the day of St. Sampson the Host, the Sampson Church was built (later rebuilt into the Sampson Cathedral).
For the 25th anniversary of the battle in 1735, the sculptural group “Samson Tearing the Lion’s Jaw,” designed by Carlo Rastrelli, was installed in Peterhof. The lion was associated with Sweden, whose coat of arms contains this heraldic beast.
The field of the Poltava battle itself long time was not noted in any way. Although Peter ordered the construction of a monastery at the site of the battle and the erection of a stone pyramid, in wartime conditions they limited themselves to a wooden cross. The first monument on the battlefield was built by a private individual in 1778 at the site of his father's death. And only in 1852 the Sampsonievskaya Church was founded there.
Despite the fact that on Russian territory the first celebration of the victory at Poltava took place already in 1710, and since 1739 the day of the Battle of Poltava was formally considered a holiday, it was celebrated only sporadically. On the eve of the war with Turkey in 1787, G. A. Potemkin arranged grandiose maneuvers for Catherine II on the Poltava field, reproducing the events of the battle. The following “memorial maneuvers” were carried out by Emperor Alexander I in 1817 in 1812, during Patriotic War, in his manifesto he reminded the Russian army of the victory at Poltava.
A major celebration was organized for the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava in 1909: a medal “In memory of the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava” was established, the museum-reserve “Field of the Poltava Battle” (now the National Museum-Reserve) was founded on the site of the battle, on the territory of which it was built museum, monuments to Peter I, Russian and Swedish soldiers were erected, on the site of the camp of Peter I and others.
Under Soviet rule, Poltava was forgotten for a long time. In 1939, efforts to mark the 230th anniversary were limited to repairing monuments on the battlefield. Only in 1950 was the museum of the history of the Battle of Poltava opened; in 1981, in preparation for the 275th anniversary of the battle, Poltava Field was declared a state historical and cultural reserve. Since the late 1930s, Soviet historiography has considered the Battle of Poltava in the context of the myth of the invincibility of Russia and the Russian army, often linking it with the battles of the Patriotic and Great Patriotic Wars.
As the historian Alexander Kamensky pointed out, despite all the efforts of the authorities, the battle in the distant Hetmanate never took a place in collective memory Russian people. There are not even memoirs of the military men who participated in the Battle of Poltava. In assessing the era of Peter, Russian thinkers of the 19th century (with the exception of Peter Vyazemsky, who tried to make the word “Poltava” a symbol of all Russian military victories) rarely paid attention to the Battle of Poltava; even Pushkin was originally going to call his famous poem not “Poltava”, but “Mazepa”.
Monuments in Poltava:
Monument of Glory
Monument at the resting place of Peter I after the battle
Monument to Colonel Kelin and the valiant defenders of Poltava.
Battle of Poltava |
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Near Poltava, Ukraine |
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Decisive victory for the Russian army |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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Carl Gustav Rehnschild |
Alexander Danilovich Menshikov |
Strengths of the parties |
General forces: |
General forces: |
Battle of Poltava- the largest battle of the Northern War between Russian troops under the command of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII. It took place on the morning of June 27 (July 8), 1709, 6 versts from the city of Poltava on Ukrainian lands (Left Bank of the Dnieper). The decisive victory of the Russian army led to a turning point in the Northern War in Russia's favor and ended Sweden's dominance as the main military power in Europe.
After the Battle of Narva in 1700, Charles XII invaded Europe and a long war broke out involving many states, in which the army of Charles XII was able to advance far to the south, gaining victories.
After Peter I conquered part of Livonia from Charles XII and founded a new fortified city of St. Petersburg at the mouth of the Neva, Charles decided to attack central Russia and capture Moscow. During the campaign, he decided to lead his army to Little Russia, whose hetman, Mazepa, went over to Karl’s side, but was not supported by the bulk of the Cossacks. By the time Charles's army approached Poltava, he had lost up to a third of the army, his rear was attacked by Peter's light cavalry - Cossacks and Kalmyks, and was wounded just before the battle. The battle was lost by Charles, and he fled to the Ottoman Empire.
Background
In October 1708, Peter I became aware of the betrayal and defection of Hetman Mazepa to the side of Charles XII, who negotiated with the king for quite a long time, promising him, if he arrived in Ukraine, up to 50 thousand Cossack troops, food and comfortable wintering. On October 28, 1708, Mazepa, at the head of a detachment of Cossacks, arrived at Charles’s headquarters. It was in this year that Peter I amnestied and recalled from exile (accused of treason based on Mazepa’s slander) the Ukrainian colonel Paliy Semyon (real name Gurko); Thus, the sovereign of Russia secured the support of the Cossacks.
From the many thousands of Ukrainian Cossacks (registered Cossacks numbered 30 thousand, Zaporozhye Cossacks - 10-12 thousand), Mazepa managed to bring only up to 10 thousand people, about 3 thousand registered Cossacks and about 7 thousand Cossacks. But they soon began to flee from the camp of the Swedish army. King Charles XII was afraid to use such unreliable allies, of which there were about 2 thousand, in battle, and therefore left them in the baggage train.
In the spring of 1709, Charles XII, being with his army on Russian territory, decided to resume the attack on Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. The strength of his army decreased significantly and amounted to 35 thousand people. In an effort to create favorable preconditions for the offensive, Karl decides to quickly capture Poltava, located on the right bank of the Vorskla.
On April 30, Swedish troops began the siege of Poltava. Under the leadership of Colonel A. S. Kelin, its garrison of 4.2 thousand soldiers (Tver and Ustyug soldier regiments and one battalion each from three more regiments - Perm, Apraksin and Fechtenheim), 2 thousand Cossacks of the Poltava Cossack Regiment (Colonel Ivan Levenets) and 2.6 thousand armed townspeople successfully repelled a number of assaults. From April to June, the Swedes launched 20 assaults on Poltava and lost more than 6 thousand people under its walls. At the end of May, the main forces of the Russian army, led by Peter, approached Poltava. They were located on the left bank of the Vorskla River opposite from Poltava. After Peter decided on a general battle at the military council on June 16, on the same day the advanced detachment of Russians crossed the Vorskla north of Poltava, near the village of Petrovka, ensuring the possibility of crossing the entire army.
On June 19, the main forces of the Russian troops marched to the crossing and crossed Vorskla the next day. Peter I camped his army near the village of Semyonovka. On June 25, the Russian army redeployed even further south, taking up a position 5 kilometers from Poltava, near the village of Yakovtsy. Total number The two armies were impressive: the Russian army consisted of 60 thousand soldiers and 102 artillery pieces. Charles XII had up to 37 thousand soldiers (including up to ten thousand Zaporozhye and Ukrainian Cossacks of Hetman Mazepa) and 41 guns (30 cannons, 2 howitzers, 8 mortars and 1 shotgun). A smaller number of troops took part directly in the Battle of Poltava. On the Swedish side there were about 8,000 infantry (18 battalions), 7,800 cavalry and about 1,000 irregular cavalry, and on the Russian side - about 25,000 infantry, some of whom, even being present on the field, did not take part in the battle. In addition, on the Russian side, cavalry units numbering 9,000 soldiers and Cossacks (including Ukrainians loyal to Peter) took part in the battle. On the Russian side, 73 artillery pieces were involved in the battle against 4 Swedish ones. The charges for the Swedish artillery were almost completely used up during the siege of Poltava.
On June 26, the Russians began to build a forward position. Ten redoubts were erected, which were occupied by two battalions of the Belgorod infantry regiment of Colonel Savva Aigustov under the command of Lieutenant Colonels Neklyudov and Nechaev. Behind the redoubts there were 17 cavalry regiments under the command of A.D. Menshikov.
Charles XII, having received information about the imminent approach of a large Kalmyk detachment to the Russians, decided to attack Peter’s army before the Kalmyks completely disrupted his communications. Wounded during a reconnaissance on June 17, the king transferred command to Field Marshal K. G. Renschild, who received 20 thousand soldiers at his disposal. About 10 thousand people, including Mazepa’s Cossacks, remained in the camp near Poltava.
On the eve of the battle, Peter I toured all the regiments. His short patriotic appeals to soldiers and officers formed the basis of the famous order, which demanded that soldiers fight not for Peter, but for “Russia and Russian piety...”
Charles XII also tried to raise the spirit of his army. Inspiring the soldiers, Karl announced that tomorrow they would dine in the Russian convoy, where great booty awaited them.
Progress of the battle
Swedish attack on the redoubts
At two o'clock in the morning on June 27, Swedish infantry moved out from near Poltava in four columns, followed by six cavalry columns. By dawn, the Swedes entered the field in front of the Russian redoubts. Prince Menshikov, having lined up his dragoons in battle formation, moved towards the Swedes, wanting to meet them as early as possible and thereby gain time to prepare for the battle of the main forces.
When the Swedes saw the advancing Russian dragoons, their cavalry quickly galloped through the gaps between the columns of their infantry and quickly rushed at the Russian cavalry. By three o'clock in the morning a hot battle was already in full swing in front of the redoubts. At first, the Swedish cuirassiers pushed back the Russian cavalry, but, quickly recovering, the Russian cavalry pushed the Swedes back with repeated blows.
The Swedish cavalry retreated and the infantry went on the attack. The tasks of the infantry were as follows: one part of the infantry had to pass the redoubts without a fight towards the main camp of the Russian troops, while the other part, under the command of Ross, had to take the longitudinal redoubts in order to prevent the enemy from firing destructive fire on the Swedish infantry, which was advancing towards the fortified camp Russians. The Swedes took the first and second forward redoubts. Attacks on the third and other redoubts were repulsed.
The brutal stubborn battle lasted more than an hour; During this time, the main forces of the Russians managed to prepare for battle, and therefore Tsar Peter ordered the cavalry and defenders of the redoubts to retreat to the main position near the fortified camp. However, Menshikov did not obey the tsar’s order and, dreaming of finishing off the Swedes at the redoubts, continued the battle. Soon he was forced to retreat.
Field Marshal Renschild regrouped his troops, trying to bypass the Russian redoubts on the left. After capturing two redoubts, the Swedes were attacked by Menshikov's cavalry, but the Swedish cavalry forced them to retreat. According to Swedish historiography, Menshikov fled. However, the Swedish cavalry, obeying the general battle plan, did not develop their success.
During the mounted battle, six right-flank battalions of General Ross stormed the 8th redoubt, but were unable to take it, having lost up to half of their personnel during the attack. During the left flank maneuver of the Swedish troops, a gap formed between them and Ross's battalions and the latter were lost from sight. In an effort to find them, Renschild sent 2 more infantry battalions to search for them. However, Ross's troops were defeated by Russian cavalry.
Meanwhile, Field Marshal Renschild, seeing the retreat of the Russian cavalry and infantry, orders his infantry to break through the line of Russian fortifications. This order is immediately carried out.
Having broken through the redoubts, the main part of the Swedes came under heavy artillery and rifle fire from the Russian camp and retreated in disarray to the Budishchensky forest. At about six o'clock in the morning, Peter led the army out of the camp and built it in two lines, with infantry in the center, Menshikov's cavalry on the left flank, and General R. H. Bour's cavalry on the right flank. A reserve of nine infantry battalions was left in the camp. Renschild lined up the Swedes opposite the Russian army.
Decisive battle
At 9 o’clock in the morning, the remnants of the Swedish infantry, numbering about 4 thousand people, formed in one line, attacked the Russian infantry, lined up in two lines of about 8 thousand each. First, the opponents engaged in gunfire, then began hand-to-hand combat.
Encouraged by the presence of the king, the right wing of the Swedish infantry fiercely attacked the left flank of the Russian army. Under the onslaught of the Swedes, the first line of Russian troops began to retreat. According to Englund, the Kazan, Pskov, Siberian, Moscow, Butyrsky and Novgorod regiments (the leading battalions of these regiments) succumbed to enemy pressure, according to Englund. A dangerous gap in the battle formation formed in the front line of the Russian infantry: the Swedes “overthrew” the 1st battalion of the Novgorod regiment with a bayonet attack. Tsar Peter I noticed this in time, took the 2nd battalion of the Novogorod regiment and, at its head, rushed into a dangerous place.
The arrival of the king put an end to the successes of the Swedes and order on the left flank was restored. At first, the Swedes wavered in two or three places under the onslaught of the Russians.
The second line of Russian infantry joined the first, increasing pressure on the enemy, and the melting thin line of the Swedes no longer received any reinforcements. The flanks of the Russian army engulfed the Swedish battle formation. The Swedes were already tired of the intense battle.
Charles XII tried to inspire his soldiers and appeared in the place of the hottest battle. But the cannonball broke the king's stretcher, and he fell. The news of the death of the king swept through the ranks of the Swedish army with lightning speed. Panic began among the Swedes.
Having woken up from the fall, Charles XII orders himself to be placed on crossed peaks and raised high so that everyone can see him, but this measure did not help. Under the onslaught of Russian forces, the Swedes, who had lost formation, began a disorderly retreat, which by 11 o'clock turned into a real flight. The fainting king barely had time to be taken from the battlefield, put into a carriage and sent to Perevolochna.
According to Englund, the most tragic fate awaited two battalions of the Uppland Regiment, which were surrounded and completely destroyed (out of 700 people, only a few dozen remained alive).
Losses of the parties
Menshikov, having received reinforcements of 3,000 Kalmyk cavalry in the evening, pursued the enemy to Perevolochna on the banks of the Dnieper, where about 16,000 Swedes were captured.
In the battle, the Swedes lost over 11 thousand soldiers. Russian losses amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded.
Results
As a result of the Battle of Poltava, the army of King Charles XII was so drained of blood that it could no longer conduct active offensive operations. He himself managed to escape with Mazepa and hid in the territory of the Ottoman Empire in Bendery. The military power of Sweden was undermined, and in the Northern War there was a turning point in favor of Russia. During the Battle of Poltava, Peter used tactics that are still mentioned in military schools. Shortly before the battle, Peter dressed the experienced soldiers in the uniform of the young ones. Karl, knowing that the form of experienced fighters is different from the form of young ones, led his army against the young fighters and fell into a trap.
Cards
The actions of Russian troops from the moment of the attempt to liberate Poltava from Vorskla until the end of the Battle of Poltava are shown.
Unfortunately, this most informative diagram cannot be placed here due to its dubious legal status - the original was published in the USSR with a total circulation of about 1,000,000 copies (!).
Memory of an event
- At the site of the battle, the Poltava Battlefield Museum-Reserve (now the National Museum-Reserve) was founded at the beginning of the 20th century. A museum was built on its territory, monuments to Peter I, Russian and Swedish soldiers were erected, on the site of the camp of Peter I, etc.
- In honor of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava (which took place on the day of St. Sampson the Host) in 1735, the sculptural group “Samson Tearing the Lion’s Jaw,” designed by Carlo Rastrelli, was installed in Peterhof. The lion was associated with Sweden, whose coat of arms contains this heraldic beast.
Monuments in Poltava:
- Monument of Glory
- Monument at the resting place of Peter I after the battle
- Monument to Colonel Kelin and the valiant defenders of Poltava.
On coins
In honor of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, the Bank of Russia issued the following commemorative silver coins on June 1, 2009 (only reverses are shown):
In fiction
- A.S. Pushkin, “Poltava” - in the novel “Poltava Peremoga” by Oleg Kudrin (shortlist for the “Nonconformism-2010” award, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, Moscow) the event is considered, “replayed” in the genre of alternative history.
Images
Documentary film
- “The Battle of Poltava. 300 years later." — Russia, 2008
Art films
- Servant of Sovereigns (film)
- Prayer for Hetman Mazepa (film)
During the reign of Peter I (1682–1725), Russia faced two difficult problems related to access to the seas - the Black and Baltic. The Azov campaigns of 1695–1696, which ended with the capture of Azov, did not completely resolve the issue of access to the Black Sea, since the Kerch Strait remained in the hands of Turkey.
Peter I's trip to the countries of Western Europe convinced him that neither Austria nor Venice would become Russia's allies in the war with Turkey. But during the “great embassy” (1697–1698), Peter I realized that a favorable situation had developed in Europe for solving the Baltic problem - getting rid of Swedish rule in the Baltic states. Denmark and Saxony, whose elector Augustus II was also the Polish king, joined Russia.
During the Northern War of 1700–1721. Russia fought against Sweden for the return of lands seized by Sweden and access to the Baltic Sea. The first years of the war turned out to be a serious test for the Russian army. The Swedish king Charles XII, having a first-class army and navy in his hands, brought Denmark out of the war and defeated the Polish-Saxon and Russian armies. In the future, he planned to capture Smolensk and Moscow.
In 1701–1705 Russian troops gained a foothold on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, in the Baltic states. Peter I, anticipating the advance of the Swedes, took measures to strengthen the northwestern borders from Pskov to Smolensk. This forced Charles XII to abandon his attack on Moscow. He took his army to Ukraine, where, counting on the support of the traitor Hetman I.S. Mazepa, intended to replenish supplies, spend the winter, and then, joining the corps of General A. Levengaupt, move to the center of Russia. However, on September 28 (October 9), 1708, Levengaupt’s troops were intercepted near the village of Lesnoy by a flying corps (corvolant) under the command of Peter I. In order to quickly defeat the enemy, about 5 thousand Russian infantrymen were mounted on horses. They were assisted by about 7 thousand dragoons. The corps was opposed by Swedish troops numbering 13 thousand people, who guarded 3 thousand carts with food and ammunition.
The Battle of Lesnaya ended in a brilliant victory for the Russian army. The enemy lost 8.5 thousand people killed and wounded. Russian troops captured almost the entire convoy and 17 guns, losing more than 1,000 people killed and 2,856 people wounded. This victory testified to the increased fighting strength of the Russian army and contributed to the strengthening of its morale. Peter I later called the battle at Lesnaya “the Mother of the Poltava Battle.” Charles XII lost much-needed reinforcements and convoys. Overall, the Battle of Lesnaya had a great influence on the course of the war. It prepared the conditions for a new, even more majestic, victory of the Russian regular army near Poltava.
The march of the main forces of the Swedish army, led by Charles XII, into Russia ended in their defeat in the Battle of Poltava on June 27 (July 8), 1709. Then Russian troops expanded their conquests in the Baltic states, drove the Swedes out of part of the territory of Finland, and together with the Poles pushed the enemy into Pomerania, and the Russian Baltic Fleet won brilliant victories at Gangut (1714) and Grengam (1720). The Northern War ended with the Peace of Nystadt in 1721. Victory in it provided Russia with access to the Baltic Sea.
Battle of Poltava June 27 (July 8), 1709 – Day of Military Glory (victory day) of Russia
The Battle of Poltava June 27 (July 8), 1709 - a general battle between the Russian and Swedish armies during the Northern War of 1700–1721.
During the winter of 1708–1709. Russian troops, avoiding a general battle, exhausted the forces of the Swedish invaders in separate battles and clashes. In the spring of 1709, Charles XII decided to resume the attack on Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. In order to create favorable conditions for carrying out this operation, it was planned to first capture Poltava. The city garrison under the command of the commandant Colonel A.S. Kelina numbered only 4.2 thousand soldiers and officers, who were supported by about 2.5 thousand armed townspeople, the cavalry that approached the city, Lieutenant General A.D. Menshikov and Ukrainian Cossacks. They heroically defended Poltava, withstanding 20 assaults. As a result, the Swedish army (35 thousand people) was detained under the walls of the city for two months, from April 30 (May 11) to June 27 (July 8), 1709. The persistent defense of the city made it possible for the Russian army to prepare for a general battle.
Peter I at the head of the Russian army (42.5 thousand people) was located 5 km from Poltava. In front of the position of the Russian troops stretched a wide plain, bordered by forests. On the left there was a copse through which the only possible path for the Swedish army to advance passed. Peter I ordered the construction of redoubts along this route (6 in a line and 4 perpendicular). They were quadrangular earthen fortifications with ditches and parapets, located one from the other at a distance of 300 steps. Each of the redoubts housed 2 battalions (more than 1,200 soldiers and officers with 6 regimental guns). Behind the redoubts there was cavalry (17 dragoon regiments) under the command of A.D. Menshikov. Peter I's plan was to exhaust the Swedish troops at the redoubts and then deal them a crushing blow in a field battle. IN Western Europe Peter's tactical innovation was applied only in 1745.
The Swedish army (30 thousand people) was built in front at a distance of 3 km from the Russian redoubts. Its battle formation consisted of two lines: the first - infantry, built in 4 columns; the second is cavalry, built in 6 columns.
Early in the morning of June 27 (July 8), the Swedes went on the offensive. They managed to capture two unfinished forward redoubts, but were unable to take the rest. During the passage of the Swedish army through the redoubts, a group of 6 infantry battalions and 10 cavalry squadrons was cut off from the main forces and captured by the Russians. With heavy losses, the Swedish army managed to break through the redoubts and reach the open. Peter I also withdrew his troops from the camp (with the exception of 9 reserve battalions), who prepared for the decisive battle. At 9 o'clock in the morning, both armies converged and hand-to-hand combat began. The right wing of the Swedes began to press the center of the combat formation of the Russian troops. Then Peter I personally led a battalion of the Novgorod regiment into battle and closed the emerging breakthrough. The Russian cavalry began to cover the Swedes' flank, threatening their rear. The enemy wavered and began to retreat, and then fled. By 11 o'clock the Battle of Poltava ended in a convincing victory for Russian weapons. The enemy lost 9,234 soldiers and officers killed and 19,811 captured. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 1,345 people killed and 3,290 people wounded. The remnants of the Swedish troops (more than 15 thousand people) fled to the Dnieper and were captured by Menshikov’s cavalry. Charles XII and Hetman Mazepa managed to cross the river and leave for Turkey.
Most of the Swedish army was destroyed on the Poltava field. The power of Sweden was undermined. The victory of Russian troops near Poltava predetermined the victorious outcome of the Northern War for Russia. Sweden was no longer able to recover from the defeat.
IN military history In Russia, the Battle of Poltava rightfully stands on a par with the Battle of the Ice, the Battle of Kulikovo and Borodino.
Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713)
Russo-Turkish War 1710–1713 took place during the Northern War of 1700–1721. Russia with Sweden and ended unsuccessfully for Russia (see. Prut campaign 1711). Russia was forced to return Azov to Turkey and demolish the fortifications on the Azov coast.
Prut campaign (1711)
The Prut campaign of 1711 was undertaken by the Russian army under the leadership of Peter I into Turkish possessions on the Danube during the Russian-Turkish war of 1710–1713. The Russian command hoped to approach the Danube before the Turks and capture the crossings, as well as for the local population to rebel against the Turks. The Turkish army managed to prevent the Russian troops from reaching the Prut and actually encircled them. At the decisive moment, the Turks did not dare to attack and agreed to peace negotiations. On July 12, 1711, Peter I was forced to sign the Prut Peace Treaty, which was unfavorable for Russia.
Battle of Gangut July 27 (August 9), 1714 – Day of Military Glory (victory day) of Russia
After the victory at Poltava, the Russian army during 1710–1713. expelled Swedish troops from the Baltic states. However, the Swedish fleet continued to operate in the Baltic Sea. During the Northern War of 1700–1721. Russian rowing fleet with 15 thousand. army (99 galleys; Admiral General F.M. Apraksin) followed to Abo. Near the Gangut Peninsula (Hanko), his path was blocked by the Swedish fleet (15 battleships, 3 frigates and a detachment of rowing ships; Vice Admiral G. Vatrang). Having learned that Peter I was preparing a portage, Vatrang sent a squadron (1 frigate, 6 galleys, 3 skerries) under the command of Rear Admiral N. Ehrenskiöld to Rilaksfjord.
On July 26, the vanguard of the Russian fleet (35 galleys) bypassed the Swedish fleet by sea and blocked the squadron in the fjord. After the main forces (Apraksin) broke through to the vanguard and the Swedes refused to surrender, the naval Battle of Gangut began on July 27, 1714. Skillfully using the advantage of rowing ships over line ships sailing ships enemy in the conditions of a skerry area and no wind, 23 scampaways under the command of Peter I defeated the enemy squadron, captured his ships and captured Ehrenskiöld.
The Battle of Gangut is the first major naval victory in the history of the Russian fleet, which ensured freedom of action for the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the success of troops in Finland and the occupation of the Aland Islands. Since 1995 – Day of Military Glory of Russia.
Battle of Grenham 1720
The most striking episode of the last campaign of the Northern War of 1700–1721. Between Russia and Sweden there is a naval battle off the island of Grengam in the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea.
On July 24, 1720, the Russian galley flotilla (61 galleys and 29 boats, which carried 10,941 landing troops) under the command of Chief General Prince M.M. Golitsyna went to sea, trying to reach the Åland archipelago. Two days later, near the island of Lemland, Russian ships met the Swedish squadron of Vice Admiral K. Sheblad, reinforced by the ships of K. Wachmeister's squadron, a total of 14 pennants. The Russian galleys anchored, waiting for the moment to attack. But the wind did not subside, and at the military council they decided to wait for calm weather and then give the Swedes battle.
As soon as the Russian ships began to leave the cover of Redshare Island, they were attacked by Swedish ships. Using the shallow draft of the galleys, Golitsyn began to move away from the enemy in shallow water. Four Swedish frigates, carried away by the pursuit, entered a narrow strait, where they could not maneuver and were poorly controlled. Realizing that in the excitement of pursuit the Swedes had driven themselves into a trap, Golitsyn ordered his galleys to stop and attack the enemy. The Swedes tried to turn around and retreat. Only the flagship succeeded. The frigates Wenkern (30 guns) and Shtorphoenix (34 guns) ran aground and were immediately surrounded. Neither the high sides nor the anti-boarding nets stopped the rush of the Russian sailors who captured the Swedish ships. Two other frigates, Kiskin (22 guns) and Danskern (18 guns), tried to escape into the open sea, but the flagship’s unsuccessful maneuver battleship didn't let them do it. They were also boarded.
Trophies M.M. Golitsyn consisted of 4 enemy frigates and 407 crew members. 103 Swedes died in the battle. The Russians lost 82 people killed and 246 wounded.
The victory at Grenham had a great influence on the further course of the war. It significantly weakened the Swedish naval forces, and the Russians, having strengthened themselves in the area of the Åland archipelago, were able to successfully operate on the enemy’s sea communications.
The Swedish captured frigates were brought to St. Petersburg, and in honor of the victory a medal was struck with the inscription: “Diligence and courage exceed strength.”
The battle of the Russian rowing fleet at Gangut in 1714, the Ezel naval battle in 1719, and the victory of the Russian rowing fleet at Grengam in 1720 finally broke the power of Sweden at sea. On August 30, 1721, a peace treaty was signed in the city of Nystadt. As a result of the Peace of Nystadt, the shores of the Baltic Sea (Riga, Pernov, Revel, Narva, Ezel and Dago islands, etc.) were returned to Russia. It became one of the largest European states and in 1721 officially became known as the Russian Empire.
Battle of Poltava
Having ended the war with Poland and Saxony, Charles XII had the opportunity to direct his main forces against the Russians. At the end of 1707, the Swedish army crossed the Vistula and moved towards the borders of Russia. The goal of the Swedish king was to force the Russian state into colonial dependence on Sweden by force of arms and thereby delay its economic and political development. He decided to defeat the Russian army with one blow, to take the shortest route, through Smolensk, to break through to Moscow and take it.
It was an adventurous plan that underestimated the strength of the Russian army and the resilience of the Russian people.
The threat of an invasion of Russia by the Swedish army forced Peter I to turn all his efforts to the defense of the country's western borders and to the defeat of the army of Charles XII. Peter's strategic plan , taking into account the enemy’s forces and the state of the Russian army, provided for active defense using all the material resources of the country. When the Swedes advanced, it was decided to retreat inland, destroying food supplies along the way, delaying the enemy at crossings and exhausting his forces with counterattacks of the regular army and actions partisan detachments . Active defense was supposed to weaken the Swedish army and gain additional time to prepare the Russian army for the decisive battle, which it was decided to fight on Russian territory under the most favorable conditions for the Russian army. After the defeat of the main enemy forces in a general battle, it was planned to launch a broad offensive against the Swedes in the Baltic states.
In the spring of 1708 Russian army was deployed on a wide front near the western border of the country. The main forces of the army, numbering 57,500 people, were concentrated in the Vitebsk region to cover the route to Smolensk and Moscow.
At the end of August 1708 swedish army approached the Russian border in the Mogilev region. The Swedes' attempt to break through to Moscow through Smolensk was thwarted by stubborn resistance from Russian troops and partisans. The tenacity and increased activity of the Russian army, the heavy losses of the Swedes as they advanced to the east, and the extreme difficulties with supplying the army forced Charles XII to abandon the attack on Moscow by the shortest route and turn to Ukraine. Here he hoped to reinforce his army with forces traitor to the homeland of Hetman Mazepa , cause the Crimean Tatars and Turkey to rebel against Russia, and then attack Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod.
The fact that Charles XII was forced to abandon a direct campaign against Moscow was important strategic success of the Russian army . The main forces of the Russian army were aimed at parallel pursuit of the enemy in order to prevent his new attempts to break into the interior of the country. At the same time, the 12 thousandth - "flying" detachment under the command of Peter I headed to intercept the 16,000th Swedish corps of General Levengaupt , coming from Riga with artillery and ammunition to help Charles XII.
On September 28, 1708, near the village of Lesnoy, Levengaupt’s corps was completely defeated by Peter’s detachment. The Swedes lost their entire convoy and up to 8.5 thousand people killed. Only the remnants of a broken corps approached Karl without artillery and ammunition, which was urgently needed by the Swedish army. Victory at Lesnaya showed the high maturity of the Russian army and its readiness for a general battle with the main forces of the Swedes. Peter called this victory “the mother of the Poltava battle.”
Charles XII's hopes of strengthening his army in Ukraine did not materialize. The Ukrainian people did not follow the traitor Mazepa. The peasants hid food from the Swedes and fought a guerrilla war against the enemy. Instead of the intended holiday in Ukraine, the Swedes were forced to spend the entire winter of 1708/09 in fruitless battles with Russian troops and partisans. Wintering in the strategic encirclement in Ukraine further weakened the Swedish army.
With the onset of spring 1709, Charles XII undertook attack on Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. On this route, one of the Russian strongholds was Poltava fortress. In April, the Swedes besieged Poltava, but the four thousand-strong garrison of the fortress, with the assistance of the population, courageously repelled more than twenty enemy assaults for three months, inflicted great damage on the Swedes and defended Poltava. Long lasting and persistent defense of Poltava allowed to prepare Russian troops for general battle with the Swedes.
Poltava was concentrated the main forces of the Russian army consisting of 42 thousand people with 72 guns. Swedish army had about 30 thousand people and of all the artillery, due to the lack of gunpowder, could use only four guns. By carefully preparing for battle, Peter I further increased the advantage of his forces over the Swedes. Two days before the battle, the Russian army settled in a fortified camp 5 km northeast of Poltava. In the rear of the Russians there was a steep bank of the Vorskla. In front of the front of the camp lay an open plain, bordered on both sides by forest. On this plain the Russians prepared a forward fortified position. It consisted of ten separate earthen fortifications - redoubts; six of them were built in a line across the plain, and four others were built perpendicular to the first line of redoubts. The passages between the redoubts were shot through with cross rifle fire. The purpose of this position was to disrupt the Swedish battle formation with frontal and flank fire from the redoubts, to divide and weaken their forces and to prepare the conditions for a counterattack by the main forces of the Russian army. The creation of a forward position, consisting of separate redoubts, adapted for all-round defense, was a remarkable innovation of the Russians in the art of war, which was subsequently borrowed by all foreign armies.
At dawn on June 27, 1709, the Swedes began an attack on the Russian forward position. For three hours, the garrison of the redoubts and the cavalry under the command of Menshikov repelled enemy attacks. The Swedes suffered heavy losses, but were unable to take the Russian forward position. They were forced to abandon the capture of the redoubts and break through between them under heavy crossfire.
Advancing behind the retreating Russian cavalry, the right flank of the Swedish army, in a cloud of smoke and dust, unexpectedly came close to the main Russian fortifications and came under concentrated fire from all Russian artillery. In panic and with heavy losses, the Swedes retreated.
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Strengths of the parties
Correctly assessing the favorable situation, Peter I ordered the army to be withdrawn from the fortified camp and attack the enemy with the goal of destroying him. The Russian army was lined up in two lines. Infantry formed in the center of the battle formation, cavalry on the flanks, and artillery in the intervals between the battalions of the first line. The second line battalions supported the first line. A reserve was left in the fortified camp. Thus, the linear battle formation of the Russian army in the Battle of Poltava received the necessary depth, which ensured its greater stability. Charles XII lined up his infantry in one line and placed his cavalry on the flanks.
At 9 o'clock the Swedes resumed their offensive. With the support of artillery, Russian troops rushed into a counterattack. The battle took on a counter character. Following the rifle fire, a fierce hand-to-hand battle ensued. In one area, the Swedes managed to break through the first line of the Russian battle formation. Then Peter I personally led the second line battalion into a counterattack and quickly eliminated the breakthrough. The Swedes could not resist the powerful bayonet strike of the Russian infantry. The cavalry began to cover the flanks of the Swedish army. Fearing encirclement, the frustrated and thinned Swedish troops began to retreat in disorder. The Russian cavalry pursued the enemy. The remnants of the Swedish army capitulated to Menshikov's cavalry at the crossing of the Dnieper at Perevolochna. Only Charles XII with Mazepa and a small detachment of troops managed to cross the Dnieper and flee to Turkey. On the battlefield, the Swedes lost and killed more than 9 thousand people. More than 18 thousand Swedes were captured near Poltava and Perevolochna. The losses of the Russian army amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded.
The victory at Poltava is a brilliant example of Russian military art. The decisive defeat of the best units of the Swedish cadre army near Poltava was achieved:
- the exceptional steadfastness and courage of the Russian troops, who waged a just war against foreign invaders;
- comprehensive skillful preparation of the battlefield and Russian troops for battle;
- skillful preparation of the main attack on the Swedish army with a vanguard battle at the forefront;
- expedient, deep construction of the battle order of the Russian army;
- the skillful use of artillery and rifle fire before delivering the decisive bayonet strike;
- flexible maneuvering of cavalry on the battlefield and when pursuing the enemy.
Poltava victory had enormous military and political significance. The defeat of the Swedes near Poltava meant the collapse of the adventurist plan of Charles XII to enslave and dismember the Russian state. The victory at Poltava, which showed the increased military power of Russia, strengthened its international position. Denmark and Poland reestablished a military alliance with Russia against Sweden. Soon Prussia joined Russia.
Sweden's military power and international position were undermined by the fact that “Charles XII made an attempt to penetrate into Russia; with this he destroyed Sweden and showed everyone the invulnerability of Russia.”
(K. Marx).
The Poltava victory created a decisive turning point in the course of the Northern War. It firmly consolidated the successes already achieved in the Baltic states and created the conditions for new victories in the struggle for free access to the Baltic Sea.
Creation Baltic Fleet
Already the first years of the Northern War showed the important role of the fleet in achieving the strategic goals facing Russia. The role of the fleet in the war increased even more after Poltava victory, when the center of gravity of the fight with Sweden moved to the Baltic Sea area.
The most important tasks of the fleet during the Northern War were: assistance to the army in the conquest of the shores of the Baltic Sea, defense together with the army of the occupied coast from attacks by the Swedish fleet, ensuring the security of Russian merchant shipping, disrupting enemy maritime communications.
To create a strong Baltic Fleet capable of solving these problems in the face of opposition from a large and well-trained Swedish fleet, it was necessary to deploy construction of shipyards and ships , organize training for the fleet And provide the fleet with a deployed basing system . As already indicated, the construction of the first ships for the Russian Baltic Fleet began in 1702-1703. at shipyards in the area of Lake Ladoga. The rapids on the Neva did not allow large ships to enter the Baltic Sea, so only small warships and frigates were built at the shipyards of the Ladoga region. By building ships at the shipyards of the Ladoga Basin it was impossible to solve the problem of creating battle fleet . That is why, soon after the occupation of the mouth of the Neva, the construction of a large Admiralty in St. Petersburg , where it began in 1709 construction of battleships . Since that time, St. Petersburg has become the main shipbuilding center of Russia. The third center for the construction of ships for the Baltic Fleet was Arkhangelsk, Solombala shipyard which built battleships and frigates. From Arkhangelsk to the Baltic Sea they were transferred around Scandinavia.
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During the war, 32 battleships, a significant number of large and small frigates, ships and other smaller sailing warships were built in St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk. In addition to the construction of a battle fleet at domestic shipyards, Peter I also resorted to purchasing ships abroad, but the purchased ships constituted only a small part of the ship composition of the Baltic Fleet. Thus, creation of domestic shipbuilding , as well as the development of other industries, especially metallurgy, allowed Russia to build numerous Baltic Fleet , which was superior in strength to many advanced fleets of Western European states.
The main classes of ships of the Russian sailing navy were battleships and frigates. Battleships had from 1,000 to 2,000 tons of displacement, large sailing weapons and 2 - 3 combat decks, on which from 52 to 90 guns of 24-, 12- and 6-pound caliber were installed. The personnel of a battleship, depending on its rank, numbered from 350 to 900 people. The frigates were armed with from 25 to 44 guns, mounted on one or two combat decks.
In terms of armament, seaworthiness and maneuverability, Russian ships were often superior to foreign ships. This, first of all, reflected the creative initiative of the Russians, shipwrights , especially F. Sklyaeva - "masters of good proportion" - and himself Peter I, who not only closely monitored the work of shipbuilding shipyards, but also personally developed projects of new warships .
Taking into account the nature of the tasks facing the fleet and the methods for solving them in the specific conditions of the skerry theater of military operations, the Russian government made the right decision to create a large rowing, skerry fleet in the Baltic Sea.
Rowing ships were built at the shipyards of the Ladoga basin, in St. Petersburg and in a number of other places. During the war, more than 700 ships of various types and purposes were built. In choosing the type of rowing warship, Russia also did not follow the path of blind imitation of foreign galleys. The main type of rowing warship in the Russian fleet was scampavea, which was a lightweight and more maneuverable sailing-rowing ship compared to the Mediterranean galley, which had up to 18 pairs of oars, 3-5 cannons of 12-, 8- and 3-pound caliber and up to 150 personnel (crew and troops). As the experience of the war showed, scampaways were universal ships for operations in skerries. They were successfully used to transport troops with equipment and supplies, to provide fire support for the flank of the army and landing troops, to bombard the coast, enemy bases and fortresses, to perform reconnaissance and a number of other tasks.
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During the war scampaways More than once they successfully attacked enemy sailing warships in the skerries. The strength and great combat capabilities of the rowing fleet in the skerries were one of the main advantages of the Russian fleet over the Swedish fleet, which had almost no rowing ships in its composition.
The deployment of the Baltic Fleet took place during the war, as the shores of the Baltic Sea were occupied. The main base of the fleet throughout the war was St. Petersburg. The first forward base of the fleet was Kronshlot. With the expansion of the theater of military operations and the occupation of the entire southern coast of the Gulf of Finland in 1710, the creation of a forward base in Reval began.
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Scampavea.
Vyborg and the Finnish ports of Helsingfors and Abo, occupied during the war, were used to base the rowing fleet.
Extension Baltic Fleet basing systems , which occurred due to the narrowing of the basing of the Swedish fleet, made it possible to move the defense of the sea approaches to St. Petersburg to the western part of the Gulf of Finland, organize closer interaction between the army and navy and create favorable conditions for active fleet operations in the Baltic Sea.
Throughout the war on Kotlin Island there was construction of the Kronstadt naval base . It was completed in 1723, and since then Kronstadt has become the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Attaching exceptional importance to Kronstadt in the defense of St. Petersburg from the sea, Peter I ordered: “To maintain the defense of the fleet and this place to the last strength and stomach, as the most important thing.”
When creating fleet bases, the Russian command attached great importance to organizing their reliable defense from land and sea. As a rule, the defense of bases was based on the interaction of heterogeneous forces and means.
Simultaneously with the construction of shipyards, ships and bases, an equally complex task was being solved fleet training . Just like in the army, the rank and file of the fleet was recruited through recruitment. Service in the navy was lifelong. The training of enlisted personnel was carried out through practical training on ships. According to contemporaries, Russian people very quickly mastered the naval profession. Relatively high moral qualities the rank and file, staffed with recruits from peasants, the natural ingenuity and hard work of the Russian people in practical training, their courage and perseverance in battle - all this determined the high fighting qualities of the personnel of the Russian fleet.
Fleet officers was staffed by Russian nobles who received theoretical training at naval educational institutions established in the country - at the Navigation School and the Maritime Academy. This was the main way of training national officers. However, the rapidly growing fleet did not have enough of these personnel, so the tsarist government practiced sending nobles for training in foreign fleets and hiring foreigners for permanent or temporary service in the Russian fleet. The majority of foreign mercenaries did not contribute to the development of the Russian fleet and its naval art, but rather were an evil for the fleet. The interests of Russia and the Russian fleet were alien to foreigners; they not only did not know the Russian language, but they were often ignorant in naval affairs, they showed cowardice in battle and often turned out to be traitors. Peter I, who initially overestimated the role and importance of foreigners and was keen on hiring them, eventually realized the harm they brought to the Russian fleet. Gradually, foreign mercenaries began to be replaced by Russian officers. By the end of the Northern War, the main backbone of the fleet's officer cadres were Russian people.
Thus, through great exertion of all the forces of the country, on the basis of the developing domestic industry, with enormous efforts and sacrifices of the Russian people at the beginning of the 18th century. was created in a short historical period strong Baltic fleet. His combat skills quickly improved, and already during the Northern War he was able to show examples of naval art that significantly surpassed the achievements of foreign fleets in this area.
Capture of Vyborg in 1710
The defeat of the main forces of the Swedish army near Poltava, which meant the complete collapse of the aggressive plans of Charles XII and marked the beginning of a new period during the Northern War, made it possible already in the campaign of 1710 to direct the main forces of the Russian army to the conquest of Vyborg and the Baltic states. Vyborg at that time it was a strong seaside fortress with a garrison of up to 4 thousand people with 151 guns. The Swedes could strengthen the fortress with their troops from Finland. From the sea, Vyborg was covered and supplied by the Swedish fleet.
The capture of the fortress and fleet base of Vyborg was extremely necessary to ensure the security of St. Petersburg, because, relying on Vyborg, the Swedish army repeatedly attacked St. Petersburg from the north, and the Swedish fleet from the Vyborg Bay created a constant threat to Kotlin, Kronshlot and the Russian Baltic Fleet. The first, unsuccessful attempt to capture Vyborg was made in the fall of 1706 using only the ground army. The roads of the Karelian Isthmus, which passed through swampy and rocky areas, turned out to be unsuitable for the movement of an army with a heavy convoy and artillery. The experience of this campaign showed the great difficulty of capturing Vyborg with ground forces alone without the assistance of the fleet.
Having correctly assessed the enemy’s forces and his own capabilities, as well as the features of the theater of upcoming military operations, Peter I in 1710 outlined a new plan for the capture of Vyborg. It was decided with part of the siege corps to make a quick transition across the ice of the Gulf of Finland and suddenly besiege Vyborg from land in order to isolate it from Finland for the spring period. With the beginning of the ice movement, certainly before the appearance of the Swedish fleet in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic fleet had to make the transition from Kotlin to Vyborg and deliver reinforcements, heavy artillery and supplies to the siege troops. With the fleet's breakthrough to Vyborg, rowing warships were supposed to be used to assist troops during the siege and blockade of the fortress. Thus, the plan of Peter I, developed taking into account the experience of the capture of Azov and the unsuccessful siege of Vyborg in 1706, outlined joint actions of the army and navy, which were based on the desire to forestall the enemy in deploying his forces during the blockade and siege of Vyborg.
In the second half of March 1710, part of the siege corps with light artillery under the command Admiral General Apraksin made a difficult ice crossing and began the siege of Vyborg. At this time, preparations for the fleet's campaign were being completed in St. Petersburg. All forces of the Baltic Fleet, consisting of up to 250 combat and transport ships, took part in the campaign to Vyborg.
For the transportation of artillery, ammunition and food to Vyborg, numerous transport flotilla . Up to 5 thousand reinforcement troops were boarded on rowing warships. Providing and covering the passage of the rowing and transport flotilla was entrusted to a detachment of the sailing fleet consisting of 11 frigates and 8 boats. On April 30, with the beginning of ice movement in the Kotlin area, rowing ships, taking transport ships in tow, began moving from Kotlin to the Bjerk Islands. Then the sailing battle fleet went to sea, providing ice support for the rowing and transport flotilla to the entrance to the Vyborg Bay. Heroically overcoming the heavy ice, the galleys and transport ships made their way into the Vyborg Bay and on May 8 approached Transund. As the flotilla passed by Transund, Russian coastal batteries staged a battle with ships supposedly breaking through to help the besieged Vyborg.
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Military stratagem was a success. The Swedes mistook the breaking through Russian ships for their own and did not interfere with their passage to the camp of the Russian troops with their fortress artillery. The ships were unloaded within four days. After this, the transport flotilla, under the cover of the naval fleet, returned to Kronshlot. Rowing warships remained in the Vyborg area to participate in the siege of the enemy fortress. The breakthrough of the Russian fleet to Vyborg decided the fate of the besieged fortress. The size of the siege corps increased to 15 thousand people. Having received reinforcements by sea, heavy artillery and ammunition, Russian troops intensified the siege of Vyborg. The main blow was delivered from sea directions on the western front of the fortress, as less fortified by the Swedes, and an auxiliary blow - on the eastern front of the fortress, which was more strongly fortified by the enemy. More than half of all the besieging troops, three-quarters of the artillery and the fleet acted in the direction of the main attack. Rowing ships supported the ground forces by blockading the fortress from the sea and with their fire.
In order to prevent the Swedish fleet from breaking through to Vyborg, the Russians created a fortified position near Tranzund, consisting of coastal batteries, ships sunk in the fairway and rowing warships operating near the fortress.
On May 16, when the Russian naval and transport fleet was already at Kronshlot, the Swedish squadron appeared at the Vyborg Bay, but did not dare to attack the fortified Russian position. Fearing being blocked by Russian forces, the Swedish squadron did not dare to provide assistance to its fortress.
The garrison of Vyborg, besieged by land and sea, without support from its army and navy, capitulated on June 13, 1710. The trophies of the winners were numerous artillery of the enemy fortress. Following Vyborg, Russian troops occupied Kexholm.
The victory at Vyborg characterizes the further growth of Russian military and naval art.
conclusions
Capture of Vyborg is an example of boldly conceived and skillfully executed joint actions of the Russian army and navy against the enemy’s coastal fortress.
The bold plan for the attack on Vyborg was based on the decision to forestall the enemy by deploying the Russian army in winter and the fleet in early spring, at the time the ice broke up in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. This deprived the enemy of the opportunity to use his more powerful fleet to counter the breakthrough of the Russian fleet to Vyborg.
The successful ice passage of a large number of sailing and rowing wooden ships from Kotlin to Vyborg was one of the clear indicators of the high level of training of the Russian Baltic Fleet and its ability to operate successfully in the most difficult conditions.
The main blow to Vyborg was delivered by ground forces. The role of the fleet was to transport siege troops by sea with heavy artillery and supplies and to directly support the army by fire and blockade of Vyborg from the sea.
By occupying the Swedish fortresses of Vyborg and Kexholm, the most dangerous bridgehead of Swedish aggression against the Russian state was eliminated and the security of St. Petersburg from the northern direction was ensured. In addition, Vyborg could be a convenient base for the army and navy in subsequent actions against Finland.
Campaign of 1710 was marked by outstanding victories of the Russian army in Estland and Livonia. Developing a successful offensive in this direction, Russian troops quickly captured Riga, Pernov, Revel and the Moonsund Islands. With the occupation of Estland, Livonia, Vyborg and Kexholm, the main goal of the war was achieved, which was to acquire free access to the Baltic Sea. Reliable security was created for St. Petersburg, which became the capital of Russia. Finally, with the occupation of Vyborg, Revel and the Moonsund Islands, the basing system and area of operation of the Baltic Fleet expanded.
It was a shame to lose the Battle of Poltava: the exhausted, hungry and demoralized Swedes, led by a Scandinavian vagabond, did not pose much of a threat.
Klyuchevsky Vasily Osipovich
The Battle of Poltava took place on June 27, 1709 and, in short, became one of the most important battles of the Northern War, which we will briefly discuss in this article. Separately, we will dwell on the reasons for the battle, as well as its course. For this, based on historical documents and maps, we will draw up a detailed battle plan and understand how significant the results of the victory were.
Reasons for the Battle of Poltava
The Northern War developed in such a way that Sweden, led by the young king-commander Charles 12, won one victory after another. As a result, by mid-1708, all of Russia’s allies were actually withdrawn from the war: both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Saxony. As a result, it became obvious that the outcome of the war would be determined in a head-to-head battle between Sweden and Russia. Charles 12, on a wave of success, was in a hurry to end the war and in the summer of 1708 crossed the border with Russia. Initially, the Swedes moved to Smolensk. Peter understood perfectly well that such a campaign was aimed at advancing deeper into the country and defeating the Russian army. When considering the causes of the Battle of Poltava, it is necessary to pay attention to two very important facts:
- On September 28, 1708, a battle took place near the village of Lesnoy, during which the Swedes were defeated. It would seem that this is an ordinary event for war. In fact, as a result of this victory, the Swedish army was left virtually without provisions and supplies, because the convoy was destroyed and the roads for sending a new one were blocked.
- In October 1708, Hetman Mazepa approached the Swedish king. He and the Zaporozhye Cossacks swore allegiance to the Swedish crown. This was beneficial for the Swedes, since the Cossacks could help them resolve issues with the interrupted supply of food and ammunition.
As a result, the main reasons for the Battle of Poltava must be sought in the reasons for the start of the Northern War, which at that time had already dragged on quite long and required decisive action.
Balance of forces and means before the start of the battle
The Swedes approached Poltava and began its siege at the end of March 1709. The garrison successfully held back the enemy's attacks, realizing that the king and his army would soon arrive at the battle site. At this time, Peter himself tried to strengthen his army with allied troops. To do this, he turned to the Crimean Khan and the Turkish Sultan. His arguments were not heard, and having gathered a single Russian army, which was joined by part of the Zaporozhye Cossacks led by Skoropadsky, he went to the besieged fortress.
It should be noted that the Poltava garrison was small, only 2,200 people. However, he resisted the constant assaults of the Swedes for almost 3 months. Historians note that during this time approximately 20 attacks were repulsed and 6,000 Swedes were killed.
The Battle of Poltava in 1709, by the time it began, after the arrival of the main Russian forces, brought together the following forces of the parties.
Swedish army before the battle:
- Number - 37,000 people (30,000 Swedes, 6,000 Cossacks, 1,000 Vlachs).
- Guns - 4 pieces
- Generals - Karl 12, Rehnschild Karl Gustav, Levenhaupt Adam Ludwig, Roos Karl Gustav,
Mazepa Ivan Stepanovich.
Russian army before the battle:
- Number - 60,000 people (52,000 Russians, 8,000 Cossacks) - according to some sources - 80,000 people.
- Guns - 111 pieces
- Generals - Peter 1, Sheremetev Boris Petrovich, Repin Anikita Ivanovich, Allart Ludvig Nikolaevich, Menshikov Alexander Danilovich, Renne Karl Edward, Baur Radion Khristianovich, Skoropadsky Ivan Ilyich.
Progress of the Battle of Poltava (briefly)
At 23:00 on June 26 (the eve of the battle), Charles 12 gave the order to wake up the army and form it into battle formation for the march. However, the disunity of the Swedes played into the hands of the Russians. They were able to bring the army into battle formation only at 2 a.m. on June 27th. Karl's plans were thwarted; the wasted 3 hours completely deprived his attack of the element of surprise. This is how the Battle of Poltava began for the Swedes, the course of which will be briefly discussed below.
Storming the redoubts - scheme of the Battle of Poltava
The Swedes left their camp and headed to the battle site. The first obstacle on their way was the Russian redoubts, which were built both horizontally and vertically relative to the position of the Russian army. The assault on the redoubts began in the early morning of June 27, and with it the Battle of Poltava! The first 2 redoubts were taken immediately. In fairness, it should be noted that they were unfinished. The Swedes did not succeed in the rest of the redoubts. The attacks were not successful. This is largely due to the fact that after the loss of the first two redoubts, Russian cavalry under the command of Menshikov advanced to the position. Together with the defenders in the redoubts, they managed to hold back the enemy’s onslaught, preventing him from capturing all the fortifications. Below is a diagram of the Battle of Poltava for a more detailed visual representation of the course of the battle.
Despite the short-term successes of the Russian army, Tsar Peter at 4 o'clock in the morning gives the order for the retreat of all regiments to their main positions. The redoubts fulfilled their mission - they exhausted the Swedes even before the battle began, while the main forces of the Russian army remained fresh. In addition, the Swedes lost about 3,000 people on the approaches to the main battlefield. Such losses are associated with tactical blunders of the generals. Charles 12 and his generals did not expect to storm the redoubts, expecting to pass them through the “dead” zones. In reality, this turned out to be impossible, and the army had to storm the redoubts without any equipment for this.
Decisive battle
With great difficulty the Swedes overcame the redoubts. After this, they took a wait-and-see attitude, expecting the imminent arrival of their cavalry. However, General Roos by that time was already surrounded by Russian units and surrendered. Without waiting for cavalry reinforcements, the Swedish infantry lined up and prepared for battle. Forming in a line was Karl's favorite tactic. It was believed that if the Swedes were allowed to build such a battle formation, it would be impossible to defeat them. In reality it turned out differently...
The Swedish offensive began at 9 am. As a result of artillery shelling, as well as volleys of small arms fire, the Swedes suffered huge losses from the first minutes. The offensive formation was completely destroyed. At the same time, the Swedes still failed to create an attack line that would be longer than the Russian line. If the maximum values of the formation of the Swedish army reached 1.5 kilometers, then the Russian detachments stretched up to 2 kilometers. Having a numerical superiority and smaller gaps between units. The advantage of the Russian army was simply enormous. As a result, after the shelling, which created gaps of more than 100 meters among the Swedes, panic and flight began. It happened at 11 o'clock. In 2 hours, Peter's army won a complete victory.
Losses of the parties in the battle
The total losses of the Russian army were 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. The losses of the Swedish army turned out to be simply nightmare:
- All generals were killed or captured
- 9,000 people killed
- 3000 people taken prisoner
- 16,000 people were captured 3 days after the battle, when they managed to overtake the main forces of the retreating Swedes near the village of Perevolochny.
Pursuit of the enemy
The course of the Battle of Poltava after the retreat of the Swedes took on the character of persecution. On the evening of June 27, an order was given to pursue and capture the enemy army. The detachments of Baur, Galitsina and Menshikov took part in this. The advancement of the Russian army was not carried out at the fastest pace. The Swedes themselves were to blame for this, who nominated General Meyerfeld with the “authority” to negotiate.
As a result of all these actions, it was possible to reach the Swedes near the village of Perevolochny only after 3 days. Here they surrendered: 16,000 infantry, 3 generals, 51 command officers, 12,575 non-commissioned officers.
The significance of the Battle of Poltava
From school we are told about the great significance of the Battle of Poltava, and also that this is eternal glory for Russian weapons. Undoubtedly, the battle of Poltava gave the advantage in the war to Russia, but is it possible to speak of historical significance as of ingenious and outstanding significance? This is much more difficult... It is no coincidence that we chose the words of the famous historian Klyuchevsky as the epigraph. You can blame him for anything, but he always describes the era of Peter exclusively positively. And as a result, even Klyuchevsky admits that even a brief study of the Battle of Poltava indicates that It would be a shame to lose in it!
Historians have significant arguments:
This allows us to say that the victory in the Battle of Poltava was very significant, but its results should not be greatly extolled. It is imperative to make a reference to the enemy’s condition.
Results of the battle and its consequences
We briefly reviewed the Battle of Poltava. Its results are clear - an unconditional victory for the Russian army. Moreover, the Swedish infantry ceased to exist (of the 30,000 army, 28,000 people were captured or killed), the artillery also disappeared (Charles had 28 guns, 12 initially, 4 reached Poltava, 0 remained after the battle). The victory is unconditional and magnificent, even if you make allowances for the state of the enemy (ultimately this is their problem).
Along with these rosy results, it should be noted that, despite such a glorious victory, the outcome of the war did not come. There are several reasons for this; most historians agree that this is due to Peter’s reaction to the flight of the Swedish army. We said that the Battle of Poltava ended at 11 o’clock in the afternoon, however, the order to pursue came only at night, after celebrating the victory... As a result, the enemy managed to retreat significantly, and Charles 12 himself abandoned his army and went to Turkey to persuade the Sultan to war with Russia.
The results of the Poltava victory are ambiguous. Despite the excellent result, Russia did not receive any dividends from this. The delay in ordering the pursuit led to the possibility of the escape of Charles 12 and to the subsequent 12 years of war.
