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Block of the lunar program of the USSR. Soviet lunar programs

The Moon landing was broadcast live all over the world, with the exception of the USSR and China. There is a widespread legend, which was outlined by the Soviet journalist and popularizer of science Yaroslav Golovanov in his book “The Truth about the Apollo Program.” He wrote: “Late in the evening of July 21, 1969, on Central Television, if my memory serves me right, they showed the comedy film “The Pig Farmer and the Shepherd.” At this time, all of humanity, with bated breath, watched the first landing of earthlings on the Moon. We then showed disrespect not for the astronauts, not for the country that sent them, but for ourselves...” But at this moment, 5:56 am Moscow time, the USSR Central Television was not broadcasting at all. At that time, the broadcast did not start until 8 am.

The take-off stage of the lunar cabin with two astronauts on board launched from the surface of the Moon.

This happened at 20:54. Moscow time. After entering the Moon's orbit and maneuvering, the cabin must move to the orbit of the main module of Apollo 11 and dock with it.

At 15:11 Washington time on Sunday, July 20, astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin separated the lunar compartment from the command compartment, in which Michael Collins remained, and began an independent flight.

After about 56 minutes, they turned on the deceleration engine and moved the lunar compartment onto a trajectory towards the landing site. One of the most important phases of the Apollo 11 flight program has begun.

Even looking at the TV screen, you can feel the tension engulfing the space center in Houston. The lunar compartment is rapidly descending. At first he flies as if on his stomach, with his steel spider legs forward. The astronauts lie face down in their niche. Then the cabin gradually assumes a horizontal position. The astronauts report that everything is going well on board. The connection with them never stops. Armstrong's distant voice is heard:

- We are descending according to plan. 20 kilometers to the surface of the Moon... 18... 15...

There are a few minutes left before landing.

- A thousand feet! - exclaims the controller at the command post in Houston. - 1500 feet!.. 100 feet!..

“40 feet left,” Armstrong reports from the lunar compartment. - The engine raises clouds of dust from the surface of the Moon. We see our own shadow.

How will the Moon meet them? Will the lunar cabin fall on its side? Instruments in Houston record the astronauts' pulse: Aldrin's is 130 beats per minute, Armstrong's is 150.

- The engine is off! - Armstrong's visibly excited voice can be heard. - Let's sit down!

There is a pause. The clock hand shows a quarter past five (Washington time).

- Hello, Houston! This is the Sea of ​​Tranquility base speaking. "Eagle" (code name for the lunar compartment) has landed!

“You made everyone in Houston turn green with excitement,” they answer from Earth. - Now we have taken a breath. Let me tell you that everyone here now has smiles on their faces.

“Keep in mind, there are also two smiles on the moon,” Armstrong jokes.

“Don’t forget another one in space,” comes the voice of Michael Collins from the command compartment cockpit. Collins asks that you inform him about everything that happens in the landing area.

The Eagle landed about four miles from its intended target in the southwestern part of the Sea of ​​Tranquility. Judging by the further stories of the astronauts, the landing was not easy.

“We descended directly onto a crater the size of a football field,” Armstrong reported 5 minutes after landing. “There were a lot of huge stones around.” I had to switch to manual control to select another landing site.

A few minutes later, looking out the window, Aldrin gave the first description of the area in which the lunar compartment landed:

- There is a whole collection of gray stones around various shapes. There are so many stones here!

Standing at another window, Armstrong continued to describe the landing area:

- It is a relatively flat surface with many craters ranging from 5 to 50 feet in diameter. A series of rock ridges 20-30 feet high. Thousands of small craters 1-2 feet in diameter. Directly in front of us are several 2 foot high shafts. There is a hill in the distance. It could be half a mile or a mile away.

At the request of the astronauts, the Houston Space Center agreed to shorten their rest time and allowed them to leave the lunar compartment on the lunar surface several hours earlier than planned.

Late in the evening Washington time (in Moscow it was early morning on July 21), the cosmonauts began depressurizing the cabin. Instead of the 15 minutes planned, it took more than an hour. On the radio, Armstrong and Aldrin could be heard talking to each other, inspecting and testing on each other the space suits, pressure helmets and life support systems that fit in the backpack on their backs. Finally, Armstrong’s voice is heard:

- Ready to go to the surface.

The cabin hatch opens, but the astronauts are in no hurry. They need to get comfortable. A minute passes, then another.

“I’m starting to leave,” Armstrong reports.

Aldrin helps him crawl on his knees to the hatch. The astronaut begins a slow, careful descent along a 9-step staircase to the surface of the Moon. On the way down, he opens another hatch that stores tools, plastic bags for lunar soil, a special shovel for working on soil, and a television camera. Edwin Aldrin turns on the camera from inside the cabin, and an image transmitted from the Moon appears on the TV screen. At first it's hard to make anything out. Then we realize that we see the lunar surface and the stairs of the lunar cabin. The image is not very clear, as if in a fog.

Suddenly we see a man's foot step on the step. Here's the second leg. Armstrong descends, facing the cockpit. At the last step he stops and “tests” the ground with his left foot. Now he is already standing on the lunar surface, without taking his right hand off the ladder.

He takes the first step, a small step, cautious and uncertain.

The right hand is still on the stairs. But the first step has been taken. And we hear the words of the astronaut, the first words of a man on the moon:

- One small step of a person is a huge step of humanity.

Armstrong steps away from the cockpit. His movements resemble those of a diver on seabed. And he himself in his spacesuit looks like a diver. There is a rope behind him, held by Aldrin, who remains in the cabin. This is in case of surprises.

“I don’t have any difficulty in moving,” the astronaut reports. “It’s even easier here than during training on Earth.”

His first task on the lunar surface after "gaining confidence" is to take a sample of lunar soil. He takes it with a special spatula, we see how he puts it in a plastic bag and puts it in a pocket sewn above the knee of his left leg. His movements become more confident and faster. He goes further and further and finally disappears beyond the frame of the television screen.

Suddenly he appears on the screen again, and the audience on Earth cannot help but cry out in surprise: he is running. But not the way they run on Earth. This is how movies run in slow motion on the screen. He takes another bag for soil samples from the storage hatch and again goes beyond the screen frame.

Edwin Aldrin appears from the cockpit hatch. He descends more confidently than his predecessor. Once again the audience gasps in amazement as Aldrin jumps off the last two steps.

He immediately climbs the stairs and jumps again.

Now there are two astronauts on the TV screen. Armstrong jumps twice in place and even tries to sit down, but the suit interferes with him.

Aldrin walks around the lunar cabin, inspects it and reports to Earth that he found no damage.

Armstrong removes the television camera from its socket in the storage hatch, carries it a few meters from the cabin and installs it on a tripod. Now we see the entire lunar cabin, the close, uneven lunar horizon. All around is a lifeless, kind of pockmarked desert, all covered in pockmarked craters. Large boulders and stone ridges are visible, which Armstrong spoke about immediately after landing.

The astronauts worked on the surface of the Moon for several hours. They installed a laser-radar reflector to measure the distance between the Earth and the Moon and study irregularities in the Earth's rotation. They spread a sheet of aluminum foil to detect traces of “noble gases” - helium, argon, neon, and conducted other scientific experiments.

Astronauts Neil Armstrong, Edwin Aldrin and Michael Collins successfully completed the tasks of the first half of their mission. Their courage is admirable.

The commander of Apollo 11, Neil Armstrong, blue-eyed, with a youthful haircut and a shy smile, according to everyone who knows him, has an enviable composure, restraint and quick reaction.

This silent and somewhat phlegmatic civilian test pilot had already twice during his stay in the cosmonaut corps successfully emerged from very dangerous situations. In March 1966, he managed to prevent a disaster spaceship Gemini 8, which he commanded. This happened during an attempt to dock the ship with one of the stages of the launch vehicle. The flight then had to be aborted, and Armstrong safely landed Gemini 8 in the waters Pacific Ocean. Last year, Armstrong flew in a simulator. Suddenly he began to spin and fall. Armstrong managed to bail out.

He is a native of the small town of Wapakoneta in Ohio (about 7 thousand inhabitants). At age 16, before he could even drive a car, Neil Armstrong received his airplane license. To be able to pay $9 an hour for training at a private flying club, Neil worked as a delivery boy at a pharmacy. Since then, for the rest of his life he connected himself with the air, and then with space.

They say about Edwin Aldrin that his brain is like an electronic computer. Before becoming an astronaut, Aldrin successfully graduated from the famous Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the United States and defended his dissertation, the topic of which was the docking of ships in space. In November 1966, he was a member of the crew of the Geminai 12 spacecraft, leaving the ship at open space.

Michael Collins, a sociable and cheerful person, is also no stranger to space. He piloted the Gemini 10 spacecraft, which orbited the Earth 43 times in July 1966. Collins was scheduled to fly with Borman on Apollo 8 last December, but fell ill and was replaced. He underwent two major spinal surgeries and, through willpower, returned to the astronaut family.

When you read about them in local magazines, see a movie made about them, you notice that these people are very similar to Soviet cosmonauts. They are also simple and sociable. They are also courageous and dedicated to their cause - the conquest of space.

...Now, the astronauts are resting inside the lunar cabin. Tomorrow is an equally busy day.

Also on the last page of Pravda, under the heading “The First Lunar Expedition,” an interview with geochemist A.P. was published. Vinogradov to a newspaper correspondent.

In addition, congratulatory statements from Soviet officials, scientists and cosmonauts addressed to the Americans were printed.

Viktor Frank spoke about the coverage of the lunar landing in the Soviet media on July 27, 1969 on Radio Liberty. He said: "Earthlings on the Moon." Under this headline, Pravda reported last Tuesday about the brilliant landing of American astronauts. I think that I was not the only one who was pleased with the attitude of the body of the CPSU Central Committee to achieve the Americans. And it’s especially good that the editors of Pravda called the American cosmonauts “earthlings,” that is, they presented them not as citizens of a state with which the Soviet Union, to put it mildly, has its own special scores to settle, but as fellow citizens on planet Earth. It is unlikely that I can be accused of excessive causticism if I express the assumption that if it were not American but Soviet cosmonauts who landed on the Moon first, then Pravda would hardly call them “earthlings.”

A good description of Soviet publications about the lunar expedition was given by comrade S.P. Korolev, Soviet space designer V.P. Mishin in his brochure “Why didn’t we fly to the Moon?”, published in 1990. He wrote that “the US successes in landing American astronauts on the surface of the Moon were illuminated by our means mass media clearly one-sided and insufficient. Silent real facts, we presented the state of affairs in such a way that work on a manned flight to the Moon had not been carried out in the USSR and our efforts were focused only on its research using automatic spacecraft. Moreover, we even began to argue that in the study of the Moon it is possible to get by only with automatic devices, that there is nothing for a person to do on the Moon.”

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Space exploration in the middle of the last century was an extremely important matter for world powers, because it directly testified to their strength and power. The priority of developments in the space industry was not only not hidden from citizens, but, on the contrary, was emphasized in every possible way, instilling a sense of respect and pride for their country.

Despite the desire of many countries to take part in this difficult and interesting task, the main serious struggle took place between two superpowers - the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

The first victories in the space race were for the USSR

The series of successes of the Soviet cosmonautics became an open challenge to the United States, forcing America to speed up work in the field of space exploration and find a way to beat its main competitor, the USSR.

  • first artificial satellite lands - Soviet Sputnik-1 (October 4, 1957) USSR;
  • the first animal flights into space - the astronaut dog Laika, the first animal launched into Earth orbit! (1954 - November 3, 1957) USSR;
  • first manned flight into space - Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin (April 12, 1961).

And yet, the competition for space continued!

First people on the moon

Today, almost everyone knows that America managed to seize the initiative in the space race by launching its astronauts on. The first manned spacecraft to successfully land on the moon back in 1969 was the American spacecraft Apollo 11, with a crew of astronauts on board: Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Buzz Aldrin.

Many of you remember the photo of Armstrong proudly planting the US flag on the surface of the Moon on July 20, 1969. The American government was triumphant that it had managed to overtake the Soviet space pioneers in conquering the Moon. But history is full of conjectures and assumptions, and some facts haunt critics and scientists to this day. And to this day, the question is being discussed that the American ship, in all likelihood, reached the Moon, took it, but did the astronauts actually land on its surface? There is a whole caste of skeptics and critics who do not believe in the American landing on the Moon, however, let’s leave this skepticism to their conscience.

However, the Soviet spacecraft Luna-2 reached the Moon for the first time on September 13, 1959, that is, Soviet spacecraft ended up on the Moon 10 years earlier than the landing of American cosmonauts on the Earth’s satellite. And therefore it is especially offensive that few people know about the role of Soviet designers, physicists, and cosmonauts in the exploration of the Moon.

But a huge amount of work was done, and the results were achieved much earlier than Armstrong’s victorious march. The USSR pennant was delivered to the surface of the Moon a decade before a person set foot on its surface. September 13, 1959 space station Luna 2 reached the planet after which it was named. The world's first spacecraft to reach the Moon (space station Luna-2) landed on the surface of the Moon in the Mare Mons region near the craters Aristyllus, Archimedes and Autolycus.

A completely logical question arises: if the Luna-2 station reached the Earth’s satellite, then there should have been Luna-1 as well? There was, but its launch, carried out a little earlier, turned out to be not so successful and, having flown past the Moon... But even with this outcome, very significant scientific results were obtained during the flight of the Luna-1 station:

  • Using ion traps and particle counters, the first direct measurements of solar wind parameters were made.
  • Using an onboard magnetometer, the Earth's outer radiation belt was recorded for the first time.
  • It was established that the Moon does not have a significant magnetic field.
  • The Luna-1 spacecraft became the first spacecraft in the world to reach the second escape velocity.

The launch participants were awarded the Lenin Prize; the people did not know their heroes by name, but the common cause - the honor of the country - was a priority.

USA lands first people on the moon

What about the USA? Yuri Gagarin's flight into space was a serious blow for America, and in order not to remain forever in the shadow of the Russians, a goal was set - and although the Americans lost the race to land the first spacecraft on the surface of the Moon, they had a chance to be the first to land astronauts on the Earth's satellite ! Work on improving the spacecraft, spacesuits and necessary equipment proceeded by leaps and bounds, the American government attracted all the intellectual and technical potential of the country, and, without skimping, spent billions of dollars on development. All NASA resources were mobilized and thrown into the furnace of science for a great purpose.

The step of an American citizen to the Moon is the only opportunity to emerge from the shadows, to catch up with the Soviet Union in this race. It is possible that America would not have been able to realize its ambitious plans, but at that time there was a change in the party leader in the USSR, and the leading designers - Korolev and Chelomey - could not come to a common opinion. Korolev, being an innovator by nature, was inclined to use the latest developments engines, and his colleague advocated for the old but proven Proton. Thus, the initiative was lost and the first to officially set foot on the surface of the Moon were American astronauts.

Did the USSR give up in the lunar race?

Even though Soviet cosmonauts failed to land on the Moon in the 20th century, the USSR did not give up in the race to explore the Moon. So already in 1970, the automatic interplanetary station “Luna-17” carried on board the world’s first, unprecedented, planetary rover, capable of fully operating in conditions of a different gravity of the moon. It was called “Lunokhod-1” and was intended to study the surface, properties and composition of the soil, radioactive and x-ray radiation of the Moon. Work on it was carried out at the Khimki Machine-Building Plant named after. S.A. Lavochkin, led by Babakin Nikolai Grigorievich. The sketch was ready in 1966, and all design documentation was completed by the end of the next year.

Lunokhod 1 was delivered to the surface of the Earth's satellite in November 1970. The control center was located in Simferopol, in the Space Communications Center and included the control panel of the crew commander, the lunar rover driver, the antenna operator, the navigator, and the operational information processing room. The main problem was the signal time delay, which interfered with full control. The Lunokhod worked there for almost a year, until September 14, it was on this day that the last, successful communication session took place.

The Lunokhod did a great job of studying the planet entrusted to it, working much longer than planned. A huge number of photographs, lunar panoramas, etc. were transmitted to Earth. Years later, in 2012, the International Astronomical Union gave names to all twelve craters encountered on the path of Lunokhod 1 - they received male names.

By the way, in 1993, “Lunokhod 1” was put up for auction at Sotheby’s, the stated price was five thousand dollars. The auction ended at a much higher amount - sixty-eight and a half thousand US dollars; the buyer was the son of one of the American astronauts. It is characteristic that the precious lot rests on the territory of the Moon; in 2013 it was discovered in photographs taken by an orbital American probe.

To summarize, it can be noted that the first people to land on the Moon (1969) were the Americans, here is a list of US astronauts who landed: Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, Pete Conrad, Alan Bean, Alan Shepard, Edgar Mitchell, David Scott, James Irwin , John Young, Charles Duke, Eugene Cernan, Harrison Schmitt. Neil Armstrong lived a long life and died on August 25, 2012 at the age of 82, still retaining the title of the first man to set foot on the moon...

But the first spaceships that conquered the Moon (1959) were Soviet; here the primacy undoubtedly belongs to the Soviet Union and Russian designers and engineers.

In a previous article about the film “Apollo 18”, the Soviet lunar module “Progress” was mentioned. According to the description of the film, it was on it that the only Soviet cosmonaut arrived on the Moon before the Americans (or a little later) and died heroically, fighting for his life against an alien threat.

In fact, the Soviet module is an almost exact copy of the L3 project, the development of which has been carried out since 1963, and the name “Progress” was then assigned not to it, but to the new rocket launcher. In principle, in the context of the film, such details do not matter and we must pay tribute to our American film colleagues - L3 was executed simply “excellently”. Therefore, we need to talk about this design in more detail.

So, as mentioned earlier, the development of the L3 lunar landing module began in 1963, almost simultaneously with the deployment of the Soyuz program. It was they who were supposed to deliver Soviet cosmonauts to the Moon, but they failed to complete this work. As a result, Soyuz became famous as a means of delivering the most cosmonauts. different countries into low-Earth orbit. As for the lunar landing module L3, its fate was as follows.

Due to the lack of a carrier suitable for power, engineers had to limit themselves to a layout designed for only one cosmonaut. Compare the sizes of the Soviet and American lunar modules (figure).

Structurally, L3 (also called LK - lunar ship) consisted of two sections:

– lunar cabin: the astronaut’s chair was located at the rear wall, controls were located on the right and left, and a large round porthole was made in the center;
– instrument module: it was disc-shaped and housed a control system, radio equipment, a power management system and equipment for docking.

The bottleneck of the LC, not counting its modest dimensions, was the impossibility of a direct transfer of the astronaut from the LOK (the lunar orbital ship that was supposed to deliver the expedition). In other words, the scheme of actions after entering low-Earth orbit was presented as follows.

Astronauts put on spacesuits different types(LOK pilot – “Orlan”, LK pilot – “Krechet-94”) and move to the living compartment, which is later used as an airlock.

Next, the LC pilot, using the handrails, moves along the outer surface of the LC to his ship. For greater convenience, both hatches were placed opposite each other. After this, the LC is separated from the LOC and descends to the surface of the Moon.

At an altitude of 16 km, the braking engines are turned on, and at an altitude of 3-4 km, the upper stage “D” is separated from the module, after which the LC performs a “dead loop”.

Such tricks were necessary so that the landing radar of the lunar ship would not mistake the separated block “D” for the lunar surface and the automatic activation of the rocket block “E” would not work ahead of time. The landing itself was carried out by the LK pilot himself, who had to use both automatic and manual control systems.

After resting and checking the operation of the equipment, the astronaut went out to the lunar surface to collect samples. The Krechet-94 spacesuit was designed for 4 hours of autonomous stay on the Moon. During this time, the cosmonaut had to install scientific instruments and the USSR national flag on the Moon, collect samples of lunar soil, conduct a television report, and photograph and film the landing area.

After spending no more than 24 hours on the Moon, the astronaut had to leave the planet. At the start, both engines of block “E” were turned on, and in the case of normal operation, one of them was subsequently turned off. Then the LC entered lunar orbit and, using the Contact system, docked with the LOK. Further, all the astronaut’s actions were carried out in reverse order like before landing on the moon. The return journey to Earth should have taken no more than 3.5 days, and the total duration of the expedition was calculated at 11-12 days.

As we see, American filmmakers were right in many ways. The LC module landed in the crater on sunny side and the Soviet cosmonaut apparently completed the main part of the program to stay on the lunar surface. By the way, not only the LC itself was successfully reproduced, but also the “Krechet-94” spacesuit.

For a more detailed study of this topic, there is a separate article “Spacesuits for the Soviet lunar program” (PDF format). Now all that remains from this epoch-making program are the modules for bench tests and one of the samples of the Krechet-94 spacesuit. The latter, moreover, is a museum exhibit, which cannot be said about the LC module.

Towards the end of the story about the Soviet lunar module LK - a few frames from the film “Apollo 18”. Let's watch, evaluate, enjoy...

Why didn't we end up on the moon? Most often you can hear about the imperfection of the technological base of Soviet industry, which was unable to create a rocket and spacecraft for the lunar project. It was reported that the Soviet Union was doomed to lose to the United States in the lunar race. But this is not entirely true. The main reason for the failure of the most expensive space project (4 billion rubles in 1974 prices) was the inconsistency of the actions of various departments and the ambitions of a number of leaders of that period.

Why did we need the Moon?

In reality, the Soviet lunar program was a symmetrical response to the American lunar program. The leaders of OKB-1 were absolutely not interested in the moon. Korolev and the N-1 rocket project were a modernized version of an earlier royal project. Intended for the delivery of a hydrogen super-bomb and for the launch of large-sized orbital complexes, the dimensions of which were supposed to be several times larger than the Soyuz and Mir that appeared later. It was completely unfeasible to implement the lunar program.

But the CPSU Central Committee decided to accept the challenge of the Americans. In 1960, a decree was issued by the Government Decree of June 23, 1960 “On the creation of powerful launch vehicles, satellites, spacecraft and space exploration in 1960-1967.” was planned to take place in the 1960s. design development and the necessary amount of research in order to create in the coming years a new space rocket system with a launch mass of 1000-2000 tons, ensuring the launch of heavy interplanetary spacecraft into orbit around the Earth

ship weighing 60-80 tons, powerful liquid rocket engines with high performance, liquid hydrogen rocket engines, nuclear and electric propulsion engines, high-precision autonomous and radio control systems, space radio communication systems, etc. But already in 1964, the CPSU Central Committee put the new goal is to carry out a manned expedition to the Moon before the United States delivers an astronaut to the Moon.

Blows of fate

The first difficult test for the project was the personal conflict between Korolev and Glushko and the latter’s refusal to develop engines for the lunar rocket. It was urgently decided to entrust the development of engines to the design bureau under the leadership of Kuznetsov.

According to Glushko, the creation of an engine of the required size using oxygen could be delayed, encountering problems with pulsating combustion and protecting the chamber walls and nozzle from overheating. In turn, the use of long-lasting components that provide stable combustion in the liquid-propellant rocket engine chamber with a temperature of 280 - 580 degrees. C lower than oxygen fuel will speed up engine burnout. In addition, the liquid rocket engine turned out to be structurally simpler.

Assessing Glushko’s arguments, Korolev wrote the following in a memo addressed to the head of the expert commission: “The entire argument about the difficulties of testing an oxygen engine is based on the experience of the V. Glushko Design Bureau in working with an open circuit rocket engine. It should be especially emphasized that these difficulties have nothing to do with the closed circuit engines adopted for the N-1 rocket, in which the oxidizer enters the combustion chamber in a hot and gaseous state, and not cold and liquid, as with the usual, open circuit. Indeed, when starting closed circuit engines, thermal ignition of the components in the combustion chamber occurs due to the heat of the hot gaseous oxidizer - oxygen or AT. This method of starting a closed-circuit oxygen-kerosene engine was experimentally tested in OKB-1 engines and adopted for the last stage of the Molniya launch vehicle, as well as in the N. Kuznetsov OKB during the development of oxygen-kerosene engines NK-9V and NK-15V for the N- rocket 1". The expert commission sided with Korolev. Glushko did not forgive the Queen for this. He supports general designer Chelomey in his project of the giant UR-700 rocket, an alternative to the N-1 using engines of his own design. But the scientific commission led by Academician Keldysh gave preference to the N-1 OKB-1 project, since design work by that time, N-1 was almost completed.

In the Resolution of August 3, 1964, it was first determined that the most important task in the exploration of outer space using the N1 launch vehicle is the exploration of the Moon with the landing of expeditions on its surface and their subsequent return to Earth.

The main developers of the L3 lunar system were:

- OKB-1 is the lead organization for the system as a whole, the development of rocket blocks G and D, engines for block D and the development of lunar (LK) and lunar orbital (LOK) ships;

— OKB-276 (N.D. Kuznetsov) — for the development of the G block engine;

- OKB-586 (M.K. Yangel) - for the development of the rocket block E of the lunar ship and the engine of this block;

— OKB-2 (A.M. Isaev) — for the development of the propulsion system (tanks, PG systems and engine) of block I of the lunar orbital ship;

— NII-944 (V.I. Kuznetsov) — on the development of a control system for the L3 system;

- NII-885 (M.S. Ryazansky) - on the radio measuring complex;

— GSKB Spetsmash (V.P. Barmin) — for the complex of ground equipment of the L3 system.

The dates for the start of the LCT were also determined - 1966 and the implementation of the expedition in 1967-1968.

At this point, an important adjustment is made to the development of the rocket. In order to ensure the delivery of an astronaut in one launch, Korolev adapts the N-1 to new conditions almost “from the knees.” Project L3 takes on the form that does not change until the lunar program is closed. Compared to the previous scheme (with direct landing without separation into orbital and landing modules), the new version differed favorably in its mass. Now one launch of the N 1 was enough, although for this it was necessary to increase its carrying capacity by 25 tons. The 91.5-ton L3 complex would be launched into an intermediate near-Earth orbit with an altitude of 220 km and an inclination of 51.8°. The device could remain here for up to 1 day, during which final preparations were made. Gradually an understanding of the complexity of the task at hand came.

The next blow is funding restrictions. Korolev was unable to obtain funding for a number of important elements of the project, one of which was a ground stand for testing the first stage engine block - the country's leadership considered this unnecessary, while in the Apollo project this stand was available. The head of the testing department of the Saturn 5 - Apollo project, K. Muller, was able to prove that to successfully solve the problem there is only one way: complete ground testing of the entire system in all possible normal and emergency situations. He gave his all to ensure that 2/3 of the funds allocated for the project were invested in the creation of testing stands and achieved a positive result: virtually all Saturn-5 launches were successful. The engines of the first stage of the N-1 (and there were 30 of them!) were tested separately and never in a single block on a test bench. Testing the engines “live” would certainly delay the implementation of the project.

Engine adjustments are being made immediately to reduce problems during test flights. Was developed automatic system engine thrust correction, which made it possible, if one or more of the engines fail, to transfer the load in a balanced manner to the others. Subsequently, lattice aerodynamic rudders were also used (this technology found application 10 years later in missiles for interceptor fighters). Distinctive feature N-1 was unique for our launch vehicles of that time in terms of mass payload payload. The supporting structure worked for this (the tanks and the frame did not form a single whole), the relatively low density of the arrangement due to the huge spherical tanks led to a decrease in the payload. On the other hand, the exceptionally low specific gravity of the tanks, extremely high engine performance and design solutions made it possible to increase it.

In 1966, Korolev dies on the operating table - OKB-1 is headed by his permanent deputy, Mishin. It is already clear to everyone that in 1968 it will not be possible to get to the moon and, apparently, in 1969 too. Calculations were made already for 1970.

The first stage had 30 engines installed along two concentric circles. Although the engine proved to be quite reliable in bench tests, most of the problems were caused by vibrations and other unaccounted-for effects associated with the simultaneous operation of so many engines (this was due to the lack of a comprehensive test bench, for which no money was given).

Academician Vasily Mishin (part of the interview):

– Vasily Pavlovich, they say that at one time Korolev promised: “In the year of the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power soviet man will be on the moon! Do you remember under what circumstances this happened?

- Yes, Korolev never said anything like that about the Moon. We would never have been able to land there before the Americans. Our guts were thin and we had no money. We were only able to launch vehicles into orbit. And a flight to the Moon is an order of magnitude more expensive! Yes, we were the first in orbit by accident. This is all propaganda... The fact is that America is rich country, the Americans could have surpassed us a long time ago. But they needed to regain their lost prestige - after the first Sputniks and Gagarin. And Kennedy spoke to Congress in 1961 and asked for 40 billion dollars for this event in order to land Americans on the Moon and return them to Earth before the year 70. The United States at that time could go to such huge expenses, but our country, exhausted after the war, could not allocate such funds in such a time frame. That's it.

– So they specifically chose the goal and timing so that they would definitely get ahead of us?

– Well, yes... And moreover, it was the Saturn 5-Apollo program that pushed us. Before that, we were working on the N-1 rocket for completely different purposes, not for the Moon. They planned to launch heavy orbital station for 75 tons. And then, when the American single-launch scheme became known (the Saturn 5-Apollo project), the leadership of our country instructed the three leading design bureaus, headed by Korolev, Yangel and Chelomey, to develop a project for such an expedition to the Moon with a return to Earth. As a result of consideration of these projects, the N 1-LZ project, developed by OKB-1 under the leadership of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, was chosen. In particular, and because the N-1 rocket had already been developed and put into production, it only had to be “increased” a little - the launch mass was increased from 2200 tons to 3000 and 30 engines were installed instead of 24 on the first stage.

At the same time, work was underway to fine-tune the spacecraft. The most developed project was the Korolev Design Bureau L1, according to which a number of unmanned test flights were carried out. This ship was similar to the Soyuz-7K-OK (orbital ship) designed for flights in near-Earth orbit, known to the general public simply as Soyuz. The main differences between the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft and the Soyuz-7K-OK spacecraft are the absence of an orbital compartment and enhanced thermal protection of the descent vehicle for re-entry into the atmosphere at the second escape velocity. The Proton launch vehicle was used to launch the spacecraft.

It was planned to enter the atmosphere over the southern hemisphere of the Earth, and due to aerodynamic forces, the descent vehicle would again rise into space, and its speed would decrease from the second cosmic speed to suborbital speed. The re-entry into the atmosphere took place over the territory of the Soviet Union. The Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft made five unmanned test flights under the names Zond-4 – 8. At the same time, the Zond-5 – 8 spacecraft flew around the Moon. Four more ships could not be launched into space due to accidents of the Proton launch vehicle during the launch phase. (Prototypes of the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft were also launched, as well as several of its research modifications not related to the manned lunar flyby program.) In three of the five Zond flights, accidents occurred that would have led to the death of crew members or they would be injured if these flights were manned. There were turtles on the Zond-5 ship. They became the first living beings in history to return to Earth after flying around the Moon - three months before the Apollo 8 flight.

In the USSR, there were a number of different projects for landing on the Moon: several launches and assembly of a lunar ship in low-Earth orbit, direct flight to the Moon, etc., but only the Korolev Design Bureau N1-L3 project was brought to the stage of test launches. The N1-L3 project was basically the same as the American Apollo project. Even the layout of the system at the launch stage was similar to the American one: the lunar ship was located in an adapter below the main ship, just like the Apollo lunar module.

The main parts of the rocket and space system for landing on the Moon according to the N1-L3 project were the Soyuz-7K-LOK lunar orbital ship, the LK lunar spacecraft and the powerful N1 launch vehicle.

The crew of the Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft consisted of two people. One of them had to go through outer space to the lunar ship and land on the Moon, and the second had to wait for the return of his comrade in lunar orbit.

The Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft was installed for flight testing on the N1 launch vehicle in its fourth (and last) launch, but due to the launch vehicle accident it was never launched into space.

Lunar ship "LK": 1 - lunar landing unit, 2 — missile block “E”, 3 — cosmonaut cabin, 4 — blocks of the vital activity system, 5 - observation device during landing, 6 - attitude control engine block, 7 — radiator of the thermal control system, 8 - docking point, 9 — aiming sensor, 10 - adjustment sensors, 11 — instrument compartment, 12 - television camera, 13 - omnidirectional antennas, 14 - power supplies, 15 - support stand with shock absorber, 16 - strut with shock absorber, 17 - landing radar, 18 — hinged instrument compartment, 19 - weakly directional antennas, 20 — antennas of the rendezvous system, 21 - television antennas, 22 — pressing motor, 23 - main engine, 24 - reflector, 25 - backup engine.

The control system was built on the basis of an on-board computer and had a manual control system that allowed the astronaut to independently select the landing site visually through a special window. The lunar landing device was a four-legged original design with honeycomb residual vertical landing speed absorbers.

The lunar spacecraft was successfully tested three times in low-Earth orbit in unmanned mode under the names “Cosmos-379”, “Cosmos-398” and “Cosmos-434”.

Unfortunately, for many reasons, the testing dates were constantly shifted “to the right”, and the time for the implementation of the lunar program was constantly shifted “to the left”. This, naturally, affected the work, which in the last quarter of the 1960s took on a completely abnormal pace. However, it was assumed that by launching a rocket every three to four months, flight tests would be completed and the complex would begin scheduled operation in 1972-1973.

The first launch of the N1-L3 rocket and space complex occurred on February 21, 1969. As a result of a fire in the tail compartment and a malfunction of the engine control system, which at 68.7 seconds issued a false command to turn off the engines, the rocket died. The second launch of the N1-L3 complex was carried out four months later and also ended abnormally due to the abnormal operation of engine No. 8 of block A. As a result of the explosion, the launch complex was almost completely destroyed. And although voices were again heard in favor of the unreliability of Kuznetsov’s engines and the rocket design itself, the cause of the disasters was the haste to prepare flight tests.

The commission found out the following: even during bench testing, the susceptibility of NK-15 to the ingress of large (tens of mm) metal objects into the oxidizer pump was registered, which led to damage to the impeller, fire and explosion of the pump; small metal objects (shavings, sawdust, etc.) burning in the gas generator led to the destruction of the turbine blades. Non-metallic objects (rubber, rags, etc.) that got into the TNA input did not cause the engine to stop. This reliability result was not achieved even much later! Instance 5L belonged to the first batch of flight products, which did not provide for the installation of filters at the inlet to the pumps. They were supposed to be installed on the engines of all rockets, starting with the 8L carrier, which was supposed to be used during the fifth launch.

The reliability of the rocket engine seemed insufficient to Kuznetsov himself. Since July 1970, the OKB began to create qualitatively new engines, virtually reusable and with a significantly increased service life. However, they were ready only by the end of 1972, and flight tests were supposed to continue until that time on rockets with old liquid-propellant engines, the control over which had been increased.

Due to damage to the launch complex and a slowdown in the pace of work, preparations for the third flight test were delayed for two years. Only on Sunday, June 27, 1971, the 6L rocket launched at 2:15:70 Moscow time from the second, recently built, launch facility of site 110 of the Baikonur Cosmodrome. All engines worked stably. From the moment of liftoff, telemetry recorded abnormal operation of the roll control system.

Starting from the 39th second, the control system was unable to stabilize the carrier along its axes. At the 48th second, due to reaching supercritical angles of attack, the destruction of the launch vehicle began in the area of ​​​​the junction of block “B” and the nose fairing. The head unit separated from the rocket and, collapsing, fell not far from the launch. The “decapitated” carrier continued its uncontrolled flight. At the 51st second, when the roll angle reached 200 degrees, on command from the end contacts of the gyroplatform, all engines of block “A” were turned off. Continuing to disintegrate in the air, the rocket flew for some time and fell 20 km from the launch, leaving a crater on the ground with a diameter of 30 m and a depth of 15 m.

On November 23, 1972, 17 months after the unsuccessful third attempt, the fourth took place. Instance 7L started from position No. 2 at 9:11:52 Moscow time. For outside observers, up until the 107th second, the flight was successful. The engines operated stably, all rocket parameters were within normal limits. But some cause for concern emerged at the 104th second. They didn’t even have time to attach significance: 3 seconds later, in the tail section of block “A,” a strong explosion scattered the entire peripheral propulsion system and destroyed the lower part of the spherical oxidizer tank. The rocket exploded and fell into pieces in the air. But the program performers themselves did not lose heart. They understood: everything is natural, the rocket is learning to fly, accidents are inevitable. In the 8L carrier, the developers tried to take into account all the previously obtained flight test results. The rocket became significantly heavier, but its creators had no doubt that there would be no more explosions or fires in block “A” and that the fifth attempt would solve the problem of flying the L-3 unmanned expedition using a simplified scheme without landing on the lunar surface.

By the beginning of 1974, the 8L rocket was assembled. The installation of new, reusable liquid propellant engines has begun at all its stages. Thus, the NK-33 engine of block “A” was a modernized version of the NK-15 with significantly increased reliability and performance. Trouble-free ground testing of all liquid-propellant rocket engines gave confidence in the successful fifth launch of the rocket, scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1974. A working version of the lunar spacecraft with all the necessary automation was installed on the rocket. It was planned to fly around the moon and it was possible to send an expedition on the next flight.

Sad end

The removal of Academician V. Mishin from the post of head of OKB-1 and the appointment of V. Glushko in his place in May 1974 was unexpected for the entire team. Work on the N-1 at the newly formed NPO Energia was completely curtailed as soon as possible; the official reason for the closure of the project was the “lack of heavy payloads corresponding to the carrying capacity of the carrier.” The production capacity of the rocket units, almost all the equipment of the technical, launch and measuring complexes was destroyed. At the same time, costs in the amount of 6 billion rubles were written off. (in prices of the 70s) spent on the topic.

Glushko himself proposed at that time an alternative project “Energy” using new, not yet created engines. Therefore, he was afraid of the successful launch of the N-1 rocket with a lunar ship on board - this could ruin all the plans of his team. Later, it took another 13 years to create a rocket of similar power and 14.5 billion rubles were spent.

The Energia complex was created much later - in 1987 and launched after the death of the chief designer. By that time, the rocket turned out to be unnecessary and expensive due to the collapse of the USSR, and according to the technical solution of the Energia-Buran combination, it was outdated, because the Americans launched a similar complex 8 years earlier. There were no longer any tasks for its use. The cost and implementation time of the project significantly exceeded those compared to Korolev’s “lunar” project. “Energia”, after several launches, two of which were partially successful, ceased to exist.

LV "Energia" at the launch

Kuznetsov did not accept his removal from work on liquid propellant engines and continued bench testing of his engines. Ground tests were carried out in 1974-1976 until January 1977 according to a new program requiring confirmation of the performance of each liquid-propellant rocket engine within 600 s. However, usually fire tests of single engines at the OKB lasted 1200 s. Forty liquid-propellant rocket engines operated from 7,000 to 14,000 seconds, and one NK-33 operated for 20,360 seconds. Until 1995, 94 engines of blocks “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” of the N-1 rocket were stored in the warehouses of NPP Trud until 1995. It turned out to be surprising that Kuznetsov’s engines for the N-1 rocket still exist and are still ready to operate as they were in that distant time.

The “D” upper stage, developed by the Korolev Design Bureau for the N-1 rocket, is still used when launching vehicles using the Proton rocket.

Subsequently, Glushko also proposed a project for an expedition to the Moon, including the creation of a long-term habitable base, but the time for ambitious dreams had already passed. The complete lack of economic effect from the program affected the opinion of the country's leadership - no one was going to fly to the Moon in the Soviet Union. Although he could have - in July 1974.

These photographic materials are some of the remaining evidence today that the USSR also tried to land a man on the Moon - obviously, after they could not do this, or, more precisely, did not have time to do it, the program was forgotten.

However, fortunately, few things disappear irrevocably and without a trace. The photographs that we can see show one of the laboratories of the Moscow aviation institute, as well as aerospace equipment, including spacecraft and landing lunar module.

The “Moon Race” is well known to many contemporaries: before American President John Kennedy initiated the Apollo program Soviet Union noticeably ahead of the United States in matters of lunar exploration. In particular, in 1959 the automatic interplanetary station “Luna-2” was delivered to the surface of the Moon, and in 1966 a Soviet satellite entered its orbit.

Like the Americans, Soviet scientists developed a multi-step approach to accomplishing the task. They also had two separate modules for orbit and landing.

While the Apollo 11 crew included three members, the entire burden of the Soviet lunar program had to rest on the shoulders of one cosmonaut - thus, the weight of the equipment was significantly reduced. In addition, there were other differences that made the Soviet apparatus lighter. First of all, these include the comparative simplicity of the design, the use of the same engine for landing and takeoff, as well as the lack of a direct connection between the orbital and lunar module. This meant that the astronaut would need to do a spacewalk to transfer to the lander before landing and, later, to climb back into the orbital module after returning from the Moon. After this, the lunar module was disconnected, and the spacecraft was sent to Earth without it.

The main reason that prevented the Soviet side from landing a man on the Moon was failures with launch vehicles. Despite the fact that the first two test runs were successful, during the third the rocket crashed. In the fourth test, conducted in 1971, the test spacecraft returned to Earth along the wrong trajectory, ending up in Australian airspace, which could have caused an international scandal: Soviet diplomats allegedly had to convince the Australians that the object falling on them was a test spacecraft. the Kosmos-434 module, not a nuclear warhead.

After several failures, the program became too expensive, and after the Americans presented the world with documentary evidence of the success of the Apollo 11 mission, it made no sense at all. As a result, space equipment has become something of a museum piece.