What was the original name planned for the Pobeda car? The original name of the car was "Pobeda" in the USSR. Victory Road history in pictures

Victory Road

Victory Road

temporary railway line Polyany - Shlisselburg, built in 1943 after the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad and the liberation of Shlisselburg and the southern coast by troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts on January 18 Lake Ladoga(width 8-11 km). On January 19, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the construction of a 33 km long railway line connecting Leningrad with the country's railway network through the Volkhovstroy station. Construction of ʼʼD. The p.ʼʼ was headed by I.G. Zubkov (Head of the Department of Military Reconstruction Works No. 2 - UVVR 2). The road route was laid along the edges of the Sinyavinsky swamps, 3-5 km from enemy positions, and was subjected to artillery and mortar fire. The main construction project - a bridge across the Neva with a length of 1300 m - at the first stage was built as a low-water pile-ice overpass with 2 meter spans. The first through train passed through the bridge, built in 11 days. Mainland to Leningrad on the night of February 6-7. The train approached the platform of the dilapidated Finlyandsky station in Leningrad at 10 hours and 9 minutes. Among other cargo, he delivered 800 tons of food - a gift from Chelyabinsk. Soon after entering ʼʼD. p.ʼʼ, on February 23, the standards for the distribution of food to Leningraders increased. A more extensive high-water railway bridge across the Neva was built on March 25, 1943. To reduce the effectiveness of enemy shelling, an 18-kilometer bypass was built parallel to the road, 1.5-2 km closer to the lake. The road also had another name - “Corridor of Death”. Therefore, trains moved only at night, one after another, within sight of the tail signals. To increase the capacity of the line, on May 7, 1943, a “live blocking” was introduced, which was carried out by railway workers standing along the entire route at a distance of visibility of light signals (24 trains arrived in Leningrad on the first night). On May 25, the “live blocking” was replaced by a semi-automatic one, which increased the road capacity to 32 trains per night. In 1943, 4.4 million tons of various cargo were delivered to Leningrad (2.5 times more than along the “Road of Life”). After the complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad, the road lost its significance and was partially dismantled.

Commemorative coin issued in 2000 (denomination 2 rubles),

which depicts a lorry breaking through

through the blockade on the ice of Lake Ladoga.

Leningrad Front created on August 27, 1941 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of August 23, 1941 during the division Northern Front from the formations that fought on the immediate approaches to Leningrad. The front included the 8th, 23rd, 48th combined arms armies, Koporye, Southern and Slutsk-Kolpino operational groups. Subsequently, the front included the 6th, 10th Guards, 4th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 42nd, 51st, 52nd, 54th, 55th , 59th, 67th combined arms armies, 1st, 2nd, 4th shock armies, 3rd, 13th, 15th air armies. The front was faced with the task of covering the immediate approaches to Leningrad and preventing it from being captured by the enemy. On August 30, 1941, it received operational subordination of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. From September 8, 1941, the fighting took place under a blockade of the city. By the end of September of the same year, the active advance of enemy troops was stopped. On December 17, 1941, formations of the left wing of the front were transferred to the formation of the Volkhov Front. Several attempts to release Leningrad were unsuccessful. On November 25, 1942, the 13th Air Army was formed from front air forces. In January 1943, front troops, together with formations of the Volkhov Front, broke the blockade of Leningrad and restored the city's land connection with the country. The blockade was finally lifted during offensive operations beginning of 1944. On April 21, 1944, the 3rd Baltic Front was created from the formations of the left wing of the front. Subsequently, front units participated in the liberation of the Karelian Isthmus and Vyborg, which created the conditions for Finland’s withdrawal from the war. In September - November 1944, front units took part in battles in the Baltic states and liberated the continental part of Estonia and the Moonsund archipelago. On this offensive actions the front is over. On October 16, 1944, the 67th Army from the disbanded 3rd Baltic Front joined the front. On April 1, 1945, formations of the Courland Group of Forces, formed on the basis of the 2nd Baltic Front, were included in the ᴇᴦο composition. These formations continued to block the enemy group on the Kurland Peninsula.

Through death to victory

We present to our readers material from the magazine “Living Water” (No. 1 (January) 2013), dedicated to the people who ensured the delivery of provisions and ammunition to besieged Leningrad.

In Shlisselburg, on the banks of the Neva, there is a modest stele, in front of which is a piece of railway track. The inscription on the stele says that after breaking the blockade under enemy fire, crossings and a railway line were built here, connecting besieged Leningrad with the country. This monument reminds us of one of the little-known pages defense of Leningrad - construction and operation railway, which went down in history under two names: “Road of Death” and “Road of Victory.”

Seventy years ago, on January 18, 1943, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts united, finally breaking through the blockade of Leningrad. And on the same day, the State Defense Committee decided to begin construction of a new railway line from the Shlisselburg station (now Petrokrepost) on the Irinovskaya railway to the Polyana platform, located on the 71st kilometer of the Leningrad-Volkhovstroy highway.

The fact that the decision to build the road was made immediately after the breakthrough, when the offensive had not yet ended, is not accidental. In the winter of 1942–43, due to warm weather, it was not possible to establish an ice route through Ladoga, and Leningrad could only count on supplies made during navigation. Therefore, it was necessary to open a new land route as soon as possible.

Already on the evening of January 18, a group of railway engineers arrived in Shlisselburg. And on the morning of January 19, teams of miners from the 9th and 11th railway brigades moved along the route of the future railway. In total, 1,338 Soviet and 393 German mines, 7 unexploded aerial bombs and 52 artillery shells were discovered in the construction zone.

The construction and subsequent operation of the road was greatly complicated by the location of the breakthrough of the German ring. As a result of Operation Iskra, a narrow corridor was created along the shore of Lake Ladoga, running through swampy terrain and completely shot through by German artillery. The decision to make a breakthrough in this particular, not very convenient place, at first glance looks strange. However, it is worth remembering that the two previous operations to break the blockade - Lyubanskaya and Sinyavinskaya - ended in disaster.

The advancing Soviet troops were surrounded both times during German counterattacks. Therefore, the Soviet command decided not to take any more risks and attack at the shortest distance, covering one of the flanks of the advancing troops with Lake Ladoga. Success had been achieved, but now the railroad workers had to pay for it by building a road through the swamps under enemy artillery fire.

To speed up the work, the route was built using the most simplified technologies. For most of the route, sleepers and rails were laid directly on the snow, without the required earthen embankment and ballast prism, so that immediately after the passage of the first train the track suffered large subsidence and distortions.

From the memoirs of the commander of the 57th railway battalion, Major Yashchenko:

“There was no soil nearby. They began to build a road from the quarry to the embankment. Waist-deep snow, frost, and under the snow the water squelches. Cars can't get through. Trophy bags were used. They were filled with soil in a quarry and carried on their shoulders to the canvas. They also carried the earth on sleds. Even some kind of German rubber stroller was adapted for transporting soil. They made an embankment, and it began to settle into the swamp. I had to first make a slant over the peat, and only then pour in the soil. There wasn’t enough daylight, people worked at night.”

The route was crossed by the Nazi and Chernaya rivers, as well as numerous irrigation canals and ditches, over which it was necessary to throw bridges and footbridges. But the most difficult part of the construction was the crossing of the Neva at Shlisselburg.

First of all, the construction of a temporary low-water pile-ice crossing began. The construction of it was entrusted to the metro builders, to whose aid two thousand exhausted women, exhausted by the blockade, arrived from Leningrad. It was assumed that before the ice drift began, a permanent high-water bridge would be built, and the temporary crossing would simply be dismantled.

On February 2, 1943, at 18:00, the first train moved across the crossing, carrying laying materials from the Shlisselburg station. It was driven by driver Mikhailov.

From the boss's memories engineering troops Leningrad Front B.V. Bychevsky:

“The ice blown up by the demolitions pressed fiercely, forming rubble in short and low spans. All the sounds were mixed up: the roar from enemy shells with the roar from their own explosions of ice, the crackling and threatening hum of the bridge, the angry, salty cursing of people, sharp commands either on the bridge or to demolition men jumping from ice floe to ice floe with explosive charges in their hands.”

On February 5, 1943, at 17:43, a train with food departed from the Volkhovstroy station for Leningrad, pulled by a steam locomotive numbered Eu 708-64. It was operated by a team consisting of senior driver I.P. Pirozhenko, assistant driver V.S. Dyatlev and fireman I.A. Antonov. Despite the shelling, on February 6 at 16:00 he reached the station New Village, and on February 7 at 12:10 the train arrived at the Finland Station. Following this, another train set off from Leningrad to the mainland. It was driven by the steam locomotive Em 721–83, which was controlled by senior driver P. A. Fedorov.

The brigade that won the right to conduct the first train from Leningrad to the “Mainland” (from left to right: A.A. Petrov, P.A. Fedorov, I.D. Volkov). 1943

Nowadays, both of these locomotives have become monuments: Eu 708–64 stands at the Volkhovstroy station, and Em 721–83 at the Petrokrepost station.

After the completion of the low-water crossing, construction of a permanent bridge began 500 meters downstream. According to the order, it was supposed to end on April 15, 1943, but the bridge builders managed to complete their work almost a month earlier. On March 18, the first train passed over the bridge.

The Germans understood the importance of the Neva crossings and concentrated their artillery fire on them. The builders suffered losses. During the shelling on February 21, thirteen people were killed and thirty-five were wounded, on the 27th, eight people were killed and fourteen were wounded, on March 3, three people were killed and four were wounded.

From the diary of the poet P. N. Luknitsky:

“The bridge was crackling, hundreds of spectators and Mikhailov himself, who did not take his left hand off the reverse, were watching: would it give way? Will the crutches pop out? Will the path become skewed under the wheels? If the track becomes distorted, the cars will derail and fall onto the ice of the Neva. Mikhailov heard “hurray!” when the tail of his train slid off the bridge onto the left bank.”

There was also a constant danger of the new bridge being destroyed by artillery fire. Therefore, it was decided not to dismantle the temporary crossing, but to keep it as a backup. This was associated with great risk: the design of the low-water bridge did not allow even small ice floes to pass through. An approaching ice drift could demolish the crossing and bring down debris onto the permanent bridge, damaging it too.

Therefore, the upper reaches of the Neva were cleared of ice even before the ice drift began. Sappers blew up the ice with landmines, and then special teams located on a boardwalk located on the upper side of the overpass pushed the ice into the small spans of the bridge. But this was just a warm-up before the ice drift began. From March 29 to April 3, while the ice was falling, work was carried out day and night, under the light of searchlights. On each shift, up to 1,500 people were deployed to fight the ice, including up to 200 demolitionists.

The efforts, fortunately, were crowned with complete success, and subsequent events confirmed the loyalty decision taken: On March 25, the enemy managed to destroy the permanent bridge across the Neva with artillery fire, but trains were able to continue moving along the low-water crossing.

The route ran only five kilometers from the front line, so the Germans could even fire at it with field artillery and heavy mortars. Therefore, trains could only run on the road at night: only three pairs of trains per night. This was not enough, and the railway workers changed the train schedule to a continuous one.

Now the trains came one after another, first in one direction, then in the other. But for efficient work in this mode, an automatic blocking system was required that would prevent trains from colliding in the dark. Its construction took time, and the besieged city was waiting for cargo, so the mechanisms were replaced by people, creating a “live blocking” system (the automatic blocking system was installed along the entire length of the route only by mid-June).

Destruction of the temporary bridge across the Neva on the Polyany - Shlisselburg line. 1943

On single-track stretches, 2–3 km from each other, telephone posts and manually controlled traffic lights were installed. They were served not by ordinary signalmen, but by experienced movers who had experience in receiving independent decisions. Traffic on this system began on May 7, 1943. At first nine and then sixteen posts were opened. The first shift of “live traffic lights” was especially difficult. They had to be on duty for several days at once. There was still nowhere for people to take shelter and warm themselves - plank shelters for those on duty could only be built later.

From the memoirs of Deputy Head of Traffic Service A.K. Ugryumov:

“While driving the train, the driver had to constantly monitor everything that was happening ahead, so as not to crash into the tail of the train in front. At the same time, he was required to closely monitor the condition of the firebox, boiler, and the operation of all locomotive mechanisms. The heating of the locomotive could not be sharply boosted by using artificial methods of increasing traction, since this would inevitably cause fire to burst out of the chimney and thereby reveal movement in front of enemy observers.”

To reduce the risk of collisions, blackout blinds have been removed from the trains' red tail lights. And two conductors were riding on the brake platform of the last car at once. If the train stopped, one of the conductors walked towards the next train and protected the tail of his train with signals and firecrackers. The other conductor remained in place so that the train could move on without waiting for the departed conductor to return. This reduced the time the train remained in the firing zone.

Spring greatly complicated the operation of the highway. The swampy soil on which the road was laid thawed, and meltwater flooded the road. From the outside it seemed that the locomotives were floating on water. On one section of the road, the wayfarers even had to move on a raft made from barracks doors.

Even greater difficulties were caused by the increase in daylight hours. Shelling and air raids followed one after another. March 1943 was especially difficult. On March 3, a train with ammunition was destroyed during artillery shelling. The driver and one person from the train accompanying the train were injured, and two more railway workers went missing. Fifteen more people died during recovery efforts.

The situation was eased by the construction (from March 19 to April 25) of a bypass route that ran 2–3 kilometers to the north. This path was not only further from the enemy, but was also better covered by bushes and folds of terrain. These benefits, however, came at the cost of operational difficulties: the route passed through swamps, and the rails often subsided.

The drivers also got used to it, developing various techniques and tricks that prevented the enemy from detecting trains and targeting artillery fire.

From the memoirs of driver V.M. Eliseev:

Machinist V. M. Eliseev

“We have learned to disguise ourselves, deceive the enemy, and emerge victorious from the most difficult situations. Departing from the Polyany station towards Shlisselburg, we knew that we would reach the 30th kilometer calmly: the line here stretched among a tall forest.

But at the 30th kilometer the saving forest ended, and a clearing overgrown with small bushes began. We acted like this: following through the forest, we picked up high speed, and when we reached an open place, we closed the regulator. During this time, the coal in the firebox was burned so that there was no smoke.

Without smoke or steam, the locomotive went until the next kilometer, where the slope began, and the train rushed for several kilometers by inertia. Then we had to open the steam. Seeing him, the Nazis immediately opened fire.

Again we had to accelerate the train strongly, close the regulator again and follow the inertia for some distance. The Nazis, having lost their bearings, ceased fire until they found the target again. And the driver tirelessly repeated his maneuver, playing with death.”

This game with death did not always end in victory. Delivery of goods to the besieged city exacted a terrible toll from the railroad workers. In total, during the operation of the Shlisselburg highway, 110 people died, and another 175 were injured. So the name “Road of Death” was not an exaggeration. But, despite this, the track continued its work.

It was along this route that the bulk of cargo arrived in Leningrad. Thanks to it, it became possible not only to provide normal food for the city’s residents, but also to supply the city’s garrison with a sufficient amount of ammunition and equipment. With them, the troops of the Leningrad Front went on the offensive, which led to the complete lifting of the blockade. Therefore, this route received its second name - “Victory Road”, quite deservedly.

Photos from the collections of the Central Museum railway transport Russia (St. Petersburg)

A train with food and ammunition arrived in Leningrad, at the Finland Station. The first after breaking the blockade, delivering eight hundred tons of valuable cargo to the city.

On that memorable day, the steam locomotive Eu-708-64 was decorated with a portrait of Stalin and banners. On the largest of them was written: “The Motherland sends military greetings to heroic Leningrad!” Is it necessary to describe the joy with which the Leningraders greeted this train?

The decision on the urgent construction of the Polyany-Shlisselburg railway line was made immediately after the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad by the State Defense Committee (GKO). Great importance was attached to the restoration of railway communication between the Nevskaya Stronghold and the mainland. To carry out the task by forces of the Directorate of Military Reconstruction Works (UVVR), railway troops and special forces of the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) were given twenty days. Leadership was entrusted to the head of UVVR-2, Ivan Grigorievich Zubkov, who headed the Leningrad Metrostroy before the war.

The 33-kilometer-long road with intermediate stations Lipki and Mezhdurechye and wooden bridges across the Neva and Nazia was built in eighteen days. On February 2, a test train passed along the new road, driven by drivers from the Leningrad-Finlyandsky locomotive depot Mikhail Belousov and Boris Ebert.

By February 5, when the laying of tracks was completed, bridges were built across the Nazi and Chernaya Rechka, which crossed the Shlisselburg Mainline, and small artificial structures on drainage canals and peat mining ditches.

In the book by Valentin Kovalchuk "Victory Road of Besieged Leningrad" it says: “The train that opened direct communication between Leningrad and the country, according to the entry in the route sheet (route), departed from the Volkhov-Stroy station at 17:43. February 5, 1943."

On the same day, People's Commissar of Railways, Lieutenant General Andrei Viktorovich Khrulev, ordered the construction of a new, permanent bridge across the Neva to begin. Therefore in last years February 5 began to be called the opening day of the Victory Road.

The forward brigade of the steam locomotive Eu-708-64, consisting of three Ivans: senior driver Pirozhenko, his assistant Kharin and fireman Antonov, was entrusted with leading the first freight train to Leningrad. The mechanic Ivan Murashov was preparing the locomotive for the secret flight.

If everything had turned out this way, that first flight could without hesitation be called Ivanovo. But subjective circumstances intervened, and at the last moment Ivan Kharin was replaced by Vladimir Dyatlev, an assistant driver from another brigade.

These were not someone's machinations for the purpose of conquest. Then the last thing was thought about her; the fight for honors and awards would come later.

At Voybokalo station, about forty kilometers from Volkhov, the train stood for four hours due to heavy shelling. Then he set off again, but at the nearest Mezhdurechye station he was stopped again. Deputy Head of the Kirov Railway, NKPS Commissioner Voldemar Virolainen, who was personally responsible for the success of the secret flight, boarded the locomotive. He gave instructions to improve blackout by completely covering the entire left side of the locomotive with a tarpaulin. To prevent the fire from being visible when throwing wood into the locomotive firebox, it was necessary to disguise the exit from the booth to the tender.

Fireman Ivan Antonov recalled the further path to: “From the Mezhdurechye station to the Left Bank we followed under artillery fire. The train walked under targeted enemy fire, in some places we were separated from enemy positions by 3-4 kilometers. The fire was crossfire - our artillery was firing on one side, and the enemy’s on the other. Shells flew above us in both directions. Every now and then deafening explosions were heard. Fortunately, not a single shell hit either the locomotive or the train. Subsequently, we called this terrible area the corridor of death. There was a forced stop at the Levoberezhye station - we stood there for more than two hours. And finally we drive across a low-water bridge - a pile-ice overpass. Crossing the bridge, which swayed from side to side, “breathing,” as they said then, was perhaps the most terrible moment of our trip.”

The terrible areas were left behind, and a situation that called into question the success of the entire operation arose when it was least expected. According to the recollections of fireman Antonov, in front of the Rzhevka station, already on the outskirts of Leningrad, an emergency occurred - due to the freezing of water in the injection pipe of the water intake hose, the left injector failed. “The situation was saved thanks to the resourcefulness of driver Pirozhenko. We pulled out small burning logs from the firebox and began to warm up the flanges and nuts of the water inlet hose. This took about ten minutes. And here is the Kushelevka station. Here we were told that the meeting was scheduled for February 7th. The train remained in Kushelevka, and the brigade spent the night at the Finlyandsky Station depot.” This is what a member of the locomotive crew testifies.

Virolainen talked about it differently. In his memoirs, he claimed that before approaching Rzhevka, Pirozhenko asked permission to put out the firebox. “I understood the driver’s concern: melting the safety plugs is a shame!” - wrote the commissioner of the NKPS, taking credit for the fact that he forbade this and ordered to follow his instructions. But he didn’t say a word about Pirozhenko’s resourcefulness, which the fireman had not forgotten about and thanks to which the water flowed.

After being informed that there was no water in the tender, Virolainen fainted. The tension of the last two days and the level of responsibility for the possible failure of the operation took their toll. But the train arrived in the city ahead of time and stood in Kushelevka, awaiting a ceremonial meeting at a strictly defined time.

And it happened. Right on schedule.

True, even today many questions remain unanswered. It is still not known exactly who was standing at the locomotive reverse when at 12:10 on February 7, 1943, the Eu-708-64 arrived at the Finland Station.

The famous Volkhov local historian Yuri Syakov claimed that Virolainen climbed into the locomotive booth on the last stage and stood behind Ivan Pirozhenko: “When the train began to arrive at the platform of the Finlyandsky Station, Virolainen pushed the driver away and took up the reverse himself. Leningraders hailed him as the man who brought the first train into the besieged city.

At the Museum of the October Railway, where I went to clarify this issue, they did not refute or confirm Syakov’s version, based on Pirozhenko’s stories, but showed a photograph stored in the collections. From the cabin of a steam locomotive, Leningraders are greeted by a man whom the railway workers recognize as Ivan Pirozhenko. Veteran of the road Viktor Ivanovich Platonov, who met that train, told me that he did not remember who was behind the reverse, because “no one paid attention to it then.”

Most likely, the name Pirozhenko disappeared at one time for political reasons. At the end of the war, the driver was sent on a business trip to the North, where he was convicted of committing some crime. When, why and for how long he was imprisoned is still unclear. It is only known that in recent years Pirozhenko lived in Volkhov and tried to combat distortions of facts relating to that legendary military flight.

And that historical steam locomotive Eu-708-64 served people faithfully for a long time. Then it was written off due to old age and could have been destroyed. But in 1979, enthusiasts discovered it on the Southern Road in Belgorod. The locomotive was delivered to Leningrad and on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Victory was placed in eternal parking at the Volkhovstroy station. The tender has a plaque with memorable lines: “This steam locomotive Eu-708-64, assigned to the depot of the city of Volkhov, on February 7, 1943, delivered the first train with food and ammunition to besieged Leningrad after breaking the blockade.”

On the day the blockade was broken, January 18, 1943, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the construction of a new railway line from the station on the strip of land liberated from the enemy. Shlisselburg on the Irinovskaya railway line to the Polyany platform, located on the 71st km of the Leningrad-Volkhovstroy highway, between the Zhikharevo and Nazia stations. The construction was headed by the head of the Department of Military Reconstruction Works No. 2, who led the construction of the metro in Leningrad before the war, I. G. Zubkov. The construction of the new line was allowed to be carried out under simplified technical conditions, and the crossing of the Neva to reach the station. Shlisselburg to be carried out on a pile-ice crossing. The construction of the bridge across the Neva and the laying of the first 10 km of the route were entrusted to the 9th separate railway brigade, the construction of the rest of the route was entrusted to the 11th separate railway brigade. Special units of the NKPS participated in the work. The construction of the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway line was extremely complex and difficult.

The terrain along which the route was laid - former Sinyavinsk peat mining - was very inconvenient for the construction of a railway. It was rugged, swampy, and lacked the roads needed to transport the necessary materials. Every meter of ground was filled with mines, unexploded ordnance, all kinds of surprises and traps. The difficulties were aggravated by exceptionally difficult winter conditions - severe frosts and snowstorms. In addition, due to the close proximity of the enemy (5-6 km), the builders had to work under his artillery and even mortar fire, which not only prevented the construction of new things, but also destroyed what had already been built.

Direct work on the construction of the railway line began on January 22, simultaneously from the west and east, and by February 5, as a result of the dedicated work of the builders, the main track from Shlisselburg to Polyany was laid. The route from the 3rd to the 20th km (from Shlisselburg) ran along the former narrow-gauge track of the Sinyavinsk peat mining, through the former Workers' settlements No. 3, 2, 1 and 4; from the 20th to the 27th km - over rough terrain and from the 27th km to the station. Glades - along a previously built path. Initially, the line had two sidings (stations), and by mid-February - four (Levoberezhny - on the 4th km, Lipki - on the 11th km, Mezhdureche - on the 23rd km and Polyany - on the 33rd km).

For most of the route, two main elements of a normal rail track were missing - the subgrade and the ballast prism on which the rails are usually laid. “To save time,” wrote the head of the track service of the October Railway during the war, A.S. Kananin, “we had to lay the track, that is, sleepers and rails, directly on the snow. The well-frozen marshy soil was the basis of the track along which trains with heavy steam locomotives were to be launched.”

Low-water pile-ice bridge across the river. Neva near Shlisselburg. Simultaneously with the laying of the rail track, work began on the construction of a bridge across the Neva at the beginning of the Staraya Ladoga Canal, where the width of the river was 1050 m and the greatest depth was 6.5 m. The work was carried out around the clock and was completed in 12 days. The bridge had a length of 1300 m and was a low-water overpass without navigable openings, designed for operation only in winter time. The pile supports of the river part of the crossing consisted of four piles connected to each other only by ice and the upper structure. Due to the fact that the left bank of the Neva was higher than the right, the overpass in profile had a rise towards the left bank. In plan, the overpass was built in a semicircle, with the curved side facing Ladoga, towards the current, which made it more durable.

On February 2, 1943, the overpass was tested: the first train passed along it, carrying laying materials from the station. Shlisselburg. From February 6, military trains began to pass through it from the Levoberezhny crossing to various stations on the right bank of the Neva. On February 7, Leningraders at the Finland Station met the first train with food arriving from the Mainland, and sent the first train to the Mainland. The train from the Mainland was brought by the senior driver of the Volkhovstroy depot I.P. Pirozhenko, and the train to the Mainland was led by the senior driver of the Leningrad-Sortirovochny-Moscow depot P.A. Fedorov.

Immediately after the opening of traffic and the commissioning of the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway line for temporary operation, construction of a high-water railway bridge across the Neva began. It was built according to the order people's commissar communication lines by A.V. Khrulev dated February 5, 1943 and the resolution of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front dated February 13, 1943.

The bridge designers abandoned the pile or ryazhe supports recommended by standard designs, and borrowed the idea of ​​Academician G.P. Perederia - pile supports with a fence in the form of a solid wall backed with stone. The bridge design provided for the construction of five spans about 20 m wide, through which cargo and small passenger ships could pass. For the passage of large passenger ships and warships with high masts, one drawbridge of the diversion system was provided.

The bridge was built by soldiers of the 9th and 11th separate railway brigades, UVVR-2 special forces and about a thousand people from the local population. Despite the enormous difficulties and losses that the builders suffered from systematic enemy shelling, the bridge was erected in record time. On March 18, 1943, the last span was installed, and on the same day at 18:50 the first run-in train passed across the bridge. Traffic on the bridge was opened at 5:25 a.m. on March 19, although finishing work continued for several more days.

The new railway bridge across the Neva, built 500 m downstream from the pile overpass, had a length of 852 m, 114 supports on piles and was single-track. The height of the bridge was 8.21 m. The bridge had ice protection structures, some of which were built in front of the bridge, and others in the area of ​​the Oreshek fortress. The bridge could also carry vehicles; for this purpose, a deck made of logs was built on it.

After the construction of the high-water bridge was completed, the low-water railway bridge of pile-ice construction, designed for operation only in winter, was supposed to be dismantled. However, by the time the construction of the permanent bridge was completed, the bridge area began to be subject to frequent artillery shelling, which led to interruptions in train service. Therefore, it was decided to retain the pile-ice bridge as a backup. The fact that, thanks to its simple design, if the overpass was destroyed, could be restored in a short time, also played a role in making this decision.

In order to use the overpass as a backup for the new railway bridge, it was necessary to take measures to preserve it during the spring ice drift, and also partially rebuild it, adapting it for work in summer conditions. Preserving the low-water bridge during the period of ice drift was a very difficult task, since its design did not ensure the passage of even relatively small ice floes. The situation required special measures, because the demolition of the overpass by ice would inevitably lead to the demolition of the newly built bridge. Therefore, a special plan was developed for passing ice through the low-water bridge, the implementation of which was supervised by the deputy head of UVVR-2, Major General V. E. Matishev. The ice drift lasted from March 29 to April 8, 1943, and during these days, work on ice passage was carried out around the clock. On each shift, and especially on busy days from March 29 to April 3, up to 1.5 thousand people, including about 200 demolition men, were deployed to combat the ice drift.

The bridges were saved. However, at moments of ice pressure, the overpass received; shifts reaching up to 0.5 m, due to which the path in plan took the form of a zigzag curve.

With the weakening of the ice pressure, the bridge largely returned to its original position, but in some places residual deformations remained that required straightening repairs.

Since the preserved temporary bridge, by its design, did not allow the passage of ships or any alloys, it was subjected to reconstruction. In the period from April 24 to May 18, 1943, a two-tiered lifting package 19.5 m long and weighing 36 tons was placed on the fairway part of the bridge. The shipping span was opened by withdrawing the span with the help of metal pontoons by the force of water flow. The pontoons were moved towards the left bank by steamships. Before the autumn ice drift in 1943, the low-water trestle bridge was strengthened again. However, during the autumn ice drift, it received serious damage, which was repaired during December 1943 and early January 1944. All work on the reconstruction of the bridge was carried out without interrupting train traffic for a long time.

Arrival of the first train from the mainland to Leningrad on February 7, 1943 after breaking the blockade. The creation of the Shlisselburg Mainline was a turning point in strengthening the communications of besieged Leningrad. But the enemy remained in close proximity. The highway was within range of his artillery. The threat of its violation was real. Therefore, on March 19, 1943, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front adopted a resolution on the construction of a bypass route on the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway line with a total length of 18.5 km. This decision was approved on March 22 State Committee Defense.

The report of military communications of the Leningrad Front on the construction of the Shlisselburg-Polyany line on this issue stated: “The railway track from the station was built in January-February. Shlisselburg to st. Polyany on the stretch from 9 to 20 km runs 5-6 km from the front line in open and lower terrain relative to the enemy occupied, due to which this entire section of the route was clearly visible to the enemy and was subjected to systematic artillery fire, especially when trains appeared on the section . Therefore, the Military Council of the front decided to build a bypass route that would ensure normal safe movement of trains on the Levoberezhnaya-Mezhdurechye section.”

The route of the bypass line was laid 2-3 km north of the previously built one and was not only further from the front line, but was also better covered from enemy observation by folds of terrain and bushes. From Art. From the Left Bank to the Staraya Ladoga Canal it passed through wetlands, then, for 7 km, along the bank of the canal, and then again through wetlands to the station. Mesopotamia.

On the bypass line, 21 wooden bridges with a total length of about 165 linear meters were built, and parallel to it, at a distance of 400-800 m from the track, a communication line was built with 316 poles and 120 km of wires.681
Train traffic on the bypass line began on April 25, 1943. On May 22, it was put into temporary operation. Until June 1, 1943, the acceptance committee left the current maintenance and protection of the bypass route to UVVR-2, which before this date was supposed to eliminate deficiencies and carry out post-deposition repairs.

Vysokovodny bridge over the river. Neva near Shlisselburg. Thus, the breakthrough of the fascist blockade of Leningrad in January 1943 was of exceptional importance for the city on the Neva. The defeat of the Nazi troops south of Lake Ladoga made it possible to lay a railway line on a strip of land liberated from the enemy, connecting Leningrad with the country's railway network. And although the Shlisselburg highway, built according to simplified technical conditions, required the elimination of many deficiencies and was under enemy observation and artillery fire, it reliably connected Leningrad, which was still under siege, with the mainland. The high-speed construction of the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway line, the construction of two railway bridges across the wide, deep, fast-flowing Neva, the construction of the Levoberezhnaya-Mezhdurechye bypass is a real feat Soviet people, an outstanding victory in the battle for Leningrad.

An equally difficult task was organizing train traffic on the Shlisselburg Mainline. Firstly, the entire highway was under constant enemy surveillance and was subject to attacks from its artillery and aviation; secondly, the condition of the track, built with large deviations from normal technical requirements, was poor.

At first, the operation of the newly built main line was carried out by the Northern Railway, and the maintenance of the track remained with its builders - UVVR-2. The exchange station between the Oktyabrskaya and Northern railways was Shlisselburg.

The first train schedule from Shlisselburg to Voybokalo and back from February 8, 1943 provided for the round-the-clock movement of four pairs of trains - two pairs at night and two pairs during the day, of which four loaded trains to Leningrad and four empty from Leningrad. However, it was not possible to carry out round-the-clock train traffic due to enemy influence, and trains had to be allowed to pass only at night. At the same time, as a rule, three pairs managed to pass through at night, that is, three trains to Leningrad and the same number from Leningrad. According to the new schedule, in the first half of the night the Northern Railway sent loaded trains to Leningrad, and in the second half empty trains left Leningrad.

The new form of organizing train traffic was subsequently called the caravan, or flow method of movement. The flow schedule, i.e., the passage of trains for some time in only one direction, contained great opportunities for increasing the capacity of the route, as it eliminated delays of trains at intermediate stations while waiting to pass oncoming trains.

But it was not possible to increase the number of trains to Leningrad. In reality, the capacity of the Shlisselburg highway increased only after it was connected to the Oktyabrskaya Railway on April 12, 1943.

By order of the head of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, train traffic control headquarters were created in Shlisselburg and Voybokalo. The Shlisselburg headquarters, headed by the head of the Leningrad-Finland branch of the movement A. T. Yanchuk, commanded the section from Shlisselburg to Leningrad. The Voybokalsky headquarters, led by the head of the Leningrad-Moscow branch of the movement N.I. Ivanov, regulated traffic from Levoberezhnaya to Volkhovstroy.

The procedure for servicing the route by steam locomotives has changed. Now the movement of trains along the entire Leningrad-Volkhovstroy line was provided by the 48th locomotive column of the special reserve of the NKPS, staffed by personnel and locomotives of the October Railway. The head of the column was the experienced railroad commander N.I. Koshelev, the commissar was M.I. Chistyakov.

The new organization of management and maintenance of the Shlisselburg route yielded positive results, but an insufficient number of trains were still arriving in Leningrad. Automatic blocking could improve matters, but its construction required time and great expense. Then, at the suggestion of the Deputy Head of the Oktyabrskaya Road Traffic Service A.K. Ugryumov and the Deputy Head of the Signaling and Communications Service D.A. Bunin, it was decided to temporarily create simple field-type signal posts on the highway, called “live blocking”.682 The essence of “live blocking” blocking" was that telephone posts were installed on single-track sections, 2-3 km from each other. These were ordinary poles with telephones hanging on them. Near each post there was a traffic light - a pointer weathervane with a kerosene lamp inside and red and green glass on a wooden mast. The mast was inserted into a wooden frame with a hole, fixed in the ground, so that a person standing near a traffic light could turn the lantern with a red or green light towards the train. The “live blockade” movement on the Levoberezhnaya-Polyany section began on May 7, 1943. First, 9 and then 16 posts were opened. They were served not by ordinary signalmen, but by experienced movers who, in the event of any hiccups, could make independent decisions.

At the beginning of May 1943, another option for continuous train movement began to be used. One night the trains moved only towards Leningrad, the next - towards Volkhovstroy. Taking advantage of the fact that the trains were going in one direction in a continuous stream, the management of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, at the beginning of April 1943, decided to send trains “following”, that is, to release not one train for the haul, as is usually done, but several trains, following at some interval in time.

The short distances between trains made the work of drivers very difficult. To make it easier and reduce the possibility of accidents, additional traffic safety measures were developed back in April 1943. In agreement with the military command, blackout blinds were removed from the red tail lights of trains traveling on the Leningrad-Volkhovstroy line. On the brake platform of the last car, in addition to the senior conductor who was there, the chief conductor of the second, replacement, train crew began to follow. In the event of a forced train stop, one of the conductors walked towards the next train and protected the tail of his train with signals and firecrackers. The other conductor remained in place and, if the reason for the stop disappeared, could continue with the train without waiting for the return of the departed conductor. To monitor the activities of lower-level workers and organize the unimpeded passage of trains, responsible employees of the Oktyabrskaya Railway were assigned to the stations of Mezhdurechye, Lipki, Polyany, Zhikharevo from April 18.

The “follow” movement and “live blocking” immediately yielded positive results. In one night, 16, 20, and sometimes 25 trains managed to pass in one direction along the Shlisselburg Mainline.

On May 25, 1943, from Levoberezhnaya to Polyany, instead of “live blocking,” a lightweight two-digit automatic blocking was introduced, developed by a group of engineers and technicians of the signaling and communications service, led by the deputy head of this service, D. A. Bunin. Instead of normal traffic lights, so-called dwarf traffic lights were used, which were installed on wooden masts. The traffic lights received power from batteries located in special wells near each mast. On the Levoberezhnaya-Mezhdurechye section, an automatic blockade was placed on a new bypass, more distant from the front line. By mid-June, the entire line from Leningrad to Volkhovstroy was equipped with automatic blocking, which made it possible to increase the intensity of train traffic.

The movement of trains “following” one night to Leningrad, the next - to Volkhovstroy began to have a detrimental effect on the condition of the track. Over the course of one night, he was driven up to half a meter in the direction of train traffic, and sometimes more. In this regard, the order of train movement has been changed. In the first half of the night, trains began to go to Volkhovstroy, in the second half - to Leningrad.

In June, the train order was changed again. From June 25, on the Volkhovstroy-Shlisselburg section, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front established round-the-clock two-way burst traffic in the amount of 11 pairs of trains per day. First of all, and at night, trains en route to Leningrad with cargo were allowed through. Secondly, and during the daytime, trains moved from Leningrad.

Since the automatic blocking on the Levoberezhnaya-Mezhdurechye section was installed on a new bypass, the old route on this section was rarely used. At the end of July 1943, it was decided to use both tracks, since they were essentially a double-track section. To ensure the safety of train traffic on the old route, the head of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, B.K. Salambekov, ordered the restoration of a “live block” on the Levoberezhnaya-Mezhdurechye section by August 1.

Thus, almost the entire Shlisselburg Mainline, with the exception of the 11.5 km long Mezhdurechye-Polyany section, became double-track. This increased traffic safety, since there were no crossings of trains, and made it possible to increase the supply of goods to Leningrad.

The capacity of the Shlisselburg Mainline largely depended on the condition of the track, which was built with large deviations from the usual technical requirements. Therefore, it was not unexpected that from the very beginning of the operation of the line, train traffic had to be frequently closed due to track faults. However, in general, in February 1943, interruptions in train traffic for technical reasons amounted to only 31 hours, which was explained by the still weak intensity of traffic along the route, as well as by the fact that frosts preserved the solid foundation of the track.

With the onset of spring, the condition of the railway began to deteriorate even more every day. With rising temperatures and the melting of the swampy soil, erosion and subsidence of the track began. In some sections, entire rail links were submerged in water and swampy mud, and the trains passing over them sometimes looked like steamships. Subsidence of the rails when trains passed along them due to discrepancies in the level of cars often led to self-uncoupling of cars equipped with automatic coupling. Since this threatened to derail the locomotive and carriages, train traffic had to be interrupted. In March 1943, due to erosion of the track, train traffic was closed 4 times and for this reason, interruptions in traffic amounted to 55 hours. In April, due to erosion of the track, traffic on the Shlisselburg-Polyany line was interrupted 18 times, and a total interruption in train traffic according to the technical condition of the route, it took 150 hours.

Due to this condition of the Shlisselburg highway, large finishing and repair work was carried out on it, on which about 3 thousand people were employed daily in February-March 1943. It was necessary to raise and strengthen the tracks by adding ballast. It was very difficult to do this during the day, since the Nazis were shelling the highway. Therefore, trains with ballast were allowed through only at night. They were released onto the track at the tail of a pack of trains with cargo, and ballast was unloaded before dawn in places that required immediate strengthening of the track.

To monitor and maintain the newly built railway line in working condition with its connection to the Oktyabrskaya Railway, by order of the People's Commissariat of Railways dated April 1, 1943, track service distances were organized - 22nd at the station. Mesopotamia (chief N.A. Varfolomeev) and 11th at the station. Voybokalo (chief N.P. Shaban).

“The practice of routine track maintenance on the highway has yielded a lot of unusual and original things,” wrote A. S. Kananin, head of the Oktyabrskaya Road track service. “For many weeks, and in some areas throughout the entire period of operation of the route, the rails were flooded with water. This meant that the generally accepted method of observing rails, joints and sleepers was impossible here. The trackman could not inspect the rail and the joint, and could not detect the crack by ordinary tapping. The linemen walked along the canvas along the water. In the water, they changed bolts, placed chocks under the rails, checked gaps, etc. The work of these people was incredibly difficult and required enormous physical exertion.”

Despite great difficulties and dangers, the railway workers managed to do a great job of increasing the capacity of the Shlisselburg highway.

The introduction of martial law on the railways on April 15, 1943 played a major role in improving the work of the Shlisselburg Mainline, as well as the entire railway transport of the country. All railway workers and employees were declared mobilized during the war and assigned to work in transport. The Charter on the discipline of workers and employees of railway transport was approved. This increased the level of labor discipline and organization among Leningrad railway workers and contributed to more efficient operation of the Shlisselburg Mainline.

As a result, the number of trains passing along the railway line increased all the time. If in February and March 1943 only 69 and 60 trains passed to Leningrad, and 67 and 72 trains in the opposite direction, then in the following months the traffic intensity continuously increased. In April, 157 trains were sent to Leningrad, in May - 259, in June - 274. In these months, 134, 290 and 261 trains departed from Leningrad, respectively.

When special measures were taken to improve train safety and round-the-clock traffic was introduced, the capacity of the Shlisselburg route increased even more. 369 trains traveled to Leningrad in July, 351 in August, 333 in September, 436 in October, 390 in November, and 407 trains in December. In these months, 338, 332, 360, 434, 376 and 412 trains respectively passed from Leningrad.688 In total, from the beginning of operation of the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway line until December 1943 inclusive, 3,105 trains were sent to Leningrad and 3,076 trains from Leningrad. This made it possible to deliver a significant amount of various cargo to the city. A wide range of cargo was delivered to Leningrad, but mostly it was ammunition, fuel, and food. The trains from Leningrad not only came empty, they also carried factory equipment and various materials.

In addition, the disabled population was transported from Leningrad. And if for most of 1943 evacuation was carried out through Lake Ladoga, then at the end of the year it was completely switched to the railway. On October 23, 1943, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front adopted a special resolution on this issue, which stated: transportation from Leningrad of evacuated disabled people of the Patriotic War, the elderly, sick and business travelers from November 10, 1943 should be carried out by rail. The same decree closed the evacuation points at the Borisova Griva and Kobon stations from November 10.

Passenger traffic was also established along the Shlisselburg Mainline. Initially, two passenger cars ran daily between Leningrad and Moscow - one soft and one hard. They were part of one of the freight trains moving in the night traffic. At the station Volkhovstroy passenger cars were included in a passenger train that went to Moscow through Tikhvin, Budogoshch, Nebolchi, Okulovka. The movement of carriages from Moscow to Leningrad took place along the same route.

When passenger cars traveled along the Shlisselburg-Polyany line, the lights were turned off. The passengers sat dressed, ready to jump out of the carriage through the wide open doors in case of an accident.

But due to the onset of white nights and the increased danger from enemy artillery shelling, the movement of passenger cars was stopped from June 18. It resumed only in the fall of 1943, when the period of darkness became significantly longer. From November 10, direct fast passenger train No. 21/22 began running daily between Leningrad and Moscow along the same route that passenger cars had previously followed.

Thus, the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway became a regularly operating line and firmly connected Leningrad with the country.

The Shlisselburg Mainline, which ran along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga along a narrow corridor only 8-11 km wide, could only work with any success if its reliable defense was organized. Understanding well that the Nazis would do everything to prevent direct railway communication between Leningrad and the country, the Soviet command took a wide variety of measures to protect the route. The defense of the railway line, which lasted almost a whole year, became a large and unique operation in which the Soviet armed forces defeated the fascist army.

For almost twelve months the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts fought, either fading or flaring up. fighting in the direction of Art. MGI with the aim of expanding the conquered corridor and thereby creating more favorable conditions for the operation of the railway line laid along it. However, our troops failed to significantly expand the corridor. Enemy positions were still located in close proximity to the Shlisselburg highway, which seriously complicated the operation of the railway line.

But the fighting in the Mga direction led to the consolidation and even some improvement of the positions of the Soviet troops defending the recaptured zone. The capture of the First and Second towns and the 8th hydroelectric power station in February 1943 led to the elimination of the enemy’s bulge, which extended into our positions in the direction of Shlisselburg, and the capture in September 1943 of the Sinyavinsky heights, on which the enemy’s observation posts were located, deprived him of the opportunity to observe monitor the movement of trains and adjust the fire of their artillery along the Shlisselburg Mainline.

In addition, the fighting carried out by the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts shackled and bled significant enemy forces and did not allow the Nazi command to use them in other directions of the Soviet-German front. At the same time, these actions made it possible to hold the corridor along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, recaptured in January 1943, and to thwart the plans of the German command to restore the blockade of Leningrad. After the defeat of the Nazis at the Kursk Bulge and the advance of Soviet troops in the Mga direction in July-August 1943, the Nazis were forced to finally abandon their plans to attack Leningrad.

Along with actions to consolidate the positions of the Soviet troops defending the recaptured corridor, and to expand it, the Soviet command took measures to protect the Shlisselburg Mainline from the effects of enemy artillery and aircraft.

For counter-battery combat against enemy artillery shelling the railway, already in February 1943, a long-range artillery group of the 67th Army was created under the command of Lieutenant Colonel N. M. Lobanov, as well as a special artillery group of long-range artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.690 Defense of the Shlisselburg routes from enemy aircraft was assigned to the Ladoga divisional air defense region. On July 15, 1943, the objects of the Shlisselburg-Polyany-Volkhovstroy railway line were covered by 41 batteries of medium-caliber artillery (144 barrels), 19 batteries of small-caliber artillery (50 barrels) and 29 platoons of anti-aircraft machine gun installations (101 barrels).

At the same time, to protect the Shlisselburg Mainline, nomadic anti-aircraft artillery groups were created, consisting of two 37-mm guns and several machine guns. In addition, 27 separate anti-aircraft machine gun platoons were formed to accompany the trains along the way. As a rule, each echelon was covered by one platoon of machine guns mounted on two platforms, one of which was placed at the head and the other at the rear of the train.

Particular attention was paid to protecting the most vulnerable point of the Shlisselburg highway - the railway bridges across the Neva. In addition to counter-battery and air defense, smoke was installed on the bridges, which made it difficult for the enemy to orientate himself during air raids and aerial adjustments of artillery fire. Measures were also taken to protect bridges from floating mines that the enemy could drop from aircraft. To do this, by order of the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, a boom was placed at the source of the Neva in August 1943, to which nets were initially suspended. But since there was a strong current here, reaching up to 9 km per hour, the nets were then removed. And with the onset of freezing, all the booms were removed. Ground security and escort of some cargo on trains were also organized.

Particular attention was paid to eliminating the consequences of artillery shelling and enemy air raids. To do this, on most railway stations special unitary teams were created that had sanitary, anti-chemical, restoration and fire departments. At the 22nd and 11th distances of the route, recovery teams of 10 people each were created. At first, there were 5 and 9 such brigades, respectively; later, at the 22nd distance, the number of recovery, or, as they were also called, emergency, brigades was increased to 32, and as a result, one brigade began to serve only 1 km of track.

At the end of 1943, the organization and implementation of restoration work both in general on the Oktyabrskaya Railway and on the Shlisselburg highway changed significantly. Since October 1, the elimination of the consequences of enemy raids was carried out by newly organized sections of the road defense with the involvement of local restoration units and powerful vehicles - trains and flights.

The Shlisselburg highway began to be exposed to enemy artillery and aviation even during the period of its construction. This greatly complicated the operation of the railway and quite often, despite the measures taken to protect it, caused interruptions in the movement of trains. In February, the enemy fired up to 500 shells at targets along the route, most of which did not explode. Only on February 24, as a result of artillery shelling of train No. 935 on the Mezhdurechye-Lipki section, two cars burned down and the section was closed to train traffic for 13 hours 10 minutes. In total, in February 1943, the interruption in train traffic caused by enemy air and artillery raids on the Shlisselburg-Zhikharevo section amounted to 16 hours 30 minutes.

In March 1943, the enemy significantly increased the impact of its aviation and artillery, which led to the destruction of the track, damage to cars, casualties and, ultimately, interruption of train traffic. In total, these breaks in March 1943 amounted to 217 hours 10 minutes.

The enemy was able to inflict the greatest damage on March 3 and 16. On March 3, as a result of artillery shelling of train No. 931 on the Lipki-Mezhdurechye section at 11:30 a.m., the enemy destroyed 41 wagons with ammunition, 2 people's heated vehicles, 4 wagons with food and 4 wagons with coal. The locomotive's tender was damaged. The driver and one person from the train accompanying the train were injured, 2 people were missing. Restoration work was carried out by laying a bypass track 750 linear meters long. They were carried out under enemy artillery fire, as a result of which 15 people were killed. The break in train traffic on the section was 60 hours 20 minutes.

On March 16 at 10:20 a.m., as a result of artillery shelling on the same stretch, the enemy destroyed 41 wagons with ammunition and 3 wagons with oats, several wagons were severely damaged. The railway track was destroyed along 350 m. During reconstruction work, 18 people were killed and wounded as a result of artillery shelling. The break in movement was 69 hours 25 minutes.

To avoid a repetition of train explosions, the head of military communications of the Leningrad Front developed special instructions on the procedure for passing trains along the threatened Shlisselburg-Polyany section. The instructions provided for the movement of trains only at night and other measures. Undoubtedly, strict implementation of the instructions greatly contributed to the safety of train traffic along the Shlisselburg highway, but, naturally, it could not completely eliminate our losses and interruptions in train traffic as a result of enemy influence.

March 1943 was the time when the enemy managed to inflict maximum damage on our transportation during the entire period of operation of the Shlisselburg-Polyany railway line. This was explained mainly by the fact that the protection and organization of movement along this line had not yet been properly worked out. In the following months, despite the fact that the enemy, trying to interrupt railway transportation to Leningrad at any cost, continued to shell and bomb the Shlisselburg highway with the same intensity, the results of these actions began to decline sharply. Thanks to the measures taken to protect transportation, interruptions in train traffic caused by air raids and enemy artillery shelling amounted to 47 hours 15 minutes in April, and 43 hours in May. breaks in train traffic were respectively 42 hours 30 minutes and 59 hours 40 minutes, in August - already 4 hours 05 minutes, in September - 37 hours, in November - 3 hours 15 minutes and in December - 2 hours 45 minutes.

In an effort to disrupt railway transportation to Leningrad, enemy aircraft from the very beginning of the Shlisselburg Mainline began to strike all railway facilities from Leningrad to Tikhvin. The enemy especially sought to disable the railway bridges across the Neva and Volkhov. On March 25, as a result of artillery shelling, the high-water bridge across the Neva, which went into operation on March 19, was disabled. Restoration work took 15 days. However, despite the fact that the permanent bridge was out of service for such a long period, this did not lead to a disruption in train services. They now began to move along the preserved low-water pile-ice bridge. True, the capacity was sharply reduced, since the movement of trains across the temporary bridge took place at speeds of up to 5 km per hour and the weight norm of the trains was 600 tons. This forced all trains at the Shlisselburg and Levoberezhnaya stations to be divided into two parts and transported across the Neva to two steps.

Despite the fact that the enemy fired and bombed bridges across the Neva almost daily, they were destroyed relatively rarely. Over the entire period of operation, the permanent bridge was damaged 12 times, and the temporary pile-ice bridge was damaged only 3 times. The total break in traffic on the first bridge was 31 days, and on the second - 73 hours.

Preserving the low-water bridge, which, due to its small spans and simplicity of design, had greater survivability, undoubtedly yielded positive results. The presence of backup bridges across the Neva made it possible to switch train traffic from a damaged bridge to an undamaged one and thus prevent interruptions in traffic on the Shlisselburg highway.

The Nazis also persistently bombarded the station. Volkhovstroy, in the area of ​​which there were two railway bridges across the Volkhov: one - permanent, metal, built in 1901-1902, and the second - temporary, wooden, built in 1941-1942. for the purpose of uninterrupted movement of trains in the event of destruction of the metal bridge. The failure of these bridges, as well as the bridges across the Neva in the Shlisselburg area, completely interrupted the railway supply of everything necessary to Leningrad. The most fierce bombing of Art. The fascist German command undertook Volkhovstroy in June 1943. A total of more than 600 aircraft took part in 9 massive raids, dropping up to 3 thousand bombs.

The bridges across the Volkhov were repeatedly seriously damaged as a result of these raids. But, despite the desperate attempts of the Nazi command to destroy the bridges and thereby interrupt railway transportation to Leningrad, he failed to do this. The total break in train traffic across the Volkhov in the period from June 1 to July 2, 1943, when both bridges were inactive at the same time, amounted to 162 hours 45 minutes, or about 7 days.

A big role in disrupting enemy plans was played by the fact that in the area of ​​Art. Volkhovstroy, like Shlisselburg, had two bridges across the river. Volkhov. The presence of a backup bridge at Volkhovstroy made it possible to switch train traffic from a damaged bridge to an undamaged one.

The main reason for thwarting the enemy's plans was a well-organized air defense system. Air defense soldiers, acting coordinatedly and selflessly, inflicted significant losses on the enemy. For example, when repelling a raid on June 1, pilots of the 630th Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down 14 enemy aircraft. The personnel of the 69th separate anti-aircraft artillery division acted heroically, defending the bridges across the Volkhov. These were experienced anti-aircraft gunners who selflessly defended the ice road across Lake Ladoga for two winters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and Lieutenant A. Ya. Abramov, commander of the fire platoon of the 3rd battery, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The batteries of the 69th OZAD, commanded by K.I. Lazarenko, V.P. Ivankov and P.I. Lomatchenko, who occupied positions directly in the bombing zone, created a continuous dome of luminous routes over the bridges. In total, units of the Ladoga divisional air defense region, defending the railway communications of Leningrad, destroyed 102 fascist aircraft in a year.

Thus, thanks to a whole set of measures taken by the Soviet command to protect the railway communication between Leningrad and the country - the fight against the enemy to preserve the corridor recaptured along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, the well-established organization of the fight against enemy aviation and artillery, the creation of a system of restoration work - and Also, thanks to the courage and heroism of the railway workers, the enemy’s plans to disrupt railway transportation in Leningrad were thwarted. The Shlisselburg highway, which became the Victory Road of the city blockaded by the enemy, reliably connected it with the country.

Despite the fact that during the entire period of operation of the Shlisselburg route, movement along it presented enormous difficulties and was extremely dangerous, train commanders in reports on the results of trips first of all reported: “The train was delivered to its destination, the machine is in good working order” or “the brigade eliminated all damage "

Every day the railroad workers worked enriched them with combat experience. “We learned to disguise ourselves, deceive the enemy, and emerge victorious from the most difficult situations,” recalled driver V. M. Eliseev. - Departing from the Polyany station towards Shlisselburg, we knew that we would get to the 30th kilometer calmly: the line here stretched among a tall forest. But at the 30th kilometer the saving forest ended and a clearing overgrown with small bushes began. We acted like this: following through the forest, we picked up high speed, and when we reached an open place, we closed the regulator. During this time, the coal in the firebox was burned so that there was no smoke. Without smoke or steam, the locomotive went until the next kilometer, where the slope began, and the train rushed for several kilometers by inertia. Then we had to open the steam. Seeing him, the Nazis immediately opened fire. Again we had to accelerate the train strongly, close the regulator again and follow the inertia for some distance. The Nazis, having lost their bearings, ceased fire until they found the target again. And the driver tirelessly repeated his maneuver, playing with death.”

Showing massive heroism and courage, resourcefulness and ingenuity, the railway workers, however, suffered heavy losses. In total, during the operation of the Shlisselburg highway, 110 people were killed and 175 were injured. But nothing could stop the railway workers. They fearlessly stood at their post, ensuring the smooth movement of trains.

Many railway workers who built and operated the Shlisselburg Mainline were awarded orders and medals, and some of them were awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. This high rank for special services in providing transportation for the front and National economy and outstanding achievements in the restoration of railway transport in difficult wartime conditions on November 5, 1943 were awarded to the head of the Oktyabrskaya Railway B.K. Salambekov, the head of UVVR-2 I.G. Zubkov, the head of the head restoration train No. 3 N.A. Narinyan , head of the Volkhovstroevskaya route of the Northern Railway A. I. Rykov, head of train No. 1 for communications repair A. B. Shatalov, driver V. M. Eliseev, chief conductor M. G. Kardash.

Along with the Shlisselburg railway line, the Ladoga communication continued to operate in 1943. From December 24, 1942 to March 30, 1943, the ice military road was in operation. From the eastern to the western shore of Lake Ladoga, 206 thousand tons of cargo were delivered by vehicles, including about 112 thousand tons of food and fodder, more than 55 thousand tons of ammunition, over 18 thousand tons of coal, more than 5 thousand tons fuels and lubricants and over 133 thousand people.

In April 1943, water transportation began, which, as in the navigation of 1942, took place along two routes - the large one (Novaya Ladoga-Osinovets) and the small one (Kobona-Osinovets). In total, in 1943, 156 thousand tons of various cargo, 713 thousand cubic meters of firewood and timber, and 93 thousand people were transported by water to Leningrad.709 More than 26 thousand tons of various materials and industrial equipment and about 69 thousand people, mostly business travelers.

In total, in 1943, the railway workers of the October Railway delivered 4,441,608 tons of various cargo to Leningrad, including 630 thousand tons of food, 426 thousand tons of coal, 1,381,591 tons of firewood, 725,700 tons of peat.711
In most works, these figures are given as the result of transportation along the Shlisselburg highway. But this is not entirely accurate. No information relating only to transportation along the Shlisselburg-Polyany line was found. The work of the Oktyabrskaya Railway consisted of transportation not only along the Shlisselburg highway, but also along the Irinovskaya railway line from west bank Lake Ladoga, where goods were delivered along ice and waterways, and inside the blockade ring (where peat and firewood harvested near Leningrad were mainly transported). If from the summary data on transportation in 1943 we subtract information on the receipt of goods through Ladoga and data on the transportation of peat and firewood inside the blockade ring, we will see that the bulk of the goods delivered to Leningrad in 1943 was transported along the Shlisselburg Mainline .

The flow of various goods that the country sent to Leningrad ultimately contributed to a significant improvement in the situation in the city.

Excerpt from the book “Unconquered Leningrad”
Dzeniskevich A.R., Kovalchuk V.M., Sobolev G.L., Tsamutali A.N., Shishkin V.A.
Edition: Unconquered Leningrad. 3rd ed. L.: “Science”, 1985.
Photos from the collections of the Central Museum of Railway Transport of Russia (St. Petersburg)

Gave birth to many legends and famous stories. Many of them have outlived the car brands themselves. One of these stories is the story of what the original name of the car was “Pobeda”.

Origin of the project

“Pobeda” appeared on Soviet roads in the second half of the 40s. This project was implemented on The idea of ​​a new passenger car was born after it became clear to the designers that the previous GAZ models were hopelessly outdated. Between them and the newest automobile industry there was a significant gap of ten years. With the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet economy finally began to recover. At the same time, resources and money were found to create and mass produce a new model.

The original name of the car “Pobeda” was discussed already at the last stage of design. But the project itself for a new car from the Gorky Automobile Plant appeared back in 1943. Then the government instructed GAZ specialists to develop a new middle-class model. Domestic craftsmen began to select structural elements and approximate layout.

Stalin's role in the emergence of "Victory"

Many people are interested in what the original name of the car “Pobeda” was that Stalin did not like. It is not surprising that the head of the Soviet state at that time controlled all important industrial and automotive innovations in the country. Stalin became the initiator. It was he who reconfigured the Soviet economy to accelerated industrialization. Among other things, the Secretary General personally oversaw the creation of the Gorky Automobile Plant in the 30s. And in the future, Stalin paid close attention to what was happening at this enterprise, important for the entire state.

In 1944, a presentation of a sample of the future car took place in the Kremlin. The importance of the event was colossal. If successful at the top and permission from them for production, the car was supposed to go into mass production.

Choosing a name

So what was the original name of the car “Pobeda” that Stalin did not like? The first person was told in detail about all the features of the presented car. Finally the turn came to the name. The head of the USSR was offered the “Motherland” option. This is the original name planned for the Pobeda car. Stalin did not like this “sign”. There is a legend that he wittily answered this proposal with a question: “And how much is our Motherland now?”

After this, the name was naturally discarded. Nevertheless, it was very important for government officials who oversaw the project of the future car to choose a patriotic option. Therefore, the next proposal was the name “Victory”. This option suited Stalin. “Motherland” (the original name planned for the Pobeda car) is the only misfire in the project.

Technical features

At the first stage of designing the car, its main stylistic and technical features were determined. The designers decided to give the car a low interior floor, a power unit located above the front axle, and an independent front spring suspension. The original name of the car “Victory” (“Motherland”) was planned to be given to the owner of a wingless vehicle with a streamlined shape. From point of view appearance and visual solutions at that time these were the most modern ideas. According to the designers' idea, Pobeda was not just a car. It became a symbol of prestige for the entire Soviet automobile industry.

The immediate project manager was chief designer Gorky plant Andrey Lipgart. It was he who finally approved all technical decisions related to the characteristics of the car. Lipgart also chose the emblem for the new model. It became the letter “M”, which was a reference to the then name of the plant. In the early 30s, it was renamed "Molotovets" in honor of the People's Commissar and Stalin's close associate. The stylized letter on the emblem resembled teeth and a seagull - a symbol of the great Volga River.

The impact of war on the car

Of course, the original name of the car “Victory” was patriotic. The second option was an even more straightforward allusion to success in the Great Patriotic War. During the fighting with Nazi Germany, domestic specialists gained invaluable experience working with foreign models of automotive equipment. These were vehicles captured from the Wehrmacht and directly in Germany. A huge number of vehicles ended up as captured equipment after the war.

Also, a significant number of models came to the country from America. The US authorities delivered many passenger cars to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program. The experience of using this technology helped Soviet specialists decide on technical and design solutions for the new vehicle. Therefore, it is not surprising that the original name of the car “Pobeda” was discarded. The new brainchild of GAZ was supposed to become another monument to the fight against the troops of the Third Reich.

Start of mass production

The first Pobeda cars were produced in the summer of 1946. These models, however, were only rough drafts. Specialists tested the new product and checked it for technical faults. The analysis continued for several months. During this time, 23 cars rolled off the assembly line. All of them later became unique collectible rarities.

The original name of the car "Pobeda" in the USSR was condemned by Stalin. Of course, the Secretary General became the first person to see the production model. It was produced in 1947. Stalin liked the car. After its approval, real mass, serial production began. In February 1948, the thousandth Pobeda rolled off the assembly line.

Need for modification

"Victory" was produced in 1946-1958. During this period, it went through several modifications. This happened because by the beginning of the 50s, the design flaws of the previously modern model became obvious. They were associated with low functionality of the body. The ceiling above the rear seat turned out to be uncomfortable for passengers. The trunk could not boast of large volume.

What was the original name of the Pobeda car that the designers considered? They wanted to give the car the name "Motherland", but Stalin changed this choice. In order for the car to become truly victorious according to its name, it needed to be updated.

"Victory-US"

Among the modification projects of the first generation of the famous car, “Pobeda-NAMI” especially stands out. This name was not a design one. It is a reference to the state research center in the field of automotive industry. Its specialists proposed starting production of another modification of the iconic car.

The main innovations were that the fastback sedan body was to be replaced by a regular sedan. It was proposed to remove the front sofa in the cabin and replace it with separate seats with improved finishing. The redevelopment would increase the usable space available for the driver and passengers. In general, the development of NAMI specialists was reduced to increasing comfort. These ideas were never implemented due to the high cost of the project.