"White Plan" - the first experience of blitzkrieg. Germany's blitzkrieg plan

In the early 40s of the twentieth century, the main leadership of Germany tried to develop its own unique plan to capture the Soviet Union. What made the idea unique was its time frame. It was assumed that the capture would last no more than five months. The development of this document was approached very responsibly; not only Hitler himself worked on it, but also his inner circle. Everyone understood that if they did not quickly occupy the territory of a huge state and stabilize the situation in their favor, many adverse consequences could occur. Hitler clearly understood that he had already begun the Second World War and quite successfully, however, in order to achieve all the intended goals, it was necessary to attract maximum resources, including mental ones. In the event of a failure in the plan, the Union can be provided with various assistance by other countries that are not interested in the victory of Nazi Germany. Fuhrer understood that the defeat of the USSR would enable Germany's ally to completely free its hands in Asia and prevent the insidious United States of America from intervening.
The European continent was firmly concentrated in the hands of Adolf, but he wanted more. Moreover, he understood perfectly well that the USSR was not a powerful enough country (yet) and I. Stalin would not be able to openly oppose Germany, but he had interests in Europe and, in order to eliminate any attempts, it was necessary to eliminate an undesirable rival in the future.

Adolf Hitler planned to end the war against the Soviet Union even before he could end the war he started against Great Britain. This was going to be the fastest company of all time to conquer a huge territory in such a short time. German ground forces were planned to be sent to conduct combat operations. The Air Force will be required to fully provide any necessary support to cover and protect its warfighters. Any actions that are planned to be carried out on the territory of the Soviet Union must be fully coordinated with the command and must not interfere with established interests in capturing Great Britain.
It was said that all large-scale actions aimed at carefully preparing a lightning takeover against the USSR should be carefully disguised so that the enemy could not find out about them and not take any countermeasures.

Hitler's main mistakes

Many historians, who have been studying for several decades the situation with the development and implementation of the plan for the instant capture of the Union, come to one single thought - regarding the adventurousness and meaninglessness of this idea. The fascist generals also assessed the plan. They considered it his main, one might say fatal, mistake - the Fuhrer’s keen desire to occupy the territory of the country of the Soviets until the final end of the war with England.
Hitler wanted to take action in the fall of 1940, but his military leaders were able to dissuade him from this crazy idea, citing a lot of convincing arguments. The events described suggest that Hitler had an obsessive manic idea of ​​​​establishing complete world domination and the crushing and intoxicating victory in Europe did not give him the opportunity to thoughtfully make some of the most important strategic decisions.
The second, most important, according to historians, mistake in the plan was that it was constantly retreated from. Hitler changed his instructions several times, causing valuable time to be lost. Although he surrounded himself with excellent commanders, whose advice would help him achieve what he wanted and conquer the territory of the country of the Soviets. However, they were opposed by the personal ambitions of the dictator, which were higher for the Fuhrer than common sense.
In addition, an important mistake of the Fuhrer is the involvement of only part of the combat-ready divisions. If all possible forces had been used, the consequences of the war could have been completely different, and history would have been written completely differently now. At the time of the offensive, some of the combat-ready divisions were in Great Britain, as well as North Africa.

Hitler's main idea regarding the lightning speed of the plan

He believed that the important point was the ability to defeat ground forces through active tank attacks. Adolf saw the purpose of the operation solely as dividing existing Russia into two parts along the Volga and Arkhangelsk. This would allow him to leave the main industrial region of the country in operation, but have full control over it, and also create an unprecedented shield dividing the country into European and Asian parts.
In addition, the first priority was to deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases, which would allow the Germans to exclude Russian participation in the battles.
Directions were given for complete secrecy regarding future acts of conquest. Only a certain circle of people were privy to this. They were charged with coordinating actions to prepare for the invasion without unnecessary dissemination of information. It got to the point that the whole country was closely involved in preparations, and only a few knew what exactly was going to happen and what specific tasks were assigned to the fascist army.

Bottom line

The plan failed. In fact, this happened with Hitler's consent when he began to retreat from his intended goals. For the entire Russian people, this is a huge plus; we don’t know how we would live now if the legendary plan for the instant conquest of Russia, created in the fortieth year of the twentieth century, became successful and achieved all its goals. One can only be glad that the commanders-in-chief of the German troops made several cardinal mistakes that did not allow him to achieve world domination and establish his ideology throughout the globe.

A catastrophic start. On June 22, 1941, without a declaration of war, the troops of Nazi Germany invaded Soviet territory. The most difficult and bloody war in the history of our Fatherland has begun. At 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft began to bomb Soviet cities - Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir, Murmansk, Riga, Kaunas, Liepaja, military bases (Kronstadt, Sevastopol, Izmail), railway tracks and bridges. On the first day of the war, 66 airfields and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed, of which 800 were on the ground. By the end of June 22, enemy groups had advanced to a depth of 50–60 km.

Stalin's mistakes and miscalculations regarding the timing and location of the German invasion allowed the aggressor to gain significant advantages. In accordance with the plan for the defense of the state border of the USSR, developed and approved by the government in February 1941, mobilization activities began during May-June. About 2,500 reinforced concrete structures were built in the border areas, and the network of military airfields expanded. In the second half of May - early June, the movement of troops from internal military districts began with the goal of bringing them closer to the western border. However, by the time the Germans attacked, the strategic deployment of troops had not been completed. To G.K. Zhukov’s repeated proposals to bring the border troops to a state of combat readiness, Stalin stubbornly refused. Only on the evening of June 21, having received a message from a defector that at dawn German troops would launch an attack on the USSR, the High Command sent Directive No. 1 to the border districts on bringing troops to a state of combat readiness. As evidenced by the analysis of this directive, it was drawn up unprofessionally, did not give specific instructions to the troops and allowed for ambiguous interpretation of individual points, which was unacceptable in combat conditions. In addition, the directive was delivered to the troops very late: some border districts, which took the first blows from the enemy, never received it.

On the eve of the attack, Hitler's Germany and its allies concentrated 190 divisions (5.5 million people), almost 4 thousand tanks, 5 thousand combat aircraft, and over 47 thousand guns and mortars along the borders of the Soviet Union.

The military potential of the Red Army, in principle, was not much lower than the German one. 170 divisions (2.9 million people) were concentrated in the western border military districts. In terms of the number of military equipment, armored vehicles and aviation, the Soviet troops were not inferior to the German ones, but a significant part of the tanks, and especially aircraft, were of outdated types, new weapons were only being mastered by personnel, many tank and aviation formations were in the formation stage. The lack of understanding of the scale of the German invasion by the Soviet command, and primarily Stalin, is evidenced by the second directive sent to the troops at 7 a.m. on June 22: “The troops are to attack enemy forces with all their might and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border " Stalin’s note “From now on, until further notice, ground troops will not cross the border” indicated that Stalin still thought that war could be avoided. This directive, like Directive No. 1, was drawn up unprofessionally and hastily, which once again indicates that the Soviet command did not have clear plans in case of forced defense.

On June 22, Molotov made a radio call to repel the aggressor. Stalin's speech took place only on July 3.

Resistance to the aggressor. The fascist command organized an offensive in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Soviet command was expecting the main blow in the southwest, but Hitler delivered it in the center, in the western direction. The Germans' advance in all directions, contrary to their expectations, was accompanied by fierce fighting. From the very beginning of the war, Soviet troops put up serious resistance to the enemy. For the first time since 1939, the Germans began to suffer significant losses.

A striking manifestation of the heroism and courage of our soldiers and officers at the initial stage of the war was the defense of the Brest Fortress. Its garrison under the command of Major P. M. Gavrilov held back attacks from superior enemy forces for more than a month.

On June 23, soldiers of the 99th Infantry Division knocked out the Germans from Przemysl with a counterattack and held the city for 5 days. In the very first battles, the 1st Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, which consisted mainly of young Muscovites, destroyed 42 tanks of General Kleist’s group. On June 23, the division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky completely destroyed the motorized regiment of the 4th Panzer Group of General Hepner. There were many such examples.

But despite the massive heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, the results of the initial stage of the war were catastrophic for the Red Army. By mid-July 1941, fascist troops captured Latvia, Lithuania, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the cities of Pskov, Lvov, and a huge number of military personnel were captured.

A terrible tragedy took place near Minsk. Here, by July 9, the Germans managed to encircle almost 30 Soviet divisions. Minsk was abandoned in battle, 323 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured, the losses of the Western Front amounted to 418 thousand people. Stalin blamed the commander of the Western Front, D. G. Pavlov, and a number of other military leaders for this defeat. All of them were shot by the Supreme Court on July 22, 1941 on charges of cowardice (rehabilitated in 1956). The flywheel of repression did not stop even with the start of the war. On August 16, 1941, during the retreat of the Soviet troops, Stalin issued order No. 270, according to which deserters from command personnel should be “shot on the spot,” and those who were surrounded should not surrender and fight to the last bullet. Stalin's accusations of desertion of military leaders were largely unfounded, nevertheless, only from July 1941 to March 1942, 30 generals were shot (all also rehabilitated).

The repressive policy also affected the civilian population. In August 1941, Soviet Germans (about 1.5 million people) were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan and most of them were sent to the labor army. In September 1941, 170 political prisoners were shot in the Oryol prison, among whom were famous revolutionaries Kh. Rakovsky and M. Spiridonova. A special meeting of the NKVD continued to pass sentences in large numbers without trial or investigation. Spreading false rumors was punishable by 2 to 5 years in prison.

In these difficult conditions, the Soviet people managed to unite against a common enemy - fascism - and showed their heroic character.

The occupation of a significant part of Soviet territory was assessed by the Nazi command as a decisive success in the war, but the Red Army turned out to be much stronger than the fascist strategists expected. Soviet troops not only defended themselves, but also struck back at the enemy.

Advancing towards Moscow, the enemy encountered fierce resistance during the capture of Smolensk. The Battle of Smolensk lasted two months (from July 10 to September 10, 1941). During the battle, the Soviet command used the famous Katyushas for the first time. Rocket launchers under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov struck the enemy in the Orsha area, and then Rudnya and Yelnya. In bloody battles, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed true heroism. On July 30, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive for the first time. On September 5, 1941, troops of the Reserve Front formed on July 30 under the command of G.K. Zhukov broke through the enemy’s defenses during a counteroffensive and liberated Yelnya. The enemy lost several divisions (more than 50 thousand soldiers). For their distinction in the Elninsky operation, the four best rifle divisions were the first in the Red Army to receive the rank of guards.

During the battles near Smolensk from August 9 to 10, 1941, the air division under the command of M.V. Vodopyanov on heavy Pe-8 aircraft, having made a heroic and most dangerous flight, bombed Berlin for the first time.

The battle near Smolensk allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare the defense of Moscow. On September 10, the enemy was stopped 300 km from Moscow. Hitler's “blitzkrieg” was dealt a serious blow.

Organizational events. The beginning of the war is the most tragic page in the history of the Great Patriotic War. By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The troops of the Western Front suffered especially heavy losses.

German troops, having advanced 300–500 km into the interior of the country over several weeks of fighting in different directions, captured the territory where almost 2/3 of industrial and agricultural products were produced before the war. About 23 million Soviet people fell into occupation. By the end of 1941, the total number of prisoners of war reached 3.9 million people.

In the very first days of the war, the country's leadership took a number of measures to organize resistance to the enemy: general mobilization was announced, and the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. In a secret directive dated June 29, 1941, to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions, the country's leadership for the first time spoke about the scale of military defeats. The directive contained a strict requirement to defend every inch of Soviet land, to leave nothing to the enemy during a forced retreat, to destroy valuable property that cannot be taken out, to organize partisan detachments and sabotage groups in the occupied territory, and to create unbearable conditions for the enemy.

The Soviet totalitarian system, ineffective in peaceful conditions, turned out to be more effective in wartime conditions. Its mobilization capabilities, multiplied during the Great Patriotic War by the patriotism and sacrifice of the Soviet people, played an important role in organizing resistance to the enemy, especially at the initial stage of the war.

The call “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily joined the active army. In the week since the start of the war, over 5 million people were mobilized.

On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created - the extraordinary highest state body of the USSR, headed by I.V. Stalin. The State Defense Committee concentrated all power in the country during the war. Much attention was paid to military-economic work. A week after the start of the war, the “Mobilization Plan” for the third quarter of 1941 was adopted. By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 4, 1941, the development of a military-economic plan for the use of resources and the development of enterprises relocated to the eastern regions of the country began. Throughout the war, quarterly and monthly plans for military-economic work were drawn up.

From the very first days of the war, all industrial and scientific institutions of the country began to restructure their work in accordance with the needs of defense. During wartime, the entire working population of cities was mobilized to work in production and construction. The decree “On the working hours of workers and employees in wartime” of June 26, 1941 established a working day of 11 hours, introduced mandatory overtime, and abolished vacations. In the fall of 1941, a card system for distributing food among the population was reintroduced.

An important part of creating a military economy was the movement of industrial enterprises, equipment, material and cultural assets to the rear. In just the first six months, over 1,500 large industrial enterprises were moved from areas threatened by occupation, and many educational institutions, research institutes, libraries, museums, and theaters were evacuated. More than 10 million people were sent to the east of the country (according to some sources, 17 million people). The deployment of the military-industrial base in the eastern regions of the country took place under extremely difficult conditions. In the rear, people worked around the clock, often in the open air, in severe frosts.

By mid-1942, the restructuring of the economy on a war footing was largely completed. The eastern regions of the country became the main arsenal of the front and the main production base of the country.

Defensive battles of the summer-autumn 1941 The outcome of the entire Great Patriotic War was seriously influenced by the defensive battles waged by the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1941. Hitler’s strategic failures near Smolensk forced him to change the direction of the main attack and direct it from the center to the south - to Kyiv, Donbass, Rostov. Significant forces were concentrated near Kiev from both the German and Soviet sides. Together with personnel units, militias and residents of Kyiv heroically fought against the fascists. However, the Germans managed to enter the rear of the 6th and 12th armies and encircle them. For almost a whole week, Soviet soldiers and officers offered heroic resistance. Trying to save the army, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, asked Headquarters for permission to leave Kyiv, but Stalin was against it. Only on September 18 such permission was given, but the situation worsened so much that few managed to escape the encirclement. In fact, both armies were lost. With the enemy's capture of Kyiv, the road to Moscow through Bryansk and Orel was opened.

At the same time, the Germans were attacking Odessa, an important base of the Black Sea Fleet. The legendary defense of Odessa lasted more than two months. The Red Army soldiers, sailors and city residents became a single combat garrison and successfully repelled the onslaught of several Romanian divisions. Only on October 16, in connection with the threat of the seizure of Crimea by order of the Supreme High Command, the defenders of Odessa left the city. A significant part of the participants in the defense of Odessa was transferred to Sevastopol.

On its defensive lines, the warriors of the Primorsky Army (commander General I. E. Petrov) and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, led by Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, destroyed almost as much enemy manpower as the Nazi army lost in all theaters of combat before the attack to the USSR. The enemy tried more than once to take the city by storm, but Sevastopol stood unshakable.

Army Group North, having captured Pskov on July 9, advanced close to Leningrad. His fall, according to the plans of the German command, should have preceded the capture of Moscow. However, despite repeated attempts, the Germans and the Finns working together with them failed to take the city. On September 8, 1941, the 900-day siege of Leningrad began. For 611 days the city was subjected to intense artillery shelling and bombing. The blockade put its defenders in an extremely difficult position. The daily bread quota in November-December 1941 was 250 g for workers, 125 g for employees and dependents. About a million Leningrad residents died from hunger, cold, bombing and shelling. To connect the city with the mainland, an ice track was built across Lake Ladoga, called the “Road of Life” by Leningraders.

Despite the occupation of a significant part of the western regions of the country, the German army did not achieve decisive successes in any of the three main strategic directions of the offensive.

Failure of Operation Typhoon. After the capture of Kyiv, Hitler’s General Staff began to develop a new operation to capture Moscow, called “Typhoon”. On September 30, 1941, after a lull on the Central Front after the Battle of Smolensk, a new offensive by enemy troops began. The tank army of the German General Guderian directed an attack along the Orel-Tula-Moscow line and captured Orel and Bryansk.

In accordance with the Typhoon plan, the enemy concentrated 1.8 million soldiers and officers and a significant amount of military equipment in the Moscow direction, creating a numerical superiority over Soviet troops. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, during the offensive the fascists managed to capture the cities of Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Kalinin and Maloyaroslavets and came within 80–100 km of Moscow. Hitler’s directive stated: “The city must be surrounded so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single inhabitant - be it man, woman or child - can leave it. Suppress any attempt to leave by force. Make the necessary preparations so that Moscow and its surroundings are flooded with water using huge structures. Where Moscow stands today, a sea must appear that will forever hide the capital of the Russian people from the civilized world.”

At the beginning of October, the situation became critical: as a result of the encirclement of five Soviet armies, the path to Moscow was practically open. The Soviet command took a number of urgent measures. On October 12, the Western Front was created under the command of General G.K. Zhukov, and the armies of the Reserve Front were also transferred to it. Particularly fierce fighting in the Moscow direction flared up in mid-October. On October 15, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to evacuate part of the government and party institutions, the diplomatic corps to the city of Kuibyshev and prepare for the destruction of 1,119 industrial enterprises and facilities in Moscow and the region. Stalin was supposed to be evacuated. Under the influence of rumors about the surrender of Moscow on October 16, panic arose in the capital. Subsequently, according to contemporaries, the words “man of October 16” became synonymous with shameful behavior and cowardice. Three days later, the panic was stopped by the order of Stalin, who remained in the Kremlin. Tough measures were taken against cowards, alarmists, and looters, including execution. A state of siege was declared in Moscow.

The whole country rose to defend the capital. Trains with reinforcements, weapons, and ammunition from Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, and Central Asia were rushing to Moscow. 50 thousand militia fighters came to the aid of the front.

The defenders of Tula made an invaluable contribution to the defense of Moscow. Guderian's army was unable to take the city and was stopped by the heroic actions of the defenders of Tula. Moscow was also reliably protected from air attack. Defending the skies of Moscow, pilot V.V. Talalikhin was one of the first to use a night air ram.

As a result of the measures taken, the Nazi offensive was stopped at the end of October and beginning of November. Operation Typhoon failed. On November 6, in Moscow, in the hall of the Mayakovskaya metro station, a ceremonial meeting was held dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, at which I.V. Stalin made a speech. On November 7, 1941, a traditional military parade took place on Red Square, after which the troops immediately went to the front. All these events were of great importance for maintaining the morale of Soviet soldiers.

By mid-November, German troops launched a new offensive against Moscow. 51 divisions took part in it, including 13 tank and 7 motorized divisions, armed with 1.5 thousand tanks and 3 thousand guns. They were supported by 700 aircraft. The Western Front, holding back the offensive, at that time already had more divisions than the enemy, and was 1.5 times larger than German aviation in the number of aircraft.

As a result of the offensive, the Germans managed to capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Kryukovo, Yakhroma, Istra and approach Moscow within 25–30 km. The fighting was especially stubborn in the defense zone of the 16th Army (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky) in the Istra region. A group of tank destroyers from the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov stood to their death. He himself died in battle on November 18. Through heroic efforts, the Nazi troops were stopped almost at the walls of the capital.

Counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. At the beginning of December 1941, the Soviet command, in secrecy, was preparing a counteroffensive near Moscow. Such an operation became possible after the formation of ten reserve armies in the rear and a change in the balance of forces. The enemy retained superiority in the number of troops, artillery and tanks, but it was no longer overwhelming.

In early December, the Germans launched another attack on Moscow, but during the attack on December 5–6, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire front, from Kalinin to Yelets. It was attended by troops of three fronts - Western (under the command of G. K. Zhukov), Kalinin (under the command of I. S. Konev) and South-Western (under the command of S. K. Timoshenko). This offensive was a complete surprise for the German command. It was unable to repel the powerful attacks of the Red Army. By the beginning of January 1942, Soviet troops pushed the Nazis back from Moscow 100–250 km. The winter offensive of the Red Army continued until April 1942. As a result, the Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Smolensk, Kalinin, Ryazan and Oryol regions were completely liberated.

The “blitzkrieg” strategy finally collapsed near Moscow. The failure of the attack on Moscow prevented Japan and Turkey from entering the war on the German side. The victory of the Red Army pushed the USA and England to create an anti-Hitler coalition.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to Barbarossa's plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
Number	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29th Division + Army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kiev. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.