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I. Stalin as a statesman

MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION VORONEZH INSTITUTE

FACULTY OF CORRESPONDENCE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF THEORY AND HISTORY OF STATE AND LAW

COURSE WORK

On the topic: “I.V. Stalin as a statesman"

VORONEZH 2011

Introduction

1 Civil War

2 Patriotic War

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of this work lies in the fact that recently in Russia there has been a heated discussion and debate on the role of individuals in the history of the 20th century. To the greatest extent this concerns the figure and personality of I.V. Stalin. What is his role in the development of the USSR after the death of V.I. Lenin in January 1924, in the development of socialism in the Soviet Union and in the world, in the development of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, in the implementation of social, democratic, self-governing, humane, legal and other principles inherent in socialism.

Positions basically came down to two mutually exclusive extremes: completely justifying and whitewashing J.V. Stalin or completely condemning and castigating him. He is either a genius or a tyrant, or a great figure and savior of the USSR, or a merciless executioner, despot and dictator, exterminating people and his own people without a twinge of conscience.

Both of these extreme, absolutized positions are undialectical, unscientific, and vulgar. The reality on the issue of the role of specific individuals in historical development is much more complex, contradictory, and richer than unilinear, maximalist, emotional, primitive assessments and schemes.

The centuries-old experience of the development of human history, including the experience of the history of the 20th century, convincingly shows and proves that there are practically no absolutely brilliant, great, heroic, only positive or only negative figures and persons, or very few and rare ones. Man, as a multidimensional, multifaceted being, as a multifaceted personality, is very diverse and often contradictory, internally and externally different. After all, he manifests and realizes himself both as a doer, a creator, and as a formal or informal leader, and as a leader, manager or performer, and as a person among people, and a person in the family and among friends, and a person as a unique personality with his own individual unique qualities. features.

Therefore, it must be measured, assessed, and described multidimensionally and multidimensionally, both from holistic and specifically diverse positions.

The purpose of the work is to study the personality of Stalin and her role in the events of the country.

To achieve this goal, the following main tasks were set:

study the biography of Stalin;

assess Stalin as a statesman;

assess the influence of Stalin's personality on the history of the country.

In my work, I primarily relied on such works as F. D. Volkova “Stalin: Rise and Fall” and A. Golenkov “Offering to Explain Stalin”

As for E. Radzinsky’s work “Stalin,” it is a very interesting, but rather journalistic rather than scientific book. It contains many controversial conclusions, sometimes the author uses unverified facts.

The object of the study is the biography of Stalin.

The subject of the study is the personality of Stalin.

Research methodology. In the study of Stalin's personality, a phenomenological approach was used, for which the primary focus is not on typology, but on the specific essence of the phenomenon. I also used the comparison method in my work. The comparative method can be justified in the approaches to the problem of foreign and domestic scientists.

Chapter I. Biography of I.V. Stalin

Joseph Stalin was born into a Georgian family; a number of sources express versions about the Ossetian<#"justify">Chapter II. Revolutionary activities

April 23, 1900 Joseph Dzhugashvili, Vano Sturua and Zakro Chodrishvili<#"justify">Chapter III. Civil and Great Patriotic War

1 Civil War

After the victory of the October Revolution<#"justify">Conclusion

The Stalin type, unfortunately, and not only due to intimidation, the threat of reprisals, but also due to obedient adherence to this example (even in clothes), as well as a misunderstanding of the appearance and image of a powerful and majestic autocrat, large and not so large leaders and leaders in other socialist countries began to follow in many ways (while remaining, of course, very original and unique). This was manifested in the nature of activity, style of behavior, and lifestyle of Mao Zedong, Josip Broz Tito, Nicolae Ceausescu, Enver Hoxha, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and others.

A number of leaders and leaders of socialist countries showed interesting and original combinations of Leninist and Stalinist types of figures and personalities, adding, naturally, their own original features and characteristics.

Between V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin there were common features that united them, and distinguished them, which were opposite to them.

Firstly, V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin both worked for the country. That is why the USSR became a great superpower, an invincible socialist country. And V.I. Lenin did not doubt I.V. Stalin about this when he wrote about him in the famous Letter to the Congress.

But, secondly, the approaches and methods of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin to creation, the construction of socialism were not only different, but also opposite. For V.I. Lenin, this is the construction of socialism by the people themselves, the creative self-action of the masses, the direct democratic power of the people through the Soviets, the control of the party masses over the party leadership, in particular by introducing 50-100 workers into the Central Committee. This is a separation of the functions of the party, as the general leader, and the state, as a direct and independent manager of the national economy. This is the accounting and control of the working masses over production and distribution, their mandatory participation in management and self-government.

Above all for V.I. Lenin were the amateur people, independently creating socialism, the working people working for themselves - the master of power and property. Next - the party as a cohesive union of people most devoted to the revolution and socialism, equal to each other, and therefore communist fighters who speak boldly and act on principle, and not as a union of the party elite and the party apparatus associated with it, serving it. Finally, a person as an actively, freely acting social subject, as a developing, inimitable, unique personality.

Socialism was not conceived by V.I. Lenin without the achievements of the highest levels, the qualities of people's democracy, self-government, and civilization. The main value is the person. The goal is to create a new, popular, humane civilization.

For J.V. Stalin, the main thing was strong-willed, autocratic (and not collegial, not collective, like V.I. Lenin) leadership of the country through the main organizational instrument - the party. He replaced the self-dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the party, and in fact with the dictatorship of its leader, J.V. Stalin himself. The basis of his individual rule was a total organization permeating the entire society (party, state, etc.), the component parts of which mutually suspected and controlled each other and were all subordinate to a single will, held in fear of the arbitrariness of power and the personal dictate of the leader.

I.V. Stalin’s desire for personal power, especially for immense power, was noticed by V.I. Lenin by the end of 1922. Letter to the Congress he wrote: Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary General, concentrated immense power in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use this power carefully enough . This Leninist fear was justified: J.V. Stalin’s abuse of power caused enormous damage to the cause of building socialism in the USSR, to the prestige and authority of socialism in the world.

Thirdly, the difference and contrast between the figures of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin themselves. V.I. Lenin is a genius, an intellectual, the greatest scientific theorist and political practitioner, a dialectician who constantly acts in the midst of the people, among workers, peasants, soldiers, youth, listening to them and constantly explaining to them his policies and the party line. This is a man of the broadest erudition, an expert on contemporary Western Europe, the most advanced capitalist countries, always thinking in decisive and main categories - people, people, democracy, civilization, progress. This is a person of constant creativity, searching for bold, quick, innovative revolutionary and reformatory solutions to the most complex, difficult practical situations and difficulties, crises (for example, the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921 and the New Economic Policy).

I.V. Stalin is a subtle and cunning politician and intriguer, primarily a practical organizer, in theoretical and cultural terms he limits himself to the most necessary, even the minimum, by nature and character he is rude (as V.I. Lenin noted), tough and cruel, which manifested itself in the repressions he organized, primarily against his opponents and generally arguing, debating, thinking people (which V.I. Lenin did not was afraid , but, on the contrary, relied on them, worked with them, surrounded himself with them, supported and raised them).

Because of this, the enormous wealth of Lenin’s plan for creation, the construction of socialism (which primarily included increasing the initiative of the people, creativity and self-realization of man, scientific and technological progress, scientific organization of labor, scientific and democratic management of the national economy, increasing creativity and democracy of Councils at all levels, focus for the final formation of a new highly developed and democratic civilization) I.V. Stalin reduced it to a primitive, but important, of course, triad : industrialization of the country, agricultural cooperation (and by violent methods), cultural revolution.

Fourthly, and this is the most important thing, the results of Leninist and Stalinist policies and lines of action turned out to be completely different and in many ways opposite. We should talk about Lenin’s most adequate, dialectical, popular, humane, humane stage of the movement towards socialism, about its most positive embodiment and great practical results. And about the Stalinist stage of departure from the Leninist course of socialist development, about the replacement of democracy by dictatorship, democracy by autocracy, people's freedoms by control over the people, carried out by I.V. Stalin. By this, socialism under I.V. Stalin was significantly deformed, distorted, literally mutilated. First of all, by a significant limitation of democracy, by allowing the working people and masses to be alienated from power and from property, and by suppressing human rights and freedoms.

Because of this, we should clearly speak about two qualitatively different stages in the development of socialism in the USSR - the Leninist and Stalinist stages. The first one was the best, Stalin's was the worst. It is unacceptable from the point of view of the ideals and principles of socialism.

Socialism, which, according to Lenin's understanding, should act as popular socialism, during the Stalinist period in the USSR became bureaucratic, from a creative society of the masses - barracks, from democratic - overwhelmingly undemocratic. It increasingly lost the features of a self-governing, humane, socially just, highly spiritual, moral society based on high ideas and consciousness.

The creation of such a moral atmosphere was facilitated by the social policy of the Soviet state, which was expressed not only in the expropriation of private property, but also in the establishment of justice in relation to the old and sick, in the elimination of sharp gaps in wages and other material living conditions. So on October 19, 1923, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RCP approved a circular On the fight against excesses and criminal use of official position by party members , which contained a demand to combat the decay of the least stable communists.

The very spirit of the revolution, the moral impulse of which was communist unselfishness, the very living example of the people it raised to the heights of power, could not help but leave an imprint on the morals not only of the first years of the revolution, but also of subsequent years, wrote V.Z. Rogovin in the brochure The aesthetic heritage of V.I. Lenin and his associates (1986). There could be no talk of material privileges and excesses, because development was subordinated to the establishment of a healthy social and psychological climate in society. For V.I. Lenin and his comrades, these issues were practically resolved once and for all, due to which modesty and unpretentiousness in everyday life remained an organic feature of their moral make-up even in the years when the country recovered from the poverty and disasters of the era of military communism.

V.I. Lenin's comrades were characterized by unity of word and deed and what can be called moral scrupulousness in matters relating to the slightest material advantages associated with their official position. One of the oldest Bolsheviks, M.S. Olminsky, having learned about several cases of gifts being presented to higher organizations and individuals, wrote a harsh article about this in the press. In it, he first of all recalled V.I. Lenin’s answer to the workers of the Stodolsk cloth factory, who sent him gifts: I’ll tell you a secret that you shouldn’t send me gifts. I would like to ask you to make this secret request widely known to all workers.

Like V.I. Lenin’s closest associates, many of their immediate successors in their personal behavior were guided by fundamental political motives, exhaustively expressed in the thought repeatedly repeated by F.E. Dzerzhinsky: We communists must live in such a way that the broadest masses of working people see that we are not a caste that has seized power for the sake of personal interests, not a new aristocracy, but servants of the people.

Regarding the differences in the appearance and style of behavior of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, the famous historian V.V. Pokhlebkin noted from I.V. Stalin a radical difference between his character and methods of action from Lenin’s.

Lenin never allowed even the slightest insincerity in his behavior - both with enemies and especially with like-minded friends.

Stalin used insincerity as a powerful weapon, as a means of disorientation - politically and personnel fight, regardless of who his counterparty was.

The researcher of Stalinism B.P. Kurashvili, recognizing the real enormous merits of J.V. Stalin and condemning his tragic mistakes, noted the main thing: Both objectively and according to his own understanding, he is far from Lenin... We must come to terms with the fact that Stalin, who is not the second Lenin, will act in this unattainably high quality - as Lenin today.

Stunning thoughts that reveal the nature of the influence of the activities and personalities of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin on the development of literature and culture in the Soviet Union, on the creative atmosphere and relationships of people were outlined by the famous Soviet writer and head of the Writers' Union A.A. Fadeev in a suicide letter dated May 13, 1956, entitled In the Central Committee of the CPSU , before committing suicide. The letter was first published at the end of 1999.

Here are excerpts from it: With what a sense of freedom and openness of the world my generation entered literature under Lenin, what immense forces were in our souls and what wonderful works we created and could still create!

After Lenin's death, we were reduced to the position of boys, we were destroyed, ideologically frightened and they called it - partisanship ... Literature - this highest fruit of our system - is humiliated, persecuted, ruined. The complacency of the nouveau riche with the great Leninist teaching, even when they swear by it, by this teaching, led to complete distrust of them on my part, because one can expect even worse from them than from the satrap Stalin. He was at least educated, but these were ignoramuses.

My life, as a writer, loses all meaning, and with great joy, as a deliverance from this vile existence, where meanness, lies and slander fall upon you, I am leaving this life.

The last hope was to at least tell this to the people who rule the state, but for the past 3 years, despite my requests, they cannot even accept me.

The twentieth century gave the world and peoples, along with V.I. Lenin, a number of outstanding, great figures and personalities of Lenin’s scale and type, integral and consistent, simple and irreplaceable, unique. Among them, I especially want to highlight Fidel Castro, with whom I had the opportunity to meet, and Ho Chi Minh.

S.A. Batchikov, first vice-president of the Society for Friendship with Cuba, wrote vividly and thoroughly about Fidel Castro, who led the Cuban people's national liberation revolution in January 1959, which became one of the outstanding events of the second half of the 20th century.

Fidel Castro, in terms of the scale of his political, state and international activities, is the most striking personality put forward by post-war history. A man generously gifted by nature with intelligence, unbending will, determination, and extraordinary capacity for work, who received a classical liberal arts university education and accumulated encyclopedic knowledge and experience over decades of hard work, he grew into a major political thinker and strategist. Over the course of five decades of active political activity, F. Castro demonstrated flexibility and an enviable ability to overcome the most difficult and hopeless in terms of common sense situations.

When M. Gorbachev, a weak-willed and incompetent leader greedy for flattery, came to power in the USSR, it did not take much effort for the United States to push our great country towards collapse. F. Castro foresaw such a development of the situation, telling his friend Nobel laureate G. Garcia Marquez that under the leadership of Gorbachev, our country would face a catastrophe. The change of regimes played out like clockwork in all Eastern European countries.

F. Castro is a special case, toughie , which turned out to be too tough for the world gendarme. He challenged the empire by carrying out a revolution under its nose. For four decades, F. Castro has been one of the main targets of subversive activities on the part of the United States. More than 600 assassination attempts, hundreds of provocations, military intervention and sabotage, astronomical funds used for psychological warfare, economic blockade and much more were in vain.

Fidel Castro sees the enemy's steps many moves ahead and invariably gets ahead of him. With his unexpected and extraordinary decisions, he breaks the most ingenious and long-term combinations, outplays the empire time after time, causing it to have attacks of impotent anger and forcing it to make more and more mistakes.

He achieved almost universal condemnation of the economic blockade of Cuba, managed after the collapse of the USSR to find new economic partners among the most developed countries that are allies of the United States, and with their help in recent years achieved one of the highest GDP growth in Latin America. He not only preserved Cuba's previous ties in the international arena, but also significantly strengthened them. Over the past 10 years, F. Castro has established diplomatic relations with dozens of countries that, until 1991, did not want to recognize his government. He maintained and strengthened his niche in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77, and the Ibero-American Movement of Latin America.

Apparently, it was no coincidence that at one of the last meetings of the countries of the region with the EU in Brazil, the hall where the cream of the Latin American political elite was represented greeted him standing for several minutes.

Another great figure and real person, Ho Chi Minh, in his will, written in 1969 shortly before his death, said the main words about himself: As for me personally, all my life I have served my homeland with soul and body, served the revolution, served the people.

When, as a result of the victory of the August Revolution, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born on September 2, 1945, the first people's democratic state in Southeast Asia, Ho Chi Minh was unanimously elected in January 1946 as president of the new state. The goal to which Ho Chi Minh devoted many years of his life was achieved - his homeland became free and independent.

Heartfelt words about the bright and eventful life of the outstanding figure of the world revolutionary movement, the leader of the Vietnamese people, a great friend of our country, Ho Chi Minh, were written by the chairman of the Society for Friendship with Vietnam, E. Glazunov: Any nation has personalities that leave a deep mark on its history. And if this trail, this road leads the people, the country to progress, to a better life, the name of this person remains in the memory of the people for centuries. Such people usually display the best traits of national character. Ho Chi Minh is one of these people. And that is why we can say that Ho Chi Minh is one of the outstanding personalities of the 20th century. He will remain in people's memory as a Man and a Politician with a capital P.

The twentieth century gave birth, raised, formed, gave to humanity these and other outstanding personalities, truly people's leaders, unbending revolutionaries and fighters who gave or gave their lives to serving their homeland, country and people, the most modest and smartest, philanthropic people who deservedly became the favorites of their peoples and peoples of other countries of the world.

Bibliography

Stalin power revolutionary war

1. Large encyclopedic dictionary. / Ed. A. M. Prokhorova. 2nd ed. - M.: Norint, 2004. ISBN 5-7711-0004-8 ; Russian Encyclopedia, 1998. ISBN 5-85270-311-7 ; Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1993. ISBN 5-85270-137-8 ; Moscow. Encyclopedia. (inaccessible link) / Ed. S. O. Schmidt. - M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1997. ISBN 5-85270-227-3

Adelkhanov. Manufacturer, owner of a shoe factory in Tiflis. AND.

Kitaev, L. Moshkov, A. Chernev. When was he born? V. Stalin // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990. No. 11

Georgy Chernyavsky. When was Stalin actually born and why is it important? // Cascade , № 210, 26.03.2004.

Svetigor S. Living Stalin. - M.: Crimean Bridge, 2003.

Stalin I.V. Poems. Correspondence with mother and relatives. / Comp. A. Andreenko. - Mn.: FUAinform, 2005. - 80 p.

Stalin I.V. Collected Works. Volume 14 (1934-1941) - M.: Information and Publishing Center "Soyuz", 2007; ISBN 978-5-903373-04-8

Rybas S. Yu. Stalin. - 2nd ed. - M.: Young Guard . 2010. - p. 11. (Series: Lives of remarkable people )

Quote by: Ostrovsky A.V. Who stood behind Stalin? - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2004.

Semanov S. N. , Kardashov V. I. Joseph Stalin, life and legacy. - M: Novator, 1997

Stalin I.V. Works. T. 13. - M.: p. 113.

World Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1998

Lev Balayan. Stalin and Khrushchev. - M.: Eksmo, Algorithm, 2009.

Stalin's conversation with the writer Emil Ludwig // Ogonyok, No. 23, 1932

The original name is German. "Stalin und die Tragoedie Georgiens"

16.A. A. Chernobaev. Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich / Political figures of Russia 1917

Biographical Dictionary. - M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1993, 432 pages.

Volkov F.D. Stalin: rise and fall. M., 1995.

Golenkov A. Offering to explain Stalin. M. 1995.

Laszlo Belady and Tamás Kraus. Stalin. M.: Politizdat, 1989.

Mukhin Yu. Killers of Stalin. M. 2005.

Recent history of the fatherland. XX century / Ed. A.F. Kiseleva, E. M. Shchagina. T. 2. M., 1999.

Radzinsky E. Stalin. M., 1997

Churchill W. The Second World War. M. 1991

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MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION VORONEZH INSTITUTE

FACULTY OF CORRESPONDENCE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF THEORY AND HISTORY OF STATE AND LAW

COURSE WORK

On the topic: “I.V. Stalin as a statesman"

VORONEZH 2011

Introduction

3.1 Civil War

3.2 Patriotic War

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

Therefore, it must be measured, assessed, and described multidimensionally and multidimensionally, both from holistic and specifically diverse positions.

The purpose of the work is to study the personality of Stalin and her role in the events of the country.

To achieve this goal, the following main tasks were set:

Study the biography of Stalin;

Assess Stalin as a statesman;

Assess the influence of Stalin’s personality on the history of the country.

In my work, I primarily relied on such works as F. D. Volkova “Stalin: Rise and Fall” and A. Golenkov “Offering to Explain Stalin”

The object of the study is the biography of Stalin.

The subject of the study is the personality of Stalin.

Chapter I. Biography of I.V. Stalin

Joseph Stalin was born into a Georgian family; a number of sources express versions about the Ossetian origin of Stalin’s ancestors in the city of Gori, Tiflis province. Father - Vissarion Ivanovich Dzhugashvili - was a shoemaker by profession, later a worker at the shoe factory of the manufacturer Adelkhanov in Tiflis. Mother - Ekaterina Georgievna Dzhugashvili, nee Geladze - came from the family of a serf peasant Geladze in the village of Gambareuli, worked as a day laborer.

During Stalin’s life and subsequently in encyclopedias, reference books and biographies, the date of birth of I.V. Stalin was designated as December 9, 1879. The anniversaries celebrated during his life were dedicated to this date. A number of researchers, with reference to the first part of the metric book of the Gori Assumption Cathedral Church, intended for registering births, have established a different date of birth for Stalin - December 6 (18), 1878. At the same time, there are documents from the police department where the year of birth of Joseph Dzhugashvili is listed as 1879 and 1881. In a document filled out in his own hand by J.V. Stalin in December 1920, the questionnaire of the Swedish newspaper Folkets Dagblad Politiken lists the year of birth as 1878. Kitaev, L. Moshkov, A. Chernev. When was he born? V. Stalin // News of the CPSU Central Committee, 1990. No. 11

Joseph was the third son in the family; the first two (Mikhail and George) died in infancy. His native language was Georgian. Stalin learned Russian later, but always spoke with a noticeable Georgian accent. According to his daughter Svetlana, Stalin, however, sang in Russian with virtually no accent.

Ekaterina Georgievna was known as a strict woman, but who passionately loved her son; she tried to give her child an education and hoped for the development of his career that she associated with the position of a priest. Stalin treated his mother with extreme respect. Stalin could not come to his mother’s funeral in May 1937, but sent a wreath with the inscription in Russian and Georgian: “To my dear and beloved mother from her son Joseph Dzhugashvili (from Stalin).”

At the age of five in 1884, Joseph fell ill with smallpox, which left marks on his face for the rest of his life. Since 1885, as a result of a severe bruise - a phaeton flew into him - Joseph Stalin remained with a defect in his left hand throughout his life.

In 1886, Ekaterina Georgievna wanted to enroll Joseph to study at the Gori Orthodox Theological School. However, since the child did not know the Russian language at all, he was unable to enter the school. In 1886-1888, at the request of his mother, the children of the priest Christopher Charkviani began teaching Joseph Russian. The result of the training was that in 1888 Soso entered not the first preparatory class at the school, but immediately the second preparatory class. Many years later, on September 15, 1927, Stalin’s mother, Ekaterina Dzhugashvili, would write a letter of gratitude to the school’s Russian language teacher, Zakhary Alekseevich Davitashvili.

In 1889, Joseph Dzhugashvili, having successfully completed the second preparatory class, was admitted to the school. In July 1894, upon graduating from college, Joseph was noted as the best student. His certificate contains “A” grades in many subjects. After graduating from college, Joseph was recommended for admission to a theological seminary.

In September 1894, Joseph, having brilliantly passed the entrance exams, was enrolled in the Orthodox Tiflis Theological Seminary, which was located in the center of Tiflis. There he first became acquainted with the ideas of Marxism. By the beginning of 1895, seminarian Joseph Dzhugashvili became acquainted with underground groups of revolutionary Marxists expelled by the government to Transcaucasia, among them: I. I. Luzin, O. A. Kogan, G. Ya. Franceschi, V. K. Rodzevich-Belevich, A. Ya Krasnova, etc. Subsequently, Stalin himself recalled: “I joined the revolutionary movement at the age of 15, when I contacted underground groups of Russian Marxists who then lived in Transcaucasia. These groups had a great influence on me and gave me a taste for underground Marxist literature."

In 1896-1898, at the seminary, Joseph Dzhugashvili led an illegal Marxist circle, which met in the apartment of the revolutionary Vano Sturua at number 194 on Elizavetinskaya Street. In 1898, Joseph joined the Georgian social democratic organization “Mesame-Dasi” “Third Group”. Together with V.Z. Ketskhoveli and A.G. Tsulukidze, I.V. Dzhugashvili forms the core of the revolutionary minority of this organization. Subsequently, in 1931, Stalin, in an interview with the German writer Emil Ludwig, answered the question “What prompted you to be an oppositionist?” Possibly mistreatment from parents? replied: “No. My parents treated me quite well. Another thing is the theological seminary where I studied then. Out of protest against the mocking regime and the Jesuit methods that existed in the seminary, I was ready to become and actually became a revolutionary, a supporter of Marxism...”

In the book of memoirs “Stalin and the Tragedy of Georgia,” published in 1932 in Berlin in German, Joseph Dzhugashvili’s classmate at the Tiflis Theological Seminary, Joseph Iremashvili, argued that young Stalin was characterized by rancor, vindictiveness, deceit, ambition and lust for power.

In 1898-1899, Joseph led a circle at the railway depot, and also conducted classes in workers' circles at the Adelkhanov shoe factory, at the Karapetov plant, at the Bozardzhants tobacco factory, and in the Main Tiflis railway workshops. Stalin recalled this time: “I remember 1898, when I first received a circle from the workers of the railway workshops... Here, in the circle of these comrades, I then received my first baptism of fire... My first teachers were the Tiflis workers.” On December 14-19, 1898, a six-day strike of railway workers took place in Tiflis, one of the initiators of which was seminarian Joseph Dzhugashvili. On April 19, 1899, Joseph Dzhugashvili took part in a work day in Tiflis.

Without completing the full course, in the fifth year of study, before the exams on May 29, 1899, he was expelled from the seminary with the motivation “for failure to appear for exams for an unknown reason.” Probably the actual reason for the expulsion, which was also adhered to by official Soviet historiography, was the propaganda activities of Joseph Dzhugashvili Marxism among seminarians and railway workshop workers. The certificate issued to Joseph Dzhugashvili upon expulsion stated that he could serve as a teacher in primary public schools. Semanov S. N., Kardashov V. I. Joseph Stalin, life and legacy. -- M: Novator, 1997

After being expelled from the seminary, Joseph Dzhugashvili spent some time tutoring. Among his students, in particular, was S. A. Ter-Petrosyan, the future revolutionary Kamo. From the end of December 1899, I.V. Dzhugashvili was accepted into the Tiflis Physical Observatory as a computer-observer.

Chapter II. Revolutionary activities

On April 23, 1900, Joseph Dzhugashvili, Vano Sturua and Zakro Chodrishvili organized a work day, which brought together 400-500 workers. At the rally, which was opened by Chodrishvili, Joseph Dzhugashvili, among others, spoke. This speech was Stalin's first appearance before a large gathering of people. In August of the same year, Dzhugashvili participated in the preparation and conduct of a major action by the workers of Tiflis - a strike in the Main Railway Workshops. Revolutionary workers took part in organizing workers’ protests: M. I. Kalinin, S. Ya. Alliluyev, as well as M. Z. Bochoridze, A. G. Okuashvili, V. F. Sturua. From August 1 to August 15, up to four thousand people took part in the strike. As a result, more than five hundred strikers were arrested. Arrests of Georgian Social Democrats continued in March and April 1901. Coco Dzhugashvili, as one of the leaders of the strike, avoided arrest: he quit his job at the observatory and went underground, becoming an underground revolutionary.

In September 1901, the illegal newspaper Brdzola (Struggle) was published at the Nina printing house, organized by Lado Ketskhoveli in Baku. The first issue's editorial, entitled "Editorial," was written by twenty-two-year-old Coco. This article is the first known political work of I.V. Dzhugashvili-Stalin.

In 1901-1902, Joseph was a member of the Tiflis and Batumi committees of the RSDLP. Since 1901, Stalin, being in an illegal position, organized strikes, demonstrations, staged armed robberies against banks, transferring stolen money (also called expropriated in a number of other sources) for the needs of the revolution. On April 5, 1902, he was arrested for the first time in Batumi. On April 19 he was transferred to Kutaisi prison. After a year and a half of imprisonment and transfer to Butum, he was exiled to Eastern Siberia. On November 27, he arrived at his place of exile - the village of Novaya Uda, Balagansky district, Irkutsk province. After more than a month, Joseph Dzhugashvili made his first escape and returned to Tiflis, from where he later moved again to Batum.

After the Second Congress of the RSDLP (1903), held in Brussels and London, he became a Bolshevik. On the recommendation of one of the leaders of the Caucasian Union of the RSDLP, M. G. Tskhakaya Koba was sent to the Kutaisi region to the Imeretian-Mingrelian Committee as a representative of the Caucasian Union Committee. In 1904-1905, Stalin organized a printing house in Chiatura and participated in the December 1904 strike in Baku. Great Russian Encyclopedia, ed. S. O. Schmidt. -- 1997. ISBN 5-85270-227-3

During the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, Joseph Dzhugashvili was busy with party affairs: he wrote leaflets, participated in the publication of Bolshevik newspapers, organized a fighting squad in Tiflis (autumn 1905), visited Batum, Novorossiysk, Kutais, Gori, Chiatura. In February 1905, he participated in arming the workers of Baku in order to prevent Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes in the Caucasus. In September 1905, he participated in the attempt to seize the Kutaisi workshop. In December 1905, Stalin participated as a delegate at the 1st Conference of the RSDLP in Tammerfors, where he first met V.I. Lenin. In May 1906, he was a delegate to the IV Congress of the RSDLP, held in Stockholm.

In 1907, Stalin was a delegate to the Vth Congress of the RSDLP in London. In 1907-1908 one of the leaders of the Baku Committee of the RSDLP. Stalin was involved in the so-called. "Tiflis expropriation" in the summer of 1907.

At the plenum of the Central Committee after the 6th Prague All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP in 1912, he was co-opted in absentia into the Central Committee and the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP. Trotsky, in his work “Stalin,” argued that this was facilitated by Stalin’s personal letter to V.I. Lenin, where he said that he agreed to any responsible work.

On March 25, 1908, Stalin was again arrested in Baku and imprisoned in Bailov prison. From 1908 to 1910 he was in exile in the city of Solvychegodsk, from where he corresponded with Lenin. In 1910, Stalin escaped from exile. After this, Stalin was detained by the authorities three times, and each time he escaped from exile to the Vologda province. From December 1911 to February 1912 in exile in the city of Vologda. On the night of February 29, 1912, he fled from Vologda.

In 1912-1913, while working in St. Petersburg, he was one of the main employees in the first mass Bolshevik newspaper Pravda. At Lenin's proposal at the Prague Party Conference in 1912, Stalin was elected a member of the party's Central Committee and placed at the head of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. On May 5, 1912, on the day the first issue of the newspaper Pravda was published, Stalin was arrested and exiled to the Narym region. A few months later the 5th escaped and returned to St. Petersburg, where he settled with the worker Savinov. From here he led the Bolshevik election campaign to the 4th State Duma. During this period, the wanted Stalin lives in St. Petersburg, constantly changing apartments, under the pseudonym Vasiliev. Semanov S. N., Kardashov V. I. Joseph Stalin, life and legacy. -- M: Novator, 1997

In November and at the end of December 1912, Stalin twice traveled to Krakow to visit Lenin for meetings of the Central Committee with party workers. Svetigor S. Living Stalin. - M.: Crimean Bridge, 2003. At the end of 1912-1913 in Krakow, Stalin, at the insistence of Lenin, wrote a long article “Marxism and the National Question”, in which he expressed Bolshevik views on ways to resolve the national question and criticized the “cultural-cultural” program. national autonomy" of the Austro-Hungarian socialists. The work gained fame among Russian Marxists, and from this time on Stalin was considered an expert on national problems.

Stalin spent January 1913 in Vienna. Soon, in the same year, he returned to Russia, but in March he was arrested, imprisoned and exiled to the village of Kureika, Turukhansk Territory, where he spent 4 years - until the February Revolution of 1917. In exile he corresponded with Lenin.

Until 1917, Joseph Dzhugashvili used a large number of pseudonyms, in particular: Beshoshvili, Nizheradze, Chizhikov, Ivanovich. Of these, in addition to the pseudonym “Stalin,” the most famous was the pseudonym “Koba.” In 1912, Joseph Dzhugashvili finally adopted the pseudonym “Stalin”. Recent history of the fatherland. XX century / Ed. A.F. Kiseleva, E. M. Shchagina. T. 2. M., 1999.

After the February Revolution he returned to Petrograd. Before Lenin's arrival from exile, he was one of the leaders of the Central Committee of the RSDLP and the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolshevik Party. In 1917, he was a member of the editorial board of the newspaper Pravda, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, and the Military Revolutionary Center. At first, Stalin supported the Provisional Government. In relation to the Provisional Government and its policies, I proceeded from the fact that the democratic revolution was not yet completed, and overthrowing the government was not a practical task. However, then he joined Lenin, who advocated transforming the “bourgeois-democratic” February revolution into a proletarian socialist revolution.

April 14 - April 22 was a delegate to the First Petrograd City Conference of Bolsheviks. On April 24 - 29, at the VII All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP (b), he spoke in the debate on the report on the current situation, supported the views of Lenin, and made a report on the national question; elected member of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b).

In May - June he was a participant in anti-war propaganda; was one of the organizers of the re-election of the Soviets and in the municipal campaign in Petrograd. June 3 - June 24 participated as a delegate to the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; was elected a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Bureau from the Bolshevik faction. Also participated in the preparation of demonstrations on June 10 and 18; published a number of articles in the newspapers Pravda and Soldatskaya Pravda.

Due to Lenin's forced departure into hiding, Stalin spoke at the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) July - August 1917 with a report to the Central Committee. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) on August 5, he was elected a member of the narrow composition of the Central Committee. In August-September he mainly carried out organizational and journalistic work. On October 10, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), he voted for the resolution on an armed uprising and was elected a member of the Political Bureau, created “for political leadership in the near future.”

On the night of October 16, at an extended meeting, the Central Committee spoke out against the position of L. B. Kamenev and G. E. Zinoviev, who voted against the decision to revolt; was elected a member of the Military Revolutionary Center, as part of which he joined the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee.

On October 24 (November 6), after the cadets destroyed the printing house of the Rabochiy Put newspaper, Stalin ensured the publication of a newspaper in which he published the editorial “What do we need?” calling for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and its replacement by a Soviet government elected by representatives of workers, soldiers and peasants. On the same day, Stalin and Trotsky held a meeting of the Bolsheviks - delegates of the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets of the RSD, at which Stalin made a report on the course of political events. On the night of October 25 (November 7), he participated in a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), which determined the structure and name of the new Soviet government. On the afternoon of October 25, he carried out Lenin’s instructions and was not present at the meeting of the Central Committee. Radzinsky E. Stalin. M., 1997

Chapter III. Civil and Great Patriotic War

3.1 Civil War

After the victory of the October Revolution, Stalin joined the Council of People's Commissars as People's Commissar for Nationalities. At this time, the Civil War was flaring up in Russia. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Stalin was elected a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. On the night of October 28, at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District, he took part in the development of a plan for the defeat of the troops of A.F. Kerensky and P.N. Krasnov, who were advancing on Petrograd. On October 28, Lenin and Stalin signed a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars banning the publication of “all newspapers closed by the Military Revolutionary Committee.”

On November 29, Stalin joined the Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), which also included Lenin, Trotsky and Sverdlov. This body was given “the right to resolve all emergency matters, but with the mandatory involvement of all members of the Central Committee who were in Smolny at that moment in the decision.” At the same time, Stalin was re-elected to the editorial board of Pravda. In November - December 1917, Stalin mainly worked at the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. On November 2 (15), 1917, Stalin, together with Lenin, signed the “Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia.”

In April 1918, Stalin, together with H. G. Rakovsky and D. Z. Manuilsky in Kursk, negotiated with representatives of the Ukrainian Central Rada on concluding a peace treaty.

During the Civil War from October 8, 1918 to July 8, 1919 and from May 18, 1920 to April 1, 1922, Stalin was also a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR. Stalin was also a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Western, Southern, and Southwestern Fronts.

As noted by Doctor of Historical and Military Sciences M. M. Gareev, during the Civil War Stalin gained extensive experience in the military-political leadership of large masses of troops on many fronts, the defense of Tsaritsyn, Petrograd, on the fronts against Denikin, Wrangel, the White Poles, etc.

In May 1918, after the outbreak of the civil war due to the aggravation of the food situation in the country, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR appointed Stalin responsible for food supplies in the south of Russia and was sent as an extraordinary commissioner of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the procurement and export of grain from the North Caucasus to industrial centers. Arriving in Tsaritsyn on June 6, 1918, Stalin took power in the city into his own hands. He took part not only in the political, but also in the operational and tactical leadership of the district.

At this time, in July 1918, the Don Army of Ataman P.N. Krasnov launched its first attack on Tsaritsyn. On July 22, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District was created, of which Stalin became its chairman. The council also included K. E. Voroshilov and S. K. Minin. Stalin, having taken charge of the city's defense, showed a penchant for tough measures.

The first military measures taken by the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District, headed by Stalin, resulted in defeats for the Red Army. At the end of July, the White Guards captured Torgovaya and Velikoknyazheskaya, and in connection with this, Tsaritsyn’s connection with the North Caucasus was interrupted. After the failure of the Red Army offensive on August 10-15, Krasnov’s army surrounded Tsaritsyn on three sides. The group of General A.P. Fitzkhelaurov broke through the front north of Tsaritsyn, occupying Erzovka and Pichuzhinskaya. This allowed them to reach the Volga and disrupt the connection between the Soviet leadership in Tsaritsyn and Moscow.

Thus, blaming “military experts” for the defeats, Stalin carried out large-scale arrests and executions. In his speech at the VIII Congress on March 21, 1919, Lenin condemned Stalin for the executions in Tsaritsyn.

At the same time, from August 8, the group of General K.K. Mamontov was advancing in the central sector. On August 18-20, military clashes took place on the near approaches to Tsaritsyn, as a result of which Mamontov’s group was stopped, and on August 20, the Red Army troops with a sudden blow drove the enemy north of Tsaritsyn and by August 22 liberated Erzovka and Pichuzhinskaya. On August 26, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire front. By September 7, the White troops were driven back beyond the Don; at the same time, they lost about 12 thousand killed and captured.

In September, the White Cossack command decided to launch a new attack on Tsaritsyn and carried out additional mobilization. The Soviet command took measures to strengthen the defense and improve command and control of troops. By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of September 11, 1918, the Southern Front was created, the commander of which was P. P. Sytin. Stalin became a member of the RVS of the Southern Front until October 19, K. E. Voroshilov until October 3, K. A. Mekhonoshin from October 3, A. I. Okulov from October 14.

On September 19, 1918, in a telegram sent from Moscow to Tsaritsyn to front commander Voroshilov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin and Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front Stalin, in particular, noted: “Soviet Russia notes with admiration the heroic exploits of the communist and revolutionary regiments of Kharchenko, Kolpakov, Bulatkin’s cavalry, Alyabyev’s armored trains, Volga Military Flotilla.”

Meanwhile, on September 17, General Denisov's troops launched a new attack on the city. The most fierce fighting took place from September 27 to 30. October 3 J.V. Stalin and K.E. Voroshilov send a telegram to V.I. Lenin demanding that the Central Committee discuss the issue of Trotsky’s actions, which threaten the collapse of the Southern Front. On October 6, Stalin leaves for Moscow. October 8 By resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, J.V. Stalin is appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. October 11 J.V. Stalin returns from Moscow to Tsaritsyn. On October 17, 1918, having suffered heavy losses from the fire of Red Army batteries and armored trains, the Whites retreated. October 18 J.V. Stalin telegraphs V.I. Lenin about the defeat of the Red troops near Tsaritsyn. October 19 J.V. Stalin leaves Tsaritsyn for Moscow. Laszlo Belady and Tamás Kraus. Stalin. M.: Politizdat, 1989

In January 1919, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky traveled to Vyatka to investigate the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army near Perm and the surrender of the city to the forces of Admiral Kolchak. Stalin's Dzerzhinsky Commission contributed to the reorganization and restoration of combat effectiveness of the broken 3rd Army; however, in general, the situation on the Perm front was corrected by the fact that Ufa was taken by the Red Army, and Kolchak already on January 6 gave the order to concentrate forces in the Ufa direction and move to defense near Perm.

In the summer of 1919, Stalin organized resistance to the Polish offensive on the Western Front, in Smolensk.

By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 27, 1919, Stalin was awarded the first Order of the Red Banner “in commemoration of his services in the defense of Petrograd and selfless work on the Southern Front.” Svetigor S. Living Stalin. - M.: Crimean Bridge, 2003.

Created on the initiative of Stalin, the First Cavalry Army led by S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov, E. A. Shchadenko, supported by the armies of the Southern Front, defeated Denikin’s troops. After the defeat of Denikin's troops, Stalin led the restoration of the destroyed economy in Ukraine. In February - March 1920, he headed the Council of the Ukrainian Labor Army and led the mobilization of the population for coal mining. World Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary. -- M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 1998

During the period May 26 - September 1, 1920, Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front as a representative of the RVSR. There he led the breakthrough of the Polish front, the liberation of Kyiv and the advance of the Red Army to Lvov. On August 13, Stalin refused to carry out the directive of the commander-in-chief based on the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on August 5 to transfer the 1st Cavalry and 12th Armies to help the Western Front. During the decisive Battle of Warsaw on August 13-25, 1920, the troops of the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat, which changed the course of the Soviet-Polish war. On September 23, at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b), Stalin tried to blame the failure near Warsaw on Commander-in-Chief Kamenev and front commander Tukhachevsky, but Lenin reproached Stalin for his biased attitude towards them.

In the same 1920, Stalin participated in the defense of southern Ukraine from the offensive of Wrangel’s troops. Stalin's instructions formed the basis of Frunze's operational plan, according to which Wrangel's troops were defeated. Volkov F.D. Stalin: rise and fall. M., 1995.

More than a month and a half before the start of the war, from May 6, 1941, Stalin held the position of head of the USSR government, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. By the day of Germany's attack on the USSR, Stalin was still one of the six secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

3.2 Patriotic War

A number of historians blame Stalin personally for the unpreparedness of the Soviet Union for war and the huge losses, especially in the initial period of the war, despite the fact that many sources named Stalin June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack. Other historians take the opposite point of view, including because Stalin received conflicting data with a large discrepancy in dates. According to Colonel V.N. Karpov, an employee of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, “intelligence did not name the exact date, they did not say unequivocally that the war would begin on June 22. No one doubted that war was inevitable, but no one had a clear idea of when exactly and how will it begin? Stalin had no doubt about the inevitability of war, but the deadlines called by reconnaissance passed, and it did not begin. A version arose that England was spreading these rumors in order to push Hitler against the USSR. That’s why Stalin’s resolutions like “Isn’t this a British provocation?” appeared on intelligence reports. Researcher A.V. Isaev states: “intelligence officers and analysts, with a lack of information, made conclusions that did not reflect reality... Stalin simply did not have information that could be 100% trusted.” Former employee of the NKVD of the USSR Sudoplatov P. A. recalled that in May 1941, in the office of the German Ambassador W. Schulenburg, Soviet intelligence services installed listening devices, as a result of which, a few days before the war, information was received about Germany’s intention to attack the SSS. According to the historian O. A. Rzheshevsky, on June 17, 1941, the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR P. M. Fitin presented a special message from Berlin to I. V. Stalin: “All military measures in Germany to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR are completely completed, a blow can be expected at any time.” According to the version common in historical works, on June 15, 1941, Richard Sorge radioed to Moscow about the exact date of the start of the Great Patriotic War, June 22, 1941. According to the representative of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service V.N. Karpov, Sorge’s telegram about the date of the attack on the USSR on June 22 is a fake, created under Khrushchev, and Sorge named several dates for the attack on the USSR, which were never confirmed.

The day after the start of the war, on June 23, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, by a joint resolution, formed the Headquarters of the Main Command, which included Stalin and whose chairman was appointed People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko. On June 24, Stalin signed a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the creation of an Evacuation Council, designed to organize the evacuation of “the population, institutions, military and other cargo, enterprise equipment and other valuables” of the western part of the USSR.

A week after the start of the war on June 30, Stalin was appointed Chairman of the newly formed State Defense Committee. On July 3, Stalin made a radio address to the Soviet people, beginning with the words: “Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, soldiers of our army and navy! I am addressing you, my friends!” On July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and Stalin was appointed chairman instead of Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko.

July 18, Stalin signs the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the organization of the struggle in the rear of German troops,” which sets the task of creating unbearable conditions for the Nazi invaders, disorganizing their communications, transport and military units themselves, disrupting all their activities, destroying the invaders and their accomplices, to help in every possible way the creation of mounted and foot partisan detachments, sabotage and extermination groups, to develop a network of Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to lead all actions against the fascist occupiers.

On July 19, 1941, Stalin replaced Timoshenko as People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. On August 8, 1941, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

July 30, 1941 Stalin receives the personal representative and closest adviser of US President Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins. December 16 - 20 in Moscow, Stalin negotiates with British Foreign Minister A. Eden on the issue of concluding an agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on an alliance in the war against Germany and on post-war cooperation.

During the war period, Stalin - as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - signed a number of orders that cause mixed assessments by modern historians. Thus, in the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 270 dated August 16, 1941, signed by Stalin, it was stated: “Commanders and political workers who, during battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy, are considered malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest as a family of deserters who violated the oath and betrayed their homeland.” Also controversial is the so-called tightening of discipline in the Red Army, prohibiting the withdrawal of troops without orders from the leadership, introducing penal battalions as part of the fronts and penal companies as part of the armies, as well as barrage detachments within the armies. Churchill W. The Second World War. M. 1991

During the Battle of Moscow in 1941, after Moscow was declared under a state of siege, Stalin remained in the capital. On November 6, 1941, Stalin spoke at a ceremonial meeting held at the Mayakovskaya metro station, which was dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution. In his speech, Stalin explained the unsuccessful start of the war for the Red Army, in particular, to the “shortage of tanks and partly aviation.” The next day, November 7, 1941, at the direction of Stalin, a traditional military parade was held on Red Square.

During the Great Patriotic War, Stalin went to the front several times to the front lines. In 1941-1942, the commander-in-chief visited the Mozhaisky, Zvenigorod, Solnechnogorsk defensive lines, and was also in the hospital in the Volokolamsk direction - in the 16th Army of K. Rokossovsky, where he examined the work of the BM-13 (Katyusha) rocket launchers, was in the 316th division of I.V. Panfilov. October 16 (according to other sources - in mid-November) Stalin goes to the front line to a field hospital on the Volokolamsk highway near the village of Lenino, Istrinsky district, Moscow region, to the division of General A.P. Beloborodov, talks with the wounded, awards soldiers with orders and medals of the USSR . Three days after the parade on November 7, 1941, Stalin went to the Volokolamsk Highway to inspect the combat readiness of one of the divisions that had arrived from Siberia. In July 1941, Stalin left to familiarize himself with the state of affairs of the Western Front, which at that time included the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies in the conditions of the advance of the German invaders to the Western Dvina and Dniester. Later, Stalin, together with a member of the Military Council of the Western Front, N.A. Bulganin, left to familiarize himself with the Volokolamsk-Maloyaroslavets defense line. In 1942, Stalin traveled across the Lama River to the airfield to test the aircraft. On August 2 and 3, 1943, he arrived on the Western Front to General V.D. Sokolovsky and Bulganin. On August 4 and 5 he was on the Kalinin Front with General A. I. Eremenko. On August 5, Stalin is on the front line in the village of Khoroshevo, Rzhevsky district, Tver region. As A.T. Rybin, an employee of the commander-in-chief’s personal security, writes: “According to the observation of Stalin’s personal security, during the war, Stalin behaved recklessly. Members of the Politburo and N. Vlasik literally drove him into shelter from flying fragments exploding in the air

On May 30, 1942, Stalin signed the GKO decree on the creation of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On September 5, 1942, he issues an order “On the tasks of the partisan movement,” which became a program document for the further organization of the struggle behind the invaders’ lines.

On August 21, 1943, Stalin signed the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation." On November 25, Stalin, accompanied by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and a member of the State Defense Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov, travels to Stalingrad and Baku, from where he flies by plane to Tehran (Iran). From November 28 to December 1, 1943, Stalin participated in the Tehran Conference - the first conference of the Big Three during the Second World War - the leaders of three countries: the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. February 4 - 11, 1945 Stalin participates in the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers, dedicated to the establishment of the post-war world order.

On May 8, 1945, Stalin signed Resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 8450-s “On providing food assistance to the population of Berlin,” including the supply of milk to the children of Berlin.

There is a well-known assessment given to J.V. Stalin in the book of Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”:

“I can firmly say that J.V. Stalin mastered the basic principles of organizing front-line operations and operations of groups of fronts and led them with knowledge of the matter, was well versed in large strategic issues... In leading the armed struggle as a whole, J.V. Stalin was helped by his natural mind , experience in political leadership, rich intuition, broad awareness. He knew how to find the main link in a strategic situation and, seizing on it, counter the enemy, carry out one or another offensive operation. Undoubtedly, he was a worthy Supreme Commander." Stalin I.V. Works. T. 13. -- M.

During the war, Stalin was awarded two Orders of Victory and the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree. On March 6, 1943, Stalin was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. On June 26, 1945, for military services (“who led the fight against Hitler’s Germany”), Stalin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; on June 27, 1945, Stalin was awarded the highest military rank, specially introduced the day before, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The Stalinist type, unfortunately, and not only due to intimidation, the threat of reprisals, but also due to the obedient following of this “example” (even in clothing), as well as a misunderstanding of the appearance and image of a strong and majestic autocrat, have become in many ways (while remaining understandably, very original and unique) followed by major and not so major leaders and leaders in other socialist countries. This was manifested in the nature of activity, style of behavior, and lifestyle of Mao Zedong, Josip Broz Tito, Nicolae Ceausescu, Enver Hoxha, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and others.

Between V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin there were common features that united them, and distinguished them, which were opposite to them.

Firstly, V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin both worked for the country. That is why the USSR became a great superpower, an invincible socialist country. And V.I. Lenin did not doubt J.V. Stalin about this when he wrote about him in the famous “Letter to the Congress.”

I.V. Stalin’s desire for personal power, especially for immense power, was noticed by V.I. Lenin by the end of 1922. In “Letter to the Congress” he wrote: “Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary General, concentrated in his hands the immense power, and I’m not sure whether he will always be able to use this power carefully enough.” This Leninist fear was justified: J.V. Stalin’s abuse of power caused enormous damage to the cause of building socialism in the USSR, to the prestige and authority of socialism in the world.

I.V. Stalin is a subtle and cunning politician and intriguer, primarily a practical organizer, in theoretical and cultural terms he limits himself to the most necessary, even the minimum, by nature and character he is rude (as V.I. Lenin noted), tough and cruel, which manifested itself in the repressions he organized, primarily against his opponents and generally arguing, debating, thinking people (whom V.I. Lenin was not “afraid of,” but, on the contrary, relied on them, worked with them, surrounded himself with them, supported and raised their).

Because of this, the enormous wealth of Lenin’s plan for creation, the construction of socialism (which primarily included increasing the initiative of the people, creativity and self-realization of man, scientific and technological progress, scientific organization of labor, scientific and democratic management of the national economy, increasing creativity and democracy of Councils at all levels, focus for the final formation of a new highly developed and democratic civilization) I.V. Stalin reduced it to a primitive, but, of course, important “troika”: industrialization of the country, agricultural cooperation (and by violent means), “cultural revolution”.

The creation of such a moral atmosphere was facilitated by the social policy of the Soviet state, which was expressed not only in the expropriation of private property, but also in the establishment of justice in relation to the old and sick, in the elimination of sharp gaps in wages and other material living conditions. So on October 19, 1923, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RCP approved a circular “On the fight against excesses and criminal use of official position by party members,” which contained a requirement to combat the decay of the least stable communists.

The very spirit of the revolution, the moral impulse of which was communist unselfishness, the very living example of the people raised by it to the heights of power, could not help but leave an imprint on the morals not only of the first years of the revolution, but also of subsequent years, wrote V.Z. Rogovin in the brochure “Aesthetic legacy of V.I. Lenin and his associates” (1986). There could be no talk of material privileges and excesses, because development was subordinated to the establishment of a healthy social and psychological climate in society. For V.I. Lenin and his comrades, these issues were practically resolved once and for all, due to which modesty and unpretentiousness in everyday life remained an organic feature of their moral make-up even in the years when the country recovered from the poverty and disasters of the era of military communism.

V.I. Lenin's comrades were characterized by unity of word and deed and what can be called moral scrupulousness in matters relating to the slightest material advantages associated with their official position. One of the oldest Bolsheviks, M.S. Olminsky, having learned about several cases of gifts being presented to higher organizations and individuals, wrote a harsh article about this in the press. In it, he first of all recalled V.I. Lenin’s answer to the workers of the Stodolsk cloth factory who sent him gifts: “I’ll tell you a secret that you shouldn’t send me gifts. I kindly ask that this secret request be widely shared with all workers.”

Like V.I. Lenin’s closest associates, many of their immediate successors were guided in their personal behavior by fundamental political motives, exhaustively expressed in the thought repeatedly repeated by F.E. Dzerzhinsky: “We, communists, must live in such a way that the broadest masses of working people see that We are not a caste that has seized power for the sake of personal interests, not a new aristocracy, but servants of the people.”

Referring to the differences in the appearance and style of behavior of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, the famous historian V.V. Pokhlebkin noted in I.V. Stalin “a fundamental difference in his character and methods of action from Lenin’s.

Lenin never allowed even the slightest insincerity in his behavior - both with enemies and especially with like-minded friends.

Stalin used insincerity as a powerful weapon, as a means of disorientation - in the political and in the “personnel” struggle, regardless of who his counterparty was.”

The researcher of Stalinism B.P. Kurashvili, recognizing the real enormous merits of I.V. Stalin and condemning his tragic mistakes, noted the main thing: “He, both objectively and according to his own understanding, is far from Lenin... We must come to terms with the fact that Stalin, not being the second Lenin, will act in this unattainably high quality - as “Lenin today.”

Stunning thoughts that reveal the nature of the influence of the activities and personalities of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin on the development of literature and culture in the Soviet Union, on the creative atmosphere and relationships of people were outlined by the famous Soviet writer and head of the Writers' Union A.A. Fadeev in a suicide letter dated May 13, 1956, entitled “To the Central Committee of the CPSU,” before committing suicide. The letter was first published at the end of 1999.

Here are excerpts from it: “With what a sense of freedom and openness of the world my generation entered literature under Lenin, what immense forces were in the soul and what beautiful works we created and could still create!

After Lenin’s death, we were reduced to the position of boys, destroyed, ideologically frightened and called it “partyism”... Literature - this highest fruit of our system - was humiliated, persecuted, ruined. The complacency of the nouveau riche with the great Leninist teaching, even when they swear by it, by this teaching, led to complete distrust of them on my part, because one can expect even worse from them than from the satrap Stalin. He was at least educated, but these were ignoramuses.

My life, as a writer, loses all meaning, and with great joy, as a deliverance from this vile existence, where meanness, lies and slander fall upon you, I am leaving this life.

The last hope was to at least say this to the people who rule the state, but for the past 3 years, despite my requests, they cannot even accept me.”

Fidel Castro, in terms of the scale of his political, state and international activities, is the most striking personality put forward by post-war history. A man generously gifted by nature with intelligence, unbending will, determination, and extraordinary capacity for work, who received a classical liberal arts university education and accumulated encyclopedic knowledge and experience over decades of hard work, he grew into a major political thinker and strategist. Over the course of five decades of active political activity, F. Castro demonstrated flexibility and an enviable ability to get out of the most difficult and hopeless situations from the point of view of “common sense.”

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There is no need to talk about Stalin's youth. It is known that he was born in Gori (Georgia) in 1879, into a poor family. They say his father abused him as a child. Later he attended a theological seminary in Tiflis, preparing clergy for the Christian church. On the eve of graduation, he was expelled from the seminary, apparently because, while studying there, he was also a member of an underground Marxist circle.

Thirteen years have passed since Stalin was expelled from the seminary, and in 1912 he finds himself in the highest echelons of the Bolshevik party and begins work outside his native Caucasus. The official records of his activities and movements during these thirteen years are extremely inaccurate and confusing. Ambiguity, omissions, contradictions, inconsistencies, deviations in different directions - this is what characterized official Soviet historians in various periods. All this gives reason to assume that his real biography contains many facts that neither Stalin nor his followers, for some reason, would like to submit for careful study by historians.

Nevertheless, three hypotheses have been put forward to explain the situation. One of them is that Stalin sought to keep his party activities secret during the mentioned period of time. Another says that he was involved in criminal fraud with party funds. Finding out his actions in those years, of course, would not correspond to the carefully created image of a great statesman. According to the third hypothesis, he was an ordinary police informer, or at least his relationship with the Tsarist secret police was at such a level that it would be difficult to explain. My own opinion on this issue is that, in essence, all three of these hypotheses had some degree of truth.

A few years ago, a document was made public that is believed to have been taken from the archives of the Tsarist secret police in Siberia. If this is a genuine document, it proves beyond any doubt that Stalin was a police informer between 1906 and 1912. However, everyone, with the exception of two old party members now in exile in the West, expressed the belief that this document was false.

In order to make sure, I conducted a survey among these people and did not find a single one among them who would not claim that Stalin was capable of betraying his party comrades out of envy or revenge. However, they doubted that he could do this for money or political reasons. And they attach much more importance to this quality of Stalin than you and I would.

I devoted a lot of time to studying this document and everything connected with it. All I can say now is that if it is not genuine - and indeed, there are a number of serious doubts about this - then an explanation is required as to where and how this document received the right to exist in the first place. The paper and ink make it impossible to consider it as a recent fake. At the same time, it is well known that immediately after the revolution and in the 20s, reactionary White Guard centers were in full swing to fabricate anti-Bolshevik documents. These people had a very vague idea of the development of the revolutionary movement, and their ignorance was visible to the naked eye in their works. However, the author of this document was well versed in the affairs of revolutionaries and the activities of the police.

Nevertheless, all this could have happened. After all, it is absolutely clear that during these troubled thirteen years, Stalin made a career in Bolshevik revolutionary circles in the Caucasus or among their political neighbors. He most likely joined the party in 1904. It is also possible that in 1907 he was expelled from the party by the local Menshevik majority due to his direct participation in acts of banditry and blackmail. Three or four times he was expelled from the Caucasus by the tsarist police, but always, until 1912, his exiles were characterized by mild and lenient conditions. Stalin attended three party meetings held outside the Caucasus: one in Finland, another in Stockholm, and a third in London. In 1907, when he appeared for the second time at the congress, the Mensheviks staged a detailed examination of his mandate, and Lenin, who had supported Stalin's admission to the congress despite the obvious inconclusiveness of his mandate, was forced to admit, or at least declare on the floor where there was a conference that this person was completely unknown to him.

In addition, there is a lot of convincing evidence that confirms that Stalin, even in those early years, was known to his comrades in the Caucasus as a troublemaker and troublemaker, as a man who could very skillfully incite feelings of resentment and suspicion among his loved ones, provoke quarrels or acts violence, satisfying his sense of revenge on those people who stood in his way.

In 1912, for reasons still unclear, Stalin was suddenly nominated to become a member of the Central Committee, which was now controlled by the Bolshevik Party. The disengagement with the Mensheviks had already been completed by this time. If in the past his attitude towards the party was unclear, then, from now on, it became completely sincere. The controversial document suggests that from that time on Stalin stopped supplying information to the Tsarist police. The turning point in his career, which now brought him to a position of high respect and responsibility in the party, may have been the reason why the police suddenly stopped treating him softly and leniently. The following year, 1913, he was actually exiled to Eastern Siberia, where he spent four long years until the revolutionary uprising in 1917.

When Stalin, liberated by the first Russian revolution, returned to Petrograd and resumed his activities as a high-ranking party official, he did not completely abandon contacts with the prominent representatives of the cosmopolitan wing of the party to whom I referred earlier. His previous experience in the central bodies of the party, located outside the Caucasus, was very insignificant and dates back to a period of four or five years ago. For the people who surrounded him - such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin - Stalin was at that time an almost unknown figure. N. N. Sukhanov, a well-known patron of the revolution, mentioned him in his memoirs as a person who represented a “gray spot” against the background of the events of 1917 - for this taunt, by the way, Sukhanov later paid with his life in one of Stalin’s concentration camps camps. The intellectuals who made up the overwhelming majority in Lenin's entourage were much better educated than Stalin, more educated, and better known in the revolutionary movement for their outstanding services. These were great figures of the revolution. However, their fates were dramatic. Stalin was a simple, colorless person in the party administrative apparatus. He couldn’t even speak Russian correctly; throughout his life he had never been able to get rid of his strong accent and, naturally, did not know a single foreign word. He did not shine with originality in the intellectual and literary sense. He completely lacked personal charm and oratory.

If we compare all these facts with what we know about Stalin today, we will get a true description of this figure. This man was possessed, as his own records of the thirties testify, by an insatiable vanity and thirst for power, which were combined with an acute sense of his own inferiority and a burning envy of the intellectual qualities of his comrades, which he himself did not possess. The well-known characteristics of the Caucasian mountaineers, to whom they say his father belonged, were clearly manifested in him - extraordinary hot temper, endless vindictiveness, the inability to ever forget an insult or disrespect, but with great patience and extraordinary hypocrisy he chose the moment to alone, well with a prepared blow to settle scores with a person he dislikes. They say that he once remarked that there is nothing more pleasant in the world than choosing a favorable moment for revenge, plunging a knife into the body of an enemy, turning it there around its axis and going home to sleep with a clear conscience. At the same time, let me note, he was an extremely talented man in the field of political tactics and intrigue, an excellent actor, a brilliant hypocrite, a master of choosing the right time and a highly qualified specialist in the art of “dosing” - he carried out his plans gradually, carefully determining the intensity of the movement of evidence in each individual case. He was a great specialist in bringing political forces and people together to satisfy his selfish interests. Of course, he didn't plunge the knife himself. He knew ways to get others to do it for him. He only observed with gentle impartiality, and his gaze sometimes expressed pain and indignation.

If we picture to ourselves a man with a similar temperament, and then imagine the situation in which we saw him find himself immediately after the revolution, it is not difficult to predict why he had to use methods whose purpose was to strengthen his activities as head of state . First of all, he very subtly felt his isolation from the world of ideas into which other party leaders were widely drawn. He could not accept the fact that they had extensive knowledge and solid political baggage. This was the world of international socialism, the center of which was Germany, not Russia. And it was populated mainly by German-speaking people: Germans, Austrians, or overwhelmingly members of the Jewish socialist movement in Poland. All these were people living in their own home, located in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But Stalin did not belong to this world, and the worst thing for him was that he knew about it. The values of this world were not his values. He knew that of its own free will, this world would never respect or support him. And Stalin decided to win him over by cunning, intimidation, using internal contradictions, directing against him the forces of the underground communist movement of Russia and young communists who joined the party after the revolution under the influence of its political success. These forces, which entered the political arena later, like himself, did not have close spiritual ties with the older party intellectuals.

In the first years after the revolution, former exiles still occupied central positions in the political and ideological organs of the party. Therefore, Stalin had to act against them with the greatest caution. If he attacks them prematurely and gradually, they will organize against him not only their influential supporters in Russia, but also their admirers and friends abroad. And then he will be isolated. They will separate from it the whole great socialist movement of Europe, to which they have access and influence there. After all, Russian communism was born from this movement, in which he now sought leadership, trying to break the umbilical cord connecting them, without which, however, it would have been significantly weakened, and the revolution in Russia would have had no ideological meaning.

Stalin was well aware of this danger. She seriously worried him. He never lost sight of this danger, even in his later years. And even after his power in Russia became undeniable, the false assertion was strongly encouraged and supported that at least the largest, most ideological and virtuous part of the European socialist movement warmly supported his regime in Russia and contemplated it with admiration and devotion. And this pretense, like nothing else, exposed Stalin’s greatest anxiety. The period from Lenin's death in 1924 until his own death in 1953 was not an easy one for his rivals in Russia, whom he kept firmly under control with the help of his professional party apparatus and the police. Nevertheless, he was always haunted by the fear that the opposition would one day manage to organize the spiritual forces of socialism abroad against him and that his rule would collapse, and he personally would be brutally dealt with.

These nightmares, which haunted him day and night, were the breeding ground from which the motivation for developing Stalin's political course flowed. This is also where his aversion to spontaneous but successful revolutions carried out by any foreign communist parties was born. He was clearly aware that no matter how long these parties remained in the ranks of struggling opposition groups involved in the sphere of their own semi-criminal resistance to the ruling regime within each individual country, they would always be dependent on Soviet support and assistance, depending on which he, as the head of state will use it to keep them under his control. Their conditions will resemble those of his previous activities in the Caucasus, and he will know how to deal with them. If, on the other hand, they manage to seize power and gain the opportunity to manage the potential of a great country in the same way as he manages the potential of a great country, such dependence will disappear. From this premise comes his firm belief in the tight control of foreign communist parties at the expense of their moral values, popular slogans and prospects for coming to power. The longer he can control in this way at least part of the foreign communist and socialist movements, he will be confident that he will be able to prevent the growth within that part of a defiant and hostile unity, in particular the alliance between his opponents at home and abroad, which caused he has a feeling of cold, abiding fear until death.

Of course, Stalin was afraid not only of the world of international socialism and communism, which he had to fight. Next to this world existed the bourgeois world - the so-called "capitalist encirclement", which also represented a mortal danger for it if capitalist hostility again took the form, as it did in 1917 and 1918, of war and military intervention.

It is very important to emphasize that during the decades of Stalin's rule, the danger of military action by capitalist countries against the Soviet Union was sometimes real, sometimes imaginary. There were times when Russia was really threatened, mainly by Germany and Japan, but there was also a time when absolutely no one threatened Russia.

However, these fluctuations in the level of external danger did not in any way affect the interpretation of the realities of world politics, which Stalin put forward for domestic consumption. He presented Russia to his supporters as a country against which aggression was being prepared, without taking into account whether this version had any basis or not. In addition, he made every effort to introduce his personal fears and suspicions into the public consciousness, namely, fear of the opposition of foreign socialists and communists and fear of capitalist intervention.

Why did he do this? He did this because one of his fears required a worthy attitude towards himself, the other did not. One concerned the favorable development of the communist movement and the country as a whole, the other affected his personal interests. He was eager to hide his fear of international socialism and communism and carefully disguised the measures he took to protect himself from fear, covering them with increased concern for the security of the Soviet Union. It was to this end that he went to great lengths to identify his communist and socialist rivals with the hostile bourgeois forces, calling the German social democrats "social fascists", confusing and accusing Trotsky with Hitler of the nightmarish invention of the purge test, coercing his communist victims with monotonous regularity, lasting for years, claim that they are agents of foreign invaders. After such “atonement for sins” and self-abasement, they were shot.

However, one should not be mistaken as to which of these fears, admitted or hidden, threatening the Soviet state or one’s own position, was greater. Trotsky and the forces he represented were what worried Stalin most. Hitler mainly served as a cover. That is why his measures to protect against Hitler's attack were simply ineffective and did not meet the requirements of the time. Stalin was determined that capitalist intervention was simply an artificially created scarecrow, and did not take the real situation into account at all. And then, when the ghost was embodied in flesh and blood and became a terrible reality on the day of the invasion of German troops into Russia in 1941, this man, who had been shouting so long and persistently about a false alarm, on that same day, perhaps for the first time in his life, found himself completely helpless and completely paralyzed, lost his composure, and his entourage had to help him out of trouble.

When I talk about such things, I do not at all believe that Stalin pursued an unrealistic course against the bourgeois world and did not defend Russia’s interests in relations with it. This man had an unusually broad and subtle understanding of political issues and events occurring in the world. It was very difficult to deceive him. He clearly understood the power of the non-communist world. He perceived her in the traditional manner of a Soviet party leader, considered her a hostile force, looked at her without sympathy and pity, and dealt with her no less cold-bloodedly than with the forces that make up the world communist movement.

But here, too, the main motive of his activity remained the defense of his own positions. Sometimes his personal interests coincided with the interests of the Soviet state, which competed with the bourgeois world. Sometimes, as we will soon see, they did not coincide. But in any case, the coincidence or divergence of personal and state interests did not matter. The protection of personal interests always came first, and this was the key to Stalin's diplomacy.

This prejudice led, in essence, to a very simple policy. Both the bourgeois world and his circle in the world of communism, Stalin wanted exclusively one thing - weakness. However, weakness was not identified with revolution. Even though some states were very small and adjacent to Russia's borders, this gave him good prospects of controlling them with the same secret political methods that he used within his own country. Stalin didn't want them to become communist. He cared only about one thing - that they were weak and fought not against his regime, but against each other. For this reason, his favorite strategy can be accurately defined in one phrase - “divide and conquer.” This political course was embedded in his subconscious and originated in his personal life, which boiled down to dividing opponents and provoking unfriendly actions.

This strategy was applied equally against all external forces without exception: communists, socialists, capitalists. It was applied both within national borders and internationally. It was used against both social and political entities. This was a policy of general fragmentation of opposition forces, which, if sometimes restrained, was only for a short time and based on tactical considerations. In other words, she knew neither boundaries nor prohibitions.

The communist was pitted against the communist, but the communist was also pitted against the capitalist. Country was opposed to country, poor to rich, liberal to conservative, labor to capital, and also labor to labor, colored to white, developed to undeveloped, inferiority to superiority, weakness to strength.

Stalin practically did not strive to introduce at least some variety into the implementation of his policies. It was always pleasant for him to throw apples of discord with which nature generously provided the human community. His agents were well trained to find differences between people and use them to their maximum advantage. As a rule, Stalin was of little interest in what his opponents were fighting for; the main thing was that they fought against each other. He was not an ideological figure who generated new doctrines. He knew that theoretical ideas meant practical actions for many people. No one understood better than he the true value of ideas, no one better than him used the political-emotional impulses that these ideas brought to the fore. But Stalin remained aloof from such manifestations, he only understood them. In their essence, ideas had no value for him personally. They acted only as determinants of action, as symbols, as a logical basis for political relations. Thus, he could be and he was a sophisticated operator who masterfully applied his subversive tactics. Everything that did not come from him must be reduced to nothing. The only thing you could see was that the erosion of positions and the defeat of one side did not occur as noticeably and quickly as the other side would like and would give it the opportunity to celebrate the victory that it gained with little blood. No force should be neutralized until it has completed its destructive work.

These principles were widely applied in both domestic and foreign policy, since Stalin did not see the difference between these two areas of his activity. For him there was no boundary between external and internal affairs. By his own convictions he was the enemy of the rest of the world. The Russian people and the Russian Communist Party, it seemed to him, were as much his enemies as the German Trotskyists and the Yugoslav regents or world capitalism. Just like the game itself remained until the second

The world war was formally a conspiratorial organization in Russia, working among the people and against the people, and Stalin’s personal secretariat was carefully concealed among the party and acted against it.

But here it should be emphasized that outside of Russia, Stalin's power was extremely limited. Of course, from time to time he could commit a kidnapping or murder of a person he disliked under the noses of the capitalist police, but such things were expensive, difficult to carry out and very dangerous. In Russia, such restrictions did not exist. It was in this country that all his subconscious ambitions and rudeness poured out. Today we know quite well what we could only suspect previously: he was an inveterate criminal who acted without any restrictions; a person who completely lacked a sense of love, pity and mercy; a person around whom no one felt safe; a man who opposed himself to everything that did not serve his interests at the moment; a man who posed the greatest danger to all his closest friends and partners in crime, since he preferred to be the sole keeper of his own secrets and did not like to share memories and responsibilities with others who, while still alive, had a tongue and a conscience and could simply show ordinary humanity weakness.

As the outlines of Stalin's personal deeds began to blur and disappear in the fog of confusion in which the author so deftly entangled them throughout his life, we had at our disposal a record of some of his affairs, next to which the most savage murders seem banal. I do not seek to list all the crimes of this man. Trotsky seriously accused Stalin of poisoning Lenin. Undoubtedly, he wanted to give Lenin poison. It is clear that he either killed his young wife himself in 1932, or drove her to suicide in his presence. Most likely, and this has now been confirmed, it was Stalin who was the mastermind of the murder of the number two man in the party - S. M. Kirov in 1934. We can only guess how many high-ranking members of Stalin’s closest circle, occupying supposedly strong positions, laid down their heads as a result of the disastrous actions of the leader.
ate of the leader’s disastrous actions, we can only guess. I started in eh, including pi-

Ariu" and in pairs
tii Sergo Ordzhonikidze and A. A. Zhdanov. However, the death of the latter is controversial. And there is no doubt that the man who split Trotsky’s skull with an ax in Mexico City in 1940 acted at the instigation of Stalin. As a response to criticism expressed by some of the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, Stalin shot 1,108 of the 1,966 congress delegates during the subsequent purge in 1934-38. Of the 139 active members of the Central Committee and elected by the 17th Party Congress, he shot 98 people - the overwhelming majority of those in the party body, which allegedly contributed to the strengthening of his power. The deaths of members of the Central Committee are only a small part of those deaths that are counted and which are the result of the purge of the party ranks that took place during that period of time. Most of the victims were high-ranking officials of the party, army and Soviet state apparatus.

Crimes in the upper echelons of power were committed along with the ruthless destruction of ordinary people, especially during the process of collectivization and during some military operations that were developed directly by Stalin. The number of victims who lost their lives was in the millions. At the same time, I do not mention destroyed families, crippled childhoods and millions of people whose lives were distorted: who survived difficult trials only to then drag out a miserable existence with broken health and spiritual destruction.

In a word, such excesses far exceeded the line that determined the protection of a person’s personal interests. Sometimes it seemed that manifestations of misanthropy were generated by a mentally disabled person. Much of what Stalin did was not at all in Russia's interests. And the other part of his actions was in complete contradiction with these interests. Of course, in some respects, Russia enjoyed the fruits of the indisputability of Stalin's greatness. But, on the other hand, it was necessary to pay for leadership both within the country and outside its borders, which is still being done not only by Russia, but by the whole world as a whole.

It may be too early to draw conclusions today. That is why one of the fundamental questions that this work poses is the need to extract all-inclusive historical documents to establish the activities of Stalin as the head of the state and the extent to which these activities were subordinated to the satisfaction of his own whims, as well as the interests of the state. And even within the framework where Russia's national interests were at stake, it becomes necessary to ask: to what extent the problems to which Stalin was involved were truly foreign policy problems, originating from the nature of the external world surrounding Russia, and to what extent these problems were created and posed by Soviet diplomacy itself.

Now it remains only to briefly recall the differences between Stalin, the leader of the state, and Stalin, the man who achieved the highest power in Russia. They are not easy to carry out, since in many respects they were very, very insignificant. Lenin was also a master of intrigue within the party and was also cruel to his political opponents. He could ruthlessly remove people who expressed serious disagreement with his policies or, as he felt, were hindering the achievement of the party's goals. No less than Stalin, Lenin pursued a policy of implacable hostility towards the West, and since the Western countries were stronger than Russia throughout his life, he also adhered to the idea of turning them against each other.

But at the same time, there were also profound differences. Lenin was a very “humane person” in the full sense of the word. He was born into a prosperous family, received an excellent education, and was gifted with a brilliant mind. The vices of a social upstart were alien to him; on the contrary, he was a worthy rival to any intellectual. He completely lacked the heavy burden of personal insecurity that weighed heavily on Stalin. He never had to doubt his colleagues, who recognized his influence and loved and respected him.

Lenin built his relationships on trust and respect, while Stalin was forced to control his subordinates based on fear. It was precisely these qualities that made it possible for Lenin to develop. movement as he intended, carrying out the general interests and leaving aside his own interests, since the intellectual potential of the party was the result mainly of his labor, he never felt the need to apply the dishonest methods that Stalin constantly practiced with the aim of strengthening one’s political views by referring to the statements of others. Having formed Leninism in accordance with his aspirations and using the legacy of Marx, Lenin was not afraid to use it as the political situation required. For this reason, he did not always objectively perceive and consider the arguments and initiatives of those people who shared his belief in the justice of the Russian revolution in October 191V. They were free to come to him and share their thoughts. And what is characteristic is that Lenin perceived these thoughts in the spirit in which they were proposed, although he responded to them critically and with an intelligence unsurpassed in the history of the socialist movement. People did not feel the slightest fear for their statements. However, later, under Stalin, everything they said was given a deep, hidden and terrible meaning, when the slightest innocent remark turned into a formidable accusation of their own “deeds.”

This approach in relations with party colleagues contributed to the establishment of a humanistic climate in the upper echelons of power of the Soviet regime during Lenin’s lifetime. Endowed with such a character, Lenin was able to convey to his associates an atmosphere of militant optimism, good humor, unshakable faith in his ideals and comradely devotion. His comrades loved and deeply respected him, and at the same time they unselfishly invested all their energy in their work, deeply believing that if this work was done well, they would be supported and properly appreciated by the party leadership. Under these conditions, while Lenin’s absolute power remained strong, among his administration there reigned such initiative and responsibility for their actions that never existed even in the best days of Stalin’s rule. This explains the flexibility and high skill of Lenin's diplomacy, which it lacked in the days of the subsequent Stalin era. And finally, the difference between foreign policy in general is that under Stalin, the foreign policy of the communist movement became the policy of one person.

Soviet power in Russia at that time represented more than a problem for the outside world. In the days when Lenin was at the head of the country's leadership, the contradictions were also deep and at times seemed insoluble, but still, there was always the opportunity, despite the rude tone of negotiations with the Soviets, to discuss various issues with Soviet leaders and receive clarification on many problems. During the reign of Stalin, this possibility disappeared. Stalin was not even capable of the sardonic and uncompromising frankness with which Lenin negotiated with representatives of the class enemy. His pernicious tendency to cheat and deception permeated his entire being and was inseparable from his intellectual calculations. In contrast, From Lenin, who could see objective reality from the outside, Stalin viewed the world solely through the prism of his egg ambitions and his own suspicions. A foreign figure who managed to talk with Stalin was never completely confident that he was discussing the problems of the movement, and not Stalin's personal interests, which were always closely intertwined. Against this background, even the antagonism between socialism and capitalism was obscured and lost its severity. It was only when Khrushchev replaced Stalin at the pinnacle of power that the opportunity again opened up, as it had under Lenin, to have a frank dialogue about what separates the world of Russian communists from its non-communist surroundings.

For many, this difference did not seem to matter much. “An enemy is an enemy,” they said about him. - Antagonism is antagonism. What difference does it make who argues on this issue? This is an absolutist point of view.

But this is not the only postulate that must be accepted by every person. We know that conflict and antagonism are present to some degree in every instance of international communication, certain steps to achieve compromise must be taken everywhere if political structures are going to coexist together on the same planet. Those political figures who realize these things in their hearts are inclined to doubt that there is such a thing in the world as universal antagonism, especially since the universal coincidence of interests is obvious. Anyone who looks at things from such a position will easily understand that the illusion of universal antagonism can only be created in the complete absence of affective connections. For this reason, he is inclined to doubt what I personally profess, namely, whether the enemy is really the one with whom one can ultimately establish relations.

Since 1923, disputes have developed between members of the political bureau regarding how to build socialism and the struggle for power. Lenin had by that time been removed from business.

The struggle took place, first of all, between L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev, I.B. Stalin. Trotsky was most popular among participants in the struggle for power. Zinoviev and Kamenev were Lenin's closest associates.

Possessing an inconspicuous appearance, Stalin, however, had a steely will, a talent for organizing and exceptional determination. Stalin was not such a prominent figure as Trotsky, but he held the position of general secretary of the party. He patiently and persistently selected and placed the necessary cadres of party workers, it was in his hands that real power was concentrated, he himself selected the people he needed.

Stalin was understandable to most of the new rank and file party members. All Bolshevik leaders, except Stalin, always believed that it was impossible to build socialism in one single country (for example, in Russia). Throughout the 20s, Bolshevik leaders sought to push revolution in Europe with the help of propaganda from the Comintern, the union of all communist parties in the world.

At the end of 1924, Stalin expressed the idea that it is possible to build socialism in one country, on our own, without the help of the world proletariat. The party supported Stalin, organizational levers and the general active, optimistic spirit of the idea of building socialism and paving the way for a bright future for the world worked. The XIV Party Congress supported Stalin, and his ideas of accelerated construction of socialism became the general line of the party. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were removed from business, Trotsky was later expelled from the country.

To build socialism in a hostile environment, it is necessary to improve defense capabilities - the industrialization of the USSR and the creation of heavy industry are needed. Perhaps industrialization was needed not for defense, but for offense, but this was not said out loud.

In 1926, the industrialization of the country began, and in 1927 it became clear that industrialization and the NEP were incompatible.

With the beginning of forced collectivization (forced) of agriculture, there is a transition to the “offensive of socialism along the entire front” - in addition to industrialization, the elimination of private property in trade. The accelerated construction of socialism continued ~ until 1937.

This time marked the apogee of the struggle against everything traditional in culture (continuity, burning of books with old spelling, the emergence of new names, the fight against religion and national movements), providing the ideological side of the “Great Turning Point”. There was active propaganda and politicization of all spheres of society. At the same time, repression intensified.

The slogan of the first five-year plan was: “Pace decides everything”, from 1933 - “Technology decides everything”, propaganda of the Stakhanovites (exceeding the plan and mastery of technology.” Industry is improving, becoming, despite the lack of scientific personnel and design and production experience, very powerful, The Red Army is becoming one of the most technically equipped in the world.

By the mid-30s, private property completely disappeared, and the Constitution of 1936 basically fixed the construction of socialism.

State Polar Academy
Department of Russian Language and Literature

Essay
By discipline
"National history"

JV Stalin as a statesman.

Completed by student 901gr.
Kuzmina E.A.

Scientific adviser:
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor Portnyagina N.A.

Saint Petersburg
2010
Introduction:
Now there is an active process of not only updating the present, but also
"restoration" restoration of the past. In this regard, I decided to write
an essay about one of the most controversial figures in our history, about Stalin.
There has never been a more controversial person in our history. Stalin is one of the most complex personalities in history. One of the conclusions that arises already at the beginning of research about Stalin is that the history of this personality highlights the most complex dialectics of his era. As difficult as the conditions of that time were, so complex was the personality at the head of the people and the party. Being honest before history, one cannot help but recognize the undeniable contribution of I.V. Stalin to the struggle for socialism, its defense, as well as his unforgivable political mistakes and crimes, expressed in the unjustified repression of many thousands of innocent people. And this is no coincidence, because when pronouncing the name of Stalin, the tragic year of 1937, repressions, and violation of humanity first of all come to mind in the minds of many people. But one cannot help but notice that these years saw the creation of the foundations of everything on which we stand today: precisely on
this time marks the highest rise of the human spirit of the Soviet people,
who survived and defeated fascism in the Great Patriotic War. That's why
It is a mistake to condemn Stalin for his crimes while questioning his real
achievements. Thus, one cannot mistakenly evaluate the past from the standpoint of whether Stalin had more merits or crimes. The question is much more complicated: in understanding the origins and reasons for the deformation of the mechanism of power, and for this it is necessary to directly turn to the personality of Stalin and his biography. Currently, numerous artistic and historical publications have been published about individual facets and aspects of this person’s activity. Undoubtedly, there will be more serious research by historians about Stalin. The reason for the unflagging interest in the pages of Stalin’s life lies in a new understanding of social and universal values: humanism, justice, truth, moral ideals. In my essay I will try to answer the question:“Stalin as a statesman. What is he like?

Chapter 1 - Biography of Stalin, before he became the leader of the state.

Chapter 2 - Stalin as a statesman.
1)Before the war
2) Great Patriotic War
3)After the war

Chapter 1-Biography of Stalin.

Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Joseph Vissarionovich, born December 21, 1879. in the city
Gori, Tiflis province. His father is Vissarion Ivanovich, by nationality
Georgian, descended from peasants, a shoemaker by profession, later a worker
Adelkhanov shoe factory in Tiflis. Mother - Ekaterina Georgievna
came from a family of serfs. Childhood Soso, as his mother called him,
passed in an atmosphere of acute need and ongoing family conflicts.
In the autumn of 1888 Stalin entered the Gori Theological School and became one of the
best students and in 1894 graduated with honors. After successful
entrance exams, he was admitted to the Tiflis Theological Seminary.
In Russia during these years, due to the growth of the labor movement, it became widespread
Marxism spread. Russian Marxists were exiled in Transcaucasia, who
began to actively promote the doctrine. Tiflis Seminary was then
a hotbed of all kinds of liberation ideas and was full of various secret
in circles. And it had a reputation as the most “rebellious” educational institution in Georgia.
Joseph Dzhugashvili became the organizer of a circle of young socialists. He abandoned
studies, succeeding only in the two subjects that most interest him -
civil history and logic. But the circle of theoretical
Stalin's requests; he studies Marx's "Capital", the works of Engels, gets acquainted with
works of Lenin. Joseph's character also changed. He became secretive, gloomy
an alienated young man. Already during this period of time he was also distinguished
intolerant attitude towards other opinions, desire for power, excessive
touchiness.
In May 1899 fifth-year student Dzhugashvili, having a strong reputation as a troublemaker,
leaves the seminary to devote himself entirely to the revolutionary struggle. IN
November 1901 he was elected to the Tiflis Social Democratic
committee and sent to Batum, the third largest center in the Caucasus, for
creation of a social democratic organization.
Stalin (he took this party pseudonym for himself in 1913) was an organizer and
the initiator of almost all Bolshevik publications in the Caucasus: illegal books,
newspapers, brochures, proclamations.
From the official biography of Stalin you can find out that from 1902 to 1913. his
arrested eight times, sent into exile seven times, in particular in
Solvychegodsk, to the Vologda province, to the Narym region for 3 years, to the distant
Turukhansk region - it was the most difficult political exile, etc., six
times he escaped.
During the same period of time, Stalin wrote a number of pamphlets, where he spoke decisively
defender of the ideological foundations of the Marxist party: “Briefly about the party
disagreements”, in two “Letters from Kutais” and in the article “Response “Social-
democrat."
Stalin's leaflets 1905 - an example of propaganda of the ideas of Bolshevism among the masses. IN
articles “Armed uprising and our tactics”, “The reaction is intensifying” and
others, Stalin consistently defends the need for armed
uprisings
In December 1905 Stalin was sent as a delegate from the Transcaucasian
Bolsheviks to the first All-Russian Bolshevik Conference of the RSDLP in
Tammerfors (Finland). Here he first met Lenin and without hesitation
took his side in the disputes that began between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.
In April-May 1907 The V (London) Congress of the RSDLP took place and Stalin was active
congress participant.
In January 1912 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP at the suggestion of Lenin, Joseph Dzhugashvili
was co-opted into the Bolshevik Central Committee, where he was assigned to deal with
national issue.
Stalin met the February revolution in Siberia. But on March 12 he returned
from exile to Petrograd and was introduced to the editorial board of Pravda. From April
1917 Stalin liaised between the Central Committee and local party organizations. On
VII (April) All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks made a report on
national question, was elected a member of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and from that time
was elected as a member of the party's Central Committee at all congresses up to and including the 19th.
During the period of preparation and conduct of the October armed uprising, we did not
We find Stalin in the ranks of its active organizers. (On political
Trotsky shone in the sky at that time). But the Second Congress of Soviets introduced him to the
the first Soviet government as People's Commissar for National Affairs.
There is not a single Soviet republic in whose organization Stalin did not participate
would have leadership participation.
During the Civil War, Stalin was one of the organizers of the defense of Tsaritsyn and the defeat of Denikin’s troops, being a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of a number of fronts. In that
period of time Stalin entered into a fierce conflict with L.D. Trotsky over
the issue of using military experts. In the spring of 1919 became a member of the first team
Politburo and Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), People's Commissar of State Control.
Stalin's appointment in 1922 not prestigious, by revolutionary standards
romantics, the post of General Secretary of the RCP(b), created for purely
hardware work, became one of the decisive factors in his victory over his
political competitors. He took over the party personnel machine, because...
understood that whoever controls personnel ultimately controls
by the state.
Stalin began his work in this new position in Lenin's Politburo.
Then it was a meeting of the most authoritative, talented people in the party,
naturally, defending one fundamental program. But within this
program, they sometimes had very different ideas about how to implement it,
because in essence they were completely different people. They argued about many things, not
agreeing with each other. It was understandable and natural. Because than
The greater the talent, the more original it is, the less it fits into any general
representation. But at the same time there was a person who organized this work in such a way
way that all the positive potential of different people arguing, and sometimes
and those who hated each other as human beings, such as Stalin and Trotsky,
merged into one; All abilities were channeled into a common channel. AND
Indeed, V.I. Lenin, who knew the party cadres perfectly, achieved
placing them in the interests of the overall party cause, taking into account individual
qualities In his “Letter to the Congress” Lenin gave a characterization of some members of the Central Committee, in
including Stalin. Considering him one of the outstanding figures of the party, Lenin
at the same time he wrote: “Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, concentrated in
has immense power in his hands, and I’m not sure whether he will always be able to
use this power carefully." In addition to his letter Lenin 4
January 1923 wrote: “Stalin is too rude, and this shortcoming is quite tolerable
in the environment and in communications between us, becomes intolerant in the position of Secretary General.
Therefore, I suggest that the comrades consider a way to move Stalin from this
place and appoint another person." However, due to the difficult situation in
country, it was considered advisable to leave the severity of the fight against Trotskyism
Stalin at his post on the condition that he take into account criticism from Lenin.
But Stalin could not come to terms with Lenin's conclusions. Study of Stalin's
speeches shows that from that time on he repeatedly, but extremely
cautiously and allegorically challenged Lenin's assessments. For example, mentally
polemicizing with Lenin, he said in one of his speeches: “We love Bukharin,
but we love the truth, but the party, but the Comintern even more.” In this phrase almost
all Stalin: devoted to the idea, but cunning and sophisticated. So one of our own
all his life he tried (and not without success) to turn weaknesses into an indicator
strength. Back in the revolution, when you had to go to a factory, to a regiment, to a street
meeting, into the crowd, Stalin had a feeling of inner uncertainty and
anxieties, which, however, he knew how to hide. Stalin did not like and, perhaps, not
knew how to speak well in front of people. His speech was simple, clear, but without
flights of thought, aphorism and tribune pathos. Strong accent,
the constraint and monotony of his speech made his speeches inexpressive. Not
by chance, Stalin spoke out less than anyone else from Lenin’s entourage
at rallies, meetings, demonstrations. He preferred to prepare directives,
instructions, write articles, notes regarding certain political
events. So, for example, after arriving from exile in mid-March 1917.
Stalin published more than sixty articles and notes in six months. He was
a mediocre publicist in terms of literary style. But he can't
was to refuse consistency, clarity and unwavering categoricalness
conclusions.
Later Stalin would get used to the stands of congresses and conferences, but the situation then
will be different: people will listen to his quiet, calm voice in the ringing
silence, ready to burst into a storm of applause. Stalin his
made a reserved attitude towards direct contacts with the masses a rule: he did not
been, with rare exceptions, neither to factories, nor to collective farms, nor to
republics, nor on the fronts. The leader's voice was occasionally heard at the very top
pyramids. At its foot, millions listened to him with sacred awe. My
the leader turned unsociability and isolation into an attribute of a cult and
exclusivity.
In general, Stalin entered the revolution as an inconspicuous functionary-executor,
who knew how not only to wait in the wings, but also not to feel sorry for themselves when completing tasks
Lenin and the party. Stalin knew how to restrain himself and wait, and he waited.
After Lenin's death, the internal party struggle broke out with renewed vigor.
The aggravation of the discussion and the intransigence of the parties was facilitated by the introduction of
disputes elements of the struggle for power. Stalin, who by his position in
the party was obliged to resist these harmful trends only exacerbated them.
Actually, this was characteristic of his nature, which Lenin warned about. Also in
one of the letters October 30, 1922 Lenin noted in Stalin's character such
the line is like bitterness. And she, wrote Lenin, “in general, usually plays in politics
the worst role."
When Lenin died, Stalin realized that now he would face a cruel
struggle for leadership. The main opponent was L.D. Trotsky, who was preparing for
seizure of power after Lenin's death.
Over time, directly or indirectly targeted by critical arrows
Trotsky was Stalin more often than others. The characteristic given by Trotsky is well known
Stalin as “the most outstanding mediocrity of our party.” And then
expulsion from the country, Trotsky was left with one eternal, manic passion,
hatred of Stalin. Until the end of life. No one in the world has written so much
caustic, angry, insulting, caricatured, humiliating about Stalin, like
Trotsky.
Stalin won this battle, and only because what people call conscience
he was already in internal confinement. His conscience was once and for all
deprived of any chance.
This is exactly the kind of man who, by force of circumstances, became the head of a huge country.

Conclusion: So, from this chapter we see that I.V. Stalin, from an early age, began to get involved in politics and propaganda activities. He is only interested in history and logic. He began to study Marx and Engels, as a result of which he became more gloomy. As soon as Stalin begins to fight for power, he is cruel, but at the same time he is purposeful and achieves his goal, no matter what. These qualities developed on the path to power will further manifest themselves in the method of government. Stalin will be very cruel, he will not listen to other people’s opinions, seeing all the people around him as traitors.

Chapter 2. Stalin as a statesman.
1) Before the war.
Based on individual statements of Lenin, Stalin began gradually
to replace the central idea of Bolshevism - the idea of world revolution - with an equally effective theory of the possibility of building socialism in one single country. Moreover, having given the party this new installation, allowing
to get out of a delicate situation, When the proletariat of European countries was not in a hurry to make a world socialist revolution, Stalin also pointed out the culprit for creating this unpleasant situation for the Bolsheviks - of course, L.D. Trotsky with his theory of “permanent revolution”. According to this theory, the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution will develop into a socialist revolution, which in turn will become the prologue to the world revolution. Stalin constructed the amazing term “Trotskyism,” which he also contrasted with his own invention, “Leninism.” He accused “Trotskyism” primarily of being
does not believe in the possibility of building socialism in the USSR. Assigning functions to oneself
the main “guardian” of Leninism, instilling the cult of Lenin, Stalin thereby, with
on the one hand, strengthened the mood in the party and society, on the other
- as if automatically transferred to himself both Lenin’s authority and his
qualities that he himself did not possess. So, the enemies were found: “Trotskyists”
oppositionists, which now were all those who did not share the views of Stalin
and its modes of action. Now it was necessary to solve the problems of internal
character. And the main one was the problem of modernizing the country, which is still
more aggravated compared to the beginning of the twentieth century. Tested
recovery period, NEP mechanisms by that time began to provide
failures. Taking advantage of the next NEP crisis, Stalin announced the “great
turning point,” about the accelerated transformation of the USSR into a great industrial power.
In order to more clearly emphasize the negative aspects and features of this
tragic period in the history of our country will be right to take advantage
the concept of “totalitarianism” (from the Latin word “full”).
This rather conventional term helps to clearly reveal the main thing
contradiction of the Stalin era: the creation of a strong state - a superpower
by depriving the majority of citizens of basic economic, political,
legal rights, up to the right to life. Totalitarianism is the price that
the people paid for the implementation of Stalin's ambitions.
Stalin began the “great turning point” with the restructuring of agriculture towards
creation of high-quality collective farms. A different point of view
adhered to N.I. Bukharin, believing that the basis of the agricultural sector should be
remain individual peasant farms. It is important to note here that
Stalin knew little about the peasant question. In his entire life, he actually only
visited rural areas once. It is the desk knowledge of agriculture and
was expressed in the single-handed acceptance of a number of such deeply erroneous
decisions that had far-reaching consequences. Stalin by nature was very
careful. And yet, after painful deliberation, he took a risk - a complete
collectivization of millions of peasant farms, while knowing that they
We weren’t ready for this yet. To do this, he had to take extraordinary measures
into the “ordinary” norms of life. The July Plenum of the Central Committee (1928) supported Stalin's
program. This meant that the party agreed to the introduction of violence into
system. And violence celebrated a magnificent feast. The mass of peasants experienced the most difficult
shock in the twentieth century. The most diligent, skillful,
enterprising, of course, among them there were many who were very
They were wary of the new government. But all of them Stalin and his assistants
clearly classified as enemies of socialism who must be “neutralized.”
In the North Caucasus, Ukraine, the Volga region, and other regions of the country,
a period of severe famine. The number of victims was very high. And that was the price too
"agrarian revolution" of the Secretary General. By order of Stalin, there was no famine in the country.
wrote.
Thus, since 1929 to 1932 Stalin carried out the "agrarian revolution"
striking a blow to the peasantry through forced collectivization. Thereby
Stalin doomed agriculture to many decades of stagnation. The experiment is not
brought relief to the country. Essentially returned to the village for many years
the practice of "war communism", although this was never stated. Stalin on
at numerous meetings he described the victories of the collective farm system and continued
seek methods for tightening command control of villages whose situation
invariably got worse. The alienation of collective farmers from the land increased,
means of production, distribution, management.
This is how NEP “died”. This was the beginning of the actual extinction for many years.
years of collective leadership in the party. So the frank prevailed
Stalin's desire to solve all issues single-handedly.
Since the end of 1928 a new stage begins in Stalin’s biography: not only
all direct rivals in the leadership are eliminated, but everything begins
what we used to call the “cult of personality.” Bukharin's removal was
a notable milestone in this process. Bukharin played an important role in assisting Stalin in the fight against Trotsky and Trotskyism. But, nevertheless, starting from 1928. Stalin began to turn away from Bukharin. First of all,
Stalin was worried about Bukharin's growing popularity among the people and the party as
theorist, political figure. Bukharin's authority in the party at that moment
was not much inferior to the authority of Stalin, and besides, Bukharin had a lot of
capable students (Astrov, Slepkov, Zaitsev, Petrovsky, etc.). Plus to this,
Bukharin's program of leisurely socialist development sharply
contradicted the ideas of Stalin. Bukharin and his supporters Rykov and Tomsky were against the forceful methods used in industrialization and collectivization. Stalin's attempts to influence their views were unsuccessful. The Pilitburo supported the Secretary General. The April and November Plenums of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of 1929, which considered the issue of the “right deviation” in the CPSU (b), completed the defeat of the “Bukharin group” begun by Stalin. On November 17, 1929, Bukharin was removed from the Politburo, and therefore, as a politician, he was finished.
Bukharin was later arrested and a “case” was opened against him, accusing him of espionage and
conspiracy. These accusations as such were ridiculous, but in this way
Stalin was clearing a place on the pedestal. Another Lenin comrade-in-arms ended up on
on the sidelines (in the same year Trotsky was expelled from the country). "Leader"
felt that he had the right to make the biggest decisions single-handedly, and that
he has enormous power to do this. And in fact, Stalin did not
He loved power because it was complete, unlimited, sanctified by the “love” of millions.
And here he succeeded. Not a single person in the world has succeeded, and apparently never,
etc.................

I. Stalin as a statesman

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Chapter III. Civil and Great Patriotic War

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