home / Self-development/ History of the first partisan detachment of the Great Patriotic War. The truth about barrier detachments in the Soviet army: only the facts During the Great Patriotic War

The history of the first partisan detachment of the Great Patriotic War. The truth about barrier detachments in the Soviet army: only the facts During the Great Patriotic War

The liberal media screams about the terrible and insidious barrage detachments in the Red Army, which shot retreating soldiers with machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created to discredit Stalin period V national history. In this analytical article you will find numbers and facts from state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as memories of the participants of past battles in the Second World War on the topic of the actions of barrage detachments in relation to their own army.

The famous order of NKO No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which immediately became known among soldiers as “Not a Step Back,” among other very strict measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, also prescribed the creation of the so-called. barrage detachments. In this order, Stalin demanded:

B) form within the army 3 - 5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;...

And somehow information about these units immediately went into the shadows. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war or in the post-war years. Even at the time of the “exposure of Stalin’s personality cult,” they tried to avoid the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply kept silent, or they were silently blamed on the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.

After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the topic of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people do not have any information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, especially those who prefer to receive fees in dollars from various foreign “funds for supporting democracy,” began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that the Red Army soldiers were driven into battle exclusively by commissars and machine guns of the detachments. That the barrier detachment members are responsible for hundreds of thousands of ruined lives, that, instead of fighting at the front themselves, the barrier detachment members mowed down entire divisions with machine gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.

Moreover, again, without any evidence, documents, and increasingly referring to the “memories” of very dubious personalities.

One of the most terrible myths of the Second World War is associated with the existence of barrier detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern TV series about the war you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in blue caps of the NKVD troops, shooting wounded soldiers leaving the battle with machine guns. By showing this, the authors take a great sin upon their souls. None of the researchers were able to find a single fact in the archives to confirm this.

What happened?

Barrier detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by military counterintelligence, first represented by the 3rd Directorate of the USSR NKO, and from July 17, 1941, by the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

As the main tasks of special departments during the war, the decree State Committee The defense was determined by “a decisive fight against espionage and betrayal in parts of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line.” They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.

To ensure operational activities in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria by July 25, 1941 were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in the fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrage service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Every detained commander, Red Army soldier, and Red Navy man was checked. If he was recognized as having fled from the battlefield, then he was subject to immediate arrest, and a prompt (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be tried by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing sentences of military tribunals, including before the formation. In “particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front,” the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (navy). Military personnel who fell behind the unit for an objective reason were sent in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, to the headquarters of the nearest division.

The flow of military personnel who lagged behind their units in the kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was enormous. From the beginning of the war until October 10, 1941 alone, the operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. German agents also easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of spies neutralized in the winter and spring of 1942 had the task of physically eliminating the command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, including commanders Generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Koneva.

Special departments had difficulty coping with such a volume of cases. The situation required the creation of special units that would be directly involved in preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, returning stragglers to their units and detaining deserters.

The military command was the first to take this kind of initiative. After an appeal from the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in “unstable” divisions, where there were repeated cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to rifle divisions throughout the Red Army.

These barrage detachments (up to a battalion in number) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops; they operated as part of the rifle divisions of the Red Army, were staffed by their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were barrier detachments formed either by special military departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which, by decree of the State Defense Committee, took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow, from the west and south along the line Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks from October 15 to October 28, 1941, more than 75 thousand military personnel were detained in the Moscow zone.

From the very beginning, the barrage formations, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not guided by their leadership towards indiscriminate executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today we have to face similar accusations in the press; The barrier detachments are sometimes called punitive forces. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand military personnel detained by October 10, 1941, after verification, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among whom the special departments included: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, spreaders of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10,201 people were shot, including 3,321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number is more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the defensive formations were gradually curtailed. Order No. 227 gave it new impetus.

The barrier detachments created in accordance with it, numbering up to 200 people, consisted of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, who did not differ in uniform or weapons from the rest of the Red Army military personnel. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was subordinate not to the command of the division behind whose battle formations it was located, but to the command of the army through the NKVD OO. The detachment was led by a state security officer.

In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments were functioning in units of the active army. First of all, Stalin's order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - was formed in the Stalingrad direction.

Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, barrage detachments were entrusted with the responsibility of preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of linear units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs in which they were engaged turned out to be wider.

“The barrage detachments,” recalled Army General P. N. Lashchenko, who was the deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army in the days of the publication of order No. 227, “were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters who , unfortunately, there were; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.”

Here is a document from the FSB archives. It is not able to illuminate the entire actual picture of the barrage detachments, but it can lead to certain thoughts. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Sections to the leadership of the NKVD. It is undated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. From this it is clear that these are only the first results of the actions of the detachments.

In accordance with the order of NKO No. 227 in units operating in the Red Army as of October 15 this year. 193 barrage detachments were formed.

Of these, 16 were formed in parts of the Stalingrad Front and 25 in the Don Front, and a total of 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD armies.

Since the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 of this year), barrage detachments have detained 140,755 military personnel who escaped from the front line.

Of those detained: 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

Largest number detentions and arrests were made by barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and transit points.

On the Stalingrad Front, 15,649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points.

It should be noted that barrage detachments, and especially detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies) during the period of fierce battles with the enemy, played a positive role in establishing order in units and preventing unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, returning a significant number military personnel to the front line.

August 29 this year The headquarters of the 29th Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, and units of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in panic. The barrier detachment operating behind the battle formations of the division units (the head of the detachment, State Security Lieutenant Filatov), took decisive measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disarray and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines.
In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break into the depths of the defense. The barrier detachment entered the battle and delayed the enemy's advance.

September 14 this year The enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Division of the 62nd Army, which were defending the city of Stalingrad. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd regiments began to retreat in panic, leaving the lines. The head of the barrier detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Yelman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. As a result, the personnel of these regiments were stopped and after 2 hours the regiments occupied their previous lines of defense.

September 20 this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The combined brigade, under enemy pressure, began an unauthorized retreat to another line. The actions of the barrier detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade occupied its previous positions and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same barrier detachment, Pestov, through joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, when support was needed to hold occupied lines, the barrage detachments directly engaged the enemy, successfully holding back his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under enemy pressure, withdrew from its occupied line. The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the detachment chief (state security lieutenant Khlystov), took up defense on the approaches to an important height. For 4 days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled attacks by enemy machine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The barrier detachment held the line until the approach military units.

September 15-16 this year The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the railway area for 2 days. station of Stalingrad. Despite its small numbers, the barrier detachment not only repelled enemy attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th Infantry Division arrived to replace it.

A number of facts were noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual formation commanders. A significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle along with linear units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were withdrawn for reorganization and barrage service was not carried out.
September 19th The command of the 240th division of the Voronezh Front, one of the companies of the barrier detachment of the 38th Army, gave a combat mission to clear the grove of a group of German machine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 were killed.

The barrage detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being operationally subordinate to the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, and therefore was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army, 2 barrage detachments were formed on September 4th. 174 troops were assigned to the division and brought into battle. As a result, the barrier detachments lost up to 70% of their personnel in battle; the remaining fighters of these barrier detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 this year. was put on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army Don Front, by order of army commander Chistyakov 59 and member of the Military Council Abramov 60, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle like ordinary units. As a result, the units lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Front Military Council to transfer 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not carried out.

Signature (Kazakevich)

Army General Hero Soviet Union P. N. Lashchenko:
Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I don’t know that any of them fired at their own people, at least on our sector of the front. I have already asked archival documents No such documents were found in this regard. The barrier detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received reinforcements, naturally, unfired, as they say, not having smelled gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the eldest. It often happened that the barrier detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up during the Soviet era. We were all brought up on the postulates of nationwide resistance to the enemy, selfless devotion Soviet people their homeland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.

These ideological guidelines somehow begin to be eroded when you read in this document that within the Stalingrad Front alone, by mid-October 1942, more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front were detained by the detachment detachments, and along the entire line of the Soviet-German front more than 140 thousand, i.e. e. numbering more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that not everyone who fled from the front was detained. At best, half.

One can only be surprised that such detachments were not created back in 1941. After all, before our eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had in its structure a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie), which, having professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying malingerers and crossbows, establishing order in the rear, and clearing rear units of surplus soldiers.

Getting acquainted with the figures in the report, you come to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of brigade detachments was a necessary and much belated measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party circle, instead of harsh disciplinary measures, which were fully justified in war conditions, led to attempts to use ideological indoctrination and, in fact, persuasion of soldiers with the help of an outrageously bloated and extremely ineffective political apparatus, and led us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if instead of reviving the institution of military commissars in the summer of 1941, detachments had been created, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.

Note that soon after the creation of the barrier detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.

Whatever one may say, associations suggest themselves: there are commissars - there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.

More interesting numbers. Of the 140,755 detained military personnel, only 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people (i.e., soldiers and sergeants) were sent to penal companies, 185 people (i.e., officers) were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 were returned to their units and to transit points. person. A very lenient attitude towards those fleeing from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand out of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.

Well, if necessary, the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.

As many participants in the war testify, barrier detachments did not exist everywhere. According to Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, they were completely absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.

The version that the barrier detachments were “guarding” the penal units also does not stand up to criticism. The company commander of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired colonel A.V. Pyltsyn, who fought from 1943 until the Victory, states: “Under no circumstances were there any barrier detachments behind our battalion, nor were others used deterrent measures. There was just never such a need for it.”

Famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of barrier detachments behind the battle formations of their unit.

In reality, the outposts of the army barrier detachment were located at a distance of 1.5–2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in penalties, but checked and detained everyone whose presence outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their military activity is sometimes covered in an extremely speculative manner.

The documents show how the combat practice of barrage detachments developed during one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer and autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 military personnel who “escaped from the front line.” Of these: 3980 were arrested, 1189 were shot, 2776 were sent to penal companies, 185 were sent to penal battalions, the overwhelming number of detainees was returned to their units and to transit points - 131,094 people. The statistics presented show that the absolute majority of military personnel who had previously left the front line for various reasons - more than 91% - were able to continue fighting without any loss of rights.

War veteran Mikhail Borisovich Levin:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary...

This order “sobered up” many, forced them to come to their senses...
As for the barrier detachments, I only encountered their “activities” once at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank trembled and fled, so the barrier detachment opened fire, where across, where directly at those fleeing... After that, I never saw a barrier detachment near the front line. If a critical situation arose in battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of barrier detachments - to stop those scurrying in panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of machine gunners.

Book of memory. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. Hero of the Second World War. Project I Remember

War participant A. Dergaev:
Nowadays there is a lot of talk about barrier detachments. We stood in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I didn't see them. That is, they were probably somewhere, perhaps even further behind us. But we haven't encountered them. A few years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which the following words: “... we dug a full-length trench. The German is hitting us right in the forehead, and behind us is a barrage detachment...” I was sitting on the balcony and, unable to bear it, jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed it. During the break, I tell them: “They are making fun of you, but you are silent.” He still sings these songs. In general, we did not see women at the front, nor did the NKVD.

Book of memory. - Artillerymen. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. Hero of the Second World War

As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This applied to deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, and self-inflicted shooters. It happened - and they shot me in front of the line. But the decision to carry out this extreme measure was made not by the commander of the barrier detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (no lower) or, in individual, pre-agreed cases, by the head of the special department of the army.

In exceptional situations, fighters of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating troops. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could have occurred: the fighters and commanders of the barrier detachments in a difficult situation could change their endurance. But there is no basis to assert that this was everyday practice. Cowards and alarmists were shot individually in front of the line. Punishments, as a rule, are only the initiators of panic and flight.

Here are a few typical examples from the history of the Battle of the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th rifle division 62nd Army. When the soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic, the head of the barrier detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Yelman, ordered his squad to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied their previous defensive lines.

On October 15, in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as three (115, 124 and 149th) separate rifle brigades, from the main forces of the 62nd Army. Succumbing to panic, a number of military personnel, including commanders of various levels, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. To prevent this, a task force under the leadership of senior intelligence officer Lieutenant of State Security Ignatenko, created by a special department of the 62nd Army, set up a barrier. In 15 days, up to 800 rank and file and command personnel were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the line. The barrier detachments acted similarly later.

The blocking detachments, as documents show, had to support the faltering, retreating units and units themselves, and intervene in the course of the battle in order to bring a turning point in it, more than once, as documents show. Reinforcements arriving at the front were, naturally, not fired upon, and in this situation, the barrage detachments, formed from persistent, fired upon, with strong front-line hardened commanders and fighters, provided a reliable shoulder for the linear units.

Thus, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through. The barrier detachment not only stopped the soldiers retreating in disarray and returned them to previously occupied defense lines, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was driven back.

On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division, under enemy pressure, retreated from the occupied line, the defense detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took over the defense. For several days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners until the approaching units took up defensive positions. This was the case in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles increasingly turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by the dynamically changing situation, but also the result in advance decision taken command. The army commanders tried to use the units that were left without “work” with maximum benefit in matters not related to the protective service.

Facts of this kind were reported to Moscow by State Security Major V.M. in mid-October 1942. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh Front, by order of the military council of the 6th Army, two defensive detachments were assigned to the 174th Infantry Division and brought into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of their personnel, the remaining soldiers were transferred to replenish the named division, and the units had to be disbanded. The barrier detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front was used as a linear unit by the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, under whose operational subordination the detachment was located. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, and therefore had to be re-formed.

The reasons for objections from special departments are clear. But, it seems, it was no coincidence that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to military counterintelligence agencies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, meant that barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for retreating units, but also as the most important reserve for direct combat operations.

As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the invaders from the territory of the USSR, the need for barrier detachments began to sharply decrease. The order “Not a step back!” completely lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order acknowledging that “due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has ceased.” By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish the rifle divisions.

Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented deserters, alarmists, and German agents from penetrating into the rear; they not only returned military personnel who had lagged behind their units to the front line, but also led direct fighting with the enemy, making a contribution to achieving victory over Nazi Germany.

The first days of the Great Patriotic War were catastrophic for the Soviet Union: the surprise of the attack on June 22, 1941 allowed Hitler’s army to gain significant advantages. Many border outposts and formations that took the brunt of the enemy’s first strike were killed. Wehrmacht troops advanced at high speed deep into Soviet territory. In a short time, 3.8 million soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were captured. But, despite the most difficult conditions of military operations, the defenders of the Fatherland from the very first days of the war showed courage and heroism. A striking example of heroism was the creation, in the first days of the war, in the occupied territory of the first partisan detachment under the command of Korzh Vasily Zakharovich.

Korzh Vasily Zakharovich- commander of the Pinsk partisan unit, member of the Pinsk underground regional party committee, major general. Born on January 1 (13), 1899 in the village of Khorostov, now Soligorsk district, Minsk region, in a peasant family. Belarusian. Member of the CPSU since 1929. He graduated from a rural school. In 1921–1925, V.Z. Korzh fought in the partisan detachment K.P. Orlovsky, who operated in Western Belarus. In 1925 he moved across the border to Soviet Belarus. Since 1925, he was the chairman of collective farms in the regions of the Minsk District. In 1931–1936 he worked in the GPU NKVD of the BSSR. In 1936–1937, through the NKVD, Korzh participated as an adviser in the revolutionary war of the Spanish people and was the commander of an international partisan detachment. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he formed and led a fighter battalion, which grew into the first partisan detachment in Belarus. The detachment included 60 people. The detachment was divided into 3 rifle squads of 20 soldiers each. We armed ourselves with rifles and received 90 rounds of ammunition and one grenade. On June 28, 1941, in the area of the village of Posenichi, the first battle of a partisan detachment under the command of V.Z. Korzha. To guard the city from the northern side, a group of partisans was placed on the Pinsk Logishin road.

The partisan detachment commanded by Korzh was ambushed by 2 German tanks. This was reconnaissance from the 293rd Wehrmacht Infantry Division. The partisans opened fire and knocked out one tank. As a result of this operation, they managed to capture 2 Nazis. This was the first partisan battle of the first partisan detachment in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 4, 1941, the detachment met enemy cavalry squadrons 4 kilometers from the city. Korzh quickly “deployed” the firepower of his detachment, and dozens of fascist cavalrymen died on the battlefield. The front moved away to the east, and the partisans had more work to do every day. They set up ambushes on the roads and destroyed enemy vehicles with infantry, equipment, ammunition, food, and intercepted motorcyclists. With the first mine Korzh personally made from explosives, used before the war to move tree stumps, the partisans blew up the first armored train. The squad's combat score grew.

But there was no connection with the mainland. Then Korzh sent a man behind the front line. The liaison officer was the famous Belarusian underground worker Vera Khoruzhaya. And she managed to get to Moscow. In the winter of 1941/42, it was possible to establish contact with the Minsk underground regional party committee, which deployed its headquarters in the Lyuban region. We jointly organized a sleigh ride in the Minsk and Polesie regions. Along the way, they “smoked out” uninvited foreign guests and gave them a “try” of partisan bullets. During the raid, the detachment was replenished thoroughly. Guerrilla warfare flared up. By November 1942, 7 impressively powerful detachments merged together and formed a partisan unit. Korzh took command over him. In addition, 11 underground district party committees, the Pinsk city committee, and about 40 primary organizations began to operate in the region. They even managed to “recruit” to their side an entire Cossack regiment formed by the Nazis from prisoners of war! By the winter of 1942/43, the Korzh union had restored Soviet power in a significant part of the Luninets, Zhitkovichi, Starobinsky, Ivanovo, Drogichinsky, Leninsky, Telekhansky, and Gantsevichi districts. Communication with the mainland has been established. Planes landed at the partisan airfield and brought ammunition, medicine, and walkie-talkies.

The partisans reliably controlled a huge area railway Brest - Gomel, the Baranovichi - Luninets section, and the enemy echelons went downhill according to a strict partisan schedule. The Dnieper-Bug Canal was almost completely paralyzed. In February 1943, the Nazi command attempted to put an end to the Korzh partisans. Regular units with artillery, aviation, and tanks were advancing. On February 15, the encirclement closed. The partisan zone turned into a continuous battlefield. Korzh himself led the column to break through. He personally led the shock troops to break through the ring, then the defense of the neck of the breakthrough, while convoys with civilians, wounded and property crossed the gap, and, finally, the rearguard group covering the pursuit. And so that the Nazis did not think that they had won, Korzh attacked a large garrison in the village of Svyatoy Volya. The battle lasted 7 hours, in which the partisans were victorious. Until the summer of 1943, the Nazis threw part after part against the Korzh formation.

And each time the partisans broke through the encirclement. Finally, they finally escaped from the cauldron to the area of Lake Vygonovskoye. . Council resolution People's Commissars USSR dated September 16, 1943 No. 1000 - to one of the ten commanders of the partisan formations of the Byelorussian SSR - V.Z. Korzh assigned military rank"Major General" Throughout the summer and autumn of 1943, the “rail war” thundered in Belarus, proclaimed by the Central Headquarters partisan movement. The Korzh compound made a significant contribution to this grandiose “event.” In 1944, several operations that were brilliant in concept and organization upset all the Nazis’ plans for a systematic, well-thought-out withdrawal of their units to the west.

The partisans destroyed railway arteries (on July 20, 21 and 22, 1944 alone, demolitionists blew up 5 thousand rails!), tightly closed the Dnieper-Bug Canal, and thwarted the enemy’s attempts to establish crossings across the Sluch River. Hundreds of Aryan warriors, together with the commander of the group, General Miller, surrendered to the Korzh partisans. And a few days later the war left the Pinsk region... In total, by July 1944, the Pinsk partisan unit under the command of Korzh in battles defeated 60 German garrisons, derailed 478 enemy trains, blew up 62 railway bridges, destroyed 86 tanks and armored vehicles, 29 guns, 519 kilometers of communication lines are out of order. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated August 15, 1944, for the exemplary performance of command assignments in the fight against the Nazi invaders behind enemy lines and the courage and heroism shown, Vasily Zakharovich Korzh was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. "(No. 4448). Graduated in 1946 Military Academy General Staff. Since 1946, Major General Korzh V.Z. in reserve. In 1949–1953 he worked as Deputy Minister of Forestry of the Belarusian SSR. In 1953–1963 he was chairman of the collective farm “Partizansky Krai” in the Soligorsk district of the Minsk region. IN last years lived in Minsk. Died May 5, 1967. He was buried at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery in Minsk. Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree, Red Star, medals. A monument to the Hero was erected in the village of Khorostov, memorial plaques in the cities of Minsk and Soligorsk. The collective farm “Partizansky Krai”, streets in the cities of Minsk, Pinsk, Soligorsk, as well as a school in the city of Pinsk are named after him.

Sources and literature.

1. Ioffe E.G. The Higher Partisan Command of Belarus 1941-1944 // Directory. – Minsk, 2009. – P. 23.

2. Kolpakidi A., Sever A. GRU Special Forces. – M.: “YAUZA”, ESKMO, 2012. – P. 45.

D.V. Gnedash

Since the time of Khrushchev’s “thaw”, some historians have carefully nurtured and “cultivate” to this day one “terrible and terrible” myth. about how a barrage detachment, originally created for a very specific, reasonable and decent purpose, has now turned into a horror film.

What it is?

The very concept of this military formation very vague, it says, in particular, about “performing certain tasks on a certain section of the front.” This can even be understood as the formation of a separate platoon. Both the composition, the number and tasks of the barrage detachments changed repeatedly throughout the war. When did the first barrage detachment appear?

History of origin

It should be remembered that in 1941 the legendary NKVD was divided into two diverse entities: the Internal Affairs Committee and the State Security Department (NKGB). Counterintelligence, from which the barrier detachments originated, was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. At the end of July 1941, a special directive was issued on work in war time, after which the formation of special units began.

It was then that the very first barrage detachment was created, whose task was to detain deserters and “suspicious elements” in the front line. These formations did not have any “execution rights”; they could only detain the “element” and then escort him to the authorities.

Again, when both departments were united again, the barrage detachment came under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. But even then, no special “relaxations” were made: members of the formations could arrest deserters. In special cases, which included only episodes of armed resistance, they had the right to be shot. In addition, special detachments had to fight traitors, cowards, and alarmists. The NKVD order No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941 is known. It was then that special companies and battalions were created, staffed by NKVD troops.

What function did they perform?

It was these barrage detachments that played the most significant role in the Second World War. Again, there were no “mass executions” under their jurisdiction: these units were supposed to create defensive lines to protect against German counterattacks and detain (!) deserters and transfer them to investigative authorities over the next 12 hours.

If a person simply fell behind his unit (which was normal in 1941), again, no one shot him. In this case, there were two options: either the serviceman was sent to the same unit, or (more often) they were reinforced by the nearest military unit.

In addition, barrage detachments in the Second World War played the role of a “filter” through which people who escaped from German captivity and those individuals in the front line whose testimony was in doubt were passed. There is a known case when such a detachment caught a group German spies... by paper clips! The commandants noticed that the “deported Soviet military personnel” had brand new stainless steel paper clips on their documents (ideal, by the way!) So there is no need to consider fighters as murderers and sadists. But this is exactly how they are portrayed by many modern sources...

The fight against banditry and the role of the 33rd barrier detachment

One of those tasks that some categories of historians “forget” for some reason was the fight against banditry, which in some regions assumed frankly threatening proportions. This is how, for example, the 33rd Barrage Detachment (North-Western Front) proved itself.

Especially the company separated from the composition Baltic Fleet. Even several armored cars were “assigned” to it. This detachment operated in the Estonian forests. The situation in those parts was serious: there was practically no desertion in local units, but the army was greatly hampered by local Nazi units. Small gangs constantly attacked small groups of military personnel and civilians.

Estonian events

As soon as we entered the game " narrow specialists” from the NKVD, the bandits’ perky mood quickly faded away. In July 1941, it was the barrage detachments that took part in the cleansing of the island of Virtsu, which was recaptured as a result of a counterattack by the Red Army. Also along the way, the discovered German outpost was completely destroyed. Many bandits were neutralized, and the pro-fascist organization in Tallinn was destroyed. Barrage detachments also took part in reconnaissance activities. The formation we have already mentioned, acting “on behalf of” the Baltic Fleet, directed its own aircraft at the discovered German positions.

During the battle for Tallinn, the same barrier detachment took part in a very difficult battle, covering (rather than shooting) retreating soldiers and repelling German counterattacks. On August 27 there was a terrible battle, during which our people repeatedly pushed back the stubborn enemy. Only due to their heroism did an organized retreat become possible.

During these battles, more than 60% of the entire personnel of the barrage detachment, including commanders, were killed. Agree, this is not very similar to the image of the “cowardly commandant” hiding behind the backs of his soldiers. Subsequently, the same formation took part in the fight against the bandits of Kronstadt.

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of September 1941

Why did the barrage units get such a bad reputation? The thing is that September 1941 was marked by an extremely difficult situation at the front. The formation of special detachments was allowed in those units that had managed to establish themselves as “unstable”. Just a week later, this practice spread to the entire front. And what, are there barrage detachments of thousands of innocent soldiers? Of course not!

These units obeyed and were armed with transport and heavy equipment. The main task is to maintain order and help the command of the units. Members of the barrage detachments had the right to use military weapons in cases where it was urgently necessary to stop the retreat or eliminate the most malicious alarmists. But this rarely happened.

Varieties

Thus, there were two categories of barrier detachments: one consisted of NKVD fighters and caught deserters, and the second prevented the willful abandonment of positions. The latter had a significantly larger staff, since they consisted of Red Army soldiers, not fighters internal troops. And even in this case, their members had the right only to shoot individual alarmists! No one has ever shot their own soldiers en masse! Moreover, if a counterattack occurred, it was the “beasts from the barrage detachments” who took the entire blow, allowing the fighters to retreat in an orderly manner.

Results of the work

Judging by 1941, these units (the 33rd barrage detachment especially distinguished itself) detained about 657,364 people. Officially, 25,878 people were arrested. 10,201 people were executed by court-martial. All the others were sent back to the front.

Barrage detachments played a significant role in the defense of Moscow. Since there was simply a catastrophic lack of combat-ready units to defend the city itself, the NKVD’s professional soldiers were literally worth their weight in gold; they organized competent defensive lines. In some cases, barrage detachments were created on the local initiative of the authorities and internal affairs bodies.

On July 28, 1942, Headquarters issued the notorious order No. 227 NKO. He prescribed the creation of separate detachments in the rear of unstable units. As in the previous case, the fighters had the right to shoot only individual alarmists and cowards who voluntarily left their positions in battle. The detachments were provided with all the necessary transport, and the most capable commanders were placed at their head. There were also separate barrage battalions at the division level.

Results of combat operations of the 63rd detachment

By mid-October 1942, 193 army detachments had been created. By this time they managed to detain 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3,980 of them were arrested, and 1,189 military personnel were shot. All the rest were sent to penal units. The Don and Stalingrad directions were the most difficult; an increased number of arrests and detentions were recorded here. But these are “little things”. It is much more important that such units provided real assistance to their colleagues at the most critical moments of the battle.

This is how the 63rd Barrage Detachment (53rd Army) showed itself, coming to the aid of its unit to which it was “assigned.” He forced the Germans to stop their counter-offensive. What conclusions follow from this? Quite simple.

The role of these formations in restoring order was very great, and they were able to return a considerable number of military personnel back to the front. So, one day the 29th Infantry Division, into whose flank the advancing German tanks managed to break through, began to retreat in panic. NKVD Lieutenant Filatov, at the head of his squad, stopped the fleeing, and together with them went to combat positions.

In an even more difficult situation, the barrage unit under the command of the same Filatov made it possible for the soldiers of the badly battered rifle division to retreat, and it itself began a battle with the breaking through enemy, forcing him to retreat.

Who were they?

In critical situations, the soldiers did not shoot their own people, but competently organized the defense and led the offensive themselves. Thus, there is a known case when the 112th Infantry Division, having lost almost 70% (!) of its personnel in difficult battles, received an order to retreat. Instead, the barrage detachment of Lieutenant Khlystov took over the position and held the position for four days, doing this until reinforcements arrived.

A similar case is the defense of the Stalingrad railway station by the “NKVD dogs”. Despite their numbers, which were significantly inferior to the Germans, they held their positions for several days and waited for the 10th Infantry Division to arrive.

Thus, barrage detachments are “last chance” detachments. If the fighters of the linear unit leave their positions unmotivated, members of the barrage battalion will stop them. If a military unit suffers heavy losses in a battle with a superior enemy, the “layers” give them the opportunity to retreat and continue the battle themselves. Simply put, barrage detachments are military units of the USSR, which during the battle play the role of defensive “bastions”. Units made up of NKVD troops, among other things, could be engaged in identifying German agents and catching deserters. When was their work completed?

End of work

By order of October 29, 1944, the barrage detachments in the Red Army were disbanded. If the personnel were recruited from ordinary linear units, similar formations were formed from them. NKVD fighters were sent to special “flying squads”, whose activities consisted of the targeted capture of bandits. By that time there were practically no deserters. Since the personnel of many barrier detachments were recruited from the best (!) fighters of their units, these people were also often sent for further training, forming the new backbone of the Soviet Army.

Thus, the “bloodthirstiness” of such units is nothing more than a stupid and dangerous myth that insults the memory of people who liberated countries captured by fascist troops.

Food barrier detachments

Back in December 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food came up with a proposal to liquidate all barrier detachments, except for the People's Commissariat for Food detachments and provincial food committees. But a clear ban on all government bodies, except the People's Commissariat for Food, to deploy detachments and requisition food products, was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars only on June 29, 1920.

The barrier detachments were liquidated in the second half of 1921 after the introduction of NEP.

Barrage detachments Trotsky

Initiative to create barrage detachments at the fronts civil war belongs to Trotsky. In the book “Around October” he recalls:

Hastily put together regiments and detachments, mainly from decayed soldiers of the old army, as is known, crumbled very pitifully at the first clash with the Czechoslovaks.

“To overcome this disastrous instability, we need strong defensive detachments of communists and militants in general,” I told Lenin before leaving for the east. “We must force them to fight.” If you wait until the man loses his senses, it will probably be too late.

Of course, this is correct,” he answered, “I’m only afraid that the barrage detachments will not show the necessary firmness.” The Russian man is a good man; he is not enough to take decisive measures of revolutionary terror. But you have to try.
The news of the assassination attempt on Lenin and the murder of Uritsky caught me in Sviyazhsk. During these tragic days, the revolution experienced an internal turning point. Her “kindness” was leaving her. The party damask steel received its final tempering. Determination grew, and where necessary, ruthlessness. At the front, political departments, hand in hand with barrage detachments and tribunals, set the backbone into the loose body of the young army. The change was not slow to take effect. We returned Kazan and Simbirsk 7. In Kazan, I received a telegram from Lenin, who was recovering after the assassination attempt, about the first victories on the Volga.

Trotsky L.D. Around October. 1924

During the Great Patriotic War

Beginning of the Great Patriotic War

On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issues Directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. And on October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, the barrier detachments were disbanded due to changes in the situation at the front. Personnel were replenished with rifle units. In particular, it provided:

Organization of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion of operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks:
a) detention of deserters;
b) detaining all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational employees of the Third Directorate of the NPO (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of material along with those detained according to jurisdiction.

By order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed at special departments of divisions and corps, at special departments of armies - separate rifle companies, at special departments of the fronts - separate rifle battalions staffed by personnel of the NKVD troops.

Instructions for special departments of the NKVD Northwestern Front to combat deserters, cowards and alarmists... § 4
Special departments of a division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:
a) organize a barricade service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who have left combat positions without permission;
b) carefully check every detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;
c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and investigated for trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within 12 hours;
d) all servicemen lagging behind the unit are organized into platoons (teams) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;
e) in particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot deserters on the spot. The head of a special department reports each such case to a special department of the army and front;
f) carry out the sentence of a military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the line;
g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;
h) daily report to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and equipment transferred to the unit.

From the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 dated July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line:

...One of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all, without exception, military personnel unorganizedly making their way from the front to the front line, as well as military personnel, in groups or alone, ending up in other units.
However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized; the check of detained persons is carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.
In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in Red Army units, I propose:
1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose assign experienced operational workers to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interviews with all detainees without exception should be carried out only by detectives.
2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments and identified through intelligence and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity.
If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons will be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, with constant surveillance established over them both by the special department and by the unit commissar.

Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 001919 to the commanders of front troops, armies, division commanders, and the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions.
September 12, 1941.
The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and downright hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, throw down their weapons and begin shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters along with them. As a result of such actions by these elements, the division takes flight, abandons its material unit, and then begins to emerge from the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were up to the task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we don’t have many strong and stable commanders and commissars.
In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. In each rifle division, have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.
2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the common escape.
3. Oblige employees of special departments and political personnel of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening order and discipline of the division.
4. The creation of barrage detachments should be completed within five days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. Report receipt and execution to the commanders of fronts and armies.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin
B. Shaposhnikov

Battle of Stalingrad

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:
…
b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland.

As of October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments were formed in the Red Army. Of these, 16 are subordinated to the Special Departments of the Stalingrad Front, and 25 of the Don Front. Detachments from August 1 to October 1, 1942

140,755 military personnel who escaped from the front line were detained. Among those detained:

3,980 people were arrested;

1,189 people were shot;

2,776 people were sent to penal companies;

185 people were sent to penal battalions;

131,094 people were returned to their units and transfer points.

By Don Front 36,109 people detained:

736 people were arrested;

433 people were shot;

1,056 people were sent to penal companies;

33 people were sent to penal battalions;

32,933 people were returned to their units and transit points.

By Stalingrad Front 15,649 people detained:

244 people were arrested;

278 people were shot;

218 people were sent to penal companies;

42 people were sent to penal battalions;

14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points.

Certificate from the OO NKVD STF in the UOO NKVD USSR on the activities of the barrage detachments of the Stalingrad and Don fronts no earlier than October 15, 1942

Practice and results of use

Army General Hero of the Soviet Union P. N. Lashchenko:

Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I don’t know that any of them fired at their own people, at least on our sector of the front. I have already requested archival documents on this matter, but no such documents were found. The barrier detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received reinforcements, naturally, unfired, as they say, not having smelled gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the eldest. It often happened that the barrier detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

Official letter addressed in October 1941 To the People's Commissar Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria Deputy Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank Solomon Milstein:

From the beginning of the war to October 10th of this year. (1941) special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops to protect the rear detained 657,364 military personnel who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front. Of those detained, 25,878 people were arrested, the remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.
Among those arrested:

spies - 1505;

saboteurs - 308;

traitors - 2621;

cowards and alarmists - 2643;

distributors of provocative rumors - 3987;

others - 4371.

Total - 25,878.

According to the decisions of special departments and the verdicts of military tribunals, 10,201 people were shot. Of these, 3,321 people were shot in front of the line

To thoroughly check the Red Army soldiers who were in captivity or surrounded by the enemy, by decision of the State Defense Committee No. 1069ss of December 27, 1941, army collection points were created in each army and special NKVD camps were organized. In 1941-1942, 27 special camps were created, but due to the verification and sending of proven military personnel to the front, they were gradually liquidated (by the beginning of 1943, only 7 special camps were functioning). According to official data, in 1942, 177,081 former prisoners of war and encirclement were admitted to special camps. After inspection by special departments of the NKVD, 150,521 people were transferred to the Red Army.

The barrage detachments were abolished in the fall of 1944.

Ratings and opinions

Of course, not everyone went on the attack, although the majority did. One was hiding in a hole, pressed into the ground. Here the political instructor played his main role: poking a revolver in the faces, he drove the timid forward... There were deserters. These were caught and immediately shot in front of the line, so that others would be discouraged... The punitive authorities worked great for us. And this is also in our best traditions. From Malyuta Skuratov to Beria, there were always professionals in their ranks, and there were always many who wanted to devote themselves to this noble and necessary cause for every state. In peacetime, this profession is easier and more interesting than arable farming or working at a machine. And the profit is greater, and the power over others is complete. And in war you don’t have to expose your head to bullets, just make sure that others do it correctly.

The troops went on the attack, driven by terror. The meeting with the Germans, with their machine guns and tanks, the fiery meat grinder of bombing and artillery shelling, was terrible. No less terrifying was the inexorable threat of execution. To keep the amorphous mass of poorly trained soldiers in line, executions were carried out before battle. They grabbed some frail goons or those who blurted out something, or random deserters, of which there were always enough. They lined up the division in the letter “P” and finished off the unfortunates without talking. This preventive political work resulted in fear of the NKVD and the commissars - greater than of the Germans. And in the offensive, if you turn back, you will receive a bullet from the barrier detachment. Fear forced the soldiers to die. This is what our wise party, the leader and organizer of our victories, counted on. They shot, of course, even after an unsuccessful battle. And it also happened that barrage detachments mowed down regiments retreating without orders with machine guns. Hence the combat effectiveness of our valiant troops.

War veteran Mikhail Borisovich Levin:

The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary...
This order “sobered up” many, forced them to come to their senses...
As for the barrier detachments, I only encountered their “activities” once at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank trembled and fled, so the barrier detachment opened fire, where across, where directly at those fleeing... After that, I never saw a barrier detachment near the front line. If a critical situation arose in battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of barrier detachments - to stop those scurrying in panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of machine gunners.

- Book of memory. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. Hero of the Second World War. Project I Remember

War participant A. Dergaev:

Nowadays there is a lot of talk about barrier detachments. We stood in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I didn't see them. That is, they were probably somewhere, perhaps even further behind us. But we haven't encountered them. A few years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which the following words: “... we dug a full-length trench. The German is hitting us right in the forehead, and behind us is a barrage detachment...” I was sitting on the balcony and, unable to bear it, jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed it. During the break, I tell them: “They are making fun of you, but you are silent.” He still sings these songs. In general, we did not see women at the front, nor did the NKVD.

What happened?

The main tasks of the special departments during the war were determined by the resolution of the State Defense Committee to be “a decisive fight against espionage and betrayal in units of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line.” They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the defensive formations were gradually curtailed. Order No. 227 gave it new impetus.

In reality, the outposts of the army barrier detachment were located at a distance of 1.5-2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in penalties, but checked and detained everyone whose presence outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed during one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer and autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 military personnel who “escaped from the front line.” Of these: 3980 were arrested, 1189 were shot, 2776 were sent to penal companies, 185 were sent to penal battalions, the overwhelming number of detainees was returned to their units and transit points - 131,094 people. The statistics presented show that the absolute majority of military personnel who had previously left the front line for various reasons - more than 91% - were able to continue fighting without any loss of rights.

Let us give several typical examples from the history of the Battle of the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. When the soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic, the head of the barrier detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Yelman, ordered his squad to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied their previous defensive lines.

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles increasingly turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a pre-made decision of the command. The army commanders tried to use the units left without “work” with maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.

Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented deserters, alarmists, and German agents from penetrating into the rear, they not only returned military personnel who had lagged behind their units to the front line, but they themselves carried out direct combat operations with the enemy, making a contribution to achieving victory over fascist Germany.

The history of the first partisan detachment of the Great Patriotic War. The truth about barrier detachments in the Soviet army: only the facts During the Great Patriotic War

What it is?

History of origin

What function did they perform?

The fight against banditry and the role of the 33rd barrier detachment

Estonian events

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of September 1941

Varieties

Results of the work

Results of combat operations of the 63rd detachment

Who were they?

End of work

Food barrier detachments

Barrage detachments Trotsky

During the Great Patriotic War

Beginning of the Great Patriotic War

Battle of Stalingrad

Practice and results of use

Ratings and opinions

Password recovery