EntranceGuerrilla warfare: historical significance. Start in science A famous partisan of the Patriotic War of 1812 was
The Patriotic War of 1812 gave birth to a new phenomenon in history - the mass partisan movement. During the war with Napoleon, Russian peasants began to unite into small detachments to defend their villages from foreign invaders. The brightest figure among the partisans of that time was Vasilisa Kozhina, a woman who became a legend of the War of 1812.
Partisan
At the time of the French invasion of Russia, Vasilisa Kozhina, according to historians, was about 35 years old. She was the wife of the headman of the Gorshkov farm in the Smolensk province. According to one version, she was inspired to participate in the peasant resistance by the fact that the French killed her husband, who refused to provide food and fodder for Napoleonic troops. Another version says that Kozhina’s husband was alive and himself led a partisan detachment, and his wife decided to follow the example of her husband.
In any case, to fight the French, Kozhina organized her own detachment of women and teenagers. The partisans used what was available on the peasant farm: pitchforks, scythes, shovels and axes. Kozhina's detachment collaborated with Russian troops, often handing over captured enemy soldiers to them.
Recognition of merit
In November 1812, the magazine “Son of the Fatherland” wrote about Vasilisa Kozhina. The article was devoted to how Kozhina escorted prisoners to the location of the Russian army. One day, when the peasants brought several captured Frenchmen, she gathered her detachment, mounted her horse and ordered the prisoners to follow her. One of the captured officers, not wanting to obey “some peasant woman,” began to resist. Kozhina immediately killed the officer with a blow to the head with her scythe. Kozhina shouted to the remaining prisoners that they should not dare to be insolent, because she had already cut off the heads of 27 “such mischievous people.” This episode, by the way, was immortalized in a popular print by artist Alexei Venetsianov about the “elder Vasilisa.” In the first months after the war, such pictures were sold throughout the country as a memory of the people's feat.
It is believed that for her role in the liberation war, the peasant woman was awarded a medal, as well as a cash prize personally from Tsar Alexander I. In the State historical museum A portrait of Vasilisa Kozhina, painted by the artist Alexander Smirnov in 1813, is kept in Moscow. A medal on the St. George's ribbon is visible on Kozhina's chest.
And the name of the brave partisan is immortalized in the names of many streets. So, on a map of Moscow, near the Park Pobedy metro station, you can find Vasilisa Kozhina Street.
Popular rumor
Vasilisa Kozhina died around 1840. Almost nothing is known about her life after the end of the war, but the fame of Kozhina’s military exploits spread throughout the country, overgrown with rumors and inventions. According to such folk legends, Kozhina once lured 18 Frenchmen into a hut by cunning and then set it on fire. There are also stories about Vasilisa’s mercy: according to one of them, the partisan once took pity on a captured Frenchman, fed him and even gave him warm clothes. Unfortunately, it is unknown whether at least one of these stories is true - there is no documentary evidence.
It is not surprising that over time, many tales began to appear around the brave partisan - Vasilisa Kozhina turned into a collective image of the Russian peasantry who fought against the invaders. A folk heroes often become characters in legends. Modern Russian directors also could not resist myth-making. In 2013, the mini-series “Vasilisa” was released, which was later remade into a full-length film. The title character was played by Svetlana Khodchenkova. And although the fair-haired actress does not at all resemble the woman depicted in the portrait by Smirnov, and the historical assumptions in the film sometimes look completely grotesque (for example, the fact that the simple peasant woman Kozhina speaks French fluently), still such films speak of that the memory of the brave partisan is alive even two centuries after her death.
The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, Napoleon's tattered and frozen army was brutally beaten by Russian flying and peasant partisan detachments.
Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants
The greatly extended Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile units to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive them of food and fodder.
During the Patriotic War, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of partisan peasants, uniting spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to actual acts of sabotage, flying detachments also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces mainly repelled the enemy from their villages.
Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman
Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and proposed it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, and beat small groups of the enemy.
Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. Davydov’s cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.
Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.
Over time, Denis Davydov’s detachment increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked French units, which sometimes had a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking convoys and freeing prisoners, and sometimes even captured enemy artillery.
After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. These were mainly Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. United partisan groups could resist large military formations Napoleon's army. Thus, at the end of October, during a battle in the area of the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat turned out to be a terrible blow. This success, on the contrary, encouraged the Russian troops and set them up for further victories.
Peasant initiative
A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of French units was made by peasants who self-organized into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov’s instructions. While willingly helping flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the men at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, and often, when the enemy approached, they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce local resistance intensified as the demoralized French army increasingly turned into a crowd of robbers and marauders.
One of these detachments was assembled by dragoons Ermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many acts of sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy convoys with food and livestock. At one time, Chetvertakov’s unit included up to 4 thousand people. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by career military men and noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of Napoleonic troops were not isolated.
Russian partisans in 1812
Victor Bezotosny
The term “partisans” in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history – the people’s war that unfolded in Russian territories in 1812 and the mass partisan movement during the Second World War. Both of these periods were called the Patriotic Wars. A long time ago, a persistent stereotype arose that partisans first appeared in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812, and their founder was the dashing hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. His poetic works were practically forgotten, but everyone from school remembers that he created the first partisan detachment in 1812.
Historical reality was somewhat different. The term itself existed long before 1812. Partisans were called partisans in the Russian army back in XVIII century military personnel sent as part of independent small separate detachments, or parties (from the Latin word partis, from the French parti) for operations on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. Naturally, this phenomenon cannot be considered a purely Russian invention. Even before 1812, both the Russian and French armies experienced the irritating actions of the partisans. For example, the French in Spain against the Guerillas, the Russians in 1808–1809. during the Russian-Swedish war against detachments of Finnish peasants. Moreover, many, both Russian and French officers, who adhered to the rules of the medieval knightly code of conduct in war, considered partisan methods (surprise attacks from behind on a weak enemy) not entirely worthy. Nevertheless, one of the leaders of Russian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich, in an analytical note submitted to the command before the start of the war, proposed deploying active guerrilla actions on the flanks and behind enemy lines and for this purpose use Cossack units.
The success of the Russian partisans in the campaign of 1812 was facilitated by the huge territory of the theater of military operations, their length, elongation and poor coverage of the communication line Great Army.
And of course, huge forests. But still, I think the main thing is the support of the population. Guerrilla actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Observation Army, General A.P. Tormasov, who in July sent a detachment of Colonel K.B. Knorring to Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. A little later, M.B. Barclay de Tolly formed the “flying corps” of Adjutant General F.F. Wintzingerode. By order of Russian military leaders, raiding partisan detachments began to actively operate on the flanks of the Great Army in July-August 1812. Only on August 25 (September 6), on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, with the permission of Kutuzov, a party (50 Akhtyrsky hussars and 80 Cossacks) of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, the Davydov to whom Soviet historians attributed the role of the initiator and founder of this movement, was sent on a “search” .
The main purpose of the partisans was considered to be actions against the enemy’s operational (communication) line. The party commander enjoyed great independence, receiving only the most general instructions from the command. The partisans' actions were almost exclusively offensive in nature. The key to their success was secrecy and speed of movement, surprise of attack and lightning withdrawal. This, in turn, determined the composition of the partisan parties: they included predominantly light regular (hussars, lancers) and irregular (Don, Bug and other Cossacks, Kalmyks, Bashkirs) cavalry, sometimes reinforced by several pieces of horse artillery. The party size did not exceed several hundred people, this ensured mobility. Infantry was rarely supplied: at the very beginning of the offensive, the detachments of A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner received one Jaeger company each. The party of D.V. Davydov operated behind enemy lines for the longest time – 6 weeks.
Even on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian command was thinking about how to attract the huge masses of peasants to resist the enemy, making the war truly popular. It was obvious that religious and patriotic propaganda was needed, an appeal to the peasant masses was needed, a call to them. Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich believed, for example, that the people “must be armed and adjusted, as in Spain, with the help of the clergy.” And Barclay de Tolly, as the commander at the theater of military operations, without waiting for anyone’s help, turned on August 1 (13) to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces with calls for “universal armament.”
First of all, armed detachments began to be created on the initiative of the nobility in the Smolensk province. But since the Smolensk region was very soon completely occupied, the resistance here was local and episodic, as in other places where landowners fought off looters with the support of army detachments. In other provinces bordering the theater of military operations, “cordons” were created, consisting of armed peasants, whose main task was to fight looters and small detachments of enemy foragers.
During the stay of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp people's war reached its greatest extent. At this time, enemy marauders and foragers are rampant, their outrages and robberies become widespread, and partisan parties, individual militia units and army detachments begin to support the cordon chain. The cordon system was created in Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir, Tula and part of Moscow provinces. It was at this time that the extermination of marauders by armed peasants acquired a massive scale, and among the leaders of peasant detachments, G. M. Urin and E. S. Stulov, E. V. Chetvertakov and F. Potapov, and the elder Vasilisa Kozhina became famous throughout Russia. According to D.V. Davydov, the extermination of marauders and foragers “was more the work of the villagers than of the parties rushing to inform the enemy for a much more important purpose, which was only to protect property.”
Contemporaries distinguished a people's war from a guerrilla war. Partisan parties, consisting of regular troops and Cossacks, acted offensively in the territory occupied by the enemy, attacking his convoys, transports, artillery parks, and small detachments. Cordons and people's squads, consisting of peasants and townspeople led by retired military and civil officials, were located in a zone not occupied by the enemy, defending their villages from plunder by marauders and foragers.
The partisans became especially active in the fall of 1812, during the stay of Napoleon's army in Moscow. Their constant raids caused irreparable harm to the enemy and kept him in constant tension. In addition, they delivered operational information to the command. Particularly valuable was the information promptly reported by Captain Seslavin about the French exit from Moscow and about the direction of movement of Napoleonic units to Kaluga. These data allowed Kutuzov to urgently transfer the Russian army to Maloyaroslavets and block the path of Napoleon’s army.
With the beginning of the retreat of the Great Army, the partisan parties were strengthened and on October 8 (20) they were given the task of preventing the enemy from retreating. During the pursuit, partisans often acted together with the vanguard of the Russian army - for example, in the battles of Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Krasny, Berezina, Vilna; and acted actively right up to the borders Russian Empire, where some of them were disbanded. Contemporaries appreciated the activities of the army partisans and gave them full credit. As a result of the 1812 campaign, all detachment commanders were generously awarded ranks and orders, and the practice of guerrilla warfare continued in 1813–1814.
It is indisputable that the partisans became one of those important factors(hunger, cold, heroic actions of the Russian army and the Russian people), which ultimately led Napoleon's Grand Army to disaster in Russia. It is almost impossible to calculate the number of enemy soldiers killed and captured by the partisans. In 1812, there was an unspoken practice - not to take prisoners (with the exception of important persons and “tongues”), since the commanders were not interested in separating a convoy from their few parties. The peasants, who were under the influence of official propaganda (all the French are “unchrists”, and Napoleon is “a fiend of hell and the son of Satan”), destroyed all the prisoners, sometimes in savage ways (they buried them alive or burned them, drowned them, etc.). But, it must be said that among the commanders of army partisan detachments, only Figner, according to some contemporaries, used cruel methods towards prisoners.
IN Soviet time the concept of “guerrilla warfare” was reinterpreted in accordance with Marxist ideology, and under the influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, it began to be interpreted as “the armed struggle of the people, mainly peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of Napoleonic troops and on their communications." Soviet authors began to view guerrilla warfare “as a people’s struggle, generated by creativity masses", saw in it "one of the manifestations of the decisive role of the people in the war." The peasantry was declared to be the initiator of the “people's” guerrilla war, which supposedly began immediately after the invasion of the Great Army into the territory of the Russian Empire, and it was argued that it was under their influence that the Russian command later began to create army partisan detachments.
The statements of a number of Soviet historians that the “partisan” people’s war began in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, that the government banned the arming of the people, that peasant detachments attacked enemy reserves, garrisons and communications and partially joined the army partisan detachments do not correspond to the truth. . The significance and scale of the people's war were enormously exaggerated: it was argued that the partisans and peasants “kept the enemy army under siege” in Moscow, that “the club of the people’s war nailed the enemy” right up to the Russian border. At the same time, the activities of the army partisan detachments turned out to be obscured, and it was they who made a tangible contribution to the defeat of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812. Today, historians are re-opening archives and reading documents, now without the ideology and instructions of the leaders that dominate them. And reality reveals itself in an unvarnished and unclouded form.
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The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the entire people. In the overwhelming majority of areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the “Great Army” not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. The next invasion of “foreigners” was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population as an invasion aimed at eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing atheism.
Speaking about the partisan movement in the War of 1812, it should be clarified that the partisans themselves were temporary detachments of military personnel of regular units and Cossacks, purposefully and organizedly created by the Russian command for actions in the rear and on enemy communications. And to describe the actions of spontaneously created self-defense units of villagers, the term “people's war” was introduced. Therefore, the popular movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is integral part more general theme"The People in the War of the Twelfth Year."
Some authors started partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality, things were somewhat different.
Even before the start of the war, the lieutenant colonel drew up a note on the conduct of an active guerrilla war. In 1811, the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, “The Little War,” was published in Russian. However, the Russian army looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement “a disastrous system of fragmentation of the army.”
People's War
With the invasion of Napoleonic hordes, local residents initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from military operations. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was apparently drawn up on the basis of the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to conduct guerrilla warfare.
It arose spontaneously and represented the actions of small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to memoirs, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms.”
French foragers sent to villages for food faced more than just passive resistance. In the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers.
Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. It was here that popular resistance acquired the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would later be brought to justice. However, this process subsequently intensified.
Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812
Unknown artist. 1st quarter of the 19th century
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked French parties making their way towards them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychev detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French and established proper order and discipline. Sychevsky partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they killed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.
Residents of the Roslavl district created several horse and foot peasant detachments, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many peasant detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydova.
Another detachment, created from peasants, was also active in the Gzhatsk district, headed by a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. Chetvertakov’s detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, throughout the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the residents of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side.”
Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner. In Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.
The actions of peasant detachments became especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.
The battle between Mozhaisk peasants and French soldiers during and after the Battle of Borodino. Colorized engraving by an unknown author. 1830s
In Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsy district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev.
Don't hesitate! Let me come! Artist V.V. Vereshchagin. 1887-1895
The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the head of the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya, the head of the centenary Ivan Chushkin and the peasant, the Amerevskaya head Emelyan Vasiliev, gathered the peasants subordinate to them, and also invited the neighboring ones.”
The detachment consisted of about 6 thousand people in its ranks, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into armed struggle with enemy troops.
It should be noted that even women took part in forays against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes became overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. Typical example- s, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed no less than the leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality did not happen.
French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna. A.G. Venetsianov. 1813
A gift for children in memory of the events of 1812. Cartoon from the series I.I. Terebeneva
Peasant and partisan detachments constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to their raids. They intercepted French correspondence, delivering especially valuable ones to the headquarters of the Russian army.
The actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” he wrote, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and take those taken prisoner to the army.”
Partisans in 1812. Artist B. Zvorykin. 1911
According to various estimates, over 15 thousand people were captured by peasant formations, the same number were exterminated, and significant supplies of fodder and weapons were destroyed.
In 1812. French prisoners. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873
During the war, many active participants in peasant groups were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward the people subordinate to the count: 23 people “in charge” - with insignia of the Military Order (St. George Crosses), and the other 27 people - with a special silver medal “For Love of the Fatherland” on the Vladimir Ribbon.
Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militia warriors, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases to supply the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to obtain additional communications that would have connected the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv.
Army partisan units
Army partisan detachments also played a major role in the Patriotic War of 1812. The idea of their creation arose even before the Battle of Borodino, and was the result of an analysis of the actions of individual cavalry units, which, by force of circumstances, ended up in the enemy’s rear communications.
The first to begin partisan actions was a cavalry general who formed a “flying corps.” Later, on August 2, already M.B. Barclay de Tolly ordered the creation of a detachment under the command of a general. He led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina on the flanks and behind enemy lines. Its strength was 1,300 people.
Later, the main task of partisan detachments was formulated by M.I. Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through what movements big army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, for the divided forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him, and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving up important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk."
Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the most mobile Cossack units and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people or more. They were tasked with sudden actions behind enemy lines to disrupt communications, destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons and suitable reserves, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to obtain food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the main headquarters of the Russian army. Interaction was organized between the commanders of the partisan detachments whenever possible.
The main advantage of partisan units was their mobility. They never stood in one place, constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift.
The partisan detachments of D.V. became widely known. Davydova, etc.
The personification of the entire partisan movement was the detachment of the commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov.
The tactics of his partisan detachment combined rapid maneuver and striking an enemy unprepared for battle. To ensure secrecy, the partisan detachment had to be almost constantly on the march.
The first successful actions encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to attack some enemy convoy walking along the main Smolensk road. On September 3 (15), 1812, a battle took place near Tsarev-Zaimishcha on the great Smolensk road, during which the partisans captured 119 soldiers and two officers. The partisans had 10 supply wagons and a wagon with ammunition at their disposal.
M.I. Kutuzov closely followed Davydov’s brave actions and attached great importance to great importance expansion of partisan warfare.
In addition to Davydov’s detachment, there were many other well-known and successfully operating partisan detachments. In the fall of 1812, they surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. The flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and a light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Thus, Kutuzov gave partisan warfare a wider scope.
Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy transports and convoys, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. Every day, the commander-in-chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, captured mail, protocols of interrogation of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which was reflected in the log of military operations.
A partisan detachment of captain A.S. operated on the Mozhaisk road. Figner. Young, educated, fluent in French, German and Italian languages, he found himself in the fight against a foreign enemy, without fear of dying.
Moscow was blocked from the north large detachment General F.F. Wintzingerode, who, by sending small detachments to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.
When the main forces of the Russian army were withdrawn, Kutuzov advanced from the Krasnaya Pakhra area to the Mozhaisk road to the area of the village. Perkhushkovo, located 27 versts from Moscow, a detachment of Major General I.S. Dorokhov, consisting of three Cossack, hussar and dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery with the goal of “making an attack, trying to destroy enemy parks.” Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to strike the enemy.
The actions of Dorokhov’s detachment received approval in the main headquarters of the Russian army. On the first day alone, he managed to destroy 2 cavalry squadrons, 86 charging wagons, capture 11 officers and 450 privates, intercept 3 couriers, and recapture 6 pounds of church silver.
Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular detachments, and. The actions of these detachments were important.
Colonel N.D. Kudashev with two Cossack regiments was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolskoye, suddenly attacked the enemy, destroyed more than 100 people and captured 200.
Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A.N. Seslavina. He and a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and a squadron of the Sumy Hussar Regiment) were assigned to operate in the area of the road from Borovsk to Moscow, coordinating their actions with the detachment of A.S. Figner.
A detachment of Colonel I.M. operated in the Mozhaisk area and to the south. Vadbolsky as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. He advanced to the village of Kubinsky to attack enemy convoys and drive his parties away, taking possession of the road to Ruza.
In addition, a detachment of a lieutenant colonel of 300 people was also sent to the Mozhaisk area. To the north, in the area of Volokolamsk, a detachment of a colonel operated, near Ruza - a major, behind Klin towards the Yaroslavl highway - Cossack detachments of a military foreman, and near Voskresensk - major Figlev.
Thus, the army was surrounded by a continuous ring of partisan detachments, which prevented it from foraging in the vicinity of Moscow, as a result of which the enemy troops experienced a massive loss of horses and increased demoralization. This was one of the reasons for Napoleon leaving Moscow.
The partisans A.N. were again the first to learn about the beginning of the advance of French troops from the capital. Seslavina. At the same time, he, being in the forest near the village. Fomichev, personally saw Napoleon himself, which he immediately reported. Napoleon’s advance to the new Kaluga road and the covering detachments (a corps with the remnants of the vanguard) were immediately reported to M.I.’s main apartment. Kutuzov.
An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.
Kutuzov sent Dokhturov to Borovsk. However, already on the way, Dokhturov learned about the occupation of Borovsk by the French. Then he went to Maloyaroslavets to prevent the enemy from advancing to Kaluga. The main forces of the Russian army also began to arrive there.
After a 12-hour march, D.S. By the evening of October 11 (23), Dokhturov approached Spassky and united with the Cossacks. And already in the morning he entered into battle on the streets of Maloyaroslavets, after which the French had only one escape route left - Old Smolenskaya. And then A.N.’s report will be late. Seslavin, the French would have bypassed the Russian army at Maloyaroslavets, and what the further course of the war would have been then is unknown...
By this time, the partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them under the command of Major General I.S. Dorokhova, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, launched an assault on the city of Vereya on September 28 (October 10), 1812. The enemy took up arms only when the Russian partisans had already broken into the city. Vereya was liberated, and about 400 people of the Westphalian regiment with the banner were taken prisoner.
Monument to I.S. Dorokhov in Vereya. Sculptor S.S. Aleshin. 1957
Continuous exposure to the enemy was of great importance. From September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), according to various estimates, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand French were captured. Their losses increased every day due to the active actions of peasant and partisan detachments.
To ensure the transportation of ammunition, food and fodder, as well as road safety, the French command had to allocate significant forces. Taken together, all this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army, which worsened every day.
Great luck partisans is rightfully considered the battle near the village. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya, which occurred on October 28 (November 9). In it, partisans D.V. Davydova, A.N. Seslavin and A.S. Figner, reinforced by regiments, a total of 3,280 people, attacked Augereau's brigade. After a stubborn battle, the entire brigade (2 thousand soldiers, 60 officers and Augereau himself) surrendered. This was the first time an entire enemy military unit surrendered.
The remaining partisan forces also continuously appeared on both sides of the road and harassed the French vanguard with their shots. Davydov's detachment, like the detachments of other commanders, always followed on the heels of the enemy army. The colonel, following on the right flank of the Napoleonic army, was ordered to go forward, warning the enemy and to raid individual detachments when they stopped. A large partisan detachment was sent to Smolensk in order to destroy enemy stores, convoys and individual detachments. The Cossacks M.I. pursued the French from the rear. Platova.
No less energetically, partisan detachments were used to complete the campaign to expel Napoleonic army from Russia. Detachment A.P. Ozharovsky was supposed to capture the city of Mogilev, where large rear enemy warehouses were located. On November 12 (24), his cavalry broke into the city. And two days later the partisans D.V. Davydov interrupted communication between Orsha and Mogilev. Detachment A.N. Seslavin, together with the regular army, liberated the city of Borisov and, pursuing the enemy, approached the Berezina.
At the end of December, Davydov’s entire detachment, by order of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the army’s main forces as its advanced detachment.
Guerrilla warfare, which unfolded near Moscow, made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon’s army and expelling the enemy from Russia.
Material prepared by the Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy General Staff RF Armed Forces
The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of Russian troops deep into the territory of the state showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of one regular army. To defeat a strong enemy, the efforts of the entire Russian people were needed. In the overwhelming majority of enemy-occupied counties, people perceived Napoleon's troops not as liberators from serfdom, but as rapists, robbers and enslavers. The actions of the invaders only confirmed the opinion of the people - the European hordes robbed, killed, raped, and committed outrages in churches. The next invasion of foreigners was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the people as an invasion that had the goal of eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing atheism.
When studying the topic of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, it should be remembered that partisans were then called temporary detachments of regular troops and Cossacks, which were purposefully created by the Russian command to operate on the flanks, in the rear and communications of the enemy. The actions of spontaneously organized self-defense units of local residents were designated by the term “people’s war.”
Some researchers associate the beginning of the partisan movement during the War of 1812 with the manifesto of the Russian Emperor Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which seemed to allow the people to take up and actively participate in the fight against the French. In reality, things were somewhat different; the first pockets of resistance to the occupiers appeared in Belarus and Lithuania. Moreover, often the peasants did not understand where the occupiers were and where their nobles collaborating with them were.
People's War
With the invasion of the “Great Army” into Russia, many local residents initially simply left the villages and went into forests and areas remote from military operations and took away their livestock. Retreating through the Smolensk region, the commander-in-chief of the Russian 1st Western Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly called on his compatriots to take up arms against the enemy. Barclay de Tolly's proclamation advised how to act against the enemy. The first detachments were created from local residents who wanted to protect themselves and their property. They were joined by soldiers who had fallen behind their units.
French foragers gradually began to face not only passive resistance, when cattle were driven into the forest and food was hidden, but also active actions of the peasants. In the area of Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Orsha, peasant detachments themselves attacked the enemy, carrying out not only night but also daytime attacks on small enemy units. French soldiers were killed or captured. The people's war received its widest scope in the Smolensk province. It covered Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavlsky, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts.
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasants attacked parties of French foragers moving towards them. Police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov headed the Sychev detachments, establishing proper order and discipline in them. In just two weeks - from August 18 to September 1, they carried out 15 attacks on the enemy. During this time, they destroyed more than 500 enemy soldiers and captured over 300. Several horse and foot peasant detachments were created in the Roslavl district. They not only defended their district, but also attacked enemy detachments that were operating in the neighboring Elny district. Peasant detachments were also active in Yukhnovsky district, they interfered with the enemy’s advance to Kaluga, and assisted the army partisan detachment of D.V. Davydova. In Gzhatsk district, the detachment created by private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment Ermolai Chetvertakov gained great fame. He not only defended the lands near the Gzhatsk pier from enemy soldiers, but also attacked the enemy himself.
The people's war gained even greater scope during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, the peasant movement assumed a significant character not only in Smolensk, but also in Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Thus, in Zvenigorod district, people's detachments destroyed or captured more than 2 thousand enemy soldiers. The most famous detachments were led by the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk district there were detachments led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, local detachments included up to 2 thousand warriors. The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a union of Bogorodsk partisans; it included up to 6 thousand people. It was led by the peasant Gerasim Kurin. He not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district, but also struck the enemy himself.
It should be noted that Russian women also took part in the fight against the enemy. Peasant and army partisan detachments operated on enemy communications, constrained the actions of the “Great Army”, attacked individual enemy units, destroying the enemy’s manpower and property, and interfered with the collection of food and fodder. The Smolensk road, where the postal service was organized, was subject to regular attacks. The most valuable documents were delivered to the headquarters of the Russian army. According to some estimates, peasant detachments destroyed up to 15 thousand enemy soldiers, and about the same number were captured. Due to the actions of militia, partisan and peasant detachments, the enemy was unable to expand the zone he controlled and gain additional features for collecting food and fodder. The French failed to gain a foothold in Bogorodsk, Dmitrov, Voskresensk, capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv, or create additional communications to connect the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier.
French prisoners. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873
Army units
Army partisan detachments also played a major role in the 1812 campaign. The idea of their creation appeared even before the Battle of Borodino, when the command analyzed the actions of individual cavalry detachments that, by chance, ended up on enemy communications. The first to begin partisan actions was the commander of the 3rd Western Army, Alexander Petrovich Tormasov, who formed the “flying corps”. In early August, Barclay de Tolly formed a detachment under the command of General Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode. The number of the detachment was 1.3 thousand soldiers. Wintzingerode received the task of covering the St. Petersburg highway, operating on the flank and behind enemy lines.
M.I. Kutuzov attached great importance to the action of partisan detachments; they were supposed to wage a “small war”, exterminate individual enemy detachments. Detachments were usually created from mobile cavalry units, often Cossacks; they were most adapted to irregular warfare. Their numbers were usually small - 50-500 people. If necessary, they interacted and united into larger compounds. Army partisan detachments received the task of delivering surprise attacks behind enemy lines, destroying his manpower, disrupting communications, attacking garrisons, suitable reserves, and disrupting actions aimed at obtaining food and forage. In addition, the partisans served as army intelligence. The main advantage of partisan detachments was their speed and mobility. The most famous were the detachments under the command of Wintzingerode, Denis Vasilyevich Davydov, Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, Alexander Samoilovich Figner, Alexander Nikitich Seslavin and other commanders.
In the fall of 1812, the actions of partisan detachments took on a wide scope; the army flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 separate squadrons and a light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 ranger battalions and 22 regimental guns. The partisans set up ambushes, attacked enemy convoys, and intercepted couriers. They made daily reports on the movement of enemy forces, transmitted captured mail, and information received from prisoners. Alexander Figner, after the enemy captured Moscow, was sent to the city as a scout; he cherished the dream of killing Napoleon. He failed to eliminate the French emperor, but thanks to his extraordinary resourcefulness and knowledge foreign languages, Figner was able to get important information, which he transferred to the main apartment (headquarters). Then he formed a partisan (sabotage) detachment from volunteers and lagging soldiers, which operated on the Mozhaisk road. His enterprises so disturbed the enemy that he attracted the attention of Napoleon, who placed a reward on his head.
A large detachment of General Wintzingerode operated in the north of Moscow, which, having allocated small formations to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the enemy’s access to the northern regions of the Moscow region. Dorokhov's detachment was active and destroyed several enemy teams. A detachment under the command of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His partisans made a successful attack on the village of Nikolskoye, killing more than 100 people and capturing 200 enemy soldiers. Seslavin's partisans operated between Borovsk and Moscow, he had the task of coordinating his actions with Figner. Seslavin was the first to reveal the movement of Napoleon's troops to Kaluga. Thanks to this valuable report, the Russian army managed to block the enemy’s road at Maloyaroslavets. A detachment of Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky operated in the Mozhaisk area; under his command was the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and five hundred Cossacks. He established control over the Ruza road. In addition, a detachment of Ilya Fedorovich Chernozubov was sent to Mozhaisk, a detachment of Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf operated in the Volokolamsk area, Viktor Antonovich Prendel acted near Ruza, the Cossacks of Grigory Petrovich Pobednov acted beyond Klin towards the Yaroslavl highway, etc.
An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.
In fact, Napoleon’s “Grand Army” in Moscow was surrounded. Army and peasant detachments hindered the search for food and fodder, kept enemy units in constant tension, this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army. The active actions of the partisans were one of the reasons that forced Napoleon to decide to leave Moscow.
On September 28 (October 10), 1812, several united partisan detachments under the command of Dorokhov took Vereya by storm. The enemy was taken by surprise, and about 400 soldiers of the Westphalian regiment with a banner were captured. In total, in the period from September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), due to the actions of the partisans, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed and 6.5 thousand enemies were captured. To ensure security of communications, supply of ammunition, food and fodder, the French command had to allocate increasingly greater forces.
October 28 (November 9) near the village. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya partisans Davydov, Seslavin and Figner, reinforced by units of V.V. Orlov-Denisov, were able to defeat an entire enemy brigade (it was the vanguard of the 1st Infantry Division of Louis Barague d'Ilier). After a fierce battle, the French brigade under the command of Jean-Pierre Augereau capitulated. The commander himself and 2 thousand soldiers were captured. Napoleon was extremely angry when he learned of what had happened, he ordered the disbandment of the division and an investigation into the behavior of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, who showed indecisiveness and did not provide timely assistance to Augereau's brigade.The general was removed from command and placed under house arrest at his estate in France.
The partisans were also active during the retreat of the “Great Army”. Platov's Cossacks attacked enemy rear units. Davydov's detachment and other partisan formations operated from the flanks, followed the enemy army, carrying out raids on individual French units. Partisan and peasant detachments made a significant contribution to the common cause of victory over Napoleon's army and expelling the enemy from Russia.
Cossacks attack the retreating French. Drawing by Atkinson (1813).