Infantry division of the Russian army 1914. Ground forces in the First World War

The imperialist states intensively developed their armed forces as the most important means for the violent implementation of domestic and foreign policy objectives. The number of ground forces and navies grew every year. Armies and navies were re-equipped with the latest types of weapons and military equipment.

Germany and France built up their ground forces the most. The introduction of a new law on universal conscription in France in 1872 allowed it to accelerate the accumulation of trained reserves. This provided the opportunity in case of war to increase the size of the peacetime army by more than 2.5 times. So, if by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. France was able to field an active army of 647 thousand people, but by 1880 this army could already have a strength of more than one million people. In addition, 638 thousand made up the territorial army.

The German militarists could not allow France to strengthen, which would have threatened them with the loss of the military superiority achieved in the war of 1870-1871. Therefore, they increased their army more and more.

So, if by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War the North German Union, led by Prussia, had a peacetime army of 315.6 thousand people (the Prussian army was 283 thousand people) (2), then according to the law of May 2, 1874, the number of German The peacetime army was determined to be 401,659 people of the lower ranks (private and non-commissioned), by the law of May 6, 1880, its number was increased to 427,274 people, and in 1890 it was increased to 510.3 thousand people (including 486,983 privates and non-commissioned officers and 23,349 generals and (4). Thus, in just 20 years, the size of the German peacetime army was increased by almost 62%. Meanwhile, the population of Germany during the same time increased by only 25% (5). Germany's rival was France by the end of the 19th century. put over 625 thousand people under arms (6), while on the eve of the war of 1870-1871. its peacetime army amounted to 434.3 thousand people.

Characterizing the situation in Europe in the early 90s of the 19th century, F. Engels in the article “Can Europe Disarm?” (1893) pointed out that “that feverish competition in armaments began between France and Germany, into which Russia, Austria, and Italy were gradually drawn in.”
The arms race took on a particularly large scale immediately before the war. On July 5, 1913, the German Reichstag approved a law to increase the peacetime army by 136 thousand people. At the same time, the amount of one-time military expenses was expressed in the amount of 898 million marks. By the beginning of the war, the size of the German land army had been increased to 808,280 people. This number included 30,459, 107,794 non-commissioned officers, 647,793 privates, 2,480 doctors, 865 veterinarians, 2,889 military officials, 16 thousand volunteers.

France found it difficult to compete in military strength with Germany due to its smaller population and significantly lower rate of population growth. In addition, the annual population growth of France was decreasing all the time, while that of Germany was increasing. As a result, the annual call for recruits could not be increased. In order not to lag behind Germany in the number of ground forces, the French government, by law of August 7, 1913, increased the length of service from two to three years and lowered the conscription age from 21 to 20 years (11). This made it possible to increase the staffing level of the lower ranks to 720 thousand (12), and increase the total number of the French standing army by 50% (13). By August 1, 1914, the French peacetime army numbered 882,907 people (including colonial troops) (14).

In increasing the size of the army, Russia did not lag behind France and Germany. The peacetime Russian regular army from 1871 to 1904 was increased from 761,602 people (15) to 1,094,061 people (16). According to the states of 1912, the army was supposed to have 1,384,905 people (17). At the end of 1913, the so-called “Great Program for Strengthening the Army” was approved in Russia, which provided for an increase in peacetime ground forces of Russia by another 480 thousand people by 1917 (18). The artillery was significantly strengthened. The implementation of the program required a one-time expenditure of 500 million rubles.

Austria-Hungary also expanded its army. At the beginning of 1911, she increased the conscription contingent by 40%, allocating an additional 100 million crowns for the needs of the army (20). On July 5, 1912, a new military law was adopted in Austria-Hungary, which provided for a further increase in recruitment (from 181,677 to 205,902 people) and additional allocations for weapons. Italy also projected an increase in contingents from 153 thousand to 173 thousand people.
Along with the great powers, small countries were also engulfed in the arms race, even such as Belgium and Switzerland, which proclaimed eternal neutrality guaranteed by the great powers. In Belgium, for example, until 1909, the size of the army needed to defend the country in wartime was set at 180 thousand people. In peacetime it was about 42 thousand people. Due to the deterioration of international relations, the Belgian government in December 1912 established the size of the wartime army at 340 thousand people, and in peacetime 54 thousand people (22). On December 15, 1913, a new military law was adopted in Belgium and compulsory military service was introduced. According to this law, the composition of the peacetime army was supposed to be increased to 150 thousand by 1918.

Army recruitment system

The recruitment of private and non-commissioned officers into armies in most European countries was carried out on the basis of universal conscription, according to which military service was formally considered compulsory for all citizens. In reality, it fell with all its weight on the shoulders of the working masses. The rank and file of the armies was recruited mainly from working people. The exploiting classes enjoyed all sorts of benefits and avoided hard military service. In the army, their representatives occupied mainly command positions. Describing universal conscription in Russia, V.I. Lenin pointed out: “In essence, we did not have and do not have universal conscription, because the privileges of noble birth and wealth create a lot of exceptions. In essence, we did not have and do not have anything resembling equal rights for citizens in military service” (24).
The recruitment system based on compulsory military service made it possible to cover the largest number of the country's male population with military training and education. By the beginning of the First World War of 1914-1918. the number of military personnel reached the following values: in Russia - 5650 thousand, in France - 5067 thousand, in England - 1203 thousand, in Germany - 4900 thousand, in Austria-Hungary - 3 million people. This made it possible to mobilize multimillion-dollar armies, which exceeded the number of peacetime armies by 4-5 times.

Persons aged 20-21 were drafted into the army. Those liable for military service were considered to be in military service until they were 40-45 years of age. From 2 to 4 years they served in the cadres (2-3 years in the infantry, 3-4 years in the cavalry and horse artillery), after which they were enlisted in the reserve for 13-17 years (reserve in France and other countries, reserve and Landwehr in Germany) and were periodically involved in training camps. After the expiration of their period in the reserve, those liable for military service were included in the militia (territorial army in France and Japan, Landsturm in Germany). Persons who were not drafted into the army for any reason, but were able to bear arms, were also enrolled in the militia.

Spares (reservists) were drafted into the army in case of war and were intended to replenish units before wartime staff. In wartime, militias were also drafted and carried out various rear and garrison services.
In England and the USA, unlike other states, the armies were mercenary. They were recruited by recruiting people aged 18 - 25 years in England and 21 - 30 years in the USA. Volunteers served in the USA for 3 years, and in England for 12 years, of which from 3 to 8 years in active service, the rest of the time in reserve, with annual participation in 20-day training camps.

Recruitment of non-commissioned officers in all countries was carried out by selecting from among the recruits persons belonging to wealthy strata of society (wealthy peasants, small shopkeepers and office workers), who, after training for a certain period (1-2 years) in special training units, were appointed to non-commissioned officer positions. Since the main role in the training and education of the rank and file, especially the single soldier, and in maintaining internal order in the units belonged to non-commissioned officers (27), all armies sought to consolidate these personnel in the ranks of the army, for which they had proven themselves faithful and devoted non-commissioned service - after the expiration of the terms of active service, they were left for long-term service. At the same time, they received some benefits and privileges (official, everyday, material), up to the opportunity to become officers, especially in wartime. In the German army, non-commissioned officers were only super-conscripts (28). Non-commissioned officers who served the established periods of active and extended service were enlisted in the reserve.

Officer cadres were trained mainly through special military educational institutions (by branch of service), where young people, mainly from among the ruling classes (nobles and bourgeoisie), were accepted for training on a voluntary basis. For example, in Russia by 1911 there were 28 cadet corps and 20 military schools, in Germany - 8 preparatory cadet schools and 11 military schools, in Austria-Hungary - 18 cadet schools and 2 academies. Since there was almost always a shortage in the armies, a certain number of people from the petty bourgeoisie, clergy, bureaucrats, and intelligentsia were accepted into military schools. Officer cadres for wartime were recruited through the promotion of non-commissioned officers to the ranks of non-commissioned officers, as well as through short-term training of persons with secondary and higher education (volunteers).
To improve the qualifications of command personnel intended for senior positions, there were various short-term courses and schools (rifle, cavalry, etc.) with a training duration of about a year. Higher military education was provided by military academies.

Decisive command positions in the armies of all capitalist countries were occupied by representatives of the ruling classes. Thus, in the German army in 1913, nobles occupied 87% of staff positions in the cavalry, 48% in the infantry and 41% in the field artillery (30). In the Russian army, the class composition of the officers in 1912 was expressed in the following form (in%, on average): nobles - 69.76; honorary citizens - 10.89; clergy - 3.07; “merchant title” - 2.22; “tax-paying class” (peasants, townspeople, etc.) - 14.05. Among the generals, hereditary nobles accounted for 87.45%, among the headquarters (lieutenant colonel - colonel) - 71.46% and among the rest of the officers - 50.36%. Of the “tax-paying class,” the majority were ober- 27.99%, and among the generals, representatives of this social group occupied only 2.69%.
The armies of capitalist states were the faithful armed support of the ruling classes in domestic politics and a reliable weapon for waging a war of conquest. However, the fundamental interests of the popular masses, who constituted the main force of the army, were in conflict with the aggressive goals of the capitalist states.

Organization and weapons

The ground forces of all states on the eve of the First World War consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery, which were considered the main branches of the military. Engineering troops (sapper, railway, pontoon, communications, telegraph and radiotelegraph), aviation and aeronautics were considered auxiliary. Infantry was the main branch of the military and its share in the system of ground forces averaged 70%, artillery - 15, cavalry - 8 and auxiliary troops - 7%.
The organizational structure of the armies of the main European states, future opponents in the impending war, had much in common. The troops were consolidated into units and formations. The highest association intended to solve strategic and operational problems during the war in all countries was the army. Only in Russia, even in peacetime, was it planned to create front-line formations (two to four armies) in case of war. The army included three to six army corps, cavalry units (formations), engineering units (in Germany also army artillery).
The army corps had an established staff and included all the necessary combat and auxiliary forces and equipment, as well as rear units sufficient for the corps to independently conduct battle even in isolation from other formations. The corps consisted of two or three infantry divisions, cavalry, corps artillery, sapper units, ferry facilities (engineer fleet), communications equipment, an aviation unit (air force, air squad), logistics institutions and transport units (the numerical strength of the corps is given in Table. 5).

Table 5. Composition of the wartime army corps in 1914*

Frame	Infantry battalions	Squadrons	Machine guns			Sapper companies	Total people
French
German

* S. N. Krasilnikov. Organization of large combined arms formations, p. 133.

(1*)2 batteries of 8 guns, 2 batteries of 4 guns.
(2*) Including 4 battalions of the reserve brigade.
(3*)Including machine guns of the reserve brigade.
(4*) All batteries are 4-gun.
(5*)24 batteries of 6 guns, 4 batteries of 4 guns.

The infantry was consolidated into divisions, which consisted of two infantry brigades (2 infantry regiments each). The division also included an artillery brigade (regiment), 2-3 cavalry squadrons and special units. The number of divisions in various armies ranged from 16 to 21 thousand people. The division was a tactical formation. Due to its composition and armament, it could carry out independent tasks on the battlefield, using fire from all types of infantry and artillery (see Table 6 for the division's numerical strength).

Table 6. Wartime composition of an infantry division in 1914*

* S. N. Krasilnikov. Organization of large combined arms formations, pp. 94-95, 133.

Infantry regiments consisted of 3-4 battalions, each of which had 4 companies. The battalion's strength was almost everywhere just over 1,000 people.
In England and the United States, there were no large military formations in peacetime. In wartime, brigades, divisions, and corps were formed from individual regiments and battalions.
The main weapon of the infantry was a repeating rifle with a bayonet caliber from 7.62 to 8 mm with a firing range of up to 3200 steps; it had good ballistic qualities. Reducing the caliber made it possible to significantly reduce the weight of cartridges and increase their carry capacity by 1.5 times. The use of magazine loading together with smokeless powder increased the practical rate of fire by almost 3 times (instead of 5 - 6 shots to 15 shots per minute). The Russian army adopted a three-line (7.62 mm) infantry rifle of the 1891 model, invented by Russian army officer S.I. Mosin (Table 7). In 1908, a new cartridge was designed for it with a pointed bullet and an initial speed of 860 m/sec. The sighting range of this rifle was 3200 steps (2400-2500 m). Before the war, the armies of almost all countries also introduced pointed bullets into their arsenal.

With a relatively small difference in ballistic properties with rifles from other armies, the Russian rifle was the best. It was distinguished by its simplicity of design, had high strength, was extremely durable, reliable and trouble-free in combat conditions.
Along with the main infantry weapon - the rifle - automatic weapons are becoming widespread. In the early 80s of the XIX century. modern machine guns appeared (the heavy machine gun of the American inventor Maxim of 1883), then automatic pistols and automatic (self-loading) rifles. At the beginning of the 20th century. light machine guns appeared. They were first used in the Russo-Japanese War (34).

Table 7. Small arms of the armies of the main European states

System	Caliber, mm	Maximum fire range, m
Russia
Model 1891 repeating rifle of the Mosin system
France
Model 1896 Lebed rifle
Hotchkiss machine gun
England
Model 1903 Lee-Enfield rifle
Maxim machine gun
Germany
Model 1898 Mauser rifle
Maxim machine gun
Austria-Hungary
Model 1895 Mannlicher rifle
Schwarzlose heavy machine gun

At first, the troops had machine guns in very small quantities. Before the war, the armies of the largest states relied on 24-28 heavy machine guns per infantry division. In the Russian army, as in most other armies, the Maxim machine gun was adopted for service. In the infantry division of the Russian army in 1914 there were 32 such machine guns (8 machine guns per regiment). Russian troops did not have light machine guns.
Cavalry in all armies was divided into military and strategic. In Russia, cavalry was divided into divisional cavalry, assigned to infantry formations, and army cavalry, which was at the disposal of the high command. In peacetime, cavalry divisions were organizationally part of the army corps, and during the war, together with two cavalry corps, they formed the army cavalry. In the infantry divisions there remained small cavalry units that made up the divisional cavalry.

The highest cavalry unit in all armies (except the English) was the cavalry corps consisting of 2-3 cavalry divisions. The cavalry division consisted of 4-6 cavalry regiments (there are 12 regiments in the English cavalry division). The division included regiments of various types of cavalry - uhlans, hussars, cuirassiers, dragoons (and in Russia, Cossacks). Each cavalry division included a horse artillery division of 2-3 batteries, machine gun and engineer units, and communications units. Machine guns and technical troops (sappers and signalmen) in some armies were also part of brigades and regiments. The cavalry division consisted of 3500-4200 people, 12 guns and from 6 to 12 machine guns (the English cavalry division - 9 thousand people and 24 machine guns). A cavalry regiment in all armies consisted of 4-6 squadrons (the English cavalry regiment had 3 squadrons). Before the war, the main weapon of cavalry was considered to be bladed (saber, pike), firearms - machine gun, carbine (short rifle), revolver.

Artillery was mainly a divisional weapon and was at the disposal of division commanders. The infantry division consisted of one or two artillery regiments (brigades) with 36 - 48 guns (in the German division - 72 guns). The artillery regiment included 2-3 artillery divisions, which consisted of batteries. The battery was the main firing unit and had from 4 to 8 guns. There was little artillery under corps subordination (one howitzer division in the Russian and German corps and a light artillery regiment in the French corps).

The use of smokeless powder, breech loading, piston locks and recoil devices led to the late 19th century. to the advent of rapid-fire guns, which significantly increased the combat power of artillery. The range and rate of fire increased by 2 or more times compared to the period of the Franco-Prussian War (range - from 3.8 to 7 km, rate of fire - from 3-5 rounds per minute to 5 - 10 rounds per minute) (35).
Along with increasing the rate of fire and range of artillery, military-technical thought also resolved the problem of indirect fire, which dramatically increased the survivability of artillery in battle. For the first time in combat conditions, indirect fire was used by Russian artillerymen during the Russo-Japanese War.

At the same time, Russian artillery midshipman S.N. Vlasyev and engineer-captain L.N. Gobyato designed a mortar, which was successfully used in the defense of Port Arthur in 1904. With the invention of the mortar, it became possible to conduct overhead fire on the enemy from short distances (mainly way along the trenches). However, only the German army at the beginning of the First World War was armed with mortars.
Divisional artillery consisted mainly of light guns of 75 - 77 mm caliber. It was intended to conduct flat fire and hit open targets with shrapnel. The firing range reached 6 - 8 km. Russian troops were armed with a 76.2-mm field gun of the 1902 model, which in terms of its ballistic properties was the best in the world.
In addition to this artillery, the armies of European states had cannons with a caliber of 100 to 150 mm, and for conducting mounted fire - howitzers (light and heavy) with a caliber of 100 to 220 mm. The main samples of artillery pieces and their tactical and technical data are given in table. 8.

Table 8. Field artillery of the armies of the main European states *

State and system of weapons	Caliber, mm	Projectile weight, kg	Grenade firing range, km
Russia
Field gun mod. 1902
Field howitzer mod. 1909
Rapid-fire cannon mod. 1910
Field howitzer mod. 1910
France
Field rapid-fire gun mod. 1897
Short Banja gun mod. 1890
Heavy howitzer Rimayo mod. 1904
Germany
Field light gun mod. 1896
Field light howitzer mod. 1909
Field heavy gun mod. 1904
Field heavy howitzer mod. 1902
Austria-Hungary
Field light gun mod. 1905
Field light howitzer mod. 1899
Field heavy gun
Field heavy howitzer mod. 1899

* E. 3. Barsukov. Artillery of the Russian Army, vol. 1, pp. 210-211, 229.

However, heavy field artillery was still very poorly developed. The German army was better equipped than others with howitzers and heavy artillery, since the German high command attached great importance to artillery. Each German infantry division included a division of 105 mm howitzers (18 guns), and the corps included a division of 150 mm howitzers (16 guns). Armies could also be assigned separate divisions of heavy artillery, which consisted of 210 mm mortars, 150 mm howitzers, 105 and 130 mm guns (36). On the eve of the war, the German army was in first place in terms of the number of artillery. The rest of the states were significantly inferior to it. The Austrian army was the weakest equipped with artillery. The field howitzers with which the Austrian army entered the war were very outdated. Mountain guns also left much to be desired (37).
In addition to heavy field artillery, there was also siege artillery of larger calibers, intended for the siege of fortresses or for operations against strong field fortifications of the enemy. A significant amount of artillery of various calibers was available in the fortresses. It was used by field troops during the war.

New technical means of struggle

On the eve of the First World War, the armies of European states were, to varying degrees, equipped with military equipment that supported the combat operations of the troops. Armored means were represented by armored (armored) trains. Such trains were used by the British during the Boer War to protect rear railway communications.

Armored vehicles were just being developed. Their technical properties did not yet meet the requirements and by the beginning of the war they were not adopted for service (39), they began to be used only with the beginning of the war and were armed with a machine gun or small-caliber gun. They moved at high speed and were intended to be used as a means of reconnaissance and for a surprise attack on enemy rear units, but did not have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.

Before the war, projects of self-propelled armored vehicles with high cross-country ability (later called tanks) appeared, and during the war the vehicles themselves (tanks) appeared. In 1911, the son of the famous Russian chemist D.I. Mendeleev, engineer V.D. Mendeleev, proposed the first tank design (40). Already during the war, the Russian inventor, military engineer A. A. Porokhovshchikov, presented his project for a light armored vehicle on tracks, armed with a machine gun, called an “all-terrain vehicle” (41). The vehicle was manufactured in Riga and assembled in May 1915. The “all-terrain vehicle,” as noted in the test report, “traversed soil and terrain impassable for ordinary cars” (42), its speed reached 25 km per hour. The tsarist government, which admired foreign models, did not dare to introduce a domestic tank into service with the army.

Aviation as a new means of armed struggle has been rapidly developing since the beginning of the 20th century. Russia is rightfully the birthplace of aviation. The world's first airplane was built by the Russian designer and inventor A.F. Mozhaisky (43). On July 20 (August 1), 1882, in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, Mozhaisky’s plane, controlled by mechanic Golubev, took off and flew over the field (44). In other countries, flight attempts have also been made since the 90s.

The year of the appearance of military aviation is considered to be 1910; from that time on, aircraft began to be used in military maneuvers. In France, 4 airships and 12 aircraft (45) took part in maneuvers in 1910. The aircraft were used in maneuvers in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. In Germany, for example, there were 24 aircraft, three airships and a tethered balloon (46) at the maneuvers. The aircraft were used for reconnaissance and fully justified the hopes placed on them.

Military aviation received its first combat experience in 1911-1912. during the war between Italy and Turkey. At first, nine Italian aircraft took part in this war, used for reconnaissance and also for bombing (47). In the first Balkan War of 1912-1913. A Russian volunteer aviation detachment operated as part of the Bulgarian army (48). In total, the countries of the Balkan Union had about 40 aircraft at their disposal. Airplanes were used mainly for reconnaissance, adjusting artillery fire, aerial photography, but sometimes also for bombing enemy troops, most of all cavalry. In Russia, aerial bombs of a large caliber for that time were used (about 10 kg) (51), in Italy - one-kilogram bombs.

The planes had no weapons. For example, the German Taube reconnaissance monoplane was equipped with a camera and picked up several bombs, which the pilot dropped with his hands over the side of the cockpit. The pilot was armed with a pistol or carbine for self-defense in the event of an emergency landing on enemy territory. Although work on arming the aircraft was underway, at the beginning of the war it turned out to be unfinished. The Russian officer Poplavko was the first in the world to create a machine gun installation on an airplane, but it was misjudged and was not adopted for service.

The most important event in the development of aircraft manufacturing in Russia was the construction in 1913 at the Russian-Baltic Plant in St. Petersburg of the heavy multi-engine aircraft “Russian Knight” (four engines of 100 hp each). When tested, it lasted in the air for 1 hour 54 minutes. with seven passengers (54), setting a world record. In 1914, the multi-engine aircraft “Ilya Muromets” was built, which was an improved design of the “Russian Knight”. “Ilya Muromets” had 4 engines of 150 hp each. With. (or two 220 hp engines). During testing, the device reached speeds of up to 90-100 km per hour (55). The plane could stay in the air for 4 hours. Crew - 6 people, flight load - 750-850 kg (56). In one of the flights, this plane with ten passengers reached an altitude of 2000 m (it stayed in the air much longer),
On July 5, 1914, the plane with passengers was in the air for 6 hours. 33 min. (57) “Russian Knight” and “Ilya Muromets” are the founders of modern heavy bombers. "Ilya Muromets" had special installations for suspending bombs, mechanical bomb releasers and sights (58).
In Russia, earlier than anywhere else, seaplanes designed by D. P. Grigorovich appeared in 1912-1913. In terms of their flight qualities, they were significantly superior to similar types of foreign machines that were subsequently created (59).

The aircraft had the following flight tactical data: engine power 60-80 hp. With. (for certain types of aircraft - up to 120 hp), speed rarely exceeded 100 km per hour, ceiling - 2500-3000 m, ascent time to 2000 m - 30-60 minutes, flight duration - 2-3 hours, combat load - 120-170 kg, including bomb load - 20-30 kg, crew - 2 people (pilot and observer).

There were few aircraft in military aviation. Russia had 263 aircraft, France - 156 aircraft, Germany - 232, Austria-Hungary - 65, England sent 30 aircraft (60) out of 258 aircraft to France with its expeditionary force.
Organizationally, aviation in units (detachments) was part of the army corps (in Russia there were 39 air detachments)
Before the First World War, aeronautics was already widely developed. The regulations contained instructions on the use of balloons for reconnaissance (61). Even in the Russo-Japanese War, they provided significant benefits to the troops.

They made observations even with winds up to 15 m/sec. In the war of 1904-1905. tethered kite balloons designed in Russia were used, which had great stability in the air and were convenient for observing the battlefield and for accurately adjusting artillery fire from closed positions. Balloons were also used in the war of 1914-1918.
At the end of the 19th century. in Russia, France, Germany and other countries, airship construction emerges, which, like aviation, developed especially rapidly in the last five years before the war. In 1911, in the Italo-Turkish War, the Italians used three airships (soft) for bombing and reconnaissance. However, due to their great vulnerability, airships could not be used on the battlefield, and they did not justify themselves as a means of bombing populated areas. The airship showed its suitability as a means of naval warfare - in the fight against submarines, in conducting naval reconnaissance, patrolling ship moorings and escorting them at sea. By the beginning of the First World War, Germany had 15 airships, France - 5, Russia - 14 (62).
Several years before the war, work was underway on the creation of an aviation backpack parachute. In Russia, the original design of such a parachute was developed and proposed to the military department in 1911 by G. E. Kotelnikov (63). But Kotelnikov’s parachute was used in 1914 only to equip pilots flying heavy Ilya Muromets aircraft.

Road transport began to be used for military purposes several years before the war. For example, at large imperial maneuvers in Germany in 1912, cars were used for communications, transporting troops, for various loads, as mobile workshops, and radio stations. Cars were also used in maneuvers of the Austro-Hungarian army (64). The French army had 170 vehicles of all brands, the English army had 80 trucks and several tractors, and the Russian army also had few cars (65). The replenishment of the army with cars according to the mobilization plan only provided for them to replace horse-drawn vehicles in the cumbersome corps rear. When mobilizing, the army received the following number of cars: French - about 5,500 trucks and about 4,000 cars (66); English - 1141 trucks and tractors, 213 cars and semi-trucks and 131 motorcycles; German - 4,000 vehicles (of which 3,500 are trucks) (67); Russian - 475 trucks and 3562 cars.

Before the First World War, military engineering resources in all armies were very limited. Sapper units were available only as part of the corps. In all armies, the mobilized corps had a sapper battalion, which included 3-4 sapper companies at the rate of one company per division and 1-2 companies in the corps reserve. Before the war, this norm of sapper units in the corps was recognized as quite sufficient for maneuverable operations, for which all armies were preparing. Sapper companies included specialists from almost all military engineering specialties of that time (sappers, miners, demolition workers, bridge workers). In addition, the sapper battalion included a searchlight unit to illuminate the area ahead (a searchlight company in the Russian corps and a searchlight platoon in the German corps). The corps had a bridge park as a means of transportation. In the German corps, which was most richly equipped with crossing facilities, it was possible to build a bridge 122 m long, and using divisional bridge facilities, the corps could build a light bridge of 200 m, and a heavy one, suitable for artillery passage, of 100-130 m.

The Russian corps had bridge equipment in sapper companies on only 64 m of the bridge (69). All sapper work was carried out manually, the main tools were a shovel, a pickaxe, and an ax.
Of the means of communication, the mobilized corps of all armies had telegraph units in the form of a telegraph department or company both for communication downward with the divisions and for communication upward with the army. The division did not have its own means of communication. Communication went to the division headquarters from below - from the regiments and from above - from corps headquarters.
The means of technical communication in the corps of all armies was extremely insufficient. The German corps had 12 devices, 77 km of field cable and 80 km of thin wire. The telegraph company of the Russian corps had 16 telegraph stations, 40 field telephone sets, 106 km of telegraph and 110 km of telephone wire, lighting equipment (heliograph, Mangin lamps, etc.). By the beginning of the war, the Russian corps was the most equipped with communications equipment. Radiotelegraph was considered an army tool and at the beginning there were no soldiers in the corps (70).
In general, it should be noted that the nature of the armaments of the armies of the largest European states, their structure, and technical equipment at the beginning of the war did not correspond to the capabilities that the industry of these countries had for the production of technical means of combat. The main burden of the fight fell on the infantry, armed with a rifle.

Control

In different countries, the organization of troop control in peacetime and wartime differed in detail, but the basics were approximately the same. In peacetime, the head of the armed forces was the head of state (president, monarch). Practical management of military construction, weapons and supplies, combat training, and the daily life of troops was carried out by the Ministry of War, in whose system there were special bodies (divisions, directorates, departments) for various types of activities and support of troops and general staffs, which were responsible for preparing for war(71).
In the German army, a large general staff, independent of the War Ministry, was in charge of preparing the armed forces for war, especially in terms of developing plans for mobilization, concentration, deployment and the first operational tasks. In Russia, these functions were performed by the Main Directorate of the General Staff, which was part of the War Ministry.

During war, the head of all armed forces was nominally the head of state, but almost always direct command in the theater of operations was entrusted to a specially appointed person - the commander in chief. For practical work on the management of the combat activities of the troops and their support, a field headquarters (Main Quarters, Headquarters) was created under the commander-in-chief with special departments for various types of combat activities and support. The commander-in-chief within the boundaries of the theater of military operations had supreme power (72). In the rest of the country, the usual authorities operated, and the War Ministry continued its work, which was now entirely aimed at meeting the needs and requirements of the front.

The strategic leadership of troops in all states (except Russia) was organized in such a way that each army was directly subordinate to the high command. Only in the Russian army, since 1900, has a new control system been developed. Even in peacetime in Russia, it was planned to create front-line departments that would unite 2-4 armies. It was recognized that, given the condition of fighting simultaneously against several opponents along a significant length of the western border, the commander-in-chief would not be able to direct the operations of all the armies subordinate to him alone, especially if they went on the offensive, when they acted in divergent directions. Therefore, it was decided to create an intermediate authority, namely front commanders.

It was assumed that the Russian high command would control the actions of the fronts, and the fronts would control the armies. True, the French “Manual for senior military commanders” of 1914. also provided for the unification of armies into groups. However, these associations were not permanent. Their organization was envisaged only for a certain time to conduct operations according to the plan of the commander-in-chief.
Due to the increase in the scope of military operations, the importance of headquarters has increased significantly. In matters of leadership and control of troops, headquarters played an important role.

The headquarters collects all the necessary information to organize the operation, it also develops directives and orders for the troops, receives reports from them and prepares reports to the senior commander. The headquarters must take care of establishing and maintaining communications with subordinate troops and higher headquarters.

Combat and operational training

In all armies, the system of training and education of personnel was aimed primarily at making the army an obedient instrument of the ruling classes, a reliable instrument for achieving their political goals in domestic and foreign policy.
They tried to instill in the soldiers faith in the inviolability of the existing social system, state system and social structure, and instilled in them obedience and diligence. Along with this, the troop training system provided for combat training necessary for the army to fulfill its direct purpose, that is, use in battle.

Combat training of troops was carried out according to a specific plan. To ensure uniformity of training, uniform programs were developed and special instructions were published. In Russia, for example, there was a “Plan for the distribution of annual training in the infantry”, “Regulations on the training of lower ranks”, “Manual for officer training”, “Manual for conducting training in cavalry”, etc. In other armies, instructions for organizing the training of recruits and some methodological advice was contained in the infantry drill regulations.

During their time in active military service, soldiers were trained in several stages. The development of professional skills began with single training, which included drill and physical training, training in the use of weapons (fire training, bayonet and hand-to-hand combat), training in performing the duties of a single fighter in peacetime (carrying out internal and guard duty) and in battle (service in patrol, field guard, observer, liaison, etc.). The importance of this period of training is emphasized by the infantry drill regulations of the German army of 1906: “Only thorough individual training provides a reliable basis for good combat performance of troops.”

Fire training occupied a significant place in the troop training system, since infantry fire was given great importance. It was believed that the infantry should prepare its own attack with the fire of its hand weapons, so every soldier was trained to be a good marksman. Shooting training was carried out at different distances and at different targets: single and group, stationary, appearing and moving. Targets were designated by targets of various sizes and imitated lying soldiers, artillery pieces in an open firing position, attacking infantry and cavalry, etc.

They were trained to perform fire missions in various environmental conditions, single, salvo and group fire. In Russia, shooting training was carried out on the basis of the “Manual for shooting with rifles, carbines and revolvers.” Russian soldiers were trained to shoot at all distances up to 1400 steps, and up to 600 steps soldiers were trained to hit any target with one or two shots. Since it was believed that victory in battle was achieved by a bayonet attack, soldiers were persistently trained in the use of a bayonet and other hand-to-hand combat techniques.

When training in cavalry, artillery and technical troops, the emphasis was on the specifics of the actions of the type of weapon. In the cavalry, for example, much attention was paid to horseback riding, equestrian sports, vaulting, and cutting.
After completing the training period for a single fighter, training followed in action as part of units in various conditions of combat service and in various types of combat. The training of units and units was carried out mainly in the summer during the period of camp training. To train the interaction of different types of troops and familiarize them with each other, joint exercises were held. The course of combat training ended with military maneuvers (79), which also had the goal of giving practice to senior and senior command personnel in a combat situation, independently assessing the situation, making decisions, and controlling the battle of subordinate troops.

Specialty and tactical training was also conducted with the officers of military units - on maps and plans, through field trips, on which officers trained in studying and assessing the terrain, choosing positions, assessing the situation and issuing orders and instructions. This form of advanced training was also practiced, such as reports and messages at a meeting on military history and various issues of combat training.
To test operational developments and war plans, as well as to prepare senior commanders for the performance of their duties in the positions for which they were intended in wartime, field trips of the general staff and war games of senior command personnel were conducted (82). In Russia, for example, such a game was held on the eve of the war in April 1914.

The training of troops and headquarters was based on official views set out in regulations and manuals.
Issues of organizing and conducting operations by large military formations were set out in special manuals, charters and instructions. In Germany, this was the manual “German Basic Principles of High Command of Troops” (1910)(84), in France - “Manual for Senior Military Commanders” (1914)(85).

The operational formation of armies in the armed forces system at the beginning of the war was provided for by the strategic deployment plans of the parties. Armies were usually built in one echelon and had a reserve. The necessary strike force was created by assigning some armies narrower zones of action and strengthening their combat strength. There were intervals between the armies to maintain freedom of maneuver. It was believed that each army would carry out its private operation independently. The armies had open flanks and took care of securing them themselves.

The operational formation of the troops of each army was also single-echelon - the corps were located in a line. In all formations, general reserves of up to 1/3 of the forces or more were created. Reserves were intended to fend off accidents or to strengthen parts of the first line. It was believed that reserves should be spent carefully and part of the reserve should be retained until the end of the battle.

The regulations recognized the offensive as the main type of action in the operation. Achieving success in an offensive in all armies was thought of only through a rapid enveloping maneuver on the flanks with the aim of encircling the enemy. H. Ritter, for example, noted that “the essence of German tactics and strategy was the idea of ​​​​completely encircling the enemy” (86). At the same time, the troops were required to take special care of their own flanks and take all possible measures to protect them. To do this, cavalry was placed on the flanks, special units were assigned to cover the flanks, and reserves were placed closer to the open flank. The troops tried their best to avoid encirclement. Encircled combat was not provided for by the regulations and was not developed. A frontal attack and a frontal attack with the aim of breaking through were considered impractical due to the difficulty of their implementation in conditions when the enemy armies had enormously increased their firepower. True, in Russia this form of operation was also allowed.
Great importance was attached to enemy reconnaissance. For this purpose, cavalry, tethered balloons, airplanes, ground surveillance, eavesdropping and agents were intended.

The main European states had large forces of cavalry, which was then the only mobile branch of the army. However, before the First World War there was no agreement on the role of cavalry in war. It was recognized that, due to the widespread introduction of more advanced weapons into the troops, cavalry attacks against mounted infantry could not be, as before, the main method of action.

In this regard, the idea arose that cavalry had lost its role on the battlefield. The more widespread opinion was that the importance of cavalry not only did not fall, but even increased, but that it must use different techniques in battle than before. The cavalry was intended primarily for strategic reconnaissance, which it must conduct in large formations.

During reconnaissance, it was necessary to “overwhelm”, “knock out” the enemy’s cavalry from the field, to break through the enemy’s guards to the location of his main forces. An important activity of the cavalry was also the implementation of covering its troops with a “veil”, prohibiting reconnaissance of the enemy cavalry. As for the use of cavalry for independent actions in deep raids (raids) on the enemy’s rear and communications, such actions were allowed, but were considered secondary and could only be used under exceptional circumstances and in conditions if there were enough forces not to weaken reconnaissance and cover of friendly forces. troops.

Regarding the method of action of cavalry in battle, it was recognized that in the conditions of the European theater, where the terrain is replete with obstacles in the form of ditches, hedges, and buildings, it is difficult to find a sufficiently large space for an attack in a closed formation of cavalry masses. Such an attack is possible with limited forces only against enemy cavalry. Against infantry, it could only be successful if the infantry was already shocked and demoralized. Therefore, it was assumed that the cavalry should also operate on foot, using their own firepower and even a bayonet.

Tactics covered the issues of using troops directly in battle: building a battle formation, the method of action of troops, the interaction of units and elements of a battle formation, the use of military branches in battle, reconnaissance, security, etc. Tactical views were set out in manuals and regulations.
The main type of combat was considered offensive. The idea of ​​an offensive, which dominated strategic and operational views, was also reflected in tactics, as was directly indicated in the charters and instructions. Here, too, it was considered necessary to act only in an offensive spirit. In Germany, for example, all actions from the army to a separate patrol included an offensive at all costs.

German regulations, manuals and tactics textbooks emphasized that only an offensive could bring a quick and decisive victory over the enemy. Thus, in the German combat infantry manual of 1906, the need was noted for the personnel to develop the skills of a non-stop offensive under the slogan “forward against the enemy, no matter the cost” (93). Austrian tactical views largely followed German ones. The Austrian Infantry Manual of 1911, on the basis of which the Austrian army prepared for war, indicated that victory could only be achieved by attacking (94). The French infantry drill manual of 1904 noted that only one offensive is decisive and irresistible (95). Russian "Field Service Regulations 1912" on this issue he gave the following general instructions: “The best way to achieve the goal is offensive actions. Only these actions make it possible to seize the initiative into our own hands and force the enemy to do what we want” (96).

For a successful offensive, according to German views, it was recommended to pull all forces to the battlefield to the last battalion and immediately introduce them into battle (97). Such tactics, as noted in Russian military literature, were based on risk. It ensured the defeat of the enemy in case of success, but in case of failure it could lead to the defeat of one’s own army (98). In the German regulations it was believed that starting a battle with insufficient forces and then constantly strengthening them was one of the most serious mistakes. Under the cover of the vanguard, one must strive to immediately deploy the main forces and only at the moment of deployment of the infantry open artillery fire, so that the enemy does not guess the intentions of the attacker for as long as possible (99).
French regulations, in contrast, believed that insufficient intelligence information forces a small part of the forces to be introduced at the beginning of the battle, while the main forces are echeloned in depth behind the front lines until the situation is clarified (100). Therefore, French regulations attached great importance to the actions of vanguards and advanced detachments.

According to Russian military theorists, the main forces were supposed to deploy into battle formation under the cover of the vanguards and begin the offensive from a distance of actual rifle fire. The main forces were concentrated in the direction of the main attack. "Field Service Regulations 1912" obligated senior commanders to concentrate the general reserve in the selected area before the attack and direct the fire of as many guns as possible to the target of attack.

The principles of tactical actions in the offensive of the armies of various states had much in common. Troops in marching columns marched towards the enemy to the upcoming battlefield with security and reconnaissance measures. In the zone of enemy artillery fire, units were divided into smaller columns (battalion, company). In the zone of rifle fire they deployed into battle formation.

According to German regulations, during the period of approach to the battlefield, troops had to concentrate, deploy and form into battle formation (102). The French divided the course of the offensive into a “preparatory period,” during which the troops were positioned against the points of attack, and a “decisive period,” during which it was necessary to “advance the infantry firing line, constantly reinforced, until the bayonet strike.” According to French regulations, the battle consisted of its initiation, the main attack and secondary attacks. The troops moved towards the enemy in columns, trying to reach his flank and rear. The start of the battle was entrusted to the strong vanguards. Their task was to capture strongholds convenient for the deployment of the main forces and hold them (103). The deployment of the main forces took place under the cover of the vanguards.

The procedure for conducting an offensive battle was better and more fully developed in the Russian “Field Service Charter of 1912” This charter defined the following periods of offensive combat: approach, advance and pursuit. The offensive was carried out under the cover of vanguards, who captured advantageous positions that ensured the deployment of the main forces in battle formation and their further actions. Before deploying the main forces, commanders were required to assign tasks to their units and subunits. The artillery of the main forces, without waiting for the deployment of the infantry, advanced to the vanguard in order to “quickly achieve superiority in artillery fire over the enemy.”

For the offensive, the troops were deployed into a battle formation, which consisted of combat sectors and reserves. Each combat sector, in turn, was divided into smaller combat sectors with their private reserves and supports (a division's combat sector consisted of brigade combat sectors, a brigade - of regiment combat sectors, etc.). According to the views of French theorists, the battle formation consisted of forces leading the start of the battle, forces not brought into battle (reserve), and security. In the battle formation, the units had to be located either next to each other or at the back of the head, and the latter arrangement was considered convenient for maneuvering during the battle.

It was recommended to make the battle formations in the direction of the main attack denser than in the auxiliary directions. If there were gaps between adjacent combat areas, they had to be kept under crossfire by artillery and infantry.
The length of combat sectors along the front depended on the situation and terrain. The main requirement was that the rifle chain produce rifle fire of sufficient density. In the Russian army, the following length of combat sectors was adopted: for a battalion - about 0.5 km, for a regiment - 1 km, for a brigade - 2 km, for a division - 3 km, for a corps - 5 - 6 km (105). The length of the company's offensive front was assumed to be 250-300 steps (106). In the German army, a brigade was assigned a sector of 1500 m, a company - 150 m (107). Reserves, as a rule, were located behind the center of their unit or on open flanks. According to Russian regulations, the general reserve was intended to assist the troops in the combat sector delivering the main blow; private reserves - to strengthen the units of their combat sector leading the battle (108). The distance of the reserve from the battle line was established so as not to suffer unnecessary losses from enemy fire and at the same time quickly bring the reserve into action.

In general, in an offensive battle, the echelon of forces was as follows: a regiment (brigade) sent two or three battalions to the battle line, which occupied their combat sectors, the remaining 1-2 battalions formed a reserve and were located in reserve columns, hidden from enemy fire. The battalion sent 2-3 companies to the battle line, with the rest in reserve. The company deployed several of its platoons in a chain, the remaining platoons formed the support of the company chain. The platoons deployed all their squads in a chain. With such a formation of battle formation, only one third of all forces took direct part in the battle. The remaining two-thirds were in the reserves of all higher authorities and were virtually inactive. The reserves of companies (support), battalions and regiments were intended mainly to replenish the loss of the chain and strengthen it with fire. At the moment of attack, supports were poured into the chain to increase its striking force. Thus, the German regulations, without defining the exact composition of the supports, considered their main purpose to be “timely reinforcement of the firing line” (109), therefore, the supports during the offensive should have been located as close as possible to the rifle chain.

The infantry had to conduct the offensive battle in dense rifle chains with intervals between fighters of 1-3 steps. “Every offensive begins with the deployment of rifle chains,” demanded the German regulations (110). “If the terrain allows secretive advance of riflemen to the distance of actual fire,” the regulations stated, “then strong, dense rifle chains must be deployed immediately” (111). They scattered into a chain and approached the enemy within the range of actual rifle fire. The chains were followed in columns by support and reserves. The movement of the chain was carried out in steps with shooting on the move, and in the zone of actual rifle fire - in dashes. From a distance of 50 m, the chain rushed to attack. The German regulations required the offensive to be carried out at a very high pace, in dashes. The troops made stops at shooting positions. The last shooting position was planned 150 m from the enemy.

It also served as the starting point for a bayonet attack. During the offensive, the artillery was supposed to fire at the attack targets. In the Russian army, infantry on the offensive moved in dashes in platoons, squads, units and individually with short stops between rifle positions. From the very beginning of the battle, the artillery was located as close as possible to the enemy, but outside the scope of his rifle fire, occupying closed, semi-closed or open positions. The infantry rushed with bayonets, shooting the enemy from close ranges with rifle and machine-gun fire and throwing hand grenades at them. The offensive should have been completed by energetic pursuit of the enemy.

The pre-war regulations of all armies noted the need to shelter manpower from enemy fire during an offensive. The combat infantry regulations of the German army, for example, indicated that the head of a squad must be able to advance the riflemen of his squad forward as covertly as possible (112). In a number of armies it was believed that self-entrenchment should not be abused, since entrenched infantry would be difficult to raise for further movement forward (113). The regulations of the Russian army provided for the secret movement of soldiers during the offensive in order to suffer fewer losses from enemy fire.
In the offensive, all armies attached great importance to small arms fire, as one of the factors in the battle. According to the German regulations, even the very essence of the offensive was “transferring fire to the enemy, if necessary, to the nearest distance” (114). How much importance the Germans attached to fire can be seen from the words of the regulations: “To attack means to push the fire forward.” According to Russian regulations, an infantry offensive consisted of a combination of movement and fire from rifle positions.

The machine guns were supposed to assist the infantry advance with their fire. Depending on the situation, they were either assigned to battalions or remained at the disposal of the regiment commander, for example in the Russian army. According to the Austrians, machine gun fire at close ranges could replace artillery.
Still, it was believed that only a blow with the bayonet could force the enemy to leave his position. Thus, the German charter stated that “an attack with cold steel crowns the defeat of the enemy” (115). The Austrian infantry regulations of 1911 also stated that, using their fire to the fullest, the infantry finished off the enemy with a bayonet.

Pre-war regulations noted the power of artillery, but its tasks were stated very vaguely. The artillery was supposed to prepare the infantry attack with its fire (116). However, by the beginning of the war, artillery preparation was understood in a very simplified way. Until the infantry approached the enemy within the range of actual rifle fire (400-500 m), the artillery fired at the enemy batteries. With the infantry thrown into the attack, the artillery had to fire from open positions to hit enemy fire weapons that were interfering with the infantry's advance. The responsibilities of the artillery were thus very limited. The role of artillery in the offensive was actually underestimated. Issues of interaction between artillery and infantry, in particular the call for artillery fire and target designation, were not clearly worked out.

In the French combat infantry manual, it was written that the command “prepares and supports the infantry movement with artillery” (117). However, the preparation of an infantry attack by artillery could be carried out independently of the actions of the infantry. Due to the fact that the fire of the French 75-mm cannon was ineffective against shelters, it was believed that when advancing, the infantry, even sacrificing themselves, must themselves knock out the enemy from the trenches, who were then shot with shrapnel by the artillery.

The Russian “Field Service Charter” emphasized that artillery, with its fire, paves the way for the infantry and, for this purpose, hits those targets that prevent the infantry from carrying out combat missions, and when the infantry attacks, specially designated batteries move forward to the attacking troops at the distances closest to the enemy to support the attack infantry (118). Here the term “pave the way for the infantry” attracts attention. By this, the 1912 regulations aimed at close interaction between infantry and artillery, which should help the infantry, accompanying it with fire and wheels. In the Russian “Field Service Charter of 1912” The idea of ​​massing artillery in battle was expressed, although not yet clearly and consistently enough, and, which was not in any of the foreign regulations, the need to support an infantry attack before throwing it with bayonets was emphasized. According to the regulations, light field artillery was included in infantry combat areas in divisions and batteries (119). The howitzer battalions and heavy field artillery that were part of the corps were either assigned to those sectors where their assistance was most useful and thus came under the subordination of lower commanders, or remained at the disposal of the corps commander and received tasks from him.

The conduct of defensive combat before the First World War was insufficiently developed in almost all countries. Defense was so neglected that some armies avoided using the word “defense.” Thus, in the French army, according to Luke, the word “defense” was so jarring that they did not dare to use it in exercises on maps and in assignments for field exercises. Anyone who was very interested in defense issues risked ruining his professional reputation (120). Nevertheless, in the charters of various armies there were special articles and sections devoted to the conduct of defensive combat. The methods of conducting defense were considered by the German regulations, although in Germany defense as a whole was underestimated. The essence of defense was seen in “not only repelling an attack, but also winning a decisive victory,” and for this, as the charter required, defense must be combined with offensive actions (121).
Despite the negative attitude of the French command towards defensive actions, French regulations still provided for defense in certain directions to save forces, disrupt the enemy in order to enable the main forces to act offensively in the best conditions (122).
Russian regulations paid significant attention to defensive actions. A transition to defense was allowed in the case “when the set goal cannot be achieved by an offensive” (123). But even while occupying the defensive, the troops had to disrupt the enemy forces with all types of fire, in order to then go on the offensive and defeat them.
In defense, troops were deployed in a battle formation, which, as in the offensive, consisted of combat sectors and reserves. When going on the defensive, the companies deployed in a chain, leaving one platoon behind as company support. The battalions deployed three companies in a chain, and one company was located behind in the battalion reserve. The regiments were deployed according to the same scheme (three battalions in the first echelon and one in reserve). According to the views of Russian military leaders, even in defense it was necessary to make the sector that was most important the strongest.
Machine guns were usually distributed two at a time between the battalions of the first echelon, evenly strengthening them in terms of fire. The Austrian infantry regulations of 1911 recommended maintaining machine guns in defense as a fire reserve.

The width of the defensive sectors differed little from the width of the offensive sectors. The width of the division's defense sectors was 4-5 km. The depth of defense was created by placing reserves and artillery and reached 1.5 - 2 km for the division. According to German views, the width of the plots had to be determined depending on the nature of the terrain. Each precinct had a precinct reserve. Great importance was attached to the creation of a strong general reserve, the purpose of which was to counterattack the enemy. In the German army, the general reserve was located in a ledge behind the open flanks. Artillery firing positions were assigned on average at a distance of up to 600 m from the infantry.
The methods of strengthening field positions and the views on their organization that existed before the First World War in the armies of future opponents were, in general terms, the same. The main line of defense consisted of strong points (centers of resistance), which were either open trenches or local objects adapted for defense (buildings, forests, heights, etc.). The gaps between the strong points were covered by fire. To delay the enemy's advance and give time to the troops of the main position to prepare for battle, forward strong points were set up. Rear positions were created in the depths of the defense. German regulations required the creation of only one defensive position (124). Field fortifications were not to be built in a continuous line, but in groups, and the spaces between them were to be shot through. There were no plans to create any barriers on the approaches to the positions (125). The defensive position, according to the Russian field service regulations, consisted of separate strong points located in fire communication. Strong points included trenches and local objects put into a defensive state. There were also “advanced points” (combat outposts). Before the start of the battle, the infantry did not occupy the trenches, but was located near them (126).

After repelling an enemy attack, according to regulations, the defending troops must launch a counterattack and a general offensive (127).
Although the decisive role in battle in all armies was assigned to infantry (128), its actions were made directly dependent on the assistance of artillery and cavalry. Thus, the organization of interaction between the military branches acquired particular importance. Russian "Field Service Regulations 1912" clearly put forward the need for interaction in battle. The desire to achieve a common goal requires the interaction of all units and branches of the military, the charter said, the selfless fulfillment of their duty by everyone and mutual assistance” (129). The cavalry was required to contribute to the offensive and defense with energetic attacks “on the flanks and rear of the enemy” in mounted and dismounted formations.
If the enemy was overthrown, the cavalry began relentless pursuit (130). The German regulations also emphasized the need for cooperation, especially between infantry and artillery (131). However, as H. Ritter later noted, the significance of the interaction of military branches in the German army “was not fully realized” (132). In reality, the individual branches of the military did not interact, but only acted next to each other. The French regulations stated that “the assistance of various types of weapons allows the infantry to complete the task under the best conditions” (133).
Russian "Field Service Regulations 1912" correctly resolved the main issues of offensive and defensive battles. Unlike similar regulations of other armies, it set out in detail the features of battles in special conditions (at night, in the mountains, etc.). The experience of these battles was gained during the Russo-Japanese War. Thus, this Russian charter undoubtedly stood higher than the regulations of other armies of that time, and was the best charter on the eve of the First World War.
The German army was the most prepared. Its officer and non-commissioned officer corps was carefully selected in terms of class, and its training was at a high level. The army was well disciplined, able to maneuver on the battlefield and march quickly. The great advantage of the German army over other armies was that its military formations included field howitzers and heavy artillery. But in terms of training, German artillery was significantly inferior to Russian and French. German artillerymen were not accustomed to firing from closed positions. All attention was paid to the speed of fire, and not to its accuracy. The preparation of the German cavalry was good. Only training in foot combat in large formations was not given enough attention everywhere.

The French army was also well prepared, and the German generals saw it as a dangerous enemy. Two-thirds of non-commissioned officer positions were filled by trained conscripts. The officer corps of the French army stood quite high in general development, education and theoretical training, which could not be said about the senior command staff. The French soldiers were fully prepared for war; in the field they acted actively and proactively. Much attention in the French army was paid to training large military formations in marching movements. The French army had an independent, well-defined military doctrine, which differed from the German army in its excessive caution. A big disadvantage of the French army was the almost complete absence of heavy field artillery and light field howitzers in the troops.
The Russian army was not inferior in combat training to the armies of Western European countries. The soldiers were well trained, distinguished by endurance and courage. The non-commissioned officers were well trained.

The troops paid great attention to the skillful conduct of rifle, machine gun and artillery fire. Russian artillery, in terms of its training, undoubtedly stood in first place compared to all other armies.
Regular Russian cavalry was well trained in combat both on horseback and in the combination of mounted and foot combat. The cavalry conducted good reconnaissance, but little attention was paid to the actions of cavalry in large masses. Cossack regiments were inferior to regular regiments in tactical training.
The officers of the Russian army at the middle and junior ranks had fairly good training. The great advantage of the Russian army was that its command staff had recent combat experience in the Russo-Japanese War. Other armies did not have such experience (the German and French armies did not fight for 44 years, the Austro-Hungarian army for 48 years, England generally only waged colonial wars against the unarmed population of enslaved countries).
The generals of the Russian army, the senior and highest command staff, whose training in peacetime was not given due attention, did not always correspond to the positions they held.

The English troops were excellent fighting material. The training of the British soldiers and juniors was good. Soldiers and officers used personal weapons skillfully. However, in operational and tactical training, the British army lagged far behind other armies. Its senior and top commanders had no experience of a major war and showed their ignorance of modern military affairs already in the first battles.
The Austro-Hungarian army was worse prepared for war than other armies. The training of the rank and file did not meet modern requirements. The junior officers were better prepared tactically. The senior command staff of the Austro-Hungarian army was not sufficiently trained in the management of combined arms formations in the field. The level of training did not meet modern requirements. Fire control and massing of artillery fire were poorly carried out.

D. V. Verzhkhovsky

In peacetime, the territory of the Empire was divided into 12 military districts, led by military commanders: St. Petersburg, Vilna, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, Caucasus, Turkestan, Omsk, Irkutsk and Amur. The ground forces consisted of a standing army and a militia. The standing army included the regular army and its reserve, Cossack troops and foreign units (i.e., consisting of representatives of non-Slavic peoples). The number of armed forces immediately before mobilization was officially 1,423 thousand people; after full mobilization it was supposed to be about 5 million people - the “Russian steam roller” could confidently crush any enemy with absolute numerical superiority.

Men aged 21 to 43 were considered liable for military service. The first three (in the infantry and artillery) or four (in other branches of the military) years of service took place in combat units, the next seven years the person was in the 1st line reserve, and the last eight - in the 2nd line reserve. They could also join the army voluntarily, which provided some privileges in the service. The basis of the army was made up of representatives of the Christian peoples of the Empire; the Muslim population of the Caucasus and Turkestan paid a cash tax instead of recruitment. The units listed as "Finnish" were Russian in composition and were simply stationed in Finland, and the Finns themselves were exempt from military service. In general, 50% of those called up for service were exempted from it due to physical disabilities, personal or economic reasons, or “education.” Opportunities for trained people to obtain non-commissioned officer rank were quite limited.

Cossacks served from 20 to 38 years, the first 12 years of which were in “field service” - 4 years each in the regiments of the first, second and third line, the rest of the time they were in reserve. The national troops consisted of irregular cavalry units, recruited on a voluntary basis by representatives of Muslim nationalities.

This photograph of brother and sister was taken in January 1916. The woman is a warrant officer in the 9th Siberian Rifle Regiment, her brother is a captain in the same regiment. He was awarded the Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd degree. Women soldiers were unusual in the army, but were an acceptable part of military life. It should be noted that the captain has a French-style uniform with a stand-up collar, and the woman has a tunic buttoned on the female side, i.e. from right to left.

The majority of persons aged 21 to 43, exempt from service in the regular army, were enrolled in the State Militia. The first category was used to replenish the army and was divided into age groups. The second, which included physically weaker individuals, was intended to form the rear units. In case of war, it was planned to form 640 militia battalions (detachments). During the war (before the February Revolution of 1917), several million militias were mobilized.

In the summer of 1914, there was one aviation detachment for each of the 25 Army, Guards and Grenadier corps, there were also three Siberian detachments and eight serfs (there was also one field aviation detachment - Approx. per.). The number of aircraft in the army is 244, in the navy - only 20 or so. However, according to some estimates, the Russian Air Force lost about 140 aircraft by the fall of 1914; the number of vehicles on the Southwestern Front alone was reduced from 99 to 8. By the end of 1914, the so-called “Airship Squadron” was created in Russia, which included heavy four-engine bombers “Ilya Muromets”.

Despite the fact that the air war on the Eastern Front was quite active and brutal, nevertheless, primacy in the skies belonged to the pilots of the Central Powers. The capabilities of Russian production and repair were limited, and between 1915 and the end of 1917. Russia imported, mainly from France, 1,800 airplanes and 4,000 engines. Due to difficulties with domestic production, the Russians had to resort to using captured aircraft: at one time, the 28th Corps Aviation Detachment was equipped exclusively with captured aircraft. On December 9, 1917 There were 579 operating airplanes in Russian aviation.

A typical imported Moran-Parasol reconnaissance monoplane. The most famous Russian ace, Staff Captain A. A. Kazakov (17 confirmed victories, but perhaps there were 32), flew the MS-5 as commander of the 19th Corps Aviation Squadron, and later on the Nieuport-17, as commander of the 1st Fighter Group, consisting of four squadrons. The pilot depicted in the photo is dressed in an aviation uniform of the 1913 model. Helmet is made of brown leather, with the usual officer's cockade (the helmet should also have had a large double-headed eagle, almost invisible in this photo. - Approx. Per.), black leather jacket and black trousers with red piping, indicating that the aviation belongs to the technical troops. The double-headed eagle of an engineering design with a bronze metal two-blade propeller was a special sign on the shoulder straps of military pilots; for observation pilots it was gold-plated. The lower ranks had the same special insignia on their shoulder straps, stenciled with brown paint.

Before the war, the Russian army had 208 infantry regiments. The guard, grenadiers, riflemen, artillery, cavalry and sappers were recruited from all military districts. The minimum height for recruitment is 154 cm.

The field army was divided into 37 army corps: Guards, Grenadier, I-XXV, I-III Caucasian, I and II Turkestan, I-V Siberian. They included all infantry divisions with their own artillery. The usual composition of the army corps was as follows: two infantry divisions, a light howitzer division (two 6-gun batteries), an engineer battalion. The infantry division consisted of four regiments, each with four battalions, and a field artillery brigade (six 8-gun batteries).

The founder and commander of the 1st Russian Women's Death Battalion, Lieutenant Maria Bochkareva, at the review of the battalion in July 1917. Formed with the aim of shaming male soldiers who did not support the aggressive military policy of the Provisional Government, this battalion took part in Kerensky's offensive in July 1917. Similar female units were organized, but only this battalion from Petrograd took a real part in the battles at the front.

Of the total number of 236 infantry regiments, 12 were guards, 16 were grenadier. Guards regiments were named, while grenadier and army regiments also had numbers. The 4th Grenadier Division - Caucasian - was stationed in the Caucasus.

The infantry regiment consisted of four battalions, four companies each, plus a non-combatant company. Regiments were united into divisions according to continuous numbering, so the 17th Infantry Division included, respectively, regiments from the 65th to the 68th. A wartime company was supposed to consist of 240 privates and non-commissioned officers with 4-5 officers. Regimental teams: machine gun, reconnaissance and communications brought the strength of the regiment to 4 thousand people. In 1914, each regiment had 8 machine guns, 14 mounted orderlies, 21 telephone operators and 4 cyclists in the communications team, 64 soldiers in the reconnaissance team. The infantry regiments from Siberia and Turkestan, known as rifle regiments, were organized similarly to other infantry regiments, i.e. also had four battalions. The “correct” rifle regiments had only two battalions each. It was precisely this regimental structure that existed in the four Guards Rifle Regiments, united in the Guards Rifle Brigade; 20 army rifle regiments, numbered from 1st to 20th and consolidated into the 1st-5th rifle brigades; 12 Finnish rifle regiments (Nos. 1-12) formed the 1st-3rd Finnish Rifle Brigades; and 8 Caucasian rifle regiments (No. 1-8) - 1st and 2nd Caucasian rifle brigades. 22 Turkestan rifle regiments (No. 1-22) were consolidated into 6 Turkestan rifle brigades, of which the 1st-4th had 4 battalions each, and the 5th and 6th had three each. Each rifle brigade included a rifle artillery brigade of three 8-gun batteries. By 1914, the name “rifle” designated only the historical role of the unit, without any practical meaning.

Since the spring of 1917, after the abdication of the Emperor, the navy had been a hotbed of political activity, partly due to its secondary role in the war. The Baltic Fleet, based in Kronstadt, participated mainly only in coastal operations, subordinate to the command of the Northern Front. His sailors were among the most active supporters of the Bolsheviks in November 1917. (and their boldest opponents in 1921). The Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Sevastopol, took an active part in large-scale military operations against the Turks. Joint operations with ground forces in April 1916 at Trebizond on the Anatolian coast were successful, but opportunities for more ambitious operations were limited. A crew member of the cruiser "Diana" - the "sistership" of the Aurora, famous for the revolution - is dressed in a traditional naval manner. An interesting thing is the black and white vest (which appeared back in 1872, the vest from the very beginning had blue rather than black stripes - approx.), worn under a blue flannel shirt; having stripped down to his vest in battle, the sailor could not retreat or surrender (this information was gleaned by the author from films. - Approx.).

During mobilization, 35 infantry divisions of the 2nd stage were deployed (53rd - 84th Infantry and 12-14th Siberian Rifle Divisions). In terms of their internal structure, they were a copy of the 1st line divisions, only their artillery was often equipped with guns of outdated systems.

The Cossack infantry were known as "Plastuns". Initially, only the Kuban Cossack army had its own infantry, but later this practice was extended to the rest of the Cossack troops. The Plastun battalions were organized into brigades of six battalions without artillery. In 1914, three Plastun brigades were sent to the Caucasian Front.

Cavalry

By 1914, Russia had the most numerous cavalry of all the warring powers. There were four groups: guards (see below “Selected troops”), army, Cossacks and national units. The army cavalry and Cossack regiments consisted of 6 squadrons, the combat strength was about 850 people; The Cossack squadron was known as the "hundred". Although the historical names - “dragoons”, “ulans”, “hussars” - were retained for the regiments, there was no difference in tactics between them. As in the infantry, there were special teams: reconnaissance, communications and horse-sapper. Each division included a horse-mounted machine-gun team armed with 8 machine guns.

By 1914, the army cavalry had 20 dragoon, 17 lancer and 18 hussar regiments. During mobilization, 24 cavalry and Cossack divisions, as well as 11 separate cavalry and Cossack brigades, were formed. The cavalry division included two brigades: the first included dragoons and uhlans, and the second included hussar and Cossack regiments. Regiments with the same number were part of the same division, so the 3rd Cavalry Division included the 3rd Dragoons, 3rd Lancers and 3rd Hussars. There was also an entirely dragoon division as part of the Caucasian Army - the Caucasian Cavalry Division.

The Cossacks were divided into two large groups: Stenovye and Caucasian. The latter were divided into the Kuban and Terek Cossack troops, and the former included the Don, Siberian, Orenburg, Ural, Astrakhan, Transbaikal, Semirechensk, Amur and Ussuri Cossack troops. The largest was the Don Cossack army.

The regiments of the 1st line served in peacetime, and the 2nd and 3rd lines were called up if necessary. The Don Army fielded 54 regiments, the Kuban - 33, the Orenburg - 16, the rest - in proportion to their population. Cossack divisions were usually created from regiments of one army, but during the war combined divisions appeared from units of various troops. Hundreds of the 2nd line were assigned to infantry divisions as convoys, messengers, local guards, etc. About 50 batteries of Cossack artillery were formed, mainly Donskoy.

This aviation lieutenant is an artillery observer, as evidenced by the emblem of two crossed guns on his shoulder straps. He is dressed in a woolen shirt from 1916, on which the officer’s cross of St. George is visible (the officer in the photograph clearly shows the Cross of St. George of the 4th degree, and not the Order of St. George of the 4th degree. The “soldier’s” cross was worn to the left of the “officers” " awards, in this case - to the left of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree, with swords and a bow, while the Order of St. George was worn to the right of all awards in general. - Approx. Per.) and the Cross of St. Vladimir, 4th degree. The Cross of St. George was the highest Russian award for bravery. It was of two types - for officers and for lower ranks, each had four degrees (according to the St. George Statute of 1913 there was a St. George Cross of four degrees, which was awarded to lower ranks, and there was the Order of the Holy Great Martyr and Victorious George of four degrees, which, as and other orders, were awarded only to officers and generals. These two awards should not be confused. - Note per.).

A group of three privates from the 67th Infantry pose in this photograph. shelf. They are interesting in three variants of tunics. From left to right: wool tunic of the 1910 model, wool tunic of the 1912 model and cotton tunic of the 1914 model. Buttons and the manner of fastening differ depending on the style. The private in the center is wearing a visor with a chin strap, indicating that he had something to do with horses (this is not a visor, but an ordinary cap, just a glare of sunlight passed across the visor, and it is almost invisible. - Approx.). Thick trousers are tucked into boots.

The foreign cavalry was staffed by volunteers: the Dagestan native cavalry regiment, the Ossetian cavalry division (half of the regiment) and the Turkmen cavalry division. The first two are from the Muslim tribes of the Caucasus, the last is from the Tekin tribe - residents of Turkestan. In August 1914, it was decided to form a new cavalry division of 6 regiments recruited from among the Muslims of the Caucasus; this Caucasian native cavalry division received the nickname “Wild Division” and gained an excellent military reputation (see section “Selected Troops”).

Artillery

Artillery was divided by type into field and mountain; equestrian and equestrian mountain; field howitzers and heavy.

Field artillery was part of brigades of two divisions, each with three 8-gun batteries. An artillery brigade was part of each infantry division, which gave three guards artillery brigades, four grenadier brigades (1-3rd and Caucasian), 52 army, 11 Siberian rifle, five rifle, three Finnish, two Caucasian rifle and six Turkestan rifle artillery brigades

Mountain batteries were stationed in Siberia, Finland, Turkestan and Kyiv (for use in the Carpathian Mountains). Mountain guns could be transported by horse-drawn vehicles or disassembled piece by piece for transportation in packs.

Horse and horse-mountain 6-gun batteries were consolidated into divisions of two batteries each. Horse artillery divisions were part of cavalry divisions. Three horse-mountain artillery divisions were stationed: in the Caucasus (Caucasian Cavalry Division), in Siberia (Ussuri Cavalry Brigade) and in Kyiv (IX Army Corps).

35 mortar artillery battalions, each of which consisted of two 6-gun batteries. One division was assigned to the Guard, Grenadier, each of the 25 army corps, I-III Caucasian, I-V Siberian; one separate battery was assigned to the 1st Turkestan Rifle Artillery Division.

The Siberian infantry regiments were all called “rifle” regiments. The private in this photo is dressed for cold weather. He is wearing a grayish-brown overcoat, a hood tied crosswise on his chest, and on his head is a Siberian sheepskin hat, distinguished by thicker and longer wool. The buttonholes on the collar, hood trim and piping on the shoulder straps are clearly visible in this magnificent photo.

A young soldier of the 23rd Engineer Battalion of the V Army Corps. The number and special sign can be seen on the left shoulder strap. His tunic is cotton, model 1914.

The heavy artillery was organized into 7 divisions of three 6-gun batteries each. The 1st-5th divisions were in the west, and the 1st and 2nd Siberian divisions were in the east. The first and second batteries in each division were armed with 6-inch howitzers, and the third with 4.2-inch guns.

The composition of the fortress artillery varied depending on the scale of the fortress and the prepared places for the guns. For example, on such a huge base as Vladivostok, there were two brigades, but in small fortresses there could be one company of fortress artillery.

Technical troops included sapper, railway and pontoon battalions, field and siege engineer parks and telegraph companies. In total there were 39 sapper battalions - one for each army corps and two separate ones for the Siberian units. The Guards Sapper Battalion had 4 companies, the rest - three, including one or two telegraph and searchlight teams.

Wartime changes

The experience gained during the war led to a number of organizational changes in the armed forces. New technical equipment such as telephones have become common use at all levels. The number of machine guns increased greatly due to imports, trophies and the growth of domestic production to the point that machine gun teams were organized at almost all levels.

At the beginning of 1916, a reorganization of the cavalry was undertaken, as a result of which an infantry battalion of three dismounted squadrons appeared in each cavalry division. Later, in the same 1916, the number of cavalry squadrons in the cavalry and Cossack regiments was reduced from 6 to 4. Dismounted cavalrymen increased the number of infantry in the cavalry divisions to a three-battalion regiment. Artillery support for cavalry was increased by the creation of 8-gun mortar battalions: several hundred British 4.5-inch howitzers were imported during 1916, with the promise of more in the future.

Winter 1916-1917 Headquarters began reorganizing the infantry: reducing the number of battalions in an infantry division from 16 to 12 made it possible to form 60 new infantry divisions, attached to existing corps as third divisions. However, the main problem continued to be the lack of artillery. In order to somehow solve this problem, a decision was made to reduce the number of field guns in artillery brigades in less critical sectors of the front and to transfer them to newly formed divisions. The artillery received heavier guns, which were consolidated into the XLVHI Corps, known as TAON - Special Purpose Heavy Artillery. TAON was at the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It was armed with guns of various calibers, including many from France and Great Britain, which were given preference for supplies. They were supposed to arrive in the first months of 1917.

Two infantry regiments in the Russian army made up an infantry brigade, and four made up a division, which was a minimal infantry formation (for it included cavalry and artillery in addition to infantry). Thus, the Russian infantry division consisted of 16 battalions; divisions in Germany and Austria-Hungary by the beginning of WWI were already 12-battalion strong. A 16-battalion division is bulkier and more difficult to control. It is not for nothing that over the next 30 years all over the world the size of the infantry division decreased down to 6 battalions. On the other hand, the reduction in the number of infantry battalions was accompanied by the strengthening of units of other military branches that were included in the division. But the “structure” of the Russian infantry division before the First World War was very simple. In addition to four infantry regiments, it included an artillery brigade consisting of 48 field guns (6 batteries of 8 guns each), an artillery park (carts with additional ammunition for artillery), an infirmary, a divisional convoy (300 people and 600 horses), and also (but not always ) Cossack hundred and cavalry division. (In total, the division was supposed to have about 21 thousand people.) Managing such an economy was not difficult, so the question of switching to 12-battalion divisions could be considered premature in 1914. Moreover, at the beginning of the First World Division there were compact: their front occupied at most 5 km, and not 10 - 15 km, as it was a year later. In 1915, the infantry of the Russian army should have switched to a reduced staff, but in the end the transition was postponed until 1917.

Since divisions were the basic operational units, it is the comparison of the strength of the divisions that makes it possible to determine which side's army was potentially stronger in a particular battle. This issue is quite complex and at different times military experts solved it in different ways. Before the start of WWII, this issue was resolved simply: “Since the Russian division has 16 battalions, and the German one has 12, then the Russian division is a third stronger.” After WWII, this issue was also resolved simply: “The German division has 72 field guns, and the Russian division has 48, which means that the German division is one and a half times stronger.” But the truth lies somewhere in the middle. When the war entered the positional phase, the importance of artillery, especially howitzers (which Russian divisions did not have), increased sharply; therefore, the German division actually became 1.5 times stronger than the Russian one (and maybe more, because German howitzers inflicted much more damage on the dug-in enemy than Russian cannons). But during the period of maneuvering operations, when artillery had to fire at moving targets from long distances (and therefore with low accuracy), rifle fire and even bayonet strikes were of greater importance. Therefore, in oncoming battles, the Russian division was not inferior to the German one, and in some situations, when, for example, artillery could not conduct aimed fire, it could be stronger. But as soon as the enemy found shelter from cannon and rifle fire, the Russian infantry began to have big problems.

In 1914, the Russian Imperial Army consisted of 3 Guards Infantry Divisions, 4 Grenadier Divisions, 52 Infantry Divisions, 11 Siberian Rifle Divisions. Plus 17 separate rifle brigades (among them the Guards, 4 Finnish, 6 Turkestan, Caucasian). During the mobilization, 21 infantry divisions and three Siberian rifle divisions were to be formed. In the Caucasus (after the start of the war with Turkey), an additional rifle brigade was created.

Branch

In the Soviet and Russian armies, a squad is the smallest military formation with a full-time commander. The squad is commanded by a junior sergeant or sergeant. Usually there are 9-13 people in a motorized rifle squad. In departments of other branches of the military, the number of personnel in the department ranges from 3 to 15 people. In some branches of the military the branch is called differently. In artillery there is a crew, in tank forces there is a crew.

Platoon

Several squads make up a platoon. Usually there are from 2 to 4 squads in a platoon, but more are possible. The platoon is headed by a commander with the rank of officer. In the Soviet and Russian armies this is ml. lieutenant, lieutenant or senior. lieutenant. On average, the number of platoon personnel ranges from 9 to 45 people. Usually in all branches of the military the name is the same - platoon. Usually a platoon is part of a company, but can exist independently.

Company

Several platoons make up a company. In addition, a company may also include several independent squads not included in any of the platoons. For example, a motorized rifle company has three motorized rifle platoons, a machine gun squad, and an anti-tank squad. Typically a company consists of 2-4 platoons, sometimes more platoons. A company is the smallest formation of tactical importance, that is, a formation capable of independently performing small tactical tasks on the battlefield. Company commander captain. On average, the size of a company can be from 18 to 200 people. Motorized rifle companies usually have about 130-150 people, tank companies 30-35 people. Usually a company is part of a battalion, but it is not uncommon for companies to exist as independent formations. In artillery, a formation of this type is called a battery; in cavalry, a squadron.

Battalion

Consists of several companies (usually 2-4) and several platoons that are not part of any of the companies. The battalion is one of the main tactical formations. A battalion, like a company, platoon, or squad, is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineer, communications). But the battalion already includes formations of other types of weapons. For example, in a motorized rifle battalion, in addition to motorized rifle companies, there is a mortar battery, a logistics platoon, and a communications platoon. Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel. The battalion already has its own headquarters. Usually, on average, a battalion, depending on the type of troops, can number from 250 to 950 people. However, there are battalions of about 100 people. In artillery, this type of formation is called a division.

Regiment

In the Soviet and Russian armies, this is the main tactical formation and a completely autonomous formation in the economic sense. The regiment is commanded by a colonel. Although regiments are named according to the branches of the military, in fact this is a formation consisting of units of many branches of the military, and the name is given according to the predominant branch of the military. The number of personnel in the regiment ranges from 900 to 2000 people.

Brigade

Just like a regiment, it is the main tactical formation. Actually, the brigade occupies an intermediate position between a regiment and a division. A brigade can also consist of two regiments, plus battalions and auxiliary companies. On average, the brigade has from 2 to 8 thousand people. The brigade commander, as well as the regiment, is a colonel.

Division

The main operational-tactical formation. Just like a regiment, it is named after the predominant branch of troops in it. However, the predominance of one or another type of troops is much less than in the regiment. On average, there are 12-24 thousand people in a division. Division commander, Major General.

Frame

Just as a brigade is an intermediate formation between a regiment and a division, so a corps is an intermediate formation between a division and an army. The corps is already a combined arms formation, that is, it is usually deprived of the characteristic of one type of military force. It is impossible to talk about the structure and strength of the corps, because as many corps exist or existed, so many of their structures existed. Corps commander, Lieutenant General.

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The Wild Division is one of the most reliable military units - the pride of the Russian army... when the war broke out, the Caucasians voluntarily went to the defense of Russia and defended it selflessly, not like an evil stepmother, but like their own mother. They fight together with the Russian army and are ahead of everyone and die boldest for our freedom.
Officer A. Paletsky, 1917

August 2014 marks the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Caucasian Native Cavalry Division. This part of the imperial army, nicknamed the Wild Division for its fearlessness, courage, ferocity and special image during the First World War, inspired horror in its enemies by its very appearance. The division consisted of residents of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia - Muslims who voluntarily took the oath to Nicholas II and pledged to defend the Russian Empire at the cost of their lives from the enemy. Only one tenth of the division were representatives of the Russian nobility who served as officers in it. The Caucasian division was led by the sovereign’s brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich Romanov, a major general by rank. The Caucasian Native Cavalry Division existed for three years - from August 23, 1914 to August 21, 1917, and all this time until the end of its existence it remained faithful to the Tsar and the Tsarist Army.

Legends and myths about the Wild Division

A huge number of myths are associated with the Wild Division, both bad and exaggeratedly good. The bad image of the Highlander Division is now beneficial to various nationalist movements and to all those who need to destabilize relations between the peoples inhabiting Russia. However, all the “incriminations” of Caucasian soldiers of desertion or defeat from the “sword” of Old Man Makhno and the robbers under his leadership are completely groundless.

Firstly, there is not a single documented fact or ordinary written mention of contemporaries about even a single case of escape or retreat. On the contrary, the entire officer corps of the “wild” was amazed by the devotion of the Caucasians. Officer of the Kabardian regiment Alexey Arsenyev wrote in his essay about the cavalry division: “Most of the highlanders of the glorious “Wild Division” were either grandchildren, or even sons of former enemies of Russia. They went to war for Her, of their own free will, being forced by no one or anything; in the history of the “Wild Division” there is not a single case of even individual desertion!”

Secondly, regarding the “defeat” of the Chechen-Ingush part of the Wild Division by the gangs of Nestor Makhno - by the time of the anarchy in the South of Ukraine in 1919, the Caucasian Native Cavalry Division did not exist, not a single hundred cavalry remained from it.

The ground for the generation of all kinds of legends is also being prepared by would-be historians from representatives of the descendants of some Caucasian nationalities. Some of them manage to exaggerate the merits of their own, albeit small, handful of fellow warriors a hundredfold, elevating them to the rank of almost saviors of humanity, to whom the Emperor himself allegedly sent “brotherly greetings.” Such an appeal does not fit into the framework of the Emperor’s etiquette, therefore the story of the thank-you telegram from Tsar Nicholas II is considered to be a tale.

Well, perhaps the wildest of the legends about the Caucasian cavalry circulated both in the rear and inside the enemy army. With all their might, the Austrian command spread rumors about the bloodthirstiness of horsemen “from somewhere in the depths of Asia, who wear long oriental robes and huge fur hats and know no mercy. They slaughter civilians and feed on human flesh, demanding the tender meat of one-year-old babies.” In battle, the mountain cavalrymen may have inspired similar horror, but nothing similar was shown in relation to women and children. There are a large number of contemporary records of Caucasians respectful treatment of women among the captured population and special treatment of children. This is what Ilya Tolstoy, the son of Lev Nikolaevich, a military journalist, wrote during the First World War: “I lived for a whole month in a hut in the center of the “wild regiments”, they showed me people who in the Caucasus became famous for killing several people out of revenge, - and what did I see? I saw these murderers nursing and feeding other people’s children with leftover barbecue, I saw how the shelves were removed from their parking lots and how the residents regretted their departure, thanked them for not only paying, but also helping with their alms, I saw them carrying out the most difficult and complex military assignments, I saw them in battle, disciplined, insanely courageous and unshakable.”

The composition of the most exotic of the divisions of the Russian army

The history of the emergence of the Wild Division began with a proposal to Tsar Nicholas II from the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Military District, Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov, to mobilize militant Caucasians to fight against the armies that supported the Triple Alliance. The Emperor approved the idea of ​​voluntarily recruiting Muslims from the Caucasus who were not subject to conscription into the war. There was no end to those who wanted to stand up for the Russian Empire. The children and grandchildren of former enemies, who defended their native land for 60 years during the Caucasian War, agreed to represent the interests of their new homeland. In those same days, immediately after the Highest Order of August 23, 1914, cavalry regiments from the color of mountain youth were already formed: Kabardinsky, Second Dagestan, Tatar, Chechen, Circassian and Ingush. Each warrior has his own Circassian coat, his own horse and his own bladed weapon. All six regiments were subsequently organized into three brigades and one Adjarian infantry battalion. The first brigade included the Kabardian and 2nd Dagestan cavalry regiments. Kabardians, Balkars and representatives of all the nationalities of Dagestan - Avars, Dargins, Laks, Kumyks, Lezgins and others - served in its ranks. The 1st Dagestan Cavalry Regiment was formed even earlier and, being part of the Third Caucasian Cossack Brigade, fought on the Southwestern Front. The second brigade consisted of the Tatar regiment, which included Ganja Azerbaijanis and the Chechen regiment, which consisted of Chechens. The third brigade was formed by the Circassian and Ingush regiments, which consisted of Circassians, Karachais, Adygs, Abkhazians and, accordingly, Ingush. It was decided to call this cavalry division native, that is, local, because its composition was exclusively mountaineer, consisting of local peoples professing the same faith.

Having heard about the courage of the mountaineers, Russian officers believed that they had achieved great success, having managed to attract Muslims into their ranks. However, not everything was so simple. It took the command a lot of time to wean the natives from habits that were unacceptable during European methods of warfare and to teach army discipline, which was brilliantly achieved by the end of the military campaign. First of all, the highlanders were required to put their appearance in order. Shaggy hats, long beards and an abundance of daggers on their belts frightened not only opponents, but also the entire division command with their predatory appearance. Difficult months for both Caucasians and Russian officers of learning manners, following commands, shooting rifles and using bayonets lay ahead. A great obstacle to work on the image of a soldier was created by the pride and reluctance inherent in the peoples of the Caucasus to obey. Nevertheless, the mountaineers were easy to train, since from childhood they were accustomed to discipline and respect for elders. Only it was not possible to create convoy teams from the highlanders; soldiers had to be recruited from among the Russian peasants for the “humiliating” convoy. Another problem in the army was the special riding style of mountain fighters - with an emphasis on one side. After long marches, this manner crippled the horses, and it took a long time to accustom the soldiers to normal riding. The custom of blood feud also created obstacles in the ranks. When organizing battalions, it was necessary to take into account the interpersonal and inter-clan relations of the highlanders. It took a long time to wean the Caucasians from robberies in the occupied territories, who treated all the property of the conquered population as a trophy according to the Eastern principle of warfare.

In general, the atmosphere inside the division was close to ideal. There was mutual assistance, respect for each other, as well as respect, which was not always shown in relation to the senior in rank, namely, those who had good personal qualities and bravely went on the attack enjoyed honor in the mountain environment. An illustrative example of internal discipline in the division was respect for representatives of other faiths. Thus, when there were a larger number of Muslims at the table, Christians, as a sign of respect for their comrades, wore headdresses, as required by Mohammedan norms. If it happened that during a joint meal the number of Christians exceeded the rest, then the highlanders took off their hats as a sign of respect for Russian custom.

Each squadron of the division was assigned a mullah. The clergyman not only inspired his fellow believers, but had the right to resolve the most complex conflicts and aggravations between fellow countrymen, if they arose in the squadron, since they could not help but listen to him. Mullah, among other things, along with the rest of the militia, took part in the battles.

The officers of the Wild were no less exotic. It included everyone who was attracted by the adventurous life and brave command in the person of the Grand Duke. Not only cavalrymen, but also artillerymen, infantrymen and even sailors who went into reserve before the war joined the amazing division. The cavalry officers were full of twenty nations - from the French prince Napoleon Murat, the Italian marquises, the Baltic barons to the Russian and Caucasian nobility, including the son of Leo Tolstoy - Mikhail, as well as the Persian prince Feyzullah Mirza Qajar and many others. They all served under the royal command of Mikhail Alexandrovich, the most charming and beautiful of the commanders and too brave for his status, beloved by the mountaineers for his disposition, pure heart, modesty and ingenuity inherent in them. The major general of the Russian army, together with his officers, huddled in cramped huts throughout his entire command of the division, and during the winter battles in the Carpathians, he spent the night in dugouts.

Great feats

It took four months to train the Wild Division and fully form it. By November 1914, regiments of Caucasian cavalry were transferred to the Austrian front (Southwestern) in Galicia, in Western Ukraine.

Ilya Tolstoy, who first saw the ranks of the Wild Division in Galicia, noted their solemn procession through Lvov with a recording: “Under the creaking chanting of the zurnachs, playing their folk war songs on their pipes, elegant typical horsemen in beautiful Circassian coats, in shiny gold and silver, passed by us weapons, in bright scarlet hoods, on nervous, chiseled horses, flexible, full of pride and national dignity. Whatever the face, the type; no matter what the expression is, it’s your own, personal expression; no matter what you look at you see power and courage...”

The path of the mountain cavalrymen began with heavy bloody battles. With the onset of an unprecedentedly early and snowy winter, they faced fierce battles in the Carpathians near the villages of Polyanchik, Rybni, Verkhovyna-Bystra in December 1914. When repelling the Austrian attack on Przemysl in January 1915, the highlanders suffered huge losses. However, the enemy retreated, and by the next month the Russian army, through the efforts of the Wild Division, occupied the city of Stanislavov. Many sons of the peoples of Dagestan died on the battlefields near the village of Shupark in the fall of 1915, who, having given their lives, opened new heroic pages in the history of the Russian army.

One of the turning points that allowed the imperial troops to penetrate deep into enemy positions were the events of February 1916. Thanks to the courage of the Chechen fifty, who defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, the Russian army moved from the hitherto occupied left bank of the Dniester to the right, where enemy troops were concentrated.

Cavalrymen of the Wild Division also took part in the famous Brusilov breakthrough in the summer of 1916. Part of the cavalry - the Ingush and Chechen regiments - temporarily joined the Ninth Army of the Southwestern Front, which participated in the breakthrough. In total, all six regiments of the Wild Division carried out 16 cavalry attacks throughout 1916 - no cavalry had achieved such success in the history of the Russian army. And the number of prisoners exceeded the number of the Caucasian division itself several times.

In the winter of the same year, the regiments of the Wild Division as part of the Fourth Army Corps were transferred to Romania. Here, already in 1917, the mountaineers received the news of the revolution and the abdication of the Tsar from the throne. Perplexed by the loss of the Sovereign, the Caucasians nevertheless remained faithful to their command even without him. In the summer of 1917, it was decided to send the “wild” to Petrograd to suppress the revolutionary uprising. However, frightened by such news, the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government, which reigned during the days of anarchy in Russia, decided to stop the highlanders at all costs. Not by force, but by word. To begin with, a ceremonial reception for the cavalrymen was organized, where fiery speeches were made that if valiant warriors want a better future for Russia, then it would be wiser for them to stay away from the civil war. The grandson of Imam Shamil, Muhammad Zahid Shamil, who lived in Petrograd, was involved in the negotiations. The mountaineers could not help but listen to the descendant of the great imam.

In the autumn of the same 1917, the native division, already reorganized into the Caucasian Cavalry Corps under the command of Pyotr Alekseevich Polovtsev, was sent home - to the Caucasus, where it was finally disbanded, and by December it completely ceased to exist.

Many names of the heroes of that war and their unforgettable exploits have been brought to us both by the stories of our ancestors and by the documentation of the headquarters of the Caucasian Cavalry Division. During the three years of the existence of “Wild”, seven thousand of our fellow countrymen took part in the battles. Half of them were awarded St. George's crosses and medals for exceptional bravery. Many of them died far from their homeland, remaining there forever. The story of the "Wild Division" is a true story. Pride in the exploits of our ancestors will remain in our hearts as a fire that will warm them for many years to come, reminding us of those from whom we descended.

Zhemilat Ibragimova