Submarine fleet during the Second World War. Development of military fleets before the Second World War World fleets in the Second World War

Greek merchant fleet(Greek Ελληνικός Εμπορικός Στόλος ) was a participant in World War II, along with the Greek Navy. The merchant fleet became involved in the war approximately a year before Greece entered the war and continued its participation in the war after the liberation of Greece (October 1944), for another 11 months.

History professor Ilias Iliopoulos notes that the participation of the Greek merchant marine in the war corresponds to the thesis of the American naval theorist, Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan, that a nation's sea power is the sum of its navy and merchant fleet. Iliopoulos notes that in ancient times the “great state of the sea” of Athens (Thucydides) was the sum of the potentials of the Athenian military and merchant fleet and that Athens then had about 600 merchant ships.

Background

According to the most conservative estimate, on the eve of World War II, the Greek merchant fleet was the ninth largest in the world in terms of tonnage and consisted of 577 steamships. Considering the fact that the top ten included the Axis countries - Germany, Italy and Japan - as well as the fleet of occupied France (see Vichy Regime), the importance of the Greek merchant fleet for the anti-fascist coalition was more than significant. Professor I. Iliopoulos writes that the Greek merchant fleet had 541 ships under the Greek flag, with a total capacity of 1,666,859 GRT, and 124 ships under foreign flags, with a capacity of 454,318 GRT. According to Iliopoulos, the Greek merchant fleet was in fourth place in the world, and the Greek dry cargo fleet was in second place.

Researcher Dimitris Galon, based on German sources, writes that in 1938, a year before the outbreak of World War II, the Greek merchant fleet was in third place in the world, after England and Norway, with 638 ships, with a total capacity of 1.9 million GRT. 96% of all ships in the Greek merchant fleet were bulk carriers.

According to Rear Admiral Sotirios Grigoriadis, the Greek merchant fleet before the war had 600 ocean-going steamers and 700 Mediterranean motor ships. 90% of ocean-going ships were bulk carriers. Grigoriadis confirms that the Greek pre-war fleet was ahead of the fleets of Sweden, the Soviet Union, Canada, Denmark and Spain, but notes that the Greek fleet did not exceed 3% of the world fleet, while the then first fleet in the world, the British, in 1939 had 26 .11% of the world fleet tonnage. However, within a few months of the war, the situation at sea for Britain worsened sharply. By mid-1940, the British Navy had only 2 months' worth of fuel. By September 1941, the British merchant fleet had lost 25% of its ships. In this regard, the Greek merchant fleet acquired great importance for the Allies, and especially for Britain.

The War Trade Agreement, signed in January 1940 with the government of then neutral Greece, with the support of Greek shipowners and the Greek sailors' union, essentially transferred one of the world's largest fleets to the British government and excluded the transportation of Axis goods by Greek ships.

Prelude to World War

As a result, Greek volunteers in Spain belonged mainly to 3 groups: sailors of the Greek merchant fleet - Greeks living in exile - Greeks of the island of Cyprus, which were under British control. Greek merchant seamen made up a significant part of the Greek Company of the Rigas Fereos International Brigades.

In addition to sending volunteers, the main task of the Union of Seafarers of Greece, with its center in Marseille, led by Kamburoglou, who was later shot by the Germans in France, was the uninterrupted supply of the Republicans. Due to the threat of submarines, cargo was more often delivered to the ports of Algeria, from where it was transported by caique to Spain. On the last shoulder, most of the Greek sailors were armed: 191. Many sailors volunteered for the Republican army immediately upon arrival in Spain. Others, such as officers Papazoglou and Homer Serafimidis, joined the Republican navy:210.

A significant contribution of the Greek sailors was their refusal to work on ships carrying cargo for Franco, in contrast to ships carrying cargo from the USSR, despite the fact that the latter were constantly under threat from Italian submarines and German and Italian aircraft:219.

The beginning of World War II and the seamen's union

With the outbreak of the World War, the pro-communist Union of Sailors of Greece (ΝΕΕ, in 1943 was reorganized into the Federation of Greek Seamen's Organizations, ΟΕΝΟ), located in Marseilles, not forgetting the “class struggle”, gave the directive “Keep the ships moving.”

After the surrender of France, the leadership of the Greek sailors' union moved to New York.

Period from the beginning of World War II (September 1, 1939) to the beginning of the Greco-Italian War (October 28, 1940)

During this period, many Greek merchant ships chartered by the Allies were sunk in the Atlantic, mostly by German submarines. Some Greek ships were confiscated in ports under the control of the Axis forces and their allies. The total losses of the Greek merchant fleet in this first period of the war reached 368,621 BRT.

Already in the first month of the war, the commanders of German submarines received the following instructions on September 30, 1939: “... since the Greeks sold or chartered a large number of (merchant) ships to the British, Greek ships should be considered enemy.... When attacking, submarines must remain invisible...” . However, at that time, some German submarine commanders still observed maritime ethics.

Memorial to the German submarine U-35 in Ventry, Ireland

The Greek steamship Ioanna (950 GRT) was stopped on June 1, 1940 by the German submarine U-37, 180 miles from the Spanish port of Vigo. The crew was ordered to abandon the ship, which was then sunk. Captain Vasilios Laskos, himself a former submariner and who died in 1942 while commanding the Greek submarine Katsonis (Υ-1), together with his crew, sailed on boats for 3 days in a stormy sea until he was picked up by fishermen. Laskos and his crew headed to Lisbon, where there was already a colony of 500 Greek merchant seamen whose ships had been sunk by German submarines. All of them were put on the Greek merchant ship Attica and transported to Greece.

A similar case is described in his book by the senior mechanic of the Greek steamship Adamastos, Konstantin Domvros. The steamship was stopped on July 1, 1940 in the North Atlantic by the German submarine U-14. The steamer was sunk. The crew were left in lifeboats 500 miles from land, but were not shot.

Over time, such cases became fewer and fewer and the sinking of Greek merchant ships was accompanied by the death of their crews.

This period is also marked by the participation of Greek merchant ships in the Dunkirk evacuation. One of the Greek losses during the evacuation was the steamer Galaxias (4393 BRT), sunk by German aircraft in the French port of Dieppe at the beginning of the operation. The participation of Greek merchant ships in the Dunkirk evacuation found its way into Churchill's memoirs.

Period from the beginning of the Greco-Italian War (October 28, 1940) to the beginning of the German invasion of Greece (April 6, 1941)

Of the 47 mobilized passenger ships, 3 were converted into floating hospitals (Attica, Hellenis and Socrates). The cargo-passenger Polikos, Andros, Ionia and Moshanti (the last 2 without Red Cross markings) were also used as hospitals.

During this period, losses of the Greek merchant fleet were mainly the result of the activities of the Italian Navy (Regia Marina Italiana). These were cargo ships and motor vessels mobilized by the Greek government and used as transports. The losses also included Greek ships confiscated in Italian ports immediately after the Greek government rejected the Italian ultimatum and the outbreak of war. Total losses during this period, including the continuing losses of the Greek merchant fleet in the Atlantic, reached 135,162 GRT.

Period from the beginning of the German invasion (April 6, 1941) to the complete occupation of Greece (May 31, 1941)

Greek cargo and passenger ship Andros. Used as a floating hospital. Sunk by German aircraft on April 25, 1941.

In October 1940, the Greek army repelled an Italian attack and transferred military operations to Albanian territory. This was the first victory of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition against the Axis forces. The Italian Spring Offensive from 9 to 15 March 1941 in Albania showed that the Italian army could not change the course of events, which made German intervention to save its ally inevitable.

At the request of the Greek government, by the end of March 1941, Great Britain sent 40 thousand of its soldiers to Greece. In doing so, the British occupied a second line of defense along the Aliakmon River, away from the front line in Albania and the potential theater of operations on the Greek-Bulgarian border.

The German invasion, from German-allied Bulgaria, began on April 6, 1941. The Germans were unable to immediately break through the Greek defense line on the Greek-Bulgarian border, but advanced to the Macedonian capital, the city of Thessaloniki, through the territory of Yugoslavia. A group of divisions of Eastern Macedonia was cut off from the main forces of the Greek army fighting against the Italians in Albania. German troops reached the rear of the Greek army in Albania. The road to Athens was open to German divisions.

Along with the losses of the Greek Navy, which lost 25 ships during this period, the losses of the Greek merchant fleet during the month reached 220,581 GRT, which was 18% of its potential. All losses, both of the Greek Navy and the Greek merchant fleet, were the result of the Luftwaffe.

Among other ships, Luftwaffe aircraft sank floating hospitals, despite the signs of the Red Cross and their full illumination at night (Attica April 11, 1941, Esperos April 21, Hellenis April 21, Socrates April 21, Polikos April 25 and "Andros" April 25.

The main target of the German planes was Piraeus (9 sunken ships), other Greek ports, but the entire Aegean Sea (88 sunk ships) was a zone of continuous attacks by German planes on warships and merchant ships.

The losses of the Greek merchant fleet associated with the battle for Crete (17 sunk ships) reached 39,700 BRT.

A large number of Greek merchant ships, carrying Greek military units and refugees as well as British, Australian and New Zealand units, followed the Greek Navy ships to Egypt and Palestine.

The period from the beginning of the occupation (31.5.1941) until the end of the Second World War (15.8.1945)

Greek steamer Calypso Vergoti Sunk by a German submarine on June 29, 1941 in the Atlantic.

During this period, the Greek merchant fleet lost most of its potential. Greek merchant ships were sunk by Axis forces in all latitudes and longitudes of the globe. A large number of Greek ships, confiscated by the Germans and Italians, were sunk by the Allies. The losses of this period also included Greek ships confiscated by the Japanese in the ports of Japan and China. Total losses of the Greek merchant fleet during this period amounted to 535,280 GRT.

Among the many heroic acts of Greek merchant seamen of this period, two were recorded in support of British forces in North Africa.

On February 2, 1943, the Greek merchant ship Nikolaos G. Koulukoundis (captain G. Panorgios), despite the shelling of Italian and German planes and ships, managed to deliver a cargo of gasoline to Libya for the 8th British Army. British Prime Minister Churchill visited the ship on February 4 to personally express his gratitude to the crew.

A similar act by the Greek ship "Elpis" (captain N. Kouvalias) received official gratitude from the King of England.

During this period, Greek merchant ships took part in convoys to England and Murmansk, which is reflected in Churchill's memoirs.

Along with the Greek corvettes "Thombasis" and "Kryesis", ships of the Greek merchant fleet were also included in the allied landing in Normandy. Steamships "Agios Spyridon" (captain G. Samothrakis) and "Georgios P." (Captain D. Parisis) were sunk by crews in shallow water to create a breakwater. The steamships "America" ​​(Captain S. Theofilatos) and "Ellas" (Captain G. Trilivas) continued to deliver troops and cargo to the Normandy coast.

It should be noted that the crews on the ships to be sunk were recruited from volunteers, after an appeal to two secretaries of the Greek seamen's union, one of whom was the communist Antonis Abatielos.

One of the losses of the last years of the war was the steamer Pilevs (4965 BRT), torpedoed by the German submarine U-852 on March 13, 1944 off the coast West Africa. For the murder after torpedoing Greek sailors, the crew of U-852, after the war, was put on trial.

By the end of the war, the number of Greek merchant ships sunk by German submarines reached 124.

Losses

In total, during the war years the Greek merchant fleet lost 486 ships, with a total capacity of 1,400,000 GRT, which accounted for 72% of its potential. About half of these losses occurred in the first 2 years of the war. By comparison, the British fleet lost 63% of its potential. Against the backdrop of total allied losses reaching 4834 ships and a total of 19,700,000 GRT, Greek losses look especially high. Of the 19,000 Greek merchant seamen who served on merchant ships during the war, 4,000 sailors died, mostly as a result of their ships being torpedoed. 2,500 sailors were left disabled. 200 sailors who survived the sinking of their ships or captivity suffered serious or irreparable damage to their mental health.

Greek merchant fleet after the war

Museum ship Hellas Liberty in June 2010

Even during the war (1944) and at the request of the emigration Greek government, the US government provided 15 Liberty-class ships to the Greek shipowners M. Kulukoundis K. Lemos and N. Rethymnis.

In recognition of the enormous contribution of the Greek merchant fleet to the Allied victory and the losses it suffered, at the end of the war, the US government provided Greek shipowners who had lost their ships in the Atlantic with 100 Liberty ships on preferential terms. Each of the 100 ships was offered for $650,000, with 25% down payment and a 17-year loan with interest, guaranteed by the Greek government. In subsequent years, but on current commercial terms, Greek shipowners purchased another 700 Liberty ships.

If, according to the original idea, the Liberty were built as “ships for five years” and their massive breakdown occurred in the 1960s, then the Greek shipowners operated these ships for another two decades. The last Liberty owned by Greek shipowners was decommissioned in 1985. To a certain extent, the Liberty served as the starting point for the post-war rise of the Greek merchant fleet (under Greek and other flags), firmly “holding its leading position in the world merchant fleet” to this day.

In recognition of Liberty's contribution to the rise of the Greek merchant fleet, in 2009, one of the last Liberty ships in the world was converted into a museum ship, Hellas Liberty, and placed in permanent berth in the Greek port of Piraeus.

Greek Seamen's Union after the war

With the defeat of the Democratic Army, many merchant seamen found themselves in exile in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Antonis Abatielos, one of the two union secretaries noted in historiography at the Normandy landings, was sentenced to death in 1947 for organizing a wartime strike. The execution was overturned, thanks to Abatielos's prominence in the world trade union movement and the efforts of his wife, the Englishwoman Lady Betty Abatielou. Abatielos was released only 16 years later, in 1963.

One of the most famous merchant navy officers, Dimitris Tatakis, was martyred in January 1949 in a concentration camp on the island of Makronisos.

Veterans of the Greek merchant fleet note that the “first fleet in the world” owes its rise not only and not so much to Greek shipowners, but to the work and sacrifices of Greek sailors, both during the war and in the post-war years.

Maintaining truly powerful naval forces is a burdensome task for any economy in the world. Few countries could afford the Navy, which consumed enormous material resources. Military fleets became more of a political instrument than an effective force, and having powerful battleships was considered prestigious. But only 13 states in the world actually allowed this. Dreadnoughts were owned by: England, Germany, USA, Japan, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Turkey (the Turks captured and repaired one abandoned by the Germans in 1918 "Goeben").

After the First World War, Holland, Portugal and even Poland (with its 40-kilometer coastline) and China expressed a desire to have their own battleships, but these dreams remained on paper. Only rich and industrialized countries, including Tsarist Russia, could build a battleship on their own.

The First World War was the last in which large-scale naval battles took place between the warring parties, the largest of which was the Naval Battle of Jutland between the British and German fleets. With the development of aviation, large ships became vulnerable and subsequently the striking force was transferred to the aircraft carrier. Nevertheless, battleships continued to be built, and only the Second World War showed the futility of this direction in military shipbuilding.

After the end of the First World War, the hulls of giant ships froze on the stocks of the victorious countries. According to the project, for example, French "Lyon" was supposed to have sixteen 340 mm guns. The Japanese laid down ships, next to which the English battlecruiser "Hood" would look like a teenager. The Italians completed the construction of four super battleships of the type "Francesco Coracciolo"(34,500 tons, 28 knots, eight 381 mm guns).

But the British went the furthest - their 1921 battlecruiser project envisaged the creation of monsters with a displacement of 48,000 tons, a speed of 32 knots and 406 mm guns. The four cruisers were supported by four battleships armed with 457 mm guns.

However, the war-weary economies of states did not require a new arms race, but a pause. Then diplomats got down to business.

The United States decided to fix the ratio of naval forces at the achieved level and forced other Entente countries to agree to this (Japan had to be “persuaded” very harshly). On November 12, 1921, a conference was held in Washington. On February 6, 1922, after fierce disputes, it was signed "Treaty of the Five Powers", which established the following world realities:

no new buildings for 10 years, except two battleships for England;

the ratio of fleet forces between the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy should be 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75;

after a ten-year pause, no battleship can be replaced by a new one if it is younger than 20 years;

the maximum displacement should be: for a battleship - 35,000 tons, for an aircraft carrier - 32,000 tons and for a cruiser - 10,000 tons;

the maximum caliber of guns should be: for battleships - 406 millimeters, for a cruiser - 203 millimeters.

The British fleet was reduced by 20 dreadnoughts. Regarding this treaty, a famous historian Chris Marshall wrote: “How the former British Prime Minister A. Belfour could sign such an agreement is absolutely beyond my understanding!”

Washington Conference determined the course of the history of military shipbuilding for a quarter of a century and had the most disastrous consequences for it.

First of all, the ten-year pause in construction, and especially the limitation of displacement, stopped the normal evolution of large ships. Within the contractual framework, it was unrealistic to create a balanced project for a cruiser or dreadnought. They sacrificed speed and created well-protected but slow-moving ships. They sacrificed protection - they went down into the water "cardboard" cruisers. The creation of the ship is the result of the efforts of the entire heavy industry, therefore the artificial limitation on the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the fleet led to a severe crisis.

In the mid-1930s, when the proximity of a new war became obvious, the Washington agreements were denounced (dissolved). A new stage in the construction of heavy ships has begun. Alas, the shipbuilding system was broken. Fifteen years of lack of practice dried up the creative thought of the designers. As a result, ships were initially created with serious defects. By the beginning of World War II, the fleets of all powers were morally obsolete, and most of the ships were physically obsolete. Numerous modernizations of the courts have not changed the situation.

During the entire Washington pause, only two battleships were built - English "Nelson" And "Rodney"(35,000 t, length - 216.4 m, width - 32.3 m, 23 knots; armor: belt - 356 mm, towers - 406 mm, wheelhouse - 330 mm, deck - 76-160 mm, nine 406 mm, twelve 152 mm and six 120 mm guns). Under the Washington Treaty, Britain managed to negotiate some advantage for itself: it retained the opportunity to build two new ships. The designers had to rack their brains about how to fit maximum combat capabilities into a ship with a displacement of 35,000 tons.

First of all, they abandoned high speed. But limiting the weight of the engine alone was not enough, so the British decided to radically change the layout, placing all the main caliber artillery in the bow. This arrangement made it possible to significantly reduce the length of the armored citadel, but it turned out to be very powerful. In addition, 356-mm plates were placed at a 22-degree angle inside the hull and were moved under the outer skin. The tilt sharply increased the resistance of the armor at high angles of impact of the projectile, which occurs when firing from a long distance. The outer casing tore the Makarov tip off the projectile. The citadel was covered with a thick armored deck. 229 mm traverses were installed from the bow and stern. But outside the citadel, the battleship remained practically unprotected - a classic example of the “all or nothing” system.

"Nelson"could not fire the main caliber directly at the stern, but the unfired sector was limited to 30 degrees. The bow corners were almost not covered by anti-mine artillery, because all six two-gun turrets with 152-mm cannons occupied the rear end. The mechanical installation moved closer to the stern. All control of the ship was concentrated in a high tower-like superstructure - another innovation. Latest classic dreadnoughts "Nelson" And "Rodney" laid down in 1922, launched in 1925, and commissioned in 1927.

Shipbuilding before World War II

Washington Treaty limited the construction of new battleships, but could not stop progress in shipbuilding.

The First World War forced experts to reconsider their views on the conduct of naval operations and the further technical equipment of warships. Military shipbuilding had to, on the one hand, use all the production achievements of modern industry, and on the other, by setting its demands, encourage industry to work on improving materials, structures, mechanisms and weapons.

Armor

With regard to the manufacture of thick cemented armor plates, few improvements were made in the post-war period, since their quality almost reached its limit at the beginning of the 20th century. However, it was still possible to improve the deck armor by using special tough steels. This innovation was especially important due to the increase in combat distance and the emergence of a new threat - aviation. Deck armor in 1914 weighed about 2 thousand tons, and on new battleships its weight was increased to 8-9 thousand tons. This is due to a significant increase in horizontal protection. There were two armored decks: the main one - along the upper edge of the armor belt, and below it - anti-fragmentation. Sometimes a third thin deck was placed above the main one - the platoon deck, for tearing off the armor-piercing tip from the shells. A new type of armor was introduced - bulletproof (5-20 mm), which was used for local protection of personnel from shrapnel and machine-gun fire from aircraft. In military shipbuilding, high-carbon steels and electric welding were introduced to build hulls, which made it possible to significantly reduce weight.

The quality of the armor remained almost equivalent to that of the First World War, but the caliber of artillery on the new ships increased. There was a simple rule for side armor: its thickness should be greater than or approximately equal to the caliber of the guns fired at it. We had to increase the protection again, but it was no longer possible to greatly thicken the armor. The total weight of armor on old battleships was no more than 10 thousand tons, and on the newest ones - about 20 thousand! Then they began to make the armor belt inclined.

Artillery

During the First World War, as in the pre-war years, artillery developed rapidly. In 1910, ships of the type were launched in England "Orion", armed with ten 343 mm cannons. This gun weighed 77.35 tons and fired a 635-kg projectile at a distance of 21.7 kilometers. The sailors realized that "Orion" just the beginning in increasing the caliber, and the industry began to work in this direction.

In 1912, the United States switched to a 356-mm caliber, while Japan installed 14-inch guns on its battleships ( "Congo") and even Chile ( "Admiral Cochrane"). The gun weighed 85.5 tons and fired a 720 kg projectile. In response, the British laid down five battleships of the type in 1913. "Queen Elizabeth", armed with eight 15-inch (381 mm) guns. These ships, unique in their characteristics, were deservedly considered the most formidable participants in the First World War. Their main caliber gun weighed 101.6 tons and sent an 879-kg projectile at a speed of 760 m/s to a distance of 22.5 kilometers.

The Germans, who realized it later than other states, managed to build battleships at the very end of the war Bayer And "Baden", armed with 380 mm guns. The German ships were almost identical to the British, but by this time the Americans had installed eight 16-inch (406 mm) guns on their new battleships. Japan will soon switch to a similar caliber. The gun weighed 118 tons and shot 1015-kg projectile

But the last word still remained with the Lady of the Seas - the large light cruiser Furies, laid down in 1915, was intended to install two 457 mm guns True, in 1917, without ever entering service, the cruiser was converted into an aircraft carrier. The forward single-gun turret was replaced by a 49-meter-long take-off deck. The gun weighed 150 tons and could send a 1,507-kg projectile 27.4 kilometers every 2 minutes. But even this monster was not destined to become the largest weapon in the entire history of the fleet.

In 1940, the Japanese built their super battleship "Yamato" armed with nine 460-mm cannons mounted in three huge towers. The gun weighed 158 tons, had a length of 23.7 meters and fired a projectile weighing between 1330 before 1630 kilograms (depending on type). At an elevation angle of 45 degrees, these 193-centimeter products flew to 42 kilometers, rate of fire - 1 shot per 1.5 minutes.

Around the same time, the Americans managed to create a very successful cannon for their latest battleships. Their 406 mm gun with barrel length 52 caliber produced 1155-kg projectile with speed 900 km/h. When the gun was used as a coastal gun, that is, the limitation of the elevation angle, inevitable in the turret, disappeared, the firing range reached 50,5 kilometer

Guns of similar power were designed in Soviet Union for planned battleships. On July 15, 1938, the first giant (65,000 tons) was laid down in Leningrad; its 406-mm cannon could throw thousand-kilogram shells over 45 kilometers. When German troops approached Leningrad in the fall of 1941, they were among the first to be met from a distance of 45.6 kilometers by shells from an experimental gun - a prototype of the main caliber guns of a never-built battleship installed at the Naval Research Artillery Range.

Ship turrets are also being significantly improved. Firstly, their design made it possible to give the guns large elevation angles, which became necessary to increase the firing range. Secondly, the loading mechanisms of the guns were thoroughly improved, which made it possible to increase the rate of fire to 2-2.5 rounds per minute. Thirdly, the aiming system is being improved. In order to correctly aim a gun at a moving target, you must be able to smoothly rotate turrets weighing more than a thousand tons, and at the same time this must be done quite quickly. Before World War II, the highest rotation speed was increased to 5 degrees per second. Anti-mine weapons are also being improved. Their caliber remains the same - Ш5-152 mm, but instead of deck installations or casemates they are placed in towers, this leads to an increase in the combat rate of fire to 7-8 rounds per minute.

Battleships began to be armed not only with main-caliber guns and anti-mine (it would be more correct to say anti-destroying) artillery, but also with anti-aircraft guns. As the combat qualities of aviation grew, anti-aircraft artillery strengthened and multiplied. By the end of World War II, the number of barrels reached 130-150. Anti-aircraft artillery was adopted in two types. Firstly, these are universal caliber guns (100-130 mm), that is, capable of firing at both air and sea targets. There were 12-20 of these guns. They could reach the plane at an altitude of 12 kilometers. Secondly, small-caliber automatic anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of 40 to 20 millimeters were used to fire at aircraft quickly maneuvering at low altitude. These systems were usually installed in multi-barrel circular installations.

Mine protection

The designers also paid great attention to the protection of battleships from torpedo weapons. With the explosion of several hundred kilograms of powerful explosives filling the warhead of a torpedo, gases with colossal pressure are formed. But water does not compress, so the ship's hull gets instant blow, like a hammer made of gases and water. This blow is delivered from below, under water, and is dangerous because a huge amount of water immediately rushes into the hole. By the beginning of the First World War, it was believed that such a wound was fatal.

The idea of ​​an underwater defense device originated in the Russian Navy. At the beginning of the 20th century, a young engineer R. R. Svirsky came to the idea of ​​a peculiar "underwater armor" in the form of intermediate chambers separating the explosion site from the vital parts of the ship and weakening the force of the impact on the bulkheads. However, the project was lost in bureaucratic offices for some time. Subsequently, this type of underwater protection appeared on battleships.

Four onboard protection systems against torpedo explosions were developed. The outer skin had to be thin so as not to produce massive fragments; behind it there was an expansion chamber - an empty space that allowed explosive gases to expand and reduce pressure, then an absorption chamber that received the remaining energy of the gases. A light bulkhead was placed behind the absorption chamber, forming a filtration compartment, in case the previous bulkhead allowed water to pass through.

In the German on-board protection system, the absorption chamber consisted of two longitudinal bulkheads, the inner one being 50 mm armored. The space between them was filled with coal. The English system consisted of installing boules (convex hemispherical pieces made of thin metal on the sides), the outer part of which formed an expansion chamber, then there was a space filled with cellulose, then two bulkheads - 37 mm and 19 mm, forming a space filled with oil, and filtration compartment. The American system was distinguished by the fact that five watertight bulkheads were placed behind the thin skin. The Italian system was based on the fact that a cylindrical pipe made of thin steel ran along the body. The space inside the pipe was filled with oil. They began to make the bottom of ships triple.

Of course, all battleships had fire control systems that made it possible to automatically calculate gun aiming angles depending on the range to the target, the speed of their ship and the enemy ship, and communications that made it possible to transmit messages from anywhere in the ocean, as well as to find the direction of enemy ships.

In addition to the surface fleet, the submarine fleet also developed rapidly. Submarines were much cheaper, quickly built and inflicted serious damage on the enemy. The most impressive successes in World War II were achieved by German submariners who sank during the war years 5861 merchant ship (counted with a displacement of over 100 tons) total tonnage 13,233,672 tons. In addition, they were sunk 156 warships, including 10 battleships.

To the beginning of World War II England, Japan And USA had in their arsenal aircraft carriers. One aircraft carrier had and France. Built her own aircraft carrier and Germany, however, despite a high degree of readiness, the project was frozen and some historians believe that the Luftwaffe chief had a hand in this Hermann Goering who did not want to receive carrier-based aircraft beyond his control.

This text should perhaps begin with a short introduction. Well, for starters, I didn't intend to write it.

However, my article about the Anglo-German war at sea in 1939-1945 gave rise to a completely unexpected discussion. There is one phrase in it - about the Soviet submarine fleet, in which large amounts of money were apparently invested before the war, and “... whose contribution to the victory turned out to be insignificant...”.

The emotional discussion that this phrase gave rise to is beside the point.

I received several e-mails accusing me of “...ignorance of the subject...”, of “... Russophobia...”, of “... keeping silent about the successes of Russian weapons...”, and of “. .. waging an information war against Russia...".

Long story short - I ended up becoming interested in the subject and did some digging. The results amazed me - everything was much worse than what I had imagined.

The text offered to readers cannot be called an analysis - it is too short and shallow - but as a kind of reference it may be useful.

Here are the submarine forces with which the great powers entered the war:

1. England - 58 submarines.
2. Germany - 57 submarines.
3. USA - 21 submarines (operational, Pacific Fleet).
4. Italy - 68 submarines (calculated from the flotillas stationed in Taranto, La Spezia, Tripoli, etc.).
5. Japan - 63 submarines.
6. USSR - 267 submarines.

Statistics are a rather insidious thing.

Firstly, the number of combat units indicated is to a certain extent arbitrary. It includes both combat boats and training boats, obsolete ones, those being repaired, and so on. The only criterion for including a boat on the list is that it exists.

Secondly, the very concept of a submarine is not defined. For example, a German submarine with a displacement of 250 tons, intended for operations in coastal areas, and a Japanese ocean-going submarine with a displacement of 5,000 tons are still not the same thing.

Thirdly, a warship is not assessed by displacement, but by a combination of many parameters - for example, speed, armament, autonomy, and so on. In the case of a submarine, these parameters include diving speed, diving depth, underwater speed, time during which the boat can remain under water - and other things that would take a long time to list. They include, for example, such an important indicator as crew training.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the table above.

For example, it is obvious that the great naval powers - England and the USA - were not particularly actively preparing for submarine warfare. And they had few boats, and even this number was “spread out” across the oceans. American Pacific Fleet - two dozen submarines. The English fleet - with possible military operations on three oceans - the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian - is only fifty.

It is also clear that Germany was not ready for a naval war - in total there were 57 submarines in service by September 1939.

Here is a table of German submarines - by type (data taken from the book “War At Sea”, by S Roskill, vol.1, page 527):

1. “IA” - ocean, 850 tons - 2 units.
2. “IIA” – coastal, 250 tons - 6 units.
3. “IIB” - coastal, 250 tons - 20 units.
4. “IIC” - coastal, 250 tons - 9 units.
5. “IID” - coastal, 250 tons - 15 units.
6. “VII” - ocean, 750 tons - 5 units.

Thus, at the very beginning of hostilities, Germany had no more than 8-9 submarines for operations in the Atlantic.

It also follows from the table that the absolute champion in the number of submarines in the pre-war period was the Soviet Union.

Now let's look at the number of submarines that took part in hostilities by country:

1. England - 209 submarines.
2. Germany - 965 submarines.
3. USA - 182 submarines.
4. Italy - 106 submarines
5. Japan - 160 submarines.
6. CCCP - 170 submarines.

It can be seen that almost all countries during the war came to the conclusion that submarines are very important view weapons, began to dramatically increase their submarine forces, and used them very widely in military operations.

The only exception is the Soviet Union. In the USSR, no new boats were built during the war - there was no time for that, and no more than 60% of those built were put into use - but this can be explained by many very good reasons. For example, the fact that the Pacific Fleet practically did not participate in the war - unlike the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern.

The absolute champion in building up the forces of the submarine fleet and in its combat use is Germany. This is especially obvious if you look at the roster of the German submarine fleet: by the end of the war - 1155 units. The large difference between the number of submarines built and the number of those that participated in hostilities is explained by the fact that in the second half of 1944 and 1945 it was increasingly difficult to bring a boat to a combat-ready state - boat bases were mercilessly bombed, shipyards were the priority target of air raids, training flotillas in the Baltic Sea did not have time to train crews, and so on.

The contribution of the German submarine fleet to the war effort was enormous. The figures for the casualties they inflicted on the enemy and the casualties they suffered vary. According to German sources, during the war, Doenitz's submarines sank 2,882 enemy merchant ships, with a total tonnage of 14.4 million tons, plus 175 warships, including battleships and aircraft carriers. 779 boats were lost.

The Soviet reference book gives a different figure - 644 German submarines sunk, 2840 merchant ships sunk by them.

The British (“Total War”, by Peter Calviocoressi and Guy Wint) indicate the following figures: 1162 German submarines built, and 941 sunk or surrendered.

I did not find an explanation for the difference in the statistics provided. The authoritative work of Captain Roskill, “War At Sea”, unfortunately, does not provide summary tables. Perhaps the matter is in different ways of recording sunken and captured boats - for example, in what column was a damaged boat, grounded and abandoned by the crew, taken into account?

In any case, it can be argued that German submariners not only inflicted huge losses on the British and American merchant fleets, but also had a profound strategic impact on the entire course of the war.

Hundreds of escort ships and literally thousands of aircraft were sent to fight them - and even this would not have been enough if not for the successes of the American shipbuilding industry, which made it possible to more than compensate for all the tonnage sunk by the Germans.

How did things go for other participants in the war?

Italian submarine fleet showed very poor results, completely disproportionate to its nominally high numbers. The Italian boats were poorly built, poorly equipped, and poorly managed. They accounted for 138 sunk targets, while 84 boats were lost.

According to the Italians themselves, their boats sank 132 enemy merchant ships, with a total displacement of 665,000 tons, and 18 warships, for a total of 29,000 tons. Which gives an average of 5,000 tons per transport (corresponding to the average English transport ship of the period), and 1,200 tons on average per warship - equivalent to a destroyer, or English escort sloop.

The most important thing is that they did not have any serious impact on the course of hostilities. The Atlantic campaign was a complete failure. If we talk about the submarine fleet, the greatest contribution to the Italian war effort was made by Italian saboteurs who successfully attacked British battleships in the Alexandria roadstead.

The British sank 493 merchant ships with a total displacement of 1.5 million tons, 134 warships, plus 34 enemy submarines - while losing 73 boats.

Their successes could have been greater, but they did not have many goals. Their main contribution to the victory was the interception of Italian merchant ships going to North Africa, and German coastal ships in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway.

The actions of American and Japanese submarines deserve a separate discussion.

The Japanese submarine fleet looked very impressive in its pre-war phase of development. The submarines that were part of it ranged from tiny dwarf boats designed for sabotage operations to huge submarine cruisers.

During World War II, 56 submarines larger than 3,000 tons of displacement were put into service - and 52 of them were Japanese.

The Japanese fleet had 41 submarines capable of carrying seaplanes (up to 3 at once) - something no other boat in any other fleet in the world could do. Neither in German, nor in English, nor in American.

Japanese submarines had no equal in underwater speed. Their small boats could make up to 18 knots under water, and their experimental medium-sized boats showed even 19, which exceeded the remarkable results of the German XXI series boats, and was almost three times faster than the speed of the standard German “workhorse” - the VII series boats .

Japanese torpedo weapons were the best in the world, surpassing the American ones three times in range, twice as much in the destructive power of the warhead, and, until the second half of 1943, had a huge advantage in reliability.

And yet, they did very little. In total, Japanese submarines sank 184 ships, with a total displacement of 907,000 tons.

It was a matter of military doctrine - according to the concept of the Japanese fleet, the boats were intended to hunt warships, not merchant ships. And since military ships sailed three times faster than “merchants”, and, as a rule, had strong anti-submarine protection, the successes were modest. Japanese submariners sank two American aircraft carriers and a cruiser, damaged two battleships - and had virtually no effect on the overall course of military operations.

Starting from a certain time, they were even used as supply ships for besieged island garrisons.

It is interesting that the Americans started the war with exactly the same military doctrine - the boat was supposed to track down warships, not “traders”. Moreover, American torpedoes, in theory the most technologically advanced (they were supposed to explode under the ship under the influence of its magnetic field, breaking the enemy ship in half) turned out to be terribly unreliable.

The defect was corrected only in the second half of 1943. By this time, pragmatic American naval commanders switched their submarines to attacks on the Japanese merchant fleet, and then added another improvement to this - now Japanese tankers became a priority target.

The effect was devastating.

Of the 10 million tons of displacement total lost by the Japanese military and merchant fleet, 54% was attributed to the submariners.

The American fleet lost 39 submarines during the war.

According to the Russian reference book, American submarines sank 180 targets.

If American reports are correct, then 5,400,000 tons divided by 180 "targets" hit gives an incongruously high figure for each ship sunk - an average of 30,000 tons. An English merchant ship from the Second World War had a displacement of about 5-6 thousand tons, only later the American Liberty transports became twice as large.

It is possible that the directory only took into account military vessels, because it does not provide the total tonnage of targets sunk by the Americans.

According to the Americans, about 1,300 Japanese merchant ships were sunk by their boats during the war - from large tankers, and almost to sampans. This gives an estimated 3,000 tons for each Maru sunk, which is roughly what is expected.

An online reference taken from the usually reliable site: http://www.2worldwar2.com/ also gives a figure of 1,300 Japanese merchant ships sunk by submarines, but estimates the losses of American boats higher: 52 boats lost, out of a total of 288 units ( including training and those who did not participate in hostilities).

It is possible that boats lost as a result of accidents are taken into account - I don’t know. The standard American submarine during the Pacific War was the Gato class, 2,400 tons, equipped with superior optics, superior acoustics, and even radar.

American submarines made a huge contribution to the victory. Analysis of their actions after the war revealed them as the most important factor that strangled the military and civilian industries of Japan.

The actions of Soviet submarines must be considered separately, because the conditions of their use were unique.

The Soviet pre-war submarine fleet was not just the largest in the world. In terms of the number of submarines - 267 units - it was two and a half times larger than the British and German fleets combined. Here it is necessary to make a reservation - British and German submarines were counted for September 1939, and Soviet ones - for June 1941. Nevertheless, it is clear that the strategic plan for the deployment of the Soviet submarine fleet - if we take the priorities of its development - was better than the German one. The forecast for the start of hostilities was much more realistic than that determined by the German “Plan Z” - 1944-1946.

The Soviet plan was made on the assumption that the war could start simply today, or tomorrow. Accordingly, funds were not invested in battleships that required long construction. Preference was given to small military vessels - in the pre-war period only 4 cruisers were built, but more than 200 submarines.

The geographical conditions for the deployment of the Soviet fleet were very specific - it was, of necessity, divided into 4 parts - the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific - which, in general, could not help each other. Some ships, apparently, managed to pass from the Pacific Ocean to Murmansk, small ships like small submarines could be transported disassembled across railway- but in general the interaction of the fleets was very difficult.

Here we come across the first problem - the summary table indicates the total number of Soviet submarines, but does not say how many of them operated in the Baltic - or in the Black Sea, for example.

The Pacific Fleet did not participate in the war until August 1945.

The Black Sea Fleet joined the war almost immediately. In general, he had no enemy at sea - except perhaps the Romanian fleet. Accordingly, there is no information about successes - due to the absence of the enemy. There is also no information about losses - at least detailed ones.

According to A.B. Shirokorad, the following episode took place: on June 26, 1941, the leaders “Moscow” and “Kharkov” were sent to raid Constanta. While retreating, the leaders came under attack from their own submarine, Shch-206. She was sent on patrol but was not warned about the raid. As a result, the leader "Moscow" was sunk, and the submarine was sunk by its escorts - in particular, the destroyer "Soobrazitelny".

This version is disputed, and it is argued that both ships - the leader and the submarine - were lost at a Romanian minefield. There is no exact information.

But here’s what is absolutely indisputable: in the period April-May 1944, German and Romanian troops were evacuated from Crimea by sea to Romania. During April and twenty days of May, the enemy conducted 251 convoys - many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine protection.

In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 combat campaigns damaged one (!) transport. According to commanders' reports, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this.

The result is astounding inefficiency.

There is no summary information on the Black Sea Fleet - the number of boats, the number of combat exits, the number of targets hit, their type and tonnage. At least I didn't find them anywhere.
The war in the Baltic can be reduced to three phases: the defeat in 1941, the blockade of the fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt in 1942, 1943, 1944 - and the counter-offensive in 1945.
According to information found on forums, Kraznoznamenny Baltic Fleet in 1941, he conducted 58 accesses to German sea communications in the Baltic.

Results:
1. One German submarine, U-144, was sunk. Confirmed by the German reference book.
2. Two transports were sunk (5769 GRT).
3. Presumably, the Swedish mobilized patrol boat HJVB-285 (56 GRT) was also sunk by a torpedo from the S-6 submarine on 08/22/1941.

This last point is even difficult to comment on - the Swedes were neutral, the boat was - most likely - a bot armed with a machine gun, and was hardly worth the torpedo that was fired at it. In the process of achieving these successes, 27 submarines were lost. And according to other sources - even 36.

Information for 1942 is vague. It is stated that 24 targets were hit.
Summary information - the number of boats involved, the number of combat exits, the type and tonnage of targets hit - is not available.

Regarding the period from the end of 1942 to July 1944 (the time of Finland’s exit from the war), there is complete consensus: not a single combat entry of submarines into enemy communications. The reason is very valid - the Gulf of Finland was blocked not only by minefields, but also by an anti-submarine network barrier.

As a result, throughout this period the Baltic was a quiet German lake - Doenitz's training flotillas trained there, Swedish ships with important military cargo for Germany - ball bearings, iron ore, etc. - sailed without interference - German troops were transferred - from the Baltics to Finland and back, and so on Further.

But even at the end of the war, when the nets were removed and Soviet submarines went to the Baltic to intercept German ships, the picture looks rather strange. During the mass evacuation from the Courland Peninsula and from the Danzig Bay area, in the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-capacity ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine protection in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 military campaigns sank only one transport, a mother ship and a floating battery .

It was at this time that high-profile victories happened - the sinking of the Gustlov, for example - but nevertheless, the German fleet managed to evacuate about 2 and a half million people by sea, the largest rescue operation in history - and it was neither disrupted nor even slowed down by the actions of the Soviets submarines

There is no summary information about the activities of the Baltic Submarine Fleet. Again - they may exist, but I haven't found them.

The situation is the same with statistics on the actions of the Northern Fleet. The summary data is nowhere to be found, or at least not in public circulation.

There is something on the forums. An example is given below:

“...On August 4, 1941, the British submarine Tygris and then Trident arrived in Polyarnoye. At the beginning of November they were replaced by two other submarines, Seawolf and Silaien. In total, until December 21, they made 10 military campaigns, destroying 8 targets. Is it a lot or a little? In this case, this is not important, the main thing is that during the same period, 19 Soviet submarines in 82 military campaigns sank only 3 targets...”

The biggest mystery comes from the information from the pivot table:
http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.

According to it, 170 Soviet submarines took part in the hostilities. Of these, 81 were killed. 126 targets were hit.

What is their total tonnage? Where were they sunk? How many of them are warships and how many are merchant ships?

The table simply does not provide any answers on this matter.

If the Gustlov was a large ship, and is named in the reports, why are other ships not named? Or at least not listed? In the end, both a tugboat and a four-oared boat can be counted as hit.

The idea of ​​falsification simply suggests itself.

The table, by the way, contains another falsification, this time completely obvious.

The victories of the submarines of all the fleets listed in it - English, German, Soviet, Italian, Japanese - contain the sum of the enemy ships they sunk - commercial and military.

The only exception is the Americans. For some reason, they only counted the warships they sunk, thereby artificially reducing their indicators - from 1480 to 180.

And this small modification of the rules is not even specified. You can find it only by doing a detailed check of all the data given in the table.

The final result of the check is that all data is more or less reliable. Except Russian and American. The American ones are worsened by 7-something times through obvious manipulation, and the Russian ones are hidden in a thick “fog” - by using numbers without explanation, detail and confirmation.

In general, from the above material it is obvious that the results of the actions of Soviet submarines during the war were negligible, the losses were great, and the achievements did not correspond at all to the enormous level of expenditure that was invested in the creation of the Soviet submarine fleet in the pre-war period.

Understandable in general outline and the reasons for this. In a purely technical sense, the boats lacked the means to detect the enemy - their commanders could only rely on not very reliable radio communications and their own periscopes. This was generally a common problem, not just for Soviet submariners.

In the first period of the war, German captains created an improvised mast for themselves - the boat, in the surface position, extended the periscope up to the limit, and a watchman with binoculars climbed onto it, like a pole at a fair. This exotic method helped them little, so they relied more on a tip - either from colleagues in the “wolf pack”, or from reconnaissance aircraft, or from the coastal headquarters, which had data from radio intelligence and decoding services. Radio direction finders and acoustic stations were in wide use.

What exactly the Soviet submariners had in this sense is unknown, but if we use the analogy with tanks - where orders in 1941 were transmitted by flags - then we can guess that the situation with communications and electronics in the submarine fleet at that time was not the best.

The same factor reduced the possibility of interaction with aviation, and probably with headquarters on land too.

An important factor was the level of crew training. For example, German submariners - after crew members graduated from the relevant technical schools - sent boats to training flotillas in the Baltic, where for 5 months they practiced tactical techniques, conducted firing exercises, and so on.

Particular attention was paid to the training of commanders.

Herbert Werner, for example, is a German submariner whose memoirs provide a lot useful information- became a captain only after several campaigns, having managed to be both a junior officer and a first mate, and receive a couple of orders in this capacity.

The Soviet fleet was deployed so quickly that there was simply nowhere to find qualified captains, and they were appointed from people who had experience sailing in the merchant fleet. In addition, the guiding idea at that time was: “... if he doesn’t know the matter, it doesn’t matter. He will learn in battle...”

When handling such a complex weapon as a submarine, this is not the best approach.

In conclusion, a few words about learning from mistakes made.

Summary table comparing boat performance different countries, taken from the book by A.V. Platonov and V.M. Lurie “Commanders of Soviet submarines 1941-1945.”

It was published in 800 copies - clearly only for official use, and clearly only enough for commanders high level- because its circulation is too small to be used as a teaching aid for officer trainees at naval academies.

It would seem that in such an audience you can call a spade a spade?

However, the table of indicators is compiled very slyly.

Let's take, say, such an indicator (by the way, chosen by the authors of the book) as the ratio of the number of sunk targets to the number of lost submarines.

The German fleet in this sense is estimated in round numbers as follows - 4 targets for 1 boat. If we convert this factor into another - say, tonnage sunk per boat lost - we get approximately 20,000 tons (14 million tons of tonnage divided by 700 boats lost). Since the average oceangoing English merchant ship of that time had a displacement of 5,000 tons, everything fits.

With the Germans - yes, it agrees.

But with the Russians - no, it doesn’t fit. Because the coefficient for them - 126 targets sunk against 81 lost boats - gives a figure of 1.56. Of course, worse than 4, but still nothing.

However, this coefficient, unlike the German one, is unverifiable - the total tonnage of targets sunk by Soviet submarines is not indicated anywhere. And the proud reference to a sunken Swedish tug weighing as much as fifty tons makes one think that this is far from accidental.

However, that's not all.

The German coefficient of 4 goals per 1 boat is the overall result. At the beginning of the war - in fact, until mid-1943 - it was much higher. It turned out to be 20, 30, and sometimes even 50 ships for each boat.

The indicator was reduced after the victory of the convoys and their escorts - in mid-1943 and until the end of the war.

That is why it is listed in the table - honestly and correctly.

The Americans sank approximately 1,500 targets, losing approximately 40 boats. They would be entitled to a coefficient of 35-40 - much higher than the German one.

If you think about it, this relationship is quite logical - the Germans fought in the Atlantic against the Anglo-American-Canadian escorts, equipped with hundreds of ships and thousands of aircraft, and the Americans fought a war against weakly protected Japanese shipping.

But this simple fact cannot be recognized, and therefore an amendment is introduced.

The Americans - somehow imperceptibly - are changing the rules of the game, and only “military” goals are counted, reducing their coefficient (180 / 39) to a figure of 4.5 - obviously more acceptable for Russian patriotism?

Even now - and even in the narrowly professional military environment for which the book by Platonov and Lurie was published - even then it turned out to be undesirable to face the facts.

Perhaps this is the most unpleasant result of our small investigation.

P.S. The text of the article (better font and photos) can be found here:

Sources, short list Internet sites used:

1. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - American boats.
2. http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm - submarine warfare.
3. http://www.paralumun.com/wartwosubmarinesbritain.htm - English boats.
4. http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/britsubs.html - English boats.
5. http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm - Japanese boats.
6. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/2270/ww2e.htm - Italian boats.
7. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
8. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/84/84929.htm - Soviet boats.
9. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/255/255106.htm - Soviet boats.
10. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - submarine warfare.
11. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Soviet boats.
12. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/46/46644.htm - Soviet boats.
13. - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
15. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
16. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/ - forum, military equipment. Hosted by Sergei Kharlamov, a very smart person.

Sources, short list of books used:

1. "Steel Coffins: German U-boats, 1941-1945", Herbert Werner, translation from German, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2001
2. “War At Sea”, by S. Roskill, in Russian translation, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1967.
3. “Total War”, by Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Penguin Books, USA, 1985.
4. “The Longest Battle, The War at Sea, 1939-1945,” by Richard Hough, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986.
5. “Secret Raiders”, David Woodward, translation from English, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2004
6. “The Fleet that Khrushchev Destroyed”, A.B.Shirokograd, Moscow, VZOI, 2004.

Reviews

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Submarines dictate the rules in naval warfare and force everyone to meekly follow the routine.

Those stubborn people who dare to ignore the rules of the game will face a quick and painful death in the cold water, among floating debris and oil stains. Boats, regardless of flag, remain the most dangerous combat vehicles, capable of crushing any enemy.

I bring to your attention a short story about the seven most successful submarine projects of the war years.

Boats type T (Triton-class), UK
The number of submarines built is 53.
Surface displacement - 1290 tons; underwater - 1560 tons.
Crew - 59…61 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m (riveted hull), 106 m (welded hull).
Full surface speed - 15.5 knots; in underwater - 9 knots.
A fuel reserve of 131 tons provided a surface cruising range of 8,000 miles.
Weapons:
- 11 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber (on boats of subseries II and III), ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 1 x 102 mm universal gun, 1 x 20 mm anti-aircraft "Oerlikon".

HMS Traveler

A British underwater Terminator capable of knocking the crap out of any enemy's head with a bow-launched 8-torpedo salvo. The T-type boats had no equal in destructive power among all the submarines of the WWII period - this explains their ferocious appearance with a bizarre bow superstructure, where additional torpedo tubes were located.

The notorious British conservatism is a thing of the past - the British were among the first to equip their boats with ASDIC sonars. Alas, despite their powerful weapons and modern detection means, the T-class high seas boats did not become the most effective among the British submarines of World War II. Nevertheless, they went through an exciting battle path and achieved a number of remarkable victories. "Tritons" were actively used in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea, they destroyed Japanese communications on Pacific Ocean, have been spotted several times in the frozen waters of the Arctic.

In August 1941, the submarines "Tygris" and "Trident" arrived in Murmansk. British submariners demonstrated a master class to their Soviet colleagues: in two trips, 4 enemy ships were sunk, incl. "Bahia Laura" and "Donau II" with thousands of soldiers of the 6th Mountain Division. Thus, the sailors prevented the third German attack on Murmansk.

Other famous T-boat trophies include the German light cruiser Karlsruhe and the Japanese heavy cruiser Ashigara. The samurai were “lucky” to get acquainted with a full 8-torpedo salvo of the Trenchant submarine - having received 4 torpedoes on board (+ another one from the stern tube), the cruiser quickly capsized and sank.

After the war, the powerful and sophisticated Tritons remained in service with the Royal Navy for another quarter of a century.
It is noteworthy that three boats of this type were acquired by Israel in the late 1960s - one of them, INS Dakar (formerly HMS Totem) was lost in 1968 in the Mediterranean Sea under unclear circumstances.

Boats of the "Cruising" type XIV series, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 11.
Surface displacement - 1500 tons; underwater - 2100 tons.
Crew - 62…65 people.

Full surface speed - 22.5 knots; in underwater - 10 knots.
Surface cruising range 16,500 miles (9 knots)
Submerged cruising range - 175 miles (3 knots)
Weapons:

- 2 x 100 mm universal guns, 2 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic guns;
- up to 20 minutes of barrage.

...On December 3, 1941, German hunters UJ-1708, UJ-1416 and UJ-1403 bombed a Soviet boat that tried to attack a convoy at Bustad Sund.

Hans, can you hear this creature?
- Nain. After a series of explosions, the Russians lay low - I detected three impacts on the ground...
-Can you determine where they are now?
- Donnerwetter! They are blown away. They probably decided to surface and surrender.

The German sailors were wrong. From the depths of the sea, a MONSTER rose to the surface - the cruising submarine K-3 series XIV, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire on the enemy. With the fifth salvo, Soviet sailors managed to sink U-1708. The second hunter, having received two direct hits, began to smoke and turned to the side - his 20 mm anti-aircraft guns could not compete with the “hundreds” of the secular submarine cruiser. Scattering the Germans like puppies, K-3 quickly disappeared over the horizon at 20 knots.

The Soviet Katyusha was a phenomenal boat for its time. Welded hull, powerful artillery and mine-torpedo weapons, powerful diesel engines (2 x 4200 hp!), high surface speed of 22-23 knots. Huge autonomy in terms of fuel reserves. Remote control of ballast tank valves. A radio station capable of transmitting signals from the Baltic to the Far East. An exceptional level of comfort: shower cabins, refrigerated tanks, two seawater desalinators, an electric galley... Two boats (K-3 and K-22) were equipped with Lend-Lease ASDIC sonars.

But, oddly enough, neither the high characteristics nor the most powerful weapons made the Katyusha effective - in addition to the dark K-21 attack on the Tirpitz, during the war years the XIV series boats accounted for only 5 successful torpedo attacks and 27 thousand brigades. reg. tons of sunk tonnage. Most of the victories were achieved with the help of mines. Moreover, its own losses amounted to five cruising boats.

K-21, Severomorsk, today

The reasons for the failures lie in the tactics of using Katyushas - the powerful submarine cruisers, created for the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, had to “tread water” in the shallow Baltic “puddle”. When operating at depths of 30-40 meters, a huge 97-meter boat could hit the ground with its bow while its stern was still sticking out on the surface. It was not much easier for the North Sea sailors - as practice has shown, the effectiveness of the combat use of Katyushas was complicated by the poor training of personnel and the lack of initiative of the command.

It's a pity. These boats were designed for more.

“Baby”, Soviet Union
Series VI and VI bis - 50 built.
Series XII - 46 built.
Series XV - 57 built (4 took part in combat operations).

Performance characteristics of boats type M series XII:
Surface displacement - 206 tons; underwater - 258 tons.
Autonomy - 10 days.
Working immersion depth - 50 m, maximum - 60 m.
Full surface speed - 14 knots; in underwater - 8 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 3,380 miles (8.6 knots).
Submerged cruising range is 108 miles (3 knots).
Weapons:
- 2 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 2 torpedoes;
- 1 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic.

Baby!

The project of mini-submarines for the rapid strengthening of the Pacific Fleet - the main feature of the M-type boats was the ability to be transported by rail in a fully assembled form.

In the pursuit of compactness, many had to be sacrificed - service on the Malyutka turned into a grueling and dangerous undertaking. Difficult living conditions, strong roughness - the waves mercilessly tossed the 200-ton “float”, risking breaking it into pieces. Shallow diving depth and weak weapons. But the main concern of the sailors was the reliability of the submarine - one shaft, one diesel engine, one electric motor - the tiny “Malyutka” left no chance for the careless crew, the slightest malfunction on board threatened death for the submarine.

The little ones quickly evolved - the performance characteristics of each new series were several times different from the previous project: the contours were improved, the electrical equipment and detection equipment were updated, the dive time was reduced, and the autonomy increased. The “babies” of the XV series no longer resembled their predecessors of the VI and XII series: one-and-a-half-hull design - the ballast tanks were moved outside the durable hull; The power plant received a standard two-shaft layout with two diesel engines and underwater electric motors. The number of torpedo tubes increased to four. Alas, Series XV appeared too late - the “Little Ones” of Series VI and XII bore the brunt of the war.

Despite their modest size and only 2 torpedoes on board, the tiny fish were simply distinguished by their terrifying “gluttony”: in just the years of World War II, Soviet M-type submarines sank 61 enemy ships with a total tonnage of 135.5 thousand gross tons, destroyed 10 warships, and also damaged 8 transports.

The little ones, originally intended only for operations in the coastal zone, have learned to fight effectively in open sea areas. They, along with larger boats, cut enemy communications, patrolled at the exits of enemy bases and fjords, deftly overcame anti-submarine barriers and blew up transports right at the piers inside protected enemy harbors. It’s simply amazing how the Red Navy were able to fight on these flimsy ships! But they fought. And we won!

Boats of the “Medium” type, series IX-bis, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 41.
Surface displacement - 840 tons; underwater - 1070 tons.
Crew - 36…46 people.
Working immersion depth - 80 m, maximum - 100 m.
Full surface speed - 19.5 knots; submerged - 8.8 knots.
Surface cruising range 8,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 148 miles (3 knots).

“Six torpedo tubes and the same number of spare torpedoes on racks convenient for reloading. Two cannons with large ammunition, machine guns, explosive equipment... In a word, there is something to fight with. And 20 knots surface speed! It allows you to overtake almost any convoy and attack it again. The technique is good...”
- opinion of the commander of the S-56, Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Shchedrin

The Eskis were distinguished by their rational layout and balanced design, powerful armament, and excellent performance and seaworthiness. Initially a German project from the Deshimag company, modified to meet Soviet requirements. But don’t rush to clap your hands and remember the Mistral. After the start of serial construction of the IX series in Soviet shipyards, the German project was revised with the goal of a complete transition to Soviet equipment: 1D diesel engines, weapons, radio stations, a noise direction finder, a gyrocompass... - there were none in the boats designated “series IX-bis”. foreign made bolt!

The problems with the combat use of "Medium" type boats, in general, were similar to the K-type cruising boats - locked in mine-infested shallow water, they were never able to realize their high combat qualities. Things were much better in the Northern Fleet - during the war, the S-56 boat under the command of G.I. Shchedrina made the transition through the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, moving from Vladivostok to Polyarny, subsequently becoming the most productive boat of the USSR Navy.

An equally fantastic story is connected with the S-101 “bomb catcher” - during the war years, the Germans and Allies dropped over 1000 depth charges on the boat, but each time the S-101 returned safely to Polyarny.

Finally, it was on the S-13 that Alexander Marinesko achieved his famous victories.

S-56 torpedo compartment

“Cruel alterations in which the ship found itself, bombings and explosions, depths far exceeding the official limit. The boat protected us from everything..."

- from the memoirs of G.I. Shchedrin

Gato type boats, USA
The number of submarines built is 77.
Surface displacement - 1525 tons; underwater - 2420 tons.
Crew - 60 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m.
Full surface speed - 21 knots; submerged - 9 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 11,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 96 miles (2 knots).
Weapons:
- 10 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 24 torpedoes;
- 1 x 76 mm universal gun, 1 x 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun, 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon;
- one of the boats, USS Barb, was equipped with a multiple launch rocket system for shelling the coast.

Ocean-going submarine cruisers of the Getou class appeared at the height of the war in the Pacific Ocean and became one of the most effective tools of the US Navy. They tightly blocked all strategic straits and approaches to the atolls, cut all supply lines, leaving Japanese garrisons without reinforcements, and Japanese industry without raw materials and oil. In battles with the Gatow, the Imperial Navy lost two heavy aircraft carriers, lost four cruisers and a damn dozen destroyers.

High speed, lethal torpedo weapons, the most modern radio equipment for detecting the enemy - radar, direction finder, sonar. The cruising range allows for combat patrols off the coast of Japan when operating from a base in Hawaii. Increased comfort on board. But the main thing is the excellent training of the crews and the weakness of Japanese anti-submarine weapons. As a result, the "Getow" mercilessly destroyed everything - it was they who brought victory in the Pacific Ocean from the blue depths of the sea.

...One of the main achievements of the Getow boats, which changed the whole world, is considered to be the event of September 2, 1944. On that day, the Finback submarine detected a distress signal from a falling plane and, after many hours of searching, found a frightened and already desperate pilot in the ocean . The one who was saved was one George Herbert Bush.

The cabin of the submarine "Flasher", memorial in Groton.

The Flasher trophy list sounds like a naval joke: 9 tankers, 10 transports, 2 patrol ship with a total tonnage of 100,231 GRT! And for a snack, the boat grabbed a Japanese cruiser and a destroyer. Lucky damn thing!

Electric robots type XXI, Germany

By April 1945, the Germans managed to launch 118 submarines of the XXI series. However, only two of them were able to achieve operational readiness and go to sea in last days war.

Surface displacement - 1620 tons; underwater - 1820 tons.
Crew - 57 people.
Working depth of immersion is 135 m, maximum depth is 200+ meters.
Full speed in the surface position is 15.6 knots, in the submerged position - 17 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 15,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 340 miles (5 knots).
Weapons:
- 6 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 2 Flak anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber.

U-2540 "Wilhelm Bauer" permanently moored in Bremerhaven, present day

Our allies were very lucky that all the forces of Germany were sent to the Eastern Front - the Krauts did not have enough resources to release a flock of fantastic “Electric Boats” into the sea. If they appeared a year earlier, that would be it! Another turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The Germans were the first to guess: everything that shipbuilders in other countries are proud of - large ammunition, powerful artillery, high surface speed of 20+ knots - is of little importance. The key parameters that determine the combat effectiveness of a submarine are its speed and cruising range when submerged.

Unlike its peers, “Electrobot” was focused on being constantly under water: a maximally streamlined body without heavy artillery, fences and platforms - all for the sake of minimizing underwater resistance. Snorkel, six groups of batteries (3 times more than on conventional boats!), powerful electric. Full speed engines, quiet and economical electric. "sneak" engines.

The stern of U-2511, sunk at a depth of 68 meters

The Germans calculated everything - the entire Elektrobot campaign moved at periscope depth under the RDP, remaining difficult to detect for enemy anti-submarine weapons. At great depths, its advantage became even more shocking: 2-3 times greater range, at twice the speed of any wartime submarine! High stealth and impressive underwater skills, homing torpedoes, a set of the most advanced detection means... “Electrobots” opened a new milestone in the history of the submarine fleet, defining the vector of development of submarines in the post-war years.

The Allies were not prepared to face such a threat - as post-war tests showed, the “Electrobots” were several times superior in mutual hydroacoustic detection range to the American and British destroyers guarding the convoys.

Type VII boats, Germany
The number of submarines built is 703.
Surface displacement - 769 tons; underwater - 871 tons.
Crew - 45 people.
Working immersion depth - 100 m, maximum - 220 meters
Full surface speed - 17.7 knots; submerged - 7.6 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 8,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 80 miles (4 knots).
Weapons:
- 5 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 14 torpedoes;
- 1 x 88 mm universal gun (until 1942), eight options for superstructures with 20 and 37 mm anti-aircraft mounts.

* the given performance characteristics correspond to boats of the VIIC subseries

The most effective warships ever to roam the world's oceans.
A relatively simple, cheap, mass-produced, but at the same time well-armed and deadly weapon for total underwater terror.

703 submarines. 10 MILLION tons of sunk tonnage! Battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes and enemy submarines, oil tankers, transports with aircraft, tanks, cars, rubber, ore, machine tools, ammunition, uniforms and food... The damage from the actions of German submariners exceeded all reasonable limits - if only Without the inexhaustible industrial potential of the United States, capable of compensating for any losses of the allies, German U-bots had every chance to “strangle” Great Britain and change the course of world history.

U-995. Graceful underwater killer

The successes of the Sevens are often associated with the “prosperous times” of 1939-41. - allegedly, when the Allies appeared the convoy system and Asdik sonars, the successes of the German submariners ended. A completely populist statement based on a misinterpretation of “prosperous times.”

The situation was simple: at the beginning of the war, when for every German boat there was one Allied anti-submarine ship, the “sevens” felt like invulnerable masters of the Atlantic. It was then that the legendary aces appeared, sinking 40 enemy ships. The Germans already held victory in their hands when the Allies suddenly deployed 10 anti-submarine ships and 10 aircraft for each active Kriegsmarine boat!

Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Yankees and British began to methodically overwhelm the Kriegsmarine with anti-submarine equipment and soon achieved an excellent loss ratio of 1:1. They fought like that until the end of the war. The Germans ran out of ships faster than their opponents.

The whole history of the German “seven” is a formidable warning from the past: what threat does a submarine pose and how high are the costs of creating an effective system to counter the underwater threat.

A funny American poster of those years. "Hit the weak points! Come serve in the submarine fleet - we account for 77% of the sunk tonnage!" Comments, as they say, are unnecessary

The article uses materials from the book “Soviet Submarine Shipbuilding”, V. I. Dmitriev, Voenizdat, 1990.

The first part of the work is about the French fleet in World War II. Covers the period before the British Operation Menace against Dakar. The second part, published in Russian for the first time, describes the operations of the French fleet in remote areas, Operation Torch, the self-sinking of the fleet in Toulon and the revival of the fleet. The reader will also be interested in the appendices. The book is written in a very biased manner.

© Translation by I.P. Shmeleva

© E.A. Granovsky. Comments to the 1st part, 1997

© M.E. Morozov. Comments on part 2

© E.A. Granovsky, M.E. Morozov. Compilation and design, 1997

PREFACE

The victory over fascism in World War II was the result of coalition actions. France took its rightful place among the victorious powers. But her path to the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition was tortuous. The fleet shared all the ups and downs with the country. There is a book about its history by the French military historian L. Garros.

The material presented to the readers is divided into two parts. This issue includes chapters on the actions of the French Navy in 1939–1940: the Norwegian and French campaigns, the actions of the fleet in the war with Italy, and then the battles with the British in Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar. The second part of this book describes the events of 1941–1945: the armed conflict with Siam, actions off the coast of Syria in 1941, the Madagascar operation, events related to the North African landing of the Allies and the history of the naval forces of the Free French.

L. Garros's book is very original in some aspects. After reading it, you will probably notice a number of features.

Firstly, this is the French “specificity” of this work, which is unusual for our readers. L. Garros has a high opinion of Marshal Petain, considers General de Gaulle almost a traitor, the history of the French Navy in World War II is essentially reduced to the history of the Vichy fleet, for which the naval forces of the Free French were the enemy.

Secondly, the absence of a number of known episodes is puzzling. The book does not say a word about the participation of French ships in the search for German raiders and intercepting blockade breakers, the convoy activity of the fleet is poorly reflected, the raid of destroyers on Gibraltar in September 1940 and some other operations are not described, and the outstanding successes of the underwater minelayer "Ruby" are ignored. ... But there are a lot of fictitious victories and savoring, perhaps courageous, but actions that did not have any influence on the course of the war. Sometimes the author almost slips into a frankly adventurous genre, for example, describing the adventures of officer Boilambert, who does not know where and with whom he spent the night.

Part 1

FRENCH NAVY IN 1939

When the war began in September 1939, the French fleet consisted of seven battleships, including two old battleships, Paris and Courbet, three old, but modernized in 1935-36. battleships - "Brittany", "Provence" and "Lorraine", two new battleships "Strasbourg" and "Dunkirk".

There were two aircraft carriers: the aircraft carrier Béarn and the air transport Commandant Test.

There were 19 cruisers, of which 7 1st class cruisers - "Duquesne", "Tourville", "Suffren", "Colbert", "Foch", "Duplex" and "Algerie"; 12 2nd class cruisers - "Duguet-Trouin", "La Motte-Pique", "Primogue", "La Tour d'Auvergne" (formerly "Pluto"), "Jeanne d'Arc", "Emile Bertin", " La Galissoniere", "Jean de Vienne", "Gloire", "Marseillaise", "Montcalm", "Georges Leygues".

The torpedo flotillas were also impressive. They numbered: 32 leaders

Six ships each of the Jaguar, Gepar, Aigle, Vauquelin, Fantask types and two Mogador types; 26 destroyers - 12 Bourrasque type and 14 Adrua type, 12 Melpomene type destroyers.

The 77 submarines included the cruiser Surcouf, 38 class 1 submarines, 32 class 2 submarines and 6 underwater minelayers.

COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 1939 TO MAY 1940,

In September 1939, the disposition of the French fleet was mainly directed against Italy, although it was not specified how it would behave.

The British believed that the French fleet should guard the Strait of Gibraltar, while they concentrated their fleet almost entirely in the North Sea against the Kriegsmarine. On September 1, Italy made it clear that it would not take any hostile action, and the French disposition was changed: the Mediterranean Sea became a secondary theater of operations, which would not present any obstacles to navigation. Convoys delivering troops from North Africa to the North-Eastern Front and the Middle East moved unhindered. Anglo-French superiority at sea over Germany was overwhelming, especially since the latter was not ready to wage a naval war.

The Kriegsmarine command expected that hostilities would begin no earlier than 1944. Germany had only two battleships, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, three pocket battleships, five light cruisers, 50 destroyers, 60 submarines, of which only half were ocean-going

The total displacement of the ships of its fleet was only 1/7 of that of the Allies.

By agreement with the British Admiralty, the French fleet assumed responsibility for operations off the French coast of the North Sea, then in the area south of the English Channel, as well as in the Bay of Biscay and in the western Mediterranean.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

As it became increasingly clear that Italy would enter the war, ships of the Atlantic Fleet assembled in the Mediterranean in late April 1940. They stood on the roadstead of Mers el-Kebir under the command of Vice Admiral Zhansul:

1st squadron (Vice Admiral Zhansul) - 1st division of battleships: "Dunkirk" (Captain 1st Rank Segen) and "Strasbourg" (Captain 1st Rank Collinet); 4th Cruiser Division (commander - Rear Admiral Bourrage): "Georges Leygues" (Captain 1st Rank Barnot), "Gloire" (Captain 1st Rank Broussignac), "Montcalm" (Captain 1st Rank de Corbières).

2nd Light Squadron (Rear Admiral Lacroix) - 6th, 8th and 10th leader divisions.

2nd Squadron (Rear Admiral Buzen) - 2nd Division of battleships: "Provence" (Captain 1st Rank Barrois), "Brittany" (Captain 1st Rank Le Pivin); 4th division of leaders.

4th squadron (commander - Rear Admiral Marquis) - 3rd cruiser division: "Marseieuse" (captain 1st rank Amon), "La Galissoniere" (captain 1st rank Dupre), "Jean de Vienne" (captain 1st rank Missof ).

June Truce

While the described fighting, the government and the general staff were increasingly inclined to think about the need to conclude a truce, since it was clear that further resistance was impossible. On June 10, the Admiralty evacuated its headquarters from Montenon to Er-et-Loire, 75 km from Paris, and soon to Guéritand, where there was a communications point; On June 17, following the incoming army, the admiralty moved to the castle of Dulamon near Marseille, on the 28th it reached Nérac in the Lot-et-Garonne department, and finally, on July 6, it ended up in Vichy.

Beginning on May 28, Admiral Darlan, anticipating the worst, informed his subordinates that if hostilities ended in a truce, under the terms of which the enemy demanded the surrender of the fleet, he “does not intend to obey this order.” Nothing could be clearer. This was said at the height of the evacuation from Dunkirk, when the British were feverishly loading ships. The fleet does not give up. This was stated clearly, precisely, definitively.

At the same time, it was assumed that ships capable of continuing the fight would go to England or even Canada. These were normal precautions in case the Germans demanded the release of the fleet. Neither Prime Minister Paul Reynaud nor Marshal Petain thought for a minute to leave the fleet still capable of fighting to such a sad fate. Only a few ships were lost at Dunkirk - not too many that the sailors lost the will to resist. The fleet's morale was high; it did not consider itself defeated and did not intend to surrender. Subsequently, Admiral Darlan said to one of his loved ones: “If a truce is requested, I will end my career with a brilliant act of disobedience.” Later his way of thinking changed. The Germans proposed as a condition of the armistice that the French fleet be interned at Spithead (England) or scuttled. But in those days when the army's resistance was weakening and when it was clear that the victor would make his demands, and he could demand everything he wanted, Darlan had a strong desire to preserve the fleet. But how? Go to Canada, America, England at the head of your squadrons?

ENGLAND AND THE FRENCH FLEET

By this term we mean all those operations that unfolded on July 3, 1940 against French ships taking refuge in British ports, as well as those gathered in Mers-el-Kebir and Alexandria.

England has always in its history attacked the naval forces of its enemies, friends and neutrals, which seemed to it too developed, and did not take into account anyone's rights. The people, defending themselves in critical conditions, disregarded international law. France always followed it, and in 1940 too

After the June truce, French sailors had to be wary of the British. But they could not believe that the military camaraderie would be forgotten so quickly. England was afraid of Darlan's fleet going over to the enemy. If this fleet had fallen into the hands of the Germans, the situation would have gone from critical to disastrous for them. Hitler’s assurances, in the understanding of the British government, did not matter, and an alliance between France and Germany was quite possible. The English have lost their cool