Truth and myth about the battle for Stalingrad. “Hot Snow” - book, film and trench truth about the Battle of Stalingrad

In the days of the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, which became a turning point during the Great Patriotic War, it is time to recall some common opinions about this battle and compare them with known facts. The degree of reliability and validity of these judgments, as we will see, will be different.

First: at Stalingrad, the German army suffered the biggest defeat in its history.

This is true only in relation to those battles of the Second World War that took place before Stalingrad, the battles of the First World War and the wars of the 19th century, except Napoleonic. According to German general K. Tippelskirch, near Stalingrad “something incomprehensible happened, not experienced since 1806 - the death of an army surrounded by the enemy.” In 1806, in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, the Prussian army was completely destroyed by Napoleon's French army. Before the disaster at Stalingrad, the Germans had never experienced anything like this. But after Stalingrad these and even more major lesions German troops were no longer an exception.
Second: near Stalingrad, the Soviet army carried out the largest operation in the world history of war to encircle enemy troops.

This is incorrect, since before Stalingrad the Germans repeatedly carried out successful operations to encircle and destroy much larger groups Soviet troops. In the first week of the Great Patriotic War, near Minsk, troops of two armies of the Soviet Western Front were surrounded, and the Germans took more than 300 thousand people as prisoners. In the fall of 1941, during operations first near Kiev, then near Vyazma and Bryansk, the Germans each time managed to capture more than 650 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers. The total number of German, Romanian and Croatian troops surrounded at Stalingrad was, according to modern estimates, 280 thousand people.

Third: Hitler sought to take Stalingrad at any cost because of its name.

In the plans of the German command for 1942, priority was given to the capture of the Caucasus. After the battles in early July, it considered it possible to take Stalingrad with the forces of the 6th Army alone and reoriented the 4th Tank Army also towards the Caucasus. Only at the end of August 1942 did it transfer it again to the Stalingrad direction. Hitler justified his desire to capture Stalingrad against the backdrop of the failed offensive in the Caucasus by the fact that the main route for transporting Caucasian oil allegedly runs along the Volga. However, many Wehrmacht military leaders after the war explained Hitler’s persistence in capturing this city precisely by the magic of its name. Before the start of the Soviet offensive, many of them suggested that Hitler withdraw troops from Stalingrad to the line of the lower Don in advance, to which he did not agree.

Fourth: during the attack on Stalingrad, the Germans significantly surpassed the Soviet troops in the number of forces and means.

Unfortunately, even in the summer of 1942, the Soviet command had not always and not always learned lessons from the defeats of the previous year and was inferior to the enemy in the ability to use materiel. Before the start of the battle in the big bend of the Don at the end of July 1942, 300 thousand soldiers of the 62nd and 64th acted against 270 thousand soldiers and officers of the 6th German Army Soviet armies, against 3,400 enemy guns and mortars - 5,000 Soviet, against 400 German tanks - 1,000 Soviet.
July 26 I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky sent a telegram to the command of the Stalingrad Front expressing indignation at his actions: “The front has a three-fold superiority in tanks, an absolute predominance in aviation [this was true - Ya.B.]. With desire and skill, one could smash the enemy to smithereens.” Meanwhile, during their unsuccessful counterattack, the front troops lost 450 tanks in just three days, that is, almost half of their total number.

Fifth: The Stalingrad direction was the main one in the winter campaign of 1942/43.

The bulk of both Soviet and German troops by the winter of 1942/43 it was concentrated, as data on their numbers show, in the central direction, west of Moscow. And the main operation of the Red Army during the winter campaign was planned there - near Rzhev and Vyazma. However, it ended in failure. At Stalingrad, Soviet troops managed to make a strategic breakthrough of the enemy front. This led to a shift in the center of gravity of subsequent operations to the south.

Sixth: there was no point in the stubborn defense of Stalingrad; Soviet troops only suffered large, unjustified losses there.

By November 1942, the completely destroyed Stalingrad was not an economically important facility. But it was located in an important strategic position. Complete mastery of it would allow the Germans to withdraw a significant mass of troops from Stalingrad to the rear. In this case, Stalingrad would not have been able to play the role of a strategic trap for the German army, and the Soviet troops would not have been able to win such a significant victory there. In addition, the capture of Stalingrad by the Germans, glorified by their propaganda throughout the world, would undoubtedly greatly increase their morale and, at the same time, reduce that of the Soviet troops and people. The magic of the city's name played a role not only for the Nazi but also for the Soviet leadership. But Napoleon also came up with a formula that in war the moral factor correlates with the material factor in a ratio of three to one.
Seventh: if the Germans captured Stalingrad, Japan and Turkey would enter the war against the Soviet Union.

Although there were no clear plans or commitments from Japan and/or Turkey to go to war against the USSR in this event, the possibility was taken into account by the Soviet leadership and undoubtedly played some role in the determination to defend Stalingrad to the last.

Eighth: the Germans had the opportunity to withdraw Paulus’s army from encirclement and save it from death, but for unknown reasons they did not do this.

When, in mid-December 1942, General Hoth's tank group covered two-thirds of the distance separating it from the 6th Army encircled at Stalingrad, Paulus could only break through to meet them. Memoirists and historians have different opinions as to why the order for a breakthrough was not given. Some blame Paulus’s indecision for everything, others blame the commander of Army Group Don, Field Marshal Manstein, and others blame Hitler. Some argue that Hitler forbade Paulus to break through and deliberately sacrificed the 6th Army in order to create from it a symbol of heroic resistance (it is not clear, then, however, why he organized a relief strike).

Most likely, the Germans were waiting for Hoth’s troops to get even closer to the encircled units in order to act for sure. But the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops (this episode of the war is described in the famous novel by Yu. Bondarev “Hot Snow”) disrupted these calculations. As a result, as it turned out later, the most favorable moment for a counter breakthrough was irretrievably missed by the Germans.

Got out during the current holidays to the library, to Gorkovka all people are like people and he is to the library :), thanks for the company Vika vi_lagarto Doesn't matter. Actually, I was there once, I even signed up for a reader’s subscription... and it cost about three rubles (in 2005), but now admission is free. It’s very cold in the reading room, but that makes it even more interesting... the brain doesn’t overheat :) (just kidding). So what did I find there! Look, read... let's go back and dive into real life 70 years ago.. We read the newspaper Stalingradskaya Pravda dated January 5, 1944. (in general, there is a whole file for different years, but this is already specific).

Pay attention to the style, the purity of the style, how the press is read!!.. I was delighted! And our current would-be PR specialists of various mayors and deputies will not be able to write even close to this, no matter how much they boast of their intelligence and superiority over people from vocational technical schools (and not only). Learn, because it’s easiest to poke an ignoramus into his mistakes, but to express your thoughts beautifully - you still need to be able to do this! :) However, enough criticism, let's enjoy the beauty...

01 Library named after. Gorky. Reading room.

02 First page Official information, military-political topics

03 In the lower left corner. Front page

04 The one in the upper right corner is slightly larger

05 Page No. 2

06 Page No. 3 about the heroes of Stalingrad. General Shumilov.

07 Page No. 3 in full, below is a TASS photo from last year “Prisoned Nazis in the Stalingrad area”

08 Page No. 4. Labor reports, news from the front

09 World news

with a mini-review of the Stalingrad Pravda of January 5, 1944, that’s all. And now some more photographs of the newspaper from other dates and years.

Sad shot:

10 Unfortunately, barbarism exists:( Well, why do this? You can copy it :(

11 A newspaper is a rarity Such "cuttings" occur frequently:(

Now just interesting moments on the pages of the newspaper (the zombie box took its toll))

12 Everything is calm at MTS

13 Before Putina I first thought about the namesake of our president. I’m telling you, the zombie box took its toll. And here everything is not about him at all. And about the problems of fishing on the Don.

14 Agricultural technology for hundred-year-old harvests.

15 Coming soon! In the best cinemas! New sound feature film

17 Fragment of a painting by Stepan Razin. Artist Surikov. And try to prove to today's children that Stepan Razin does not speak on his cell phone)

18 Aunt, give me "Summer" just not the one that's bad..)

And the eternal theme- still relevant today :)

19 Dar-gora, children's leisure.

20 Put the roads in exemplary order

And some photos from the pages of a newspaper. Nowadays you won’t find such city corners. The city has changed. Here I took a photo Stalingrad truth for 1937.

21 At the Musical Comedy Theater

22 On the Volga embankment

23 Cyclists I immediately remembered Denis

On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops near Stalingrad launched a counteroffensive (Operation Uranus) and 4 days later closed the encirclement ring around the 6th German Army of General Friedrich Paulus operating in the Stalingrad area. This began a radical change in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Soviet Union. With this the most important event wars in the Soviet and Russian historiography There are a number of myths associated with them that are refuted upon closer acquaintance with the facts.

These are the myths.

Firstly, by the time the Stalingrad counteroffensive began, the Red Army and its commanders had learned to fight and acted decisively and skillfully.

Secondly, the attack at Stalingrad was completely unexpected for the Germans, since the preparations for it were kept in absolute secret.

Thirdly, this blow was the only main blow of the Red Army in the autumn-winter campaign of 1942.

And finally, fourthly, Marshal Zhukov played a decisive role in planning and carrying out the Stalingrad counter-offensive.

In addition, we like to talk about the 91 thousand prisoners captured during the capitulation at Stalingrad, but they avoid the question of how many Paulus soldiers and officers were able to return home after the war.

How did it really happen? This is what the special department of the Stalingrad Front reported about the first day of the Soviet counteroffensive (and the most truthful reports about the situation at the front are reports from special officers, since they were not responsible for the course of hostilities): “The personnel in the offensive are poorly camouflaged, move crowded and at full speed.” growth; if not for the clouds, which prevented the enemy from widely using aviation, our units would have suffered heavy losses... In the 13th Mechanized Corps, 34 tanks failed, 27 of them were blown up by enemy mines.”

It is not surprising that our tankers suffered heavy losses. After all, they had to be guided by the idiotic order of Comrade Stalin dated September 19, 1942, which ordered “tank units of the Active Army, from the moment they approach the battle formations of their infantry, to begin attacking the enemy with powerful fire on the move from all tank weapons, both guns and machine guns, not "to be afraid that the shooting will not always be accurate. Firing from tanks on the move should be the main type of fire impact of our tanks on the enemy and, above all, on his main force." Since stabilizers, which made it possible to conduct targeted fire from tank guns, appeared only in the 50s, Stalin’s order doomed tankers to shoot into the white light as if it were a pretty penny and a waste of shells.

It also cannot be said that the Germans knew nothing in advance about the Soviet counteroffensive. As the former head of the Eastern Armies Department of German military intelligence, the famous Reinhard Gehlen, noted in his memoirs, “On November 4, 1942, an important report was received through the Abwehr. It said: “According to information received from a trusted person, on November 4, a meeting of the military council was held under the chairmanship of Stalin, which was attended by twelve marshals and generals... It was decided to carry out all planned offensive operations before November 15, as far as weather conditions allow. The main attacks: from Grozny in the direction of Mozdok, in the area of ​​Nizhny and Verkhny Mamon in the Don region, near Voronezh, Rzhev, south of Lake Ilmen and near Leningrad."

There are also references to this report in the works of German and other foreign researchers. Hitler and other Wehrmacht leaders were informed about him on November 7. There would be enough time to withdraw the 6th Army from Stalingrad. In reality, Soviet troops were initially supposed to go on the offensive at Stalingrad at an earlier date (November 15 appears in one of Zhukov’s reports to Stalin), and only the delay in the concentration of forces and means forced the start to be postponed until November 19. In fact, the Soviet Southwestern Front delivered the main blow not on its right wing, at the villages of Upper and Lower Mamon, against the Italians, but on its left wing, against the Romanians. However, it is likely that a deeper envelopment of the enemy and a strike on the right flank of the South-Western Front were initially envisaged, as the unknown agent reported.

Today, most documents related to the planning of the Stalingrad counteroffensive remain secret. Therefore, they are not in the just published two-volume set of documents “The Battle of Stalingrad” (M.: OLMA-Press, 2002). And in any case, a blow from the southwest threatened to cut off the German group at Stalingrad. However, Hitler did not want to withdraw troops to the Don - this would mean admitting the collapse of the strategy on Eastern Front. Moreover, almost until the very day of the counteroffensive, the troops of the 6th Army continued to be active fighting in Stalingrad, trying to throw Soviet units into the Volga. This deprived the German command of the opportunity to take at least palliative measures - to transfer part of the divisions of the 6th Army from the city to strengthen the flanks defended by much less combat-ready Romanian units.

Marshal Zhukov stated in his memoirs that he developed the idea of ​​a counteroffensive together with Marshal Vasilevsky, and then directly coordinated its preparation. However, in reality, both preparation and direct leadership of the troops at the beginning of the Stalingrad counteroffensive were carried out by Vasilevsky. Zhukov devoted most of his time to preparing the main attack of the 1942 campaign in the western direction. Reinhard Gehlen on November 6, even before reading the report on the meeting in the Kremlin, stated: “The main direction of future Russian operations... is emerging more and more clearly in the zone of Army Group Center.” However, it is still unclear whether the Russians intend to carry out major operation on the Don or they will limit their goals to the south for the reasons that they will not be able to achieve success in two directions at the same time due to lack of forces. In any case, we can conclude that their preparations for an offensive in the south have not advanced enough to suggest a major operation here in the near future - simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Center.

The head of German intelligence in the East underestimated the scale and speed of the concentration of Soviet troops on the southern sector of the front. But he was not mistaken in the fact that the offensive on the Don would be auxiliary to the offensive in the western direction. This is proven by the distribution of forces and means. The troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts, which launched Operation Mars, an attack on Rzhev, on November 25 under the leadership of Zhukov, numbered, together with the reserves in the rear, 1.9 million people, more than 24 thousand guns and mortars, 3,300 tanks and 1,100 aircraft. During the operation it was supposed to defeat Army Group Center and reach the Baltic Sea. At this time, on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts had only 1.1 million people, 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1,400 tanks and more than 900 aircraft. Only after Zhukov’s offensive failed and the strike forces of Kalininsky and Western fronts were surrounded (having lost 1,850 tanks and half a million people, they broke through to their own with great difficulty), reserves were transferred to the south. The failed Operation Mars was declared by Zhukov, and after him by Soviet historians, as “auxiliary” in relation to Operation Uranus - the Stalingrad counter-offensive.

Not everything went smoothly during the further Soviet offensive in the Stalingrad area. I would like to cite here one little-known episode. Beria reported to Stalin: “According to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, on the night of December 27, 1942, a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Guards Army, Major General Larin, shot himself in his apartment. Larin left a note with the following content: “I do not moreover. Please don't touch my family. Rodion clever man. Long live Lenin." Rodion - commander of the 2nd Guards Army, Comrade Malinovsky. On December 19 of this year, going to the front line, Larin behaved nervously, walked upright and was slightly wounded by a bullet in the leg, it seemed that that he was looking for death" (RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 19, l. 8).

The suicide of Ivan Larin did not at all arise from the military situation. The 2nd Guards successfully pushed back Manstein’s tank group, which was rushing to the rescue of Paulus. Perhaps Larin was afraid that the special officers would begin to promote the case of Malinovsky’s adjutant, Captain Sirenko, who deserted back in August and went with two comrades across the front line to create an independent partisan detachment and fight the Germans. A report on this case was attached to Lavrenty Pavlovich’s report on Larin’s suicide. Sirenko left a note in which he asserted that “our generals have shown themselves to be incapable of command, they have decayed, they drink, they are debauched, like the old libertine General Zhuk (Major General Zhuk was on Southern Front deputy commander for artillery and arrived at front headquarters together with Malinovsky from the 6th Army). That the generals take with them various “wives” and “daughters”, but simply carry prostitutes. Having looked at all this, he, Sirenko, decided that he had to actively fight the Germans for his homeland and decided to join the partisans" (RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 19, l. 11-12). And in During the days of the Stalingrad victory, Soviet generals feared the special forces more than the Germans.

In conclusion, it is worth remembering tragic fate German prisoners captured at Stalingrad. Their situation turned out to be no better than the situation of Soviet prisoners in German camps during the tragic winter of 1941/1942. Of the 91 thousand German prisoners in Stalingrad (according to other sources, there were 110 thousand), only 5 thousand people survived. More than half of the survivors were officers: in the officer camps they had better food and more qualified medical care. Tens of thousands of German soldiers died from hunger and epidemics, also weakened by 73 days of malnutrition in the “cauldron.” According to the testimony of the few survivors, in the first days of captivity they were often not only not given food, but even their last supplies were taken away. Many also could not withstand the grueling foot marches from the ruins of Stalingrad to the camps. As the German historian Rüdiger Overmans writes, “the overwhelming majority did not see any cruelty in the fact that the guards shot the lagging behind. It was impossible to help them anyway, and the shot was considered an act of mercy compared to slow death from the cold.” He also admits that many soldiers, being too exhausted, would not have survived captivity even if the food had been tolerable. Almost 20 thousand “accomplices” captured in Stalingrad - former Soviet prisoners who served in auxiliary positions in the 6th Army - also died. They were shot or died in the camps.

On December 20, 1942, German tanks reached the small frozen Myshkova River. From there, some 35-40 kilometers remained to Stalingrad and the 6th Army of General Paulus surrounded in it. One of their participants, Yuri Bondarev, described the fierce battles that took place there in the novel “Hot Snow”, based on which director Gavriil Egiazarov made a film of the same name - one of the best Soviet films about that War...

An infantry cadet with the soul of an artilleryman

Bondarev's main characters are artillerymen, and the story is told from the perspective of the battery fire platoon commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Kuznetsov.

Meanwhile, the author himself did not begin his military career as an officer or an artilleryman. In the summer of 1942, 18-year-old Bondarev was sent to the 2nd Berdichev Infantry School, but did not manage to receive the rank - in October the cadets were urgently sent to the front, near Stalingrad.

There, yesterday's cadet became the commander of a mortar crew, in December near Kotelnikov he was shell-shocked, wounded, received frostbite and ended up in the “gods of war” after the hospital, and became an officer only towards the end of the war.

In 1967, when Bondarev, collecting material for a future novel, tried to meet with von Manstein in Munich, the 80-year-old Nazi field marshal refused the meeting, citing poor health.

According to Bondarev, he himself was not particularly sorry that the attempt failed. He admitted that “I felt for him the same thing that twenty-five years ago, when I shot at his tanks in the unforgotten days of 1942. I understood why this “undefeated on the battlefield” did not want to meet with the Russian soldier.”

Why Manstein

The 6th Army was considered one of the most combat-ready in the Wehrmacht. It was she who was tasked with wiping the city on the Volga from its face. Did not work out. More than 330 thousand German soldiers and officers were surrounded, and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was entrusted with rescuing them.

Why him? Behind him was the authorship of the victorious 1940 campaign against France, the occupation of Crimea in 1941 and the capture of Sevastopol in 1942. Hitler considered him the best military strategist: if Manstein doesn’t succeed, no one will succeed.

The field marshal hastily formed Army Group Don. It included several large formations, the most powerful of which was the tank group of General Hermann Hoth. The operation was named pompously in German - Wintergewitter (“Winter Storm”).

Corporate identity: a blow where you didn't expect it

The offensive began on December 12, 1942. The Germans almost immediately broke through the outer ring of encirclement in the Kotelnichesky direction, literally sweeping away the 302nd Infantry Division of the 51st Army of General Nikolai Trufanov and breaking into operational space.

The Soviet command expected a strike, but to the west, from Nizhne-Chirskaya. There, on the middle Don, the distance to the 6th Army was only 40 kilometers.

As a result, Manstein managed to outplay Soviet generals Andrei Eremenko (Stalingrad Front) and Nikolai Vatutin (Southwestern Front). He took the longer route and struck from the south. On December 13, Goth's tankers reached the Aksai River, having gone a quarter of the way to Stalingrad. There was very little left, and the encirclement would have been broken.

How General Volsky managed to surprise first Stalin and then Hoth

Attack Soviet tanks KV-1 of the Stalingrad Front with infantry support.

To eliminate the breakthrough, Headquarters hastily transferred the 2nd guards army General Rodion Malinovsky. But she had to march almost 300 kilometers in winter in a forced march, and before her approach the enemy had to be somehow delayed.

The command entrusted this task to the 4th mechanized corps of General Vasily Volsky, separate tank regiments and the 20th anti-tank artillery brigade.

Before telling how General Volsky managed to surprise the Germans, it is impossible to keep silent about the incident in which he managed to surprise himself... Stalin.

The fact is that on the eve of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, in November 1942, Volsky sent a letter to Stalin, which could have enormous consequences. At least for Vasily Timofeevich himself.

Here is what Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky said about this letter in a conversation with Konstantin Simonov: “Volsky wrote to Stalin approximately the following. Dear Comrade Stalin. I consider it my duty to inform you that I do not believe in the success of the upcoming offensive (the operation to encircle and defeat the army of Paulus - Ed.). We do not have enough strength and resources for it. I'm convinced that we won't be able to break through German defense and complete the task assigned to us. That this whole operation could end in disaster, that such a catastrophe would cause incalculable consequences, bring us losses, have a detrimental effect on the entire situation of the country, and after this the Germans could end up not only on the Volga, but also beyond the Volga...

As an honest party member, Volsky asked for a reality check decisions made, and, perhaps, abandon the operation altogether.

The letter reached the addressee, but fortunately, neither the author himself nor the developers of our victorious plan for Operation Uranus were harmed. General Volsky took part in our counter-offensive, and was subsequently awarded and promoted several times. It was he who made Goth “turn around”.

An active defense was imposed on the Nazis: Volsky’s tankers from all sides, including from the rear, counterattacked Hoth’s divisions. This “rotating battle,” as the Germans dubbed it (the opponents changed places several times, storming the heights south of Verkhne-Kumsky), lasted five whole days.

Then, on December 19, Hoth brought the 17th Panzer Division into battle. It broke through the right flank of the Soviet defense, threatening the 4th Mechanized Corps with encirclement. With a heavy heart, Volsky was forced to withdraw his units to the next line of defense - the Myshkova River.

From there, Manstein’s tankers had only 35 kilometers to reach Paulus’s grouping. But time was won - behind the 4th Corps the 8th and 3rd Guards had already taken up defensive positions. rifle divisions Malinovsky's army and infantry units of the 5th Shock Army, reinforced by two tank brigades, deployed.

There was a “thunderstorm”, but “thunder” did not strike

Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus (left), commander of the Wehrmacht's 6th Army encircled in Stalingrad, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Arthur Schmidt, and his adjutant Wilhelm Adam after surrender. Stalingrad, Beketovka, headquarters of the Soviet 64th Army.

One of the important parts of the “Winter Storm” was the Donnerschlag (“Thunderbolt”) plan, according to which the 6th Army was supposed to break out of the “cauldron”, break through to the Donskaya Tsarina River and link up with Manstein’s troops. But the paradox was that the commander of the encircled men himself did not dare to take such a step.

Having familiarized himself with the plan, the chief of staff of the 6th Army, General Arthur Schmidt, replied to the field marshal that this would lead to a complete disaster. And Paulus agreed with him, citing the fact that the Fuhrer categorically forbade him to leave Stalingrad. The commander of Army Group Don did not insist.

Could the 6th Army get through to Manstein's troops? This is still debated in historical forums. It is only known that the surrounded group had only 30 kilometers of fuel left. In addition, as soon as Paulus began the breakthrough, he was immediately attacked from all sides by Soviet units, monitoring the slightest changes on the front line. The risk was too great and the resources too few.

A day containing four days, and mothballs instead of snow

Hoth's tanks fell on Soviet positions on the northern bank of the Myshkova River. In Bondarev’s novel and the film based on it, our artillerymen, infantrymen and tankmen fight them off for exactly one day, after which, after waiting until the Germans are exhausted, General Bessonov (in the film he was wonderfully played by Georgy Zhzhonov) brings a fresh tank corps into battle and drives back the enemy.

In fact, the battles lasted not one day, but four, from December 20 to 24. Scary and dramatic. With tank attacks and repeated bombing of our positions.

The snow here was really hot - from the flames of destroyed tanks, explosions of aerial bombs and artillery shots. The Germans, having taken a bridgehead on the northern bank of the river, tried to expand it several times and rolled back each time.

By the end of the film, the viewer also believed that the snow was hot - against the backdrop of destroyed tanks, destroyed trenches and communication passages. The fact is that during the filming of the famous film, a problem arose with snow.

We filmed the battles at a tank training ground near Novosibirsk, relying on local frosts and heavy snow. And at first, Siberia even more than justified itself: the cold caused the filming equipment to break down.

But in March, winter suddenly ended and the snow began to melt quickly. I had to bring a whole carload of mothballs and sprinkle them on the “trenches.” The smell was terrible, but only the participants in the filming knew about it.

The finale of the film was filmed in Alabino, near Moscow, in late April - early May. The weather was already like summer. And according to the recollections of the actors, they literally melted in their greatcoats and quilted jackets. But there was no mothballs. Here snow was depicted with chalk and lime...

The end of “Winter Storm”

A German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighter was shot down and grounded (the landing gear was down) in the center of Stalingrad. Summer 1943.

And then, in 1942, the fate of the “Winter Thunderstorm” was decided not on Myshkova, but 250 kilometers to the north-west. According to Manstein’s plan, there were to be two unblocking strikes: the main one was delivered by Hoth, and the auxiliary one, from Nizhne-Chirskaya, by General Karl-Adolf Hollidt.

But there, the troops of the Southwestern Front, together with the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, went on the offensive on December 16 and, during Operation Little Saturn, broke through the enemy’s defenses, which were held by Germany’s allies - the Italians and Romanians.

General Hollidt, whose flank was dangerously exposed, had no time for Stalingrad. Soviet units approached the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, aiming at Rostov-on-Don.

Manstein realized that a strategic catastrophe was brewing: Army Group A, which included Don, could be cut off from North Caucasus and surrounded. There was an urgent need to strengthen the collapsing Chir Front.

February 2 marks the 75th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, which was marked by the surrender of the 330,000-strong group of Field Marshal Paulus, or rather, what was left of it after two months of hunger, shelling and bombing. About 90 thousand people were captured by the Soviets. Germany had never known such a defeat. Stalingrad was the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. Remembering this day military glory Russia, the portal’s editors publish an article by Dr. Protodeacon Vladimir Vasilik, dedicated to various myths related to the Battle of Stalingrad.

MYTH No. 1.

The victory at Stalingrad was achieved thanks to Stalin's order No. 227, penal battalions and detachments.

Indeed, after the defeat of our troops near Kharkov in May 1942, the fall of Sevastopol on July 4, 1942 and the abandonment of Rostov, fearing further retreat and trying to stabilize the situation, Stalin signed order No. 227 on July 28, 1942, which received the name “Ni” at the front. one step back! This order called for resistance and condemned the widespread thesis that the vast expanses of the country provided ample opportunities for retreat. The order provided for punitive measures, including execution, for leaving positions and retreating without an order. He demanded the restoration of iron discipline. The repressive measures were aimed at stopping the Nazi offensive by any means, which could lead to an irreparable catastrophe. This order established penal units and army barrage detachments. On July 30, the order was read out to all units and made a tremendous impression, playing an important mobilizing role.

This is how, for example, Konstantin Simonov recalled the impact of this order on people’s consciousness: “The poems “If your home is dear to you” were written by me under the direct impression of Stalin’s July order, the meaning of which was that there was nowhere to retreat further, that the enemy had to be stopped at any cost, at the most merciless price, or die... Now the movement of life seemed like some kind of leap in the future - either jump over, or die.”

As a former penal battalion member, three times seriously wounded war veteran, major general, notes, failure to take the necessary, sometimes tough, measures in a critical situation can lead to irreparable consequences. This is well illustrated by the following example: during a train crash, a young man’s foot was caught between two carriages, and he could not free himself from this vice, but the carriage was already burning, and the flames were approaching. Suddenly a military man with a saber appeared nearby, he snatched it from its sheath to chop off the pinched and already crushed foot. Those present protested violently and did not allow the military man to “mutilate” the young man. So he burned alive along with the carriage. Isn’t this a direct analogy with how our Motherland would have burned in the fire of the war imposed on us if these tough measures had not been taken?

However, a legitimate question arises: how great were the repressions really? How many, for example, were punished for desertion during the Battle of Stalingrad? The English historian Anthony Beaver speaks of 13,000 executed. In reality, this value is overestimated by 12 times: German researcher Joseph Hellbeck in his book “Stalingrad. Memoirs of Witnesses and Eyewitnesses” provides data that is much closer to reality - 668 shot and 1,200 sent to penal companies and battalions.

The number of penal prisoners during the Battle of Stalingrad amounted to no more than 1%

It is also a myth that the victory at Stalingrad was won by penalty soldiers. The penalty officer himself, an officer of permanent composition, that is, in fact, a suicide bomber, holder of many military orders A.V. Pyltsyn categorically rejects the idea of ​​the decisive contribution of penal battalions to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, including the Battle of Stalingrad. He especially notes in his works that the number of penal prisoners during the Battle of Stalingrad numbered no more than one percent from total number Soviet soldiers and officers.

Unfortunately, A.I. also paid tribute to this myth. Solzhenitsyn, who wrote in “The Gulag Archipelago” about the flow of penal prisoners, whose blood became, in his opinion, the cement for the foundation of the victory at Stalingrad. For this he received a fair rebuke from the hero of the Battle of Stalingrad, commander of the 62nd Army, Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov:

“I am painfully aware of the insult you inflicted on us, the people of Stalingrad. I say this because I myself experienced 200 fiery days and nights, all the time I was on the right bank of the Volga and in Stalingrad. Perhaps, in your opinion, I, as a penal prisoner, was appointed to command the 62nd Army, about the merits of which our newspaper Pravda wrote on November 25, 1942: “In the petition, which mentions the armies defending Stalingrad, the special role of the 62nd Army is emphasized th Army, which repelled the main German attacks on Stalingrad, its commander, Lieutenant General Comrade V.I. Chuikov. and his main assistants vol. Colonel Gorokhov, Major General Rodimtsev, Major General Guryev, Colonel Balvinov, Colonel Gurtiev and others.” In your opinion, Solzhenitsyn, it turns out that the guards divisions were “cemented” by penal companies?! Is it really possible that sniper Vasily Zaitsev, who destroyed about 300 fascists, sergeant Yakov Pavlov and a group of fighters of different nationalities led by him, defended a house for 58 days and nights, which the Nazis never took, but placed more of their corpses around this house than during the capture of the French the capital of Paris - were these good defenders of Stalingrad really “cemented” by penal companies? Was the glorious son of the Spanish people Ruben Ibarruri really a penalty box or “cemented” by the penalty box? You, Solzhenitsyn, dared to mock these heroes.”

According to the well-founded opinion of the modern German researcher Joseph Hellbeck, there was simply no work for the barrier detachments: the fighters had sufficient motivation and the will to resist. The heroes of Stalingrad mentioned by Marshal Chuikov are vivid examples of this.

MYTH No. 2.

It stems from the first. Allegedly, the Soviet soldiers were a faceless mass, poorly armed and trained, and won only by numbers.

“Here we must conquer every meter of land in difficult battles.”

Again, this is refuted by the above-mentioned exploits of Vasily Zaitsev, Yakov Pavlov, Ruben Ibarruri and hundreds of others. But let's give evidence from enemies, written not after the war, but on the spot, from the trenches of Stalingrad:

“Equipped with the most modern weapons, the Russians deal us the most severe blows. This is most clearly demonstrated in the battles for Stalingrad. Here we must conquer every meter of land in heavy battles and bring great sacrifices, since the Russian fights stubbornly and fiercely, until his last breath..." (From a letter from Corporal Otto Bauer, mailing address 43396 B, to Hermann Kuge. November 18, 1942).

“...Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, red Verdun, with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to occupy 20 meters in the morning, in the evening the Russians push us back..." (From a letter from Corporal Walter Oppermann, p/n 44111, to his brother, November 18, 1942).

At the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Germans had a numerical advantage

“...When we came to Stalingrad, there were 140 of us, and by September 1, after two weeks of fighting, only 16 remained. All the rest were wounded and killed. We do not have a single officer, and a non-commissioned officer was forced to take command of the unit. Up to a thousand wounded are transported from Stalingrad to the rear every day. As you can see, our losses are considerable..." (From a letter from soldier Heinrich Malchus, p/p 17189, to Corporal Karl Weitzel. November 13, 1942).

“...You can’t show yourself from behind cover during the day, otherwise you’ll be shot down like a dog. The Russian has a sharp and accurate eye. There were once 180 of us, only 7 remain. There used to be 14 machine gunners No. 1, now there are only two...” (From a letter from machine gunner Adolf to his mother. November 18, 1942).

As for numbers, it should be noted that at the beginning and in the middle of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Germans had the numerical advantage. The formations of Paulus's 6th Army advancing at the end of July numbered 270 thousand people against 160 thousand Soviet soldiers, 3000 guns and mortars against 2200 Soviet, 500 tanks against 400 Soviet. And even at the beginning of the offensive operation "Uranus" on November 19, 1942, the superiority of the Soviet troops was minimal: in personnel - 1.1 to 1, in guns and mortars - 1.5 to 1, in tanks - 2.2 to 1, in aviation - 1.1 to 1. Meanwhile, for large-scale offensive operations military science requires fourfold superiority in manpower and technology. This proves that already during the Battle of Stalingrad we fought not with numbers, but with skill.

Myth No. 3.

The Germans, who experienced the horrors of the blockade, were innocent victims of both regimes - Hitler's and Stalin's, equally responsible for the war.

It was precisely this false concept that led to the speech of the Urengoy boy Nikolai Denisov in the Bundestag, in which he bemoans the fate of poor German prisoners of war.

And how did many of them themselves feel about the fate that befell them? As to fair retribution and God's judgment. Here are some more excerpts from the letters:

“...Yes, here you have to thank God for every hour that you remain alive. No one can escape their destiny here. The worst thing is that you have to wait resignedly until your time comes. Either by sanitary train to your homeland, or immediately and terrible death to the other world. Only a few lucky ones, chosen by God, will safely survive the war at the front near Stalingrad..." (From a letter from soldier Paul Bolze to Maria Smud. November 18, 1942).

November 19. If we lose this war, we will be avenged for everything we have done. Thousands of Russians and Jews were shot with their wives and children near Kiev and Kharkov. This is simply incredible. But that is why we must exert every effort to win the war.
5 January. Our division has a cemetery near Stalingrad, where over 1000 people are buried. That's just terrible. People who are now being sent from transport units to the infantry can be considered sentenced to death.
January 15. There is no way out of the boiler and there never will be. From time to time, mines explode around us..." (From the diary of officer F.P. of the 8th light rifle and machine gun fleet of the 212th regiment.).

By the way, the last letter explains the fierce resistance that the Germans offered even in the Stalingrad cauldron. It is explained by propaganda that suggested that the “subhuman” Russians know no mercy, as well as by the fear of retribution for the crimes actually committed, of which there were more than enough. The mentioned thousands of Russians and Jews shot near Kiev are just the tip of the iceberg. One execution in Babi Yar September 30, 1941 – 100 thousand people. In Crimea, the Germans and their accomplices - Crimean Tatars– killed 50 thousand Crimean Jews, not to mention many ordinary Soviet citizens. During the occupation, 22,828 civilians and Soviet prisoners of war were shot, tortured or driven into slavery in Simferopol, 69,866 people in Sevastopol, 11,707 in Yalta, 43,429 in Kerch, 12,598 in Evpatoria, 11,300 people in Feodosia, etc. .

In Odessa, the Romanians and Germans destroyed about 140 thousand inhabitants.

But what happened at Stalingrad or in Stalingrad itself! Here is just one act of the Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders, dedicated to the terrible Dulag No. 205, where, according to various sources, from 6,000 to 15,000 prisoners of war and civilians of Stalingrad died:

“After the liberation of the village of Alekseevka, Gorodishchensky district, on January 22 by units of the Red Army, a prisoner of war camp was discovered in its vicinity, designated by the German command under No. 205. Here, behind barbed wire, in dark and cramped pits dug in the open steppe, by the time the Soviets arrived The troops contained 950 prisoners of war, some of whom were civilians of the city of Stalingrad. The overwhelming majority of prisoners were so weak from hunger, beatings, exhaustion, and backbreaking work that they were unable to move without assistance.

Here's how the civilian population was treated:

“Below is published an act on the atrocities of the Nazi scoundrels in the village of Skosyrskaya, Rostov region: “Before retreating from the village, the Germans committed a bloody massacre of the civilian population. Hitler's bandits shot a 6th grade student high school Grigory Pashutin, hospital employee Leonid Perepelkin, tractor driver Khristofor Shilov, collective farm chairman Yegor Kharitonov, disabled person Nikanor Lyutin, Alexander Shirokoradenko, Andrei Shilov, Alexander Semenov and others. There were sick Soviet citizens in the local hospital. The fascist monsters drove them to the river and shot them. Some patients could not move and remained in the hospital. The Nazis burned the hospital along with the sick citizens who were in it.” The act was signed by: Captain Mitrofanov, Captain Kovtunov, military paramedic Tkalenko, junior lieutenant Kolesnikov, residents of the village of Skosyrskaya M. Kharitonova, M. Voronina, A. Shevchenko, S. Voronina and L. Shilova. (Sovinformburo)

I believe that after such descriptions many will not want to feel sorry for the unfortunate Germans, much less compare them with our Red Army soldiers, who treated captured Germans completely differently. They were not kept under open air, they were given normal working rations. Unfortunately, this did not save many who reached extreme exhaustion. Of the 90 thousand captured at Stalingrad, 27 thousand died from dystrophy. However, measures were taken, 35 thousand prisoners of war were sent for treatment and placed on increased allowance. After 1949, about 60 thousand Stalingrad prisoners returned to Germany. Many German prisoners of war retained the warmest memories of Soviet captivity, incomparable to what our captured soldiers and officers faced with the Germans.

And finally, many German prisoners of war rightly considered the cause of all their troubles to be their own leadership, which refused to accept the offer of surrender and doomed its soldiers to senseless death. Here's just one example:

“Everyone on the battery - 49 people - read the Soviet ultimatum leaflet. At the end of the reading, I told my comrades that we were doomed people and that the ultimatum presented to Paulus was a life preserver thrown to us by a generous enemy...” (From the testimony of prisoner Martin Gander).

“...I read the ultimatum, and burning anger at our generals boiled up in me. They, apparently, decided to completely kill us in this damn place. Let the generals and officers fight themselves. Enough for me. I'm fed up with the war..." (From the testimony of captured corporal Joseph Schwartz, 10th company of the 131st infantry regiment of the 44th infantry division. II.I. 1943).

MYTH No. 4.

Stalingrad was supposedly just one of the “key places” of the Second World War.

Comparing the battle of Stalingrad and El Alamein looks simply indecent

In order to justify the inaction of England and the United States in 1941-1943 and inflate their very modest contribution to the Victory over fascism, the concept of the so-called “key places” of the Second World War, which allegedly decided its outcome, was developed in English and American historiography. In this concept, the Battle of Stalingrad was miraculously equated with the battle of El Alamein in Egypt in October 1942, since if as a result of Stalingrad Hitler was unable to break through to the Volga and, accordingly, further to the south and east, then as a result of the battles at El- With Alamein he was unable to reach the Suez Canal and capture Palestine. Of course, if the salvation of Palestine is considered the main result of the Second World War, then the Anglo-Saxon historians are right. However, it is clear to any sane person that her main result- the defeat of the Third Reich and its allies and ridding the world of the fascist plague. From this point of view, comparing the battle of Stalingrad and El Alamein looks simply indecent. Let's look at at least some data. Thus, at Stalingrad, at the time of the offensive, about 1 million soldiers, equipped with 15 thousand guns and rocket launchers, took part on our side. They were also opposed by a million-strong German-Romanian group, which had more than 10 thousand guns and large-caliber mortars. At El Alamein, 220 thousand British, French and Greeks with 2359 guns fought against 115 thousand Germans and Italians armed with 1219 artillery barrels. From July 1942 to February 1943, the Italian-German bloc lost no more than 40 thousand people killed and wounded in northern Africa. During the same time, at least 760 thousand enemy soldiers were put out of action between the Don and Volga rivers. These data are provided by Western researchers themselves. The heads of the Allied powers themselves were well aware of the very modest nature of their efforts and paid tribute to Soviet Union and the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad. This is what F.D. wrote in his letter to Stalingrad. Roosevelt:

“On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I present this certificate to the city of Stalingrad to commemorate our admiration for its valiant defenders, whose courage, fortitude and dedication during the siege from September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943 will forever inspire the hearts of all free people. .."

And Churchill quite openly called the battles for El Alamein a “pinprick.” Hitler had a similar attitude towards the war in North Africa. Marshal Rommel noted: “In Berlin, the campaign in North Africa was of secondary importance, and neither Hitler nor General base They didn’t take it particularly seriously.” Meanwhile, the Battle of Stalingrad really marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war. Victory in it plunged Germany into mourning, kept Japan and Turkey from entering the war with the USSR, and forced many German allies to look for ways to a separate peace. And finally, she inspired all the people good will to fight fascism.

Remembering the Battle of Stalingrad, we ponder the ways of God's Providence

Remembering the Battle of Stalingrad, we ponder the ways of God's Providence. The Lord led and is leading Russia through trials, falls and revival, just as He led Old Testament Israel. The terrible military disaster of 1941 and the defeats of 1942 gave way to great victories that had no analogues in world history. All this, of course, is connected with an incredible, terrible feat Soviet people, great military and labor efforts. But we must remember Who is the source of strength, courage and wisdom. In the Battle of Stalingrad and, more broadly, in the Great Patriotic War, with His mercy towards Russia and the judgment of the occult Reich, the Lord told us: “It was from Me.”

In conclusion, we cite the words of a participant in the Great Patriotic War, its hero, a great old man who recently died:

"This great terrible Patriotic War, of course, was a consequence of God’s allowance for our deviation from God, for our moral, ethical violation of God’s law and for the fact that in Russia they tried to do away with religion, with faith, with the Church. This was the enemy’s plan: for complete atheism to reign everywhere.

The Lord foresaw these enemy plans, and in order to prevent their implementation, the Lord allowed the war. Not by chance. And we see that the war really turned people to faith, and the rulers treated the Church completely differently. Especially when Stalin issued a decree on the opening of churches in Russia. This undoubtedly brought God’s mercy to our country, to our Church, to our people. Humanly speaking, of course, we can say that the high military spirit of our soldiers won. And we must pay tribute to the country’s leadership, which raised such a brilliant commander as Zhukov. In former times, the Lord raised up Suvorov and Kutuzov for Russia. In our time, Georgy Zhukov was the mercy of God. We owe our salvation to him.

She immediately rose, became stronger and improved with us military equipment. Humanly speaking, we attribute all this to the fact that people united and worked successfully on the front line and in the rear. This is right. But the Lord gave them strength, energy and intelligence.

When I read the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, I was struck by the moment where he writes about how he was amazed at the beginning of the war by the genius of the strategic plans of the German generals. Then he was surprised at the mistakes and miscalculations that they subsequently made. This is what Zhukov says for his part. For my part, I will say: the Wisdom of God did all this! The Lord, whomever he wants to punish, always deprives him of reason and intelligence... And the same person who at first showed wisdom, when the grace of God receded, makes mistakes.

When the Lord had already decided to give help to our people, our army, He darkened the minds of the fascists, and gave wisdom, military ingenuity, courage and success to our military leaders. The Lord gave strength, energy, intelligence to our designers and engineers in order to win. As they say: “Without God there is no way!”

The trouble is that we do not see the Providence of God and do not give glory to the Lord for showing such providence, such care. It is sad...

As a matter of fact, Russia has risen from insignificance and grown to great power only by the grace of God, only by the power of God, miracles... And no one wants to talk about it.”

Indeed, most often they prefer to remain silent about this. But we need to talk about this loudly. Especially now, in our difficult times, which are in many ways reminiscent of the pre-war ones. So that Russia will grow again to a great power, and we will grow to the extent of those great people who suffered the Victory given to us by God...