Unlimited submarine warfare. How the German submarine fleet tried to crush the “mistress of the seas” as a result of submarine warfare in 1915

The leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary decided in 1915 to “defeat Russia during this summer.” More than half of all the armed forces of these powers were thrown against Russia, and from the south - the Ottoman Empire. IN February-March 1915 German troops in fierce battles managed drive Russian armies out of East Prussia. In May, Austro-Hungarian troops broke through the front in the area Turtle Doves. The Germans launched an offensive north of Warsaw and took the city in August. Russian troops, in dire need of weapons and ammunition, suffered a number of heavy defeats.

At this time on Western Front German troops repelled the onslaught of Anglo-French divisions in Champagne, Artois and Flanders. Their active actions were limited to an attack north of the Ypres River, where in April-May they first used chemical weapons - a gas called mustard gas. This was a criminal violation of the Hague Convention. But the Germans’ success was only tactical.

By autumn, the armed forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany captured all of Poland, part of the Baltic states, but they could no longer advance. It was not possible to force Russia to ask for peace.

Simultaneously with the offensive in the East, the German leadership in 1915 tried to bring Great Britain to its knees with a blockade. It did not want to risk the main forces of the fleet, and the cruisers could not achieve serious success. Therefore, in February, unrestricted submarine warfare was launched with a relatively new weapon - submarines. They sank all ships going to Great Britain, even from neutral countries. Until January 1916, more than 700 ships with their crews and passengers were destroyed.

After sinking in May 1915 ocean steamer Luisitania, on which citizens of different countries died, USA and other neutral states categorically demanded that Germany immediately end unrestricted submarine warfare. The German command was forced to give the order not to sink passenger ships without warning. But the submarine war continued.

Great Britain increased and accelerated the construction of its ships and developed effective means of combating submarines, thereby overcoming the danger looming over it. The German command failed to bring Great Britain to its knees.

In 1915, the diplomatic struggle around Italy intensified, whose ruling circles in 1914 refused to enter the war on the side of the Austro-German bloc. They took into account both the pacifist sentiments of the population and the fact that the peninsula was too vulnerable to the powerful Entente fleet. In addition, Austria-Hungary did not want to satisfy Italy’s claims to its territories with an Italian population, nor agree to expand its influence in the Balkans. The German government, with the support of the Vatican, persistently tried to win Italy over to its side and, for this purpose, convinced the leaders of Austria-Hungary to make significant concessions to Italy. But the Entente governments easily promised Italy more at someone else’s expense and backed up the promises with a loan. Therefore, the hesitation of the ruling circles of Italy ended in favor of the Entente: in May 1915 they declared war on Austria-Hungary, and in August of the following year on Germany.

Italian troops tried to attack the positions of Austria-Hungary on the Isonzo River, but to no avail, but the Mediterranean Sea was closed to the Austro-German bloc.

The leaders of this bloc managed to take revenge in the Balkans. Having promised the Bulgarian government parts of the territories of Serbia, Greece, Romania and even Turkey, in September they achieved Bulgaria’s entry into a bloc with Germany and the Ottoman Empire. This is how it was created Quadruple Alliance Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. With the support of Bulgarian troops, Austro-German troops finally occupied Serbia, forcing the troops that heroically defended it to retreat. A direct connection was established between Berlin, Vienna and Istanbul through the Balkans.

But under strong pressure from the Entente, Greece agreed to the landing of Anglo-French and Serbian troops in the country, which formed against the forces of the Quadruple Alliance in the Balkans Thessaloniki Front.

In search of a path to victory, the German command in 1916 tried to exhaust the forces of France. It concentrated 12 divisions and a huge amount of artillery to attack a narrow section of the front - 10 km near Verdun. This was the direction to Paris, and the Germans rightly believed that here the French would fight to the last.

The offensive on February 21 began with artillery preparation of unprecedented power. But the French resistance was stubborn. During a week of fierce fighting, the Germans managed to capture only a few destroyed fortifications. French commander-in-chief Joffre ordered the soldiers: “Fight to the death!” and continuously sent reinforcements.

The German command threw its reserves into battle. "The Verdun Meat Grinder" (February 21 – December 18, 1916) as the soldiers called this battle, it continued without interruption until the beginning of July. The advance of the German troops turned out to be insignificant, their forces were depleted and the German command did not achieve its goals. The French lost 350 thousand people, the Germans - 600 thousand people.

The pressure on Verdun was weakened by Russian offensives on the Eastern Front in March and summer 1916. In June, as a result powerful breakthrough of the troops of the Southwestern Front of Russia under the command ofA. Brusilova ( June-July 1916) After their advance of 60-100 km, the situation there, from the point of view of the German command, became “exceptionally serious. A number of German divisions from the Western Front were transferred there. Despite this, Brusilov’s troops occupied part of Galicia and Bukovina and entered the Carpathians. Their further advancement was hampered by stretched communications and a lack of ammunition, as well as Dvina-Naroch operation Russian troops in the north.

The failure of the Germans at Verdun and the successes of the Brusilov offensive put an end to the long hesitation of the ruling circles of Romania. No matter how Entente diplomats had previously convinced them to oppose the Quadruple Alliance, providing loans and promising Austro-Hungarian territories with a Romanian population, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary only in August 1916. However, its army could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy, who soon occupied almost the entire country , and Russia had to send its troops there.

In July, the Anglo-French command organized a large offensive on the Somme River. However, the German troops did not allow their front to be broken through and stubbornly resisted. The fierce and bloody battle of the Somme also turned into a “battle of attrition” and dragged on until the end of autumn. In September, the British used tanks here for the first time, but did not achieve serious success. Only the German pressure on Verdun was weakened.

Results of the campaigns of 1915 – 1916. The bloodiest battles at Verdun and on the Somme, on the Eastern and Caucasian fronts and the submarine war have not yet given a decisive advantage to either side. The German army did not suffer a single defeat, but its reserves were exhausted. Austria-Hungary could only hold on thanks to the support of Germany. The capture of Romania strengthened the position of the German army in the Balkans, but the Macedonian front stabilized, the allied army in Macedonia grew stronger, gained strength and was waiting in the wings. The Germans' efforts to break the naval blockade were unsuccessful; the British continued to dominate the sea. The Allied command created an effective system of economic warfare; neutrals were encouraged by carrots and sticks to curtail all trade with Germany. The German war economy was suffocating without non-ferrous metals, rubber, fuel, and food.

Having squandered its reserves in 1916, Germany never achieved a turning point in the war in its favor. For the Entente, 1916 was a very difficult year in terms of reserves, but by the end of the year the crisis was generally overcome - not only the proper training of troops and their hardening in battles, but also the production of weapons was established. The entry of the United States into the war, which was becoming increasingly realistic, was supposed to finally resolve the issue of the prospects for a protracted war.

Unlimited submarine warfare- a type of military action that involves conducting active combat operations on the lines of sea communications using submarines to destroy enemy military and civilian transport ships. The doctrine was widely used by Germany in the First and Second World Wars, as well as by the United States in Pacific Ocean in 1941-1945

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Emergence of the doctrine was a logical development of military-technical thought, due to the emergence of a new class of ships - submarines. The history of submarines dates back to the 16th and 17th centuries, when projects of such devices were conceptually justified and the first working models were created. Due to the technical imperfections of the first submarines, they were not widely used, being an attractive idea to which outstanding engineers of their time returned from time to time.

The development of science and technology contributed to the improvement of submarines, and they gradually began to replenish the fleets of leading maritime powers.

At the same time, despite the rapid pace of scientific and technological progress, leading to the emergence of new types of weapons, submarines were in the eyes of naval commanders and officials of the naval departments atypical weapons that are strikingly different from traditional armadas consisting of surface ships. This gave rise to a negative attitude towards military underwater vehicles, as well as a lack of understanding of how to use them in real combat operations. Indicative in this sense is the statement of Admiral Henderson of the British Navy, who stated in 1914:

A similar point of view was prevalent in the British Admiralty. Subsequently, the shortsightedness of the naval commanders of a great sea power will play with An empire on which the sun never sets, a cruel joke.

However, with the outbreak of war, submarine cruisers demonstrated their military potential when on September 5, 1914, the German submarine U-9 sank the British light cruiser Pathfinder, and two weeks later, on September 20, 1914, three more British Navy warships were destroyed. What happened had a huge effect on the warring countries, which believed in the promise of the new weapon.

Doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare

The essence of the doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare is to destroy, with the help of the submarine fleet, enemy merchant ships transporting weapons, reinforcements, as well as supplying troops and civilians with supplies and fuel. The first country to resort to this strategy was Germany, which contested dominance over Europe and the colonies from the Entente countries in the First World War. The targeted use of the submarine fleet against merchant ships was a consequence of the deadlock in trench warfare and was caused by the naval blockade of Germany itself.

The safety of civilian courts during interstate hostilities was ensured by the London Declaration of Law naval war 1909, which was ratified by all the great powers except England. The declaration ordered warships of opposing countries, when meeting an enemy merchant ship, to fire a warning shot along its course. The civilian crew had to be allowed to abandon the ship before it was destroyed or given to the enemy crew as a prize.

However, during the First World War, the British Navy widely used the so-called. decoy ships, warships converted from merchant ships, as well as specially built anti-submarine ships, similar in silhouette to civilian steamships. When the crew of a German submarine tries to capture such a ship, English sailors opened cannon and machine gun fire on the enemy ship that had surfaced.

In November 1914, the German naval command changed its mind to the idea of ​​​​using submarine forces against the merchant fleet of the British Empire:

Since England completely disregards international law, there is not the slightest reason for us to limit ourselves in our methods of warfare. We must use this weapon (the submarine fleet) and do it in a way that best suits its characteristics. Consequently, submarines cannot spare the crews of steamships, but must send them to the bottom along with their ships. Merchant shipping can be prevented, and all maritime trade with England will cease within a short time Excerpt from a note submitted by the fleet command to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. background Field

The actions of groups of submarines on enemy lines of communication in the pre-war years were not part of the naval doctrines of the leading world powers. The submarines were primarily assigned reconnaissance and defensive functions. Yes, on initial stage During the First World War, German submarines were located in a defensive arc on the approaches to the Heligoland Bight, where, according to the Headquarters of the German Navy, the English fleet would strike.

As British and German admirals testify in their records, in war time no one considered it possible to use the submarine fleet against merchant ships. This was due both to a possible negative public reaction to such an act of aggression, and purely practical problems, namely, the lack of the required number of submarine cruisers. Thus, German experts assessed the need for 200 submarines for successful operations against England.

The use of Unlimited Submarine Warfare has been noted in several military campaigns:

• Battle of the Atlantic, used by Germany in 1915, 1917-1918;
• Second Battle of the Atlantic, fought by Nazi Germany from 1939-1945;
• US military actions in the Pacific against Japan (1941-1945).

First Battle of the Atlantic

By the beginning of the First World War German Empire had only 28 submarines with 41 battleships. Realizing the vulnerability of England's island position, German military leaders were interested in disrupting the supply routes for its troops. The possibility of conducting military operations against merchant ships was also considered in relation to the rest of the Entente countries. Initially, the German Navy headquarters assigned the task of destroying enemy merchant and warships to surface ships and raiders. However, the losses among them were too high, which prompted consideration of submarine cruisers as an alternative.

Admiral von Pohl, commander of the High Seas Fleet in 1915-1916.

A supporter of the use of the submarine fleet to deplete the enemy was Admiral von Pohl, who replaced Admiral Ingenohl as commander of the High Seas Fleet on February 2, 1915. Seeking to weaken the British fleet as much as possible before the general battle, von Pohl practically abandoned the use of surface ships, focusing on submarine fleet operations on enemy lines of communication. The purpose of the actions taken was to blockade Great Britain.

German submarine activity between February 1915 and April 1916. can be characterized within the framework of the so-called Limited submarine warfare. There was no consensus in Germany on the issue of conducting military operations against civilian ships. German Kaiser Wilhelm II opposed the increasing number of civilian casualties, while the majority of the Admiralty was in favor of using all available means to achieve victory. Sailors were allowed to sink ships of neutral states only under prize law after inspection and detection of contraband. First, it was necessary to verify that the ship belonged to a neutral country, which became especially difficult at night.

Max Valentiner, one of the first ace submariners

Of the 30 submarines that were part of the German Navy in 1915, 7 operated in the Baltic and North Seas, the remaining 23 - off the coast of England and in Atlantic Ocean. A significant part of the submarines operating in the western direction were stationed in Flanders, where the bases were well equipped, and the Allies’ poor anti-submarine defense allowed German submarines to penetrate the Atlantic under the enemy’s nose.

In total, as a result of actions on the enemy’s lines of communication in 1915, the German submarine fleet managed to sink 228 Entente merchant ships with a total displacement of 651,572 gross register tons, as well as 89 ships of neutral countries with a tonnage of 120,254 gross register tons. During this period, a number of successful operations took place. Thus, the crew of Max Valentiner’s U-39 distinguished itself by destroying 22 cargo ships, 5 fishing schooners and 3 sailing ships with a total tonnage of 70 thousand tons in one combat campaign.

Anti-submarine actions of the allied countries did not bring much success. The periodic easing of the trade war by Germany was largely due to the position of the country's leadership, seeking to reduce the number of incidents with the use of submarines leading to the loss of civilian ships. One of the most striking manifestations of the horrors of the general war was the sinking of the steamer by the German submarine U-20 on May 7, 1915 Lusitania. The destruction of the airliner, which led to the death of 1,198 people, was negatively received by the world community.

Despite the excuses German side(the ship was moving in a combat zone and the German embassy in Washington notified of the possible consequences of this for civilian ships), the political scandal that broke out had a negative impact on Germany’s reputation and led to a reduction in trade turnover between Berlin and Washington. Subsequently, there was a rupture in trade and diplomatic relations with the entry of the United States into the war on the side of the Entente in April 1917. After this incident, the operations of the German submarine forces were partially curtailed, which, however, did not affect the actions of German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea. Fears caused by the possible entry of the United States into the war prevented Germany from lifting restrictions on submarine warfare until February 1917.

In 1916, von Pohl was replaced as commander of the High Seas Fleet by Admiral Reinhard Scheer. He considered it necessary to continue to put pressure on England through the active actions of submarine forces, which, however, as before, were given secondary importance - the destruction of the merchant fleet, luring out warships for their subsequent destruction by German surface forces. However, after Battle of Jutland From May 31 to June 1, 1916, it became clear that the High Seas Fleet would not be able to challenge Britain's naval hegemony. Admiral Scheer spoke for the beginning Unlimited submarine warfare.

Unlimited submarine warfare. 1917 campaign

All preparations for the start of Unlimited Submarine Warfare have been made. In January 1917, the US government received a note from Berlin announcing that all ships of the Entente countries and neutral states encountered by the German Navy would be sunk. On January 9, the command of the German fleet received a telegram in which the start of a new submarine campaign was scheduled for February 1, 1917:

Admiral Scheer

The main area for operations against merchant ships was the western approaches to the British Isles, where most trade routes converged. In addition, German submarines cruised in the Mediterranean Sea, violated lines of communication with the mainland in the English Channel, and operated in the North Sea against ships of neutral states chartered by the Entente. These areas were patrolled by small submarines UB and UC, suitable for operating in local conditions.

During the first month of the submarine war, 87 ships were sunk, with a total tonnage of 540 thousand gross tons. Neutral merchant ships stopped sailing in the North Sea. The Germans lost 4 submarines. The following month, merchant fleet losses amounted to 147 ships with a tonnage of 574 thousand gross tons. The number of ship deaths off the western coast of England increased. In April, the result of the submarine war was expressed in 881 thousand brt, which the Entente countries missed, exceeding all expected calculations. Such high rates of ships sunk by German submarines are due to both the technical imperfection of the anti-submarine weapons that Germany’s opponents had at their disposal and the inadequacy of the measures they took to combat German submarines. The April losses greatly worried the British command. In fact, Germany has shown that it is the new master of the Atlantic.

Admiral Jellico

On average, out of every 100 ships leaving English ports, 25 were sunk by German submarines. The tonnage losses threatened the British navy's war supplies. Despite the commissioning of new ships and the chartering of ships from neutral states, the ships that London had at its disposal would soon be barely enough to transport food. According to calculations of losses from the actions of German submarines, by the end of 1917 the transportation of military cargo should have stopped due to a lack of tonnage. The difficulties encountered with supplies forced England to withdraw troops from Thessaloniki.

In November 1916, he took office as First navy Admiral Jellico (Adm. Scheer's opponent in the Battle of Jutland) with the beginning of Unlimited Submarine Warfare faced a number of difficulties in organizing anti-submarine warfare. The technical backwardness of a significant part of the destroyers did not allow them to be used on the open sea to search for enemy submarines.

Admiral Jellico, together with Rear Admiral Daff, head of the new anti-submarine department, formed special hunting squads to search for and neutralize German submarines. However, the lack of anti-submarine ships prevented the organization of large-scale activities in areas where German submarines were active. Attempts to limit their activities to the North Sea ended in failure. Protective structures in the Strait of Dover and mining of the Heligoland Bay could not prevent German crews from leaving their bases. Search raids by British destroyers, trying to keep German submarines at depth until their batteries ran out and they floated to the surface, were also ineffective (in 24 hours, submarines of the type U could travel 80 miles under water, escaping the attack of the British patrols).

German underwater minelayers actively laid deadly traps in the straits and on the approaches to ports. Thus, in 1917, the British discovered over 536 mine cans and cleared 3,989 mines; 170 ships were blown up by mines.

An attempt to replace lost ships with new ones could not give the desired result. At the end of 1917, German submarines sunk over 6 million tons of tonnage; taking into account the ships that entered service, the deficit was 2 million tons.

England, caught in a naval blockade, was on the verge of exhaustion. The situation changed fundamentally in April 1917 with the entry of the United States into the war. Counting on the support of his ally, the commander of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Jellico, obtained help in the form of merchant and warships. In June 1917, the Allies switched to the tactic of organizing convoys to escort merchant ships, and the number of shipping routes was reduced, allowing efforts to be concentrated on protecting ships. The ports for the formation of convoys heading to England were New York and the Hampton roadstead; the port of Sydney was designated for the collection of ships from American ports and Halifax for Canadian ships. Dakar was supposed to serve the trade routes of the South Atlantic, i.e., the ports of Africa and South America. Gibraltar was established as a gathering point for ships coming from the Mediterranean Sea. In August, ships heading to England from Gibraltar, North America and the South Atlantic began to be consolidated into convoys under the protection of warships.

The United States deployed 34 anti-submarine ships across the Atlantic Ocean to the areas of greatest activity of German submarines (the English Channel, Irish waters). In Portsmouth, New Haven, Portland and Dartmouth in June 1917, detachments consisting of naval boats armed with hydrophones were formed, and air patrols were also created.

The new protective measures bore fruit, so in September-December 1917, only 6 ships were sunk at sea more than 50 miles from the coast, instead of 175 ships destroyed in the same way between April and August.

Number, composition and deployment of German submarines

During the First World War, the number of submarines increased significantly. If in 1914 Germany had only 28 ships of this class, then by the beginning of the Unlimited Submarine War in February 1917 there were already 111 boats in service, and five months later - 140.

The German submarine fleet was represented by ships three types - U, UB, U.C.. Large type boats U used for operations in the waters west of the coast of England. The duration of their stay at sea ranged from 21 to 28 days, they were also sent to remote theaters of combat (White, Mediterranean seas).

Small submarines type UB were used for operations in the North Sea, in the English Channel. The first samples of underwater vehicles had a displacement of 125 tons, the latest modifications had a tonnage of 500 tons. Boats of this type were armed with 4 torpedoes.

Submarines type U.C. were armed with both torpedoes and mines, and mainly carried out mine laying in areas of active shipping near the British Isles and in the North Sea. They had a displacement of 125 tons, subsequently increased to 400 tons by the end of the war. Submarines type U.C. carried 18 mines and 4 torpedoes.

Of the total number of active submarines (on average about 120 monthly), usually 1/3 was under repair, 1/3 on a cruise (and on vacation) and 1/3 in action, i.e. about 40 submarines. Typically, of these 40 submarines, 30 operated in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean between Ireland and Spain. Operating submarines were distributed among the following bases:

60 submarines were based in German ports (Wilhelmshaven and Ems);

35 to the Flemish bases (Bruges, Zeebrugge and Ostend);

25 to the Austrian bases (Pola and Cattaro).

Anti-submarine measures of the Entente countries

To combat German submarines, the Allies used various defensive measures. In the Strait of Dover, the narrowest part of the English Channel, a special network was installed to prevent German submarines from breaking through in the southern waters of England. This, however, did not prevent the crews of German submarines from regularly breaking through the protective structure under the cover of darkness. Thus, in March 1917, German submariners crossed the barrier over 40 times. Also, in order to combat German raids, areas of greatest submarine activity were mined, and over 140 thousand mines were installed in the North Sea alone. To counteract German submarines, over 5 thousand ships were brought in: destroyers, decoy ships, submarines, in addition, airships and balloons were used in patrols. Delivered by underwater minelayers U.C. mines were cleared by British minesweepers. Nevertheless, the defensive defenses of England and its allies until April 1917 were not effective enough.

The introduction of the convoy system made it possible to reduce the losses of the transport fleet. The commanders of German submarines made less and less attempts to attack ships moving under the protection of warships, preferring to look for single targets.

The first samples of the depth charge were tested as an effective anti-submarine weapon, showing the German crews that being under water was no longer safe for them.

Other anti-submarine measures consisted of equipping ships with smoke equipment to set up smoke screens, using tethered balloons on convoys, using zigzag courses (which made underwater hunting very difficult), and placing trawlers equipped with hydrophones at the head of convoys.

The effectiveness of the use of anti-submarine weapons
Year	Mines	Deep bombs	Torpedoes	Artillery	Ram	Trap vessels	Air strength	Networks	Trawls	Unfortunate. cases	Surrender	Unknown causes	Total
1914	3	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
1915	3	-	3	2	5	3	-	-	1	1	-	1	19
1916	6	2	2	3	-	2	-	2	2	1	1	1	22
1917	14	12	8	5	3	5	6	3	1	2	-	4	63
1918	18	24	6	6	5	2	-	1	1	1	-	5	69
Total	44	38	19	16	15	12	6	6	5	5	1	11	178

End of the first Battle of the Atlantic

Until December 1917, the amount of lost Allied tonnage remained at 600 thousand gross tons. At the same time, the convoy system and the laying of mines in the Strait of Dover and the Heligoland Bight lead to a decrease in the activity of the submarine forces of the German Navy. It becomes clear that the initiative at sea has passed into the hands of the Entente, despite the increasing number of German submarine hunters.

During the period January-August 1918, Germany lost 50 submarines, the number of losses exceeded the number of ships entering service. In August, Admiral Scheer became commander of the High Seas Fleet and tried to rectify the situation. However, opportunities for active submarine warfare were missed. In September 1918, the ships stationed in Flanders were evacuated. Thus, strategically important bases were lost that made it possible to operate in close proximity to the enemy.

The outbreak of revolutionary actions in the navy put an end to the continuation of the struggle. The last ship destroyed by a German submarine was an English one. battleship Britannia, torpedoed by the crew of UB-50 on November 9, 1918.

Losses of the merchant fleet in 1915, 1917-1918.

The First Battle of the Atlantic was an example of the effective use of submarines against military and civilian ships. The actions of submarines on enemy lines of communication became a factor capable of changing the balance of power in the war, which subsequently influenced the development of ships of this class.

Naval campaign of 1917 and 1918 turned out to be quite effective for the German submarine fleet. Most of the lost ships fell to the British Empire, which lost over 5 million gross tons. or 69% of the destroyed tonnage. In total, during the First World War, the losses of the transport fleet of the Entente countries and neutral states amounted to more than 11 million gross tons. Against the background of the losses of the German submarine fleet, the chosen strategy of combat operations at sea turns out to be very successful. A total of 372 submarines participated in the German fleet in the war. Of these, 178 died: 62 types U, 64 types UB and 52 types U.C.. At the time of the armistice, Berlin had 169 submarine hunters, with another 438 at various stages of construction. During the war years, Germany's submarine forces made a leap in their development, increasing 7 times compared to the pre-war composition of the German fleet.

Legal protection of shipping from attacks by submarines

During the First World War, submarines proved to be effective weapons for disrupting maritime supply lines. Attempts by individual powers to ban the construction of ships of this class in the post-war period were unsuccessful. However, measures were taken to introduce restrictions on the actions of submarine crews in relation to transport ships in wartime.

As an annex to the London Protocol of 1936, the Rules for the Operation of Submarines in Relation to Merchant Ships in Wartime were formulated. They provided for compliance by submarine teams international law on a par with surface ships. Submarines were required to conduct military operations according to the principle of prize law. When meeting with a merchant ship, the crew of the boat had to give the ship the order to stop; if it continued moving, the submarine had the right to attack the intruder. The stopped ship had to be inspected for carrying prohibited cargo. If carrying contraband or military cargo, the merchant ship could be sunk. However, there was a requirement to ensure the safety of the crew by taking them on board the boat and/or transporting them to land to a safe place.

A year later due to civil war in Spain, the Nyon Agreements of 1937 qualified the destruction of a merchant ship by a submarine of any of the warring parties as an act of aggression, and measures had to be taken to search for and eliminate the submarine. An attack by a warship on a merchant ship in peacetime was considered an act of piracy. Regulatory regulation also affected weapons used in underwater warfare. The Hague Convention on the Laying of Underwater Mines that Explode Automatically on Contact of 1907 prohibited the use of mines without anchors and the laying of minefields in areas of commercial shipping.

Second Battle of the Atlantic

The results of the First World War showed leading states the vulnerability of communication lines in wartime. At the same time, submarines, as a formidable weapon against surface ships, provided them with a worthy place in the navies of various countries even after the end of the first general war.

The fact that Germany managed to retain submarine design engineers, and Germany in 1935 was allowed to build modern ships, incl. and submarines, played a significant role in the restoration of the submarine fleet. Britain did not rely on the use of submarine forces in its naval doctrine, so the number of ships of this type in the Navy of the British Empire was small, amounting to 57 in 1939 (France - 78). Despite the limitation of having 45% of submarines (with the possibility of increasing to 100%) of England's already small number of submarines, Germany made efforts to restore the submarine fleet. In 1935, Berlin formed the 1st submarine flotilla, called “Weddigen” in honor of Lieutenant Commander Otto Weddigen, who sank three British cruisers at the beginning of the First World War, which was quickly replenished with new ships.

Erich Topp, submarine ace who sank 28 transport ships on the submarine U-552

Despite the successful use of submarines to attrition the enemy in World War I, Germany continued to rely on its surface fleet, which was reflected in the shipbuilding program of 1939, which included the construction of 233 boats by 1948.

Berlin's plans changed with the outbreak of World War II, and the pace of submarine construction accelerated. In the ensuing war at sea, Germany was able to field only 56 ships of this class, despite the fact that there was a need for 300 submarines.

From the first days of the war, German submarines came into conflict with British surface ships. International treaties limited the actions of German submariners, who were ordered to conduct combat operations according to the principle of prize law. However, civilian casualties could not always be avoided. So, on one of the first days of the war - September 4, 1939, a passenger steamer was mistakenly sunk by the German submarine U-30 Athenia, which was mistaken for an auxiliary cruiser.

As a result of actions against merchant shipping by German submarines, from September 3, 1939 to February 28, 1940, 199 ships with a total displacement of 701,985 gross tons were sunk. British anti-submarine measures resulted in the loss of 14 submarines with a total tonnage of 9,500 tons. At the same time, the German crews had to face a number of technical problems, which affected the effectiveness of the “hunt” - the impact fuses of the torpedoes turned out to be extremely unreliable, and often did not explode when hitting the ship’s hull. After a thorough investigation, the problems were resolved and the number of failures decreased. The German command used small 250-ton submarines to lay mines in the straits and areas of the most active movement of enemy ships. During the entire period of World War II, 115 ships with a total tonnage of 394,533 gross tons were lost in minefields.

After the capture of Norway by Nazi troops in June 1940, the German Navy Headquarters was able to focus on organizing combat operations in the Atlantic. Submarines, concentrated in the North Sea to counter British ships, returned to the shores of Britain. France is already in the hands German troops, which meant unhindered access to the ocean. England lost the opportunity to prevent submarine attacks in the waters west of the British Isles, the Gibraltar area and the Mediterranean Sea. Boats needed less time to move from bases to the combat area. This increased the number of ships simultaneously operating against England.

Germany's submarine forces used tactics throughout World War II wolf pack. It implied the use of groups of submarines to attack enemy ships. Since the Allies, from the beginning of hostilities, adhered to the practice of convoying transport ships, the actions of groups of submarines gave the best results. Between May and October 1940, German submarines sank 287 ships with a total tonnage of 1,450,878 GRT. This success is explained by the use of “wolf pack” tactics against convoys.

The 1941 naval campaign was less successful. There was a dispersion of Germany's submarine forces (sending ships to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas), which affected the overall effectiveness of the fleet's actions against Britain. The dispatch of a significant number of ships to the Mediterranean to support Italy and disrupt the transport of Middle Eastern oil eased the pressure on British positions in the Atlantic.

With the entry of the United States into the war, Germany's position at sea seriously deteriorated. She found herself at war with two of the most powerful naval powers. On February 1, 1941, the United States created the Atlantic Fleet, which led Admiral King. The American “safety zone” extended in the Atlantic east to 26 degrees west longitude. 4/5 of the Atlantic Ocean was under the supervision of the American fleet, whose main goal was to detect and, together with the British, destroy all German ships.

Despite the difficult working conditions for submarine crews in the Atlantic in 1942 (unusually strong storms raged), good results were achieved. From June to November, the Allies lost an average of about 500 thousand brt every month, with losses reaching their peak in November, when 700,000 brt were sunk.

Wolf Pack Tactics

Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz

The key factor that ensured that Great Britain and its allies in the First World War protected transport ships from the actions of German submarines was the convoy system, which made attacks by single submarines ineffective. Relying on already tested protective measures, the British naval command believed that in modern warfare German submarines will not be effective, and the situation in 1915, 1917-1918. will not be repeated. However, a World War I submarine veteran Karl Dönitz, appointed commander of the German submarine fleet in 1939, was able to draw conclusions from previous defeats. The submarine tactics he developed were called the “wolf pack.” It involved the actions of groups of submarines to search and destroy convoys.

After a submarine or observation aircraft detected an enemy convoy, several submarines concentrated on its path. They were instructed to attack enemy ships at night. The attack was carried out from several directions on the surface. Submarines went into an underwater position after firing torpedoes and to break through anti-submarine formations or evade pursuit. The pursuit of the convoy was accompanied by repetition of attacks to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy. This tactic proved quite effective against the Allies in the early years of the war.

The correctness of the chosen tactics of group actions of boats is confirmed by a comparison: from October 10 to November 30, 1940, the crews of Italian submarines, using outdated tactics of single submarines, sank only one ship with a displacement of 4,866 GRT during 243 days spent in positions in the combat area . One submarine accounted for 20 tons per day. During the same time and in the same area, German submariners spent 378 days at sea and sank 80 ships with a total displacement of 435,189 GRT. For each German submarine there were 1,115 tons per day.

Allied anti-submarine measures and increasing losses of German submarines

The system of organizing convoys, despite the effectiveness of the actions of the German "wolf packs", underwent only minor changes. Great importance American escort aircraft carriers were responsible for ensuring the safety of maritime transportation in the Atlantic Ocean, whose air groups became an indispensable means of anti-submarine warfare. Deck-based torpedo bombers Grumman TBF Avenger, with a long range and the ability to carry four 350-pound depth charges in the bomb bay, have proven to be effective anti-submarine aircraft in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The increase in losses of German submarines during the transition to the area of ​​​​operations in the second half of 1942 was a consequence of the use of radars for direction finding of boats. Back in 1933, the British Navy received at its disposal the ASDIC radar system, which recorded high-frequency ultrasounds created by the noise of submarine propellers. Subsequently, improved devices began to be installed on patrol aircraft. They did a poor job of detecting submarines at depth, however, since most of the time (on passages and in night attacks) German boats were on the surface, radars became a real scourge of submariners. Hunting opportunities were also narrowed by the introduction of these devices on security ships.

The Hedgehog rocket launcher, one of the Allies' most dangerous anti-submarine weapons

Depth charges were improved by using a more powerful explosive charge. A rocket launcher entered service with British ships. Hedgehog, throwing out 16 small depth charges. Despite the effectiveness of the new anti-submarine weapons, losses among transport ships remained quite significant. December 1942 – February 1943 marked by a loss of a total of 900 thousand gross tons.

The largest submarine battle of World War II was the attack on convoy HX-229, which took place on March 15-19, 1943. The attack involved 40 submarines against 50 transport and military vessels. The Allies lost 21 ships with a total tonnage of 141,000 gross tons, and German losses amounted to 1 submarine.

At the same time, it became obvious that the joint actions of the Anglo-American fleet in the Atlantic, the coordinated actions of transport, military ships and aviation, were nullifying the actions of German submariners. In May, the Germans lost 38 submarines, which was a third of the number of submarines operating in the Atlantic (118). The ratio of sunk ships/dead submarines was rapidly deteriorating, not in Germany's favor. So, if at the beginning of 1942 there were 210 thousand gross tons per submarine, then a year later it was already 5.5 thousand gross tons. The trend continued - in May 20 ships were sunk and 21 boats were lost, in July the Allies lost 45 ships, with 33 German submarines destroyed.

In 1944 the number of German submarines operating off the coast of England decreased by 3 times compared to 1942 - from 30 to 40 German submarines were operating here at the same time. In September-December 1944, the Allies lost 14 ships in coastal waters and 2 in the Atlantic from submarine attacks. At the same time, during these four months, 12,168 merchant ships crossed the ocean in both directions. German losses exceeded the number of ships sunk and amounted to 37 submarines. Dönitz realized that the initiative at sea had been lost.

However, the deplorable state of dying Germany did not allow the development of a new phase of the submarine war.

The February patrol off the Shetland and Faroe Islands claimed the lives of the crews of 21 submarines. In March, as a result of massive Anglo-American raids air force 32 submarines were destroyed at German ports. The April result of air patrols of the North Sea led to the death of 51 boats. The damage caused by the boats could not be compared with their own losses. During 1945, they managed to sink only 38 merchant ships (156,199 GRT) and 8 small warships.

The defeat of Germany put an end to the six-year-long Battle of the Atlantic. As British and German military leaders point out in their memoirs, Germany’s mistake was that it joined the fight for the Atlantic too late, and, moreover, scattered its forces on the construction of surface ships. Churchill wondered why the Germans, having the experience of the First World War behind them, were unable to recognize the potential of submarines and did not build hundreds of them from the very beginning? The use of the doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare became Germany's only truly effective weapon at sea against obviously stronger powers - England and the USA. The successful operations of German submarines in World War II in all theaters of combat led to the loss of 27,570 ships with a total tonnage of 14,518,430 GRT. (93% of the tonnage was destroyed in the Atlantic, Indian Oceans and North Sea). The submariners themselves lost 768 ships.

Total tonnage losses of allied and neutral countries in 1939–1945 (brt.)
Reasons for losses	Submarines	Aviation	Surface ships	Mines	Other reasons	Navigation accidents	Total
Period	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage
1939	103 / 420445	10 / 2949	15 / 61337	84 / 257430	4 / 3551	107 / 188716	323 / 934428
1940	435 / 2103046	174 / 557020	95 / 518347	199 / 510219	79 / 188762	363 / 672286	1345 / 4549680
1941	422 / 2132943	320 / 967366	102 / 492945	107 / 229757	163 / 318904	305 / 551510	1419 / 4693425
1942	1149 / 6248687	148 / 697825	85 / 400394	45 / 103188	137 / 232331	302 / 620266	1866 / 8302691
1943	459 / 2585005	74 / 419393	11 / 47903	36 / 119991	8 / 37623	257 / 508390	845 / 3718305
1944	129 / 765304	19 / 120656	13 / 26935	23 / 95383	9 / 28571	233 / 400689	426 / 1437593
1945	54 / 263000	5 / 37000	5 / 10200	19 / 79000	5 / 8000	-	88 / 397200
Total	2751 / 14518430	750 / 2802209	326 / 1558111	513 / 1394973	405 / 817742	1567 / 2941857	6312 / 24033322

Unlimited submarine warfare in the Pacific

Having a fairly balanced fleet, the United States declared unlimited submarine warfare on the very first day of the war with Japan. On December 7, 1941, the crews of 51 submarines in the Pacific Ocean received orders to consider all Japanese cargo and fishing ships as military targets. All restrictions imposed by international law were lifted

The total displacement of the Japanese transport fleet at the beginning of the war was 6.1 million gross tons, half of the total tonnage American ships. Japan's island position and numerous possessions in mainland China made the Land of the Rising Sun potentially vulnerable to attacks on its supply lines. The length of individual sea routes reached 3-4 thousand miles.

The dispersion of the Japanese Navy over a long sea area prevented the effective protection of communication lines. The destroyers and torpedo boats that were part of the Japanese Navy were mainly used to guard large warships. Destroyers unoccupied in other operations were used to protect transport routes and patrol ships, possessing weak anti-submarine weapons. In 1943, transport ships were protected by only 50 escort ships. Often, fishing schooners that did not have sonar weapons were attached to escort transport ships.

The Japanese leadership did little to make up for the losses incurred by building new ships. In 1941 At the shipyards, transport ships with a total displacement of 200,000 GRT were built; in 1942, this figure increased to 262,000 GRT. Only in last years understanding came of the damage that was caused by the actions of American submarines. In 1944, ships with a total tonnage of 880,000 gross tons left the stocks, but even this figure was only half of the lost transport capacity for the year.

The tonnage of ships that Japan had at its disposal was rapidly falling every year. At the end of 1943, there were 5 million brt available, a year later - 2.8 million brt, by the end of the war - about 1.8 million brt.

As a result of the extremely successful actions of the submarine fleet for the United States, it was possible to deprive Japan of much-needed raw materials for the operation of industrial enterprises.

The reasons that led to the high losses of the Japanese transport fleet were: the poor quality of Japanese locators, their poor implementation in the navy and aviation; the unjustified delay in introducing a system for convoying transport ships and the lack of the required number of escort ships at the beginning of the war. Japan's main problems were the lack of understanding of the vulnerability of its island position and the threat posed by the actions of submarine forces on sea lines of communication.

Japan, for its part, also tried to fight on the supply routes for the US Navy. Submarine forces were initially considered secondary by the Japanese leadership; they were given a place in the surface fleet. The combat record of Japanese submarines was opened on December 8, 1941, when the I-26 boat fired from a gun and sank a military transport with a displacement of 3 thousand tons. However, the overall results of the Japanese in the Pacific were more modest than their German counterparts.

During five months of underwater hunting (November 1942 - March 1943) in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Japanese sank 50 merchant ships of Western allies and neutral countries with a total displacement of 272,408 GRT, of which 42 were in the Indian Ocean. From March 1943 to November, another 22 ships were destroyed. At the same time, the increase in losses from the actions of enemy destroyers and aircraft led to the curtailment of operations on enemy lines of communications at the beginning of 1944.

October-December 1944 was marked by the destruction of only 1 transport ship by the Japanese, while the Japanese themselves suffered losses of 27 submarines in June-December. The reason for this was the predominantly single actions of Japanese submarines, a small number of submarines, as well as the well-established anti-submarine defense of the American Navy, which prevented the hunting of enemy boats in the Pacific Ocean. In fact, the success of the Japanese submarine force was disproportionately less than that of the United States.

Assessing the results of Unlimited Submarine Warfare

The doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare was born largely due to the desperate situation of Germany, its inability to challenge the supremacy at sea of ​​the leading naval powers - the British Empire and the United States - by conventional methods. The auxiliary nature of the submarine forces as part of the Kaiser’s and then Hitler’s Germany is confirmed by the fact that naval commanders did not give up attempts to build a powerful surface fleet, thereby scattering raw materials, human, financial, and time resources on battleships and cruisers that performed much worse at the end of the war , whose results of military campaigns could not be compared in terms of the number of enemy ships sunk with the results of submarine crews (in fairness, it is worth noting that the awareness of the need to speed up the creation of a powerful submarine fleet made it possible to increase the pace of submarine construction). Thus, following the results of the Second World War, the merchant fleet of the Allies and neutral countries suffered 9 times more losses from the actions of German, and to a lesser extent Italian and Japanese submarines, than as a result of attacks by surface ships. Despite the losses among submarines, the new class of warships, thanks to their stealth, was a weapon that even the mighty British fleet had to reckon with.

Despite the decline in the effectiveness of submarine operations towards the end of both wars, the use of the doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare brought impressive results. The tonnage of sunk transport ships of the British Empire in the First World War was equal to the total displacement of its merchant fleet in the pre-war period. As a result of the Second World War, the Axis countries destroyed about 4,770 ships of the Allies and neutral countries with a total tonnage of more than 24 million gross register tons. Approximately 2,770 ships were sunk by submarines (total displacement - 14.5 million gross tons). Despite the fact that during World War II the German Navy had 1,143 submarines with a total displacement of 979,169 tons, the ratio of destroyed transport ships/dead submarines was 14:1. An indicator that Germany would hardly have been able to achieve if it had relied on surface ships. Japan, in turn, lost about 5 million gross tons as a result of the actions of American submarines.

The development of attack-defense confrontation in connection with the emergence of such a serious threat to the lines of sea communications as underwater hunters was accompanied by the constant improvement of offensive weapons and anti-submarine weapons. Thus, locators, which emerged in the First World War, became an effective means of detecting a hidden enemy, without which it is impossible to imagine a modern navy. The massive distribution of hydro- and radars in the navy and aviation made it possible to protect convoys from unexpected attacks and organize sea patrols in order to clear a given area from enemy boats. Depth charges were improved, and interaction between the fleet and aviation was established. Attack systems (mines, torpedoes) were also improved, and the appearance of the snorkel made it possible to increase the submarine’s stay under water.

It is noteworthy how the weapons of submarine cruisers changed. If in the first months of 1915, when the use of submarines against merchant ships began to be practiced, about 55% of ships sunk were lost as a result of submarine artillery, and torpedoes accounted for approximately 17% of losses (the rest of the ships were lost as a result of mines), then by 1917 about 80% of successful submarine attacks were torpedoes. This ratio remained the same in the future.

Bibliography

Alex Gromov “Wolf Packs” in World War II. Legendary submarines of the Third Reich / Book Club "Family Leisure Club". - Belgorod, 2012

Bush G. Such was the submarine war - M.: Voenizdat, 1965.

Velmozhko A.V. English naval blockade in the First World War / Maritime law: current issues of theory and practice. - Odessa, 2005. - P.201-208

Gibson R., Prendergast M. German submarine war 1914-1918. - Mn.: Harvest, 2002.

Gray E. German submarines in the First World War. 1914-1918 - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.

Doenitz K. German submarines in the Second World War. - M.: Voenizdat, 1964

Ruge F. War at sea. 1939-1945., - M.: AST, St. Petersburg: Polygon, 2000

Scheer R. German fleet in World War. - M.: Eksmo, Isographus; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 2002.

Stahl A. Development of methods of submarine operations during the war of 1914–1918. at the main naval theaters. - M.: Military Publishing House NKO USSR, 1936.

German submarine U-848 attacked by an American aircraft (11/05/1943)

US Coast Guard ship USCGC Spencer drops depth charges to sink German submarine U-175

Chapter XXVII
Submarine warfare{ }

From the outline of the general course of the World War it is known what a huge role submarine warfare played, being, along with the blockade, one of the most important operations of the 1914-1918 campaign.

Let us now consider this issue in some detail in order to trace how the idea of ​​submarine warfare developed, how the Germans used its capabilities, and, finally, what measures to combat it were taken by the Entente states.

The merciless submarine war continued until October 15, 1918. Its termination was the first demand set by the Entente before the start of peace negotiations.

Anti-submarine protection by 1917-1918. was greatly improved and received a completely solid organization, only with which it was possible to avoid the catastrophic consequences of submarine warfare.

Anti-submarine protection measures were as follows:

1) The most important measure that formed a certain stage in the fight against losses from submarines was the introduction of the so-called convoy system.

This system consisted in the fact that commercial ships were brought into groups (caravans), which were disciplined by the appointment of a military command and the organization of navigation (formations, alternating courses, etc.) and, in addition, were escorted by military vessels (destroyers and patrol vessels). The approaches to the shores of England were specially guarded and trawled. The approach and exit were strictly regulated by the relevant rules. The fairways were changed frequently to prevent German boats from establishing routes. Transports carrying troops were especially carefully guarded.

The convoy system was inconvenient in that more time was lost than during free navigation, but the losses in convoys were relatively insignificant.

2) Gradual arming of almost all commercial ships with artillery. Up to 13,000 guns were installed on commercial ships for anti-submarine warfare. The latter were no longer a defenseless target for the submarine - they themselves were capable of causing damage to it and even drowning it with fire, as soon as it was on the surface. This forced the boats to be more careful, making their operations extremely difficult.

3) Reinforced construction of destroyers, which were intended for convoy service and for fighting boats. How energetically the British began to build destroyers can be seen from the following figures. Destroyers entered service: in 1914 - 31; 1915 - 37; 1916 - 96; 1917 - 69; 1918 - 72. Having entered the war, America took part by sending its destroyers - about 200 - to fight the boats.

4) Laying minefields on the roads to German bases. The barriers were placed in several rows in depth to prevent the boat from passing under them. In addition to mining the approaches to the bases, in 1918 a huge barrier was erected that blocked the North Sea between Norway and the Shetland Islands (it consisted of 70,000 mines placed at a number of depths, up to 300 meters). The significance of this barrier was especially great, since it crossed the main direction for the boats to exit. The channel was mined.

5) Anti-submarine bombs with a hydrostatic fuse, which could, when dropped from a ship, explode at a given depth, hitting a significant volume. The boat, having been discovered, was overtaken by patrol ships, which threw such bombs at the area where it was likely to be located, often hitting it.

6) Hydrophones were introduced, which made it possible, by listening to the noise of the movement of a boat in the water, to establish its location, where patrol vessels then rushed. Only when stopping, or at the smallest speed, could the boat hide from the hydrophone. Hydrophones were effective over relatively short distances.

7) Specially designated submarines that cruised at sea, looking for an opportunity to attack an enemy boat that had surfaced for charging or orientation.

8) Numerous patrol vessels and motor boats, which carried out security service on the fairways, were sent to guard the boats.

9) Special types of networks (signaling and blasting), which were installed in areas where boats were likely to appear (however, the latest boats were equipped with devices that cut these networks).

10) In the last years of the war, air forces were widely used to combat submarines, both for reconnaissance and for their destruction.

These means were somewhat grandiose, one can judge from the fact that 770,000 people were assigned to work against submarines in England (personnel and servants of observation, guards and guns, patrol vessels, service workshops, etc.), which was already an impressive number of detached from the front of the fighters.

During the entire war, the Germans had 371 boats in service, of which 178 were sunk by the Allies during the war, 14 by their own crew and 7 were interned.

The losses of boats, due to the increase in means of combating them, are visible from the following table.

German submarines significantly changed the strategy of warfare at sea during the First World War. For the first time in naval history, the German command began to use submarines to conduct operations in territories remote from their bases and ports. At the same time, with the development of combat submarines, anti-submarine measures began to improve, and, consequently, the defensive forces of states. The book by English naval historians R. Gibson and M. Prendergast, written on the basis of many sources that appeared immediately after the World War, contains rich factual material covering in detail the course of operations of German submarines that took place during the First World War of 1914–1918.

A series: Marine Chronicle

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by liters company.

Chapter III. Mediterranean Sea. Beginning of the underwater campaign

(1915)

Thus, in the waters of the metropolis, passenger liners, cargo and fishing vessels had some respite from their robbers. But now it is the turn of the Mediterranean Sea, hitherto calm and safe, to experience attacks from new pirates. Here, in this great water corridor connecting the East with the Atlantic Ocean, one could find richer and more abundant booty than the North Sea privateers had imagined in their wildest dreams. From there came the submarine fighters of the maritime trade; for long days allied and neutral ships between Gibraltar and Suez were waylaid and destroyed. Ships were sunk so continuously that they began to look at it as an inevitable evil that could only be endured. The sailing conditions were ideal for the attackers. Therefore, the best boats with the most capable commanders were sent to the Adriatic in order to attack powerful streams of ships heading to the East or West from there. Leaving bases flanking the sea routes, submarine commanders easily found the courses of merchant ships, thanks to good visibility and favorable weather. The countermeasures initially used by the Allies to protect sea cargo against danger were insufficient and far from effective. Initially, it was not the enemy's trade in the Mediterranean that attracted the attention of Germany and forced its naval command to send submarines there. In the spring of 1915, when the Dardanelles naval attack alarmed the Turks, Herzing was asked if he could try to reach the Mediterranean with his U-21 and threaten Allied warships off the Gallipoli Peninsula. His enterprise was a success, but it was only in the fall that the first merchant ship in the Mediterranean was sunk by a submarine.

In 1914, when Triple Alliance turned into a Dual Alliance, radical changes in the Mediterranean policy of the Central Powers became inevitable. The Austro-Hungarian naval rafts were a compact, well-proportioned fleet of moderate size, consisting of six small submarines of three different types. They could not be considered open sea boats ("Hochseeboote") due to their limited range, and were therefore intended for operations in domestic waters. Five large boats, built at the Krupp shipyard at the beginning of the war, were included in the German fleet. In addition, in August 1914, a small "demonstration" boat, the private property of Whitehead's firm in Fiume, was confiscated and listed as number XII.

Austria-Hungary was content with these seven small units until the entry of Italy into the war forced it to replenish its forces. Small submarines operated only in the Adriatic Sea, which was constantly patrolled by Anglo-French forces. Austro-Hungarian boats were used against trade only in 1917, and the conservative policies of the Viennese authorities caused friction with the less scrupulous Germans. Many ingenious attempts were made by Germany to involve its ally in compromising incidents; this includes, for example, the abuse of the war flag of the Dual Monarchy. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that only German boats are responsible for all the atrocities committed in the Mediterranean.

The first attack is completely legal military operation– took place on October 17, 1914, when French forces were at Cattaro. The cruiser Waldec-Rousseau, attacked by boat IV, escaped damage. The second attack heralded the approach of a new task for the pinning French forces, which were in the habit of cruising in the waters adjacent to enemy bases without the slightest defense against submarine attacks. On December 21, boat XII (Lerch) met the French battleship Jean Bart in the Strait of Otrant; she saw this large ship, moving slowly, at a speed of 9 knots, and completely unprotected by any curtain of destroyers. The French dreadnought was very lucky. A torpedo hit her bow and the damage was repaired while docked in the British port of Malta.

Simultaneously with the incident described, the French submarine Curie made a brave but unsuccessful attempt to attack the Austrian ships lying in the harbor of Pola; she became hopelessly entangled in a net and was forced to surface and surrender; despite the broken hull, the Curie was raised. It was thoroughly rebuilt by the Austrians. Entering service in March of the following year as number XIV of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet, she was a significantly improved boat.

The long period of peace was suddenly broken by a stunning blow. The lesson of the Jean Bart attack was not heeded, and the inevitable disaster followed. On the night of April 26, 1915, the French armored cruiser Leon Gambetta was on patrol in the Strait of Otrant at a speed of just 6.5 knots and without any screen of destroyers. In subsequent periods of the war, such a goal could only be found in the dreams of German submarine commanders. Two torpedoes burst from the surrounding darkness and struck the large cruiser with terrible results. The team, finding itself in the dark due to the failure of the dynamos, remained completely calm. All officers remained on the ship, led by Admiral Zenes, and died along with the ship when it disappeared 10 minutes later. A total of 650 people died - a heavy retribution for the lesson already learned by the British during the death of the cruisers the previous autumn. Boat V (Trapp) attacked. As a result of its success, the large French ships guarding the Austro-Hungarian fleet were moved to the south, and the blockade was entrusted to destroyers.

About a month after the disaster described, Italy joined the Allies and relieved the French of most of their hard work, but on the condition that the Italian fleet was supported by a British squadron. It was necessary to remove 4 battleships and 4 light cruisers from the Dardanelles and send them to Taranto. These included the light cruiser Dublin, which became the submarine's next victim. On June 9, while escorting a convoy of ships along the Montenegrin coast, he was hit at San Giovanny di Medua by a torpedo from boat IV (Yustel), although there was a screen of destroyers. Despite the damage, he made it back to the port. The attack was clear evidence of the growing skill of the Adriatic submarines. We have already talked about how Herzing left Ems for the Mediterranean Sea on April 25, and how he decided to continue his journey, despite the unsuitability of the fuel brought on the Marzala transport to Rio Corcubion (Spain). Since mid-April, rumors have appeared that enemy agents are secretly organizing a base for submarines near Budrum in the Gulf of Kos. By the end of the month the rumors had become certain that actual preparations were being made for the arrival of a submarine. The last shadow of doubt disappeared when, at dawn on May 6, destroyer No. 92 from the Gibraltar patrol met U-21, heading to the stop. The submarine fired a torpedo at it and then dived to avoid being rammed. The next day, south of Cartagena, Herzing was sighted by a steamer. These reports caused great concern for the safety of the capital ships off the Gallipoli peninsula, and large Allied rewards were promised in neutral ports, mainly Greek, for information about U-21. Meanwhile, Herzing did not enter the eastern Mediterranean basin; he turned north and headed for Cattaro, where he arrived on May 13. Before proceeding to the Gallipoli Peninsula, his boat had to call at Pola for repairs.

When Italy became a belligerent, the Austro-Hungarian naval command immediately took measures to increase the weak submarine forces at its disposal. Small but useful reinforcements were quickly delivered by German shipyards. It is known that in October - November 1914 adm. Tirpitz ordered 17 coastal boats and 15 small underwater minelayers from the Krupp and Weser factories. Of these 32 German boats, 6 coastal boats (UB-1, UB-3, UB-7, UB-8, UB-14, UB-15) and 4 minelayers (UC-12, UC-13, UC-14, UC-15) were sent disassembled by rail to Pola, where they were assembled under German supervision. During 1915, only 6 new submarines entered the Austro-Hungarian fleet. One was a trophy - a rebuilt French Curie (received number XIV). One or two operational tours appear to have been made by UB-1 and UB-15 under the German flag, the latter boat achieving great success; but during the summer both of these German boats were finally transferred to Austria-Hungary and became boats XI and X in its fleet. During the autumn, three more small boats were transported in parts by rail from Bremen to Pola. These were ships of the German UB-I type. The boats were quickly assembled, and the “tin tadpoles” entered service under numbers XV, XVI and XVII.

Before Herzing's arrival at Pola, three new small coastal boats set out to attack the Allied naval forces off the Balkan Peninsula, carrying with them a load of much-needed supplies for the Turks. One of them, UB-3 (Schmidt), reported about 80 miles from Smyrna, and then disappeared without a trace; the other two – UB-7 and UB-8 – arrived safely in Constantinople and then operated in the Black Sea against the Russians, based in the Bulgarian port of Varna.

Herzing himself reached the Dardanelles on May 20, passing through the Zerigo Strait and avoiding minefields. At Dedegača he attacked the Russian cruiser Askold, and then on the 25th caused consternation with his appearance among the British ships at Gallipoli. First, he unsuccessfully attacked the battleships "Swiftshur" and "Vengence", then, meeting the "Triumph" at Gaba-Tepe, he waited 2 hours for the opportunity to fire a torpedo. The torpedo did its job; The battleship slowly capsized and sank in half an hour, killing 75 people. teams. U-21, which had surfaced to observe the results of its hit, was vigorously attacked, and Herzing relates that he escaped by veering into the wrecked ship and even dove under it as it slowly sank. He found it necessary to remain submerged for the next 28 hours, after which he rose to the surface to charge his batteries. Then he tried to find “Askold”, but did not find it. Since there were no battleships visible at Gaba Tepe, he went south to the area of ​​​​Cape Helles. Here, early in the morning of May 27, he saw the Majestic. The ship had Bullivant's nets supplied and was surrounded by patrol ships and transports; Nevertheless, the torpedo reached its target, passing in the interval between the surrounding ships, and after 7 minutes the old ship rested at a depth of 9 soots. (16.5 m) underwater. “A better shot could hardly have been imagined,” wrote the late Sir Corbett. But Herzing was insatiable and cruised around for another two days until he learned that the battleships had gone to the island of Mudros. He then stopped off the Turkish coast for one day, returned to the Dardanelles and, finding no objects to attack, entered the strait on June 1. Upon entering, he fell into a terrible whirlpool, endured a desperate struggle to get out of it, and on June 5, with half a ton of fuel in reserve, he arrived in Constantinople, where he was greeted with indescribable delight. Herzing completed his difficult task with honor. He eased the situation for the Turks and encouraged them. Like a palladin clad in steel, he smote before their eyes two great sea dragons that were spewing death upon the Turkish troops. The sight of the dying monsters could only cause despondency among the British troops, clinging to the edge of the peninsula that they had won with such difficulty.

Let's leave U-21, having completed its mission, and return to the Adriatic. On June 10, the day after the attack on Deblin, the newly assembled UB-15 (Heimburg) set out on its first mission and immediately achieved unexpected success. Off Venice, Heimburg spotted the Italian submarine Medusa on the surface and quickly fired a torpedo at it. As the torpedo exited the bow, the German "sewing machine" made a wild leap, its bow rose, and the crew had to move to the bow to restore trim. UB-15 then surfaced and rescued half a dozen Italians.

Another warship destroyed by UB-15 was the Italian armored cruiser Amalfi, part of a squadron of cruisers sent to defend Venice from naval raids. On July 7, during a light force support operation in the Gulf of Venice, Amalfi was hit by a torpedo and sank with 72 crew. Very soon another blow was struck. July 18, during shelling by an Italian squadron railway off Ragusa, Giuseppe Garibaldi was hit by a torpedo from boat IV (Yustel), and thus another large Allied cruiser was sunk. Another success was achieved by the Austrian boats on 5 August, when the V (Schlosser) waylaid the Italian submarine Nereide, which was adrift on the surface and unloading supplies for a small garrison on Pelagosa, an island temporarily occupied by the Italians on 11 July.

Then finally the happiness changed. On 1 July, a French plane reported that it had bombed and damaged the submarine XI (Fernland), but this report was not supported by any evidence. The first Austrian submarine was lost on 8 August when Whitehead's XII (Lerch) exploded in a minefield placed to protect Venice after the Amalfi disaster. Five days later, the French destroyer Bisson bombed and sank boat III (Strnad) off the Montenegrin coast. After these failures, the activity of submarines operating in the Adriatic weakened.

A semi-flotilla was formed in Constantinople, consisting of U-21, UB-7 and UB-8, UC-14 and UC-15. Of these 5 boats, UB-7 (Werner) operated in the Black Sea, where she sank several ships, of which the British steamer Patagonia (6011 tons) should be mentioned, sunk off Odessa on September 15. On October 27, she also attacked the Russian battleship Panteleimon off Varna. UB-8 was transferred to Bulgaria. UC-15, en route from the Adriatic, spent a troubled week in the Gulf of Kos undergoing repairs following a breakdown before being able to take refuge in the Dardanelles. Herzing was joined during the summer by UB-14 and UC-13; these 3 boats operated in both the Aegean and Black Seas.

The Constantinople group suffered its first loss in late November. UC-13 (Kirchner), overtaken by Russian destroyers with a discharged battery, washed ashore at Cape Kefken and was blown up by its crew. The remaining minelayer UC-12 carried military supplies, money and German agents to the North African coast to stir up a rebellion among the Senussi tribe against England in Egypt and against Italy in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, although Italy was not at war with Germany.

During his expeditions to the eastern Mediterranean, Herzing sometimes visited Beirut and Tripoli. He left the Dardanelles on July 4 and sank the empty French transport Carthage (5601 tons) off the Gallipoli Peninsula. While diving to evade patrols, his boat was nearly killed when a barrage mine exploded nearby. On August 29, Herzing went on another cruise and on September 18 made a second attack on the battleship Swiftshare, but again unsuccessfully. On the 26th, seeing that the return route was blocked by minefields, he went to Pola, where U-21 stood for repairs until January 22, 1916. However, his work was continued by Heimburg on UB-14. This boat managed to sink the first of many military transports lost by the Allies on the way to Constantinople (13 August). Her victim was the Royal Edward (11,117 tons), sailing with 31 officers and 1,335 men from Alexandria to Mudros. The torpedo was fired from 1,600 m and hit her in the stern, causing such destruction that she quickly sank after the bow rose above the water, with the loss of 866 people. The attack was carried out near Budrum, where the boat took refuge, waiting for passing ships. Her patience was rewarded on 2 September when she similarly waylaid the transport Southland (11,899 tons) off the island of Strati. As a result of the torpedo attack, 40 people were killed; but the ship did not sink and was taken to Mudros after the troops were transferred to the hospital ship Newralia.

Sporadic attacks on Allied communications soon became much more serious. On 4 August, U-34 (Rücker) and U-35 (Cophamel) left the domestic ports for the long journey to Cattaro, and were soon followed, on 27–28 August, by U-33 (Ganser) and U-39 (Forstmann). The fifth boat from these famous “thirties” - U-38 (M. Valentiner) - joined her brothers in November. The first two arrived at Cattaro on August 23 and, after the necessary repairs, went to sea to act against merchant ships in the area around Crete.

They sank 5 ships, including the French auxiliary cruiser Indien on 8 September and the Indian troop transport Ramazan (3,477 tons), which was fired upon and sunk on the 19th, with the loss of 305 soldiers and 1 sailor. After this raid, both boats delivered military equipment to the Senussi tribe.

They were followed by U-33 and U-39. Off Gibraltar they were spotted by destroyer No. 95 of the Gibraltar Patrol, and U-33 was fired upon by it. Having got rid of their pursuers, the new newcomers, going east to their destination, began to destroy ships off the Algerian coast. Organized action against merchant ships did not begin until late September, and the eastern waters of the Mediterranean were chosen as probably the most advantageous area of ​​operations. From September 28 to October 11, at least 18 ships were sunk, including the ammunition transport "Erebien" (Arabian) (2,744 tons) on September 2; Many other ships were attacked, including the huge White Star line steamer Olympic (46,359 tons), carrying 5,500 troops. Since all these losses were suffered in the zone guarded by the French fleet, a flotilla of French destroyers was sent there from the Adriatic. In addition, to strengthen patrols, the British submarine H-2 was sent to the Aegean Sea to act as a decoy. Some transports passing through the dangerous area were also armed with 12-pounder (76 mm) cannons.

There was a lull that lasted more than 10 days. During this period, the tasks of the Allied command became even more complicated, both due to the declaration of war by Bulgaria on October 15, and due to the landing of large Anglo-French forces in Thessaloniki. The enemy could hardly miss such targets as transports with troops and cargo without hindrance. U-35 (Kophamel) was brought here. On the 23rd, in the Gulf of Thessaloniki, he came across the military transport Marquette (7057 tons) with 646 officers, nurses and privates and 541 animals, coming from Egypt, and sank it with a torpedo; In total, 10 sisters, 128 soldiers and 29 crew members died. Having delivered his blow, Kophamel went straight to the Gulf of Xeros, where he received orders to go to Budrum to take the Turkish mission and equipment to transfer them to Bardia on the North African coast. He took 10 German and Turkish officers on board and put to sea on November 1 with two schooners in tow. Having safely transported the cargo of supplies and disembarked the mission three days later, Kophamel the next morning (5 November) encountered the armed landing steamer Tara entering the port of Sollum for its daily visit to the threatened garrison. He quickly blew up an unsuspecting British patrol ship with a torpedo and, capturing 70 crew members who managed to board the boats, towed them in his boat to Bardia, which was at that time in the possession of hostile Senussi, and handed them over to the Turkish commandant. Kophamel returned to Sollum, where he met two Egyptian coastal defense gunboats: he sank one, the Abbas, and damaged the other, the Abdul Moneim. A day later, U-35 apparently sank the horse transport Moorina (4944 tons) off Crete. Upon his return, Kophamel was ordered to take command of the German submarine base in Pole. He handed over the U-35 to one of the adm.'s staff officers. Fields - the one who was destined to become the “ace of aces” of the German submarine fleet, namely Lothair Arnauld de la Perriére. After the final formation of the Adriatic flotilla, Pola and Fiume became bases for periodic repairs; The fortified and landlocked Dalmatian port of Cattaro, with its deep waters, fully met all the requirements as an operational base. During the period of U-35 activity, U-39 reappeared off Crete; she was soon replaced by U-34. After this, U-33 operated independently off Malta. A total of 40 ships were sunk during November, and 12 were attacked but escaped. U-33 believed that during her cruising (from 15 November to 1 December) she destroyed 14 ships. Among its victims was "Clan Macleod" (4796 tons). For two hours this ship escaped from its pursuer. When his captain surrendered, Gansser opened fire on the crew boarding the boats, killing 12 people. and injured many others. Since during this early period the Allied naval forces and the patrols could not provide the ships with escorts, the only means at hand was to arm the most valuable ships.

The first sign of U-38's arrival in the Mediterranean was an attack on the troop transport Mercian (6,305 tons) between Gibraltar and Alboran on 4 November. Panic ensued as shells began to fall around the ship and onto its deck. Following a zigzag course, the captain managed to avoid most of the hits, but since the radio telegraph was shot down, he was unable to call for help. When he was finally replaced at the helm by one of the soldiers, he activated his machine gun and drove off the U-38. His brave defense lasted about an hour. 23 people on the ship were killed, 31 died while trying to lower two boats without permission. A more terrible fate befell the French transport Calvados (1658 tons) a few miles from Oran on November 3. She had a whole battalion on board, but, not being equipped with a radiotelegraph, she could not call for help, and 740 people died when she sank.

Continuing his journey along the Algerian coast, M. Valentiner sank several other ships; this submarine commander disgraced himself by being the first to commit a deliberately cruel act in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, after which his name appeared on the list of “war criminals.” On November 7, he sank the empty French transport France IV (4025 tons) off Sardinia, and then met with the Italian steamer Ancona (8210 tons). Raising the Austrian flag, he opened fire on the passengers and crew boarding the boats; 208 people died as a result of this pointlessly inhumane attack. Then M. Valentiner arrived in Cattaro, sinking 14 ships during his campaign. Six days later, another Italian steamer, the Bosnia (2,561 tons), was sunk, killing 12 people. Since Berlin promised Washington that passenger ships that did not take hostile actions would be spared, Austria, although innocent, was forced to accept condemnation and thereby cover up the treachery of its ally.

Not long before, the Constantinople boats achieved another success. On November 2, while UB-14 was being repaired, its commander Heimburg was informed that the French submarine Turquois, which had run aground in the Sea of ​​Marmara, had been captured intact; further that the documents found on her show that on November 5 she should have a rendezvous with the British boat E-20 near Rodosto. At the cost of great effort, the boat was prepared for the trip within 24 hours, and instead of the French boat, UB-14 went to meet the E-20. The British boat was on the surface waiting for its ally. A torpedo was fired at it, which blew it up; Only 9 people were saved from the dying ship.

There was a lull until December 10, which was broken by a series of attacks that continued until January 4. On December 9, M. Valentiner left Cattaro on U-38, towing a small UC-12 loaded with war materials for the Senussi. Having completed this task, he made a series of visits, calling at Jaffa, Beirut and Alexandretta, at which ports he was received with enthusiasm. He then turned his attention to shipping and between December 27 and January 4 sank 5 British and many Allied steamships with the loss of over 500 lives. Free from any chivalrous or humane feelings, on the 30th he did not hesitate to blow up without warning the Pepinsular and Oriental line steamer Persia (7974 tons) 70 miles south of Crete. The ship's boilers exploded and it sank like a stone, killing 334 people.

He then destroyed the Clan Makfarlan (4823 tons) on the same day, killing 52 crew; January 1 - Glengyle (9395 tons) with 10 people; January 4 – “Coquet” (4396 tons) with 17 victims; the larger Japanese steamer Yasaka Maru (10,932 tons) and the French steamer Ville de la Ciotat (6,390 tons), on which 29 people died.

On January 2, in the Gulf of Marmaris, he accepted a new batch of military materials and a new Turkish mission for transportation to Africa. However, the vigilance of the patrol off the coast of Tripoli prevented him from carrying out this undertaking, and on 10 January he arrived back at Cattaro.

After M. Valentiner's gross violation of the German obligation to spare passenger ships, Washington quite naturally sent a protest, composed in energetic terms; but Berlin with shameless impudence denied any of its commanders responsibility for this matter. However, Austria flatly refused to again portray itself as a scapegoat, since it strongly objected to such wild methods. Later, when the sinking of hospital ships began during unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, German submarines were strictly prohibited from flying the Austrian flag.

By sending submarines to the Mediterranean, the German command hoped to avoid any “incidents” that could arouse the indignation of America. These hopes were deceived by the behavior of M. Valentiner. As a result of his lawless actions, the commanders of German submarines were ordered to comply with the rules of prize war in this theater, giving passengers and crews time to board the boats before sinking the ship. With few exceptions, these rules were followed until 1917. Thus ended 1915 in the Mediterranean. During the autumn, half a dozen submarines destroyed 54 British and 38 allied and neutral ships. This was the most unequivocal warning of the difficulties ahead. The problem of protecting trade in the Mediterranean presented a particular difficulty; The allies did not at all clarify this task, but made it even more difficult by dividing the entire sea into an artificial system of “zones”, like a mosaic.

Although this division of command was extremely unsatisfactory from a military point of view, it was at the time the only possible solution to a tangled political problem. Britain fought in alliance with the two great Mediterranean powers; she had to exercise restraint and take into account the claims of the allies to participate in the management of the naval campaign. France and Italy jointly and very vigorously objected to the idea that they, the two great Latin states of the "Latin Sea", could allow their fleets to be subject to any system of unified command in which Britain would be the main directing force. The lines of communication vital to all three allies ran through the Mediterranean Sea, and each naturally considered its own interests in all respects more important than the other two. From this conflict of demands arose the method of area control. For a long time this method, with all its inherent negative properties and difficulties, was used to resolve relations between the allies. But as long as the system of separate command prevailed, a single, general and coordinated system of trade protection was unattainable.

Anti-submarine measures were almost non-existent. On the one hand, British opinion favored the establishment of "routes" and patrols; on the other hand, the French preferred a systematic search for bases. The more important transports were armed with artillery to repel surface attacks from submarines, but nothing practical had been devised to provide protection against torpedoes. It was estimated that to patrol the long shipping lines with any hope of success it would be necessary to have at least 40 destroyers and 280 trawlers. Everything was going in favor of the submarines. There were numerous straits and canals into which maritime trade flowed, and German submarines had only to visit these key points to find the desired targets. From east to west, from west to east, transports and supply ships constantly moved between Gibraltar and Gallipoli, Thessaloniki and Egypt. Traffic across the Mediterranean was no less busy: Italy urgently needed to import the necessities of life. All these factors, in connection with atmospheric conditions, made the task of the German boats very easy. It is not surprising that the commanders of the German boats sought to be sent to the Mediterranean Sea. A long and fierce struggle lay ahead before the threat could be overcome and repelled.

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The given introductory fragment of the book German submarine war 1914-1918. (Maurice Prendergast, 1931) provided by our book partner -

Completion of the first stage of submarine warfare

The intensification of submarine warfare led to a sharp increase in Allied losses at sea. By May 1915, 92 ships were sunk in less than three months: German boats sank one ship a day. The cruelty of submariners also began to increase. In the first months, U-28 captain Forstner “became famous”, who first ordered to open fire on the boats with the surviving sailors from the Aquila steamer. Then, deciding not to bother waiting, he sank the passenger steamer Falaba before the crew and passengers could leave it. 104 people died, including women and children.

On May 7, an event occurred that became one of the symbols of submarine warfare and seriously influenced the further course of the entire world war. The submarine U-20, under the command of Captain Walter Schwieger, sank the huge passenger steamer Lusitania off the coast of Ireland. While the ship was still in New York, the German embassy in the United States warned through newspapers of a possible attack on the liner, but people continued to buy tickets. On May 7, the ship was spotted by U-20, which by that time had already used almost all its ammunition except for one torpedo, and was about to return to base. However, having discovered such a tasty target, Schwieger changed his mind. The largest ocean liner was torpedoed. Immediately after the first explosion, a more destructive second explosion was heard. Judicial commissions in the UK and the USA concluded that the liner was attacked by two torpedoes. U-20 commander Schwieger claimed that he fired only one torpedo at the Lusitania. There are several versions explaining the origin of the second explosion, in particular, damage to steam boilers, an explosion of coal dust, a deliberate explosion with the aim of framing Germany, or the spontaneous detonation of illegally transported ammunition in the hold. It is very likely that the British were transporting ammunition on the ship, although they denied this.

As a result, the passenger liner sank, killing 1,198 people, including almost a hundred children. The death toll included 128 Americans, including those belonging to the “cream of society,” which caused a storm of indignation in America. Washington was not interested in Berlin's excuses, which pointed out that the ship was sailing without a flag and with a blacked-out name, that passengers were warned about the danger, that the reason for the torpedoing of the Lusitania was the smuggling of ammunition on board. That the German military command regarded the liner as an auxiliary cruiser. A sharp note was sent to Germany, saying that the American government could not allow such a tragedy to happen again, the death of US citizens, and was protesting against attacks on merchant ships. May 21st The White house notified Germany that any subsequent attack on the ship would be regarded by the United States as a "deliberately unfriendly move."

Illustration of the sinking Lusitania in the London News, May 15, 1915.

Relations between the countries have become extremely strained. Newspapers began to write about the imminent entry of the United States into the war on the side of the Entente. A propaganda campaign was launched in England and the USA about the barbarity of German submariners. Former US President Theodore Roosevelt compared the actions of the German fleet to “piracy, surpassing in scale any murder that was ever committed in the old pirate days.” The commanders of the German submarines were declared non-humans. Churchill cynically wrote: “Despite all the horror of what happened, we must consider the death of the Lusitania as the most important and favorable event for the Entente countries.... The poor children who died in the ocean hit the German regime more mercilessly than perhaps 100 thousand victims." There is a version that the British actually planned the death of the liner in order to frame the Germans.

This kind of aggravation was not at all part of the plans of the German military-political leadership. This time, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, at a meeting also attended by Kaiser Wilhelm II, Ambassador Tretler as Deputy Foreign Minister, Grand Admiral Tirpitz, Admirals Bachmann, Müller, proposed curtailing active submarine warfare. Chief of the General Staff Falkenhayn also supported the politicians; he believed that the German army could achieve decisive success on land. As a result, the Kaiser was convinced of the need to limit submarine warfare.

Submarine U-20 (second from left) among other boats in Kiel harbor

U-20 commander Walter Schwieger

On June 1, 1915, new restrictions were introduced for German submariners. From now on they were prohibited from sinking large passenger ships, even if they belonged to the British, as well as any neutral ships. Tirpitz and Bachmann resigned in protest against this decision, but the Kaiser did not accept it. It is worth noting that despite the restrictions, the German submarine fleet was still actively sinking enemy ships. In the following months, the numbers of sunk ships only increased compared to previous months. In May, 66 ships were sunk, in June already 73, in July - 97. At the same time, the Germans suffered almost no losses in submarines. In May, not a single submarine was lost in the North Sea, in June - two (U-14 and U-40). The Allies still could not establish effective anti-submarine defense.

In August 1915, the Allies had already lost 121 ships with a total capacity of 200 thousand tons. But soon another event occurred that finally completed the first stage of the submarine war. On August 19, the German submarine U-24 sank the passenger ship Arabica. In this case, 44 people died. The United States again expressed strong protest and demanded an apology and compensation for damages. The German ambassador in Washington again had to assure the American government that submarine warfare would be limited. On August 26, the German council decided to curtail underwater operations. On August 27, the German submarine fleet was ordered to interrupt combat operations until the situation is clarified. On August 30, new rules for underwater warfare were introduced. The submarine fleet was ordered to leave its area of ​​operations off the west coast of England and in the English Channel. In addition, ships were now allowed to be sunk only within the framework of maritime law. It was forbidden to sink passenger ships; cargo ships were not to be sunk, but to be captured. Thus, the first stage of the submarine war came to an end.

The first stage of submarine warfare showed the great potential capabilities of the submarine fleet, especially when anti-submarine defense was ineffective. Since the beginning of the war, ships with a total displacement of 1,300,000 tons have been sunk. Germany lost 22 submarines for various reasons. However, it was obvious that Germany overestimated the capabilities of the submarine fleet. It could not lead to a naval blockade of England. The submarine war had little effect on Britain. England had too large a merchant and military fleet. Germany had few submarines and they were still far from perfect. Also, the submarine war, with the death of passenger ships and civilians, caused a great negative resonance in the world. In addition, the hesitations of the government, which did not dare to start a full-scale submarine war, hindered the submariners. The German admirals were also greatly hampered by the constant interference of the military ground command.

As a result, admirals Bachmann and Tirpitz resigned. The Kaiser left Tirpitz in his post for political reasons (he was very popular among the people). Bachmann was replaced as chief of the naval staff by Genning von Holtzendorff, a man close to the chancellor who advocated normalizing relations with the United States. He continued the course of curtailing submarine fleet operations. True, von Holtzendorff soon reconsidered his views and sent several memoranda to the Kaiser and the government, in which he argued for the need to resume unlimited submarine warfare.

Military transport sunk by a German boat. Drawing by Willy Stöver

The appearance of the first submarine cruisers

"Limited" submarine warfare in the North Sea continued. Off the coasts of Ireland and western England, the Germans concentrated on warfare with underwater minelayers that laid mines off ports and the coast. But small submarines, carrying only 12 mines, could not greatly influence the position of the enemy fleet. German submariners also operated in other theaters of war: in the Mediterranean, Black and Baltic Seas. True, the scope of operations there was many times inferior to the activity of military operations in the seas around England. For example, only a few German submarines operated in the Black Sea, which were mainly engaged in reconnaissance and could not pose a serious threat to the Russian fleet. The submarine war was more active in the Mediterranean Sea, where Austrian and German submarines attacked ships of Italy, France and Great Britain. Submarine warfare was also waged in the Baltic Sea, although Russian and British submarines were very active here.

At the same time, the Germans continued to actively increase the power of their submarine fleet and build new submarines. They began to build real ocean-going submarine cruisers designed to break blockades and deliver strategic cargo. These submarines had an increased cruising range. They were supposed to receive powerful weapons: 2 500-mm torpedo tubes with ammunition of 18 torpedoes and 2 150-mm cannons, 2 88-mm cannons. The first-born were two ships of the Deutschland class: Deutschland and Bremen. They had a displacement of more than 1,500 tons, a speed above/under water of 12/5 knots, and a huge endurance of 25 thousand miles.

The first submarine, the Deutschland, made a test trip to America in June 1916 for a cargo of strategic raw materials. For the most part, the boat sailed on the surface and only when a vessel appeared did it go under water and proceed using periscopes, and if this seemed risky, it completely disappeared into the water. Its appearance in Baltimore, where the submarine took on board 350 tons of rubber, 343 tons of nickel, 83 tons of zinc and half a ton of jute, caused a great resonance in the world. The appearance of similar submarine cruisers in Germany meant that the Germans could now attack enemy ships even at a considerable distance from their bases, including off the coast of America. The British attempted to intercept the submarine, but it returned safely to Germany on August 24.

In September, Germany decided to repeat the experiment. Two more boats were sent to the shores of the United States - another submarine cruiser "Bremen" and the submarine U-53. “Bremen” never reached America; it died somewhere. And U-53 safely reached Newport, refueled there and went to sea again. She sank seven English merchant ships off the coast of Long Island. The submarine then successfully returned to its base on the island of Heligoland. In November, Deutschland made another voyage to the United States with a cargo worth $10 million, including precious stones, securities and medicines. She successfully returned to Germany. In February 1917, the submarine cruiser was transferred to the German Imperial Navy and was converted from an underwater transport into the military submarine U-155. The ship was equipped with 6 bow torpedo tubes with 18 torpedoes and two 150 mm cannons. Thus, German submariners showed that they could now operate on enemy transatlantic trade lines.

Deutschland in July 1916

The beginning of the second stage of a large-scale submarine war

By the end of 1916, the military position of the Central Powers began to deteriorate rapidly. During the 1916 campaign, Germany was unable to achieve decisive success in either the West or the East. Human resources were dwindling, and there was a shortage of raw materials and food. It became obvious that in a war of attrition the German bloc would face defeat. Germany became convinced that “merciless” submarine warfare should be resumed.

As military historian A. M. Zayonchkovsky noted: “Basically, the Germans’ calculations were very simple: by 1917 the British had a tonnage of approximately 16 million tons; of which 7 million tons were needed for military needs, the remaining 9 million tons were necessary for the life of the country during the year. If it is possible to destroy a large percentage of the total tonnage, and neutral ships, for fear of being sunk, stop their voyages to England, then further continuation of the war will become impossible for the latter.”

On December 22, 1916, von Holtzendorff addressed the Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal Hindenburg, with an extensive memorandum. In the document, the admiral once again emphasized the need to start unrestricted submarine warfare. It was believed that if England were withdrawn from the war, this would have a disastrous effect on the entire Entente, which depended on the capabilities of the British fleet. It is clear that the risk of the United States entering the war was taken into account. However, supporters of unlimited submarine warfare believed that even if Washington took the side of the Entente, there was no particular threat. The US doesn't have a big one ground army, which would strengthen the allies in the French theater and America already financially supports the Entente countries. The Germans also hoped to bring England to its knees before the United States had time to form and transfer significant forces to Europe.

As a result, the German government decided on January 27, 1917 to resume unrestricted submarine warfare at sea. On January 31, Berlin notified the world of the beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Henning von Holtzendorff

Submarine warfare at the end of 1916 - beginning of 1917.

On December 9, 1916, England reported the sinking of three civilian ships in the English Channel. On December 11, the steamer Rakiura, sailing under the flag of neutral Norway, was sunk by a German submarine in the English Channel. The crew managed to escape. On the same day, the British transport Magellan was sunk by the German submarine UB-47 off the coast of Sicily. On December 20, the German submarine U-38 sank the British steamer Eatonus 72 miles northeast of Malta. On December 27, 1916, the German submarine UB-47 under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Steinbauer sank the French battleship Gaulois off the coast of Sicily. The crew managed to evacuate, 4 people died.

With the beginning of 1917, the Germans sharply intensified the activities of their submarine fleet. On January 1, 1917, the same submarine nearby torpedoed and sank the British liner Ivernia, which was transporting troops to Egypt. Thanks to the skillful actions of the crew, most of the soldiers managed to escape on boats; 36 people died. In just one day, January 2, they sunk (mainly in the Bay of Biscay and off the coast of Portugal) 12 ships - 11 merchant ships belonging to Norway, England, France, Greece and Spain, and the Russian battleship Peresvet.

Peresvet was the lead ship of a series of three slightly different battleships (the series included Oslyabya and Pobeda), built at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in the Baltic. In 1902 the ship arrived in Port Arthur. During the Russo-Japanese War, this ship was sunk in Port Arthur harbor, then raised by the Japanese, repaired and commissioned under the name Sagami. Due to the need for ships for the flotilla being created in the Arctic Ocean, as well as for possible participation, at least symbolically, in Allied operations in the Mediterranean Sea, Russia in 1916 turned to Japan with a request to sell it former Russian ships that the Japanese had acquired as war trophies . The Japanese agreed to give up only three old ships: the battleships Tango (formerly Poltava) and Sagami and the cruiser Soya (formerly Varyag).

The buyout of Sagami cost Russia 7 million yen. On March 21, 1916, all three ships arrived in Vladivostok. In October 1916, after repairs, Peresvet set sail for Europe via the Suez Canal. It was assumed that the ship would first be overhauled in England, and then it would join the Russian Northern Flotilla. But on January 2, 1917, 10 miles from Port Said at 17.30, the Peresvet was blown up bow and stern by two mines at once. The ship was quickly sinking, and the commander ordered the crew to save themselves. Only one steam boat was launched. At 17.47 "Peresvet" capsized and sank. A nearby English destroyer and French trawlers lifted 557 people from the water, several of whom later died from wounds and hypothermia. 252 members of the Peresvet crew were killed. It later turned out that the ship was lost in a minefield laid by the German submarine U-73.

Memorial plate with the names of sailors from Peresvet, installed on a grave in the cemetery in Port Said

Over the next few days, German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Bay of Biscay sank another 54 ships of the Entente countries and neutral countries - mainly cargo ships and trawlers. From January 9 to 15, in the Bay of Biscay, the English Channel, the North, Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, German submarines sank 29 ships (most were British, but there were also French, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish). German submariners suffered only one loss - on January 14, the boat UB-37 was sunk in the English Channel.

On January 17, in the Atlantic Ocean near the Portuguese island of Madeira, the German auxiliary cruiser Möwe sank an English merchant ship. From 16 to 22 January, German submarine forces sank a total of 48 merchant ships from the Entente and neutral countries in the Atlantic Ocean (mainly off the coast of Portugal and in the Bay of Biscay) and in the Mediterranean Sea.

Between 23 and 29 January, German submarines sank a total of 48 ships, including 1 Swedish, 3 Spanish, 10 Norwegian, 1 Danish and 1 Dutch, despite the neutrality of these countries. On January 25, the British auxiliary cruiser Laurentic was blown up by a mine laid by a German submarine in the Irish Sea. The cruiser was traveling from Liverpool to Halifax (Canada) and already at the exit from the North Channel came across a German mine. 378 of the 745 people on board were killed. This tragedy could be regarded as ordinary against the backdrop of other losses of the British Royal Navy, and other navies, during the First World War. In addition, the Laurentic itself was not even a warship and was not a valuable unit of the British fleet. It was a passenger liner, hastily converted before the war into an auxiliary cruiser. Its only advantage was its fairly high speed.

However, the death of this ship deserved the closest attention of the British government. The place where the cruiser died was immediately taken under guard by English ships. The fleet command was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the divers. The reason was that more than 3,200 gold bars, packed in boxes weighing 64 kilograms each, with a total weight of almost 43 tons from the UK's gold reserves, went to the bottom. The cruiser broke all records that existed before it; no ship had ever transported so much gold. The gold was intended for the US government as payment for food and military supplies to Great Britain. It is worth noting that during the war, Washington greatly enriched itself by supplying the Entente countries and neutral powers, and also turned from a debtor into a global creditor, since the warring powers were forced to pay in gold for American supplies, and also took loans from the United States. The loss of this ship hit British finances hard.

Soon divers arrived at the site of the ship's death. The first descent under water made it possible to discover the sunken cruiser and outline a plan for further work. The ship lay on the port side, its upper deck was only 18 meters from the surface of the sea. A special vessel also arrived, with special equipment for underwater work. Since the Admiralty did not require the ship itself to be preserved, but only its contents to be retrieved, it was decided to use explosives. The start of the work was successful, several boxes were lifted. But then a storm broke out that lasted a whole week. When the rescuers returned to the Laurentic, a sad sight awaited them. Under the blows of storm waves, the hull of the ship folded into an accordion, the passage through which divers pulled out their first finds turned into a gap. The ship also shifted and sank to a depth of 30 meters. When the divers cleared their way to the treasure again, they were surprised to find that all the gold had disappeared. It turned out that under the influence of the storm, the hull of the cruiser parted, all the gold fell down and was located somewhere there, under tons of steel debris. As a result, the work was greatly delayed. Divers used explosives to pave their way and search for gold. In the fall of 1917, work was temporarily interrupted due to the onset of a period of storms. Since America entered the war on the side of the Entente, the work was postponed until post-war period. Only in 1919 the rescue ship again approached the site of the sinking of the cruiser. And again the divers had to start all over again. Now they had to remove stones and sand, which had compacted into a dense mass and resembled cement. It was impossible to use explosives; the gold would have completely disappeared. Divers, using crowbars and hoses through which water was supplied under high pressure, broke off pieces of “cement” and sent them to the surface. As a result, work continued until 1924. During the search, the huge ocean liner was literally cut into pieces and dragged along the ocean floor. During the entire search, divers made more than 5,000 dives and returned almost all the gold to the British treasury.

British auxiliary cruiser Laurentic

In the first five days of unrestricted submarine warfare, which was officially declared on January 31, 1917, German submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea sank 60 ships of the Entente countries and neutral powers, including one American. During the period from February 6 to February 12, German submarines sank another 77 ships, including 13 ships of neutral countries. During the period from February 13 to 19, the Germans sank even more merchant ships of the Entente countries and neutral states - 96. In the period from February 20 to 26, the Germans sank 71 ships. From February 27 to March 5, German submarines sank 77 ships.

In just the first three months of 1917, German submariners sank 728 ships with a total displacement of 1,168,000 tons. As a result, on average, the Germans sank 8 ships a day during these months. True, their losses have also increased - 9 submarines in three months. However, the pace of construction of new submarines also increased, and during the same period 24 submarines were built in Germany. The main problem now was the lack of trained personnel.

To be continued…