The first chairman of the Tunguska volost. Pavel Postyshev

September 7th, 2018

In the fall of 1957, on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, the Khabarovsk section of veterans of the revolutionary underground and civil war was looking for candidates to be “immortalized” on the occasion of the anniversary.

On October 2, the chairman of the section, Ivan Semikorovkin (former commander of mounted reconnaissance in the partisan detachment of Alexei Kochnev), proposed filing a petition to erect a monument to the Kochnev brothers in Khabarovsk.

Both in the hall and among the members of the bureau there were many former Kochnevites; apparently, a unanimous “for” was expected, but a member of the bureau, Comrade Malyshev, asked to speak:

– Although I was in the neighboring partisan detachment of Shevchuk, I know the Kochnev brothers well, especially the younger brothers - Nikolai, Alexander and Grigory, who in 1920, after the partisan detachments entered the city of Khabarovsk, were engaged in unworthy things, namely: they were in a gang Shmatko Alexandra, were engaged in robbing the population, for which they were beaten by the partisans of Izotov’s detachment. Therefore, I think there is no reason to erect a monument.

Heroes of the post

The Kochnevtsy, of course, reared up. Comrade Timkin expressed himself most eloquently:

– Slander, policy of revenge of the class enemy(sic!).

Former partisan Klishko said with a blue eye:

– Indeed, the bandits Shmatok, Yevtushenko and others penetrated our detachment. But they were all quickly exposed and, by order of Comrade Kochnev, shot.

Bureau member Ponomarev responded to his speech in a peculiar way:

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TOKUEV Grigory Arkadyevich (December 23, 1917, Potashevskaya village, now Shenursky district, Arkhangelsk region - 1995, Belarus).

He graduated from seven-year school. He worked at the Arkhangelsk flying club. In the army since 1938. Participant in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 - 1940.

Participant of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. Since June 1942, the commander of a partisan subversive group, since August 1943, the commander of a sabotage detachment operating in the Kopatkevich and Petrikovsky districts of the Gomel region. The partisans under his command derailed 55 enemy trains, the commander’s personal account included 19. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Grigory Arkadyevich Tokuev on August 15, 1944.

After the liberation of Belarus G.A. Tokuev graduated from the College of Physical Education in Minsk. He worked as deputy chairman of the republican DSO "Spartak" and in other positions.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, and medals.

The name of Tokuev is immortalized on the central obelisk of the Verkhopadenga rural administration.

In Belarusian forests

Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the partisan youth detachment Grigory Arkadyevich Tokuev. The title was awarded by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 15, 1944. During the Great Patriotic War, our fellow countryman Grigory Arkadyevich Tokuev was the pride of the Belarusian partisans.

Tokuev was born in the village of Potashevka, Shenkursky district, into a poor peasant family. He spent his youth in Arkhangelsk. This is where his work biography and sporting success began.

Belarus, with its hospitable people and gentle nature, became the second homeland for Tokuev. There, in an airborne formation, he served in active military service. In Belarus, where the blood-spattered chariot of Hitler's invasion first passed, Tokuev received his first baptism of fire.

At the beginning of the war, Grigory Arkadyevich was unlucky. Heavily wounded and unconscious, he was captured. The agonizing days of wandering through fascist death camps began.

But the Soviet patriot could not live in slavery. Tokuev escapes from captivity several times and, after long wanderings in the summer of 1942, finally ends up with the partisans of Belarusian Polesie.

Polesie is a heroic region. The partisan movement spread through it like spring waters, and White Rus' became enraged. The partisans took a firm hold of the forest. Every branched oak, every bush was an ally of the patriots and their stepfather's houses. The endless forests became a school for the formidable avengers to fight for the freedom and independence of the Motherland.

In one of the detachments of the Polesie unit, Tokuev led a sabotage group. In the summer of 1942, Grigory Arkadyevich, together with two companions along a difficult partisan path, “sang the demolition song to the Nazis” for the first time. He mined the railway and derailed an enemy train with a punitive detachment of SS men. The military class carriages were crushed to pieces, leaving about 200 of the Fuhrer's soldiers as their bones. In a word, it turned out to be a “partisan steak.” A personal account for the enemy was opened.

The first success inspired the Tokuevites. A few days later, the second train with shells went downhill, then the third, fourth, fifth. The Tokuevites harassed their partisan formations on the section of the railway along which the front was continuously supplied with people, equipment, weapons, and fuel. Every day, sabotage was committed on the “piece of iron”.

The headquarters of the partisan movement reported to the Arkhangelsk regional committee of the Komsomol: “Komsomol member of your organization Grigory Arkadyevich Tokuev is fighting the German occupiers in their deep rear in Belarus. We're happy to report that he's acting like a hero. Tokuev commands a Komsomol group of demolitions. This group blew up 11 enemy trains. In all operations carried out by the detachment, Tokuev serves as a model of heroism.”

Good fame about Tokuev spread throughout Polesie. News about the military affairs of the demolition man and his friends was passed on from mouth to mouth, supplemented by storytellers, and degenerated into a legend. The forest soldiers lovingly called Gregory “Tokuy”, and the Fritz dubbed him “the white-haired devil” and were afraid like hell of meeting the daring and elusive athlete-saboteur.

The German command was extremely concerned about the subversive attacks of the Polesie partisans. The occupiers were forced to reorganize the railway security. If in the first days of the war the Nazis entrusted the protection of the road to the peasants of the surrounding villages, then after the increasing incidence of train crashes, the Germans themselves were responsible for the protection of the railway track.

The enemy's vigilance increased. Along the entire line, bunkers with machine gun nests were made every three hundred meters, and a sentry stood every one and a half hundred meters. There were two observation watchtowers with heavy machine guns per kilometer of route. To prevent the partisans from secretly approaching the embankment, the Nazis cut down trees and bushes on both sides of the embankment for a hundred meters. Villages located near the railway were burned. Residents were shot or taken to hard labor.

Ambushes against bombers have become more frequent. SS battalions with artillery, aircraft, and tanks removed from the front were sent to fight them.

Train traffic tactics have been changed. Ahead of the military personnel, the Germans began to launch a control maneuverable steam locomotive with five or six freight platforms loaded with sand. It also happened that several safety platforms with ballast rolled in front of a steam locomotive pulling a military train.

All these measures did not save the invaders. Demolitionists continued to go out on combat operations, laying mines with a delayed fuse, mines “on a cord”. Explosions on the railway did not stop.

In the summer of 1943, an important event occurred in the life of the famous demolition bomber, who by this time had perfectly mastered the complex science of partisans and had already been awarded the Order of Lenin for his exploits.

On August 25, 1918, the 5th Extraordinary Regional Congress of Soviets opened in Khabarovsk, where the only correct decision was made - to switch to partisan forms of struggle, to use all opportunities to defeat the counter-revolution and foreign intervention.

In the fall of 1918, independently of each other, 2 underground groups appeared in Khabarovsk: one of workers under the leadership of D. Boyko, the other of representatives of Centrosiberia, who arrived from Siberia, escaping White Guard terror. In 1918-1922. Throughout the Far East, partisan detachments were formed in the taiga. Among the partisan leaders, Sergei Georgievich Lazo (1894-1920), one of the leaders of the struggle for Soviet power in Siberia and Primorye, a hero of the Civil War, was especially popular. Member of the Bolshevik Party since 1918, member of Central Siberia. In 1920, member of the Military Council of Primorye, Far Eastern Bureau of the Party Central Committee. After the fall of Soviet power in the Far East, he went into the taiga along with other Bolsheviks. In the spring of 1919, he was appointed commander of all partisan detachments in Primorye. The enormous guerrilla war that unfolded from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean facilitated the advance of the Red Army.

There were 2 large partisan detachments operating on the territory of the future Jewish Autonomous Region: Tunguska and Kuldur.

Tunguska partisan detachment was formed in the village of Arkhangelovka, located about 10 km. from Art. Volochaevka. The Khabarovsk loaders became the core of the detachment. From here the detachment made sabotage attacks on the railway, raids on Japanese garrisons, and defended their village from extortions and confiscations. The detachment was led by Ivan Pavlovich Shevchuk, in 1914-1917. was on the German front, where he joined the Bolshevik Party. In 1919, the detachment numbered 30 people, organized its own flotilla, first from boats, then they got a steamer. Soon the detachment grew, by 1920 there were 900 fighters in Shevchuk’s detachment.

Kuldur partisan detachment was organized in the taiga in the village of Kuldur, this place was chosen because of the proximity of the railway. And along the railway, at all the stations and sidings, there were Japanese. The commander of the Kuldur detachment was initially Fyodor Vorobyov, and after his death (shot by the Japanese) in 1919 - Anatoly Fedorovich Bolshakov-Musin. The deputy chairman of the detachment committee was Maxim Trofimovich Onishchenko.

The detachment initially consisted of 6 people, and then grew to 300. From the moment of its formation, the detachment was engaged in blocking the movement of interventionists and White Guards along the railway - they set fire to bridges, mined the railway, derailed and pushed enemy trains against each other. Later, roads began to be mined when the White Guards or interventionists approached villages located on the territory of the future Jewish Autonomous Region, under guard. In 1920, the detachment joined the regular units of the Red Army.

In 1917, Nikolai Trofimovich Onishchenko was elected to the first Vladivostok Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In 1918 he worked at Dalsovnarkom. During the occupation of the Amur region by foreign interventionists and with the formation of the Ussuri Front in the summer of 1918, as a gifted speaker, he worked on agitating the population to attract volunteers to the Red Guard, then was assigned to underground work at the station. Bira. Nikolai Trofimovich and his wife Alexandra Grigorievna maintained contact with the Kuldur partisan detachment, campaigned among Japanese soldiers, and distributed political literature. In May 1919, Onishchenko was betrayed by provocateurs and the Japanese brutally tortured him, mocked his wife, then shot him and threw his body into the Bira River.

The Japanese interventionists, seeing that their positions in the Far East were becoming increasingly precarious, more than once tried to create a pretext for continuing the intervention. On the night of April 4–5, 1920, with the consent and blessing of the Americans, who gave the Japanese “free hands,” Japanese demonstrations took place in almost all cities of the Far East. Under the guise of an exercise, they took advantageous strategic positions and unexpectedly opened fire on the partisans, beating civilians in cold blood. However, the partisans managed to fight out of the encirclement. But the Japanese managed to capture the leader of the partisans Sergei Lazo, members of the military council Sibirtsev and Lutsky. They were burned in the locomotive firebox. In total, about 7,000 people died. Over Vladivostok, where Russian flags had previously been, Japanese ones fluttered. And again the taiga became a fortress of defense, from where the partisans launched attacks on the enemy.

The grandiose guerrilla war that unfolded in Kolchak’s rear from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean greatly facilitated the advance of the Red Army to the East and the implementation of the plan to defeat the 1st Entente campaign. The military situation in the Far East changed when, according to the verdict of the revolutionary tribunal, Admiral Kolchak was shot in January 1920. The Americans, British, and French were forced to evacuate. And the Japanese declared neutrality.

1. Shishkin S.N. Civil war in the Far East, 1918-1922. – M.: Voenizdat, 1957.

The insurgent movement in the Amur region, in contrast to the movement in the Amur region and Southern Primorye, where it originated on the periphery, began with an uprising in the city. It was initiated by a group of young communists who remained in the Khabarovsk underground. Despite the cruel terror of the Kalmyks and foreign interventionists, this group already in September 1918 managed to gather local communists around itself and form an underground party committee. The first step of the committee was to issue a leaflet about the brutal reprisals of the White Guards against Soviet people and about the execution of 16 former Magyars prisoners of war in the city garden.

In early October, the committee established contact with the union of longshoremen, workers of the arsenal of the Amur River Flotilla and the railway depot. An active force was created here to carry out revolutionary work.

Considering the dissatisfaction of the population with the mobilization of peasant-Cossack youth announced by Kalmykov, the committee also launched active propaganda among units of the Khabarovsk garrison. As a result of this work, revolutionary cells arose in some parts of the White troops, which primarily included former Red Army soldiers who came to Kalmykov along with those mobilized.

The unbridled revelry of the White Guard reaction, supported and encouraged by the interventionists, increasingly tensed the atmosphere. The executions of not only civilians, but also soldiers who did not want to participate in punitive expeditions became more frequent.

On the first anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the underground committee decided to prepare an uprising of the Khabarovsk garrison and organize workers' squads. At the same time, a number of party workers went to villages and villages in order to create initiative groups there from former Red Guards and revolutionary-minded peasants. Revolutionary propaganda and news received from the villages about the robberies, bullying and torture committed by the Kalmyks soon yielded results. By January 1919, revolutionary cells organized in white units had already extended their influence to a significant part of the Khabarovsk garrison. Only the Plastun hundreds of the Wild Division, the commandant's teams and the military school remained loyal to Kalmykov.

In early January, the committee developed a plan for an uprising with the aim of exterminating counter-revolutionary officers led by Kalmykov and seizing weapons and ammunition. After this, the rebels had to break through the American-Japanese outposts into the region and, together with the rebel peasants and Cossacks, begin to destroy the interventionists. It was decided not to draw the workers’ squads into battle for now, but to gradually send them to the region to organize partisan detachments there.

The uprising began on the night of January 28. The 3rd and 4th hundreds of the Cossack regiment, part of the artillery battalion and a machine gun team disarmed a company of cadets, killed officers, including Kalmykov’s closest assistant, Colonel Biryukov. Kalmykov himself could not be captured. He managed to escape to Japanese headquarters and raise the alarm there. Japanese units occupied all exits from the city and cut off the rebels' escape routes. At the same time, the American interventionists, hiding behind, as usual, “neutrality,” treacherously allowed the rebels into their zone, and then imprisoned the disarmed ones in a concentration camp on Krasnaya Rechka. Only a few rebel cavalrymen managed to break through and escape across the Amur towards the Chinese border. For the rebels who ended up in an American concentration camp, unbearable conditions were created. Many of them died from disease and hunger.

Although the uprising of the Khabarovsk garrison did not achieve its goal, it still played a positive role in mobilizing the masses to fight the counter-revolution. The authority of the communist organization increased. The working people of the Amur region saw in it the only force capable, under the most difficult conditions of terror of the interventionists and White Guards, of waging an irreconcilable struggle against the American and Japanese occupiers and their henchmen. Kalmykov's position was significantly undermined. He lost some of his powers.

After the Khabarovsk uprising, the underground committee decided to shift the center of gravity of the work to the periphery. In February 1919, proactive revolutionary groups, reinforced by party workers who arrived from Khabarovsk, began active preparations for the illegal congress of workers of the Amur region. This congress took place on March 10-11, 1919 in the village of Sokolovka. It was attended by 76 delegates from the Tunguska, Nekrasovskaya, Dormidontovskaya, Vyazemskaya, Khabarovsk and other underground revolutionary organizations. The congress was held under the slogan of the struggle for Soviet power and marked the beginning of a massive partisan movement in the Amur region.

At the congress, it was decided to declare illegal the orders of the White Guard authorities on mobilization into the army, to organize partisan detachments and provide them with comprehensive assistance and support. To lead the partisan movement, the congress elected a military-revolutionary headquarters headed by D.I. Boyko-Pavlov.

During March and April, the military revolutionary headquarters, with the help of revolutionary initiative groups previously created in the villages, organized four infantry partisan detachments, one cavalry and one sapper - with a total number of up to 600 people. Chinese workers from logging sites on the Khor River took an active part in organizing the detachments. They dealt with the white administration and turned logging food warehouses into a supply base for the partisans. The workers' squads who arrived from Khabarovsk and the Red Guards of the former Ussuri Front who escaped from the Kalmyk dungeons were the basis for the selection of command personnel.

Active combat operations by the partisans began in May 1919. By order of the military revolutionary headquarters, on May 19, partisan detachments carried out a raid on the Japanese garrison located at the station. Verino and guarded the railway bridge over the Khor River. The blow took the enemy by surprise. The partisans destroyed the entire enemy garrison and captured weapons, ammunition and uniforms.

The command of the interventionists and White Guards sent large forces against the partisans. Three Japanese and two White Guard regiments with a total number of up to 5 thousand soldiers and officers were advanced from the direction of Knyaze-Volkonsky and from the stations and crossings of Dormidontovka, Khor, Verino, Kruglikovo. The enemy sought to encircle the partisan detachments with a simultaneous offensive from the north, west and south.

On May 23, fierce fighting broke out in the area of ​​the village of Marusino and to the southeast. For three days, the partisans held back the enemy's onslaught, stubbornly defending their positions. However, having suffered significant losses from artillery and machine-gun fire, they were forced, by order of the military-revolutionary headquarters, to retreat deep into the taiga to the upper tributaries of the Khor-Mataya and Bicheva rivers. Having begun the pursuit, the interventionists and White Guards tried to press the partisans to the Khor River. The partisan sapper detachment quickly set up a raft crossing and ensured the withdrawal of the main forces. Having set up an ambush on the river bank, the partisans met the enemy with devastating fire and thwarted his plan. Moving away from the pursuing enemy and confusing their tracks, the partisans made a huge circuitous path through the taiga wilds. At the end of June, they reached the area of ​​​​the village of Vesely Kut, where the military revolutionary headquarters established contact with partisan detachments operating in the areas of the lower Amur.

After some lull, the partisan movement by the end of the summer of 1919 again covered a significant part of the Amur region. Detachments of people's avengers appeared not only in areas south and northeast of Khabarovsk, but also to the west of it. Here in the areas of Arkhangelovka, Art. In, Art. In Volochaevka and to the east, two Tunguska partisan detachments operated: one under the command of I.P. Shevchuk, the other under the command of the river flotilla workers in Khabarovsk, brothers Nikolai and Grigory Kochnev. The political leader of Shevchuk’s partisan detachment was a prominent figure of the Communist Party in the Far East, P.P. Postyshev, who carried out enormous political work not only in the detachment, but also in the entire surrounding region, as well as in Khabarovsk itself. No measures taken by the White Guard authorities or interventionists could stifle the growing movement. The population of villages and villages met punitive detachments with fire or went into the taiga, joining partisan detachments.

The party center and the military-revolutionary headquarters were faced with new tasks. It was necessary to unite and make the actions of all partisan forces more purposeful. The question also arose about the creation of local organizations that could paralyze the hostile activities of the kulaks and take over the material support of the partisan detachments.

To solve these problems, on the 20th of August in the village of Alekseevka, Nekrasovskaya volost, a conference of representatives of the partisan detachments of the Amur region and the Khabarovsk underground communist organization was convened. The conference heard information from the party committee on the international situation and the situation on the fronts of the Soviet Republic, as well as a report from the military-revolutionary headquarters on the state of the partisan movement. She discussed the issue of partisan tactics and decided, in order to provide the most effective assistance to the Soviet Army, to intensify the work to disintegrate and disorganize the enemy rear. To do this, all partisan detachments were asked to launch an attack on the enemy’s railway and water communications. The conference decided to create illegal revolutionary committees in the villages and assign them responsibilities for providing assistance to partisan detachments and combating counter-revolution on the ground.

After the conference in Alekseevka, the second period of the partisan movement in the Amur region began. It was characterized by more organized and active actions of the partisans, who concentrated their main efforts on the destruction of enemy lines of communication. At the direction of the military-revolutionary headquarters, part of the partisan detachments occupied the area adjacent to the Ussuri railway from the station. Bikin to st. Verino. The other part of the detachments was sent closer to Khabarovsk and located along the Ussuriysk railway from the station. Verino to st. Krasnaya Rechka, as well as along the Amur River from the village of Voronezhskoye to Verkhne-Tambovskoye (280 km northeast of Khabarovsk).

At the end of August and autumn, the partisans won a number of battles with the interventionists and White Guards. Izotov’s detachment, faced with a White punitive expedition near the village of Vyatskoye (on the Amur River), fought an intense battle for 16 hours. The enemy was completely defeated and lost up to 60 people killed. The partisans captured the head of the punitive expedition. A detachment of partisans under the command of Zhukov, operating on the Amur, in response to the reprisal of Japanese gunboats against the village of Sindh, attacked two enemy ships - “Lux” and “Kanavino” in the Voronezh region and in a one-day battle destroyed them along with the White Guard teams. The second detachment of partisans under the command of Mizin exterminated in the area of ​​Lake Qatar a group of Kalmyk counterintelligence officers operating here under the guise of a workers' artel. The third detachment captured a Japanese food transport near the village of Malmyzh, heading to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.

Along with actions on river routes, the partisans carried out a number of attacks on the Ussuriysk railway. In September, a mixed infantry-cavalry detachment under the command of Boyko-Pavlov attacked the station. Korfovskaya. The partisans defeated the White Guard garrison stationed here, blew up bridges and burned the station.

At the end of October, one of the detachments set up an ambush between the Korfovskaya and Krasnaya Rechka stations and derailed a train with soldiers and officers of the 14th Japanese Infantry Division, heading from Vladivostok to Blagoveshchensk. Despite the destruction of the underground party center in Khabarovsk by the Kalmyks in mid-October, the partisan movement continued to grow. It covered more and more new areas, spreading down the Amur in the direction of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.

On November 1-2, 1919, the 2nd joint conference of representatives of partisan detachments, revolutionary peasants and urban underground organizations took place in the village of Anastasyevka. The conference discussed the issues of zoning the actions of partisan detachments, transferring part of the forces to launch the struggle on Sakhalin, strengthening the leadership of the partisan movement on the part of the communists and organizing revolutionary committees as bodies of Soviet power in the areas liberated from the White Guards. The conference elected a joint military-revolutionary headquarters of the partisan detachments of the Khabarovsk, Nikolaev regions and the Sakhalin region and issued an appeal to the Cossacks, peasants and workers with an appeal to join the partisan detachments.

The detachments operating on the Ussuri railway were united into the 1st combat area; detachments operating in the lower reaches of the Amur formed the 3rd combat area. The partisans, grouped west of Khabarovsk along the Tunguska River, united into consolidated detachments under the overall command of Shevchuk. Boyko-Pavlov was again elected chairman of the military revolutionary headquarters and commander of all detachments.

After the Anastasyev Conference, the third period of the partisan movement in the Amur region began. It was marked, on the one hand, by overcoming the unhealthy tendency towards independence in actions on the part of some commanders, by establishing mass political and educational work and raising the combat capability of partisan detachments, and on the other hand, by the deployment of decisive battles with the interventionists and the White Guards. During this period the struggle reached its highest tension.

Trying to starve out the population that did not want to submit, Kalmykov issued an order in November 1919 prohibiting the export of food and other goods from the city to villages. In response to this, the military-revolutionary headquarters declared an economic blockade of Khabarovsk, calling on the peasants to stop supplying food, fodder and fuel to the city. As a result of the blockade, Kalmykov was forced to cancel his order.

On the 20th of November, the military revolutionary headquarters gave all partisan detachments operating in the direction of the Ussuri Railway an order to set out simultaneously on November 25 to blow up the railway track and destroy railway structures.

Strike by a partisan detachment at the station. Razengartovku was not successful. The actions of other units were more successful. Between the Goedicke and Snarsky sidings, a Japanese armored train was derailed. A detachment of partisans near the village of Otradnoye destroyed a train of interventionists with troops and cargo, blew up a bridge and destroyed the railway track for 8 km. At the station Dormidontovka, the White Guard garrison was defeated and the railway track was destroyed. At the same time, two other partisan detachments defeated a Japanese garrison of up to a regiment on the Khor River and captured the regimental banner, cash register, machine guns and 120 carts with military equipment. As a result of the defeat of this garrison, the 1st District managed to establish contact with the partisans operating in the Iman Valley and in the area of ​​the station. Bikin. At the same time, Shevchuk’s detachment carried out a raid on the Japanese garrison located at the station. Ying, and inflicted significant losses on him.

On December 20, partisan detachments suddenly attacked the Goedicke crossing and captured a Japanese train there with weapons, uniforms and food. 6 Japanese bomb throwers and 4 machine guns fell into the hands of the partisans. The partisans took the captured property on carts to the taiga. The interventionists left the station in pursuit of them. Vyazemsky is a strong detachment. The enemy surrounded the partisan barracks, located 28-30 km from the Gedike junction, and after a 2-hour battle recaptured part of the captured property. Having pulled up their forces, the partisans went on the offensive. They used Japanese bombs and machine guns and, in a fierce 5-hour battle, defeated the interventionists and forced them to hastily retreat. Pursuing the enemy, one detachment of partisans went to the rear and set up an ambush between the Gedike and Kotikovo patrols. At the same time, another detachment continued to push the enemy from the front. Having stumbled upon an ambush, the enemy lost over 200 people killed and wounded and left all their weapons on the battlefield. Only some interventionists managed to escape to the station. Vyazemskaya.

The daring attacks of the partisans, carried out on an increasing scale every day, completely disorganized the routes of communication of the interventionists. The combat activities of partisan detachments in December 1919 already covered a huge strip to the south and west of Khabarovsk. Telegraph communications and a significant part of the railway track from the station. Bikin to st. Vira for 420 km were put out of action by the partisans. The American-Japanese and White Guard garrisons, scattered across stations and sidings, lived under constant fear of attack. They did not dare to go beyond their fortifications. For restoration work, the interventionists were forced to send special repair and construction trains. Trains could only move during the day and only under the protection of armored trains.

In connection with the growth of the partisan movement, Kalmykov introduced a state of siege in the Amur region back in November 1919, and in December announced an additional mobilization of ten ages of Cossacks. But the overwhelming majority of the Cossacks, instead of reporting to the assembly points, went to the partisans.

Trying to extinguish the flames of the people's war with the blood of the families of the partisans, the interventionists equipped several large punitive expeditions.

One of these expeditions, formed from parts of the Wild Division, was sent at the end of December along the Tunguska River against partisan detachments operating west of Khabarovsk. Having burst into the village of Arkhangelovka, the White Guards carried out a brutal massacre of the local residents and burned out half of the village. To fight the punitive forces, an urgent mobilization of peasants was carried out, which produced up to 600 fighters within two days. At night, the partisans surrounded the White Guards and, in a heated battle, defeated them. The second detachment, sent by the interventionists to help the first in the village of Vostorgovka (northwest of Arkhangelovka), turned out to be less reliable. Some of his soldiers, having established contact with the partisans, killed the officers, disarmed the remaining units and went over to the side of the partisans.

Having thus taken possession of two mountain guns and three machine guns, Shevchuk’s partisan detachment joined the rebel soldiers and launched an offensive against the Insk garrison of interventionists. After a fierce battle that lasted a whole day, the partisans occupied the station on January 1, 1920. In, cutting off communications between Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk. After the defeat of the punitive expeditions sent by the interventionists and the Japanese garrison at the station. The partisan-insurgent movement began to spread with increasing force towards Khabarovsk.

At the same time, partisan detachments operating along the Ussuri railway were approaching the station from the south. Red River. Here were units of Colonel Moore's American brigade transferred from Khabarovsk by this time. The American interventionists, having occupied Krasnaya Rechka, subjected to barbaric shelling the state Soviet colony for orphans located in the station village. They destroyed and burned all the premises of the colony. Many children died during artillery shelling and fire. The partisans decided to teach the American military a lesson. On January 19, they made an unexpected raid on the station. Krasnaya Rechka and the radio station and appeared in Muravyovskaya Slobodka (a suburb of Khabarovsk), causing panic among the interventionists and White Guards.

In January 1920, uprisings engulfed a significant part of the Amur region. In this regard, on January 18-21, at the initiative of the party committee, a congress of workers, peasants, soldiers and Cossack deputies of the Khabarovsk district was held in the village of Kukelevsky. The Congress elected a Council and decided to recall persons serving in government agencies and in the white troops, and also demanded the removal of interventionist troops from the Far East.

At the end of January, partisan detachments of the 1st region, uniting with Tunguska partisans, formed the Khabarovsk Front and began preparations for an attack on Khabarovsk. No less active actions developed during this period to the northeast of Khabarovsk in the 3rd combat area. Here, at the end of October 1919, the partisans defeated the White garrison near Zimmermanovka and captured all the enemy’s weapons.

In November, the interventionists and White Guards sent a punitive expedition to the Obor River and the village of Vyatskoye, which managed to capture the taiga partisan base. Escaping persecution, the partisans moved down the Amur River, raising uprisings in villages along the way. All peasants who had weapons joined the partisan detachments, the rest actively helped the partisans in organizing supplies and rear bases. The mine workers completely joined the partisans. Revolutionary committees were created in villages and villages liberated from the white administration. In January 1920, the partisan detachment advancing in the direction of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur already numbered several thousand fighters. He had two full-blooded regiments and teams of skiers.

Having joined the rebellious white garrison of the village of Mariinsk, this detachment at the end of January launched an attack on the Chnyrrakh fortress, located 12 km from Nikolaevsk-on-Amur.

As a result of the measures taken and individual successes achieved in military clashes in January 1922, the position of the Eastern Front of the People's Revolutionary Army improved significantly. On January 31, the front in the area of ​​Art. Vira, st. The Chita Rifle Brigade arrived. With the arrival of the Chita brigade, the cavalry group operating in the Amur direction was disbanded. The 4th Cavalry Regiment was transferred to the Combined Brigade, and from the Chita Brigade and the Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment attached to it, the Transbaikal Group was created under the command of N.D. Tomin, the commander of the Chita Brigade. By February 4, 1922, a grouping of units of the Eastern Front of the People's Revolutionary Army was next.

The Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment was still in the Amur direction in the area of ​​​​the villages of Zabelovo and Lugovskoy; The 2nd Regiment of the Chita Brigade, replacing units of the Combined Brigade, which withdrew to the station. Ying for additional staffing, moved to the area of ​​the 3rd half-barracks; The 1st regiment of the Chita brigade was located in the area of ​​the village and the station. In; 3rd Regiment of the Chita Brigade - at the Aur junction; Combined brigade (5th, 6th, Special Amur regiments and 4th cavalry regiment) - in the area of ​​the village and station. In.

In addition, the Eastern Front included the Tunguska partisan detachment of Shevchuk, grouped in the area of ​​the village of Vostorgovka, and the Plastun partisan detachment of Petrov-Teterin, located in the area of ​​​​the village of In. The last two detachments were attached to the Combined Brigade, whose commander at the end of January was appointed J. Z. Pokus. In total, the troops of the Eastern Front of the People's Revolutionary Army before the counter-offensive had about 6,300 bayonets, 1,300 sabers, 300 machine guns, 30 guns, 3 armored trains and 2 tanks.

In terms of the number of bayonets, the People's Revolutionary Army outnumbered the enemy by almost 2 times, in sabers the superiority was insignificant, in machine guns - almost five times, in guns - 2.5 times.

The front's supply of ammunition and food thanks to those created at the station. There were sufficient reserves. Forage supplies were scarce. The units were not sufficiently provided with warm clothing. Supply agencies and logistics services clearly failed to cope with their tasks. For example, during the assault on Volochaev’s positions, fighters were forced to make passes through the enemy’s wire barriers with grenades and rifle butts, while the scissors for cutting the wire lay in warehouses in Blagoveshchensk. The units were not provided with a sledge train. There were also no skis in the units.

Politically, the upcoming operation was well secured. This was evidenced by the high political and moral state of the units and the offensive impulse of the troops, despite the harsh conditions of the cold Far Eastern winter and the lack of sufficient warm clothing among the soldiers. Political bodies under the leadership of P.P. Postyshev, a member of the Military Council of the Eastern Front, used every military encounter with the Whites to make his experience available to the entire command staff and the people’s army. Using specific examples of combat situations, they raised the fighters' confidence in their abilities, instilled a consciousness of superiority over the enemy and rallied them around the communists.

Grouping and combat composition of enemy forces.

Having failed in the battles under Art. In and having lost the initiative of the offensive in the January clashes, the enemy decided to gain a foothold in the area of ​​Art. Volochaevka. Having created strong defensive positions here, the White Guard command intended to bleed the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army, and then, choosing an opportune moment, go on the offensive again. The White Guards did not choose the Volochaevka area for this purpose by chance. The presence of the hills and hills of the June-Korani Mountain to the northeast of Volochaevka, as well as a small forest to the south of it, created natural conditions for the creation of defensive positions that blocked the path to Khabarovsk.

To the west of Volochaevka stretched a hummocky plain, covered in places with skinny bushes and perfectly visible from Mount June-Korani. With a small clearing of the firing sectors, all approaches to Volochaevka could be kept under artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire. Loose, waist-length snow made it impossible for the attacker to move in large forces across the plain. In view of this, the fighting of the parties was inevitably drawn to the railway track. Armored trains were to play an exceptional role.

During January 1922, the Whites created and equipped positions that began at the Tunguska River, passed through Mount June-Korani, the western outskirts of the village of Volochaevka and, capturing the edges of the forest south of Volochaevka, went south, ending with fortifications in the Verkhne-Spasskaya area on the left bank of the Amur. The total length of positions between the Tunguska and Amur rivers reached 18 km.

The area of ​​the station was especially strongly fortified. Volochaevka. Many trenches with ice parapets were created here; Blockhouses for observation posts and machine guns were equipped from icy snow. Two strips of wire fences were erected in front of Volochaevka. The northern slopes of Mount June-Korani and the western and southwestern edges of the forest south of Volochaevka were also entangled with wire. In general, Volochaevka was a heavily fortified field-type area at that time. General Molchanov, who toured the front of the “White Rebel Army” at the end of January, assessed the railway direction as completely safe and believed that in order to capture Volochaevka, the People’s Revolutionary Army should have much more significant forces than those it actually had. Even reactionary US newspapers wrote about Volochaevka: “The Bolsheviks will not advance to the east. The Far Eastern Verdun was created on the approaches to the Amur".

But, representing a truly serious, almost insurmountable obstacle in the railway line, Volochaev’s positions had one drawback. They did not reach Verkhne-Spasskaya in a continuous line. In this regard, the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army could, although with great difficulty due to the lack of roads, bypass Volochaevka from the south. In addition, the attacker could use the direction along the Amur. Moving along the ice of the river, it was possible through the channel connecting the Amur and Ussuri to reach the Kazakevicheva area and further to the station. Korfovskaya, i.e. to the rear of the entire Volochaev-Khabarovsk group of whites. But the White Guard command believed that the distance of this direction from the base of the People's Revolutionary Army, located at the station. In the absence of sleds and skis, there was no possibility of active operations by large infantry units. Molchanov believed that only cavalry action could be expected in the Amur direction, and therefore placed a strong infantry barrier in the Verkhne-Spasskaya area.

The advantage of well-equipped defensive positions in the Volochaevka area was also that the White Guard troops were located in populated areas (the villages of Volochaevka, Danilovka, Arkhangelovka, Dezhnevka and others). This circumstance, in cold winter conditions, was of no small importance for maintaining the combat effectiveness of the troops. The Whites also had well-rolled winter roads running along the railroad tracks and the left bank of the Amur towards Khabarovsk. The presence of these roads allowed the enemy not only to ensure uninterrupted supply to the front, but also to use them to maneuver reserves. The troops of the People's Revolutionary Army were deprived of these advantages.

On January 1, 1922, the “White Rebel Army” had about 4,550 bayonets and sabers, 63 machine guns, 12 guns, 3 armored trains at the front; in the immediate and deep rear - about 3,460 bayonets and sabers, 22 machine guns, 3 guns.

According to intelligence data from the headquarters of the People's Revolutionary Army, the forces of the "White Rebel Army" were exaggerated. The White Guard command, which pinned its hopes on the support of the Amur Cossacks, failed to attract any significant number of Cossacks to its side. Thanks to the widespread work of party organizations, the Amur Cossacks took a hostile position towards the “white rebel army”, responding to Molchanov’s appeals that their path was not with the whites, but with the working peasantry, and did not give the whites any reinforcements. Thus, the forces of the “White Rebel Army” not only did not increase with its advance to the Amur region, but even decreased due to losses.

Considering the main direction to be the railway, and the right flank of the Volochaev positions to be the most threatened due to the actions of the partisans, the White Guard command concentrated its main forces in the Volochaevka area and to the northeast. North of the railway and station. Volochaevka, in the area of ​​Mount June-Korani, the 3rd detachment was located. To secure the right flank, a group of General Vishnevsky consisting of 500 bayonets and sabers was advanced to the area of ​​​​the village of Arkhangelovka. In the village of Danilovka there was a cavalry regiment and the Iman hundred of Colonel Shiryaev. In the area of ​​Volochaevka itself, along the saddle railway, the 1st detachment was concentrated. The vast majority of artillery and machine guns were located here. South of the railway and along the edge of the forest behind wire fences, the 2nd detachment occupied a position. The 4th detachment was located in the Amur direction in the area of ​​Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya. The 5th detachment was located in reserve in the Dezhnevka area, which, if necessary, could be sent to the flanks or to the center of Volochaev’s positions.

Plans of the command of the People's Revolutionary Army.

In December 1921, when, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, parts of the People's Revolutionary Army were forced to retreat to the west and the command of the People's Revolutionary Army had no confidence in the rapid concentration of troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District west of Khabarovsk, it was planned to actively defend the Ina bridgehead with available forces. In the event of a forced retreat to the west from the station. The In troops of the People's Revolutionary Army, destroying the railway track and bridges, had to retreat to the Arkhara positions (about 250 km west of the station In) in order to gain time, exhaust the enemy forces and put their extended communications under attack by the partisans. Having concentrated the Chita brigade under the cover of the retreating units, the command of the People's Revolutionary Army intended to inflict a crushing blow on the Whites here and organize a parallel pursuit of them, first along the Amur River and then along the Ussuri River with the aim of finally eliminating the enemy. This was the original plan of action.

However, the turning point at the front, which occurred as a result of the defeat of General Sakharov’s group near Art. On December 28, and the concentration of units from the Transbaikal Military District that began in early January radically changed the original plan. Already at the beginning of January 1922, the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army made their first attempt to launch a counteroffensive, capture Volochaevka and completely seize the initiative of military operations into their own hands.

Despite the fact that this offensive was unsuccessful, the commander of the Eastern Front, S. M. Seryshev, gave a new order for the offensive on January 8, 1922. The front units were given the task of encircling the enemy in the Khabarovsk area, Art. Verino and destroy his manpower. To accomplish this task, the Troitskosavsky and 4th Separate Cavalry Regiments had to occupy Verkhne-Spasskaya, Kazakevicheva on January 10-11, and on January 12 go to the Krasnaya Rechka crossing area, Art. Verino, where to contact the partisan detachment of Boyko-Pavlov and cut off the enemy’s retreat to the south. The Insk group was divided into two columns. The first column, consisting of the Special Amur Regiment, the 5th and 6th Rifle Regiments, with the support of armored trains No. 2 and No. 9, was tasked with taking Volochaevka on January 9 and, having sent the 5th Regiment to occupy Pokrovka, Khabarovsk, on January 10 go to the Nizhne region -Spasskaya, Samarka and further advance on Nikolo-Aleksandrovskoye. The second column, consisting of Shevchuk’s partisan detachment, two squadrons of cavalry with two guns, was supposed to strike the rear of the Volochaev white group on the morning of January 9, occupy the Amur crossing in the evening on January 10, and then, bypassing Khabarovsk from the northeast, destroy the enemy retreating along road to Knyaz-Volkonskoe.

The Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army, V.K. Blucher, believed that a decisive offensive should not be undertaken without preliminary preparations, and therefore canceled the order. At the same time, he pointed out that the dispersion of forces and the lack of opportunity to launch a concentric strike could lead to the failure of this offensive. On January 10, 1922, V. K. Blucher, in a direct conversation with the commander of the Eastern Front, outlined the plan of the main command of the People's Revolutionary Army.

At the first stage of hostilities, it was proposed to firmly hold the positions occupied and defeat the enemy if he went on the offensive, in order to ensure the concentration of the cavalry division of the Chita brigade in the area of ​​st. In. At the second stage, the 5th, 6th and Special Amur regiments, forming the Consolidated Infantry Brigade, were to move along the railway line to attack Volochaevka, and the 4th, Troitskosavsky cavalry regiments and the cavalry division of the Chita brigade, united into the Consolidated Cavalry The brigade, supporting the infantry advance, was supposed to strike the nearest rear of the enemy Volochaev group. Shevchuk’s detachment was to attack Dezhnevka for the same purpose. At this stage, the main task of the troops was to capture the Volochaevka region.

At the third stage, which began after the capture of Volochaevka, it was planned to occupy Khabarovsk and destroy the enemy in this area. The fighting at this time should have taken place in this sequence. The Special Amur and 6th Rifle Regiments, as well as the Combined Cavalry Brigade, forming a strike group, advance through Novgorodskaya, Novo-Troitskoye, and capture Kazakevicheva, Art. Korfovskaya, Krasnaya Rechka crossing and thereby cutting off the enemy’s retreat to the south. Shevchuk's detachment and the 5th Infantry Regiment, united in a group, are attacking Khabarovsk by rail. That was the plan.

From the stated plan it is clear that before the capture of Volochaevka the main blow was planned to be delivered on the railway direction. After the capture of Volochaevka, decisive importance was assigned to the Amur direction, because only by acting in this direction could the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army cut off the enemy's escape route to Primorye and destroy his manpower. The plan did not yet talk about the use of the Chita brigade, which was already heading to the front. Only the cavalry division of this brigade was mentioned. Meanwhile, the arrival of the Chita brigade had a significant impact on changing this plan.

On January 15, the commander of the Eastern Front proposed new considerations that arose in connection with the transfer of the Chita brigade: 1) until the arrival of this brigade, the draft order for the capture of Volochaevka should not be implemented; 2) with the end of the concentration of the Chita brigade, carry out both tasks with a simultaneous strike: a) capturing Volochaevka and b) attacking Kazakevicheva. The task of capturing Kazakevicheva was assigned to the Trans-Baikal group, and the capture of Volochaevka - to the Combined Infantry Brigade, giving it the 4th cavalry regiment and Shevchuk's partisan detachment. The front commander believed that in this way it would be possible to prevent the Whites from retreating to the south and to get closer to the task of destroying enemy manpower.

At this time, the commander-in-chief had already left Chita for the front, so no response was received to the considerations presented. Subsequently, the front commander came up with another plan - to deeply bypass the enemy from the north along the Tunguska River valley.

On January 28, 1922, the commander-in-chief of the NRA, V.K. Blucher, arrived at the front to directly lead the counteroffensive. With his arrival, the final plan of the operation was adopted, which boiled down to the following: 1. Seize Art. Olgokhta, using its area as a springboard for the deployment of forces for the purpose of a subsequent attack on Volochaevka. 2. After the regrouping and deployment of forces in the area of ​​st. Olgokhta With a combined brigade, advance along the railway and, with the assistance of partisan detachments, strike at the right flank of Volochaev’s positions; further pursue the enemy in the direction of Khabarovsk. At the same time, the Transbaikal group, sent from the station. Olgokht in the Amur direction, strike on the left flank in the direction of Verkhne-Spasskaya, Nizhne-Spasskaya and, building on the success along the channel connecting the Amur with Ussuri, to Kazakevicheva, cut off the enemy’s retreat to Southern Primorye. The ultimate goal of the operation was to encircle and destroy the “White rebel army” in the Khabarovsk region. It was decided to launch a general offensive on February 7-8, having previously captured the area of ​​the station. Olgokhta.

Plan of the White Guard command.

As already mentioned above, the White Guard command, after unsuccessful battles near Art. In and loss of offensive initiative in the January clashes, he decided to temporarily gain a foothold in the Volochaevka area. Molchanov intended to defeat the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army in Volochaev's fortified positions, and then, choosing an opportune moment, launch a decisive offensive. The goal of the offensive was to occupy the passes over the Vanda ridge (a spur of the Lesser Khingan) in the shortest possible time. By capturing the passes across the Vanda ridge, the Whites hoped to strengthen their position in the Amur region and secure the Khabarovsk region and all of Primorye. These goals completely followed from the plans of the Japanese interventionists, who prepared the entire “White Rebel” adventure.

Progress of the counteroffensive.

The counteroffensive of the People's Revolutionary Army developed in the following stages: First (February 5-7) - the battle of units of the People's Revolutionary Army for the capture and retention of Art. Olgokhta. The second (February 8-9) - regrouping of units of the People's Revolutionary Army and reaching the starting position to attack Volochaev's positions. The third (February 10-12) - the assault on Volochaevka by the Combined Brigade and the battles of the Transbaikal group for Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya. Fourth (February 13-26) - pursuit of the enemy.

First stage (February 5-7). On February 4, the Chita brigade of the Eastern Front was ordered to capture the station the next day. Olgokhta. At the same time, the partisan detachments came under the command of the commander of the Combined Brigade, who was supposed to advance the Plastun partisan detachment to the area of ​​the village of Vostorgovka, occupied by the Tunguska partisan detachment, and unite these detachments under the overall command of Petrov-Teterin.

To advance to the station. Olgokht was allocated the 2nd rifle regiment of the Chita brigade, a squadron of the 4th Separate Cavalry Regiment, the 3rd battery of the artillery division of the Combined Brigade, separate railway and engineer companies, armored trains No. 2, 8, 9 and one tank.

On the morning of February 5, the 2nd regiment of the Chita brigade, with the support of the 3rd battery, went on the offensive at the station. Olgokhta and, having knocked out the enemy, occupied it. With selfless work in 30° frost, sappers and a railway company by the end of the day on February 5 restored all the railway bridges west of the station. Olgokhty thereby gave armored train No. 8 the opportunity to move to the station.

At dawn on February 7, a strong group of whites numbering up to 700 bayonets, 85 sabers with 8 machine guns and 4 guns launched a counterattack. Advancing with the forces of the “Volunteer” regiment, supported by the “Volzhanin” armored train, along the railway, the Whites simultaneously advanced the Kama and Jaeger regiments consisting of 225 bayonets and sabers with two guns to bypass the station. Olgokhty from the north, and the Omsk and Ufa regiments numbering up to 375 bayonets and sabers with four machine guns and two guns - to bypass from the south and reach the rear of the People's Revolutionary Army units.

Having received a report of an enemy advance along the railway, the commander of the 2nd regiment moved the 1st battalion to the east. With the support of the approaching armored train No. 8, this battalion not only delayed the White advance, but, acting decisively and boldly, drove them back and occupied the bridge at the 3rd verst east of the station. Olgokhty. At this time, the enemy's encircling column, approaching the station from the north, opened fire. Almost simultaneously, the second enemy column went on the offensive from the south. The 2nd and 3rd battalions located at the station deployed on both sides of the railway track and prepared to repel the enemy attack. At this time, the white cavalry, having reached the railway between the station. In and Art. Olgokhta, set fire to the bridge and opened fire from the west. Communication with Art. The battle was interrupted, and the 2nd Regiment was surrounded. The team of armored train No. 8, seeing a bridge burning in the rear, stopped the firefight with the enemy armored train and rushed to the west. Using cannon and machine gun fire, she dispersed the white cavalry. The fire was extinguished. At the same time, the 3rd Battery moved its guns to exposed positions and opened fire with grapeshot. The White attack was repulsed by fire from the armored train and battery.

Encouraged by the bold actions of the artillerymen and the armored train crew, the infantry launched a counterattack. After a three-hour battle, the enemy, having suffered heavy losses, retreated to the east. The 2nd regiment began pursuit and occupied the 1st half-barracks, located 6 km east of the station. Olgokhta. Thus, the task was completed. A springboard for the deployment of units for the purpose of launching a general counteroffensive was secured.

Second stage (February 8-9). On February 7, the Combined Brigade was supposed to replace the 2nd Regiment of the Chita Brigade in the area of ​​the station. Olgokhta and the 1st half-barracks, and on February 8 occupy Mount Lumku-Korani (north of the railway) as the starting line for the attack on Volochaevka. The Transbaikal group was supposed to follow the Combined Brigade to the station. Olgokht, meaning that when the latter goes on the offensive, go south to occupy Nizhne-Spasskaya, and subsequently capture Kazakevicheva. One regiment of the Chita brigade remained in the front reserve in the Olgokhta area.

On February 8, the Combined Brigade, replacing the 2nd Regiment of the Chita Brigade, began an offensive. Its vanguard - the Special Amur Regiment - having on the right flank a combined cavalry squadron (consisting of teams of mounted reconnaissance regiments of the Combined Brigade) and one battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment in reserve, maneuvered around the enemy's flanks in two columns and forced him to retreat. By the evening of February 8, the Special Amur Regiment occupied Mount Lumku-Korani. However, it turned out that the area of ​​Mount Lumku-Korani was too far from the enemy’s main defensive line and could not serve as a starting point for an attack. As a result, units of the Combined Brigade, having reached Mount Lumku-Korani, continued to fight their way east during February 9.

Carried away by the battle for Mount Lumku-Korani, the commander of the Combined Brigade did not pay due attention to the railway direction. Taking advantage of this, the enemy, with the help of an armored train, held this direction in his hands until midday on February 9 and fired flanking fire at units of the Combined Brigade, thereby delaying their advance. Only after a battalion of the Amur Regiment with an artillery platoon was sent here were the Whites forced to clear the railway. The advance became faster and by the end of the day on February 9, the Combined Brigade reached the Poperechnaya River.

The Transbaikal group was less successful. Having been late due to poor performance of the military communications service of the front, focusing on the station. Olgokhta, she set out on Verkhne-Spasskaya only at 12 o’clock on February 9. She was supposed to reach Verkhne-Spasskaya on the same day in order to capture this point with a blow from the east and north-east and a simultaneous attack of the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment from the west. But due to the lack of a road and a rising snowstorm, which made it difficult to navigate, parts of the Transbaikal group (1st and 2nd regiments of the Chita brigade, Chita cavalry division and horse-mountain battery) covered only 10 km in 6 hours and were forced to make a big halt in the village of Ulanovka. The group did not achieve their intended goal that day.

Third stage (February 10-12). Another February 9th at 12 noon. 10 min. The commander of the Eastern Front gave the order to launch a general attack on the enemy. According to this order, the Combined Brigade, having occupied Arkhangelovka, the railway water pumping station near the Poperechnaya River and the Poperechnaya postal station as its starting position by the end of February 9, was to launch an offensive on Volochaevka at dawn on February 10. The Transbaikal group was ordered, leaving one regiment in the front reserve in the Olgokhta area, to occupy Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya by the end of February 9. At dawn on February 10, the Trans-Baikal group was supposed to begin demonstrating an offensive on Samarka, Orlovka, and at 12 o’clock move to Kazakevicheva with the goal of cutting off enemy units leaving the Volochaevka, Khabarovsk area and destroying them.

On February 9, units of the Combined Brigade were unable to capture the line of the Poperechnaya River. They completed this task only by dawn on February 10, occupying the 3rd half-barracks on the right bank of the Poperechnaya River (7 km west of Volochaevka).

The Transbaikal group, which spent a lot of time on the march, was only approaching Verkhne-Spasskaya at dawn on February 10th. Since the vanguard of the group lost its orientation due to a snowstorm, the main forces left on the morning of February 10 not eastern Verkhne-Spasskaya - to the enemy’s rear, as planned, but to the west.

On February 10, the Combined Brigade, having taken its initial position in the area of ​​the 3rd half-barracks, launched a decisive offensive. She launched her main attack on the white right flank, with a secondary attack in the center and south of the railroad.

To deliver the main attack, a bypass column consisting of the 5th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Separate Cavalry Regiment, partisan detachments of Petrov-Teterin and Shevchuk with four mountain guns was allocated. For operations south of the railway, the 6th Infantry Regiment with two guns was assigned. One battalion of the Special Amur Regiment with a platoon of tanks (two tanks) was supposed to advance in the center. Two battalions of the Special Amur Regiment were left in reserve on the railway line. The artillery was grouped in the center under the overall command of the chief of artillery of the Combined Brigade. Since the railway track and bridges between the 3rd semi-barracks and the station. Volochaevka were destroyed, armored trains could not take part in the offensive.

February 10 at 11 a.m. 30 min. units of the Combined Brigade launched an attack on Volochaevka. Before others, two companies of the 6th Infantry Regiment, operating on the right flank, approached the enemy fortifications. The enemy opened strong cross-machine gun fire. Under enemy fire, the companies began to overcome obstacles, but became entangled in the wire and almost completely died. The advance of other units of the 6th Regiment was stopped.

In the central sector, one tank, supporting the advance of the battalion of the Amur Regiment, broke through two rows of wire barriers, but was hit by fire from an enemy armored train. The second tank was out of action due to a malfunction even before the attack.

The units of the encircling column advancing on the left flank (5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments) had to walk through deep snowdrifts that reached their waists. They were so tired that when they reached the enemy wire, they were completely exhausted. The partisan detachments advancing to the left of the Combined Brigade did not reach their starting position by the appointed time, and contact with them was lost. Therefore, the 4th Cavalry Regiment, intended to attack the enemy's rear, was forced to dismount and cover the left flank of the 5th Infantry Regiment. The artillery assigned to the encircling column fell behind and could not conduct effective fire at enemy firing points. By 5 p.m. the advance of the Combined Brigade was stopped by the enemy. The soldiers lay in the snow near the wire fences under heavy enemy fire and could not get up either to rush forward or to retreat back. Only with the onset of darkness was it possible to take them 600 m back.

The partisan detachments of Petrov-Teterin and Shevchuk, who had orders to advance from Vostorgovka to Arkhangelovka and further to the southeast, broke into Arkhangelovka at dawn on February 10 and attacked the White headquarters, but counterattacked by the enemy, they were forced to retreat to Vostorgovka, having lost contact with Svodnaya brigade. A positive result of the partisan raid was that they captured an important operational order from the commander of the White Guard troops, General Molchanov. Thus, the first attack on Volochaevka failed. South of Volochaevka, in the offensive sector of the Transbaikal group, events developed as follows.

At the time when the Combined Brigade began attacking the Volochaev positions, the Trans-Baikal group, having joined the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, at 11 o'clock on February 10 launched an offensive on Verkhne-Spasskaya. At first, only one 2nd regiment was brought into the battle, so the offensive developed slowly. The enemy, having fortified himself on the western outskirts of the village, held back the advance of the 2nd regiment with artillery and machine-gun fire. By the evening of February 10, another battalion of the 1st regiment was brought into battle. At the same time, the horse-mountain battery, having moved to an open position, shot down the White observation post with direct fire. Taking advantage of the temporary weakening of enemy fire, the infantry broke into Verkhne-Spasskaya and captured the western and northern outskirts. The enemy nevertheless held the eastern part of the settlement and made forays into the location of the Transbaikal group all night.

Only by dawn on February 11, when the Chita cavalry division put forward to bypass created a threat to the Whites reaching the rear, they left Verkhne-Spasskaya and began to hastily retreat to the east. On the same day in the afternoon, the Transbaikal group reached Nizhne-Spasskaya and, with a simultaneous attack from the west, north and northeast, captured this village. The enemy was thrown back towards Samarka. However, with the active actions of horse patrols, the Whites interrupted the connection between the Combined Brigade and the Transbaikal Group.

Throughout the entire day of February 11, the commander of the Transbaikal group had no information about the situation in the area of ​​the Combined Brigade. Only late in the evening did two mounted scouts manage to deliver to the commander of the Trans-Baikal group an order to assist the Combined Brigade in capturing Volochaevka. To do this, it was proposed to allocate the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, reinforcing it with artillery, with the task of delivering a blow to the rear of the Volochaev white group in the direction of Dezhnevka. The Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment began to prepare for a new mission on the morning of February 12. The remaining parts of the Transbaikal group settled down for the day in Nizhne-Spasskaya.

Thus, as a result of the battles that took place on February 10 and 11, success was achieved only in the Amur direction. In two-day battles, the Transbaikal group defeated the 4th White detachment and captured Verkhne-Spasskaya and Nizhne-Spasskaya. But this task was completed two days behind schedule.

The slow and insufficiently decisive offensive of the Transbaikal group allowed the enemy to retain freedom of action. Having covered himself with insignificant forces in the Amur direction, he concentrated his main efforts in the Volochaevka area and repelled the attacks of the Combined Brigade here. In the current situation, when the main White group was not only not defeated, but also continued to firmly hold its positions, the further advance of the Transbaikal group to Kazakevicheva and further to the northeast could lead to its complete isolation and did not promise success.

Meanwhile, the White Guard command, having received information about the defeat of the 4th detachment in the Verkhne-Spasskaya area, decided that the People's Revolutionary Army had transferred the main blow of its forces to the Amur direction. Therefore, on the night of February 12, Molchanov sent his reserve here - the Volga brigade (5th detachment), giving it the task of recapturing Nizhne-Spasskaya at any cost.

The unsuccessful actions of the Combined Brigade in the Volochaev direction are explained by the following reasons. Due to poor reconnaissance, the brigade command was unable to determine in advance the enemy grouping and the nature of its fortifications. Therefore, the main blow was delivered on the right flank of the Volochaev junction, where the positions were the strongest and where the main enemy forces were grouped. The starting position was chosen too far from the target of attack. As a result, the strike group approached the enemy’s main defensive line exhausted.

In addition, in the conditions of the struggle for Volochaevka, armored trains became extremely important, since off-road conditions and deep snow cover almost completely excluded the maneuver of field artillery. However, the destroyed bridges and railway tracks were not restored. As a result of this, the armored trains could not support the infantry and suppress enemy firing points, and the artillery assigned to the infantry lagged behind and could not provide effective assistance to the attacking units. The lack of interaction between the created groupings also had an effect, as a result of which the units reached the front edge of the enemy’s defensive position separately. Taking advantage of this, the Whites were able to consistently concentrate their fire on threatened areas and repel attacks.

Yet, despite the failure, the attacks launched by the Combined Brigade on February 10 also had a positive impact. As a result of the battle, as well as from the operational order of the commander of the “White Rebel Army” captured by the partisans, the command of the Combined Brigade became aware of the enemy group and its intentions. It was discovered that the main forces of the Whites were in the most fortified, northern section of the Volochaev positions; the central section is covered mainly by machine guns, artillery and armored trains; in the southern section the fortifications are not completed and do not reach Verkhne-Spasskaya.

Based on the data obtained, a new action plan was adopted. It was decided to deliver the main attack south of the railway with the right flank of the Combined Brigade, while at the same time selecting a bypass column consisting of one battalion, one cavalry squadron and two guns under the overall command of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 6th rifle regiment, Gulzhof, to bypass from the south.

The right flank was strengthened by the 3rd regiment of the Chita brigade transferred from the front reserve. Under the general command of the commander of the 6th regiment A. Zakharov, a strike group was created here. The special Amur regiment with attached armored trains was still supposed to advance in the center. The 5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments were to conduct demonstrative offensive actions on the left flank. The general attack was scheduled for the morning of February 12.

During February 11, units of the Combined Brigade regrouped according to the new plan. Despite enemy fire, the railway track and bridges were restored. Armored trains No. 8 and 9 were put on alert and pulled closer to the front line.

Assault on Volochaevka on February 12. By 7 o'clock on February 12, units of the Combined Brigade occupied a new starting position. The 3rd regiment of the Chita brigade was located on the northern edge of the forest, 2.5 km southwest of Volochaevka; 6th Infantry Regiment - to the left of the 3rd Regiment, on the edge of the grove, 1.5 km from Volochaevka; 1st battalion of the Special Amur Regiment - along the edge of the grove, 1.5 km west of Volochaevka, with the 2nd and 3rd battalions in a ledge behind; 5th Infantry Regiment - to the left of the Special Amur Regiment, along the edge of the grove northwest and north of Volochaevka, 2 km from the central hill of Mount June-Korani; The 4th Cavalry Regiment, attached to the 5th Infantry Regiment, covered the left flank. The main artillery group of 11 guns was concentrated in the center behind the Special Amur Regiment. Armored train No. 8 approached the bend of the railway 4 km west of Volochaevka; Behind him stood armored train No. 9.

The outflanking column of the 6th Infantry Regiment set out to complete the assigned task at 3 o'clock on February 12th. The signal for the start of the offensive was three gun shots from armored train No. 9.

At 8 o'clock on February 12, following a signal, units of the Combined Brigade began an attack on Volochaevka. Tearing apart the wire fences with rifle butts, sapper shovels, hand grenades, or crushing them under themselves, the companies of the right-flank 3rd and 6th regiments approached the enemy trenches and, after a short battle, occupied some of them. However, further advance was delayed by strong flanking fire from enemy armored trains, which advanced along the railway level with the battle formations of their infantry. Having come under devastating fire, the companies of the 3rd and 6th regiments were forced to leave the trenches they had captured.

In the central sector, the artillery group, having dispersed fire on individual targets, did not provide effective support to the infantry. At the same time, armored train No. 8, due to one section of rails destroyed by enemy artillery, could not move closer to the battle formations in order to conduct targeted fire. In view of this, the attack of the Special Amur Regiment foundered.

The advance of the 5th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Regiments was also stopped by heavy enemy fire. By 9 o'clock the advance of the Combined Brigade resulted in a protracted firefight. The main obstacle to the advance of our troops were enemy armored trains. With their fire they did not allow the infantry to rise to rush forward.

Having assessed the situation, the commander of the Combined Brigade ordered the fire of all artillery to be concentrated on the white armored trains and, under the cover of this fire, to restore the railway track. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment, Kondratyev, ordered the battalion gun to be moved directly into the chain and fired at point-blank range on the enemy armored train, which was cruising in the area of ​​Mount June-Korani. Artillery fire diverted the attention of enemy armored trains. They entered into a firefight with the artillerymen. The sappers took advantage of this and quickly restored the path, and armored train No. 8 moved forward at full speed. Despite the oncoming hurricane fire, he forced the enemy's lead armored train to retreat and, breaking into the Whites' position, opened flanking machine-gun fire on the trenches. Encouraged by the bold onslaught of their armored train, the infantry of the Combined Brigade rose and launched an assault, trying to knock the enemy out of the trenches with a bayonet strike and grenades. A fierce battle broke out, often turning into hand-to-hand combat in some areas.

While these events were unfolding in the Volochaevka area, the following happened in the Amur direction and south of Volochaevka. The Volga region white brigade, sent by Molchanov on the night of February 12 to help the 4th detachment, moved towards Nizhne-Spasskaya. Due to the darkness of the night and a rising snowstorm, its vanguard broke away from the main forces. By the morning of February 12, he reached Nizhne-Spasskaya and was defeated by the Transbaikal group. Having been defeated, the vanguard began to quickly retreat to the northeast to the main forces. He was pursued by the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, which received the task of going to the rear of the Volochaev white group. Almost at the same time, the main forces of the Volga brigade, still only halfway between Dezhnevka and Nizhne-Spasskaya, unexpectedly came across a bypass column of the 6th Infantry Regiment. Taking advantage of the enemy's confusion, the commander of the encircling column quickly deployed his units and opened fire with direct fire from two guns. The enemy began to retreat, but finding that the numerical superiority was on his side, he stopped and decided to take the fight. The Whites barely had time to deploy their forces when cavalry appeared on their flank. It was the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, pursuing the vanguard of the Volga brigade. The unexpected appearance of cavalry on the flank caused confusion among the whites. Having only lost up to 300 people killed, they began to hastily retreat to the northeast.

The outflanking column of the 6th Infantry Regiment and the Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment, dividing into two detachments, began pursuit. The first detachment quickly reached the railway east of Volochaevka and set fire to a bridge 6 km east of the station. This forced the white armored trains to leave their positions and move east, thereby weakening the defense of the Volochaevka area. The exit of the encircling column to the rear of Volochaev’s group, combined with a powerful blow from the front by the Combined Brigade, decided the fate of Volochaev’s positions. The infantry of the Combined Brigade intensified the onslaught and broke into the enemy fortifications.

The Whites, suffering huge losses, began to retreat to the east. Already at 11 o'clock. 30 min. On February 12, the Special Amur Regiment entered Volochaevka, and the 5th Infantry Regiment occupied Mount June-Korani. A battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment, the 6th Infantry Regiment and the Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiment were sent to pursue the enemy. However, due to severe overwork in previous battles, the regiments pursued that day only to the experimental field, located 12 km east of Volochaevka.

The White Guards lost up to 400 people killed and 700 wounded in the battles for Volochaevka. The losses of the People's Revolutionary Army were also significant. The heroism and courage shown by the soldiers and commanders during the assault on Volochaev’s positions aroused admiration even among their enemies. The commander of the Volochaev group of whites, Colonel Argunov, later said: “I would give each of the red soldiers who stormed Volochaevka a St. George’s Cross”.

For the heroism of the soldiers and commanders shown during the capture of Volochaevka, the 6th Infantry Regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and was subsequently renamed the “4th Order of the Red Banner Volochaevsky Regiment.” Armored train No. 8 and 67 soldiers and commanders of the Combined Brigade were also awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Fourth stage (February 13-26) - pursuit. After the defeat at Volochaevka, the White Guards had no choice but to quickly flee to the south under the cover of Japanese troops. They wanted to preserve the remaining manpower for the subsequent struggle. To do this, they first of all needed to get out from under the blow that was threatening in the Amur direction.

On the night of February 12-13, hiding behind strong rearguards and blowing up bridges after themselves, the “White Rebels”, without entering Khabarovsk, immediately began to retreat from Dezhnevka to the southeast. To protect themselves from a flank attack from Kazakevicheva and to prevent the Transbaikal group from capturing the latter, the White Guard command organized a withdrawal in two columns. The main forces, forming the left column, were sent from Dezhnevka to Vladimirovka, Nikolo-Aleksandrovskoye and further south along the Ussuriysk railway. The right column as part of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk brigade received the task of moving from Dezhnevka to Novgorodskaya and Kazakevicheva in order to secure the flank and subsequent withdrawal along the Ussuri River.

The pursuit of the enemy with all the forces of the People's Revolutionary Army began on February 13. On this day, the Combined Brigade occupied Dezhnevka, but the enemy had already left there. From Dezhnevka the 5th Regiment was sent along the Amur Railway to Pokrovka and further to Khabarovsk; Having occupied Khabarovsk on February 14, the 5th Regiment remained there as a garrison. The 6th regiment and the partisan detachment of Petrov-Teterin moved through Vladimirovka to Nikolo-Alexandrovskoye. On the night of February 14-15, they reached Nikolo-Alexandrovsky and after a short battle with the White rearguard, they occupied it. The Special Amur Regiment and the 4th Cavalry Regiment were sent to Novo-Troitskoye (the Special Amur Regiment immediately from Dezhnevka, and the 4th Cavalry Regiment after occupying Pokrovka) with the task of assisting the Transbaikal group in capturing Kazakevicheva with a blow from the north. The regiments reached Novo-Troitsky on February 14. In general, the Combined Brigade had clashes only with the enemy rearguard in the area of ​​​​Vladimirovka and Nikolo-Alexandrovsky. The main forces of the left column of the whites managed to go south.

The Transbaikal group, according to the previously set task, was to vigorously attack Kazakevicheva and further to the station. Verino cut off the enemy's escape route to the south and destroy his manpower. However, due to the fatigue of the people and lack of forage, she set out from Nizhne-Spasskaya only at noon on February 13, thus losing a whole day. Having set out from Nizhne-Spasskaya, the vanguard of the Transbaikal group, due to the lack of preliminary reconnaissance of the route and poor orientation, lost its way. Instead of going along the channel leading to Kazakevicheva, the vanguard went along the Amur branch, going in a northeast direction, and only after a three-hour march discovered its mistake. By the morning of February 14, the Transbaikal group passed the channel, but, mistaking the Chinese village of Goldy, located at the confluence of the channel on the left bank of the Ussuri, for Kazakevichev, they began to deploy against it. While this second mistake was corrected, the enemy managed to hide behind the Consolidated Regiment stationed in Kazakevicheva and slipped to the south along the Ussuri River. In the battle for Kazakevicheva, the Whites suffered minor losses: 45 people captured, 25 carts, 1 gun. The Transbaikal group finally occupied Kazakevicheva only in the evening of February 14th. The Special Amur and 4th Cavalry Regiments, sent to help her, also arrived there. On February 15-16, the Trans-Baikal group, having made a 35-kilometer march over rough roads, made another attempt to cut off the enemy’s retreat route in the area of ​​st. Dormidontovka, but only overtook the rearguards here.

The People's Revolutionary Army continued to pursue the whites in two columns: the Transbaikal group along the Ussuri River and the Combined Brigade along the Ussuri Railway. On February 26, its vanguards reached the Bikin River, where the enemy offered the first serious resistance during the entire retreat from Volochaevka.

Fights for Bikin positions. On February 27-28, the White Guards tried to gain a foothold in previously prepared positions along the right bank of the Bikin River.

The narrow front and the presence of heights commanding over the surrounding terrain gave the enemy the opportunity to organize defense at this line. By the time the People's Revolutionary Army arrived, the Whites, with the help of the Cossacks of the Bikinsky stanitsa district they had mobilized, managed to erect field-type defensive structures here, using the remains of old fortifications. The tactical key of the entire position was the village of Vasilyevskaya, located on a hill along the right bank of the Ussuri River. Having prepared for active defense in the Bikin positions, the enemy positioned himself as follows.

The main group under the command of General Yastrebov, consisting of 1,500 bayonets and sabers with six guns, occupied the left sector in the Vasilyevskaya area. On the railway line near the station. Bikin was left with three armored trains with infantry landings and cavalry.

On February 26, the advanced units of the People's Revolutionary Army occupied the village of Kozlovskaya (north of the village of Vasilievskaya). The plan of the command of the Eastern Front was to eliminate the main enemy group with a strike in the direction of Vasilyevskaya. For this purpose, the Special Amur and 4th Cavalry Regiments were temporarily transferred to the Transbaikal Group from the Combined Brigade. The commander of the Trans-Baikal group, which was entrusted with the task of defeating the main enemy forces, decided to achieve this goal through a roundabout maneuver. To do this, the 3rd Infantry Regiment, the Special Amur Regiment and the Chita Cavalry Division had to attack Vasilievskaya from the north in order to pin down the enemy from the front; at the same time, a detachment consisting of the 1st, 2nd rifle regiments and the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment under the overall command of the commander of the 1st regiment Kuzmin received the task of bypassing Vasilyevskaya along the Lesnichenkova River from the east and capturing the main enemy resistance center with a blow from the rear; The 4th Cavalry Regiment was sent for a deep bypass of the village. Vasilievskaya through Chinese territory from the west with the task of reaching the village of Pokrovsky Novy and cutting off the Whites’ retreat routes.

For actions along the railway in the direction of Art. Bikin left two regiments (5th and 6th). For the sake of surprise, the offensive was launched immediately with a march from the village. Kozlovskaya. By 6 o'clock on February 27, a detachment sent to bypass enemy fortifications approached them along the valleys of the Lesnichenkova and Bikin rivers from the east and turned around to attack. But the enemy was not taken by surprise. He met the advancing units of the 1st Infantry and Troitskosavsky Cavalry Regiments with strong artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire, and then launched a counterattack.

The pinning group, advancing from the north, approached the White positions on February 27 and made several passes through the wire entanglements, but also encountered stubborn enemy resistance. Fierce fighting in the eastern and northern sections of the Transbaikal group continued throughout the day on February 27. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but with the help of redeployed reserves, he still held his positions.

On the night of February 27–28, the 3rd Infantry Regiment was replaced in the pinning group by the Special Amur Regiment; In the outflanking group, the 2nd Infantry Regiment was assigned to the offensive.

On February 28, the outflanking group, leaving the 1st Regiment as a barrier towards the station. Bikin and placing the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment on the left bank of the Bikin River to secure the left flank, led the 2nd regiment to advance along the road along the right bank of the river. Bypassing the first line of fortifications under the cover of the vanguard, the 2nd regiment threw the enemy back to the second line of trenches, but, met by shrapnel fire, was unable to advance and was forced to lie down in front of the wire. At the same time, the Whites launched an attack against the Troitskosavsky cavalry regiment, bypassing its left flank.

The cavalrymen retreated to the right bank of the Bikin River, and then, regrouping their forces, launched a counterattack. Knotted on the eastern face of the fortifications near the village. Vasilievskaya battle became protracted. The enemy was forced to pull all reserves here.

Meanwhile, the Special Amur Regiment, having correctly organized the interaction of artillery, machine guns and infantry, broke through the wire barriers and with a swift attack occupied an important White stronghold on the northern approaches to the village. Vasilievskaya. The successful attack of the Special Amur Regiment predetermined the fate of the enemy’s defense. Further developing their success together with the 2nd Infantry Regiment, the Amurians completely occupied the village by the end of day 28. Vasilievskaya. Having lost the main support of the entire defensive position, the White Guards began to hastily retreat to the south.

The battles in the Bikin positions were the last attempt of the “White Rebel Army” to provide serious resistance to the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army. After these battles, the Whites continuously retreated to Southern Primorye to the “neutral zone.”