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How many tanks are there in the tank army of the USSR? Construction of Soviet BT and MV during the Great Patriotic War

Artillery is the god of war!

Infantry is the queen of the fields!!

Tanks are an iron fist!!!.

Dear colleagues, I bring to your attention information about the state and balance of forces of tank armies at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

How could you lose in 41? having 26,000 tanks?!

Notes (hereinafter simply - Note). Once again, a person, exploring the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, tries on the Wehrmacht the same methods (and the same shirts) that were in the USSR. No more than the number of tanks. And the quality indicators of tanks (both the USSR and Germany) are generally replaced. We will highlight and analyze these places separately.

I immediately picture long and slender columns of armored vehicles - like the Parade on Red Square...
Well, let's compare the tanks on 06/22/41. QUANTITATIVELY and QUALITATIVELY….
SO – QUANTITATIVELY
As of 06/22/41 The USSR had 12,780 tanks and wedges in the Western districts...
The Wehrmacht had 3,987 armored vehicles on the border of the USSR + German satellites advanced 347 tanks to the borders of the USSR.
Total – 3987+347= 4334

Note The number 4334 also includes tanks and wedges. Let's really figure it out and count. Nothing secret, official network data.

1. Tank Pz I (no more than a wedge), all modifications (Ausf A and B), including command ones, as of June 22, 1941, serviceable - 877 units (78%), not serviceable (under repair) - 245 (22% ).
In total, there are 1122 wedges. This wedge had no cannon armament at all. The main armament is two MG-34 machine guns with a caliber of 7.92 mm. The maximum armor thickness is 13 mm.

2. Tank Pz II. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to G4 took part ( latest version April 1941). There are 1074 tanks in total. Immediately serviceable - 909 (85%), in repair - 165 pieces (15%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.

3. Tank Pz III. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to J took part. A total of 1000 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 825 (82%), in repair - 174 pieces (17%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.

4. Tank Pz IV. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to E took part. A total of 480 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 439 (91%), in repair - 41 pieces (9%). The maximum armor thickness, only on the E series, and for 223 tanks, is 50 mm frontal.

At the same time, there are 223 (7%) (maximum number, excluding faulty tanks) tanks with an armor thickness of 50 mm.

Tanks with armor thickness from 13 to 30 mm - 2827 (93%) units. And the most popular Wehrmacht tank is the Pz I wedge - 1,122 units.

Now we begin to deal with satellite tanks.

347 tank is generally all the tanks in the bunch of all the allied countries of Germany in World War II. This includes Romanian tanks, Renault FT-17 and French B-1bis and Italian Vickers 6 tons. On June 22, 1941, these may have been modern and serviceable tanks, but nothing more than that, if you just want to laugh. We will not take them into account in our article. Because we will not follow Gareev’s methods.

The superiority is exactly 3 times...

Note So far the superiority is exactly 4 times.

However, there is an English proverb: (the devil is in the details).
Let's see the DETAILS
FIRST
Sometimes those who say that, well, we had 3 times more tanks than the Germans, forget that the Germans, in principle, have 4334 - this is serviceable tank equipment, combat-ready.

Note Why on earth did ALL 4334 BECOME SERVICEABLE AND COMBAT READY? This is where the details start to emerge. Everything is fine. But we won’t believe it.

In our country, only tanks of the first two categories (out of 4 available) could be combat-ready... The first category is a completely new technology.
The second category is serviceable military equipment, used and faulty military equipment requiring routine repairs.
The third and fourth categories are already there different kinds repairs - medium repairs, major repairs, non-repairable, and so on. That is, this third or fourth category can actually be discarded. As for the border districts, there were about 8,000 tanks of the first two categories (minus those requiring routine repairs).

2. Categorizing equipment is nothing more than bureaucratic correspondence only for repair departments. Categorization is intended to indicate the service level of a tank (or other equipment) in the army. Categorization has nothing to do with the practice of using tanks.

3. Medium repairs were carried out in departments by departments with the involvement of specialists from repair departments. In average repair there may be tanks not only of III or IV categories, but also II and even I. A tank is transferred to the fourth category only before it is written off. Before this, the tank was in category III. And it will be repaired.

Pay attention to the logic of the author, who is trying to prove that the USSR had as many tanks as Germany. First, ALL THE TANKS that GERMANY COULD HAVE are counted. Including tanks with bulletproof armor, as well as tanks manufactured in 1917. And in relation to the USSR, a note is used that only tanks of the first two categories, that is, new tanks, will be counted. That's just not how things are done. If you want to count, count, just apply the same methods to everyone. Because if we start counting only new German tanks, produced in 1940 and 1941, then our number of German tanks will be reduced to 1124 and no more.

Where did the number of 8000 tanks come from?

Very simple. This is arithmetic (Pupkina, without pictures). It’s just that 4,780 tanks are stupidly equated with old, outdated and faulty tanks. Why was this done? In order to try to prove that there were about 8000 serviceable types.
Once again, pay attention. When counting German tanks, the words " near" not used. Everything is accurate. There are so many of these. Plus these have so much more. And everything is fine.
And the USSR (poor thing) has about 8000. There is no accuracy. And it cannot be.
Let's really look at the details. And let's compare.

As of June 22, the Western Special Military District alone had 1,136 T-26 tanks. It was customary to laugh at this tank in the USSR. But, by the way. Captured T-26s were used by the Wehrmacht in both 1941 and 1942. And in Finland, the T-26 was in service until 1961.

October 1941. The German infantry is advancing under the cover of... the Soviet T-26 tank (already in other hands).

October 1941. BT-7M, on the other side.

Armored car Ba-20 from the Germans.

Another Ba-20 in different hands.

And this is the T-34, on the other side.

This is a modernized (by the Germans) KV-1 tank

August 1941, apparently - these are not serviceable tanks?

November 1941. Modernized and improved (by the Germans) thirty-four.

September 1941. The Germans did not pass by the KV-2, they also brought it to mind. The finishing is visible to the naked eye.

March 1945. Soviet tank crews did not disdain German tanks.

Armor - 15 mm (20 mm since 1939), in 1940 the T-26 received shielded armor. But, let’s not let the T-26, armor is the only thing that the T-26 was inferior to German tanks on June 22, 1941.
But in terms of armament he was superior to them. Because the T-26 had a 45-mm 20-K tank gun. The initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile is 760 m/s. Until December 1941, this was quite enough to knock out any German tank at a distance of 300 meters.
Little of. The latest modifications of the T-26, produced in 1938 and 1939, had a stabilizer in the vertical plane of the gun and sight. Therefore, it was easier for this type of tank (the latest modification consisted of 2567 vehicles) to fire on the move, without short stops.

The ratio is 1 to 2... It seems to be good... However, there is such a sad thing: 95% Soviet tanks had bulletproof armor and could be hit by any anti-tank gun...

Note And 93% of German tanks (we have already proven this above) were tanks with bulletproof armor.

The PAK 35/36 penetrated 40 - 50 mm of armor with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile from 300 meters. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 95% of Soviet tanks from half a kilometer away.

Note And the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K penetrated 40-50 mm of armor from 300 meters with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 100% of German tanks from half a kilometer away.

Speed ​​- firing 10-15 rounds per minute...

Note The Soviet gun has the same rate of fire, 10–15 rounds per minute.

Both the Wehrmacht in 41-42, and the Red Army in 43-45, sought to avoid an oncoming tank battle in the offensive: what’s the point of spending a lot of ammunition, people and equipment forming a breakthrough, and introducing a tank corps/division into it, in order to 20-30 km, exchange your tanks in battle for enemy tanks? - It would be much wiser to place your anti-tank missile system under counterattack by enemy tanks...

Note But stop here. Dear! You are a blacksmith who jumps from topic to topic. We are not interested in what happened in 1942 and 1943. We're looking specifically at 1941.

The attacker uses his infantry formations, which are the majority in the army, to attack a pre-selected area of ​​defense. The defender can only cover this blow to a limited extent with the same infantry formations - he could assemble for “ sealing» breakthrough only those of them that were in close proximity to the affected area. The defender is forced to use valuable motorized mechanized formations to parry the attack, pulling them towards the section of the front that is being breached... where he runs into anti-tank defenses on the flanks of the enemy’s attack...
THAT. the entire number of Soviet tanks was devalued by their bulletproof armor...

Note The same thing applied to German tanks, whether on defense or on the offensive. However, this is not the answer to the question “ Why" This is nothing more than speculation on the topic. Combat is organized and coordinated actions. And not rides, in order to “ pulling together, bumping" Any anti-tank unit is not without its limits. And even more vulnerable than the tank itself. That’s why in the USSR the 45-mm anti-tank gun (PTP) was called “ goodbye Motherland"(there was also an option " death to the enemy..... calculation"), and in the Wehrmacht the 37-mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun was called " mallet».

Now let's look at the QUALITY side...

We had the best tank in the world, T-34-76 and KV... They would have prayed to roll it out " in an open field» - « crowd on crowd"all German tanks...

Hmm...I immediately remember a joke...

There is a tour of the zoo. He reaches a cage with a huge elephant. And then one person asks:
- What does he eat with you?
“Well,” the guide answers him, “cabbage, hay, carrots, vegetables, a total of 100 kilograms.”
- So what - will he eat all this? - the curious tourist is surprised.
“He’ll eat something,” the guide answers, “but who will give it to him?!”

Note And who, one might ask, is to blame for the fact that Soviet tanks (elephants) were not given 100 kilograms of something a day? And the anecdote given is somewhat inappropriate. Need an example? Please. In August 1941, a tank platoon of senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Konstantinovich Klobanov disabled 22 enemy tanks in just one battle. If we take the example of Kolobanov in August 1941, then the question arises, who limited Kolobanov’s elephants? Nobody. That is, when no one interfered with the tank crews of the Red Army in battle (from the elephant breeders, in the form of senior management), the tank crews not only achieved results, but also accomplished real feats.

If there were idiots in the Wehrmacht who only dreamed of clashing in an oncoming tank battle with enemy tanks, then it’s clear that we would have given them a task... But the trouble is, the vile little thing, both at Prokhorovka, and at Lepel, and wherever it could - exposed her anti-tank missile system to the counterattack of Soviet tanks... against which the tank attacks were safely broken up... and if the T-34 or KV had a chance, then other tanks were burned at distant approaches...

Note The point is not that there were idiots in the Wehrmacht or not. But the point is that, I repeat, the battle is organized and coordinated actions. It is not a single tank that achieves success in battle, but only as a result of joint active actions. And if the Germans’ reconnaissance worked at the proper level and identified Soviet tanks: without infantry, without artillery and air support, then why blame the Germans? It turns out that it was not the Germans who were idiots, but the Soviet command. Which is not clear what he was thinking when he sent his tanks into battle.

BUT! It seems like we were talking about 1941. It’s not clear how to return the author to 1941? Prokhorovka is just flowers. But the berries appear further. There really is a joke there.

Here’s a small detail - the share of tanks with normal armor (i.e. medium and heavy) capable of resisting anti-tank artillery was:
- in the Red Army - about 5%;
- in the tank forces of the Wehrmacht on eastern front– about 50%.

Note Here they are, the berries appeared. It turns out that in 1941 the Germans had medium and heavy tanks, in percentage terms as much as 50%. Whereas in the USSR there are only 5% of them. This is an anecdote, if only they could compare it with the tank fleet of Italy, there would be no problems. But with USSR tanks it’s funny. Did the Germans have something equal to the T-35? Or maybe there was something equal to the T-28? Why these tanks were lost will be answered below.
We can name the Soviet heavy tanks of 1941 without any problems. But, just let the respected author name “ heavy"German tanks on June 22, 1941?

Once again, pay attention to what words are used to describe German tanks - “ medium and heavy" And for the Soviet " faulty and outdated" This is a method of NLP (neuro-linguistic programming). The key to this method is the union " And" This was always done in the USSR when it was necessary to denigrate something. This method can be used to denigrate anything at all, for example: “ astronauts and sadomites" We didn’t say anything bad about the astronauts, but the negativity is already obvious. The result will come if you repeat this constantly. This was proven back in the 19th century by Gustave Lebonne.

But our medium tanks were better than the German ones! Isn't it true!?

Note In some ways yes, but in others no.

I’m disappointed, but the best tank of the Red Army was the T-34-76 in 1941. still inferior to his German " opponent».

Note Keyword in the sentence above, the word " after all" Therefore, we will answer the author in the same word (and method): the T-34-76 in 1941 was not inferior to any German tank. And therefore we will disappoint the respected author.

ARMOR - as an opportunity to resist enemy anti-tank weapons:
T-34-76 - 40 – 45 mm.
PZ-3-J - 50 mm.

Note Pz III Ausf. J is a tank manufactured in March 1941. This is the only thing the author grabbed onto. But there is one small thing. From March to December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J was produced with a 50 mm KwK 38 L/42 gun (50 mm tank gun, model 1938, with a barrel length of 42 calibers, or 2100 mm).
Since December 1941, Pz III Ausf J began to be produced with a 50-mm KwK 39 L/60 cannon (50-mm tank gun, model 1939, with a barrel length of 60 calibers, or 3000 mm).

Since March 1941, all T-34s have been equipped with a 76.2 mm F-34 cannon with a barrel length of 41.5 calibers, which is 3162 mm.

Two clarifications need to be made here:
- the strength of German armor was approximately 1.5 times higher than that of Soviet armor (in 1941, where did this come from?)
- the T-34 armor plates have a rational angle of inclination.

But the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, for example, the artilleryman of a 50-mm cannon was “ purple“At what angle are the armor plates of the tank bent... the main thing is to hit it.

Note It turns out that rational angles of inclination are bullshit? Why then did all the countries in the world subsequently switch to rational angles? But! On a German tank from June 1941, a 50 mm cannon with a short barrel. A very wonderful weapon. But this weapon could only cause harm to the T-34 manufactured in March 1941 from a distance of 300 meters, and to the side or rear. All. In all other cases, it could not. But that’s not even the main thing. Not every hit on a tank and penetration of the armor means the defeat of the tank.

And the T-34 could, with its 76-mm cannon, harm the Pz III Ausf J from at least 500 meters, even from 1000. Not just because the gun was more powerful, but in addition to the cannon, the Pz III Ausf J lacked rational armor angles. Which they hit at everything not with a 50 mm cannon, but with a 76 mm one.
In the same example with Klobanov, the KV-1 tank received more than 40 hits from German shells during the battle. And not only was it not damaged, but it was also capable of further battles. Very surprisingly, Kolobanov’s tank did not fall into category IV after the battle on August 22. This was for the Soviet tank crews " purple whether a German shell will hit them or not. Because they knew very well that the Germans had short-barreled tank guns, which were not intended to fight armored targets.

By December 1941, the Wehrmacht command had just reconsidered its attitude towards its tanks. Because the Wehrmacht tankers were far from “ purple“A Soviet 76-mm armor-piercing shell will hit them or it won’t.

ENGINE:
T-34-76 -engine " V-2» « was dying» after 40-60 hours of operation. This is an indicator of production quality.
Pz-III Ausf. J - engine " Maybach"had a service life of 400 hours. This is also an indicator of production quality.

SPEED (Highway/Road):
T-34-76 – 54/25 km/h
Pz-III Ausf. J - 67/15 km/hour
But! On the gravel highway Kubinka Pz-III Ausf. H and J accelerated at a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km/h, while the best figure for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h. The BT-7 on wheels, singled out as a standard, reached only 68.1 km/h!
AT THIS POINT: The German vehicle surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it also turned out to be less noisy - at maximum speed the Pz.III was heard from 150–200 m away, and the T-34 from 450 m away. Even in this case, you can add the author that Soviet tankers, sadly enough, were very fond of the Pz-III Ausf. J and not only, but even version N. Why? Because the tank was of high quality. Nothing whistled, fell off, or turned on its own.

CREW CONVENIENCE:
Pz-III Ausf. J - had a three-man tower, in which there were enough comfortable conditions for combat work of crew members. The commander had a comfortable turret, which provided him with excellent visibility, and all crew members had their own intercom devices.
The T-34 turret could hardly accommodate two tankers, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases, as a unit commander. Only two of the four crew members – the tank commander and the driver – were provided with internal communications. All of the above is absolutely true. But this does not apply directly to the tank itself. This is the problem of Soviet tank generals. Who ordered the T-34, while the tank commander was not a gunner, but a loader. This generally applied to all Soviet tanks produced before 1943. And we emphasize that this is not a problem with the T-34, it’s a problem with the Soviet tank school.

"ARMOR PIERCING" tank in '41:
- T-37-76 – limited by the lack of armor-piercing shells. At the end of 1941 solved.
- Pz-III Ausf. J – limited by a relatively weak gun.” At the end of 1941 solved by introducing a new gun...

Note The absence of an armor-piercing shell is not an indication that a tank cannot fight against a tank. German Pz-III Ausf. J behind the eyes and ears, a hit from a 76-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile would be enough. And just one. After the battle, the crew would have to be removed from a completely intact tank and replaced with another.

After reading, the answer to the question does not come. So what is the reason? Why did the USSR, having even 8,000 serviceable tanks, manage to dry out 3,050 tanks in the initial phase of the war, of which the vast majority were wedges?

After all, everything is calculated very simply. For every German tank there are 2 Soviet ones and another 1900 can be left in reserve. Just in case. You never know.
But they didn’t do that. And they didn’t.

As of October 28, 1941 at Western Front there were 441 tanks, of which: 33 KV-1, 175 T-34, 43 BT, 50 T-26, 113 T-40 and 32 T-60. This is from 3852 of the original composition, on June 22, 1941.
On October 28, 1941, on the Western Front, there were 8.7 (almost 9) times fewer tanks than there were on June 22 of the same year!

But if you already need to answer the question, then there is no problem.

REASONS for the loss of tanks in the USSR from 6/22/1941 to 10/28/1941:

1. any Wehrmacht tank is not just an armored cart. Each tank had appropriate communications equipment. He didn't just have something. These means of communication have been tested, there was some experience in using them. And if a person did not understand or did not want to understand: how a means of communication works, what it is needed for, and what is achieved with the help of means of communication in battle, then this person would NEVER BE PUT TO THE POST OF A TANK COMMANDER;

2. The Wehrmacht command tank is not just the same tank as the others, just a little different. This is a control vehicle that could take part in battle on an equal basis with all the tanks in the platoon. But with all this, she not only controlled, but had a connection with each participating tank. And among other things, the commander of a Wehrmacht tank platoon had in his command tank: communications for interaction with infantry, communications for interaction with artillery, communications for interaction with aviation and a means of communication with senior authorities. And if the commander of a tank platoon could not CORRECT ARTILLERY FIRE, DIRECT OWN AVIATION, AND COULD NOT INTERACT WITH INFANTRY, then such a person would never be appointed to the position of commander of a tank platoon.

As of 2013, in the Russian army, the commander of a tank platoon not only does not have (but does not even dream of having) means of communication to interact with aviation, and does not have contact with his own artillery. He has very infrequent and very unstable communication with his tanks, as well as (not always) with the infantry;

3 . A Wehrmacht tank platoon is not three tanks, as was customary in the USSR and now in Russia. A Wehrmacht tank platoon consists of 7 tanks. Two in each compartment, plus the commander’s tank itself, the 7th tank. Therefore, a Wehrmacht tank company could be used to carry out operational tasks. And I was attracted. But why? It is still not clear in the USSR and in Russia. Because the organization is not just different. But completely different. Not even close to Soviet.

There were two tanks in each squad for a reason. The essence of the application is simple: the first one performs a maneuver (any), and the second one covers it at this time. There are generally a lot of options for action;

4 . The term for coordinating a Wehrmacht tank crew is two years (the figure is still wild for the USSR army and especially for Russia). People not only learned from the practical experience of their predecessors, but the crews literally got used to each of their people. In order to achieve understanding in battle without words at all, from one half glance. At the same time, special attention was paid to which crew was supporting and which was operating. And therefore they did not create a mixture of people.

The Wehrmacht tank commander was not a loader. He was only a gunner in the Pz I tank. On all other Wehrmacht tanks, the tank commander controlled the crew in battle.

And one last thing. The specific customers of tanks in Germany were not generals, but those who fought in tanks. That is, when the German Minister of Armaments sent his representatives to the troops so that they would give a clear and clear picture of what and how to modernize, then representatives of the Ministry of Armaments talked with driver mechanics, gunners and tank commanders. And not with the commanders of tank divisions. The tank division commander could only facilitate the delivery of a representative of the Ministry of Armaments to each unit and its protection.

That's why the Germans didn't have " flying tanks“, but this is precisely why the Wehrmacht managed to get to Moscow on Pz I Ausf A wedges.
And everything that was in the USSR before 1941, into which a simply colossal resource was poured (factories were drowning space for almost 20 years, it turns out just like that), it was either stupidly abandoned (and accordingly went to the Germans) or lost - because was not intended for war at all. For travel during parades on Red Square, and nothing more.

Gareev’s methods still live today. Not only do they rewrite history. To this day, only a quantitative indicator is assessed in the Russian army. And everything is not of high quality. The training of those who will fight in general is not taken into account. So not so long ago, boss General Staff in Russia Gerasimov stated that: “ The troops are poorly prepared, but the headquarters are very well prepared».

But, " highly professional staff"they cannot prepare in any way (even before their " almost"level) of those who will bring victories or defeats to these headquarters in the war.

In 1941, the headquarters were also prepared to such an extent “ Fine"that this did not prevent the Red Army from retreating all the way to Moscow.


The ground forces of any country are armed with special large-sized multi-purpose combat vehicles with a terrifying appearance - tanks. These hulking monsters combine armor, high level protection and firepower to resist the enemy, support infantry with fire when capturing and holding territory. That is why they are an important element of the weapons of any country and number thousands of units.

If an armed monster weighing 70 tons is moving towards someone at a speed of 65 km/h, then he will think several times whether to get in the way of a strong and modern combat vehicle. It is very difficult to name the exact number of tanks, since some states that are proud of their weapons openly declare the number of these combat vehicles, while others deliberately suppress information. The same figures that are already known are very contradictory. Therefore, when compiling the review, data declared by national governments was taken into account.

10. Türkiye: 3,763 main battle tanks


Türkiye occupies a worthy place in the world in terms of the number of armed forces. The country is armed with many American and German-made tanks, for example, the M48 Patton and Leopard 2A4. Leopard main battle tanks from Germany are considered the best of their kind in the world, and the 2A4 modification is adapted for urban combat. Turkey is interested in having large tank forces as a counterweight to the forces of its militarized neighbors, Iran and Syria.

9. Ukraine: 3,784 main battle tanks


Taking into account the turbulent situation in Ukraine associated with the military conflict, it is not surprising that the state wants to have a large number of tank troops. Ironically, a situation has arisen where the majority of tanks are T-64s left over after the collapse of the USSR.

8. Pakistan: 4,000 main battle tanks


Pakistan is one of the countries where the numbers regarding the number of tanks fluctuate greatly. But the fact that the state is armed with tanks is undeniable. Pakistan purchased most of the tanks, and, surprisingly, from China. The Pakistani Al-Zarrar tank is based on the Chinese Type 59 tank, and the country also has a Type 85 tank in service.

7. Egypt: 4,145 main battle tanks


Most Egyptian tanks are of American origin, such as the M60-2000 and M1 Abrams tanks. It is sad that they actively showed themselves on the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities in recent confrontations. The country also uses tanks from the former Soviet Union, including the Ramses II main tank, which is based on the Soviet T-54.

6. Syria: 4,750 main battle tanks


It is not surprising that Syria has a large number of tank troops in its arsenal. The country is in a zone of constant conflict, and the current situation determines the use of heavy equipment against the Syrians themselves. Syria received most of its tanks from Russia, including the T-55. Tank T54/55 is considered the most numerous Soviet Union produced 100,000 copies of this model until 1981, when it was discontinued (until 1983 it was still produced in Czechoslovakia).

5. North Korea: 5,500 main battle tanks


Any figures regarding North Korea must be questioned, since the state seeks to secure superiority over its eternal enemy, South Korea, through false, inflated statistics. China and the former USSR supplied North Korea tanks, while the country itself increased production of the T-62-based Chonma-ho and P'okpoong-ho tanks, built in North Korean factories (North Korean Second Machine Industry Bureau).

4. India: 5,978 main battle tanks


Every military historian and fan of The Princess Bride knows to never get involved in a war in Asia. But if a country is forced to enter into a military conflict on this vast territory, it is obliged to have large tank forces. The four largest tank armies in the world belong to Asian countries. Most of the tanks in Indian service are T-72 with 125mm cannon and powerful destructive capabilities.

3. China: 9,000 main battle tanks


According to statistics, China is in second or third place in the number of tank troops in the world. It is armed with Type 59 and Type 96 tanks, and a large number of Type 99s with a 125 mm gun. The tank's armor is equipped with laser defense systems, and the tank itself can reach a speed of 80 km/h.

2. USA: 9,125 main battle tanks


The United States' neighbors are Canada and Mexico, and it would seem to make no sense for the state to build up its weapons for fear of invasion by land. Indeed, there is no need for the United States to increase the number of main battle tanks, since the state mainly relies on development navy And air force. The United States is armed with thousands of units of the M1 Abrams tank and its modifications. The future of US tank forces lies with the M1A3 Abrams tank, which competes with a highly modernized tank South Korea, K2 Black Panther.

1.Russia: 22,710 main battle tanks


Not surprisingly, Russia is at the top of our list. The amount of weapons is determined by the long border of the state, 19,312 km, which must be controlled and protected. Most of the tanks are in a mothballed state - the T-54, T-64 tanks, and the modern T-90 tank is ready to fight fighting at any moment. In the future, Russia hopes to create a fully remote-controlled tank based on the Armata platform. Everything is heading towards the fact that tanks on the battlefield will fight without crews and be controlled from a distance. And it is possible that over time all military equipment will turn

This topic has surfaced on social networks at the instigation of liberal “strategists” and is being actively discussed with the posting of “kind and affectionate” comments addressed to those who really care about maintaining the combat capability of the Russian army at the required level, even if there is a catastrophic lack of funds for this.

As an answer to this question, let me retell the article by Mikhail Barabanov, who is an employee of such an organization as the “Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies,” which is dated March 12, 2017.

We dance “from the stove”

or

“what we had yesterday and what we have today”

In 2005, the Russian Armed Forces had 23,000 tanks of various models in service. In 2016, 2,700 units remained. Citing these two figures, “experts” loudly declare that a huge Russian army, powerful and modern, it is a fiction and a “Kremlin myth.” At the same time, they refer to the fact that even the Turkish or Syrian armies currently have more tanks.

T-72M1M with KAZ "Arena"

Where did the missing tanks go? And, most importantly, what are we going to fight with if the Russian army has only 2,700 tanks in service:

  • T-90A;
  • T-72B.

And the remaining 10,200 tanks are T-55, T-62, T-72 and T-64, which are in storage.

Where did the numbers 2700 + 10200 come from?

The modern Russian army is focused, first of all, on participating in limited armed conflicts. First of all, on the territory former USSR. For this, the remaining 10,200 tanks are enough to complete the assigned tasks.

There is currently no real threat of an unexpected large-scale land invasion of the territory of our state. Any potential adversaries who are hypothetically capable of such an invasion (the USA and NATO, China) will require a fairly long period of mobilization, subsequent deployment and concentration of significant groups of ground forces on the borders of Russia. Our country will get similar time for this.

In such a situation, “measuring by quantity” is meaningless. Existing systems modern communications, control and reconnaissance, the presence of high-precision weapons (ground and airborne) are, today, the main guarantee of achieving victory in the war, incl. and land.

In such a situation, only the most modern tanks are needed, equipped with thermal imagers and the latest protective equipment. Otherwise. A potential enemy will simply shoot “blind” tanks in a night battle. This is exactly what the Americans did with the tanks of the Iraqi army in 1991 during the Gulf War.

It is quite natural that Russia is not able to have a significant number of modern tanks due to the current economic situation.

T-90A "Vladimir"

Conclusion. It is better to have 2000 - 3000 tanks, but the most modern ones, or those that have undergone radical modernization.

Human resource

  1. Western Military District:
    1. 4th separate guards tank division Kantemirovskaya (military unit 19612);
    2. 1 Ural-Lvov Tank Brigade (military unit 63453);
    3. 6 Czestochowa Tank Brigade (military unit 54096);
    4. 1st Guards Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards MSD (military unit 58190).
  2. Southern Military District:
    1. Tank regiment of the 150th MSD.
  3. Eastern Military District:
    1. 5th Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Brigade (military unit 46108). Deployed on the basis of the 2nd Guards Tank Division.
  4. Central Military District:
    1. 90th Guards Vitebsk-Novgorod, twice Red Banner Tank Division - Chebarkul, Chelyabinsk region. Deployed on 12/01/16 on the basis of the 7th Separate Guards Tank Brigade.

Individual parts:

  • 240th training tank regiment (military unit 30632-6);
  • 212 district The educational center tank troops of the Siberian Military District (military unit 21250);
  • 44th Training Guards Tank Regiment (military unit 30618-8);
  • 522nd Guards Training Tank Riga Regiment (military unit 30616-7).

Elementary calculations indicate that the number of tanks and the tankers who control them is the same. That is, the number of tanks currently in service is precisely the number that we are able to control at a time.

Our neighbours

According to RIA Novosti, NATO has 10,000 tanks in Europe. Most likely, this number includes both vehicles in service and those in reserve.

According to information posted in open sources, (including on Wikipedia) as of 2016, the countries that were potential opponents had:

  1. First strike countries:
    1. Poland:
      1. Leopard2A5 - 105;
      2. Leopard2A4 - 142;
  • T-72M - 505;
  1. RT-91 “Twardy - 233.
  1. Romania:
    1. T-55 - 250;
    2. TR-580 - 42;
  • TR-85 - 91;
  1. TR-85M1 "Bizonul" - 54.

  1. Czech Republic:
    1. T-72 and its modifications - 154.
  2. Slovakia:
    1. T-72M - 245.
  3. Hungary:
    1. T-72 - 155.
  4. Germany:
    1. 1100 tanks of various modifications. It is planned that after the 2017 reform there will be 600 left.

Leopard2A6M

  1. Second strike countries:
    1. Britannia:
      1. Challenger - 70;
      2. "Chieftain" of various modifications - over 900;

  • Light tanks "Scorpion" - up to 300.
  1. France (total 776):
    1. "Leclerc" - 300 in service + 80 in reserve;
    2. Tanks of other models - 396 reserve

Leclerc

  1. Denmark - 69
  2. Italy (1730):
    1. C1-"Ariete" - 200;
    2. "Leopard1A5" - 120;

  • M60A1 - 300 reserve;
  1. M47 - 510
  1. Bulgaria (524):
    1. T-72 - 362;
    2. T-55 - 165
  2. Spain (510):
    1. Leopard2A4 - 108;
    2. Other models - 402
  3. Portugal (224):
    1. Leopard 2A6 - 37;
    2. M60 - 101;
  • Other models - 86

  1. Third strike countries:
    1. Türkiye (4504):
      1. M60 - 932;
      2. Leopard1 - 397;
  • Leopard 2A4 - 325;
  1. M48A5 - 2850
  1. USA (9125) of which M1 Abrams make up about 60%.

BHVT and CBRT

One of the most important questions, when fully considering a possible confrontation, becomes the following: “How quickly will Russia be able to reactivate the equipment stored at the BKhVT?” The outcome of the armed confrontation will largely depend on this.

What is the condition of the equipment in storage?

During long-term storage:

  • oxidation of connectors occurs in electrical circuits;
  • the insulation resistance of the existing electrical wiring decreases;
  • all filled technical fluids (antifreeze, oils, hydraulic fluids, lubricants) become unsuitable for use;
  • fuel tanks begin to rust from the inside;
  • Rust appears on the mirror surfaces of hydraulic cylinders.

Despite the fact that high-quality conservation allows you to save equipment from all of the above, a certain percentage of equipment fails. It is precisely in order to reduce the number of such cases to zero that exercises are regularly held in Russia, in which equipment from the reserve is attracted to participate. Before exercises, it undergoes the necessary maintenance and testing.

During inspections carried out in 2016, the condition of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles was considered satisfactory.

The time required for an army to bring it into combat readiness is calculated by summing up the time:

  • necessary for mobilization (staffing) of units and units;
  • replenishment of ammunition and provisions;
  • bringing materiel to the condition required to carry out any combat orders;
  • the time given to a specific unit to complete its formation and recruitment.

The mentioned period is significantly influenced by the initial state of the unit in peacetime, as well as the distance from the place of its deployment to the places where reserves are received.

What about tanks?

Modern warfare is a remote war. And today, few people bet on tanks, since modern anti-tank weapons (starting with RPGs) are capable, with a high degree of probability, of destroying almost any tank.

But this is not the type of weapon that can stop the war.

Modern tanks are vulnerable from the air, they can be suppressed by artillery fire, destroyed by opposing them with special units whose task is to destroy the armored vehicles of a potential enemy (ATGM, etc.).

Based on this, the high command of the Russian Armed Forces and the leadership of our country acted quite pragmatically, reasoning: fighting head-on is futile today. Therefore, the Russian Armed Forces do not require an excessive number of tanks. What we have today is quite enough.

T-14

But a tank is still armor - fire and maneuver. And we are not going to completely abandon it, which is confirmed by the appearance of the T-14 and the entire line of armored vehicles on the Armata platform.