Hungary USSR 1956. Soviet tanks in Budapest

Hungarian troops were defeated, its territory was occupied by Soviet troops. After the war, free elections were held in the country, provided for by the Yalta agreements, in which the Party of Smallholders won the majority. However, a coalition government imposed by the Allied Control Commission, which was headed by Soviet Marshal Voroshilov, gave the victorious majority half of the cabinet seats, with the Hungarian Communist Party holding key positions.

Matthias Rakosi

The Communists, with the support of the Soviet troops, arrested most of the leaders of the opposition parties, and in 1947 they held new elections. By 1949, power in the country was mainly represented by the communists. The Matthias Rákosi regime was installed in Hungary. Collectivization was carried out, mass repressions began against the opposition, the church, officers and politicians of the former regime, and many other opponents of the new government.

Hungary (as a former ally of Nazi Germany) had to pay significant indemnities in favor of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, amounting to a quarter of GDP.

An important role was also played by the fact that in May 1955 neighboring Austria became a single neutral independent state, from which, after the signing of the peace treaty, the allied occupation troops were withdrawn (Soviet troops had been in Hungary since 1944).

A certain role was played by the subversive activities of the Western intelligence services, in particular the British MI-6, which trained numerous cadres of "people's rebels" on their secret bases in Austria and then transferred them to Hungary

Side forces

More than 50 thousand Hungarians took part in the uprising. It was suppressed by Soviet troops (31 thousand) with the support of Hungarian workers' squads (25 thousand) and Hungarian state security agencies (1.5 thousand).

Soviet units and formations that took part in the Hungarian events

• Special Corps:
  • 2nd Guards Mechanized Division (Nikolaev-Budapest)
  • 11th Guards Mechanized Division (after 1957 - 30th Guards Tank Division)
  • 17th Guards Mechanized Division (Enakievo-Danube)
  • 33rd Guards Mechanized Division (Kherson)
  • 128th Guards rifle division(after 1957 - 128th Guards Motor Rifle Division)
• 7th Guards Airborne Division
  • 80th Airborne Regiment
  • 108th Airborne Regiment
• 31st Guards Airborne Division
  • 114th Airborne Regiment
  • 381st Airborne Regiment
• 8th Mechanized Army of the Carpathian Military District (after 1957 - 8th Tank Army)
• 38th Army of the Carpathian Military District
  • 13th Guards Mechanized Division (Poltava) (after 1957 - 21st Guards Tank Division)
  • 27th Mechanized Division (Cherkasy) (after 1957 - 27th Motor Rifle Division)

In total, the operation was attended by:

• personnel - 31550 people
• tanks and self-propelled guns - 1130
• guns and mortars - 615
• anti-aircraft guns - 185
• BTR - 380
• cars - 3830

Start

Intra-party struggle in the Hungarian Party of Labor between Stalinists and reformists began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956, led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Party of Labor Matthias Rakosi, who was replaced by Erno Gero (former Minister of State Security).

The dismissal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznań uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the "Petőfi Circle" began to operate actively, in which the most acute problems facing Hungary were discussed.

The inscription on the wall: "Death to state security!"

October 23

At 3 pm, a demonstration began, in which tens of thousands of people took part - students and intellectuals. The demonstrators carried red flags, banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, about the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc. slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons. In addition, demands were made for free elections, the creation of a government led by Nagy, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT, Erne Gehre, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

In response, a large group of demonstrators tried to break into the broadcasting studio of the Radio House, demanding that the demonstrators' program demands be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units defending the Radio House, during which, after 21 hours, the first dead and wounded appeared. The insurgents received or confiscated weapons from reinforcements sent to help protect the radio, as well as from civil defense depots and captured police stations. A group of insurgents entered the territory of the Kilian barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalions joined the rebels.

The fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels, not to interfere in their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the office for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.

At 11 p.m., on the basis of the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin advancing to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops "in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative labor." Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest by 6 o'clock in the morning and entered into battle with the rebels.

the 25th of October

In the morning, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division approached the city, in the evening - the 128th Guards Rifle Division, which joined the Special Corps. At this time, during a rally near the parliament building, an incident occurred: fire was opened from the upper floors, as a result of which a Soviet officer was killed and a tank was burned. In response, the Soviet troops opened fire on the demonstrators, as a result, 61 people were killed on both sides and 284 were wounded.

28 of October

Imre Nagy spoke on the radio and stated that "the government condemns the views according to which the current grandiose popular movement is regarded as a counter-revolution." The government announced a ceasefire and the beginning of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

October 30. Anarchy

In the morning, all Soviet troops were taken to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left with little or no power.

Some prisons associated with the repressive GB were taken over by the rebels. The guards offered practically no resistance and partly fled.

Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons. On the ground, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils, not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.

Having achieved success for some time, the participants in the uprising quickly became radicalized, killing communists, employees of the State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Hungary, and shelling Soviet military camps.

By order of October 30, Soviet servicemen were forbidden to return fire, "succumb to provocations" and go beyond the location of the unit.

Cases of killings of Soviet servicemen on leave and sentries in various cities Hungary.

The insurgents captured the Budapest Township Committee of the VPT, and over 20 communists were hanged by the crowd. Photos of hanged Communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary.

Re-entry of Soviet troops and the Suez Crisis

October 31 - November 4

November 4

Soviet troops launched artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent sweeps with infantry forces supported by tanks. The main centers of resistance were the working-class suburbs of Budapest, where the local councils were able to lead a more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.

End

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian special services and their Soviet counterparts managed to arrest about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which "a significant number of members of the HTP, military personnel and student youth."

On November 22, 1956, Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were tricked out of the Yugoslav embassy, ​​where they had taken refuge, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. Then they were returned to Hungary, and they were put on trial. Imre Nagy and former minister Defense Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to individual estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of which 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, however, by 1963, all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of Janos Kadar.

After the fall of the socialist regime, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were solemnly reburied in July 1989. Since 1989, Imre Nagy has been considered a national hero of Hungary.

Side losses

According to statistics, during the period from October 23 to December 31, 2,652 Hungarian citizens were killed and 19,226 were wounded in connection with the uprising and hostilities on both sides.

The losses of the Soviet army, according to official figures, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing, 1540 wounded.

Consequences

The entry of Soviet troops made it clear to the West that attempts to overthrow the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe would elicit an adequate response from the USSR. Subsequently, during the Polish crisis, NATO explicitly stated that the invasion of Poland would lead to "very serious consequences", which in this situation meant "the beginning of the Third World War."

Notes

1. by definition communism Dictionary Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.
2. http://www.ucpb.org/?lang=rus&open=15930
3. K. Laszlo. History of Hungary. Millennium in the center of Europe. - M., 2002
4. Hungary //www.krugosvet.ru
5. Short story Hungary: from ancient times to the present day. Ed. Islamova T. M. - M., 1991.
6. R. Medvedev. Yu. Andropov. Political biography.
7. M. Smith. New coat, old dagger. - London, 1997
8. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, p. 325
9. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 441-443
10. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, p. 560
11. O. Filimonov "Myths about the uprising"
12. Hungarian "thaw" of the 56th
13. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 470-473
14. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 479-481
15. Johanna Granville First Domino The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, Texas A&M University Press, 2004. ISBN 1585442984.
16. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 336-337
17. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, pp. 558-559
18. http://www.ucpb.org/?lang=rus&open=15930
19. Cseresnyés, Ferenc (Summer 1999). "The" 56 Exodus to Austria ". The Hungarian Quarterly XL(154): pp. 86–101. Retrieved 2006-10-09. (English)
20. COLD WAR Chat: Geza Jeszensky Hungarian Ambassador
21. Molnar, Adrienne; Kõrösi Zsuzsanna, (1996). "The handing down of experiences in families of the politically condemned in Communist Hungary". IX. International Oral History Conference: pp. 1169-1166. Retrieved 2008-10-10. (English)
22. The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1998, ISBN 5-86004-179-9, p. 559
23. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: Statistical study. - M.: Olma-Press, 2001. - S. 532.

Links

• Hungarian uprising in 1956. Almanac “Russia. XX century. Documentation"
• Hungarian uprising 1956: anniversary. New economy, No. 9-10, 2006, pp. 75-103.
• V. Gavrilov. Black October 1956. Military Industrial Courier
• N. Morozov. Rise from the Past - Part 1 , Part 2
• O. Filimonov. Myths about rebellion
• V. Shurygin. Dead Captain's Letters
• Tamas Kraus. On the Hungarian workers' councils of 1956
• K. Erofeev.

I am deceived in a bright hope,
I - devoid of Fate and soul -
Only once I rebelled in Budapest
Against impudence, oppression and lies

And how did the burning corpses on the poles smell, you know? Have you ever seen a naked woman with her stomach open, lying in the street dust? Have you seen cities where people are silent and only crows cry?

"It's hard to be God" Strugatsky

Anarchists and fascists took the city,
Anarchists and fascists walk the streets together
Young and beautiful

Eduard Limonov

It is rather unpleasant for me to analyze the motives of people whom even friendly historians have called "primitive, primitive and cruel crowd."

After reading the memoirs of eyewitnesses of the Hungarian events of 1956, you perceive with a smile the benevolent apocrypha, in which the actions of Soviet soldiers to suppress the rebellion are explained by "the ignorance of recruits from Central Asia, who were told that they were sent to fight NATO soldiers in Berlin." Everything was much easier. What analogies arose in the minds of Soviet tankers and infantrymen when they saw mutilated corpses hanging on poles, the burnt bodies of their comrades captured, broken communist symbols and piles of burnt books? Who could do such a thing? Only fascists are the only obvious answer.

But why did this happen? Why, 11 years after the collapse of Nazism in Hungary, did the mass fascist movement almost win in the country? Perhaps the answer to these questions will help us understand not only the origins of the tragedy of 1956, but also the causes of the collapse and collapse of "real socialism" in subsequent decades.

Soviet propaganda explained the Hungarian catastrophe by the intrigues of imperialism, which, as you know, does not sleep. But Hungary in 1956 was not Honduras in 1954 or Cuba in 1961. For the American authorities, the events in this country were a complete surprise. By October 24, 1956, there was only one staff member at the American embassy in Budapest who spoke Hungarian. Only at the beginning of November, apparently, American instructors and combat detachments of Hungarian emigrants began to arrive in the country, but they did not have a real impact on the course of events. The same cannot be said about the propaganda effect of the broadcasts of the Free Europe radio station, which during the days of the uprising became an analogue of the perestroika Ogonyok and Ekho Moskvy rolled into one. American propagandists from Munich urged the Hungarians to fight the Soviet troops to the last and promised Western help long after Budapest had fallen and Cardinal Mindszedy locked himself in the American embassy. But the inflammatory transmissions of the Americans became important only after October 24, 1956.
The causes of the crisis must be sought in Hungary itself.

Although the current Hungarian propaganda presents Hungary in the 1920s and 1930s as a "lost paradise", it should be understood that this is a poor, agrarian country. Destructive Second World War destroyed 40% of the national industry, which also did not contribute to the progress and well-being of the population. Moreover, Hungary, as the losing side in the war, was forced to pay reparations to the winners. The situation became even more aggravated after the beginning of the Cold War, in which Hungary became one of the "front-line powers". The constant threat of invasion from the West forced the Rakosi regime to create a militarized economy in which every forint went to military spending at the expense of living standards.

The position of the working class was very difficult. In 1954, 15% had no blankets. 20% did not have winter clothes. The worker at that time received about 1,200 forints a month, which was not enough to live on. Only 15% of families could support themselves at the subsistence level.

Up to a certain point, the authorities could refer to the "heavy legacy of the old regime," but the post-war economic boom every year made this argument more and more vulnerable. To make matters worse, industrial wages fell in 1953 and returned to their 1949 levels. The generous promises made by the communists after the war turned out to be unfulfilled, and the masses were gradually overcome by a sense of hopelessness and despair.
As early as 1953, the Csepel plant in Budapest, the flagship of Hungarian industry, was rioted by nearly 20,000 workers who opposed low wages, food shortages, and heavy production standards. Labor unrest also took place in other cities of the country.

Economic difficulties were exacerbated by the tense situation in the national question. Like the USSR, Hungary after 1945 faced an acute problem of shortage of personnel. There were two reasons for this: First, the rapid growth in the economy and education. Secondly, the emigration of the old elites. As in the Soviet Union, this issue was resolved through the use of cadres from among the more educated national minorities, primarily Jews. This led to a surge in anti-Semitism. As in the pre-war Soviet Union, for the backward masses and the old Hungarian intelligentsia, the words Jewish-Communist-Chief were synonymous.

American sociologist Jay Schulman, who surveyed Hungarians who fled overseas after 1956, concluded that "In the eyes of 100% of the respondents, all communist leaders were Jews." “All important positions are occupied by Jews,” said Erika, a young and devout Hungarian woman who was interviewed by Shulman. Another immigrant, an engineer by profession, said that "All the leaders of the cooperatives are Cohens and Schwartzes." “There was a pogrom in their eyes,” summed up the American scientist.
For the "fight" against anti-Semitism, the Rakosi regime did not come up with anything better than organizing "anti-Zionist" trials and giving secret instructions to limit the number of Jews in a number of areas. However, this did not convince anti-Semites of anything, because Matthias Rakosi himself was still Rosenfeld.

The ridiculous and tactless propaganda of the "Soviet way of life" and the USSR also added fuel to the fire. Too many streets were named after Pushkin and Lermontov, too unceremoniously Soviet advisers interfered in the political and economic life of Hungary, too many empty words were said about "Soviet-Hungarian friendship." Not even for nationalist-minded Hungarians, copying the Soviet grading system in schools and Soviet uniforms in the army was offensive, but what about nationalists for whom Russians were “worse than animals”?

The combination of economic discontent and feelings of national disadvantage created an explosive mixture. In Hungary, as in a number of other Eastern European countries, there was a tradition of mass fascist movements putting forward radical social slogans. They had massive support not only among the middle class and the lumpen proletariat, but also among the industrial workers. In Hungary, the Nazi Arrow Cross Party, founded in 1937, received 41% of the vote in the elections in the working-class suburbs of Budapest. After the collapse of the Horthy regime, and then Salashism, the leadership of the "Screen Arrows" was sent to the gallows or fled, but many thousands of workers who voted for the Nazis did not share anywhere and took an active part in the events of 1956, largely determining the nature of the movement - brutal cruelty in combination with a mixture of nationalist and social slogans.

The immediate impetus for the beginning of the crisis of 1956, which developed into an uprising, was the attempts of the ruling bureaucracy to reform the system. Tov. Ivan Lokh made an interesting observation on this issue that bureaucratic reforms in Eastern Europe, and later in the USSR, almost always led to counter-revolution. On the one hand, the reform led to conflict and a split in the stratum that was in power, which opponents of the regime in any country and in any era are always happy to take advantage of. The second reason was that these reforms from above were usually the reaction of the bureaucracy to the regime of "proletarian Bonapartism", which not only limited the political and economic ambitions of the highest party bosses, but also constantly called into question their status and even their lives. Through de-Stalinization, the bureaucartia provided guarantees for its lifelong power, but the most consistent officials like Beria, Nadia, Gorbachev, Yakovlev got the opportunity to think about the next step: privatizing the property of the workers' state and transferring this property and power by inheritance.

In the period from 1953 to 1956, the struggle between the supporters of proletarian Bonapartism (Rákosi, Géré), moderate reformers (Kadar) and the wing of the bureaucracy ready to undertake more radical reforms along the path of restoration of capitalism completely destabilized the political system of the Hungarian People's Republic.
On October 24, 1956, the regime collapsed like a house of cards. The "slender columns of workers" who gathered at the pro-government rally turned into wild hordes of vigilantes. The attempt to build socialism ended in medieval barbarism.

French journalist Jean-Paul Boncourt, an eyewitness to the events, exclaimed in horror:
“This is not a bourgeois revolution! Look at this motley crowd; it's rubbish!"
Boncourt was right. What was happening was not a bourgeois revolution, but a spontaneous fascist uprising. Dearly beloved in Russia, David Irving, whose Nazi views are, I hope, no secret to anyone, wrote in his 1956 book on Hungary: “The uprising that began as an old-fashioned Jewish pogrom suddenly escalated into a full-scale revolution.” There is a lot of truth in this phrase. In many parts of Hungary, the "Revolution of 1956" began precisely with the massacre of the Jewish population.

On October 25, 1956, patients from a Jewish nursing home were slaughtered in Tápiószentgyörgy. Three Jews were killed in Miskolc. Also, three Jews were slaughtered in the town of Tarkal Tarcal. On 25 October in Mezökövesd and in Mezönyárad many Jews were beaten, in Hajdunánás the events took the form of a Jewish pogrom when the mob tortured and robbed the Jews. According to the testimony of Jewish refugees in Canada, Jews escaped from the pogromists on the roofs of houses. In Debrecen Debrecen, the massacre of the Jewish population was carried out according to pre-prepared (!) Lists. In the village of Tárpa, demonstrators demanded the hanging of three Jews who lived in their community, but in the end limited themselves to "only" beating them. In the town of Mátészalka, anti-Semitic demonstrations by insurgents were accompanied by accusations against Jews of drinking the blood of Christian babies. The Jews were forced to flee from the vigilantes. After the suppression of the revolution or rebellion, the press service of the Kadar government announced pogroms in the villages of Vámospercs-Nyíradony, Hajdunánás, Balkány, Marikocs and Nyirbátor. Even in those places where there were no attacks on the Jews, all the time of the uprising they lived in fear and every minute expectation of the beginning of the massacre.

(It is curious that even in the West, anti-Soviet Jews did not find peace from their former fellow citizens. The riots and attacks on Jews who emigrated from Hungary by other Hungarian refugees in Austria forced the authorities of this country to get rid of the Jews as soon as possible by transporting them across the ocean).

The first days of unrest passed in the atmosphere bloody chaos and anarchy. In a matter of hours, Hungary went through all those processes along the path of restoring the old regime, which took Russia six years to overcome (from 1987 to 1993). Not everyone was able to immediately adapt to the situation. Some talked about socialism and sang the health resorts of Nadia, while others burned the books of Lenin and Marx in a neighboring street. On October 23, 1956, the workers of Csepel kicked the students who came to agitate them in the neck. A few days later, the same workers, with the name of the Virgin Mary on their lips, went to die under Soviet tanks.
There was one more factor in the Hungarian events that misleads many people today. This is a factor of possible restitutions. Unlike the Eastern Europeans of the 1980s, the Hungarians of 1956 had not yet forgotten all the delights of capitalism in the city and feudalism in the countryside. The peasants were so afraid of the return of the landowners that, despite all the costs of the Hungarian collectivization, they preferred to quietly sabotage the "people's revolution", while maintaining neutrality. The Hungarian workers of 1956, unlike their children, did not believe in a "good master" and preferred workers' self-management.

Meanwhile, the country was rapidly moving to the right. Nationalist and fascist methods slogans absolutely dominated social programs and determined the nature of the uprising. Already on October 25, students covered the walls of Budapest with graffiti like: “Freedom for Mindszenty!”, “No to communism!” and what is most interesting: "No to workers' councils - the communists put their paws into this pie." It is true - the first workers' councils were set up with the support of the Nagy government. The first secretary of the Budapest city committee, Ymer Meze (killed in the back on October 30), personally ordered the workers to be armed, hoping to rely on them in the fight against the counter-revolution.

As the rebels rapidly radicalized, public sympathies shifted from the unlucky "Uncle Imre" to the suffering Cardinal Mindstseny, an anti-Semite and monarchist languishing under house arrest. On October 30, the American embassy in Budapest reported to Washington a list of the demands of the demonstrators outside the parliament building:
1. Appoint Mindszenty Prime Minister
2. Appoint Colonel Malter as Secretary of Defense.
3. Withdraw Soviet troops from the country by November 15
4. If these requirements are not met, demand from the Western powers to begin intervention.
As you know, Mindszenty soon got his freedom. To the sound of church bells, like Atoyalla Homenni, he drove into Budapest in a tank, surrounded by crowds of admirers. He set up his residence on the territory of the royal palace in Buda, in a symbolic place from where, in 1944, German paratroopers under the command of Otto Skorzeny pulled out regent Horthy.
Imre Nagy became an absolutely superfluous figure, like Gorbachev after Foros. After he decided, under pressure from the mob, to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, the last more or less principled communists left his government, including the philosopher Dergy Lukács.

In early November, the first groups of American military specialists began to arrive in Hungary through the open border. They trained Hungarian teenagers to make anti-tank bombardments and firebombs.
The rolling ultra-right wave was obvious to everyone who was even a little aware of the real state of affairs in Budapest. The leader of the Hungarian Social Democrats, Anna Kelti, who arrived at a meeting of the Socialist International in Vienna (by the way, a staunch anti-communist) spoke of the "victory of the counter-revolution." Her words sounded like a voice crying in the desert amid the raptures of the Social Democrats singing the praises of the "workers' uprising". Before leaving Vienna, she received a phone call from the leader of the Socialist International, Herbert Wehner:
“What will Nagy do?
-He intends to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact! You can't add two and two! Do you want Mindszenty and a fascist putsch in Hungary?”

The fanaticism and cruelty of the rebels played a bad joke on them. If they had followed a more moderate line, then the intervention of the USSR in the Hungarian events would probably have been avoided. As early as October 29, 1956, at a reception at the Turkish embassy in Moscow, USSR Foreign Minister D. Shepilov and Marshal G. Zhukov openly spoke of their sympathy for the Hungarian workers who opposed the bureaucracy. However, the shocking information about the pogroms and massacres in Hungary eventually overwhelmed Khrushchev's patience. On November 4, Soviet troops crossed the Hungarian border. The resistance of the rebels was crushed in a few days.

In left-communist, Trotskyist and anarchist historiography, the dominant view is that the Soviet regime suppressed the Hungarian workers' movement. This is an interesting thesis, the only drawback of which is that it does not correspond to the facts. After all, the Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest came into being on November 14, 1956, ten days after the beginning of the Soviet intervention. After the smoke from the shots cleared, it turned out that the entire right-wing political spectrum of Hungarian politics was on the way to the Austrian border, and the workers' councils were the only power on the ground. The fascist phase of the Hungarian revolution was over, Prime Minister Mindszenty was out of the question. The anarcho-syndicalist stage began, marked by labor strikes and useless bargaining with the Kadar government. The nationalist sentiments of the Hungarian working people again played a bad joke on them. Kadar was ready to compromise on the issues of self-management of enterprises and workers' councils, but the demand for the return of Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops was obviously impossible. But these were the main conditions of the protesters.

As a result, the movement of workers' councils, after several weeks of unsuccessful confrontation with the government, relying on Soviet bayonets, collapsed. The Hungarian workers could write Kadar's "goulash-socialism" to their credit. The restoration of capitalism was delayed for 30 years. The fascist revolution in Hungary continues to be on the agenda inspired by the 1956 myth.

HUNGARY. 1956

Brief historical and geographical reference

Hungary - a country in the middle reaches of the Danube. In ancient times, its territory was part of the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dacia. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Avar Khaganate was formed there, defeated in the 8th century. Charlemagne, and in the ninth century. the Great Moravian state of the Western Slavs arose. In 896, tribes of Hungarians (Magyars) migrated to these lands from the southern Russian steppes under the leadership of Prince Arpad, who founded the dynasty. This year is considered the date of "finding the motherland" by the Hungarians and the beginning of their statehood, recognized by the King of Germany and Italy, Arnulf. In 1241, the Mongols devastated the country, then a threat arose from Ottoman Empire. The death in the battle with the Turks at Mohacs of the Hungarian king Louis (Lajos) II in 1526 led to the division of the kingdom between the Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Sultanate. By 1711, the entire country was under the rule of the Habsburgs, which remained part of their empire until the beginning of the 20th century. The defeat in the First World War led to the establishment in November 1918 of an independent democratic republic, which in 1919 was briefly replaced by the communist regime of Bela Kun. From 1920 to 1944, Hungary (nominally a monarchy) was ruled by regent Miklós Horthy, who received dictatorial powers. During World War II, Hungary took the side of Germany and its allies, after the defeat of which it was occupied by the USSR. In 1946 it was proclaimed a republic, and in 1949 it became a one-party communist state.

The dramatic events of the autumn of 1956 in Hungary left a deep mark on the history of post-war Europe. They were a reflection of the most complex problems and contradictions that have developed in the era " cold war", and caused a wide resonance around the world.

As you know, at the final stage of World War II, not without the help of I.V. Stalin, at the head of the Hungarian Working People's Party (VPT) and the country was a group of former Comintern leaders, led by the "orthodox Stalinist" Matthias Rakosi, who returned to their homeland from Moscow emigration. According to Henry A. Kissinger, in the 1950s and 1960s, an adviser to American presidents on foreign policy, back in the 1930s, Rakosi was literally bought out by Stalin from a Budapest prison in exchange for Hungarian banners taken as trophies by the tsarist troops in 1849.

After a few years of their leadership of the country, serious signs of a socio-political crisis appeared in Hungary, expressed in dissatisfaction with the authorities, methods of government, copying the experience of the USSR without taking into account national characteristics.

The political situation in the country was also aggravated by economic problems - wage cuts, rising prices and, against this background, a drop in the living standards of the population. The forced industrialization launched by the country's leadership and the campaign to create agricultural cooperatives provoked a popular protest against socialist forms of management. The Soviet leadership, closely following the developments in Hungary, assessing the catastrophic consequences of M. Rakosi's rule, took urgent measures to normalize the situation in the country. The Hungarian leaders, summoned to Moscow, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU held on June 13, 1953, were subjected to harsh criticism - for the mistakes made, the usurpation of power, repressions and the difficult socio-economic situation.

The meeting resulted in the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Hungary (HPR), who was instructed to proclaim changes that included a number of changes to mitigate totalitarian pressure on society, reforms in the economy and democratization of the existing political system.

Here, in our opinion, it is important to briefly characterize Imre Nagy, who became the main figure in the events that followed soon after.

Imre Nagy was born on June 7, 1896 in the city of Kaposvár to Jozsef Nagy, a storekeeper, and Rosalia Scharinger, a housekeeper. He studied at the Higher Commercial School, from where he joined the Austro-Hungarian army in 1915. In July 1916, during the Brusilov breakthrough, he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Russians. He was in camps in the Verkhneudinsk region (Ulan-Ude), doing auxiliary work in the Baikal villages, in Irkutsk. In March 1918 he joined the international Red Guard detachment, in which he served until September of the same year. Here he was admitted to the Hungarian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(b). According to some reports, he took part in the suppression of the rebellion by the White Cossacks in Verkhneudinsk, battles with whites near Irkutsk. The scale of this participation and Nagy's personal contribution are unknown. In September 1918, the detachment , in which he was, laid down his arms, and Nagy, along with other former prisoners of war, was returned to their former places of residence, where he worked until Kolchak's defeat. years to March 1921 served in a special department of the Irkutsk Cheka. In those years, with a shortage of competent personnel, "internationalist fighters" were considered "reliable comrades" ready to fulfill any order. They were not connected by national ties with the local population, did not differ in relation to them with excessive sentimentality and therefore were willingly enrolled in ordinary work in the Chekist bodies. period in the life of Imre Nagy.

In 1921, after a brief stay in Moscow, Nagy was sent by the Hungarian section of the Comintern to work underground in Hungary. There is little information about this period of his life in the Russian archives. Nevertheless, several interesting facts are known. In particular, about the patronage in the Comintern, after his return to Moscow in 1929, of his closest associates in the underground struggle in Hungary, N. Tiriner and A. Molnar. In fact, they turned out to be provocateurs and agents of the Hungarian police, who "surrendered" their comrades in the revolutionary movement. Nagy survived, which gave rise to unkind rumors in the circles of the Hungarian emigration. Perhaps these rumors were the reason for Nadia's refusal to be admitted to the staff of the GPU. In addition, there are documents in archival materials that testify that the Chekists were unpleasantly impressed by "Nady's persistent attempts to get a job as a staff member of the GPU." Instead of enrolling in the cadres, Nadia was offered to become an unspoken agent (secret informant), to which he agreed on January 17, 1933. Quite a lot of materials have been preserved about his work on the organs. There is, for example, a document showing that in 1939 Nagy proposed to the NKVD for the "development" of 38 Hungarian political emigrants, including F. Munnich. In another list, he names 150 Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Germans, Italians he knows, with whom, if necessary, he could "work."

According to the reports of Nagy (pseudonym - "Volodya"), several groups of political emigrants, consisting of members of the Hungarian, German and other communist parties, were convicted. All of them were accused of "anti-Soviet", "terrorist" and "counter-revolutionary" activities (cases "Agrarians", "Incorrigible", "Agony of the Doomed" and others). Another document (June 1940) indicates that Nagy "gave materials" on 15 arrested "enemies of the people" who worked in the International Agrarian Institute, the Comintern, and the All-Union Radio Committee. The activities of "Volodya" led to the arrest of the famous scientist E. Varga, a number of leaders of the Communist Party of Hungary (B. Varga-Vago, G. Farkas, E. Neumann, F. Gabor and others). Some of them were shot, some were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and exile. In a letter from the chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov to the Central Committee of the CPSU "On archival materials on the activities of Imre Nagy in the USSR", prepared in June 1989, it was noted: "From the available archival materials it does not follow that Nagy collaborated with the NKVD under duress. Moreover , the documents directly indicate that "Volodya" shows great interest and initiative in the work, is a qualified agent ".

But back to the events of the 1950s.

As a result of the decisions of the June (1953) plenum of the CR HTP in public life Hungary showed the first signs of a "thaw". Actions for the rehabilitation of illegally convicted people began, and the activities of public organizations became more active. However, the process of democratization could not unfold in full force. Taking advantage of the economic difficulties on the just begun path of transition to market forms of management, Rakosi, who remained the first secretary of the CR HTP, and his entourage undertook a counter-manoeuvre. The Prime Minister was accused of "serious violation of the principle of collegiality." The government crisis provoked a split in society, which resulted in a confrontation between reformers and conservatives, in a confrontation between supporters of the "modernization" of the socialist system and dictatorship, in a rivalry between Nagy and Rakosi. As a result, Nagy was removed from the post of prime minister in April 1955 and expelled from the party in December. A new "cold snap" has come. However, attempts to restore the old methods of governing the country gave rise to new resistance. The intelligentsia came out actively in support of the reforms. The first publications of Hungarian writers appeared in the press criticizing the principles of party spirit in literature, the interference of party functionaries in the creative activities of writers and artists. Various public associations began to form, acquiring an increasingly pronounced political character. The Union of Hungarian Writers became the center of discontent and resistance to the regime. In the "Petofi" circle created in the summer of 1956, under the guise of literary discussions, criticism of the socio-political system that existed in the country was carried out. This happened against the background of intensified Western ideological campaigns: radio stations Free Europe and Voice of America were engaged in active propaganda, calling on Hungarians to openly oppose the ruling regime.

All this contributed to the formation of government opposition around Nagy, who was expelled from the party, but who was seeking his political rehabilitation.

"Oils on the fire" were added by external factors.

In May-June 1955, a significant event took place: the Soviet leaders arrived in Belgrade on an official visit, including to meet with I. Tito. The reconciliation with Tito had far-reaching political implications. Moscow's rehabilitation of the Yugoslav "apostate" automatically removed the blame from many people who were repressed during the campaign against "Titoism". This had a strong impact even on those who sincerely believed in the ideals of socialism in Eastern Europe. In these states, including Hungary, a campaign has begun to rehabilitate those who suffered for "Titoism".

And, finally, an important reason for the development of the movement for "liberal reforms" was N.S. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU (February 14-25, 1956). Despite its "secrecy", in a matter of weeks, thanks to the operational work of American intelligence agencies, it became widely known in Eastern European countries. Criticism of the recent past, condemnation of the cult of personality, mistakes and crimes caused rather strong, overt or covert, anti-Soviet sentiments in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

The consequence of this was a large-scale demonstration on June 28-29, 1956 in Poland in Poznan with calls for "Freedom!", "Bread!", "God!", "Down with communism!". The demonstration escalated into street clashes, the troops of the voivodeship security department intervened, opened fire on the demonstrators, and then the army. As a result, more than 70 people died, about 500 were injured.

In Hungary, anti-Soviet sentiments began to manifest themselves at first in seemingly insignificant episodes - refusals in stores to sell goods to Soviet military personnel and members of their families, insults on the streets of cities. Then they became more and more aggressive. In the dormitory of Soviet officers in Szombathely, windows were smashed with stones at night. At one of the railway crossings, a group of Soviet soldiers were thrown from a passing train with pieces of coal. Commandant of Budapest Colonel M.Ya. Kuzminov reported that unknown persons telephoned the commandant's office, threatened and warned that the Russians would face bloody retribution for everything they had done. Incidents like this are getting worse and worse.

The events in Poland met with enthusiastic support in Hungary. The situation was not alleviated by the forced castling in the leadership of the Hungarian People's Republic: on July 18, 1956, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the VPT, the resignation of Rakosi was accepted, who immediately, together with his wife, a Soviet citizen F.F. Kornilova, went to the USSR for "treatment". Erne Gehre, his faithful comrade-in-arms, was elected the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT. Four new members were nominated to the central leadership, including Janos Kadar and two candidates, and 14 members and candidates were co-opted to the Central Committee. However, these changes, as it turned out later, resulted only in a tactical combination that changed little in essence.

In mid-October, student unrest began in Hungary. In Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged, Szombathely and Pec, they demanded to abandon the Stalinist methods of governing the country, to stop the study of Marxism-Leninism in universities and institutes.

On October 22, 16-point demands were formulated at the Budapest Polytechnic University - convening a party congress, removing the Stalinists from the leadership, expanding socialist democracy, returning I. Nagy to the post of prime minister, and reducing taxes on peasants. They were supplemented by calls for a multi-party system, holding free elections, restoring the old state symbols, canceling military training and Russian language lessons, and withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary.

On October 23, at 15:00, a large student demonstration began in Budapest, which was gradually joined by representatives of all segments of the population. The number of demonstrators reached 200 thousand. The authorities were confused. The Minister of the Interior, L. Pirosh, first banned it, then, when the demonstration assumed an unprecedented mass character, he allowed it. However, already during the first clashes with law enforcement forces, the nature of the demonstration changed, anti-government slogans appeared. According to eyewitnesses, well-organized groups of people began to stand out in the crowd. At 19:00, the first secretary of the HTP CR, Erne Gere, spoke on the radio. But instead of trying to find some kind of compromise, he branded the performance as "counter-revolutionary" and "nationalist" and threatened reprisals. According to. V. Musatov, who worked for a long time in the Soviet embassy in Budapest, and then in the apparatus of the Central Committee, where he dealt with issues of relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, he did this on purpose, "wanting to suppress the uprising in one fell swoop" . One way or another, Gera's statement only aggravated the situation even more. I. Nagy, who spoke at the request of the demonstrators at a rally in front of the parliament, could not calm the passions either. The unrest continued to escalate. Shouts began to be heard in the crowd: "We do not need tunics!", "Down with the red star!", "Down with the communists!" The demonstrators tore off the images of the state emblem from the national flags of the Hungarian People's Republic, burned red flags. The apotheosis of the riots was the dismantling of a giant statue of Stalin, which was then smashed into small pieces, taken apart for souvenirs. Not the last place was occupied by anti-Semitic slogans. A significant number of Jews in the leadership of the country, which, according to the demonstrators, bore the main blame for the problems of Hungary, caused popular discontent throughout the country.

By evening, the situation in the capital was tense to the limit. The uprising began. The rebels were opposed by parts of the state security and the army. Even with the beginning of armed uprisings, parts of the Budapest garrison were ordered to occupy the most important objects in the city. But there were few troops in the city. So, in a report addressed to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Zhukov, it was reported that total strength attracted troops was only about 2,500 people. At the same time, the Hungarian government did not give permission to open fire, so the units and subunits came out without ammunition. As a result, they were unable to resist. Some units were disarmed by the rebels, who by the evening seized the editorial office and printing house of the central party newspaper, the weapons depot and cartridge factory, the Western Station and threatened to seize the buildings of the Central Committee of the party, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Railways.

Serious events unfolded near the building of the Hungarian Radio Center, where a crowd of demonstrators arrived, demanding access to the radio and for the time being held back by the police and state security forces (ABH). The delegation of students was let into the building to negotiate with the director. However, a false rumor soon spread among the demonstrators who remained on the street that one of the delegates had allegedly been killed. The crowd became agitated, there were calls to storm the building. As to how subsequent events developed, the opinions of contemporaries were divided.

According to one version, shortly after 21:00, some of the guards threw tear gas from the window of the radio center, and after one or two minutes, state security officers opened fire on the crowd. Then came the white ambulances. But instead of doctors, state security officers dressed in white coats jumped out of the cars. The angry mob attacked them and took away their weapons. Parts of the Hungarian army were sent to help the ABH, but the soldiers, after some hesitation, went over to the side of the crowd.

According to another version, at 9:00 pm the rebels began shelling the building of the Radio Center, and only when several of its guards were killed and wounded did the state security officers receive permission to open fire.

Here is how one of the commanders of the radio guard describes the siege of the Center:

“At about 6-6.30, groups of demonstrators appeared on Shandor Brody Street. The crowd continuously grew and behaved more and more aggressively. It did not follow the call to disperse, therefore, in order to disperse it, we “wedge” crashed into the crowd and used tear gas grenades.

Figure 141

Rebels on the streets of Budapest

Later, we began to fire warning shots, as a result of which we managed to clear Shandor Brody Street twice. But, since the crowd saw that we were shooting only into the air, they returned and did not disperse any more.

The first single shots with live ammunition were fired by demonstrators from Shandor Brody Street and almost simultaneously from the side of the National Museum - through the Palace Garden - at 19:30. They shot at the windows, near which there were then a lot of people.

Several people were immediately killed by the first shots. By the time we received the order to open fire, there were over twenty dead among the guards.

When we opened fire, the street was empty again for a while, but by this time the rebels had occupied the houses and roofs opposite and were firing from there. Shooting was carried out from machine guns not only from Shandor Brody Street, but also from the roofs of houses located on Sentkirai Street ... ".

One way or another, but shortly after midnight, the Radio Center was captured by the attackers.

At noon on October 24, Hungarian radio announced the introduction of a state of emergency in Budapest and the establishment of a curfew. Residents of the city were forbidden to take to the streets at night until 7 am, to hold rallies and meetings. The rebels were asked to stop the armed struggle and lay down their arms. And the day before that, on the afternoon of October 23, Gera telephoned Moscow with a request to bring Soviet troops into Budapest, who were in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact. At night, the plenum of the Central Committee of the VPT formed a new government headed by Imre Nagy, who, being present at the meeting of the Central Committee, did not object to the invitation of the Soviet troops. Moreover, speaking on the radio on October 25, he recognized their inevitability of intervention in the current situation. However, when the troops had already entered the capital, he rejected the request of the USSR ambassador to sign the corresponding letter. The former head of government, Hegedüs, did it instead. The text of the appeal read: "On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, I ask the government Soviet Union to send Soviet troops to Budapest to help to eliminate the unrest that arose in Budapest, to quickly restore order and create conditions for peaceful creative work ". The letter was backdated - October 24, it arrived in Moscow on October 28.

At this time, rather strange events were taking place in Budapest. Some researchers explain them by the confusion of the authorities and the confusion that reigned in various government departments, including law enforcement agencies. Others are convinced that these were planned provocations, betrayal and direct intervention by Western intelligence agencies. We are talking primarily about weapons that ended up in large quantities in the hands of the rebels. The Western media claimed that all of it was captured in battles with the regular units of the Hungarian and Soviet armies or taken from the police. At the same time, according to many eyewitnesses of the events, already on the first day of the rebellion, trucks appeared on the streets and squares of the city, from which machine guns and rifles were distributed to everyone. Looking ahead, we note that during the period of fighting and after they ended in November 1956, more than 44 thousand small arms were seized from the rebels and the population, including 11 thousand 500 machine guns and about 2 thousand machine guns, 62 guns, of which 47 anti-aircraft guns. Moreover, about 2 thousand units of small arms were foreign-made in the post-war period.

How did the rebels get these weapons? Indeed, some of the small arms were taken away from the Hungarian military, and some were seized from the weapons depots captured by the rebels. But there were other sources as well. So, for example, it is known that I. Nagy, immediately after he headed the government, demanded to arm the party activists. The weapons were delivered to district committees, to the police and to large enterprises. However, from there it somehow fell into the hands of the rebels. The same thing happened when the Hungarian government decided to arm the workers.

At first, the Ministry of Defense searched for weapons for a long time, but when it was found, it again fell into the hands of the rebels in considerable quantities.

Yes, and "miracles" happened to the rebels. So, during the fighting, about 300 people were captured and disarmed. They were handed over to the Hungarian police. But a few days later, the detainees were again captured with weapons in their hands.

Figure 142

A tank captured by the rebels. 1956

Later it became known that all the detainees were released on the orders of the chief of police in Budapest, Sandor Kopacha, and the weapons were returned to them.

October 23 at 23.00, having received an order from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, parts of the Special Corps were alerted and moved to Budapest. They had to make a 75-120-kilometer march. The calculation was for a show of force. The task force of the headquarters of the Special Corps, headed by Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko also went to the capital, where with great difficulty she got to the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic.

It should be said that the plan of action for the troops of the Special Corps to maintain and restore order in Budapest and on the territory of Hungary was developed by the headquarters of the corps and worked out on the map as early as July 1956. He received the code name "Compass".

According to the plan, the restoration of order in Budapest was assigned to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Major General S.V. Lebedev. She was supposed to move out of Kecskemét and take under protection the main objects of the Hungarian capital. She determined the priority objects, as well as the forces and means to hold them.

17th Guards Mechanized Division Major General A.V. Krivosheeva was supposed to cover the border with Austria and ensure public order at the points of permanent deployment - in the cities of Gyor, Koszeg, Kermend, Szombathely. Parts of the division stationed in Khaimashkar formed a reserve and were intended for use in Budapest.

The rest of the formations and parts of the corps were ordered to ensure public order at their permanent deployment points, as well as to hold and defend military camps, airfields, warehouses and other critical facilities.

The special instructions indicated: the procedure for the operation of units and subunits in the city, the tasks of guarding and defending objects, the procedure for interacting with units of the VNA, and some other issues. The procedure for the use of weapons was especially stipulated.

After completion on July 20, 1956, the corps commander, Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko approved a new version of the action plan of the Special Corps, according to which parts of the corps were given from 3 to 6 hours to establish control over the most important objects of the country and Budapest. After coordination with Moscow, the new plan was codenamed "Volna".

At a time when parts of the Special Corps advanced to the capital, confusion and confusion reigned in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense. The information about the actions of the rebels, the Hungarian units and the police was the most contradictory. Defense Minister I. Bata and Chief of the General Staff L. Toth were in a panic. By that time, there were about 7 thousand Hungarian soldiers and 50 tanks in Budapest, dispersed over many objects. At the same time, no one knew the location and number of forces in a particular area, how reliable they were, and how many military personnel went over to the side of the rebels. In such a situation, the Soviet command did not have to rely on the interaction and assistance of the Hungarian army.

The first to enter Budapest at 4 am on October 24 were the 37th Tank Regiment, headed by the deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Colonel Bichan, and the motorcycle battalion of Lieutenant Colonel G. Dobrunov. The regiment received the task of guarding the buildings of the Central Committee of the VPT, the parliament, the Soviet embassy, ​​bridges across the Danube and freeing the Radio House captured by the rebels. However, even at the entrance to the city, the Soviet units were subjected to unexpected fire from the rebels. As a result of the attack, several people died, including the company commander of the motorcycle battalion, Captain Petrochenkov. Despite the losses, our soldiers, in obedience to the order, did not open fire.

The main forces of the division (the 5th mechanized regiment of Colonel Pilipenko, the 6th mechanized regiment of Colonel Mayakov, the 87th heavy self-propelled tank regiment of Colonel Nikovsky) approached Budapest only at 5 o'clock. The regiments immediately entered the battle and in a short time cleared a number of important objects from armed groups, including railway stations, bridges, and, together with the regiments that had arrived earlier, began to protect the buildings of the Central Committee of the VPT, parliament, ministries of defense and foreign affairs, the Soviet embassy, ​​banks , warehouses and airfield . By this time, the grouping of Soviet troops in Budapest consisted of about 6 thousand people, 290 tanks, 1236 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns.

In the afternoon of the same day, the 83rd tank and 56th mechanized regiments of the 17th Guards Mechanized Division, Major General A. Krivosheev, approached the city, who were tasked with maintaining order in the western part of the city - Buda and guarding the bridge across the Danube .

Figure 143

The crew of the armored personnel carrier BTR-152 from the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, which participated in the suppression of the rebellion. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

Together with the Soviet units, four VNA divisions began to operate in the city (7th mechanized division, 8th, 27th rifle and 5th mechanized division of the 3rd rifle corps). On October 24-26, on the orders of General Durko, a 340-man rebel detachment was destroyed in Kuchkemet by Hungarian units. During the operation in Sabadsalash, 7 rebels were killed and 40 wounded. At the same time, a number of units of the 8th mechanized regiment of the Hungarian army, construction and anti-aircraft units of the capital's garrison, individual officers and cadets of the military academy and schools went over to the side of the rebels.

By the end of October 24, the troops of the Special Corps had largely succeeded in completing their assigned tasks. However, as subsequent events showed, the forceful action taken led to the toughening of the resistance of the rebels. The situation became more complicated the very next day, October 25. According to Mikoyan and Suslov, who arrived in Budapest on October 24 to clarify the situation in the country, two events shook the Hungarian capital. The first is an incident near the parliament, when during a rally from the roofs and attics of nearby houses, unarmed demonstrators and Soviet soldiers were fired at, one tank was burned. Among the dead was the regiment commander, Major V.P. Bachurin. He was killed by a burst from a heavy machine gun during a peaceful conversation with demonstrators. In response to the provocation, Soviet units and Hungarian state security officers also responded with fire. To this day, there is no exact answer as to who organized this provocation. According to one version, employees of the Hungarian State Security Service started shooting from the roofs. According to others - a group of armed rebels. One way or another, but as a result of the shootout, more than 60 Hungarians were killed (according to later data - over 200 people).

Lieutenant General E.I. Malashenko recalls this incident in the following way:

“Many approached the tanks standing here, climbed on them and stuck banners into the gun barrels.

Figure 144

Member of Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956

From the attics of the buildings located on the square opposite the parliament, fire was opened on the demonstrators and Soviet soldiers. Two Hungarian tanks escorting the demonstrators fired several shots and disappeared. The commander of one of our units was killed.

Soviet soldiers and state security officers guarding the parliament returned fire on the roofs of the buildings from which they fired. There was a panic in Lajos Kossuth Square. People with the first shots began to scatter in search of shelter. When the firefight subsided, many hurried to leave the square. Twenty-two demonstrators were killed and many wounded. Several of our military personnel and Hungarian policemen were killed ... ".

It is not known, as noted above, who was the instigator of this provocation, but it is certain that it was the result of I. Nagy's decision to lift the curfew. It was adopted a few hours before the incident at the Parliament, without the consent of the Soviet command.

The second event - a shootout near the Central Committee building - the Soviet tankmen, covering the building, mistakenly opened fire on a suitable Hungarian guard company, mistaking it for a rebel detachment; 10 Hungarians were killed.

Perhaps this incident was the reason for the publications, which claimed that many Soviet soldiers sympathized with the rebels and even provided them with armed assistance. So, for example, the Austrian newspaper "Bild Telegraph" dated October 31, 1956 wrote:

“Members of the AVO (Hungarian Chekists) began to shoot at unarmed demonstrators ... Suddenly, the towers of three Soviet tanks turned from 12 to 3 - as they say in the language of the tankers, and three tank commanders commanded in Russian: “Fire!” - but not at the demonstrators, but in the Chekists of Hungary. The communist security officials fell under the shells of tanks of the Soviet army. It was the greatest heroism in the history of this Soviet military unit and the complete collapse of the official communist ideology ... ".

Reacting to the aggravation of the situation, the Soviet command took measures to build up the grouping of troops in the Hungarian capital.

On October 25, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division of Major General G.I. approached Budapest. Obaturov (from the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania) and the 128th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel N.A. Gorbunov (from the Carpathian military district). Both divisions became part of the Special Corps. Thus, the total number of troops operating in Budapest was brought up to 20 thousand people.

Nevertheless, the resistance of the rebels, especially in the center of the capital, continued to grow. In this regard, the 33rd division was given the task of "clearing from armed detachments" the central part of the city, where the rebels created strongholds (in the Kebanya sector, Yllei Street, areas adjacent to the Danube, the Kilian barracks and the cinema area " Corwin"). By this time, the rebels were already armed with not only small arms, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank grenades and bottles of combustible mixture.

It should be noted that some parts of the 33rd division suffered losses immediately upon entering the city. A tank and an armored personnel carrier were hit, in which the commanders of two regiments were located, and headquarters radio stations were destroyed. The artillery regiment of the division on Ferenczi Avenue was ambushed and almost completely lost the second division. Regiment commander E.N. Khanovich was mortally wounded. How this happened, the former instructor of the political department of the Special Corps, Colonel V.I., told in his memoirs. Fomin:

"The head of her column (33rd division, - A. O.), following in marching order, according to the Hungarians, appeared on the outskirts of the city at about six o'clock in the evening. The division commander, Major General Obaturov, arrived at General Lashchenko for instructions much earlier. He arrived in a staff "gas truck", dressed, like the driver, in a soldier's uniform: a raincoat, a cap on his head. The Hungarian guard asked me to help check the documents of a soldier who claimed to be a general, but did not show his identity. I escorted the division commander to the corps commander. And in the evening it became known about the attack on the convoy of armed groups in the area of ​​​​Prater Square and on Yllei Street. Having missed the tanks, the rebels took the division's artillery, which was moving with uncovered gun barrels, and rear units under crossfire. Many soldiers and officers died, including the commander of the artillery regiment. He did not have time to give the command "to fight." The division got lost in the city and lost control. General Obaturov, as I was later told by the Hero of the Soviet Union, retired colonel G.D. Dobrunov, then the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized division, found himself in a very difficult situation. An experienced intelligence officer, who knew Budapest well, had to help the divisional commander in drawing the location of his units on the city plan, issued in 1945! But in 1956, all the troops of the Special Corps were equipped with such plans, which, in the absence of officers, those who know the language and the Hungarian capital, created great difficulties in orientation on its streets: over the course of eleven years, not only the names of many streets and squares have changed, but also their configuration ".

Already in the city, a tank of the regiment commander Litovtsev (number "072") was knocked out by a direct hit of a shell. Of the entire crew of the car, only Colonel Litovtsev managed to escape.

In total, on October 25-26, the 33rd mechanized division lost 130 servicemen on the streets of Budapest, without taking part in any of the actions against the armed groups of the rebels. Other units also suffered losses, in particular, on October 24 alone, more than 40 soldiers and officers of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division died at the hands of militants. At the same time, not isolated cases of abuse of the bodies of the dead, as well as atrocities and bullying by the rebels in relation to the captured Soviet soldiers, were recorded. So, according to the memoirs of L.V. Petukhov, in the village of Dunakesi, 20 km north of Budapest, the rebels attacked a convoy of Soviet fuel trucks. Fuel trucks slipped through, two drivers were injured, and a shell hit the security car. Senior group captain G.I. Miseenkov and ten guards were shell-shocked and taken prisoner. The guards were immediately shot, and the captain was demanded that he voluntarily go over to the side of the rebels. G.I. Miseenkov refused. Then, while alive, they cut off his arm to the elbow, his leg to the knee, doused him with diesel fuel and set him on fire.

According to the former senior instructor of the political department of the OK for special propaganda, retired colonel Vitaly Fomin, in many respects the large losses of the first days were due to the morale of the personnel of the Soviet troops. “Brought up on respect for the sovereignty and independence of the fraternal people,” V. Fomin recalled, “our soldiers found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Yesterday they were welcome guests at industrial enterprises, in production cooperatives and state farms. Now they had to meet with the people of Budapest far from in a friendly atmosphere. They were clearly not ready for this, as well as for opening fire first. And in this case, the instruction of the corps command not to do this was superfluous.

Figure 145

The crew of the T-34/85 tank from the 33rd GMD after the suppression of the rebellion. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

As for the order to avoid provocation, it proved even more difficult to carry it out. As subsequent events showed, extremists and terrorists of all stripes widely used the friendly feelings of Soviet military personnel for Hungarian citizens for their insidious purposes.

On the morning of October 28, an assault on the center of the capital was planned together with units of the 5th and 6th Hungarian mechanized regiments. However, just before the start of the assault, the Hungarian units received an order from their command not to participate in hostilities. This was explained by the fact that the rebels were allegedly ready to lay down their arms. Indeed, Imre Nagy negotiated with the leaders of the armed detachments Laszlo Ivankovich, Gergely Pogranats and others and accepted their demands. Following this, he phoned the Ministry of Defense and warned that if the Corvina was stormed, he would resign. As a result, the operation was cancelled. From that moment on, units of the VNA, at the request of the government of I. Nagy, did not show resistance to the rebels, they did not receive orders to conduct actions against the rebels. A Revolutionary Military Council was created in Budapest, consisting of Major General B. Kiraly, L. Kahn, I. Kovacs, Colonel P. Maleter, and others.

On the same day at 17:00. 20 minutes. according to Budapest time, I. Nagy spoke on the radio with a declaration of the new government. The Hungarian leadership condemned the previous assessment of the uprising as a counter-revolution, recognizing it as a "broad national-democratic movement" that rallied the entire Hungarian people in the struggle for national independence and sovereignty. The declaration outlined a program for the speedy satisfaction of the just social demands of the working people, announced the dissolution of the troops and state security agencies, and an agreement reached between the Hungarian and Soviet governments on the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. On the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, the declaration said: "The Hungarian government will take the initiative of negotiations on relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union - in particular, on the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces located on the territory of Hungary - in the spirit of Hungarian-Soviet friendship, on the basis of the principles equal rights of the socialist countries and national independence".

Figure 146

Soviet tank on the street in Budapest. 1956

The Soviet representatives Mikoyan and Suslov drew the following conclusion about the behavior of Nagy and his supporters: "The most dangerous thing is that, having morally decomposed the state security cadres - the most persistent fighters - with their declaration, they have not yet been able to do anything in return, which is used by the reaction." In the West, on the contrary, the text of the Declaration evoked positive responses.

I. Nagy's statement of October 28 was a turning point in the development of the October events. The defenders of the constitutional order were demoralized. The party activist, who defended public buildings, ministries and district committees, received an order from the Hungarian government to immediately surrender all available weapons. The most disciplined communists carried it out, and later many of them paid for it with their lives.

The decision of the government to abolish the state security agencies actually placed all employees of the Hungarian special services outside the law. So, the head of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Orban, told the Soviet adviser that "he will gather officers and will make his way into the USSR." The former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Dean, fearing the massacre of employees of the bodies and their families, decided to "create a detachment of employees and move to the Soviet border with weapons," and if he fails, then "partisan underground and beat the enemies." The regional department of state security in the city of Sabolch went to Romania, and employees of the Debrecen department approached the Soviet border in the Uzhgorod region and turned to the border guards with a request to let them into the USSR. Large groups of state security workers also concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, waiting for permission to enter this country.

A reassessment of the nature of the events also put an end to the stay of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital. The consequence of this was a fierce campaign against the Soviet military.

On October 30, the Nagy government demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Budapest.

At this time, an active search for a way out of the worsening situation continued in Moscow. On October 28, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Marshal Zhukov proposed to refrain from suppressing the center of resistance in the Budapest barracks "Kilian" and in the cinema "Korvin", located in residential areas, called for political flexibility.

Figure 147

Officers of the 128th Guards Rifle Division in positions near Budapest. November 1956

Khrushchev offered to support the new Hungarian government, to help him in the provinces. He was supported by Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov. Voroshilov, Molotov and Bulganin had a different opinion.

As a result of this meeting, the "Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Foundations of the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries" was adopted. The Declaration stated: "As recent events have shown, it became necessary to make an appropriate statement about the position of the Soviet Union in relations between the USSR and other socialist countries, primarily in the economic and military fields." This Declaration was already broadcast on the radio on October 30, and the next day it was published in the press.

On the evening of October 30, the withdrawal of troops from the city began. In connection with the continued attacks on Soviet military personnel, the withdrawal of troops was carried out under the protection of tanks. They were "interspersed" in transport columns with guns deployed to the right and left. This kind of "herringbone" made it possible at any moment to suppress the machine-gun nest of the rebels. And they did not spare even the ambulances that took out the wounded from the Soviet hospital in Budapest. In one of them, a paramedic died and the soldiers he accompanied were wounded again.

Nevertheless, by the end of the day, all Soviet formations and units were withdrawn from the city and concentrated 15-20 kilometers from Budapest. The headquarters of the Special Corps deployed at the airfield in Tekel, at the base of one of its aviation units. In the areas of concentration of troops, they put equipment and weapons in order, stocked up on ammunition, fuel and food.

It would seem that political methods of getting out of the conflict arose.

However, by this moment the situation in Moscow had changed one hundred and eighty degrees. The documents known to date do not allow a definitive answer to the question of the reasons that forced N.S. Khrushchev sharply reconsider his views on the Hungarian events. Obviously there are several.

The main role, in our opinion, was played by external factors. The Suez crisis at the end of October (October 30-31, Israeli, British and French troops began military operations against Egypt) was perceived in the Kremlin as a symptom of the unacceptable weakening of Soviet influence in the world. This prompted the Soviet leadership to demonstrate military power in Hungary. If we withdraw from Hungary, it will cheer up the Americans, the British and the French. They will regard this as our weakness and will attack ..., N.S. Khrushchev. Moreover, the anti-Egyptian action of the three countries, which, by the way, was not supported by the United States and condemned by many Western, and not only left-wing, politicians, became the external background against which the Soviet action in Hungary could have aroused a more condescending attitude. In addition, the states of Eastern Europe were, following the results of the Second World War, a recognized zone of influence of the USSR and members of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Therefore, a direct confrontation there with the West seemed unlikely. USA and NATO, considering the events in Hungary purely internal affairs the Soviet bloc, did not make any serious efforts to put pressure on the USSR. According to the former Minister of Defense of Germany F.-I. Strauss, "there was no question of NATO military intervention." Moreover, the US government, using various diplomatic channels, managed to convey to the Kremlin its determination to maintain complete neutrality with regard to possible Soviet actions in Hungary. Yes, and the American President Eisenhower was busy with the election campaign.

No less significant, in our opinion, reasons lay in the unbalanced, impulsive nature of N.S. Khrushchev, as well as the struggle for power in the Central Committee of the CPSU that began after Stalin's death. Thus, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR V. Michunovich said that during a meeting with Tito, which took place incognito on November 2-3, 1956 on the island of Brioni, Khrushchev said that the USSR could not allow the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet Union there are quite a few people who would take it all in the following way: under Stalin, everyone was obedient and there were no unrest. And since these ... (here Khrushchev used a strong expression in relation to Soviet leaders) came to power, the collapse began, Hungary leaves ... And everything happens at the very moment when the Soviet leadership began a campaign to condemn Stalin.

According to Khrushchev, as V. Michunovich recalled, this would be the first to be spoken of in the Soviet army.

The course of events in Hungary also had a certain influence on the uncompromising position of the Soviet leaders: the intensified rampant terror and, in particular, the defeat of the Budapest city party committee, as a result of which the secretary of the city committee, Imre Meze, was mortally wounded and 24 Hungarian soldiers who defended him were brutally killed.

On November 1, Prime Minister Imre Nagy handed a note to Andropov demanding that he begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On the same day, at 4 pm, an emergency meeting of the Hungarian Council of Ministers was held, which unanimously adopted a resolution on the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a Declaration of Hungary's neutrality. I. Nagy addressed the United Nations with a message in which he asked for the help of the four great powers to protect Hungarian neutrality. In the evening at 7:45 pm, Imre Nagy addressed the Hungarian people on the radio with a speech in which he announced the Declaration of Neutrality. He concluded his speech with the words:

“We call on our neighbors, both near and far, to respect the unchanging decision of the Hungarian people. There is no doubt that our people are as united in this decision as, perhaps, never before in their entire history.

Millions of Hungarian workers! Preserve and strengthen with revolutionary determination, selfless labor and the restoration of order a free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary."

The appeal of I. Nagy was perceived by the rebels as a call to intensify the struggle. On November 3, a renewed Hungarian government was formed, in which the communists got only three minor ministerial portfolios.

The declaration of neutrality, the appeal to Western countries for help, and the deprivation of the Communists of power left no doubt in Moscow that it was literally about the loss of Hungary. This was already a blow to the entire socialist camp. Hungary's withdrawal from the eastern military alliance would mean the collapse of its entire defense system. And the reaction was immediate.

The leadership of the Soviet troops in Hungary was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev. Preparations have begun for the military operation to restore order in the Hungarian Republic, codenamed "Whirlwind".

Meanwhile, around Budapest, the rebels hastily created a defensive belt, reinforced by hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. Outposts with tanks and artillery appeared in the settlements adjacent to the city.

Figure 148

Soviet officers from the 33rd GMD who distinguished themselves during Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

The most important objects were occupied by armed detachments, the streets were patrolled by military personnel and the National Guard. The number of personnel of the Hungarian units in Budapest reached 50 thousand people. In addition, more than 10 thousand people were part of the "national guard", armed groups and detachments. The rebels had about 100 tanks.

Meanwhile, negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, begun on November 3, continued in the parliament building. The USSR delegation was headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M.S. Mlinin, Hungarian - General P. Maleter. The Soviet side conducted them formally, trying to gain time and misinform the Hungarian leadership.

The discussion of specific issues related to the withdrawal of units of the Soviet army, late in the evening of November 3, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, was transferred to the Soviet military base Tekel. Members of the Hungarian delegation took part here in a gala dinner arranged for them by Soviet military representatives. It was almost midnight when the reception was interrupted by the arrival of the head of the Soviet state security, General I.A. Serov. Accompanied by NKVD officers, he entered the hall and ordered the entire Hungarian delegation to be detained. The military leadership of the Nagy government was beheaded. The Minister of Defense, General Pal Meleter, the Chief of the General Staff, General Istvan Kovacs, the head operational management Colonel Miklos Syuch and Ferenc Erdei.

At 5:15 am on November 4, on the waves of Szolnok Radio (according to some information, the transmission was carried out from Soviet city Uzhgorod), an appeal was made by the new Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, allegedly created in Szolnok, headed by J. Kadar. This communication was in the form of an open letter signed by Kadar and three other former members of Imre Nagy's government. They declared that on November 1 they withdrew from the government of Imre Nagy because the government was unable to deal with the "counter-revolutionary danger". To "suppress fascism and reaction" they formed the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, on the same waves, Kadar announced the new composition of the government. He argued that "the reactionary elements wanted to overthrow the socialist social system in Hungary and restore the rule of the landowners and capitalists." Kadar went on to say that the new government turned to the command of the Soviet troops to "help our people defeat the black forces of reaction and counter-revolution, restore the people's socialist system, restore order and tranquility in our country."

All political formalities were observed, and the Soviet troops began to carry out an operation to restore order in Budapest and other cities of Hungary. It should be noted here that the decision to provide "joint military assistance" to Hungary was supported by the highest political leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nevertheless, the defeat of the forces of the armed opposition was completely entrusted to the Soviet troops.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, called "Whirlwind", the Soviet divisions had to solve the following tasks:

2nd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the north-eastern and central part of Budapest, capture the bridges across the Danube River, the parliament buildings, the Central Committee of the VPT, the Ministry of Defense, the Nyugati station, the police department and block the military camps of the Hungarian units, prevent the rebels from approaching Budapest by roads from the north and east.

33rd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the southeastern and central parts of Budapest, capture the bridges across the Danube River, the Central Telephone Station, the Korvin stronghold, the Keleti station, the Kossuth radio station, the Csepel plant, the arsenal, block the barracks of the Hungarian military units and prevent the rebels from approaching Budapest along the roads from the southeast.

128th Guards Rifle Division to capture the western part of Budapest (Buda), capture the Central Air Defense Command Post, Moscow Square, Gellert Hill and the fortress, block the barracks and prevent the rebels from approaching the city from the west.

Disarm the Hungarian units. At the same time, the disarmament of units that do not offer resistance should be carried out directly in military camps.

To capture the most important objects in all divisions, one was created - two special forward detachments as part of an infantry battalion, as well as 150 paratroopers of the 108th Guards. PDP on armored personnel carriers reinforced with 10-12 tanks. These detachments included senior officials of the KGB of the USSR K.E. Grebennik, P.I. Zyryanov, A.M. Korotkov and others. They were to capture the members of Imre Nagy's government and the leaders of the armed uprising.

In addition, to capture the bridges across the Danube River and other important objects in the regiments, detachments were formed as part of a rifle company, reinforced with tanks, guns and sapper units.

The heavy self-propelled tank regiment of the 11th mechanized division was attached to the 33rd mechanized division of General G.I. Obaturov, who had to perform the most difficult tasks.

In total, the operation to restore order in Hungary was attended by: formations of the Special Corps (2nd Nicholas Veko-Budapest Red Banner Order of Suvorov and 17th Yenakievo-Danube Red Banner Order of Suvorov Guards Mechanized Divisions, 177th and 195th Guards Aviation Divisions); 8th Mechanized Army (31st Panzer Vistula Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, 11th Rivne Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and 32nd Berdichev Orders of Bohdan Khmelnitsky Guards Mechanized, 61st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Divisions); 38th Combined Arms Army (70th Glukhov Order of Lenin twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 128th Turkestan Red Banner Guards Rifles, 27th Cherkasy Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 390th Guards Poltava orders of Lenin and twice Red Banner orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov mechanized, 60th anti-aircraft artillery division); Separate Mechanized Army (33rd Guards Kherson Red Banner Twice Orders of Suvorov Mechanized Division); 35th Guards Kharkiv Twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Mechanized Division of the Odessa Military District; 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions; 1st Guards Railway Brigade and other units. They were armed with more than 3,000 tanks.

Before the start of the operation, Order No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces was communicated to the entire personnel of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES

Comrade soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals! At the end of October, in fraternal Hungary, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution rose in revolt with the aim of destroying the people's democratic system, liquidating the revolutionary gains of the working people and restoring in it the old landowner-capitalist order.

Events have shown that the active participation in this adventure of the former Horthys leads to the revival of fascism in Hungary and creates a direct threat to our Fatherland and the entire socialist camp. It must not be forgotten that in the last war Horthy Hungary opposed our homeland together with Hitlerite Germany.

In accordance with the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Pact concluded between the countries of the socialist camp, obliging us to take "concerted measures necessary to strengthen their defense capability in order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories and ensure protection from possible aggression", the Soviet troops began to fulfill their allied obligations.

There is no doubt that the working class and working peasantry of the Hungarian People's Republic will support us in this just struggle.

The task of the Soviet troops is to render fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in defending their socialist gains, in crushing the counter-revolution and eliminating the threat of the revival of fascism.

I ORDER:

To all the personnel of the Soviet troops, with full consciousness of their military duty, to show perseverance and firmness in the fulfillment of the tasks set by the command. To assist local authorities in their activities to restore public order and establish normal life in the country.

Hold high the honor and dignity of the Soviet soldier, strengthen fraternal friendship with the working people of Hungary, and respect their national traditions and customs.

I express my firm conviction that the soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the Soviet troops will honorably fulfill their military duty.

Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev

The text of the order is unusual and therefore requires some clarification. Its content does not meet the most elementary requirements for combat orders.

Documents of this kind reflect the conclusions from the assessment of the situation and the enemy, the concept of actions and combat missions for formations and units, indicate the lines of demarcation between the active forces, issues of interaction, ammunition consumption, the time of readiness of troops, and more. In order No. 1, these components are completely absent. What's the matter? Obviously, it is a purely propaganda document aimed mainly at the world community. The troops acted according to the rules prescribed by the combat regulations in accordance with another order of Marshal I.S. Konev. Its real content was brought to the attention of a narrow circle of people in the strictest confidence. This is also confirmed by archival documents - reports from commanders to higher authorities on the work done to fulfill the order of Marshal I.S. Konev No. 01.

Retired Lieutenant-General E. I. Malashenko told about how the operation "Whirlwind" went on:

"October 4 at 6 o'clock at the signal" Thunder ", which meant the beginning of the operation" Whirlwind ", the formed detachments to capture objects and the main forces of the three divisions of the Special Corps in columns along their routes rushed to the city simultaneously from different directions and, having overcome resistance on the outskirts of the Hungarian capital, by 7 o'clock on the move broke into Budapest.

The formations of the armies of Generals A. Babadzhanyan and Kh. Mamsurov began active operations to restore order and restore the authorities in Debrecen, Miskolc, Gyor and other cities.

The airborne units disarmed the Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries blocking the airfields of the Soviet aviation units in Veszprem and Tekel.

Imre Nagy, with part of his entourage, left the parliament, having previously announced on the radio that "the government is in its place," and took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. General Bela Kiraly gave the order to conduct hostilities, moved his headquarters to Mount Janos, from where he tried to control the Hungarian units and armed detachments of the "national guard".

Parts of the 2nd Guards Division by 7 hours 30 minutes. captured the bridges across the Danube, the parliament, the buildings of the Central Committee of the party, the ministries of the interior and foreign affairs, the city council and the Nyugati station. In the parliament area, a security battalion was disarmed and three tanks were captured.

Colonel Lipinskiy's 37th Tank Regiment disarmed approximately 250 officers and "national guards" during the seizure of the building of the Ministry of Defense.

The 87th heavy self-propelled tank regiment captured the arsenal in the Fot area, and also disarmed the Hungarian tank regiment.

During the day of the battle, parts of the division disarmed up to 600 people, captured about 100 tanks, two artillery depots, 15 anti-aircraft guns and a large amount of small arms.

Parts of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, without meeting resistance at first, took possession of the artillery depot in Pestszentlerinc, three bridges across the Danube, and also disarmed units of the Hungarian rifle regiment, which had gone over to the side of the rebels.

The 108th Airborne Regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Division disarmed five Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries, which blocked the airfield in Tekel, by surprise actions.

Figure 149

Soviet soldier killed on the street in Budapest. 1956

128th Guards Rifle Division Colonel N.A. Gorbunova, by the actions of forward detachments in the western part of the city, by 7 o’clock captured the Budaers airfield, capturing 22 aircraft, as well as the barracks of the communications school, and disarmed the mechanized regiment of the 7th mechanized division, which was trying to resist.

For the fastest defeat of the armed detachments in Budapest, on the instructions of Marshal I.S. Konev, the Special Corps additionally received two tank regiments (100 tp 31td and 128 tsp 66th guards division), the 80th and 381st airborne regiments of the 7th and 31st guards. airborne division, a rifle regiment, a mechanized regiment, an artillery regiment, as well as two divisions of a heavy mortar and jet brigades.

Most of these units were attached to reinforce the 33rd Mechanized and 128th Guards Rifle Divisions.

Particularly difficult operations in Budapest were the battles to capture the strongholds of the rebels in the center of the capital: the Corvin district, the University campus, Moscow Square and the Royal Fortress. To suppress these centers of resistance, significant forces of infantry, artillery and tanks were involved, incendiary shells, flamethrowers, smoke grenades and bombs were used. The attack on a strong resistance center in Korvin Lane, which began on November 5 at 15:00, was preceded by a massive artillery preparation, in which 11 artillery battalions took part, which included about 170 guns and mortars, as well as several dozen tanks. By evening, Colonel Litovtsev's 71st Guards Tank Regiment and Colonel Yanbakhtin's 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment captured the ruins of the former city block. During their assault, the crew of the tank "765" of the 71st Tank Regiment, 33rd Guards Motor Rifle Division under the command of Guards Senior Sergeant A.M. Balyasnikov. In the midst of the battle, his thirty-four at full speed broke into the enemy positions, in the area where the rebel headquarters was located. Despite the damage to the vehicle (shells hit the caterpillar and engine), the tank crew continued to fight, throwing hand grenades at the enemy and shooting from personal weapons. These minutes allowed the infantry to support the attack and soon capture the fortification. For courage and heroism shown during the battle, the commander of the guard tank, senior sergeant A.M. Balyasnikov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Ordinary members of the crew also received high awards: the gunner Latyshev and the loader Tokarev were awarded the Order of Glory III degree, the driver R. Guk was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Figure 150

Destroyed Soviet self-propelled artillery mount ISU-152K from the 128th self-propelled tank regiment. Budapest, November 1956

The "Gold Star" medal was also awarded to the commander of a tank platoon, Lieutenant S.S. Tsik, who led the assault group. For battles in the Hungarian capital, he received his Order of Alexander Nevsky and the company commander of the 114th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 31st Guards Airborne Division (commander - General: Major P. Ryabov) Captain Sharip Migulov. This was the first and only award of such an order to officers after the end of the Great Patriotic War.

“In Budapest, I was wounded four times,” recalls Migulov, “the leg was shot through, a shrapnel in the head, in the shoulder and in the side. The company went forward. They missed the company. And I was in the rear guard. groans ... Around all the guys were killed, and I fell with a shot in my leg, but noticed that they were shooting from the fourth floor. Next to me, the grenade launcher lies lifeless. I reached for the grenade launcher, crawled behind a large tree. Shot. And about two floors collapsed on them. The fire has ceased from there ... ".

And there were many such heroic episodes. For example, the feat of Lieutenant F.I. Shipitsyn, described in the newspaper "Red Star" for 1957.

"... It was November 6, 1956, on Zsigmond Moritz Square in Budapest. A group of fascist rebels, led by the Horthy general Bela Kiraly, hiding in the basements and attics of buildings, fired on Hungarian workers and soldiers of the Hungarian People's Army, who decided to drive the rebels out of their shelters Together with the Hungarian patriots, they participated in the battle soviet soldiers... In the tanks, as escorts, there were Hungarian officers who knew the location of the city well. Major Hafiek Laszlo was in the car with Lieutenant Fyodor Shipitsyn. This crew included a driver, senior sergeant Gross, a gunner, sergeant Melin, who was loading Private Ormankulov ...

The counter-revolutionaries managed to set fire to the tank... The Hungarian officer was wounded by a tracer bullet in the shoulder. His clothes were on fire. Such a situation was created that it was necessary to immediately leave the burning tank. But Laszlo had no strength. Lieutenant Shipitsyn and Private Ormankulov hurried to help the Hungarian friend. With the assistance of Sergeant Melin, they opened the hatch of the tank and helped Hafiek Laszlo to get out of the burning car. At this moment, the Hungarian comrade received several more wounds. Lieutenant Shipitsyn was also wounded. Private Ormankulov was struck to death by a machine-gun fire. Overcoming excruciating pain, Lieutenant Shipitsyn dragged the Hungarian officer to the ditch with water and extinguished the burning clothes on him. Then he picked up a seriously wounded Hungarian officer and wanted to shelter him in the nearest house. However, Shipitsyn was able to take only a few steps - he received new injuries, and his strength left him. Bleeding, the Soviet officer fell dead to the ground. Hafiek Laszlo was left alone. Having regained consciousness for a minute, having gathered the last of his strength, he crawled under the gates of the house and buried his face in the cold earth. So Laszlo lay until dawn the next day. On the morning of November 7, two Hungarian workers picked him up unconscious and sent him to a safe place ...

For courage and courage, Lieutenant Fedor Ivanovich Shipitsyn was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin ... ".

Despite the stubborn resistance of the rebels, on November 7, parts of the division of General G.I. Obaturov captured the Kossuth radio station. In the pier area, units of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division captured the boats of the Danube Flotilla. Regiments of the 128th Guards Rifle Division stormed the Royal Fortress and Horthy Palace on Castle Hill. More than 1,000 people were active in the area of ​​the fortress; during their capture, 350 machine guns, the same number of rifles, several mortars, a large number of pistols and grenades were seized. No less successfully operated in other cities and towns of Hungary and the troops of Generals A.Kh. Babajanyan and H.U. Mamsurova.

On the same day, the new leadership of Hungary, led by J. Kadar, was delivered to Budapest in a Soviet armored vehicle, accompanied by tanks.

Several pockets of resistance inside Budapest held out until November 8, and on the outskirts for several more days. On November 8, in the area of ​​the suburban working settlement of Chepel, where up to 700 people operated, armed with heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the rebels managed to shoot down a Soviet Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft from the 880th Guards Regiment of the 177th Guards Bomber Air Division. His entire crew died: squadron commander captain A. Bobrovsky, squadron navigator captain D. Karmishin, squadron communications chief senior lieutenant V. Yartsev. Each crew member was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The fact that during the assault on Chepel, the Soviet troops lost only three tanks, is the undoubted merit of the heroic crew.

With the defeat of the armed detachments in Csepel and Buda, the fighting in Budapest was essentially completed.

By November 11, armed resistance was broken not only in the Hungarian capital, but throughout the country. The rest of the armed groups went underground. In order to eliminate groups that had taken refuge in the forests adjacent to Budapest, these areas were combed. The final liquidation of the remaining small groups and the maintenance of public order were carried out jointly with the created Hungarian officer regiments.

Following the results of the hostilities on December 18, 1956, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, more than 10 thousand Soviet military personnel were awarded orders and medals, 26 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 14 posthumously: Captain AA. Bobrovsky, private Yu.V. Burmistrov, Senior Lieutenant P.G. Volokitin, Sergeant I.M. Goryachev, Senior Lieutenant G.M. Gromnitsky, senior lieutenant M.S. Zinukov, captain D.D. Karmishin, senior lieutenant M.P. Karpov, Colonel S.N. Kokhanovich, junior sergeant A.I. Kuzmin, captain G.P. Moiseenkov, captain N.V. Mura-lev, Sergeant A.D. Solovyov, Senior Lieutenant V. Yartsev.

The total losses of the Soviet troops during the hostilities in Hungary amounted to 706 people killed (75 officers and 631 soldiers and sergeants of military service), 1540 wounded, 51 people were missing. A large number of tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment were destroyed and damaged. Only units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, nine armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, four BM-13s, six anti-aircraft guns, 45 machine guns, 31 cars and five motorcycles in Budapest.

The losses of the Hungarian side were also significant. According to the official Budapest, from October 23, 1956 to January 1957, until separate armed skirmishes between the rebels and the Hungarian authorities and Soviet troops ceased, 2,502 Hungarians were killed and 19,226 people were injured. Other figures are given by the West German magazine "Stern" (1998. No. 9). According to him, during the Hungarian events, 2,700 local residents were killed, thousands were injured. The Soviet side lost 2170 people, including 669 killed. In the first months after the suppression of the uprising, more than 200 thousand people left Hungary (out of a total population of 10 million people), mainly young people of the most active and able-bodied age. As a result of subsequent trials (22 thousand cases), 400 people were sentenced to death and 20 thousand were interned. The fate of Imre Nagy was also tragic.

Figure 151

A soldier of the 128th Guards Rifle Division on a street in Budapest. November 1956

Even at the height of hostilities in Budapest, on November 4, he, with the ministers who remained loyal to him and members of their families, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. According to an agreement with the new government of Janos Kadar, everyone who wished to stay in Hungary was allowed to return home without hindrance, the rest could leave the country. Everyone was guaranteed immunity.

On the evening of November 22, Nagy and his associates agreed to leave the Yugoslav embassy. But Janos Kadar did not keep his word. When leaving the embassy, ​​the former Hungarian leaders were arrested by Soviet servicemen and taken to Romania a day later with the consent of his government. The entire action was agreed in advance with Moscow and Bucharest. Kadar claimed that the Yugoslavs were aware of the agreement, although they later protested why Nagy was taken to Romania.

At the end of March 1957 in Moscow, Kadar reached an agreement with the Soviet leadership that Nagy and his group could not escape responsibility. In April 1957, they were arrested in Romania, where they enjoyed the right of "temporary asylum", and secretly transferred to the Hungarian People's Republic. The investigation dragged on until the autumn of 1957. By this time, 74 more "active participants in the counter-revolutionary rebellion" had been detained in the "Nagya case." From among them, at the suggestion of the Soviet competent authorities, a "leading core of the conspirators" was singled out in the amount of 11 people. In June 1958, a closed trial took place. Imre Nagy and several of his associates, including Minister of Defense P. Maleter, well-known publicist M. Gimes and J. Siladi, received capital punishment by hanging. On June 16 at 5 o'clock in the morning the sentence was carried out. It should be noted that the Soviet leadership opposed the execution of I. Nagy. N. Khrushchev advised J. Kadar to conduct the case of the former Hungarian leader "in soft gloves" (put him in prison for 5-6 years, and then arrange a teacher at some agricultural institute in the province). Kadar didn't listen. According to some researchers, behind this lay "personal grievances" and Magyar stubbornness.

More than 50 years have passed since the October events in Hungary. In December 1991, the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev, in a speech on the occasion of the reception of Hungarian Prime Minister J. Antall, condemned the 1956 invasion. Nevertheless, to this day, the question remains, who was the main armed force of the "popular uprising", how did the Western media characterize the rebellion?

According to experts of various political views, the number of those who took part in the armed battles in Budapest was 15-20 thousand (with a total population of the capital - about 1.9 million people). Moreover, the "revolutionary vanguard" - workers and peasants, apparently occupied the smallest percentage in this series, although many "revolutionary committees" were called workers' and peasants'. Probably, individually, a significant number of workers nevertheless took a direct part in the demonstration and armed struggle. This is confirmed by the materials of the trials. However, what is significant, on October 23, work was not stopped at any factory, there were no strikes anywhere in support of the demonstration, and then an uprising, and armed centers were not organized at any factory. The same can be said about agricultural cooperatives and state farms.

In connection with the question raised, it is important to cite the observations of the Hungarian philosopher, Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Jozsef Foriz. In the article “On the Counter-Revolution in Hungary in 1956,” he notes: “Armed centers were organized in such squares, in such public buildings, which from a military point of view were well defended and made it possible to conduct armed activities covertly and with impunity.” Competent and skillful actions of the rebels during the assaults and defense of various objects are noted by many eyewitnesses of the events. An analysis of the hostilities also suggests that their leaders had good professional military skills. And also in a number of cases, clearly special training - for the conduct of hostilities in urban conditions. Confirmation of this professional choice positions for organizing firing points, the use of snipers and more.

Many sources mention the participation in the struggle of a large number of military personnel of the Hungarian People's Army and internal troops. On the radio even the facts of the transition to the side of the insurgent individual military units were transmitted. For example, Andras Hegedyush speaks about the transition to the side of the rebels of the personnel of the Military Academy named after Miklos Zrini in his autobiographical work. But J. Forizh refutes this information. In particular, he writes that on October 28, 1956, the Military Academy, with its full complement, went out to suppress the rebels in Corvin Kez, which was thwarted by the performance of Imre Nagy. A little later, on the basis of the personnel of the academy, the 2nd revolutionary regiment of internal troops was formed. “This,” as Forizh emphasizes, “meant to speak out for socialism.”

Laszlo Dyurko, a well-known Hungarian writer, in his book mentions only one such part - the construction, located in the Kilian barracks. In it, as he writes, "children of class alien families were called up, but not for armed service."

Former Chief of Staff of the Special Corps, Colonel E.I. Malashenko writes that an insignificant part of the Hungarian army went over to the side of the rebels. So, in Budapest, the rebels were supported and offered armed resistance by units of two mechanized and one rifle regiments, several construction battalions, and about ten anti-aircraft batteries. At the same time, most researchers note that, in general, the army did not take the side of the rebels and did not oppose the Soviet troops. Moreover, a significant number of Hungarian military personnel took part in the fight against armed insurgent groups and helped the Soviet troops.

Here, in our opinion, it is important to touch upon the issue of armed assistance from external forces, namely Western countries interested in destabilizing relations in the socialist bloc. First of all the USA. This assistance was not provided at the state level. An analysis of the documents of the National Security Council suggests that the swiftness of the Hungarian events caught American leaders by surprise. To provide military assistance to Hungary, the United States had to obtain the consent of its allies, but they were busy with the war in Egypt. Under these conditions, the US Security Council removed the issue of military assistance to Hungary from the agenda. Moreover, Austria would hardly risk its neutrality in order to allow military transport aircraft to pass through its airspace.

Nevertheless, it is known that during the Hungarian events in Austria, the "legend" of American intelligence, the former head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), General William D. Donovan, was in charge of the "International Relief Committee" as the head of the "International Relief Committee". According to the Washington Daily News, in late November he returned to Washington from Hungary, the border of which, according to the newspaper, he repeatedly crossed during his stay in Austria. In Washington, Donovan told the press that "arming those still fighting" was the best opportunity to "help" the Hungarians. When asked if the United States should "facilitate the continuation of the fighting", Donovan replied: "Of course!" . With the beginning of the rebellion, Austria was visited by the then US Vice President R. Nixon. He also traveled to the Hungarian border and even spoke with the rebels. During the trial of I. Nagy and his associates in February and June 1958, the names of the British military attache, Colonel D. Cowley and a member of the West German parliament, Prince X. Von Lowenstein, were mentioned. The first of them was accused of direct participation in the leadership of the uprising, the second was called a link with the "big imperialist capitalists in West Germany."

To a greater extent, Western intelligence services were ready for the Hungarian events. Thanks to their direct assistance, active work was launched to form and prepare combat detachments and sabotage groups for being sent to Hungary. Moreover, it began long before the October events. Popular American journalist Drew Pearson on November 8, 1956 reported Interesting Facts. As early as 1950, he heard from the Hungarian émigré Dr. Bela Fabian about "underground preparations" in Hungary, with which Fabian was closely associated.

“The Hungarian people want to revolt,” Fabian told Pearson. “Hungary wants to be the first to oppose its Soviet masters ... I know about the unrest among the peasants ... If you help a little, a fire will break out in Hungary.”

Pearson asked Fabian how the United States government could help.

"Nothing can be won in this life if you do not risk anything," Fabian replied. "Let them risk shedding a little blood!" .

Pearson's memoirs are consistent with the words of D. Angleton, who in 1956 was in charge of counterintelligence and subversive operations in the CIA. A conversation with him was published in The New York Times on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the October events. Here is how the newspaper reported Angleton's story:

“By the mid-1950s, we had brought into line the task forces that had been created by order from above in 1950,” Angleton said, referring to the directive establishing the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination. – Auth.), the concept of which included the use of quasi-military task forces in order "to not in any way agree with the status quo of Soviet hegemony." Mr. Wisner, recommended by General J. Marshall (then US Secretary of Defense. – Auth.) to lead the subversion program, and Mr. Angleton "did extensive training" ... Eastern Europeans, partly members of pre-war peasant parties in Hungary, Poland; Romania and Czechoslovakia, were trained in secret CIA centers in West Germany under the guidance of CIA experts. Mr. Angleton added that these units were led by "a born leader from Yugoslavia, military training in Austria-Hungary under the Habsburgs.

One of the "freedom fighters" training camps was located near Traunstein in Upper Bavaria. It is known that in October 1956 a group of Hungarian Germans arrived there, many of whom had previously served in the SS. They formed close-knit core groups of rebellious detachments, which were then transferred by planes to Austria, and from there, on ambulance planes and cars already to Hungary.

It should be noted that the basis of the Hungarian combat detachments were mainly the Horthys who fled to the west in 1945.

The former OSS officer, and since 1950 the CIA officer William Colby, also mentions special CIA detachments trained to participate in hostilities in socialist countries, including Hungary. In his memoir, My Life in the CIA, he writes:

“Since the creation of the CMO under the leadership of Frank Wiesner, the CIA has had, or thought it had, the task of providing OSS-style military support to resistance groups seeking to overthrow totalitarian communist regimes. In Hungary, we called such groups freedom fighters ... As soon as the uprising in Hungary, Wiesner and the top leadership of the plans department (as the CIA was called since 1952, merged with other divisions of the CIA. - Auth.), especially those who were involved in subversive work, were fully prepared for action - to come to the aid of the freedom fighters with weapons, communications and air transport. This is exactly what the CIA's quasi-military units were designed to do."

Thanks to the support of Western intelligence services, underground paramilitary groups were also created in Hungary itself. Such as "White Partisans", "National Resistance Movement", "Association of Junkers", youth organization "Lux" and others. By the mid-1950s, their activities had intensified sharply. In 1956 alone, 45 underground organizations were uncovered by security agencies, a number of agents of West German intelligence and the US CIA were detained.

Emigrant organizations, in particular the Hungarian Bureau (Austria), Caritas (Austria) and the Legion of Hungarian Freedom (Canada), were also actively involved in the formation of combat detachments to be sent to Hungary. The latter, according to the newspaper "Neyes Deutschland" on October 31, planned the transfer of three thousand volunteers - former officers and soldiers of the Horthy army.

Emigrant recruiting centers supported by Western intelligence agencies operated in Salzburg, Kematen, Hungerburg and Reichenau. In Munich, on Lockerstrasse, there was a recruiting office headed by a captain in the American army. From here, former Nazi supporters were heading to the scene. On October 27, one of the groups (about 30 people) was transferred to Hungary with the help of border neutral Austria. More than 500 "volunteers" were transferred from England. From the French Fontainebleau, where the headquarters of NATO was then located, several dozen groups were sent.

In total, according to some reports, during the period of active armed resistance, more than 20 thousand emigrants were thrown into the country with the help of Western intelligence services. About 11 thousand people who were part of the "expeditionary corps" were waiting for an order to speak near the Hungarian border. And the border restaurant in Nikkelsdorf (Austro-Hungarian border), as Osterreichische Volksstimme wrote, was "like a staging post where people from West Germany arrived, speaking Hungarian and dressed in American uniforms ... each of them had camping equipment" .

Other national anti-communist organizations of the world, including Russians, did not remain indifferent to the events in Hungary. The author does not have any facts about the participation of Russian emigrants in hostilities on the side of the rebels. Nevertheless, there is information about a sabotage group of about 200 people, which was planned to be sent to Hungary from the territory of Austria. The saboteurs were led by a member of the NTS since 1942, Nikolai Rutchenko. Information about this group was given in the documentary "The Hungarian Trap", shown on November 9, 2006 on the Rossiya TV channel.

More is known about the activities of representatives of Russian organizations in the field of propaganda. NTS and RNO were especially active in this direction. Here is a sample of one of the RNO's appeals to Soviet soldiers and officers, broadcast over the radio.

"RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Like a terrible spider, the Soviet Union keeps in its web the countries of the so-called Eastern bloc. Many of you have visited and seen there the remnants of those freedoms and prosperity that were created before the war under the conditions of a democratic regime, which our Motherland has been deprived of for almost forty years.

The Soviet government, with the help of its agents, enslaved these states, deprived their peoples of any rights whatsoever, and introduced a communist regime of terror and lawlessness into them.

The first outbreak of popular anger was the Poznan uprising of Polish workers. At a recent trial, it was definitely revealed that the Poles were fighting for bread and freedom. The cruel and inhuman actions of the communist police, with their provocation, lack of legality and mockery of the population, were also revealed.

Then genuine popular indignation broke out in Poland. Soviet troops were moved to Poland, but at the last moment the collective leadership gave in, and the regime of freedom began to be restored in Poland.

Poland was immediately followed by Hungary. Driven to despair by poverty and lack of rights, the Hungarian people rose up and overthrew the despicable and corrupt communist government. AND THE MOST TERRIBLE HAPPENED IN HUNGARY. By order of the collective leadership, the Soviet troops were sent to suppress the PEOPLE'S UPRISING. Soviet aircraft began to bombard Hungarian cities, Soviet tanks shoot Hungarian freedom fighters.

We know of gratifying cases when Russian officers and soldiers refused to fire on the Hungarians. Moreover, in certain cases they helped the rebels, expressed their sympathy to the Hungarian patriots and fraternized with them. But the general impression for the entire free world is terrible: on the orders of the Soviet government, which falsely and hypocritically declares itself to be the defender of the working people, Russian soldiers found themselves in the role of suppressors of the popular uprising.

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Tomorrow other countries enslaved by communism will follow the example of Poland and Hungary. You will be sent to put down popular uprisings in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Fulfilling the order of despotic power, you will shoot at crowds of people just because they want freedom.

The Russian soldier, a centuries-old synonym for heroism, sacrifice and humanity, will become in the eyes of other peoples the executioner of freedom. This will affect the future relations of the countries liberated from the communist yoke with the coming free Russia.

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Do not follow the inhuman and illegal orders of the communist government, which has been holding our people in terrible slavery for 39 years.

Help the rebellious peoples who are fighting for their and YOUR freedom.

Show these peoples all the generosity that the RUSSIAN is capable of.

Turn your bayonets, machine guns and tanks against the communist tyrants who hold our people and other peoples in terrible slavery and dishonor the name of our motherland.

RUSSIAN GENERALS AND OFFICERS. Set an example for your soldiers. The fate of Russia and its people is in your hands. Overthrow the communist government. Create a people's government, responsible to the people and caring only for the interests of our Fatherland.

Down with the dishonest, slave-owning, communist regime.

LONG LIVE FREE RUSSIA.

LONG LIVE THE UNION AND FRIENDSHIP OF FREE RUSSIA WITH OTHER FREE PEOPLES".

A special role in the events in Hungary in October-November 1956 was played by the Western services of "psychological warfare". First of all, the radio stations "Voice of America" ​​and "Free Europe". The latter, as G. A. Kissinger noted in his book Diplomacy, was under the special patronage of John F. Dulles. These radio stations not only called for open action against the ruling regime, promising support for NATO countries, but were actually the coordinating body of the uprising. Moreover, even the Western mass media were forced to admit that many radio broadcasts of "Free Europe" grossly distort the real state of affairs. "Radio Free Europe," said an article in the American magazine "News Week," "specialized in putting the communist order in the worst possible light."

Hungarian programs were compiled with the most active participation of Hungarian emigrants, most of whom collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War. For example, the Free Europe radio broadcasts specially organized for Hungary under the title "Voice of a Free Hungary" were opened on October 6, 1951 by Count D. Dageffy, a participant in the anti-republican conspiracy in Hungary. The former Horthy diplomat A. Gellert participated in the radio broadcasts. One of the leading commentators on Radio Free Europe's Hungarian section was former Horthy army captain J. Borsany, who spoke under the pseudonym "Colonel Bell."

At the end of October 1956, a secret meeting of representatives of American intelligence and leaders of Hungarian émigré organizations took place in Munich. At this meeting, the question of how the propaganda of "Free Europe" should contribute to the unfolding of the "revolutionary situation" in Hungary was considered. A "two-stage" tactic was adopted: the first was the defeat of the state security organs, the prohibition of the Communist Party, the declaration of "neutrality", economic and later military accession to the Western bloc; the second is the overthrow of the socialist system, the bourgeois revolution. From that moment on, Radio Free Europe became, in essence, the governing body and organizer of the rebellions. Having switched to round-the-clock broadcasting, she began to broadcast, along with general propaganda statements, specific combat instructions. Advice was given to illegal radio stations on what wavelength and how to broadcast. Those who did not surrender their weapons were urged to continue the resistance. For example, when Imre Nagy's government issued a call for a ceasefire, Free Europe immediately urged its listeners to disrupt the truce. The already mentioned military expert and Free Europe commentator "Colonel Bell" believed that the ceasefire was "as dangerous as a Trojan horse."

“Imre Nagy and his friends,” he said on October 29, “want insidiously, in a modern way, to repeat history with Trojan horse. A ceasefire, like a Trojan horse, is necessary so that the government of Budapest, which is still in power at the moment, can hold its ground for as long as possible ... Those who fight for freedom must not forget for a moment about the plan of the government opposing them, because otherwise the tragedy with the Trojan horse will be repeated.

As is known, it was under the active influence of the propaganda of Radio Free Europe and as a result of the intervention of some Western missions that the truce was indeed disrupted. The next day, just a few hours after the above radio broadcast, an attack began on the city committee of the party on Republic Square and other organizations, as well as mass attacks on the communists, which resulted in numerous casualties.

On October 31, "Colonel Bell" demanded that the portfolio of the Minister of Defense be transferred to the "freedom fighters", and soon, on November 3, this post was taken by Colonel Pal Maleter. On the same day, Radio Free Europe issued new instructions: "Let them liquidate the Warsaw Pact and declare that Hungary is no longer a party to the agreement." The next day, November 1, Imre Nagy announced his withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. And there are many such examples.

The leading role of "Free Europe" in fomenting the armed conflict in Hungary was recognized even by representatives of the Western press. Here, for example, is how the Parisian correspondent of the newspaper "France Soir" Michel Gorde, who was in Hungary during the uprising, described the transmissions of this radio station. "We could listen to foreign radio broadcasts, which were our only source of information from outside world. We have heard many false reports about what is happening in Hungary.

We listened to broadcasts from Radio Free Europe in Munich intended for the satellite countries. Her impatient tone and excited calls for rebellion, no doubt, did a lot of harm.

Over the past few days, many Hungarians have told us that these broadcasts have led to great bloodshed. " A correspondent of another French publication, the weekly Expresse, wrote the following about his Budapest impressions: "Everywhere in Budapest I met Hungarians of the most diverse social status, who bitterly and even spoke with hatred about the Americans, about Radio Free Europe, about balloons being sent in with propaganda leaflets." And one more piece of evidence. The West German newspaper "Freies Wort" wrote: "We are convinced that, above all, the aggressive propaganda of the Free Europe transmitter" largely responsible for the bloodshed in Hungary... Propaganda, which is ultimately paid for with the blood of misguided people, is a crime against humanity."

Speaking of the "psychological warfare" launched by Western propaganda services, it is important to touch on two mythological plots that have become widespread on the pages of many "free" media. Echoes of these stories are heard to this day.

First myth. According to the Western media, during the Hungarian events, a large number of Soviet military personnel went over to the side of the rebels. Thus, in particular, in the Parisian emigrant magazine Vozrozhdenie, it was noted that already in the first days, among the wounded rebels who were evacuated to Austria, there were many Russian officers and soldiers. All in all, according to Pastor, a member of the Budapest Revolutionary Committee, "3,000 Russians with 60 tanks went over to the side of the "revolution." The same figures are given in some other émigré publications. At the same time, A.N. Pestov, a Russian White émigré, writing about his stay in Hungary in the pages of the authoritative émigré magazine Chasovoy, writes that the rumors about large armed detachments that supposedly went to the mountains were "extremely exaggerated." Although he mentions "one Soviet unit that joined the Hungarian detachment." True, and this is not true. In any case, there is no data on the transition of any groups of Soviet military personnel to the rebels. Only about five cases of escape to Austria are known. The Soviet servicemen who went over to the side of the Hungarian rebels did not "surface" on the pages of propaganda publications in subsequent years either.

Nevertheless, even special committees were organized to help "Russian heroes who joined the Hungarians in their struggle for freedom." The collection of donations was initiated by a number of Russian emigrant organizations, including the Tolstov Foundation, the Union of Russian Corps Officials, and the Russian National Association (RNO).

"Russian people!

According to the latest information received, many officers and soldiers of the Soviet army went over to the side of the Hungarian freedom fighters and fought in their ranks. Russian soldiers have already arrived in Austria.

Seven Russian organizations have already applied with a special memorandum to the International Red Cross, drawing its attention to the exceptionally difficult legal situation of the Russians who rebelled against the usurper Soviet power, and demanding that the legitimate norms of international law be applied to them.

But at the same time, urgent sanitary and material assistance is needed. Germany is already organizing the dispatch of sanitary and food aid to Hungary. A special Russian Relief Committee was formed in Munich.

We appeal to all Russian people in Belgium with a request for urgent assistance in cash contributions in favor of Russian officers and soldiers who raised the banner of struggle against communism in Hungary.

Each, the most insignificant contribution will be accepted with gratitude.

All the sums collected will be urgently sent to the disposal of the Russian Committee in Munich, in whose hands this assistance will be centralized.

Please send all contributions to the SSR - 60.039 to the address: de I "Union Nationule Russe, 4, rue Paul-Emile Janson, Bruxelles, or collect them according to subscription lists, transferring them to the Office of the Russian National Association" .

According to the magazine Nashi Vesti, over the course of ten days alone, more than 200 Russian émigré families in Corinthia and Styria donated about 13,000 shillings to the needs of the new refugees.

True, where the funds collected by Russian emigrants went "for the thousands of compatriots who left the" communist paradise ", the author could not find on the pages of the same emigrant newspapers and magazines.

The second myth is connected with alleged "atrocities of the Soviet soldiers". These "facts" were devoted to many pages of the Western media of those years. According to an eyewitness of the events, a Russian white émigré A. Pestov, who can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the Soviet Union, this is not true. In the essay "I was in Hungary" he notes the strict discipline in the Soviet units, which are under the complete control of their commanders. former officer Volunteer army This is how he describes his impressions of Soviet soldiers:

“When I looked at these Russian guys and saw them every day and in the most diverse situations, I did not find in them those “Bolsheviks” who were drawn to me and are drawn to thousands of my comrades-in-arms abroad. We imagine an unbridled robber, with a whirlwind of hair, with with brutal eyes and an evil grimace, such as we remember the "Bolsheviks" in the civil war. Now these are the same Russian guys with shaved heads, with kind faces, with a desire to joke and laugh, like the soldiers of that company, which I, a young ensign, first led to battle in the August forests at the beginning of the war. My guys shed their blood for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland. And they shed selflessly. These, too, perhaps a few of the "armed peoples" of the civilized world, will go into battle, even without a supply of crackers, without any canned chickens, without field cinemas and lupanars, and without artillery preparation sweeping away everything and everyone in front of them.

In addition, he notes "true human relation"on the part of Soviet military personnel to local residents, especially women and children. And not only in the early days, but also after the suppression of the rebellion. Despite the often emphasized hostility towards the soldiers of the population of Budapest, A. Pestov claims that there was neither a thirst for revenge, nor reprisals, emphasizes the respect of the Soviet military for the church and the execution of orders so that the population suffers the least.

In conclusion, the essay should be said about the consequences of the Hungarian events. They influenced not only the aggravation of relations with Western countries, but also caused a negative reaction in some states of the socialist bloc. Thus, one of the professors of the University in the city of Brno, in an article published in the newspaper Literaturny Novyny, noted:

“Our youth is also infected with the “Hungarian disease”. We have young people before us and do not really know who we have in front of us. seminar…"

Some leaders of countries "friendly" to the USSR also condemned the Soviet policy in Hungary. The prime ministers of India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, in a joint declaration adopted on November 14, condemned the armed solution to the political crisis in Hungary. In their declaration, they wrote that "the Soviet armed forces must be withdrawn from Hungary as soon as possible" and that "the Hungarian people must be given complete freedom in deciding their future and the form of government."

Assessing the difficult situation in the country, Khrushchev did not dare to use armed force and even made concessions: the Polish leadership was updated, workers' councils were created at enterprises, agricultural cooperatives were dissolved, the former Minister of Defense of Poland, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky and numerous Soviet advisers. Bloodshed was avoided this time. Blood will be shed later, on December 17, 1970, when the same Gomulka will give the order to shoot the demonstrators in Gdansk. True, already on December 20, he himself would resign and Edward Gierek would become First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee.

Events in Hungary unfolded according to a different scenario.

In Hungary, the influence of the opposition was growing rapidly, declaring itself louder and louder. Events in Poland spurred the Hungarians: if the Poles managed to return Gomulka to power, despite the resistance of the Russians, then why not do the same with Imre Nagy?

Soviet armored personnel carrier BTR-40

All this caused a sharp negative assessment of the Soviet ambassador Yu. V. Andropov. The consent of the Hungarian leadership to the return of the "old party cadres" to the Politburo was regarded by him as "a serious concession to the right and demagogic elements." M. Suslov and A. Mikoyan were sent to Budapest to analyze the events and evaluate them. In the end, Mikoyan persuaded "the best student of Comrade Stalin" M. Rakosi to resign. The Hungarian Working People's Party (VPT) was headed by Erne Gera, who almost did not differ from his predecessor in ideological and political views.

In September, opposition actions under the slogans of "more humane socialism" and the restoration of the former Prime Minister I. Nagy in the party noticeably intensified. Under strong pressure from below, the Hungarian party leadership was forced to announce on October 14 that Nagy was reinstated in the VPT. But the protests continued.

On October 23, tens of thousands of residents of the capital took to the streets, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops, freedom of the press, a multi-party system, etc. By evening, the number of demonstrators reached 200 thousand people. The crowd chanted: "Death to Gera!", "Imre Nagy to the government, Rakosi to the Danube!"

At about 8 pm, E. Gehre spoke on the radio. His speech was replete with attacks on the demonstrators - they say, this demonstration is "nationalist" and "counter-revolutionary". He demanded to stop the riots and go home. But with this performance, Gere only added fuel to the fire: at night, groups of radical youth looted a number of arms depots. A small army unit with two tanks went over to the side of the already armed demonstrators. With their support, the demonstrators seized the building of the national radio center, where the secret police were forced to open fire with service pistols. The rebels already had submachine guns and machine guns (two tanks have already been mentioned). The rebels smashed a giant statue of Stalin into small pieces. The first dead and wounded appeared, the demonstration rapidly grew into an uprising!

Distinctive features Hungarian events have become radicalism and intransigence of their participants. In Hungary, there was a real armed uprising against the Soviet Union and its supporters. The streets were filled with blood, sometimes completely innocent victims, as, for example, during a mass lynching by an angry crowd of Hungarian party activists and secret police recruits on Republic Square - 28 people became victims of the "people's" lynching, of which 26 were Hungarian state security officers. The Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who returned to power, managed, in a few days allotted to him by fate, history and the Kremlin, to hand over to the Soviet ambassador Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov a statement about Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and its neutrality and to inform the whole world about the war between Hungarians and Russians by radio.

On the territory of the country during this period there were parts of the Special Corps of Soviet troops (the corps headquarters was located in Szekesfehervar, commanded by Lieutenant General P.N. Lashchenko) - the 2nd and 17th Guards Mechanized Divisions, which were delayed on the way home from Austria after liquidation in 1955 of the Central Group of Forces, as well as the 195th Fighter and 172nd Bomber Air Divisions.

The uprising for the military did not come as a surprise - given the difficult political situation in the country, the corps command already in July 1956, by order of Moscow, developed the "Action Plan for the Soviet troops to maintain and restore public order on the territory of Hungary." After the approval of the plan by the commander of the Special Corps, he received the name "Compass".

Armored car BA-64, created during the Great Patriotic War. He remained in service with the Soviet Army for a long time.

The restoration of order in Budapest according to this plan was assigned to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Lieutenant General S. Lebedev. Major General A. Krivosheev's 17th Guards Mechanized Division was supposed to cover the border with Austria with its main forces. Cases were specifically discussed when it was allowed to use weapons to kill. Other events and special training of the Soviet units were not carried out.

Western countries actively helped the Hungarians in preparing the rebellion: on July 18, the United States allocated over 100 million dollars for the preparation of the putsch, Radio Free Europe intensively inspired: NATO countries would come to the rescue, in Upper Bavaria, near Traunstein, Hungarian saboteurs were preparing (who fled in 1945 . to the west, Horthy and Salashists). In October 1956, a group of Hungarian Germans arrived there, many of whom had previously served in the SS. They formed close-knit core groups of rebellious detachments, which were then transferred by planes to Austria, and from there, on ambulance planes and cars, already to Hungary.

In Munich, on Lockerstrasse, there was a recruiting office headed by a captain in the American army. From here, former Nazi supporters were heading to the scene. On October 27, one of the groups (about 30 people) was transferred to Hungary with the help of neutral Austrian border guards. More than 500 "freedom fighters" were transferred from England. From the French Fontainebleau, where the headquarters of NATO was then located, several dozen groups were sent.

T-34 on the street of Budapest

So, as already mentioned, on October 23, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Budapest, demanding free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. In the evening, in the office of Lieutenant-General P. N. Lashchenko, a telephone rang. The Soviet ambassador Yu. V. Andropov called:

Can you send troops to deal with the unrest in the capital?

In my opinion, the Hungarian police, state security agencies and the Hungarian army should restore order in Budapest. It is not in my competence, and it is undesirable to involve Soviet troops in the performance of such tasks. In addition, such actions require an appropriate order from the Minister of Defense.

Despite the apparent unwillingness of the army authorities to intervene in the internal Hungarian conflict, Andropov and Gera on the same evening, by telephone through the Moscow party leaders who had gathered for an emergency meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, made a decision to bring parts of the Special Corps on combat readiness.

After the start of shooting and fighting on the streets of Budapest, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, at 11 pm on October 23, ordered the advance of Soviet troops to Budapest. Imre Nagy himself did not object to this decision either. A similar action was supported by Mao Zedong, Joseph Broz Tito and Palmiro Togliatti. The commander of the corps, General Lashchenko, left for the capital to lead the troops, accompanied by guards. On one of the streets of Buda, the rebels burned down a radio station on a car, and killed a radio operator. Approaching Soviet tanks saved other crew members.

On the city streets, Soviet soldiers were met by barricades hastily erected by the rebels. Fire was fired at the troops from the windows of houses, from the roofs. The rebels skillfully used close combat anti-tank weapons and the features of urban planning. Strong pockets of resistance were created in the center of the city, which were defended by rebel detachments of up to 300 people. every.

The first to enter the battle on the streets of Budapest in the early morning of October 24 was the 2nd Guards Mechanized Nikolaev-Budapest Division of Major General S. V. Lebedev, losing four tanks and four armored personnel carriers during the day of fierce fighting.

Armored personnel carriers BTR-152, which did not have an armored roof, burned like candles: any grenade or Molotov cocktail thrown from the upper floors of buildings turned them into a blazing steel grave for the entire crew and landing force.

The current situation required clarification of the Compass plan, since it was not necessary to count on the help of the Hungarian army and police. As it became known later, out of 26 thousand people. personnel of the Hungarian People's Army (VNA) 12 thousand supported the rebels. Only in Budapest itself there were about 7 thousand Hungarian troops and up to 50 tanks. In addition, there were several dozen self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS), anti-tank guns, easel and hand grenade launchers. The passages between the houses were mined and covered with barricades.

The rebellion turned out to be perfectly prepared, a lot of weapons fell into the hands of its participants. It was the saboteurs mentioned above that on the night of October 24 captured the radio stations, the arms factories "Danuvia" and "Lampadyar". The International Red Cross Hospital in Budapest was headed by former SS man Otto Frank.

The Hungarian revolution began with a carnival, but too quickly turned into a massacre. The intervention of Soviet tanks politically turned the tide: the civil war turned into a war with the Soviet Army, its main slogan now became "Soviets, home!".

Up to three thousand armed insurgents were already active on the streets of the Hungarian capital. About 8 thousand people were released from prisons, most of whom were ordinary criminals.

The approaching units - the 37th Guards Tank Nikopol Red Banner Order of the Suvorov Regiment of Colonel Bichan, the 5th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Pilipenko, the 6th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Mayakov and the 87th Guards Heavy Tank Self-Propelled Brest Regiment of Nikovsky - immediately entered the battle.

The number of Soviet troops that entered Budapest did not exceed one division: about 6 thousand people, 290 tanks,

Some units of the Hungarian People's Army went over to the side of the rebels

120 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns. To restore order in a huge city of two million, these forces were clearly not enough.

Parts of the Hungarian People's Army, which remained loyal to the previous government, also entered the battle - until October 28, Hungarian units used weapons against compatriots in 40 cities of the country. According to Hungarian data, about a thousand people died, Hungary was on the verge of civil war.

Four divisions of the 3rd Rifle Corps of the VNA arrived in the capital and began hostilities against the rebels. The grouping of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital also constantly increased. On the same day, October 24, armored vehicles of the 83rd Tank and 57th Guards Mechanized Regiments of the 17th Guards Enakievo-Danube Mechanized Division entered the city.

At noon on October 24, Hungarian radio announced the introduction of a state of emergency in Budapest and the establishment of a curfew. The cases of the participants in the uprising were to be considered by specially created courts-martial. Imre Nagy announced the introduction of martial law in the country, trying to bring the anarchy of the revolution into the mainstream of law and order. Alas, it was already too late - the events held back for too long, as if catching up on what had been lost, developed spontaneously and unrestrainedly.

During the day of fierce fighting, about 300 rebels were captured. Soviet tanks took control of strategic facilities in Budapest, bridges across the Danube.

On October 25, M. Suslov and A. Mikoyan met with I. Nagy. By October 28, an agreement was reached to overcome the crisis by peaceful means, but the whole course of further events in the capital and the country changed the agreements reached.

The fighting continued in the following days. The tankers had a hard time in the narrow streets among the hostile population. Schoolchildren, who at first did not pay attention, approached the tanks standing at the crossroads, took out bottles of gasoline from their briefcases and set fire to the combat vehicles. From the windows they constantly fired at the soldiers who left the tanks and shelters. There was danger everywhere. Every day, transport planes took away the wounded and the bodies of the dead to the Union.

PTRS-41 is another fairly effective anti-tank weapon. Simonov's anti-tank rifle had a 5-round magazine and automatic reloading

By October 28, virtually all power in Hungary was in the hands of the Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Generals Kanna, Kovacs and Colonel Maleter. Imre Nagy was proclaimed the official leader of the uprising. On the same day, Hungarian troops receive an order from their government not to participate in hostilities. The assault on the center of the capital planned for that day by the joint efforts of the Soviet and Hungarian units did not take place.

At the request of the government of Imre Nagy, at the end of October, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest. On October 30, Suslov and Mikoyan brought from Moscow the Declaration of the Soviet government on equality and non-intervention in relations between socialist countries. The next day, Soviet units began to leave Budapest, and Imre Nagy announced on the radio that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary had begun.

On November 1, the Hungarian government, in connection with the transfer of an additional eight divisions by the Soviet command to the territory of Hungary, announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the neutrality of the country and the need to withdraw Soviet units and subunits outside the country. Such a development of events was not expected either in Moscow or in the capitals of other socialist states.

At the same time, 87-year-old Admiral Horthy, who was in Portugal, offered himself as the ruler of Hungary, and a demonstration of Hungarian emigrants took place in Montreal, Canada, shouting: “Hitler is back! We are freedom fighters!

In October 1956, “fighters for democracy and freedom”, brutalized by blood and impunity, hung, trampled their victims underfoot, gouged out their eyes and cut off their ears with scissors. On Moscow Square in Budapest, they hanged 30 people by their feet, doused them with gasoline and burned them alive.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Soviet troops began, but it was only a smoke screen. The grouping of troops in Hungary and neighboring territories continued to build up - the danger of the Hungarian example for other socialist countries of Eastern Europe was too great. The Soviet leadership decided to put out the blazing fire as soon as possible.

The Soviet units withdrawn from the capital for 15-20 km put equipment and weapons in order, replenished fuel and food supplies. Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was instructed by the Central Committee of the party to develop "an appropriate action plan related to the events in Hungary." This was the last military operation that Zhukov was to carry out.

The Degtyarev light machine gun (RPD), created back in 1944, was actively used by both sides

N. S. Khrushchev and G. K. Zhukov: one of the last "peaceful" conversations

To the question of N. S. Khrushchev about how long it would take the Soviet troops to restore order in Hungary, Zhukov replied: “Three days.” It took, of course, more, but the operation had already received the code name “Whirlwind”. The leadership of the Soviet troops in Hungary was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact, Marshal I. S. Konev.

In the border military districts, troops were raised in alarm. Units of the 38th Army of General Kh. Mamsurov and the 8th Mechanized Army of General A. Babadzhanyan from the Carpathian Military District were urgently sent to help the Special Corps, including the 31st Tank, 11, 13 (39), 32nd Guards , 27th Mechanized Division.

Li-2 - began its service in the United States before the Second World War. For a long time was the best Soviet military transport aircraft

The units sent to Hungary received new T-54 tanks and other military equipment. A white vertical stripe was applied to the tank turrets to identify "friend or foe". From the composition of the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division of Major General E. I. Obaturov arrived. The 35th Guards Mechanized Division was transferred from the Odessa Military District.

Thousands of tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers walked along the roads of Hungary. Since the Second World War, the Hungarians have not seen such an amount of military equipment and soldiers. The ring of Soviet troops was tightened around the center of the armed uprising - Budapest. USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov daily reported to the party leadership on the progress of the fighting on Hungarian soil.

T-34-85 with identification stripe, slightly damaged

By this time, the new government of Hungary, headed by Imre Nagy, announced the neutral status of the country, and even turned to the UN with a request to protect sovereignty. These actions of the Hungarian authorities finally decided their fate. The Soviet leadership ordered the armed suppression of the "mutiny". In order to hide preparations for a military action, the Soviet representatives entered into negotiations on the withdrawal of troops. Naturally, no one was going to do this, it was just necessary to gain time.

On November 2, Janos Kadar was brought to Moscow, who agreed to head the new government after the suppression of the rebellion, although more recently, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador Yu. ".

T-54 - the latest tank of that time

But the rebels did not waste time. A defensive belt was created around the capital, reinforced with hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. Outposts with tanks and artillery appeared in the settlements adjacent to the city. The most important objects of the cities were occupied by armed detachments, the total number of which reached 50 thousand people. In the hands of the rebels were already about 100 tanks.

Particularly fierce battles unfolded in Hungary in November 1956. After strengthening the grouping and careful preparation, on November 4, at 6 a.m., Operation Whirlwind began at the signal "Thunder". The Soviet command, completing the preparation of the operation, sought to misinform, and, if possible, behead the Hungarian leadership. When the troops were already finishing their final preparations for the assault on Budapest, General of the Army M.S. Malinin negotiated with the Hungarian delegation about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The delegation was headed by Pal Maleter, who had already received the rank of lieutenant general. And on November 3, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR and his group, during negotiations, arrested a delegation of the Hungarian government, which included the "new" Minister of Defense Pal Maleter, Chief of the General Staff Syuch and other officers. Ahead of them was a military tribunal that did not bode well.

The main task of "neutralizing" the enemy was still carried out by the formations of the Special Corps. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Division was to take control of the northeastern and central part of Budapest, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division was to enter the city from the southeast, the 128th Guards Rifle Division was to establish control over the western part of the city.

The main role in the street battles in Budapest was played by the 33rd Kherson Red Banner twice Order of Suvorov Guards Mechanized Division, reinforced by the 100th Tank Regiment of the 31st Tank Division and the 128th Self-Propelled Tank Regiment of the 66th Guards Rifle Division. It was commanded by General Obaturov.

The Soviet tank and mechanized units had to go into battle on the move, without careful reconnaissance and organization of interaction with the infantry. To capture the most important objects, the commanders created in the division one or two special forward detachments as part of an infantry battalion with attached paratroopers and 10-12 tanks. In some cases, assault groups were created. To suppress pockets of resistance, the troops were forced to use artillery, and use tanks as mobile weapons. The assault groups operated with flamethrowers, smoke grenades and checkers. In cases where the massive use of artillery did not give positive results, surprise night attacks were carried out.

It can be said that the tactics of the actions of the combined arms units of the Soviet Army were based on the virtually universal experience of the Great Patriotic War.

The German MP-40 submachine gun, again proved to be an excellent weapon in urban battles

By 7 a.m. on November 4, the main forces of the 2nd, 33rd Guards Mechanized and 128th Guards Rifle Divisions (about 30,000 people) broke into Budapest on the move, capturing the bridges across the Danube, the Budaers airfield, while capturing about 100 tanks, 15 guns, 22 aircraft. Paratroopers from the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions also fought in the city.

Tanks with cannon fire and ramming made passages in the barricades lined up on city streets, opening the way for infantry and paratroopers. The scale of the fighting is evidenced by the following fact: on November 5, units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, after an artillery raid, began an assault on the resistance center in the Korvin cinema, in which about 170 guns and mortars from 11 artillery divisions took part. From three sides, several dozen tanks fired on the surviving firing points, suppressing the last pockets of rebel resistance. By evening, Colonel Litovtsev's 71st Guards Tank Regiment and Colonel Yanbakhtin's 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment captured the city quarter.

At the same time, our units attacked the positions of the rebels near Moscow Square. It was not possible to capture the positions near the square, the Royal Fortress and the quarters adjacent to Mount Gellert from the south, but General Istvan Kovacs, one of the rebel leaders, was captured here. Fighting continued in the area in the following days. Assault groups used flamethrowers, smoke and incendiary charges.

Stubborn battles were fought for the Royal Fortress and for the former palace of the dictator Horthy. More than a thousand rebels skillfully used engineering communications and underground walls of the fortress. I had to use heavy tanks and concrete-piercing shells. On November 7, Soviet units took another node of resistance - Mount Gellert.

The suppression of the rebellion went on outside of Budapest. From November 4 to 6, units of the 8th Mechanized Army disarmed 32 Hungarian garrisons, suppressing armed resistance in Derbrecen, Miskolc, Szolnok, Kecskemet and others. The troops of Generals Babadzhanyan and Mamsurov took control of airfields and main roads, the Austro-Hungarian border was blocked.

"Faustpatron" (Panzerfaust) - the most formidable anti-tank melee weapon of the period after the end of World War II was again used by the rebels

On November 8, over the island of Csepel, where several military factories were located and the production of anti-tank "faustpatrons" was established, the Hungarians manage to shoot down an Il-28R from the 880th Guards Regiment of the 177th Guards Bomber Air Division. The entire crew of the reconnaissance aircraft was killed: squadron commander captain A. Bobrovsky, squadron navigator captain D. Karmishin, squadron communications chief senior lieutenant B. Yartsev. Each crew member was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The fact that during the storming of the island the Soviet troops lost only three tanks is the undoubted merit of the heroic crew - the losses could have been much greater.

Small armed groups that remained after the defeat of the main detachments no longer sought to hold individual buildings and positions, but, acting from ambushes, retreated first to the outskirts settlements and further into the woodlands.

By November 11, the armed resistance of the rebels was broken throughout Hungary. Having stopped the open struggle, the remnants of the rebel groups went into the forests in order to create partisan detachments, but a few days later, after a continuous combing of the area, in which the Hungarian officer regiments took part, they were finally liquidated.

Twin anti-aircraft machine gun MG-42 on an anti-aircraft mount. With the help of such a "spark" was shot down IL-28R

The Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft descended too low and was shot down. The crew died

During the fighting, Soviet troops lost 669 people killed. (according to other sources - 720 people), 1540 were injured, 51 people were missing. Parts of the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions lost 85 people killed. and 12 pers. - missing.

A large amount of equipment was hit and damaged, for example, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division alone lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9 armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, 4 BM-13 installations, 31 cars and 5 motorcycles.

The 9mm Makarov pistol (PM) has been in service with the Soviet Army and a number of Warsaw Pact allies since 1951.

During the period of fighting and after they ended, a large number of weapons were seized from the Hungarian armed detachments and the population: about 30 thousand rifles and carbines, 11.5 thousand machine guns, about 2 thousand machine guns, 1350 pistols, 62 guns (of which 47 were anti-aircraft). According to the official Budapest, from October 23 to January 1957, that is, until the clashes between the rebels and the Hungarian and Soviet troops stopped, 2502 people died. and 19,226 were wounded. Only in Budapest, about 2 thousand people died. and over 12,000 were wounded. About 200 thousand people. left Hungary.

When the fighting ended, they began to carry out investigative actions against those persons who were suspected of participating in the uprising. Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy asked for political asylum from Yugoslavia. Tito refused to extradite the rebellious prime minister for almost a month, but eventually gave in, and on November 22, 1956, I. Nagy, accompanied by two employees of the Yugoslav embassy, ​​boarded a bus and headed to his house.

When the car drove past the headquarters of the Soviet command, a tank blocked its way, the Yugoslavs were dropped off the bus, and Imre Nagy was arrested. Two years later, he was convicted and executed "for treason." Although it should be noted that N. Khrushchev advised J. Kadar to conduct the case of the former Hungarian leader in "soft gloves" - put him in prison for 5-6 years, and then arrange a teacher at some institute in the province. But Janos Kadar did not listen to the "patron": Imre Nagy and six of his main associates were executed by hanging. 22 thousand trials were held, another 400 people. were sentenced to death and 20 thousand were expelled from the country.

The attempt to "democratize" Hungarian society from below ended in failure. After the suppression of the rebellion on the territory of Hungary, the Southern Group of Forces was formed, which included the 21st Poltava and 19th Nikolaev-Budapest Guards Tank Divisions.

J. Kadar ruled Hungary for more than 30 years. But he did not build the socialism that developed on the territory of the Soviet Union. Kadar constantly emphasized that socialism is a distant prospect and there is no need to rush. In Hungary, he introduced alternative elections (several candidates for one seat), partial price liberalization, and economic levers for managing enterprises. A program for the development of commercial banks, joint-stock companies and stock exchanges was implemented, the Hungarian economy remained multi-structured - state, cooperative and private enterprises competed in the market. As a side note, it can be noted that the "father" of the Hungarian economic reforms, R. Nyersch, once passed on the experience of the Hungarian transformations to China, which to this day gives the PRC development stability and a positive effect.

After the liquidation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (read the socialist camp) and, accordingly, its military component (the Organization of the Warsaw Pact), Hungary quickly chose a pro-Western orientation, and by 1999 became a full member military organization West during the implementation of the program "NATO Expansion to the East".

However, at present, there is a certain revival of contacts between Hungary and Russia in the military-technical sphere. Obsolete Hungarian armored vehicles are proposed to be replaced by Russian armored personnel carriers, Russian tanks are supposed to be delivered. The supply of spare parts for various samples has noticeably revived military equipment and Russian-made weapons, which are mainly equipped with the Hungarian army.

Notes:

15 developing countries are armed with ballistic missiles, another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 states.

Cit. Quoted from: Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts in the second half of the 20th century. - M., 2000. P.58.

The engineering structure itself, bearing this name and including a high wall of reinforced concrete slabs, was installed in August 1961 and lasted until 1990.

50 Jahre das Beste vom Stern. 1998, No. 9. S. 12.

The secrecy stamp has been removed ... - M .: VI, 1989. S. 397.

Introduction

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 (October 23 - November 9, 1956) (during the communist period in Hungary it is known as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in Soviet sources as the Hungarian counter-revolutionary uprising of 1956) - armed uprisings against the regime of people's democracy in Hungary, accompanied by massacres of communists from the VPT , employees of the State Security Administration (AVH) and internal affairs (about 800 people).

The Hungarian uprising became one of the important events of the Cold War period, demonstrating that the USSR was ready to maintain the inviolability of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) by military force.

1. Background

The uprising, which in the USSR and Hungary until 1991 was called a counter-revolutionary rebellion, in modern Hungary - a revolution, was largely caused by the difficult economic situation of the local population.

In World War II, Hungary took part on the side of the fascist bloc, its troops participated in the occupation of the territory of the USSR, three SS divisions were formed from the Hungarians. In 1944-1945, the Hungarian troops were defeated, its territory was occupied by Soviet troops. But, it was on the territory of Hungary, in the area of ​​​​Lake Balaton, in the spring of 1945, that the Nazi troops launched the last counter-offensive in their history.

After the war, free elections were held in the country, provided for by the Yalta agreements, in which the Party of Smallholders won the majority. However, a coalition government imposed by the Allied Control Commission, headed by Soviet Marshal Voroshilov, gave the victorious majority half of the seats in the cabinet, while the Hungarian Communist Party held key posts.

The Communists, with the support of the Soviet troops, arrested most of the leaders of the opposition parties, and in 1947 they held new elections. By 1949, power in the country was mainly represented by the communists. In Hungary, the regime of Matthias Rakosi was established. Collectivization was carried out, a policy of forced industrialization was launched, for which there were no natural, financial and human resources; began mass repressions conducted by AVH against the opposition, the church, officers and politicians of the former regime and many other opponents of the new government.

Hungary (as a former ally of Nazi Germany) had to pay significant indemnities in favor of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, amounting to a quarter of GDP.

On the other hand, the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU brought to life attempts to liberate from the communists in all Eastern European states, one of the most striking manifestations of which was the rehabilitation and return to power in October 1956 of the Polish reformer Wladislaw Gomulka.

An important role was also played by the fact that in May 1955 neighboring Austria became a single neutral independent state, from which, after the signing of the peace treaty, the allied occupation troops were withdrawn (Soviet troops had been in Hungary since 1944).

A certain role was played by the subversive activities of the Western intelligence services, in particular the British MI6, which trained numerous cadres of "people's rebels" at their secret bases in Austria and then transferred them to Hungary.

2. Forces of the parties

More than 50 thousand Hungarians took part in the uprising. It was suppressed by Soviet troops (31 thousand) with the support of Hungarian workers' squads (25 thousand) and Hungarian state security agencies (1.5 thousand).

2.1. Soviet units and formations that took part in the Hungarian events

Special Corps:

• 2nd Guards Mechanized Division (Nikolaev-Budapest)

  11th Guards Mechanized Division (after 1957 - 30th Guards Tank Division)

  17th Guards Mechanized Division (Enakievo-Danube)

  33rd Guards Mechanized Division (Kherson)

  128th Guards Rifle Division (after 1957 - 128th Guards Motorized Rifle Division)

7th Guards Airborne Division

• 80th Airborne Regiment

  108th Airborne Regiment

31st Guards Airborne Division

• 114th Airborne Regiment

  381st Airborne Regiment

8th Mechanized Army of the Carpathian Military District (after 1957 - 8th Tank Army)

38th Army of the Carpathian Military District

• 13th Guards Mechanized Division (Poltava) (after 1957 - 21st Guards Tank Division)

  27th Mechanized Division (Cherkasy) (after 1957 - 27th Motor Rifle Division)

In total, the operation was attended by:

personnel - 31550 people

tanks and self-propelled guns - 1130

guns and mortars - 615

anti-aircraft guns - 185

• cars - 3830

3. Start

Intra-party struggle in the Hungarian Party of Labor between Stalinists and reformists began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956, led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Party of Labor Matthias Rakosi, who was replaced by Erno Gero (former Minister of State Security).

Rakosi's dismissal, as well as the Poznań Uprising of 1956, which caused great resonance in Poland, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the "Petofi Circle" began to operate actively, in which the most acute problems facing Hungary were discussed.

On October 16, 1956, part of the university students in Szeged organizedly left the pro-communist “Democratic Youth Union” (the Hungarian analogue of the Komsomol) and revived the “Union of Students of Hungarian Universities and Academies”, which existed after the war and was dispersed by the government. Within a few days, branches of the Union appeared in Pec, Miskolc and other cities.

Finally, on October 22, this movement was joined by students from the Budapest University of Technology (at that time, the Budapest University of the Construction Industry), who formulated a list of 16 demands on the authorities (immediate convening of an extraordinary party congress, appointment of Imre Nagy as prime minister, withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country , the destruction of the monument to Stalin, etc.) and planned a protest march on October 23 from the monument to Bem (Polish general, hero of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848) to the monument to Petőfi.

At 3 pm, a demonstration began, in which about a thousand people took part - including students and intellectuals. The demonstrators carried red flags, banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, about the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc. slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons. In addition, demands were made for free elections, the creation of a government led by Nagy, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT, Erne Gehre, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

In response, a large group of demonstrators stormed into the radio broadcasting studio of the Radio House, demanding that the program demands of the demonstrators be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the units of the Hungarian state security AVH defending the Radio House, during which, after 21 hours, the first dead and wounded appeared. The insurgents received or confiscated weapons from reinforcements sent to help protect the radio, as well as from civil defense depots and captured police stations. A group of insurgents entered the territory of the Kilian barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalions joined the rebels.

The fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels, not to interfere in their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the office for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.

At 11 p.m., on the basis of the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin advancing to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops "in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative labor." Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest by 6 o'clock in the morning and entered into battle with the rebels.

On the night of October 23, 1956, the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party decided to appoint Imre Nagy as prime minister, who already held this post in 1953-1955, who was distinguished by reformist views, for which he was repressed, but shortly before the uprising was rehabilitated. Imre Nagy was often accused of the fact that the formal request to the Soviet troops to assist in the suppression of the uprising was not sent without his participation. His supporters claim that this decision was made behind his back by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Erno Görö and former Prime Minister Andras Hegedus, and Nagy himself was opposed to the involvement of Soviet troops.

On the night of October 24, about 6,000 servicemen of the Soviet army, 290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, 156 guns were brought into Budapest. In the evening, they were joined by units of the 3rd Rifle Corps of the Hungarian People's Army (VNA). Part of the Hungarian military and police went over to the side of the rebels.

Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov, the chairman of the KGB I. A. Serov, and the deputy chief of the General Staff, General of the Army M. S. Malinin, arrived in Budapest.

In the morning, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division approached the city, in the evening - the 128th Guards Rifle Division, which joined the Special Corps. At this time, during a rally near the parliament building, an incident occurred: fire was opened from the upper floors, as a result of which a Soviet officer was killed and a tank was burned. In response, the Soviet troops opened fire on the demonstrators, as a result, 61 people were killed on both sides and 284 were wounded.

Erno Geryo was replaced as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU by Janos Kadar and left for the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Szolnok. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio, addressing the warring parties with a proposal to cease fire.

Imre Nagy spoke on the radio and stated that "the government condemns the views according to which the current anti-popular movement is regarded as a counter-revolution." The government announced a ceasefire and the beginning of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

Imre Nagy abolished AVH. The fighting in the streets ceased, and for the first time in five days, silence reigned in the streets of Budapest. Soviet troops began to leave Budapest. It seemed that the revolution had won.

Jozsef Dudash and his militants seized the editorial office of the Sabad Nep newspaper, where Dudash began to publish his own newspaper. Dudas announced the non-recognition of the government of Imre Nagy and the formation of his own administration.

In the morning, all Soviet troops were taken to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left with little or no power. Some prisons associated with the repressive AVH were taken over by the rebels. The guards offered practically no resistance and partly fled.

Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons. On the ground, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils, not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.

Bela Kiraly's guards and Dudash's troops executed communists, AVH employees and the Hungarian military who refused to obey them. In total, 37 people died as a result of lynching.

The uprising, having achieved some temporary success, quickly radicalized - there were murders of communists, employees of the AVH and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Hungary, shelling of Soviet military camps.

By order of October 30, Soviet servicemen were forbidden to return fire, "succumb to provocations" and go beyond the location of the unit.

Cases of murders of Soviet servicemen on leave and sentries in various cities of Hungary were recorded.

The insurgents captured the Budapest city committee of the VPT, and over 20 communists were hanged by the mob. Photos of hanged Communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary.

There was little Nagy could do. The uprising spread to other cities and spread ... The country quickly fell into chaos. Railway communication was interrupted, airports stopped working, shops, shops and banks were closed. The rebels roamed the streets, catching state security officers. They were recognized by their famous yellow shoes, torn apart or hung by the legs, sometimes castrated. Caught party leaders were nailed to the floor with huge nails, with portraits of Lenin placed in their hands.

On October 30, the government of Imre Nagy decided to restore a multi-party system in Hungary and to create a coalition government of representatives of the HTP, the Independent Party of Smallholders, the National Peasants' Party and the re-established Social Democratic Party. Free elections were announced to be held.

4. Re-entry of Soviet troops

The development of events in Hungary coincided in time with the Suez crisis. On October 29, Israel, and then NATO members Great Britain and France, attacked Soviet-backed Egypt in order to seize the Suez Canal, near which they landed their troops.

On October 31, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev said: “If we leave Hungary, this will cheer up the Americans, British and French imperialists. They will understand our weakness and will attack.” It was decided to create a "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government" headed by J. Kadar and conduct a military operation to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. The plan of the operation, called " Vortex", was developed under the leadership of the Minister of Defense of the USSR G.K. Zhukov.

On November 1, the Hungarian government, when the Soviet troops were ordered not to leave the location of the units, decided to terminate the Warsaw Pact by Hungary and handed the corresponding note to the USSR embassy. At the same time, Hungary asked the UN for help in protecting its neutrality. Measures were also taken to protect Budapest in the event of a "possible external attack".

In Tekel near Budapest, right during the negotiations, the new Minister of Defense of Hungary, Lieutenant General Pal Maleter, was arrested by the KGB of the USSR.

Early in the morning of November 4, the introduction of new Soviet military units into Hungary under the overall command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov began, and the Soviet operation "Whirlwind" began. Officially, Soviet troops invaded Hungary at the invitation of the government hastily created by Janos Kadar. The main facilities in Budapest were captured. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio:

Detachments of the "Hungarian National Guard" and individual army units unsuccessfully tried to resist the Soviet troops.

Soviet troops launched artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent sweeps with infantry forces supported by tanks. The main centers of resistance were the suburbs of Budapest, where local councils were able to lead a more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.

Fighting in the streets.

5. End

By November 8, after fierce fighting, the last centers of resistance of the rebels were destroyed. Members of the government of Imre Nagy took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. On November 10, workers' councils and student groups turned to the Soviet command with a proposal for a ceasefire. Armed resistance ceased.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov "for the suppression of the Hungarian counter-revolutionary rebellion" received the 4th star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR Ivan Serov in December 1956 - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

After November 10, even until mid-December, the workers' councils continued their work, often entering into direct negotiations with the command of the Soviet units. However, by December 19, 1956, the workers' councils were dispersed by the state security organs, and their leaders were arrested.

Hungarians emigrated en masse - almost 200,000 people (5% of the total population) left the country, for whom Austria had to create refugee camps in Traiskirchen and Graz.

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian secret services and their Soviet counterparts arrested about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which "a significant number of members of the VPT, military personnel and student youth."

On November 22, 1956, Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were tricked out of the Yugoslav embassy, ​​where they were hiding, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. Then they were returned to Hungary, and they were put on trial. Imre Nagy and former defense minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of which 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, however, by 1963, all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of Janos Kadar.

After the fall of the socialist regime, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were solemnly reburied in July 1989. Since that time, Imre Nagy has been considered a national hero of Hungary.

6. Losses of the parties

According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and fighting on both sides, from October 23 to December 31, 1956, 2,652 Hungarian citizens died and 19,226 were wounded.

The losses of the Soviet Army, according to official figures, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing, 1540 wounded.

7. Consequences

The Hungarian events had a significant impact on the internal life of the USSR. The party leadership was frightened by the fact that the liberalization of the regime in Hungary led to open anti-communist speeches and, accordingly, the liberalization of the regime in the USSR could lead to the same consequences. On December 19, 1956, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved the text of the Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On strengthening the political work of party organizations among the masses and suppressing attacks by anti-Soviet, hostile elements." It said:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to appeal to all party organizations ... in order to attract the attention of the party and mobilize the communists to intensify political work among the masses, to resolutely fight to stop the sorties of anti-Soviet elements, which in recent times, in connection with some aggravation of international situation, intensified their hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state ". Further, it was said about the recent activation of anti-Soviet and hostile elements ". First of all, it is counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Hungarian people ”, conceived under the sign “ false slogans of freedom and democracy " using " discontent of a significant part of the population, caused by serious mistakes made by the former state and party leadership of Hungary.

also stated:

Recently, among individual workers in literature and art, who are slipping from party positions, politically immature and philistine-minded, there have been attempts to question the correctness of the party line in the development of Soviet literature and art, to move away from the principles of socialist realism to positions of unprincipled art, demands have been put forward to “liberate” literature and art from the party leadership, to ensure "freedom of creativity", understood in a bourgeois-anarchist, individualistic spirit.

A direct consequence of this letter was a significant increase in 1957 in the number of those convicted "for counter-revolutionary crimes" (2948 people, which is 4 times more than in 1956). Students, for any critical statements on this topic, were expelled from the institutes.

There is still no unity in Hungary regarding the assessment of the events of 1956. As the Russian media have repeatedly reported, in 2006, during the celebration of the 50th anniversary, many residents of the country (about 50%), primarily in remote and rural areas, still perceive them as a fascist rebellion inspired by frontier. This is happening, in particular, because the rural inhabitants of the country have received a lot from the nationalization of the landlords' lands as a result of the coming of the Communists to power. And many organizers of the rebellion, including Imre Nagy, constantly called for the return of the land to the former owners. It is also worth recalling that the Hungarian workers' squads played an active role in suppressing the rebellion.

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