The Great Patriotic War on the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland. The long-suffering island in the Gulf of Finland - But how could they end up “banned”

PUBLISHING

L. V. VLASOV

LONG-SUFFERING ISLAND IN THE GULF OF FINNISH

The island of Gogland has long been notorious among sailors because of the events taking place off its shores and incomprehensible shipwrecks.

In Finnish, Suursaari is a large land, located on the same meridian with the Finnish city of Kotka. The distance between the city and the island is 40 kilometers.

This eerie, picturesque forest of pine and spruce, often shrouded in fog, is a colossal cliff with four elevations (106, 126, 142 and 158 meters above bay level) and lies halfway between St. Petersburg and Tallinn.

The island is 11 kilometers long, 1.5-3 kilometers wide, and its perimeter is 27 kilometers. The island has five very beautiful mountain lakes and several springs. The sea off its shores rarely freezes in winter; more often there is mobile and floating ice. And at other times of the year there is either a storm or complete calm.

On the eastern part of the island there are two picturesque villages and three lighthouses. In the north is the village of Suurkylä with solid and neat houses, many of which were recently built. A beautiful bay with a small pier and the building of a former Finnish restaurant, later a sailor's club. Nearby there is a shooting range and an abandoned Finnish-Russian cemetery, where those who were not buried by the Gulf of Finland are buried. In the south is Kiiskinkylä, a small village near the bay. Both villages are connected by a road that passes through fabulous rocks and dense thickets. It is very narrow and traffic on it is one-way.

In ancient times, the island was a haven for Norman corsairs, then a haven for smugglers. On July 6, 1788, 50 kilometers from Gogland, the famous battle took place between the Russian and Swedish fleets. The battle did not subside for two days and ended in victory for the Russians.

Since 1743, according to a treaty concluded in the city of Abo (Turku), the island belonged to Russia. Its inhabitants were engaged in fishing, farming, cattle breeding and gardening. They were fearless, courageous and unusually inquisitive, as Finnish historians wrote.

The island of Gogland gained worldwide fame at the end of 1899 - beginning of 1900, when the famous Russian scientist Alexander Stepanovich Popov built radio stations here and on the Finnish island of Kutsalo to communicate with the coastal defense battleship Admiral General Apraksin, which had landed on the rocks. While the antennas were being installed and the instruments were being adjusted, news arrived that a group of fishermen had been carried out to sea on an ice floe. On January 23, 1900, a radiogram was sent to the icebreaker Ermak with an order to save the fishermen. So, thanks to radio communications, the battleship was removed from the rocks, and the fishermen were saved. On June 13, 1954, an obelisk was erected on Cape Telegraphny, where Popov’s radio station stood.

At the end of 1917, when Finland gained independence, the island of Gogland and other islands in the Gulf of Finland passed to it. In 1920, Gogland was demilitarized.

Beginning in August 1938, the Soviet government turned to Finland many times with proposals, through an exchange of territories, to transfer the island of Gogland to the ownership of the USSR in order to create defensive structures on it to protect the approaches to Leningrad. The Finns did not agree to this. In March 1939, during negotiations with Finland, the question arose about transferring Gogland to the Soviet Union. However, the results of the debate were inconclusive, although Marshal Mannerheim 1 was inclined to cede Hogland to us, since the Finns did not have the opportunity to defend it.

At negotiations with the Finnish government in Moscow on October 12, 1939, the question of the Finnish islands again arose, but the conversation about Gogland was not resolved.

After the statement made on October 28 at a meeting of the Finnish government by the Finnish Minister of Defense that “war is more profitable than Russia’s demands,” Marshal Mannerheim defiantly left the meeting.

The situation was heating up.

On November 3, 1939, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov sent a directive to the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet: “With the outbreak of hostilities, seize, arm and hold the islands: Gogland...”.

On November 30, the day the Soviet-Finnish war began, after the "Torch" signal, major operation Baltic Fleet. Having wasted 4,425 shells and 2,110 bombs on the islands that the Finns had already abandoned, destroying two villages with domestic animals, the paratroopers “heroically” captured two boats and 30 old rifles.

On March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded with Finland, as a result of which the Soviet Union, along with other islands, received Gogland, where the coastal defense sector of the Kronstadt naval base was created. Colonel Ivan Anisimovich Bolshakov was appointed commandant of the sector. 2 Three artillery batteries were installed on the island. Some of the guns were taken from the cruiser Aurora. In the fall of 1941, the number of batteries increased to six.

When the Great Patriotic War began, Gogland was used as a stronghold for anchoring ships during daylight hours, refueling boats and basing a rescue squad. In the last days of August 1941, the situation in the area of ​​the island became significantly more complicated. The evacuation of the capital of Estonia, Tallinn, has begun. Enemy planes attacked ships and transports that were pressed against Gogland, trying to get under the protection of its anti-aircraft batteries. Captain G.S. Nikiforov's anti-aircraft gunners fired at maximum range.

Friday, August 29, 1941, was a terrible day for Gogland. At about 12 noon, 5,450 men, women and children from burning boats and transports landed on the island. German planes in low-level flight fired cannons and machine guns at the maddened crowds of naked and half-naked people who were rushing about, looking for at least some kind of shelter. While serving on Gogland, I had the opportunity to discover the bones of dead people in dense forest thickets. The German pilots were visibly frolicking, flying low with canopies open and throwing hand grenades into the crowds of people. The evening of August 29 was especially terrible for Colonel I. A. Bolshakov and his officers. As it began to get dark and the air raids stopped, huge crowds of men and crying women and children began to flock from the cliffs and from the forest to the villages. They had to be settled somewhere, fed, tended to the wounded, and buried the dead. Under the cover of darkness, the colonel temporarily accommodates people in all engineering and defensive structures and dugouts, since it was dangerous to stay in houses after large fires. There were not enough places for shelter, and it was necessary to create a system of shelter caves in the rocks by explosions. It was decided to load people onto ships heading to Kronstadt in small groups, disguising the queues in the forest. In the morning, to the surprise of the Finnish scouts, the island turned out to be almost deserted.

Until September 1941, when the last groups of Tallinn residents were sent to Kronstadt, the officers, petty officers and sailors of the sector forgot that the nights were meant for sleeping. The Tallinn operation of 1941, in the center of which was the island of Gogland, was the bloodiest in the history of the Russian fleet - it claimed, according to various sources, from 14 to 18 thousand people.

In connection with the approach of winter and new military tasks, a regrouping of forces began. On October 29 and 30, the evacuation of the islands of Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuters began, from where 3,439 people were removed. On Gogland, by order of the Military Council of the fleet, one 152-mm gun, a battery of 45-mm guns and a garrison of 150 people were left. On December 7, 1941, having blown up military equipment and some fortifications, however, forgetting about numerous bunkers and dugouts, the last Hoglanders, led by Colonel Bolshakov, left the island.

Finnish intelligence, now hostile, closely monitored the situation on Gogland, and a few days later the Finnish command had already transferred troops there.

Now, after our units left Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuters, the forward stronghold in the middle part of the Gulf of Finland for the Baltic Fleet turned out to be the islands of Lavensaari and Seskar. Lavensaari, with its convenient bays, became a base for submarines and a stop for light naval forces.

The stabilization of the front near Leningrad and the successful active actions of the Red Army units on other fronts posed new tasks for the fleet. One of them in the spring campaign of 1942 was the task of conquering and holding Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters.

On December 19, 1941, by directive of the Military Council of the Fleet, a detachment was created that was supposed to capture these islands.

The command of the detachment, formed from the garrisons of the islands of Lavensaari and Seskar, was entrusted to Colonel Alexey Andreevich Barinov 3 and regimental commissar Joseph Lvovich Volynsky. 4

Within eight days, 170 people were ready to go. Intelligence established that on Gogland the Finns settled in two villages and in a lighthouse. Barinov reported the results of the reconnaissance to the assistant fleet commander and received the answer: “Start the operation immediately. Use the boats available on Lavensaari to cross the gullies and cracks.” Having assessed the situation, Barinov sent an encrypted message to Kronstadt: “Carrying out an operation on boats at a distance of 47 kilometers is completely impractical and dangerous. The enemy can reveal the operation, and hence its failure.” The answer was short: “Act independently, according to the situation.”

On December 30 at 17.00 the detachment set out for Bolshaya Tyuters. There were no Finns on the island, but a large number of fresh ski tracks were discovered. Apparently, Finnish intelligence visited here. Around noon, enemy planes appeared over the island, but, thanks to careful camouflage, they did not find our paratroopers.

Having given the detachment a rest to welcome the new year, 1942, Colonel Barinov left a rifle platoon and convoy on Bolshoi Tyuters and on the evening of January 1, 1942, set out across the ice to Gogland.

At 5.30 am on January 2, having made sure that the Finns had no security on the ice, the detachment approached the island. They divided into three groups and began an attack on the southern lighthouse, southern and northern villages, having previously cut off the enemy's telephone communications. When attacking the southern lighthouse, the Finns, without accepting the battle, went into the forest. In the southern village, the enemy put up strong and stubborn resistance, signaling the attack to the northern village with rockets. In the battle, the entire garrison of the southern village was destroyed, while in the northern one a heavy battle ensued with the Finns, who were holed up in eight houses and a bunker. Having been defeated, the remaining enemy soldiers from other houses and dugouts retreated into the forest. The guards of the upper northern lighthouse, unable to withstand the attack, fled into the forest. The detachment captured large trophies: artillery, machine guns, ammunition, a tugboat, a boat and much other property.

Having occupied Gogland, Colonel Barinov’s detachment found itself in a difficult position: the Finns could receive reinforcements and attack the island within one night. Barinov's detachment - 161 people, without artillery and mortars, equipped only with hand weapons and three heavy machine guns, was clearly insufficient not only for the defense of the island, but even for all-round observation. There was only enough food for three days. There was no need to expect help in the next 4-6 days.

Colonel Barinov and his chief of staff Evgeniy Aleksandrovich Cherkasov, 5 realizing that it was impossible to disperse the detachment throughout the island, decided to place rifle platoons in seven directions and create three maneuver groups. Barinov ordered no one to settle in the villages, to live in dugouts and bunkers. And in order to create a false impression among the enemy about the forces of the detachment in all houses, bathhouses, dugouts and bunkers, especially during aerial reconnaissance of the enemy, heat the stoves and lay clear paths to each room.

The detachment lived on a nightly schedule: they slept during the day and served at night. Starting on January 4, 1942, the Finns began to actively conduct reconnaissance: during the day - by aviation, at night - by groups of skiers. Enemy planes stormed and bombed villages almost daily. The detachment's losses were small; they were saved by the shelter caves prepared in August-September by the sailors of Colonel Bolshakov.

Since January 6, solid ice has formed around Gogland, which has greatly complicated the defense of the island. It was necessary to create a stronger all-round defense and ensure constant surveillance.

Barinov sends an encrypted message to Kronstadt: “The number of people, firepower and ammunition does not provide a reliable hold on the island... We are wasting time, the problem must be solved briefly and immediately.”

On January 7, at 20 o’clock, a detachment of 82 people finally arrived from Lavensaari to Gogland. On his way to the island, he got lost. For about four days, without warm clothing, people were on the ice. They lost their company and platoon commander, as well as all their weapons and baggage. 27 of them, severely frostbitten, had to be sent back. Naturally, this reinforcement did not change the situation on Gogland and did not strengthen the detachment’s defense capability.

In February, the Finns intensified their reconnaissance, approaching the island on snowmobiles. The detachment's patrols and combat guards fought with them every night. One of the killed Finnish officers had a map that clearly stated that the enemy was planning to capture Gogland, acting with different directions. Colonel Barinov immediately reported this to Kronstadt.

At the end of February and beginning of March, a rifle company consisting of 141 people arrived on the island; later, two 45-mm cannons, without sights and spare parts, as well as 180 shells for them were delivered. The guns were installed in positions and the soldiers began to train the soldiers to shoot by eye.

In his famous “Memoirs” (volume II, chapter “The Capture of Gogland”, pp. 381-384), Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “On March 9, 1942, I decided to attack the island of Suursari (Gogland), although it was a complex and difficult matter.. "For the successful implementation of the operation, surprise was needed. Having discussed all the options for the operation, we concluded that the garrison of the island of Suursari (Gogland) is strong and cannot be taken without the help of reconnaissance and fire adjustment from the air. The commander of the 18th division was chosen for the post of commander of the landing force Major General A. O. Payari, 6 whose good tactical thinking and strong nerves aroused my complete trust... On March 10, 1942, Major General Payari was invited to Headquarters in Mikkeli, where I instructed him to form a landing force of three battalions for implementation of the operation plan." The Payari group included coastal defense units and a number of army units.

Meanwhile, a convoy with 45-mm guns and ammunition sent to Gogland from Lavensaari on March 15 was completely destroyed by Finnish aircraft.

On March 17, the Finns conducted reconnaissance of Gogland Island in force, attacking the island from three sides. A battle ensued on the ice. The enemy was dispersed by rifle and machine gun fire and was not allowed to the island.

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “Having approved the operation plan, I went to the city of Kotka on March 18, where I personally checked the detachment’s readiness for the operation and gave Major General Payari some additional instructions at the Meritorni hotel. The starting point for the offensive was set to be a night without full moon from 26 to 27 March 1942."

The battle on ice with the Finns on March 17 was a serious warning for Colonel Barinov. He understood that due to the limited number of fire weapons, it was impossible to create the required fire density. It is enough for the Finns to disable only two heavy and one light machine gun of the Gogland defenders, and 3 kilometers of the island’s coastline will be completely open. There was also nothing to provide serious resistance to the enemy in the depths of the island.

Having convened a small military council and listened to all the pros and cons, Colonel Barinov makes a decision: to place all fire weapons along the coastline of the island, to destroy the enemy only on the ice. Under no circumstances should the Finns be allowed to break through to the island and take possession of its heights. Inside Gogland, prepare three maneuver groups of 20-25 people each, under the command of Boyko, Siliverstov and Dudchenko.

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “A day before the offensive, the troops were advanced to the islands close to Hogland, from which, when dusk fell, the convoy on horseback and partly in cars moved towards Hogland.”

On the afternoon of March 26, Colonel Barinov received a report from observers that five groups of Finns, under air cover, were moving to the islands located near Gogland. The detachment commander immediately sent an encrypted message to Kronstadt: “The enemy on the islands is regrouping - the concentration, I assume, will launch an attack on the island of Gogland at night. In this regard, reconnaissance and security on the ice have been strengthened, and the island’s garrison has been put on combat readiness.”

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “Despite the fact that the soldiers and horses were in white camouflage coats, the enemy noticed movement on the ice and sent a prearranged signal to Kronstadt, which we took direction finding.”

At one in the morning on March 27, an encrypted message arrived from Kronstadt that Soviet aircraft would bomb the Finnish islands. In case of complications, the Finns will be attacked by the bombers of Colonel E. I. Preobrazhensky.

At 3.30, reconnaissance reported to Barinov: “Two columns of Finns are moving towards the north-eastern part of Gogland.”

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “We delivered the main blow at 3.30 on March 27, 1942 against the western coast of the island of Gogland. At the time of the attack, a strong snowstorm broke out, which lasted all day, covering the troops with a layer of snow.”

At 5 o’clock in the morning, the commander of the 3rd maneuver group, Dudchenko, reported to Barinov by telephone: “Three columns of Finns are moving in deployed formation to the fourth bay. A large number of vehicles and tankettes stopped 2-3 kilometers from the shore. One small column is going straight to the northern lighthouse.” .

Finnish artillery and mortars opened heavy fire on the island's firing points, which reconnaissance had quite accurately identified. Eight Soviet planes that took off from Kronstadt to Gogland returned back due to a snowstorm that covered the bay with a white blanket.

At 8.30 the Finns went on the attack. They struck the main blow on the western and northwestern coast of the island.

The Gogland garrison brought all its firepower into the battle, including captured ones, but was unable to push the enemy back onto the ice. In the south of the island, a Finnish company broke through to the shore and captured the southern lighthouse. The enemy battalion, having broken through the defenses of the Gogland defenders, reached height 166 and began to advance to the northern and southern villages. Counterattacks by Siliverstov's 2nd maneuver group were unsuccessful. At 9.25 he reported: “The enemy is moving towards the northern village, through Hill 162. His second group has reached the northern road.” The commander of the 1st maneuver group, Boyko, asked: “Block the northern road, the Finns cannot be allowed into the rear of the northern village.”

Fighting broke out all over the island. At 10.40, when Colonel Barinov was talking with Captain Cherkasov, the telephone connection with the 3rd maneuver group was cut off. Barinov only heard that his chief of staff was wounded in the arm and there was no communication with the machine-gun points on the western shore of the island.

At about 11 o'clock, a small group of Finnish machine gunners, walking along the shore of Suurkyulyan-Lahti Bay, near the cemetery and the former restaurant building, passing the guardhouse, broke into the northern village and opened fire on Barinov's command post, cutting off his connection with the defenders of the island. The detachment commander decides to retreat to a reserve command post. Having come under Finnish crossfire from the windows of a former restaurant, houses and from a height where there was an observation post, Barinov lost a radio operator and a cryptographer. Communication with Kronstadt ceased.

From the reserve command post, unreliable communications were established with individual battle groups, from where disappointing information came.

By 2 p.m., the Finns captured the southern and northern villages, all the lighthouses and heights of Gogland. The defenders of the island suffered heavy losses. 237 people were killed and wounded, 36 people were captured.

At 16 o'clock A. A. Barinov gives the order: “Fight until the last cartridge and grenade. Not a single person leaves the island, act stronger and more impudent...”.

By 19 o'clock almost the entire island was in the hands of the Finns. The island's defenders were running out of ammunition. The maneuver groups had 5-6 people each. No air assistance arrived.

Colonel Barinov decides to fight the enemy until nightfall, and then leave Gogland and, in three separate groups, retreat across the ice to the island of Lavensaari.

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “As expected, the battle was difficult. The defenders of the island, of whom there were 600 people (Finnish reconnaissance was mistaken by 112 people), fought staunchly. We had difficulties with the snow and terrain obstacles of the island. By the evening of March 27 "In 1942, we captured the central part of the island, concentrating the fighting in the northern and southern parts. The surviving defenders of the island fled to the island of Lavensaari at night."

When it became completely dark, around 11 p.m., three groups of Gogland defenders launched a counterattack and then went out onto the ice. A group of volunteers led by the wounded captain E.A. Cherkasov covered the withdrawal of the main forces. They fought fierce battles until the evening of March 28, and only a few people, frostbitten at night and in the morning of March 29, reached the island of Lavensaari.

While the main forces of the detachment were leaving across the ice of the bay, they were attacked many times by Finnish aircraft. At about 5 p.m., the surviving defenders of Gogland reached Lavensaari - 191 people.

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “When the blizzard ended, our and Russian aviation began air battles. Despite the fact that our aviation acted effectively, shooting down Russian planes, our detachment suffered heavy losses from Russian air strikes. All day long, Russian aviation attacked the island.. "On the southern part of Suursari, fighting continued until the evening of March 28, until the last defenders of the island, squeezed into a ring, surrendered." Finnish losses in the battle for Gogland amounted to 161 people killed and wounded, and not 800-900 people, as Colonel A. A. Barinov wrote in his report.

On the night of March 28, 1942, Lieutenant General Eliseev, apparently not knowing the situation on Gogland, made a “valuable gift” to the commander of the Finnish detachment, Major General Payari, dropping more than 1.5 tons of food and ammunition and a radio station from planes in the area of ​​the northern village , 20 carrier pigeons and two reconnaissance paratroopers. Having been captured, at the direction of the Finns, they sent a radiogram to Kronstadt: “We found neither our own nor the enemy on the island.” At this point the radio connection was cut off.

Analyzing the reasons for the loss of Gogland, the Main Naval Staff admitted that the command of the Leningrad Front underestimated the seriousness of the situation on this island, although there were enough signals about the position of the garrison. At the same time, Colonel A. A. Barinov was accused of making the decision to withdraw the Gogland garrison not to Bolshoi Tyuters, but to Lavensaari.

When the remnants of the Gogland garrison reached Lavensaari, a strict order came from the Military Council of the fleet: “Keep Bolshoi Tyuters Island at all costs.” Meanwhile, a day before receiving this order, the garrison of Bolshoi Tyuters, led by its commandant, Senior Lieutenant Pugachev, left it without permission.

Marshal Mannerheim wrote: “Immediately after the capture of the island of Gogland, Major General Payari moved his detachment to the islands of Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters.”

The Military Council of the Leningrad Front orders the fleet commander to organize the capture of the islands of Bolshoi Tyuters and Gogland.

On April 2, 1942, a reconnaissance company entered Bolshoi Tyuters, but due to the disorganization and inactivity of its commander, it failed: military units on the island of Lavensaari were concentrated so openly that the Finns immediately revealed all the plans of the fleet command. They quickly strengthened the defense of the islands, strengthened the garrisons, and brought up artillery.

The Military Council of the Fleet ordered the commander of the operational group to capture the island of Bolshoi Tyuters on the night of April 8, 1942, concentrate forces on it, and capture the island of Gogland on the night of April 12.

The rifle regiment, having covered 50 kilometers in knee-deep water in 16 hours, approached Bolshoy Tyuters at six in the morning on April 8 and stopped at a halt half a kilometer away. Three hours later, the order was given for a frontal attack on the island. However, the soldiers did not react either to the orders of the commanders or to the fire of the Finns: they fell asleep on the move in the icy water that covered the ice. At noon, behind a smoke screen, reinforcements approached the enemy from Gogland.

The Finns increased their fire and went on the attack.

The first battalion of the rifle regiment began to retreat in panic. All attempts by the commanders to stop him were unsuccessful. The battle was lost.

The regiment commander decided to take the soldiers away from the island, give them a rest, and repeat the attack at nightfall. However, it soon began to rain heavily and lasted for eight hours. The soldiers were soaked to the skin. They were without food or sleep for the second day. Taking all this into account, the regiment commander decided to return to Lavensaari. The retreat was more difficult than the march to Bolshaya Tyuters. Tired people fell into the water and fell asleep. It took effort to raise almost 40% of the regiment's fighters and drag them along. This terrible “ice crossing” lasted about 20 hours.

Having received a detailed report and report on this terrible “operation”, the Military Council of the Fleet does not draw any conclusions and again decides to seize the island of Bolshoi Tyuters.

At 20.30 on April 13, 1942, military units from the island of Lavensaari set out on a campaign in vehicles, which immediately began to fall through the ice. Having moved only 10 kilometers from Lavensaari and having lost all vehicles, the fighters stopped. Before dawn, walking, knee-deep in water, it was impossible to reach Bolshoi Tyuters. The commander of the task force decides to return to Lavensaari, which was reported to the Fleet Military Council on April 17. This, in 1942, ended all attempts by the command of the Baltic Fleet to capture the islands of Bolshoi Tyuters and Gogland.

In 1942-1943, the Finns thoroughly fortified these islands with artillery. To block our path to the Baltic Sea, the enemy built a powerful anti-submarine line in the Gogland area. The density of mines in certain areas of this position was (taking into account the depth of the line) one mine per 4.5 meters, plus booby traps and mines with a depth of 20-30 centimeters.

On September 5, 1944, the Soviet Union stopped fighting against Finland. Nine days after this, the Finnish command invited the Germans to leave the base and port of Kotka. The deadline was given 24 hours.

The Germans left Kotka, but in the Gulf of Finland, uniting with their other ships in a detachment of 39 pennants, having 2,500 soldiers and officers on board, they approached Gogland. The commander of the German detachment issued an ultimatum to the Finnish commandant to surrender the island. He refused. Then the Germans began a landing, which the Finns repulsed, with the exception of Suurkylä-Lahti Bay. The Finns pulled their forces to the western coast of the island. Coordinating their actions with the Finnish command, at dawn on September 15, 1944, two Soviet attack air squadrons attacked German ships, sinking one transport and nine high-speed landing barges. The surviving ships, having landed on Gogland, left in a southwestern direction. On the morning of September 16, 1944, the Germans raised the white flag and surrendered to the Finns.

By decision of the Main Naval Staff, fulfilling the terms of the truce with Finland, the fleet commander ordered the commander of the Island Naval Base, Rear Admiral Gavriil Vasilyevich Zhukov 7 to take the island of Gogland from the Finns.

Colonel Shramkov, appointed commandant of the island, was ordered to land on Gogland together with a separate artillery division, anti-aircraft gunners, machine gunners and the 7th base hospital.

Meetings between the Finnish commandant of the island, Lieutenant Colonel Miettinen, and Colonel Shramkov took place under the “watchful eye” of a SMERSH officer who monitored contacts between the Russians and the Finns. All military personnel were strictly forbidden to personally meet and talk with Finns in their homes, to walk around the island alone with a Finnish guide, always in a group, etc.

Two commandants, Soviet and Finnish, agreed that from September 24, 1944, Soviet officers would gradually take over Gogland, its engineering and defensive structures, weapons and equipment, by region, from south to north. The Finns, having surrendered the area, withdrew their soldiers from it, and it was occupied by Soviet units.

On September 30, 1944, the act of surrender and acceptance of the island was drawn up and signed. Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov’s fears about the destruction of military installations by the Finns and other “dirty tricks” that he expected did not come true. Finnish officers were precise and careful in everything. The Gogland garrison in two villages received from the Finns 36 good residential buildings with supplies of firewood and excellent wells, 12 equipped warehouses and 43 various buildings, and even in addition to five trucks, one good passenger car, which quickly disappeared from the island into the “foggy distance of Kronstadt.”

Unfortunately, much of what the Finns gave us gradually fell into disrepair due to mismanagement or was stolen. Arriving to serve in Gogland, I found in the house that was allocated to me only a good Finnish stove and bare walls. Some things were preserved only in the attics of houses that were not “emptied” by the former owners.

A coastal defense sector was created on Gogland, which was subordinate to either Kronstadt or Tallinn. In 1952, Gogland became a separate artillery division, which in 1957 turned from a naval division into an army division.

In the summer of 1960, division commander Andrei Timofeevich Panfilov announced to his subordinates that the artillery division was disbanded by order of the command and Gogland, like 20 years ago, became a demilitarized island, a place for excellent summer vacation for people. The truth is, as the press reports, they only talk about this at management meetings Leningrad region.

1 Mannerheim Carl Gustav Emil (1867-1951) - Marshal and President of Finland. In 1887-1917. service in the Russian army, last rank of lieutenant general. In 1918 he led the young Finnish army in the National Liberation War. In 1939, Marshal Mannerheim led the army and the people in the fight against the aggressor. During the Second World War he conducted military operations on the side of Germany. In 1944, having become the President of Finland, he prevented the split of the nation and laid the foundations for new relations with the Soviet Union.

2 Bolshakov Ivan Anisimovich (b. 1898) - Major General of Artillery. In 1940-1941 Commanded the Hogland sector of the military base. From 1943 until retirement in 1955, chief Higher school BO Navy.

3 Barinov Alexey Andreevich (b. 1897) - colonel. He has come a long way from a company commander to the deputy chief of staff of the main fleet base. For three months in 1942 he was the commander of a detachment on the island of Gogland. From 1949 to 1956 he served in the VMAKV named after. A. N. Krylova in Leningrad.

4 Volynsky Joseph Lvovich (b. 1903) - captain of the 1st rank. In 1933 he graduated from the Leningrad Military-Political Academy. In 1941, head of the political department of the island of Dago (Estonia). In 1946, in his biography, he wrote: “From 12/21/41, as a commissar of a detachment of sailors, I took part in the capture of the island of Gogland, where I stayed until its abandonment on 03/27/42.”

5 Cherkasov Evgeniy Aleksandrovich (1910-1942) - captain. In June 1941 he served on Gogland, where during combat operations, fulfilling the duties of chief of staff, he died in March 1942.

6 Pajari Aaro Olavi (1897-1949) - Major General of the Finnish Army. Participant in the National Liberation War of 1918. Gained military glory in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, rendering two Soviet divisions (75 and 139) ineffective. In 1942, he led operations on the Karelian Isthmus and on the island of Gogland.

7 Zhukov Gavriil Vasilievich (1899-1957) - vice admiral. In 1943-1944. commander of the Ostrovny naval base of the KBF.

Death Island - Treasure Island

These small patches of land are usually called the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland. A sea route to our Northern capital is laid past them along a narrow water “tongue” that the Baltic sticks out. On one side is Finland, on the other is Estonia; the main fairway passing nearby reminds of itself with ships sailing one after another, and here, in a deserted bear corner on the islands, life seems to have stood still, preserving the evidence of long-past battles.

Ordinary citizens have no access here: the border zone. However, in the last few years, the St. Petersburg “terra incognita” was examined by members of expeditions of the Russian Geographical Society, who discovered many relics from the times of the Great Patriotic War. An MK correspondent met with one of the search engines.

The barrel of an anti-aircraft automatic gun. Photo by Artem Khutorskaya.

In total, there are 14 islands in the “outer” group. The largest of them is Gogland, whose area is about 21 square meters. km. And the smallest ones barely reach 100-150 meters in diameter. Since ancient times, these fragments of land have been considered important strategic objects for control over shipping in the Gulf of Finland, and therefore on the largest ones - Gogland, Moshchny, Seskar, Bolshoy Tyuters, Sommers - fortification work was previously actively carried out, batteries and pillboxes were built from concrete, hollowed out in granite rocks caponiers, trenches, shelters.

From 1920 to 1940, the islands were part of Finland. After the USSR victory in the winter war, they found themselves under the red flag, but not for long. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis planned, together with the Finns, to capture all the “external” ones. However, several islands were still held by the Red Army and the Baltic Fleet. These few pieces of land were important areas of defense of the Leningrad blockade ring. For some time, a kind of front line along the water was established in the Gulf of Finland: the eastern islands were behind us, the western islands were behind the enemy. It was very difficult to supply the garrisons of the Soviet part. The ships made their way there across the bay under attacks from four sides: they were shot at from right and left - from the coasts of Finland and Estonia, occupied by the enemy, German aircraft attacked from above, and enemy submarines threatened from below, from under the water...

Even in the first period of the war, our sailors tried several times to return the lost island territories. But only in the fall of 1944 all the “external” ones were again under the control of the Soviet side: the enemy left the islands without a fight.

The military events that happened here are now almost forgotten. But the same Hogland was noted during the war for a unique battle: the Germans fought with the Finns. This happened during Operation Tanne Ost in the fall of 1944. A few days earlier, Finland announced its withdrawal from the war, and then the German command decided to capture Gogland, which was well fortified by the Finns, which was the most important point for monitoring the situation in the Gulf of Finland. The Germans continued to consider the army of the Suomi Country their ally and hoped that the northerners would simply surrender to them all the batteries and strongholds on the island without a fight. However, these hopes were not realized. When the German ships tried to land troops, the Finns, faithful to the obligations just given by the USSR, began to defend themselves fiercely. The forces, however, turned out to be unequal, and in order to avoid defeat, the Finns called in our aviation for help. Several squadrons of attack aircraft and bombers made a vinaigrette out of the Germans on Gogland - the enemy landing force was defeated, the Nazis lost about 2,300 people. This is an unprecedented case of military cooperation between warring countries: although at that time there was a truce between Finland and the Soviet Union, formally we were still enemies with them!

According to historians, among the Red Army and Red Navy soldiers who participated in combat operations on the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland during the war, losses amounted to at least 1,500 people - killed, drowned, missing, or died from wounds. Moreover, the bodies of most of these victims were never found... How many Germans and Finns died there during the same time - no one at all counted.

After the end of the war, the islands fell into oblivion. The population of the Finnish villages that existed before did not return here; large defensive structures were not built to replace the previous ones... Now the entire population of the “external” ones is a few attendants of the lighthouses working here and several small ones military units: border guards, locator workers, sailors. It was the desolation and inaccessibility that caused the islands to become a preserve of time.

Special trailer for anti-aircraft artillery fire control device. Photo by Artem Khutorskaya.

Hellish filling of Big Tyuters

“Since 1992, I have been engaged in search work at battle sites,” says the deputy executive director of the Expedition Center of the Russian Geographical Society for search activity Artem Khutorskoy. — In the summer of 2013, friends and colleagues from the Leningrad regional branch of the Russian Geographical Society invited me to visit the island of Gogland, where students from several St. Petersburg universities had field internships. We arrived for only four days, but even this period was enough to fall in love with the nature there. And in the evening, around the fire, the “old-timers” told us that Bolshoi Tyuters Island was nearby, and since the Great Patriotic War, everything there has been literally filled with abandoned military equipment...

Frankly, I thought these were classic stories that search engines often hear. However, with Bolshoi Tyuters it turned out to be completely different. Upon returning home, I found the first factual information confirming that numerous artifacts of the past war were indeed still preserved on this island on the Internet. And already in the fall of the same 2013, thanks to a happy coincidence, I was able to visit this protected area myself: I was offered to take part in a search expedition to Bolshoi Tyuters as a specialist in military equipment and weapons of Germany.

What we saw there exceeded all our wildest expectations. “Iron” from the war began to catch my eye literally from the first steps on the island. Anti-aircraft batteries, searchlight installations, field kitchens, pyramids of shells, mountains of some parts piled up in a heap, the remains of our and German fortifications... However, walking in this military museum under open air need to be done with caution.

- In what main danger?

— The Germans placed an impressive garrison on Bolshoi Tyuters - about 2,000 people, and installed several powerful batteries. They ruled the island for more than two years and all this time they lived there very freely: our air raids and shelling from the sea did not cause any significant damage. True, the Soviet command twice tried to take control of the island. The first attempt to land troops dates back to April 1, 1942. The fighting went on for several days, but as a result our detachment suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat. A few days later, on April 13, they launched another assault on Bolshoi Tyuters - and also unsuccessfully...

The situation changed rapidly in 1944. By the beginning of September, our troops had advanced on all sectors of the front, and serious danger loomed over the garrisons of the outer islands occupied by the Germans. Hitler's command preferred in this situation, without waiting for Soviet attacks, to give the order for evacuation.

It took place on September 18 and was so rapid that the Germans were not even able to remove almost a single gun from there. But at that time, a massive offensive of the Red Army troops was already underway on the Soviet-German front, our aviation was gaining overwhelming air superiority, so for the Wehrmacht, every anti-aircraft, every anti-tank gun was literally worth its weight in gold! But the Germans had to blow up those that stood on Tyuters. They rendered not only the guns unusable, but also all the mechanisms and instruments. Even the field kitchens did not survive: the Nazis threw a grenade into the cauldron of each of them...

During the occupation, the Germans managed to import a huge amount of ammunition. Leaving the island in a hurry, they were unable to evacuate this entire arsenal, but they also did not risk blowing it up, fearing that a powerful explosion would cover the departing ships with the garrison. As a result, the enemy tried to mine the entire hellish filling of Bolshoi Tyuters. This deadly surprise found its first victims among the paratroopers who landed on the island abandoned by the enemy two days later - September 20, 1944. Then the list of dead kept growing. Even many years after the Victory, the people who found themselves there continued to die from being blown up by Nazi ammunition. It’s not for nothing that until recently Bolshoi Tyuters was called the island of death...

On such a seemingly small area of ​​land (about 8 sq. kilometers), attempts were made to clear mines several times: sappers came here immediately after the war, and in the 1950s and 1960s, and there is information that many of them died here . Finally, in 2005, mine clearance specialists from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, together with their colleagues from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, carried out a large-scale cleanup of the island of death. They discovered more than 30 thousand explosive items from the war - shells, mines, bombs, cartridges... Some of the ammunition was destroyed, some was rendered harmless by removing the fuses from them. So Big Tyuters parted with his former terrible nickname.

- Let's return from the “explosive” past to the present...

— Based on the results of our short-term exploration expedition, carried out with a grant allocated by the Russian Geographical Society, a report was prepared addressed to its president, Sergei Shoigu. We tried to outline the situation as clearly as possible: unique equipment from World War II survived on the islands, it needs to be saved for the country’s museum collections, and there is an opportunity to do this. Sergei Kuzhugetovich read this summary and made a resolution: we must continue the work and expand the search. As a result, already in next year we received a new grant from the Russian Geographical Society. These funds were enough to explore almost all the islands in the summer of 2014 (we visited 13 of them, and we were unable to reach only one, a tiny one, which is located in the distance: there was not enough time and diesel fuel for the engines). As a result of the survey raid, it became obvious that the main repository of artifacts is, after all, Bolshoi Tyuters. That same summer we were able to examine it very thoroughly: a special search expedition was organized. This is a unique island both historically and military-technically. There are maybe only two or three of these in the whole world.

— Did you manage to make any unusual finds?

— Almost all the finds there are unusual. But I’ll start, perhaps, with hiding places. On the island we found two old caches. One of them is in a very convenient location. Imagine: the rock hangs from above, like the visor of a gigantic cap, and under the “visor” there is a narrow gap, so that you can only crawl into it by crawling. And this hole leads into a small cave...

There are still disputes about who the caches might have belonged to. In these secret shelters, improvised beds are built, and the remains of firewood that were once stored...

Our search guys later, already on the mainland, began to study archival documents and found out: in 1943, two reconnaissance groups disappeared on the island. Moreover, about one of them there were no details at all in our archives. And about the second group it is known that it consisted of two people - and both were called Ivans. These two, having landed safely, began transmitting radiograms with information, but then suddenly disappeared from the air. What trouble happened to them?

At first there was an assumption that the Ivans were killed or captured by the Nazis. However, from the materials that we were able to find in the German archives, it turned out that the enemy was unable to detect the scouts. I have copies of documents: 800 people were sent to comb the island - with so many soldiers it was possible to search almost every centimeter! As a result, the Fritz found some traces of our reconnaissance group: bandaging equipment hidden in the wilderness of the forest, a supply of food, lamps for the transmitter... After a thorough examination of the coastline of the island, they came across an inflatable boat camouflaged in the rocks. But the Germans never found the Ivanovs themselves. Judging by documents from the Soviet archives, according to the operation plan developed in advance, our submarine approached the island at the agreed time and place behind the scouts. She waited for them for two nights, but to no avail. The two Ivanovs also never got in touch again. The mystery of this disappearance has not yet been solved...

Entrance to a concrete bunker. Photo by Artem Khutorskaya.

The “defector” gun

— What other reminders of that war were found on Bolshoi Tyuters?

- There are several German guns on the island - and completely unique ones. There is, for example, an anti-tank gun, which, according to experts, is now preserved in a single copy all over the world. So, it turns out that another such rarity has survived on Bolshoi Tyuters.

- What kind of miracle of technology is this?

- This and weapons of the same type have - interesting biography. Even before the war, many units of the Red Army were equipped with 76-mm caliber regimental guns - they were produced en masse by factories. In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, a large number of such guns went to the enemy - the Germans and Finns, who included the trophies in their artillery. And if in the army of the Country of Suomi our “regiments” were used without any modifications, then in the Wehrmacht units the Russian 76-millimeter guns were modernized. For example, they were equipped with more advanced aiming systems, a muzzle was attached to the barrel... The ex-Soviet guns were very useful to the Nazis for organizing anti-tank defense. (It should be noted that in the initial period of the war against the USSR, the Germans experienced an acute shortage of anti-tank weapons. After all, before the attack on our country, Hitler’s generals planned completely different combat tactics - they did not imagine that as the war progressed they would have to repel more and more massive tank attacks units of the Red Army, and therefore at first they were not too concerned about the massive supply of anti-tank defense guns to the front line. And when they realized it, it was already very difficult to fill this gap: the industry of the Third Reich could not provide such a number of anti-tank guns.)

During the period of the victorious end of the war Eastern Front Some of the “Soviet-German” anti-tank guns were destroyed, and others that survived and were taken back by us as trophies were soon sent for melting down - so that even such a “disguised” memory of Nazism would not be preserved. I have already mentioned the result of such a global cleanup: before our expedition, only a single surviving cannon was known, and even then, according to available information, it is located overseas - there are no such examples in European museums. (In general, examples of captured military equipment are probably the rarest subject of museum collecting, since such samples are usually not preserved, they tend to dispose of them “without delay.”) And now another “defector” gun has been discovered.

Among other rarities of the “treasure island” was a whole collection of German searchlight equipment. There we also found six pieces of automatic anti-aircraft installations - and “in assortment”, of different calibers: 20 mm, 40 mm...

And more about the “gifts” of Bolshoi Tyuters. In Russia, only a single copy of the 88-mm German anti-aircraft gun is now stored, which was recognized by experts as the best anti-aircraft gun of the Second World War (but the Wehrmacht also had to spend a lot of money on this technical excellence: the miracle anti-aircraft gun cost almost 35,000 Reichsmarks, despite the fact that a simple Mercedes cost the buyer 4000). Not so long ago, such an 88-mm film was purchased in France and taken to our country by the owner of one of the private museums of technology. And on Bolshoi Tyuters we counted as many as five of these!

In Russian museum exhibitions you can find only a couple of examples of a German mobile anti-aircraft searchlight. And on this island they found eight of them at once. The situation is similar with the German wheeled gasoline generator. It is believed that we have one such sample preserved in Russia, and while searching the wilderness of Bolshoy Tyuters, we came across a whole “deposit” of such technical rarities...

In general, almost all the old German technology that survived on this island is unique to our country. After all, in post-war USSR Its leaders at that time made a lot of efforts to destroy everything connected with the damned enemy - the German army and its weapons. Therefore, enemy tanks, planes, and artillery installations were completely liquidated and sent for scrap metal... Even those specimens that were exhibited at grandiose exhibitions of captured military equipment (the most famous of them were organized during the war on the territory of the Central Park of Culture and Leisure in Moscow) were subsequently sent for melting.

— But why did this “hardware” survive to this day on Bolshoi Tyuters?

— Because after the war there was no military garrison there, the small island remained practically deserted for many years. We must also take into account the most important fact: this is a border zone, and access there is limited. However, to say that the equipment is well preserved is still not entirely true. In fact, these retro specimens are fairly tattered; they show damage that was clearly inflicted at a later time. Most likely, non-ferrous metal collectors, visiting tourists, fishermen, and “diggers” did their best here...

- But how could they end up “banned”?

— So, for some, getting permission to be present in the border zone is a problem (I don’t even want to remember how many ordeals the organizers of our expedition had to go through for this in 2013!), but for others they manage to turn on the “green light” for themselves. The so-called black diggers, apparently, did not have such problems. I later found photos on the Internet of people posing near these cannons on Bolshoi Tyuters, read messages from illegal immigrants: they say that they managed to take something out... And these are not empty boasts. At least two guns were taken from the island somewhere - that is, simply put, stolen! They are in the photo from the Internet, but when we got to the place, these guns were not found.

The Germans stored fuel reserves in such barrels. Photo by Artem Khutorskaya.

Save everything!

— Based on the results of our surveys of the island, a report was prepared for the Russian Geographical Society and the Ministry of Defense. Based on the data contained therein, Sergei Shoigu signed a plan for his ministry’s expeditionary work for 2015 at the end of last December. It also includes the following item: “Removal of military-historical equipment from Bolshoi Tyuters Island and its surrounding islands, which will be found during the spring expedition.”

Such attention from high military authorities forces the search engines of the Expeditionary Center of the Russian Geographical Society to work at maximum speed. During the three expedition weeks scheduled for May-June, we need to comb through all the nooks and crannies of the islands that we were not able to explore last year. There is a lot of work to be done!

— How realistic is it not only to take out the rarities you mentioned, but also to restore them in their original “standard” form for display in museums? Still, for almost 70 years this “iron” experienced the onslaught of rain, winds, salty sea spray...

— The existing experience of search engines and restorers proves that from the point of view of the conditions for preserving retro equipment, the Baltic is unique! Nature there seems to be specially programmed to preserve the products of human hands. It comes to the point that even some fragile parts made of simple stamped steel - in addition, which have clearly experienced the effects of an explosion or fire - are preserved quite tolerably here, although similar finds made in other places often simply crumble when you touch them.

Another thing is that the mentioned equipment was damaged, blown up by the Germans themselves in 1944, before their departure from the islands. However, skilled restorers will turn our finds into exhibition samples without any problems.

— According to the planned plan, will they remove everything interesting that the search expeditions managed to discover?

“We will strive to have all military artifacts from the islands that have been preserved in a more or less transportable state sent to the mainland.” Here you need to take into account that we are talking about technology unique to our country from the times of the Great Patriotic War. Of course, some of these copies can be purchased, say, at an auction in France and brought to Russia, but this costs a lot of money. Only a very rich collector-fan can afford such expenses.

— What fate awaits the mentioned rarities? Where will they end up after evacuating the island?

— Further prospects for “Tyuter” retro technology largely depend on the joint decision of the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Geographical Society. For our part, we would propose to adhere to the principle of public and private partnership. That is, some of the finds should be transferred for restoration and exhibition to private museums of technology. After all, the volume of work to restore the rarities discovered in Tyuters is colossal. And in these difficult times, the state does not have enough funds to do this on its own.

—Are you not afraid to talk in detail about the unique military artifacts discovered on the islands? What if, having read about this in MK, one of the enterprising “seekers” decides to quickly pull something out of retro technology and beat you to it? They themselves talked about the stolen guns...

“Now we are no longer afraid of such incidents.” And publication in the newspaper will only contribute to the preservation of these war relics: I think that after this problem is made public, the leadership of the Baltic Fleet, the Western Military District, and border guards will take these places under even greater control and protection from the penetration of outsiders.

Photo by Artem Khutorskaya.

Missing graves

— In 2014, members of an expedition from the Russian Search Movement explored the territory of Gogland. But superficially: the island is still very large. So far it has been possible to discover the remains of only one Red Army soldier. And regarding all the “hardware”, we were convinced that now nothing interesting has been preserved on Gogland. All Finnish equipment and weapons were exported either for scrap metal or as trophies (it is known that some of the Finnish guns were used by the Red Army in the hostilities of 1944-1945).

Meanwhile, according to available information, somewhere on the island there should be a mass grave of those who died in 1941 from German shells, bombs and mines during the breakthrough of the notorious “Tallinn convoy” - a caravan of our combat and transport ships heading to Leningrad from Estonia, which was under the threat of occupation. Accurate information about the burial place of these people - most of them civilians - has not yet been found. And in one of the old Finnish cemeteries, several graves of Soviet military sailors survived. Among them, Petty Officer 1st Article Merinov and Captain Rudy were remembered: judging by the inscription on the gravestone tablet, the lives of both were cut short on May 10, 1945 - the day after the Victory... What could have happened to them? According to official data, the sailors were killed by an enemy mine.

On another island - Sommers - there should also be a mass grave. It was organized by the Finns after the death of the Soviet landing force in the summer of 1942. Now little is remembered about this large-scale operation of the Baltic Fleet. But then, from July 8 to 12, ours lost over 300 paratroopers in fierce but unsuccessful battles - almost everyone who landed on this small island, measuring only 500x900 meters. Only a small part of the paratroopers were captured, and our boats managed to pick up several. Last year, members of our expedition looked for this mass grave, but, unfortunately, without success. Over the months that have passed since then, we have been able to study new archival materials, and now it is already obvious to us where exactly we should search.

A joint expedition of the Russian Geographical Society, the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Search Movement is planned for the 2015 season. We will work on three islands at the same time - on Gogland, Sommers and Bolshoi Tyuters. As for this latter, our plans are not only to thoroughly comb the entire island, but to draw up a detailed diagram indicating all the equipment from the war that has been preserved there, and also to prepare a plan for its evacuation. By the way, the list of necessary technical means for such evacuation of artifacts has already been prepared and sent to the Ministry of Defense.

— Are there other places where you can find something preserved from the Second World War in our time? military equipment?

— A very rich “deposit” is on the Kuril Islands. We already carried out exploration expeditions there together with the Ministry of Defense last year - we discovered Japanese tanks, cars... But there are also much closer geographically “deposits” of retro equipment. Crimea has now returned to us, and from documentary sources it is known that in its coastal waters lie two or three German transports sunk during the war, chock full of self-propelled guns and anti-aircraft guns. At a time when the peninsula was part of independent Ukraine, several of these self-propelled guns and guns, according to my information, were raised with the connivance of the previous authorities and disappeared in an unknown direction. But each such combat vehicle in restored condition costs collectors in the West millions of dollars!

When carrying out the evacuation of “iron” found on the islands in the Gulf of Finland from the time of the Great Patriotic War, such “private enterprise” initiatives are excluded: we organize the strictest control. All exported samples of equipment and even its fragments will be carefully described, photographed, and sealed before being sent to the mainland, so that nothing goes missing or gets mixed up. We will draw up acts signed by representatives of all responsible parties: the Russian Geographical Society, the Ministry of Defense, authorized for delivery and storage...

By the way, there, on the outer islands, in this remote corner that few people know about, in addition to military relics, there are other objects that require attention. For example, ancient lighthouses have survived there (although often not in the best condition), and on the island of Seskar, even the first cast-iron lighthouse in Russia, built in 1863, has been preserved. On several of these pieces of land there are ruins of Finnish villages, old cemeteries that have been preserved from the last and even the century before last. Now they are a depressing sight: everything is torn apart, stone monuments are overturned, broken, someone tried to dig up some graves (and, judging by the traces, not so long ago)...

Of course, justifying such desolation and devastation, one can refer to the fact that this is all “enemy heritage”, remember that we fought against the Germans and Finns. However, this is not an argument. It is necessary to instill in people hatred for the enemy, but respect for the enemy and not take out your anger on his cemeteries. If this law had been observed in previous years, then perhaps the war would have gone differently.

The fighting on the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1941 seemed to be in the shadow of the battle that took place south of Leningrad. The actions of the 23rd Army north of Leningrad were described extremely briefly, but almost all works mentioned that the reason for the abandonment of Vyborg and the difficult situation in which the left flank 50th Corps found itself was the landing of an amphibious assault by the Finns on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here is how the history of the Leningrad Military District describes this event:

“The enemy sought to cut off the 43rd, 115th and 123rd rifle divisions from the rest of the forces and encircle them. With the help of a landing force landed south of Vyborg, the Finnish command managed to cut the coastal railway and highway leading to Leningrad.

In the current situation, the Military Council of the front, with the knowledge of Headquarters, allowed on August 28 the commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General Gerasimov... to withdraw three divisions from the Vyborg area in a southerly direction to the line of the former Mannerheim Line. But this was not possible, since the enemy had already tightly closed the escape routes.”

Thus, it turns out that the landing force landed by the Finns led not only to the occupation of a large territory, but also to the encirclement and actual defeat of three Soviet divisions. No other landing operation on the Eastern Front has achieved such success! And how did the Finns manage to do this? After all, in the Vyborg Bay they did not have any military fleet at all, but the Soviet Baltic Fleet could operate freely here.

This article is an attempt to understand the true causes of the Vyborg tragedy, so a significant place in it will have to be devoted to actions on the land front. Nevertheless, we will start with landing operations...

As a result of the peace treaty of 1940, the Soviet-Finnish border in the area immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Finland acquired rather bizarre shapes. At sea, it meandered between skerry islands, often lying a couple of hundred meters from each other, and on land, the Kiiskinalhti peninsula was connected to the rest of Soviet territory only by a narrow half-kilometer-long bridge with a bridge over the Koskolan-joki River, located almost close to the border.

The coastal section of the border was guarded by the 2nd commandant's office of the 33rd border detachment, its 5th outpost was located on the Kiiskinlahti peninsula, the 6th on the adjacent islands of Laitsalmi, Pajusari and Patio; The 7th outpost was located on more distant islands, the northernmost of which was Martinsari. In addition, the 41st separate machine gun battalion (in some sources called a marine battalion) was located on the islands. His headquarters and the 1st company were located on the island of Payusari, the 2nd company in the rear on the islet of Pitkyapasi, and the 3rd company, reinforced by four 45-mm guns, on the largest island of Patio; this company was operationally subordinate to the commander of the 6th border outpost. The land section had no defensive structures, but bunkers for machine guns and light cannons were equipped on Patio Island.

The entrance to Vyborg Bay was covered by the Vyborg sector of coastal defense under the command of Colonel V. T. Rumyantsev. In addition to the 41st separate machine gun battalion, this included the 22nd and 32nd separate artillery divisions - 12 coastal and anti-boat batteries with a caliber from 45 to 152 mm, as well as 10 separate field guns and the 27th separate anti-aircraft artillery division. The artillery of the 32nd division was located on the island of Pukkionsari, which lies near the sea border line 5 kilometers seaward of Patio, as well as on the northern coast of the Vyborg Bay near the village of Ristsatama and on the Satamaniemi Peninsula 15 kilometers east of the border. The 22nd Division was located on the islands of the Koivisto (Bjerke) archipelago - Piisari, Tiurinsari and Bjerke, lying along the eastern coast of the bay. The actions of the coastal defense units were supported by a skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, captain 3rd rank E.I. Lazo, based in Uuras (Trongsund) on the island of Uuransari - two divisions of gunboats, a division of self-propelled landing barges (all four barges of the SB type), a unit of guards MO-type boats, a division of minesweepers, a detachment of torpedo boats, a detachment of armored boats and three divisions border boats.

As we can see, the anti-landing defense of the coast and islands was extremely weak - no one clearly expected the high activity of the Finns on the sea section of the border.

The Vyborg area was defended by the 50th Rifle Corps of the 23rd Army - the 123rd and 43rd Rifle Divisions; the first of them held defenses along the border from the Gulf of Finland to the Saimaa Canal, the second - north of the Saimaa Canal to the Vuoksa (Vuoksi) River. Behind Vuoksa, starting from Enso, there was a strip of the 115th Rifle Division of the 19th Rifle Corps. Further north, in the area of ​​Elisenvaara and Lazdenpohja, the 142nd Infantry Division of the 19th Infantry Corps occupied the defense, and further north - the 168th Division of the 7th Army (later transferred to the 23rd Army). The role of the army reserve was performed by the 10th Mechanized Corps, but already at the beginning of July the bulk of its forces were transferred to Karelia and near Luga. Only one 198th motorized division remained on the Karelian Isthmus, which was later also “torn apart” separate shelves. All divisions had a good complement for that time - 10-12 thousand personnel.

On the Finnish side, the 23rd Army was opposed by two army corps - IV (8th and 12th Infantry Divisions and 25th Infantry Regiment) and II (2nd, 15th and 18th Infantry Divisions). In addition, the 4th and 10th Infantry Divisions and the Light Brigade "T" were there as reserves. Thus, there were eight estimated Finnish divisions against five Soviet divisions. Taking into account the greater strength of the Finnish divisions (14 thousand versus 12 thousand), this gave the Finns more than one and a half superiority. Under these conditions, Soviet troops could only defend themselves...

It is officially believed that Finland declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, 1941 - after Soviet air raids on peacefully sleeping Finnish cities and airfields. However, the personnel of the 2nd Commandant's Office were put on combat readiness already at five o'clock on June 22 - after peaceful Finns began to openly (white night!) install heavy machine guns at the bridge over Koskelan-joki, and after that several planes crossed the border, heading towards Leningrad.

At about ten o'clock in the morning, peaceful Finns unexpectedly attacked a border guard at a tower in the area of ​​the 5th outpost west of the bridge, near the village of Kiiskinlahti. The border guard was forced to retreat to the outpost itself, located in the village. The Finns captured the tower and installed a machine gun there; at the same time they reached the mouth of Koskelan-joki. A little later, another group of Finns crossed the border west of Kiiskinlahti and tried to capture the bridge leading to the island of Laitsalmi, but were stopped 200 meters from the bridge by machine-gun fire from border guards and marines.

Thus, the land road to the 5th outpost was cut. There was no radio at the outpost; communication with the commandant's office was maintained only via an underwater telephone cable. Towards evening, the village of Kiiskinlahti had to be abandoned, and the bridge to the island of Laitsalmi had to be blown up. By order of the commander of the border detachment, the entire composition of the 5th, 6th and 7th outposts was transferred by boats to the mainland and took up defense along the banks of the Koskelan-joki River, and the defense of the islands was transferred to the marine battalion.

In addition, in repelling the Finnish attack on June 22, a group of MO-type boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander A. Finochko, which supported the border guards with fire from 45-mm cannons, took place.

On June 23, the Finns, with the help of an infantry company, crossed Koskelan-joki along an unexploded bridge and tried to occupy the village of Koskela on its eastern bank, but fell into a “bag of fire”; According to domestic data, the company was almost completely destroyed.

For some time there was a calm here. On June 26, the concentration of Finnish troops on the Khurpu Peninsula, as well as on the island of Tunholma, lying just a kilometer west of the island of Patio, was noticed from the islands. On July 27, the 41st separate machine gun battalion opened fire on the Finnish coast, forcing the enemy to cease activity. On June 29, the Finns from Khurpu, under the cover of a smoke screen and artillery fire, tried to land a boat landing force (up to a hundred people) on Patio, but the landing was repulsed by the fire of the 41st separate bullet battalion.

Meanwhile, the batteries of the 32nd separate artillery division fired at concentrations of Finnish troops near the border - mainly at the request of the ground forces. The Finns responded with artillery fire and air raids. On July 3, a tragedy occurred - as a result of air bombing and artillery shelling on the island of Pukkionsari, the forest caught fire, and from it, ammunition depots. An explosion occurred, as a result of which about half of the entire ammunition was destroyed, property and food were burned. Only on July 20 and 22 did we manage to win back - according to reports from artillerymen, a four-gun battery on the Hurppu Peninsula and a two-gun battery in the Kiiskinlahti area, occupied by Finnish troops on June 22, were destroyed.

On the same day, July 3, the Finns captured the island of Martinsari, landing a company-sized boat force there. Having occupied Martinsari, conveniently located between Patio and Pukkionsari, the enemy immediately began to strengthen it and transfer new troops here.

On the night of July 16, Finnish boats appeared near Patio, but were driven away by artillery fire. On July 26, the Finns made two unsuccessful attempts to land directly on Pukkionsari; their boats were again driven away by machine gun fire. On July 26 and 27, the Finns again tried to land troops on the islands of Patio and Pukkionsari - or imitated a landing. The same thing happened on August 1 on the Laitsalmi coast. In all cases, the Finns failed to reach the shore.

The Soviet side took retaliatory actions - on the night of August 5-6, reconnaissance was carried out on the Kiiskinlahti Peninsula occupied by the Finns and the small islands adjacent to Patio. It turned out that there was no enemy on some of them, so the 41st Separate Machine Gun Battalion landed boat landings on the “empty” islands of Halsholm (Holsholm) and Raationsari, lying 500–1000 meters northwest of Patio. The rocky Raationsari and the low-lying, swampy Halsholma did not have any fortifications and it would have been very difficult to defend them - but this was a rare case of entry in 1941 Soviet troops into enemy territory.

Since August 5, sporadic shelling of the islands occupied by the enemy and their watercraft was carried out by the gunboat Kama. But in general, until the 20th of August in the area occupied by the 32nd artillery division, the situation remained relatively calm.

Meanwhile, the position of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus at the beginning of August 1941 deteriorated significantly. Back on July 30, Mannerheim ordered the II Army Corps (1st, 15th and 18th Infantry Divisions) to launch an offensive at the junction of the 115th and 142nd divisions, reach Lake Ladoga in the Khiitol area and cut through the forces of the 23rd Army . The Finns managed to break through the Soviet defense only on August 5, on this day heavy fighting began for the Khiitola junction station, located at the northwestern corner of Ladoga, 22 km from the border.

At this stage of the fighting, the subjective factor came into play. Anticipating an unpleasant scenario, the commander of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, on August 5 gave the new commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General M. N. Gerasimov (who had replaced Lieutenant General Pshennikov the day before) the order: while continuing to hold Khiitol, withdraw through the remaining corridor of troops from near Sortavala and take a strong defense on the approaches to Kexholm. However, the next day this order was canceled by the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western direction, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, who gave instructions to hold the Sortavala area at all costs.

Alas, on August 7, the left-flank 2nd Infantry Division of the II Army Corps occupied Lakhdenpokhya and reached Ladoga, thus cutting off Sortavala and the 168th Infantry Division defending it. On August 8, the 10th and 15th Finnish infantry divisions occupied Kirka Hiitola, effectively cutting off the main forces of the 198th and 142nd rifle divisions (four regiments) from the rest of the 23rd Army.

Thus, the right wing of the 23rd Army was cut into three parts, two of which were pressed to the coast. But what’s even worse is that to the right of the 115th Infantry Division, a gap up to 30 km wide formed between Sairala and Kexholm, covered only by scattered remnants of the units that retreated here, often without communication with each other and with the high command.

Even the introduction into battle of the 265th Infantry Division, which was hastily transferred from the front reserve and had only 5,539 men, did not help to turn the situation around. Therefore, the counterattack on Hiitola, organized by the forces of this division on August 10, was not successful, although it delayed the Finnish advance for two days. The situation could have been saved by the transfer of part of the forces from near Vyborg - however, the command of the direction demanded to hold the border line near Vyborg at any cost.

In addition, the command of the 23rd Army, under pressure from Voroshilov, instead of hastily removing cut-off formations along Ladoga and transferring them to the Kexgolm area, tried to organize a breakthrough to the Khiitol area by land - not taking into account the heavy losses of the 168th, 142nd and 198th divisions and the obvious superiority Finns in numbers. On August 12, the enemy occupied Sortavala, and on the same day the 142nd and 198th divisions retreated to the Kippola Islands via existing bridges.

As a result, the order from the front command to evacuate across the lake was given only in the evening (at 16:15) on August 17. In fact, the evacuation began even earlier. The 168th Rifle Division was transported from Sortavala on the morning of August 16 - first to the island of Valaam, and then to the Shlisselburg area and Golsman Bay. On August 15, the evacuation of the 19th Rifle Corps (142nd and 198th divisions) began.

Alas, time was lost, and instead of the area south of Kexgolm (Sortanlahti Bay, now Vladimirskaya), the troops had to be taken to Morje and Saunaniemi bays (south of the mouth of Taipalenjoki). The evacuation lasted until August 23; the 168th Rifle Division was concentrated in the Shlisselburg area only by August 28. In total, from August 15 to 23, 23,600 thousand soldiers, 748 vehicles, 193 guns, 4,823 horses, as well as up to 18 thousand civilians were evacuated from the northern shore of Ladoga. In addition, even before the evacuation began, about 4 thousand wounded were transported by water.

Thus, the Finns received about two weeks of head start, during which three of the seven divisions of the 23rd Army were actually “cut out of the game.” Taking into account the losses of the Soviet troops, the enemy's superiority on the Karelian Isthmus from about one and a half became at least three times, and in the area west of Kexholm - almost overwhelming. The command of the 23rd Army reported to the front headquarters that the formations leading the battle had been drained of blood and had absolutely no reserves - but at the same time, two divisions, the 123rd and 43rd, continued to remain out of battle.

And the Finnish command took full advantage of the opportunities that opened up to them. On August 13, Mannerheim gave the command of the II Army Corps an order: to reach Vuoksa as quickly as possible and occupy bridgeheads on its southern bank. The attack on Vyborg from the east was postponed. Over the next week, the enemy almost completely occupied a vast territory in the large bend of Vuoksa, where only scattered Soviet units defended - two regiments of the 265th division, the 588th regiment of the 142nd division, the 5th and 33rd border detachments, the group of Colonel Donskov , group of brigade commander Ostroumov. And all this - against three Finnish divisions and one motorized brigade...

True, the 10th and 15th divisions, partly constrained by battles with the Soviet group cut off in the Hiitol area, and partly delayed by the stubborn defense of Kexgolm, advanced rather slowly at first - Kexgolm was occupied only on August 21. On the same day, the advance elements of the 10th Infantry Division reached Vuoksa at Kiviniemi, and on August 22–23, the 15th Infantry Division occupied Taipale. But the 18th Infantry Division, which had virtually no enemy in front of it, quickly took the lead. Already on August 16, it reached the area of ​​​​Vuosalmi and Eurepä, where no Soviet defense was organized. The next day, the 27th Infantry Regiment, together with a heavy artillery battalion, crossed Vuoksa. On August 18, they were joined by the motorized brigade “T”, which was promoted from the reserve. So the Finns received a bridgehead beyond Vuoksa, 14 km wide and up to 5 km deep, from which they could advance both bypassing Vyborg and directly towards Leningrad.

The trouble is that the Soviet command received news of the Finns crossing at Vuosalmi only on August 20, and the number of troops transported was estimated at two battalions. Meanwhile, the Finnish command sent, following the 18th division, the 12th infantry division from the IV Army Corps from the Vyborg direction. Instead, the 4th Infantry Division of Colonel K. Viljanen was brought into battle from the command reserve against the 115th Infantry Division. Somewhat later (August 26), the 10th Infantry Division was also redirected to Vuosalmi from the blown-up bridge at Kiviniemi.

Back on August 20, due to the sharply deteriorating situation, the commander of the 23rd Army, No. 027/op, was given an order to take up defense along the Vuoksa River. At the same time, the troops of the left wing of the army were withdrawn from the border, but leaving Vyborg was strictly forbidden. The 43rd Rifle Division was retreating to the city, and the 123rd and 115th divisions, under its cover, were to be withdrawn from the Vyborg “sack” in order to strengthen its neck.

In this regard, on the same day, August 20, the command of the Vyborg sector gave the order to evacuate the northern coast of the bay. Together with the artillerymen of the 32nd division, the left flank units of the 123rd division remaining in the area were also removed. The evacuation was carried out from the island of Pukkionsari, capes Ristiniemi and Satamaniemi, it was covered by a company of the 41st separate rifle battalion and two platoons of the 51st separate rifle battalion.

Fighting on the Karelian Isthmus in July-August 1941

The Finns discovered the withdrawal of our troops and began their offensive only two days later - covering units entered into battle with the enemy only shortly before the end of the evacuation, which ended on the evening of August 22. Alas, there were still some losses - of the three barges on which the division’s materiel was transported, one was destroyed by enemy fire. In addition, on August 23, at Cape Sayamaniemi, while removing personnel from a machine gun company, armored boat No. 215, which had landed on rocks, was killed by enemy fire. However, by the end of August 24, the remaining personnel of the covering company were removed by two other armored boats and the KM boat.

Meanwhile, the Finns, having concentrated a sufficient number of forces on the bridgehead at Vuosalmi, went on the offensive on August 22. Already on August 23, the T brigade broke through to the area of ​​​​the village of Kamyarya (not to be confused with the Kamyarya station!) near Lake Kamyaryan-yarvi (now Gavrilovskoye) 25 km east of Vyborg, where it united with units of the 12th Infantry Division advancing from the north, crossing Vuoksa at Antrea's. At the same time, the 18th Infantry Division, turning to the southeast, reached the line of Lake Muolan-yarvi, Yaurepyan-yarvi and the Salmenkaita River (now Lakes Glubokoe and Bolshoye Rakovoe and the Bulatnaya River) between Leipyasuo station and the Vuoksa bend.

On this day, Soviet troops finally launched a counterattack: units of the 123rd and 115th Infantry Divisions attacked the Finns in the areas of Mannikala (10 km northeast of Vyborg) and near Kämär, trying to push the enemy back to Vuoksa. The counteroffensive was unsuccessful, and in the meantime the Finns began to implement another part of their plan. Back on August 22–23, the 8th Infantry Division of Colonel Vinel from the IV Army Corps reached the shore of the Vyborg Bay, cutting off and pressing the 245th Regiment of the 43rd Infantry Division to the coast in the Repol area. The Finns immediately began preparing a crossing across the bay in order to hit the rear of the Soviet troops near Vyborg.

The crossing was made easier by the fact that the width of the water space between the two shores of the bay here is only one and a half kilometers. Finnish troops concentrated in the area of ​​​​the villages of Porkansari and Piispansari, as well as on the island of Turkinsari, connected to the shore by a dam and a road running along it.

Finns cross the Vyborg Bay by boat

The crossing began on the morning of August 24. From Porkansari, the 3rd battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment was transported on motor boats and Shutskor boats to Cape Keihäsniemi; south of it, the main part of the 24th Infantry Regiment was transported from Turkinsari Island to the Lihaniemi Peninsula. In the evening of the same day, the 2nd battalion of this regiment organized a crossing from the area of ​​the village of Repola to the northern tip of the island of Suonionsaari, where the width of the strait was also about a kilometer. Already from this island, the Finns, using captured boats and available means, without any opposition, crossed the waters of the closed Trongsund roadstead and the half-kilometer shipping canal to the port of Uuras (Trongsund, now Vysotsk) on the island of Uuransaari.

Commander of the 4th Finnish Infantry Division, Colonel K. Viljanen

By the evening of August 24, there were already two Finnish battalions on the Lihaniemi Peninsula, and another battalion was intended to capture Uuras. Using the existing watercraft, it was impossible to transport transport or even field artillery across the bay, so units of the 8th Division had only 81-mm mortars with them as fire support, which significantly weakened their striking power. On the other hand, the Finns were greatly helped by a good knowledge of the area and its features - including those that are not indicated on topographic maps...

On August 24, the first day of the crossing, no opposition was provided to the Finnish landing. Only on August 25, the Soviet boats ZK-35 and ZK-36 at the southern tip of the island of Suonionsaari, at the entrance to the closed roadstead of Uuras, fired from 45-mm guns at “a concentration of enemy infantry and boats with landing forces” - according to the boatmen’s report, three boats were destroyed.

A little later, larger ships were sent to the landing site. On August 26 and 27, from the area north of Uuras, the destroyers Strong and Stoiky, as well as the gunboat Kama, fired at the Finnish crossing and concentrations of enemy troops on the shore from a distance of 8-10 miles. In total, the destroyers fired 1,037 130-mm shells. Alas, the effect of firing at areas from almost the maximum distance turned out to be minimal, especially since the ships going to sea and preparing them for the combat mission were hasty and disorganized. The naval liaison officer at the headquarters of the 23rd Army was unable to organize the exchange of data between ships and ground units, since the flagship artilleryman of the fleet was not informed about the tasks assigned to the destroyers. Artillery reconnaissance and target designation were not carried out. Shooting at the Lihaniemi Peninsula on August 26, the destroyers themselves did not know who and where was on it, and the commander of the “Stoikiy” B.P. Levchenko, even when writing his memoirs, was sincerely confident that the Lihaniemi Peninsula was located on the northern shore of the bay. According to reports from the destroyers, on August 27, a convoy of two transports and several boats heading to Cape Ristiniemi was fired upon, and both transports were sunk. What kind of “transports” they were remains unknown to this day...

Commander of the 8th Finnish Infantry Division, Colonel Vinel

On August 27 and 28, an attempt to disrupt the Finnish crossing to Lihaniemi was made by armored boats No. 213 and No. 214 - they attacked Finnish small ships and, according to reports from the crews, sank 6 raid boats, two boats and a pontoon with ramming attacks. It can be assumed that as a result of these actions, the buildup of enemy forces on the bridgehead was somewhat slowed down.

The first information about the Finnish landing on Lihaniemi arrived at the headquarters of the Koivist (103rd) border detachment (commander - Major Nikityuk) quite quickly - already at 17:00 on August 24. A group of border guards under the command of Captain M.A. Revun was immediately sent to the landing area. Alas, there were only 30 people in the group; we couldn’t scrape together more.

Quickly assessing the situation, Captain Revun took up defense in the most convenient place - near the village of Samola at the base of the peninsula, where its width did not exceed one and a half kilometers. The border guards fought all night, but they failed to block the exit from the peninsula - on August 25, the Finns walked along the shore of the Rauha-Lahti Bay and reached the railway and the Koivisto-Vyborg highway in the area of ​​Sommee station (according to Finnish data, the latter was captured only on the morning of August 26 ).

Uuras harbor, Lihaniemi peninsula and Somme station area. Finnish map

However, by this time, a detachment consisting of a combined company of the Koivist border detachment and a school for junior command staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had already been transferred to the Kaislahti area under the overall command of the chief of staff of the border detachment, Major Okhrimenko. The detachment took up defense in the area of ​​Kaislahti station, 2.5 kilometers southwest of Somme. Captain Revun's group also reached Kaislahti on the afternoon of August 25 and united with Okhrimenko's detachment, losing 5 people killed and three wounded, but taking with them a lot of captured weapons and ammunition.

At 10 o'clock in the morning, a message was received that the enemy, who had landed the day before in the Uuras area, had reached the railway bridge connecting the island of Uuransaari with the mainland and captured the village of Niemelya, as well as the brick factory located here, threatening the border guards' retreat to the rear. Major Okhrimenko sent a combined company here under the command of the reconnaissance platoon commander, Lieutenant Kozlov. Surprisingly attacking the enemy with the support of two 76-mm guns from an army battery, the company drove the enemy out of Niemel and out of the brick factory, forcing them to retreat back to the Uuransari bridge. According to our data, the Finns lost 50 people killed and 9 wounded in this battle (possibly in the latter case they are taken prisoner), two mortars, many rifles, machine guns and grenades were captured. Our losses amounted to 20 people killed and wounded!

All day, the enemy, supported by mortar fire, attacked the Kaislahti station, coming close to it. However, at 6 am on August 26, after a raid by our aircraft, the border guards unexpectedly counterattacked the Finns and, after hand-to-hand combat on the northern outskirts of Kaislahti, drove the enemy back to the forest. In this battle, Major Okhrimenko was mortally wounded; Major Uglov from the coastal defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took command of the detachment.

On August 27, the combined detachment, under enemy pressure, was forced to leave the Kaislahti station. The border guards retreated to the port of Johannes and took up defense along the Rokkalan-joki river 5 kilometers south of Kaislahti. At the same time, a combined naval regiment hastily formed in Koivisto, consisting of a combined detachment of the Vyborg coastal defense sector and two battalions of the 5th separate naval brigade, transferred to Koivisto from the Izhora sector from the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, arrived here.

From August 27 to 29, sailors and border guards held the line along Rokkalan-joki, repeatedly launching counterattacks and allowing units of the 23rd Army to reach Koivisto. Only on August 30, under increased enemy pressure, Johannes was abandoned, and Soviet troops retreated directly to Koivisto. On the same day, the 103rd border detachment was evacuated to the island of Koivisto, where, together with the school of junior commanders of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, it entered the reserve of the brigade commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

The occupation of the Sommee and Kaislahti stations by the Finns on August 26–27 played a fatal role in the fate of the Vyborg group of our troops (50th Rifle Corps - 123rd, 43rd and partly 115th Rifle Divisions). An attempt at a counteroffensive on August 24, carried out by a series of scattered attacks from different directions, did not lead to any results - although in the zone of the 18th Finnish division at the line of Jaureppä and Lake Muolanjärvi, the Finns were pushed back to Vuoksa for some time, and “in the night battle it came to to hand-to-hand combat with the use of Finnish knives and hand grenades.”

Having repelled scattered Soviet counterattacks, units of the 12th and 18th Infantry Divisions and the T brigade reached the area of ​​the Leipyasuo and Kamyarya stations, cutting the railway and highway from Vyborg to Leningrad. At the same time, the 4th Infantry Division, advancing from the north, captured the Tienhaara station, pushing the Soviet troops back to Vyborg itself. By August 27, according to the report of its command, the 123rd Infantry Division found itself divided into separate groups, some of which were fighting surrounded.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that on August 23, the previously united Northern Front was divided into two - Karelian and Leningrad; As a result, inevitable confusion reigned at headquarters for some time. However, to the request of the command of the 23rd Army for permission to leave Vyborg and retreat to the old border, the new Lenfront leadership responded with a categorical refusal. Only early in the morning of August 28, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, with the knowledge of Headquarters, allowed the command of the 23rd Army to leave Vyborg and retreat to a “prepared line along the former Mannerheim line” - which in reality did not exist.

Soviet tanks T-38 and armored vehicles abandoned at Somme station

It is characteristic that this order was dated 5:00 on August 28, while the army headquarters directive to withdraw was signed already at 4:15 on the same day. However, it was already too late - especially since the directive reached the troops only in the afternoon, and the withdrawal line indicated in it (from Muolaa to Rokkala) was already partially occupied by the Finns. The 123rd Division, which concentrated its main forces in the Sainio area (5 km southeast of Vyborg), had to fight its way to the right of railway, through the village of Huumola. An attempt by the division's 245th regiment to recapture Kamarya station ended in failure. The 115th Division received an order from the army commander to retreat not to the southeast, but to the south, to Koivisto. This withdrawal was covered by the 272nd Regiment of the 123rd Division and the 576th Regiment of the 115th Division, defending in the area of ​​Karhusuo station, along the railway line from Vyborg to Yaurapää and to Valk-järvi. On August 29, units of the 4th Finnish Division (5th Infantry Regiment) occupied Sainio, after which the rearguards of the 123rd and 115th divisions were cut off and defeated.

Contrary to the assertion of many subsequent historians, neither on August 28 nor 29 the Finnish encirclement was yet closed. Even the area of ​​the village of Näyukki and Lake Näyukki-järvi (near Honkaniemi station, between Säinio and Kämärä) was captured by the 4th Infantry Division only on August 29. However, as luck would have it, heavy autumn rains began, all the streams turned into rapid torrents, and the forest paths between Kämärä and Kaislahti turned out to be impassable for wheeled vehicles and heavy equipment. Therefore, the artillery and part of the convoys had to be abandoned - thus, the convoy and all the artillery of the 638th Infantry Regiment of the 115th Division were abandoned on the Korpellan-Autio wasteland, 7 km south of Sainio. However, the regiment itself, numbering 2,000 people, was able to make its way to Koivisto.

Artillery of the 43rd Infantry Division captured at Porlampi

No one even tried to break through the Primorskoe Highway - although there were no more than two Finnish regiments here, without equipment or artillery, and until August 30, Soviet sailors and border guards held the city of Johannes and the line of the Rokallan-joki River. Without a doubt, an organized attack by three divisions (even if not in full force), supported by divisional and corps artillery, would simply crush the flimsy positions of the 8th Infantry Division and allow the 50th Rifle Corps to withdraw to Koivisto without any problems, evacuating a large part of the equipment and equipment.

Alas, this did not happen. On August 29, leaving Vyborg, the rearguard commander of the 43rd Infantry Division decided to fight his way to Koivisto east of the Primorskoye Highway, along forest roads through the villages of Yulya-Sommee and Porlampi. However, the terrain here was even worse than in the Huumola region; there were often no roads or even paths through the swamps. As a result, the division simply got stuck at Porlampi, where it fought surrounded by battle for three days. On September 1, the resistance stopped - the Finns claim that the order to surrender was given by the division commander himself, Major General V.V. Kirpichnikov. According to the Finns, they found about 2,000 corpses on the battlefield, and 3,000 soldiers of the 43rd Infantry Division were captured. A huge amount of equipment was captured - artillery, cars, armored vehicles, which the division command did not even try to destroy.

Former commander of the 43rd Infantry Division, Major General V.V. Kirpichnikov in Finnish captivity

In total, according to Helge Seppel, during the battles for the Vyborg region, 9 thousand prisoners, 55 tanks, 306 various guns, 246 mortars, 272 machine guns, 673 vehicles and 4,500 horses were captured. The Finns estimated the losses of Soviet troops killed at 7 thousand people, the number of those who retreated to the Koivisto area at 12 thousand.

Already on August 31, Finnish troops, encountering virtually no resistance on their way, occupied Terijoki. On the same day, the 18th Infantry Division reached the old border in the Maynila area, and on September 1, fighting took place along the entire perimeter of the Karelian fortified area. Meanwhile, to the west, along the sea coast, fighting was still ongoing in many places - for example, Fort Eno was occupied by units of the 12th Infantry Division only on September 3. Soviet garrisons also remained on the islands of the Vyborg Bay.

“After occupying the Virolahti skerries, Finnish coastal defense units were tasked with crossing the Vyborg Bay and establishing contact with units located further to the east. To do this, it was necessary to capture the islands of Teikarsari and Thuppuransari."- writes Jurgen Meister. He further reports that on the morning of August 29, the 2nd Finnish coastal battalion (425 people), departing by boat from Vilajoki in Vilajoen Lahti Bay, landed on the island of Teikarsari (Teikarinsaari), which lies west of Uurinsaari and covered the approaches to the harbors of Vyborg Bay. According to Meister, the island was defended by a “reinforced Soviet company.” The Finns landed in three stages on the west coast of the island. Around noon, several small Soviet ships tried to approach the island, but were forced to withdraw because the Finns opened fire with captured guns - I wonder which ones?

The description of this battle from the Soviet side is very different - primarily in terms of dating. Back on August 20, from the island of Teikarsari, where the 1st outpost of the Koivist Border Detachment was located, a concentration of Finnish troops was noticed on Cape Pitkäniemi (2.5 km west of the northern tip of the island) and Santasari Island (2 km north of Teikarsari). On the same day, the outpost was reinforced by 50 Red Navy men from the coastal defense forces - thus, the “reinforced company” amounted to no more than 70 people.

According to the description of the combat operations of the Koivist border detachment, the Finnish landing force was landed on the island on August 25, and not on August 29 - which is more likely to be true, because by the 29th the fight for the Vyborg Bay was almost over. The lieutenant of the Ninth, who reported the landing to the outpost commander, was ordered to hold the enemy on the northwestern tip of the island until the last opportunity, in order to make it possible to evacuate the artillery battery from Thuppuransari, which lies 2.5 kilometers to the south. The border guards and sailors fulfilled their duty - the enemy managed to capture Teykarsari only by landing another company on it. No further information was received about the battle, because at the very beginning of the battle the outpost's radio station was destroyed, and communication with the garrison ceased. On a single motor boat, six wounded were evacuated from the island; several more people later reached Koivisto on a raft.

On August 31, the Finns tried to land on the island of Tuppuransari (Tuppura), which lies southwest of Teikarsari, at the northern tip of the Kiperort Peninsula. However, this time the landing was repelled by the fire of coastal battery No. 229.

However, this did not help the situation on land. On September 1, the command of the North-Western direction decided to evacuate the remnants of the 50th Rifle Corps, which had withdrawn to Koivisto, to the islands of the Koivisto (Bjerke) archipelago, for which a special detachment was formed from gunboats, transports and boats of the skerry detachment. On the same day, units of the 43rd Infantry Division that had come here were removed from Koivisto, and in the morning of the next day - units of the 123rd and 115th Infantry Divisions. To evacuate troops to Koivisto on the evening of September 1, the VT-506 “Barta” and VT-507 “Otto Schmidt” transports were sent, guarded by two minesweepers and two “MO” type boats. The third steamer, VT-542 "Meero" (1866 brt), on the way to Koivisto on the night of September 2, was sunk at Cape Stirsuden by the Finnish torpedo boat "Syuoksyu" (it was initially believed that the transport was lost to a mine).

The evacuation began on the night of September 2, 1941 and ended early in the morning. The chief of staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Yu. A. Panteleev, who led the operation to remove troops, recalls that many soldiers were unarmed. In total, 14,000 people from the 115th and 123rd rifle divisions, including 2,000 wounded, were transported to Kronstadt. Among those taken out was the commander of the 115th Infantry Division V.F. Konkov and his staff. Part of the troops (primarily coastal defense units and the remnants of the 43rd Infantry Division) were evacuated to the island of Bjerke, with them the number of people evacuated by sea reached 20 thousand people.

By noon on September 2, the garrison of the island of Tuppuransari, the personnel of the 229th coastal battery and the sailors from Koivisto covering the landing were removed. On the evening of September 2, the Finns entered the empty city without a fight.

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Notes:

Melzer W. Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln. Neckargemuend, 1960. S. 23.

Haupt W. Baltikum 1941. Neckaigemuend, 1963. S. 122. Conze W. Die Geschischte der 291. Infanterie-Division 1940–1945. Bad Nauheim, 1953. S. 96

Lukin V. The tragedy of Commandant Moonzund // Marine collection. 2006. No. 12.

History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M.: Voenizdat, 1974. P. 233.

See: V. Platonov. Border guards in battles for the Motherland. A collection of examples of combat actions of border guards in the first days of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascist Germany. M.: Main Directorate of Border Troops of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1961. Pp. 6–8.

The described case was not the only one on the Karelian Isthmus. For example, on the morning of June 22, a detachment of the 14th outpost of the 2nd commandant’s office of the Ensovo border detachment was fired upon from the Finnish side. At 7 o'clock in the morning on June 23, in the same area, a group of Finnish soldiers numbering about 50 people tried to attack the 14th outpost itself; When the covert attack failed, mortar fire was opened on the outpost from the Finnish side. The chief of staff of the 2nd commandant's office, senior lieutenant Gelev, died in the battle. On June 23, at the site of the Vyborg border detachment, an airplane arriving from Finland fired at cars with evacuating families of command personnel of the 272nd Infantry Regiment, killing a Red Army soldier. The next day, the 1st outpost of the same detachment detained two Finnish soldiers on our territory. Cases of attacks and shelling from the Finnish side (even without taking into account the actions of aviation) also took place on other sections of the border - for example, on June 25, at the site of the 2nd outpost of the Ukhta border detachment, a group of Finnish soldiers who crossed the border shot at and wounded junior political instructor Eliseev. At the site of the Rebolsky border detachment, traces of the landing of paratrooper saboteurs were found - including 45 kg of TNT and a bag of food with Finnish inscriptions. But the most amazing incident occurred near Murmansk - here, at the site of the 12th outpost of the Kuolajärvi border district, on June 22 at 1:30 (that is, even before the German attack), a German corporal conducting reconnaissance on our territory was captured, who gave detailed testimony about the group of German 9- th Infantry Division on Finnish territory in the area of ​​Sarviselka, Kuolajärvi, Kotal and the deployment of the enemy for the offensive. See: Border Troops of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. 1941. Collection of documents and materials. M.: Nauka, 1976. pp. 390–391, 399, 430, 460, 474, 480–481. If the actions of German aviation from Finnish territory, as well as the deployment of sabotage groups (to blow up the locks of the White Sea-Baltic Canal) were actions, the decision about which was taken at the level of the top military leadership of Finland, then the attacks on the border outposts were most likely the “amateur actions” of local Finnish commanders. Apparently, the Finnish military received an order to prepare an offensive and, for this purpose, to conduct reconnaissance of the adjacent territory, and some of them simply did not bother with the fact that an official cause for war had not yet been found.

Yu. V. Ladinsky. On the fairways of the Baltic. M.: Military Publishing House. 1973. P. 44.

V. Platonov. Border guards in battles for the Motherland. pp. 11–12.

On July 21, to facilitate control, together with the 361st regiment, the 71st Infantry Division was transferred from the 7th Army to the 23rd Army.

According to the recollections of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 168th Infantry Division, S.N. Borshchev, the order from the front headquarters to break through by land was received on August 12, but the next day it was canceled and the order was given to evacuate along the lake. See: S. N. Borshchev. From the Neva to the Elbe. L.: Lenizdat, 1973. P. 24.

V. I. Achkasov. Protection of maritime communications in the Baltic during the Great Patriotic War // Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War. 1941–1945. M.: Nauka, 1981. P. 173 (with reference to TsVMA, f. 2, d. 9222, l. 85; V.F. Tributs names slightly different figures in his memoirs). 11,995 people, 112 guns and mortars, 1,823 horses, 136 vehicles were evacuated to the island of Valaam (see: V. F. Tributs. The Baltic people enter the battle. Kaliningrad, 1972. P. 96). As of August 19, the 142nd Division's total losses were 3,190—1,839 wounded, 611 killed, and 740 missing. 12 152 mm guns, 6 122 mm howitzers, 52 mortars, 64 heavy and 140 light machine guns were lost (see: G. A. Oleynikov. Heroic pages of the defense of Leningrad. St. Petersburg: Nestor, 2000. P. 86.). There were about 6,000 people left in the division - thus, the final losses of personnel and equipment amounted to only about a third, although according to earlier reports (from August 10–12) they were fifty percent.

Infantry regiment, two battalions, two rangers, engineer and artillery companies, anti-aircraft battery.

According to G. Oleinikov, the 2nd Infantry Division was also transferred here.

V. I. Achkasov, N. B. Pavlovich. Soviet naval art in the Great Patriotic War. M.: Voenizdat, 1973. P. 192.

B. P. Levchenko....In the wake, without lights. L.: Lenizdat, 1981, pp. 82–83. True, Levchenko claims that the shooting was corrected by radio from the observation post of the Vyborg sector.

Bjerke, now Primorsk.

Suomen Sota 1941–1945. 1951. S. 312. Cited. By: N. I. Baryshnikov. The offensive of Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus in August-September 1941 // From war to peace. USSR and Finland in 1939–1944. SPb.: St. Petersburg University Publishing House, 2006. P. 269.

In total, by September 3, 5,500 people remained in the division. See: Siege of Leningrad in documents from declassified archives. M.: ACT; SPb.: Polygon. 2004. P. 25.

V.V. Kirpichnikov turned out to be the only Soviet general who was captured in Finland, so his photographs in captivity were widely published by Finnish propaganda. Upon returning from captivity in 1944, Major General Kirpichnikov was arrested and sentenced to death in 1950; later posthumously rehabilitated.

Cm.: Jurgen Meister. Eastern front. War at sea, 1941–1945. M.: Eksmo. 2005. P. 33.

See: Border Troops of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. 1941. Collection of documents and materials. M.: Science. 1976. P. 686.

B. A. Weiner. Soviet maritime transport in the Great Patriotic War. M.: Voenizdat, 1990. P. 35. See also: Courts of the Ministry Navy, who died during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M.: GPIIIMT "Soyuzmorniiproekt", 1989.

In total, on September 5, the 23rd Army (together with KaUR units) had 44,000 people, 200 guns, 80 mortars, 400 heavy and 600 light machine guns (see: Siege of Leningrad in documents from declassified archives. P. 184). Obviously, this does not include the 168th Division, transferred to the 55th Army, and the 115th Division, which was withdrawn from the 23rd Army on September 4 and sent to occupy the defense along the Neva. The strength of these divisions at the beginning of September was 12–15 thousand people. Thus, out of 5 full-blooded (123rd, 43rd, 115th, 142nd, 168th) and two incomplete (198th and 265th) divisions total number(together with army and corps units) of about 85 thousand, 30 thousand people or about a third of the army were lost in the battles on the Karelian Isthmus - mostly dead and missing.

The Gulf of Finland (Finnish Suomenlahti, Est. Soome laht, Swedish Finska viken) is a bay in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, washing the shores of Finland, Russia and Estonia. The western border of the bay is considered to be an imaginary line between the Hanko Peninsula and Cape Põyzaspea (located near the island of Osmussaar).
The area of ​​the Gulf of Finland is 29.5 thousand km², length 420 km, width from 70 km at the throat to 130 km at the widest part (on the meridian of Moshchny Island), and in Neva Bay it decreases to 12 km, average depth 38 m ( maximum 121 m). A sea canal was laid along the bottom of the Neva Bay for the passage of ships.
Due to the large influx fresh water of the rivers, especially from the Neva (2/3 of the total flow), the water of the bay has very low salinity (from 0.2 to 9.2 ‰ at the surface and from 0.3 to 11.0 ‰ at the bottom). The average water temperature in winter is about 0 °C, in summer 15-17 °C on the surface and 2-3 °C at the bottom.
The bay freezes from late November to late April (in warm winters it may not freeze all year round). Freezing begins in the eastern part of the bay and gradually spreads to the west.
Characterized by strong wind waves and surges of water during westerly winds, leading to flooding. Complex of flood protection structures in St. Petersburg, flood protection structures in St. Petersburg, KZS, dam - a complex of dams and related hydraulic structures (culverts and navigation structures), stretching across the Gulf of Finland from Bronka to Sestroretsk (Gorskaya village), across the island Kotlin, on which the city of Kronstadt is located (part of St. Petersburg). Construction was carried out from 1979 to 2011, the cost of the project as of the first ten days of August 2010 amounted to 87.3 billion rubles. The complex of structures became fully operational on August 12, 2011.

On August 18, 1940, military cooperation between Finland and Germany began.
On September 12, 1940, Finland and Germany agreed on the possibility of transit flights of the German Air Force through Finnish territory.
On October 1, 1940, an agreement was concluded between Finland and Germany on the supply of German weapons to the Finnish army. Before January 1, 1941, 327 artillery pieces, 53 fighters, 500 anti-tank rifles and 150,000 anti-personnel mines were delivered.
Supplies also came from the USA - 232 artillery pieces.
Since January 1941, 90% of Finland's foreign trade was oriented towards Germany.
In the same month, Germany brought to the attention of the Finnish leadership its intention to attack the USSR.

Review of Finnish troops. Spring 1941

On January 24, 1941, the Finnish parliament adopted a law on conscription, which increased the period of service in the regular troops from 1 to 2 years, and the conscription age was lowered from 21 to 20 years. Thus, in reality military service in 1941 there were 3 conscription age groups at once.

On March 10, 1941, Finland received an official proposal to send its volunteers to the newly formed SS units and in April gave its positive response. An SS battalion (1,200 people) was formed from Finnish volunteers, which in 1942 - 1943. participated in battles against units of the Red Army on the Don and in the North Caucasus.

On May 30, 1941, the Finnish leadership developed a plan for the annexation of the so-called territory. "Eastern Karelia", which was part of the USSR (Karelo-Finnish SSR). Professor Jalmari Jaakkola, commissioned by the Finnish government, wrote a book-memoir “The Eastern Question of Finland”, which substantiated Finland’s claims to part of the territory of the USSR. The book was published on August 29, 1941.

In June 1941, the Finnish army received 50 anti-tank guns from Germany.

On June 4, 1941, in Salzburg, an agreement was reached between the Finnish and German commands that Finnish troops would enter the war against the USSR 14 days after the start of the Soviet-German military campaign.

On June 6, at the German-Finnish negotiations in Helsinki, the Finnish side confirmed its decision to participate in the impending war against the USSR.

On the same day, German troops (40,600 people) entered Finnish Lapland from Norway and settled in the Rovaniemi area.

On the same day, in Finnish Lapland, German troops (36th Mountain Corps) began moving to the USSR border, to the Salla region.

On the same day, a flight of 3 German reconnaissance aircraft began to be based in Rovaniemi, which over the next days made a number of flights over Soviet territory.

On June 20, a flight of 3 German reconnaissance aircraft began to be based at Loutenjärvi airfield (central Finland).

On June 21, Finnish troops (5,000 people with 69 guns and 24 mortars) landed on the demilitarized Åland Islands (Operation Regatta). The personnel (31 people) of the USSR consulate on these islands were arrested.

On the same day, the Finnish command received information about Germany’s intention to begin military operations against the USSR on June 22.

On June 22, the German Air Force bombed the territory of the USSR, moving through Finnish airspace using previously installed radio beacons and having the opportunity to refuel at the airfield in Utti. On the same day, Finnish submarines, together with German submarines, took part in mining the western part of the Gulf of Finland.

On June 25, Soviet aviation launched strikes on the territory of Finland, including the capital of the country, Helsinki. On the same day, Finland declared war on the USSR, becoming an ally of Germany in World War II. 41 Finnish aircraft were destroyed at the airfields. Finnish air defenses shot down 23 Soviet aircraft.

Turku Castle after the bombing on June 25, 1941
The new war against the USSR was called the “continuation war” (Jatkosota) in Finland.

By the beginning of hostilities, two Finnish armies were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - on the Karelian Isthmus, the Southeastern Army under the command of General Axel Erik Heinrichs, and in Eastern Karelia, the Karelian Army under the command of General Lennart Karl Oesch. There were 470,000 soldiers and officers in the active army. The armored forces included 86 tanks (mostly Soviet captured ones) and 22 armored vehicles. Artillery was represented by 3,500 guns and mortars. The Finnish Air Force included 307 combat aircraft, of which 230 were fighters. Navy consisted of 80 ships and boats of various types. Coastal defense had 336 guns, and air defense had 761 anti-aircraft guns.

General Lenart Ash. 1941

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces was Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim.

In Finnish Lapland, the left flank of the Finnish troops was covered by the German 26th Army Corps.

On the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish Southeastern Army (6 divisions and 1 brigade) was opposed by 8 divisions of the Red Army.

In Eastern Karelia, the Finnish Karelian Army (5 divisions and 3 brigades) was opposed by 7 divisions of the Red Army.

In the Arctic, German-Finnish troops (1 German and 1 Finnish division, 1 German brigade and 2 separate battalions) were opposed by 5 divisions of the Red Army.

Finnish soldiers on the way to the front. July 1941

As part of the Finnish army, in addition to the Finnish units themselves, a Swedish volunteer battalion (1,500 people) led by Hans Berggren took part. After the Swedish volunteer battalion returned to Sweden on December 18, 400 Swedish citizens remained to serve in the Finnish army until September 25, 1944, as part of a separate volunteer company.

Also, Estonian volunteers (2,500 people) served in the Finnish Armed Forces, of which on February 8, 1944, the 200th Regiment (1,700 people) was formed as part of the 10th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Eino Kuusela. Until mid-August 1944, the regiment conducted combat operations on the Karelian Isthmus and near Vyborg. In addition, 250 Estonians served in the Finnish Navy.

On July 1, 1941, the Finnish 17th Division (including a Swedish volunteer battalion) launched attacks on the Soviet military base(25,300 people) on the Hanko Peninsula, which were successfully repelled by the Soviet garrison until December 1941.

On July 3, the Finnish submarine Vesikko, east of the island of Suursaari, sank the Soviet transport Vyborg (4100 GRT) with a torpedo. Almost the entire crew was saved (1 person died).

Finnish submarine Vesikko. 1941

On July 8, German troops (36th Mountain Corps), advancing from the territory of Finnish Lapland, occupied the desert mountain region of Salla. At this point, active hostilities on the northern section of the Soviet-Finnish border, controlled by German troops, stopped until the fall of 1944.

On July 31, British aircraft bombed Petsamo. Finland protested and withdrew its embassy in London. In turn, the British Embassy left Helsinki.

On July 1, 1941, fighting began in the Kandalaksha direction. The Finnish 6th Infantry and German 169th Infantry Divisions advanced 75 km into Soviet territory, but were stopped and went on the defensive, which they occupied until the end of the war.
On August 15, 1941, a Finnish patrol boat sank the Soviet submarine M-97.

Captured Red Army soldiers surrounded by Finnish soldiers. September 1941

By September 2, the Finnish army had reached the borders of Finland everywhere in 1939 and continued the offensive on Soviet territory. During the battles, the Finns captured more than a hundred Soviet light, amphibious, flamethrower, medium (including T-34) and heavy (KV) tanks, which they included in their tank units.

The Finnish army, having crossed the Soviet-Finnish border in 1939 and advanced further 20 km, stopped 30 km from Leningrad (along the Sestra River) and blocked the city from the north, carrying out a blockade of Leningrad together with German troops until January 1944.

The return of Finnish refugees (180,000 people) to the southern regions of Finland, formerly occupied by the USSR, began.

On the same day, a Finnish torpedo boat south of Koivisto sank the Soviet steamer Meero (1866 GRT). The crew was saved.

On September 4, Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim told the German command that the Finnish army would not participate in the assault on Leningrad.

On September 11, Finnish Foreign Minister Rolf Johan Witting informed the US Ambassador in Helsinki, Arthur Schoenfield, that the Finnish army would not participate in the assault on Leningrad.

On September 13, off the island of Ute (off the coast of Estonia), the Finnish flagship, the coastal defense battleship Ilmarinen, was struck by a mine and sank. 271 people died, 132 people were saved.

On September 22, Great Britain expressed a note to Finland about its readiness to return to friendly relations, subject to Finland’s cessation of hostilities against the USSR and the withdrawal of troops abroad in 1939.

On the same day, Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, by order, banned the Finnish Air Force from flying over Leningrad.

On October 3, 1941, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull congratulated the Finnish Ambassador in Washington, Hjalmar Johan Fredrik Procope, on the “liberation of Karelia,” but warned that the United States opposed the Finnish army’s violation of the 1939 Soviet-Finnish border.

On October 24, the first concentration camp for the Russian population of Eastern Karelia was created in Petrozavodsk. Until 1944 The Finnish occupation authorities created 9 concentration camps, through which about 24,000 people (27% of the population) passed. Over the years, about 4,000 people died in concentration camps.

Russian children in a Finnish concentration camp.
On November 3, 1941, the Finnish minesweeper Kuha hit a mine near Porvo and sank.

On November 28, Great Britain presented Finland with an ultimatum demanding a cessation of hostilities against the USSR before December 5, 1941.

On the same day, the Finnish minesweeper Porkkala hit a mine in the Koivisto Sund Strait and sank. 31 people died.

On the same day, the Finnish government announced the inclusion of the USSR territory occupied by Finnish troops into Finland.

On December 6, Great Britain (as well as the Union of South Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) declared war on Finland after refusing to cease hostilities against the USSR.

On the same day, Finnish troops captured the village of Povenets and cut the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

In 1941 - 1944 Germany supplied the Finnish Air Force with new aircraft designs - 48 Messerschmitt Bf 109G-2 fighters, 132 Bf 109G-6 fighters, 15 Dornier Do 17Z-2 bombers and 15 Ju 88A-4 bombers, which took part in the battles against the Red Army.

From January 3 to January 10, 1942, in the Medvezhyegorsk area, Soviet troops (5 rifle divisions and 3 brigades) carried out unsuccessful attacks on Finnish troops (5 infantry divisions).

Finnish infantrymen on the Svir River. April 1942

During the spring of 1942 and the beginning of the summer of 1944, local battles were fought on the Soviet-Finnish front.

By the spring of 1942, 180,000 older people had been demobilized from the Finnish army.

Since the summer of 1942, Soviet partisans began to carry out their raids into the interior of Finland.

Soviet partisans in Eastern Karelia. 1942

On July 14, 1942, the Finnish minelayer Ruotsinsalmi sank the Soviet submarine Shch-213.

On September 1, 1942, Finnish aircraft sank Lake Ladoga Soviet patrol ship "Purga".

Finnish Italian-made fighter FA-19

October 13, 1942 2 Finnish patrol boats south of Tiiskeri, the Soviet submarine Shch-311 (“Kumzha”) was sunk.

On October 21, near the Åland Islands, the Finnish submarine Vesehiisi sank the Soviet submarine S-7 with a torpedo, from which its commander and 3 sailors were captured.

On October 27, near the Åland Islands, the Finnish submarine Iku Turso sank the Soviet submarine Shch-320 with a torpedo.

On November 5, 1942, in the area of ​​Åland Islands, the Finnish submarine Vetehinen sank the Soviet submarine Shch-305 (“Lin”) with a ramming attack.

On November 12, the 3rd Infantry Battalion (1,115 people) was formed from Red Army prisoners of war belonging to the Finnish peoples (Karelians, Vepsians, Komi, Mordovians). Since May 1943, this battalion took part in battles against Red Army units on the Karelian Isthmus.

On November 18, 3 Finnish torpedo boats in the Lavensaari roadstead sank the stationary Soviet gunboat "Red Banner".

By the end of 1942, on the territory of the USSR occupied by Finnish troops, there were 18 partisan detachments and 6 sabotage groups (1698 people).

In the spring of 1943, the Finnish command formed the 6th infantry battalion, consisting of Finnish-speaking residents of the Leningrad region - Ingrians. The battalion was used for construction work on the Karelian Isthmus.
In March 1943, Germany demanded that Finland sign a formal commitment to a military alliance with Germany. The Finnish leadership refused. The German ambassador was recalled from Helsinki.

On March 20, the United States officially offered Finland its assistance in exiting the war against the USSR and the British Empire, but the Finnish side refused.

On May 25, 1943, the Finnish minelayer Ruotsinsalmi sank the Soviet submarine Shch-408.

In the summer of 1943, 14 partisan detachments carried out several deep raids into the interior of Finland. The partisans were given 2 interrelated strategic tasks: destruction of military communications in the front-line zone and disorganization economic life Finnish population. The partisans sought to inflict as much damage as possible on the Finnish economy and sow panic among the civilian population. During the partisan raids, 160 Finnish peasants were killed and 75 seriously wounded. The authorities issued an order for the urgent evacuation of the population from central Finland. Local residents abandoned livestock, agricultural equipment, and property. Haymaking and harvesting in these areas were disrupted in 1943. For security settlements Finnish authorities were forced to allocate military units.

On August 23, 1943, Soviet torpedo boats south of Tiiskeri sank the Finnish minelayer Ruotsinsalmi. Of the 60 crew members, 35 people were saved.

In August 1943, a tank division (Panssaridivisoona) was formed from 2 tank brigades with a total of 150 tanks (mainly captured T-26s), an assault gun brigade equipped with Finnish Bt-42s and German Sturmgeschütz IIIs, a Jaeger brigade and support units. which was headed by Major General Ernst Lagus (Ernst Ruben Lagus).

On September 6, 1943, Finnish torpedo boats sank a Soviet transport barge between Leningrad and Lavensaari. 21 people died.

On February 6, 1944, Soviet aviation bombed Helsinki (910 tons of bombs). 434 buildings were destroyed. 103 city residents were killed and 322 were injured. 5 Soviet bombers were shot down.

Fires in Helsinki caused by bombing. February 1944
On February 16, Soviet aviation bombed Helsinki (440 tons of bombs). 25 city residents died. 4 Soviet bombers shot down.

On February 26, Soviet aviation bombed Helsinki (1067 tons of bombs). 18 city residents died. 18 Soviet bombers were shot down.

On the same day, a Finnish patrol boat was sunk by Soviet aircraft in the Helsinki roadstead.

Women from the Lotta Svärd organization at an aerial surveillance post. 1944

On March 20, the United States offered Finland its mediation in peace negotiations. The Finnish government refused.

On March 21, the evacuation of the Finnish population from Eastern Karelia began. From here, about 3,000 former Soviet citizens were evacuated to the interior of Finland.

In total, up to 200,000 people were evacuated from the front-line zone to the north.

March 25 former ambassador Finland in Stockholm, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, and the special representative of Marshal Mannerheim, Oscar Karlovich Enckell, went to Moscow to negotiate peace with the USSR.

On April 1, 1944, the Finnish delegation returned from Moscow and informed the government of the Soviet conditions for concluding a bilateral peace: the 1940 border, the internment of German units, reparations in the amount of 600 million US dollars over 5 years. During the discussions, the last 2 points were recognized by the Finnish side as technically impracticable.

On April 18, 1944, the Finnish government gave a negative response to the Soviet conditions for concluding a peace treaty.

On May 1, 1944, Germany protested in connection with the Finnish side’s search for a separate peace with the USSR.

At the beginning of June 1944, Germany stopped grain supplies to Finland.

In June 1944, Germany supplied the Finnish army with 15 Pz IVJ tanks and 25,000 Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck anti-tank grenade launchers. The 122nd Wehrmacht Infantry Division was also transferred from Estonia to Vyborg.

June 10, 1944 troops of the Leningrad Front (41 rifle divisions, 5 brigades - 450,000 people, 10,000 guns, 800 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,547 aircraft (not counting naval aviation), the Baltic Fleet group (3 marine brigades, 175 guns, 64 ships, 350 boats, 530 aircraft) and ships of the Ladoga and Onega flotillas (27 ships and 62 boats) began an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finnish army had 15 divisions and 6 brigades (268,000 people, 1930 guns and mortars, 110 tanks and 248 aircraft).

On June 16, Germany transferred 23 Ju-87 dive bombers and 23 FW-190 fighters to Finland.

On the same day, Soviet aircraft (80 aircraft) attacked the Elisenvaara railway station, killing more than 100 civilians (mostly refugees) and injuring more than 300.

From June 20 to 30, Soviet troops launched unsuccessful attacks on the Vyborg-Kuparsaari-Taipele defense line.

On the same day, Soviet troops (3 rifle divisions) unsuccessfully attacked Medvezhyegorsk.

On the same day, Soviet aircraft sank the Finnish torpedo boat Tarmo.

On the same day, the 122nd Wehrmacht Infantry Division stopped the advance of the Soviet 59th Army along the Vyborg Bay.

On the same day in Helsinki, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop concluded an agreement with President Risti Heikko Ryti that Finland would not conduct separate peace negotiations.

On the same day, 42 Stug-40/42 self-propelled artillery units arrived from Germany to Finland.

From June 25 to July 9, 1944, there were fierce battles in the Tali-Ihantala area on the Karelian Isthmus, as a result of which the Red Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Finnish troops. The Red Aria lost 5,500 people killed and 14,500 wounded. The Finnish army lost 1,100 people killed, 6,300 wounded and 1,100 missing.

Finnish infantryman with a German Panzerschreck anti-tank rifle. Summer 1944

By the end of June 1944, the Red Army reached the Soviet-Finnish border of 1941.

From July 1 to July 10, 1944, Soviet troops captured 16 islands of the Bjork archipelago in the Vyborg Bay. The Red Army lost 1,800 people killed, and 31 ships were sunk during the fighting. The Finnish army lost 1,253 people killed, wounded and prisoners, and 30 ships were sunk during the fighting.

On July 2, near Medvezhyegorsk, Soviet troops surrounded the 21st Finnish brigade, but the Finns managed to break through.

On July 9 - 20, Soviet troops unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses of Finnish troops on the Vouksa River - the bridgehead was captured only in the northern sector.

On the same day, the USSR notifies Sweden of its readiness to discuss the terms of an armistice with Finland.

On August 2, in the Ilomantsi area, the Finnish cavalry and 21st rifle brigades surrounded the 176th and 289th Soviet rifle divisions.

On August 4, 1944, Finnish President Risti Heikko Ryti resigned. Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim was elected as the new president.

On August 5, in the Ilomantsi area, the remnants of the 289th Soviet Rifle Division broke out of encirclement.

On August 9, the troops of the Karelian Front, during the offensive, reached the Kudamguba - Kuolisma - Pitkäranta line.

On August 25, Finland announced a severance of relations with Germany and turned to the USSR with a request to resume negotiations.

Finnish delegation to conclude a truce. September 1944

By the end of August 1944, during the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus and in South Karelia, Soviet troops lost 23,674 people killed and 72,701 wounded, 294 tanks and 311 aircraft. Finnish troops lost 18,000 killed and 45,000 wounded.

On September 4, 1944, the Finnish government made a radio announcement that it accepted Soviet preconditions and ceased hostilities along the entire front.

Soviet and Finnish officers after the armistice. September 1944

During the fighting against the USSR from June 28, 1941 to September 4, 1944, the Finnish army lost 58,715 people killed and missing. 3,114 people were captured, of which 997 people died. In total, in 1941 - 1944. About 70,000 Finnish citizens died.

Accurate data on the losses of Soviet troops on the Soviet-Finnish front in 1941 - 1944. no, but in the battles in Karelia in 1941 - 1944. and during the summer offensive of 1944, 90,939 people died on the Karelian Isthmus. 64,000 people were captured in Finnish captivity, of which 18,700 died.

After the end of World War II, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 required Finland to significantly reduce its Armed Forces. Thus, the number of military personnel was to be determined at 34,000 people. Then the tank division was disbanded. Also, until now, the Finnish Navy should not include submarines, torpedo boats and specialized assault ships, and the total tonnage of ships was reduced to 10,000 tons. Military aviation was reduced to 60 aircraft.

In the USSR, Ingrians were greeted with an orchestra. Vyborg, December 1944

55,000 Ingrians voluntarily returned to the USSR, as well as employees of the 3rd and 6th infantry battalions forcibly. The former were sent to settle in various regions of the RSFSR and Kazakhstan, and the latter were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in camps.

Literature:
Finnish Army 1939 - 1945 // Magazine “Soldier at the Front”, 2005, No. 7.

Verigin S.G., Laidinen E.P., Chumakov G.V. USSR and Finland in 1941 - 1944: unexplored aspects of military confrontation // Journal " Russian history", 2009. No. 3. P. 90 - 103.

Yokipia M. Finland on the road to war. Petrozavodsk, 1999.

Meister Yu. War in Eastern European waters 1941 - 1943. M., 1995.

Abbott P., Thomas N., Chappell M. Germany's allies on the Eastern Front 1941 - 1945. M., 2001