The first 10 days of the war. The truth about the first days of the Great Patriotic War

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The myth that in the first days of the war Stalin was afraid of responsibility and fell into “prostration” was officially voiced by N.S. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU and since then has not been refuted by practically anyone and has even been included in textbooks modern history Russia.

The author of this book has destroyed this myth, which has existed for over 50 years. The reader is offered a fascinating history of the origin, formation and “triumphant” march of this myth and the original version of its collapse. Along the way, the author dispelled several more legends and myths that developed around the Great Commander of World War II, including one of the most “recent” ones about how Stalin allegedly prepared to personally host the Victory Parade on June 24, 1945...

Dedicated to the blessed memory of the outstanding sons of Russia: Hero of Socialist Labor, Academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Professor Boris Sergeevich Preobrazhensky and Hero of the Soviet Union, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, without whose evidence about the life and work of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in the first days of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 a real book could not be born.

Chapter 1
ONE OF THE MOST PERSISTENT MYTHS ABOUT THE EVENTS OF THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

A lot has been written about the tragic events of the first days after the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union: the official history of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War, memoirs of direct participants in these events, works of art famous and little-known writers, dissertations, scientific articles, reports of numerous scientific conferences, textbooks of modern history, finally. Just listing all the works would take many pages, and the number of authors who put their efforts into describing these events has long exceeded a hundred. However, to this day there is no complete clarity regarding many of the tragic events of June 1941. If the entire variety of literature about those unforgettable days is assessed from the point of view of the degree of reliability of the facts presented, then it can be divided into two very unequal groups: one group of historians, writers, journalists and simply amateurs persistently formed legends and myths, and the other, at first timidly, but then more thoroughly, she refuted these myths.

One of the most persistent myths is the following: “In the first days of the war, out of fear, Stalin fell into prostration, did not lead the country and even refused to speak on the radio, ordering Molotov to do so.” This myth was born almost eleven years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, along with the report of N.S. Khrushchev “On the cult of personality and its consequences” at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU 1. ("N.S. Khrushchev. Report, at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU on February 24-25, 1956, “On the cult of personality and its consequences.” “Izvestia of the CPSU Central Committee,” 1989, No. 3.)

Another source of the formation of the myth is the memoirs and memories of people from I.V.’s close circle. Stalin, who could directly observe the behavior of the leader in these difficult days for the country, but which can be called witnesses with great stretch, since they appeared decades after the events described, bear the stamp of the subjectivity of the authors and the aberrations of their memory (G.K. Zhukov , A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria, N.G. Kuznetsov, Ya.E. Chadayev). However, to call these sources of the genesis of the myth of “Stalin’s prostration” independent would not be entirely correct, since the fact of “debunking” the cult of Stalin’s personality by Khrushchev could not but affect the behavior of the leader’s former associates when they wrote their memoirs. A striking, one might say classic, example of the opportunistic nature of memoirs is “Memories and Reflections” by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, which for a long time were called perhaps the most objective chronicle of the Great Patriotic War.

It was G.K. Zhukov, who at the beginning of the war held the post of chief General Staff, I had to directly observe I.V. Stalin in his work on making the first historical decisions to organize resistance to the enemy. It was Zhukov, judging by his memoirs, who conveyed to Stalin the terrible news about the beginning of the enemy bombing of Soviet cities, since he had to wake up the leader, who was resting at the Blizhnaya dacha in Kuntsevo. Events developed rapidly; not only every hour, but also every minute was important. Witnesses to the behavior of I.V. Stalin, in the first hours of the outbreak of war, a significant number of people arrived at his Kremlin office on June 22, 1941. However, let's see how freely G.K. Zhukov with these hours and minutes and other facts, which he interpreted in his own way.

Let us note that the entrance and exit of literally all visitors to Stalin’s Kremlin office were recorded by secretaries in a special journal (book), which Zhukov, of course, knew about, but this did not stop him from distorting the facts about the real behavior of those around I.V. Stalin's people.

Thus, in his memoirs he writes: “At 3:30 a.m. (06/22/1941), Chief of Staff of the Western District General V.E. Klimovskikh reported on the German air raid on the cities of Belarus. About three minutes later, the chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General M.A. Purkaev, reported on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine. At 3:40 a.m. the commander of the Baltic Military District, General F.I., called. Kuznetsov, who reported on an enemy air raid on Kaunas and other cities...” What follows is a detailed story about how he ordered to wake up I.V. Stalin, as he gave the command to gather all members of the Politburo in the Kremlin. He further writes that at 4:30 a.m. he and S.K. Tymoshenko arrived in the Kremlin: “All the summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. The People's Commissar and I were invited into the office. I.V. Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding a pipe filled with tobacco in his hands...”(G. Zhukov. “Memories and Reflections.” In 3 vols. M., APN., 1987. T. 2. P. 8-9.)

Now let’s open the register of visitors to I.V.’s Kremlin office. Stalin for June 22, 1941, or rather, the book “At Stalin’s Reception,” published in 2008 by the New Chronograph publishing house, which published the results of registration of visitors from 1924 to February 1953. According to the logbook for registering visitors to Stalin’s office, Zhukov, Timoshenko, members of the Politburo Molotov and Beria, as well as Mehlis entered it at 5:45 a.m. Other members of the Politburo entered Stalin's office much later: Malenkov - at 7:30 a.m., Mikoyan - at 7:55 a.m., Kaganovich and Voroshilov - at 8:00 a.m. But according to Zhukov, a completely different picture emerges: all members of the Politburo (since he claims that Stalin ordered all members of the Politburo to gather) were already assembled at the time Zhukov and Timoshenko arrived in the Kremlin (4 hours 30 minutes). This is the main property of human memory! This is the ability to forget the details of certain events, and especially time parameters.

Since to date no other documentary sources have been found from which it would be possible to restore an objective picture of the situation hourly and minute by hour, the Logbook is the only impartial document from which it is possible to at least partially restore the picture created at the very first moment when the top management the country became aware of Hitler's attack. If you believe Zhukov, then Stalin kept all the members of the Politburo and Timoshenko and Zhukov in the reception room for a whole hour and 15 minutes, while sitting in his office with a pipe full of tobacco. If this had happened, this particular episode would have been etched in the memory of those present, and above all Zhukov himself. Bombing Soviet cities, a massive German offensive was launched, and Stalin knew practically nothing about it and was tormenting people in the waiting room.

Zhukov further claims that all members of the Politburo arrived at 4:30 a.m. and only after Zhukov’s report to Stalin did they enter the office. At the same time, the Logbook states that Timoshenko and Zhukov reported the situation on the fronts not to Stalin personally, but in the presence of Politburo members Molotov and Beria, as well as Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense Mehlis.

We will not believe the marshal’s memories, on which time has left its mark; Stalin could not have acted like that at such a critical moment. In addition, according to the statement of historian V.M. Zhukhrai, Stalin arrived in the Kremlin sick, with a temperature of over 40° C. The leader’s sickly appearance was noticed, and some of those present subsequently noted this in their memoirs, which will be discussed further. Stalin had a very sore throat, he could hardly breathe and could not speak loudly, but according to Zhukov, it turns out that for some reason he sat in his office for more than an hour. One conclusion suggests itself: one must very carefully use eyewitness memories that followed several decades after the events described. Zhukov could not have entered I.V.’s office at 4 o’clock. Stalin on Sunday June 22, 1941. The marshal’s memory failed him, and for some reason he didn’t check his memory with the Visitor Register.

But here are the memories of another witness of that restless night - former driver I.V. Stalin P. Mitrokhin, given in the book by V.M. Zhukhraya “Stalin”: “At 3.30 on June 22, I delivered the car to Stalin at the entrance of the dacha in Kuntsevo. Stalin came out, accompanied by V. Rumyantsev, with a kind of heavy gait, breathing heavily through his nose. Stalin sat down in the folding seat in the car next to me. I began to hear his heavy breathing even more clearly.”(V.M. Zhukhrai. Stalin. M., Perspective, 2007. P. 298.).

This fragment of P. Mitrokhin’s memoirs was reproduced by V.M. Zhukhrai for the sole purpose of confirming the conclusion of Professor B.S. Preobrazhensky about the presence of a serious illness in Stalin. A few pages earlier, in a subsection of the chapter of the seventh book, which is called “Stalin’s Illness,” the professor’s memories of how he was summoned to Stalin’s dacha on the night of June 22 to see the seriously ill leader, who was diagnosed with a severe form of phlegmonous tonsillitis, are described in detail. accompanied by a very high temperature (over 40°C).

So it turns out that, according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, at 3:40 a.m., he was still listening to the report of the commander of the Baltic Military District, General F.I. Kuznetsov, after which, by order of People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko, he began calling I.V.’s dacha. Stalin. However, according to the recollections of another eyewitness, at least ten minutes before this decision was made (to call Stalin, besides, it was still necessary to “throw in” a few minutes for the procedure of waking up the leader), Stalin had already been given a car for the trip to the Kremlin. But what if we assume that G.K. was mistaken? Zhukov and the “wake-up” of the leader occurred somewhere at 3.20-3.25, and the reports of the district leaders took place even earlier? Then it turns out that the road from Kuntsevo to the Kremlin took more than 2 hours. So it was the driver who made a mistake. What is surprising is not that the driver made a mistake by at least an hour, what is surprising is that such an experienced writer and subtle psychologist as V.M. did not notice this discrepancy in time. Zhukhrai, who literally just one page later, without any comment, cites the memoirs of P. Mitrokhin (“...At 3.30 on June 22, he delivered the car to Stalin at the entrance of the dacha in Kuntsevo..”) after a fragment of the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova: “The People's Commissar ordered to call Stalin (after the report of F.I. Kuznetsov, who called the General Staff at 3:40 a.m. - A.K.). I'm calling. Nobody answers the phone. I'm calling continuously. Finally I hear the sleepy voice of the general on duty of the security department.

- Who's talking?

- Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Please urgently connect me with Comrade Stalin.

- What? Now? - The head of security was amazed. - Comrade Stalin is sleeping.

- Wake up immediately: the Germans are bombing our cities!

Silence lasts for several moments. Finally in

They answered the phone in a dull voice:

- Wait.

About three minutes later I.V. approached the device. Stalin.

I reported the situation and asked permission to begin a response fighting. I.V. Stalin is silent. I can only hear his breathing (presumably heavy, as P. Mitrokhin already noted. Such moments are firmly etched in my memory. - A.K.).

- Do you understand me?

Silence again.

Finally I.V. Stalin asked:

- Where is the People's Commissar?

- He speaks on HF with the Kyiv district.

- Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to call all members of the Politburo.".

Zhukov received F.I.’s call. Kuznetsov, according to his recollections, at 3 hours 40 minutes. Considering that ten minutes before this call Zhukov listened to the reports of the chiefs of staff of two military districts, then F.I. Kuznetsov also takes about 5 minutes. This is followed by a report from Zhukov to Timoshenko, a decision to notify Stalin about the current situation, long calls to the dacha, a decision from the half-awake Vlasik, a three-minute pause (Stalin’s wake-up call), a report to Stalin, Stalin’s silence, dialogue with the leader and, finally, a decision. about his departure to the Kremlin - all this took at least 15-20 minutes. That is, Stalin could have given the command for the car to leave no earlier than 4 a.m., if not later.

Considering that the journey from the nearby dacha to the Kremlin took no more than 30 minutes, and the summoned visitors entered Stalin’s office at 5 hours and 45 minutes, the leader could have left Kuntsevo at 5 hours or even at 5 hours and 15 minutes. After this, trust the testimonial memories of eyewitnesses!

Another nuance from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov regarding the convening of “all members of the Politburo.” He emphasizes twice that Stalin summoned all members of the Politburo. However, of all the members at the time Stalin received Zhukov and Timoshenko, only Molotov and Beria arrived. What disobedience! Poskrebyshev was given the command to invite “all members of the Politburo,” and, according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova, at 4:30 a.m. they were already “all” assembled? However, somewhere A.I. was “chilling” for two hours. Mikoyan, 2 hours and 5 minutes of “wooling” with the arrival of L.M. at the emergency meeting. Kaganovich and K.E. Voroshilov. Here we can safely not believe the memories and reflections of G.K. Zhukova. This simply could not happen by definition. This did not work for Stalin, and exactly those officials whom he invited arrived at the appointed time, neither a minute earlier nor a minute later.

It is surprising that Zhukov did not use the data from the journals (notebooks) of registration of persons received by Stalin in his Kremlin office. Of course, at the time of writing the memoirs, these magazines had not yet been published, but for G.K. Zhukov, who wrote essentially the “official” history of the Great Patriotic War, could not have any secrets. In order to confirm the thesis that memories of events that took place many years ago are reliable, it would be nice to back it up with evidence from official documents (the same records about the time of visiting Stalin’s office).

Here is another fragment from the memories and reflections of G.K. Zhukova. So, he writes: “On the evening of June 21, the chief of staff of the Kyiv Military District, Lieutenant General M.A., called me. Purkaev reported that a defector, a German sergeant major, had come to the border guards, claiming that German troops go to the original areas for the offensive, which will begin on the morning of June 22.

I immediately reported to the People's Commissar and I.V. Stalin received what M.A. conveyed. Purkaev.

“Come with the People’s Commissar to the Kremlin,” said I.V. Stalin.

Taking with him the draft directive to the troops, together with the People's Commissar and Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed to achieve a decision to bring the troops into combat readiness at all costs.

I.V. Stalin met us alone. He was clearly concerned.

- Didn’t the German generals plant this defector to provoke a conflict? - he asked.

“No,” answered S.K. Tymoshenko. - We believe that the defector is telling the truth.

Meanwhile, in the office of I.V. Stalin included members of the Politburo. Stalin briefly informed them.

- What do we do? - asked I.V. Stalin.

There was no answer.

“We must immediately give a directive to the troops to bring all troops in the border districts to full combat readiness,” said the People’s Commissar.

- Read! - said I.V. Stalin.

I have read the text of the directive. I.V. Stalin remarked:

- It is premature to give such a directive now, perhaps the issue will still be settled peacefully. It is necessary to give a short directive indicating that the attack can begin with provocative actions by German units. The troops of the border districts should not succumb to any provocations, so as not to cause complications.

Without wasting any time, N.F. and I Vatutin went into another room and quickly drew up a draft directive from the People's Commissar.

Returning to the office, they asked permission to report».

Now let's look at the Visitors' Log for June 21, 1941. The moment Zhukov and Timoshenko entered I.V.’s office. Stalin (20 hours 50 minutes), members of the Politburo V.M. were already there. Molotov (entered at 18:27), K.E. Voroshilov, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov - all three entered the office at 19.05. In addition, Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Safonov (deputy prosecutor general) and Tymoshenko entered with them, who left at 20:15 to re-enter 35 minutes later along with Zhukov and Budyonny. As is clear from the entries in the Journal, N.F. Vatutin did not enter the office at all, and, therefore, did not go out with Zhukov to correct the draft Directive to the troops.

Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria left I.V.’s office. Stalin at 23.00, and Malenkov left at 22.20 along with Budyonny, Timoshenko and Zhukov. But for a short time, for 35 minutes - from 20 hours 15 minutes to 20 hours 50 minutes - Tymoshenko came out, who, it seems, reported to the members of the Politburo on the draft Directive, entering with them into the office of I.V. Stalin at 19 hours 05 minutes ., and he himself went out to correct it (here Zhukov and Vatutin, called by him, could get involved). Has Georgy Konstantinovich got it all wrong?! And if he had this Journal at hand, he would have checked the records and would not have allowed such lapses. Who knows, maybe Zhukov knew about these records, but he was sure that they would forever be stored in the “Special Politburo Folder”, being inaccessible to historians and other researchers of this tragic period for the country.

Why was G.K. necessary? Zhukov should “remember” that he personally read out to Stalin the draft Directive drawn up not by him, but by his deputy N.F. Vatutin, whom he “took” with him just in case. But People's Commissar S.K. Tymoshenko, it turns out, was only present at this. It doesn't happen that way. Stalin clearly observed the principle of subordination and hierarchy. He instructs S.K. to report on the situation. Tymoshenko and report not to him personally, but in the presence of members of the Politburo, who, together with the rapporteur, entered his office at 19:05. The report and its discussion lasted 1 hour 05 minutes (“there was no response” from the members of the Politburo, who, according to G.K. Zhukov, entered I.V. Stalin’s office after Zhukov’s report). It seems that the draft Directive was discussed thoroughly, and the People's Commissar was asked to make appropriate adjustments, which he did, going out into the adjacent room at 20:15 (for some reason, together with G.N. Safonov - Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR from December 15, 1939 .), where Zhukov and Vatutin were already waiting for him. And only after the Directive was finalized did Tymoshenko and Zhukov enter I.V.’s office. Stalin at 20:50. Vatutin did not enter there at all.

The presence of journals (notebooks) of registration of persons received by Stalin in his Kremlin office failed many “researchers” of I.V.’s behavior. Stalin in the first days after the start of the war. Or rather, not the very presence of journals, but the lack of information about their availability, or more precisely, the lack of information about the content of these journals. The publication of journals leaves no stone unturned from the results of numerous “studies” of the supposedly unprecedented behavior of I.V. Stalin in the first days of the war, who “fell into prostration”, withdrew into himself, did not accept anyone, did not take any action to lead the country and its armed forces in critical days for the country, refused to make an appeal to the people, entrusting this to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs case V.M. Molotov. Moreover, according to different “sources”, the period of Stalin’s “prostration” falls on different days, but for all of them during the first ten days after the start of the war.

The exact time of the leader’s absence from the Kremlin due to illness was indicated by V.M. Zhukhrai: “Stalin did not appear in the Kremlin for three days - June 23, 24 and 25, 1941, because I.V. Stalin “lay there, not receiving anyone, without food. He couldn't eat because of an abscess in his throat. These days, no matter who called, they received the same answer: “Comrade Stalin is busy and cannot talk to you.” Further V.M. Zhukhrai writes:

“Even his personal guards did not know about Stalin’s illness. Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not know either. I.V. Stalin decided to keep the fact of his illness in the strictest confidence, so as not to please the enemy and not to demoralize the Soviet people, who pinned all their hopes on him.

One of Stalin’s personal guards, Lozgachev, noted in his memoirs that Stalin, due to illness in the first months of the war, became somewhat haggard and blackened, but later returned to normal. Allegations arose that, according to the records of duty secretaries in Stalin’s reception room, on June 23, 24 and 25, 1941, he visited the Kremlin and even received visitors. Thus, it was indicated that on June 23, 1941, Stalin received Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Timoshenko, Vatutin, Kuznetsov and Zhigarev.

This is probably a false statement."

Let us add on our own behalf: Stalin also received Kaganovich (he entered I.V. Stalin’s office at 4:30 a.m. and left it at 5:20 a.m.). This statement, contrary to the opinion of V.M. Zhukhraya, cannot be wrong, since I.V. Stalin, according to entries in the Visitors' Register, was actively working not only on June 23, 1941, when in addition to the morning reception of 8 people (from 3:20 a.m. to 6:25 a.m.), he received another 13 people during the evening reception (from 6:00 p.m. 45 minutes to 1 hour 25 minutes at night already on June 24th). Intense work continued on the evening of June 24 (from 16:20 to 21:30) and after a short break resumed on June 25, 1941, literally from 1 am to 5:50 am (a total of 20 people were hired that day - June 24) , then during the evening reception from 19:40 to 1:00 am on June 26 (in total, 29 people were received on June 25). So, during three days of Stalin’s “illness,” 70 people were received in the Kremlin office, which took 25 hours of the leader’s working time. If you believe the entries in the Journal, and there is no reason not to believe them, I.V. could not have been “sick” during these three days. Stalin.

But Zhukhrai further writes: “Vyacheslav Molotov, who was Stalin’s first deputy at that time, claims that during these days Stalin was at his dacha in Volynsky and did not appear in the Kremlin.” And one more thing: “People’s Commissar Navy Kuznetsov, who is listed in the records of duty secretaries as having been at a reception with Stalin on June 23, 1941, claims that on June 22, 23, 24 he failed to find Stalin and achieve a meeting with him.” (There is a statement that even within a week. - A.K.).

“It is interesting that none of those on the list of those allegedly present at Stalin’s receptions on June 22, 23, 24, 25, 1941 left any memories of these meetings. All memories of meetings with Stalin begin on June 26, 1941. It is interesting that these days there is not a single resolution, not a single note from Stalin on any document.

And here’s what personal security officer I.V. said. Stalin, Lieutenant Colonel Borisov Mikhail Evdokimovich, who was on duty that day at the gate of the dacha in Volynskoe:

“On June 22, 1941, Stalin returned from the Kremlin late in the evening and did not go anywhere else on June 23, 24 and 25, 1941. No one came to see him either. Only one car passed with the curtains closed, which I was ordered to let through without being checked. Subsequently, I learned that Professor Preobrazhensky, who had been Stalin’s personal physician for a long time, had come.”

This fact is also interesting. Usually, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) after work came to Volynskoye to see Stalin, where they continued to discuss matters during lunches and dinners. There were no such visits on June 23, 24 and 25, 1941. During these days, members of the Politburo did not see Stalin and were therefore at a loss as to what was happening.”

To the above arguments, allegedly substantiating the version of V.M. Zhuhrgya that I.V. Stalin did not receive anyone and did not appear in the Kremlin for three days, we will come back. However, we emphasize once again that there is no reason to consider the entries in the visitor logs during this time as “erroneous”. On the contrary, only thanks to this document can one reasonably reject any lies regarding the behavior of I.V. Stalin in the first days of the war.

There are no other documentary sources except the memories of witnesses!

The significance of journal entries for exposing the lies “about Stalin’s prostration” was first spoken out by retired Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkov in his book “The Kremlin. Bid. General Staff", published in 1995. Yu.A. Gorkov, at that time a consultant at the Historical, Archival and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff, having familiarized himself with the materials published in the magazine " Historical archive"(1994, No. b; 1995, No. 2,3,4,5, b; 1996, No. 2,3,4,5, b; 1997, No. 1) the Journal highly appreciated: “The unique an invaluable source - a register of persons who visited him (Stalin - A.K.) in the Kremlin office, now stored in the archives of the President Russian Federation(former archive of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee)."

In fact, the data from this unique historical document expose lies about the great commander of World War II. Here is how General Gorkov writes about it:

“Let's go back to the first days of the Great Patriotic War. It was around them that the thickest atmosphere of gossip and rumors concentrated. Unfortunately, it has already become a textbook opinion that these days I.V. Stalin, supposedly deeply depressed by the collapse of his offensive doctrine, deceived and humiliated by Hitler, fell into deep apathy, and on June 22 and 23 he was drinking heavily, not taking any part in the affairs of government. So, analysis of the visit log of I.V. Stalin shows that I.V. Stalin had been in his Kremlin office since the early morning of June 22, 1941.".

By the way, in his derogatory criticism of the falsifiers of history and the founders of the myth of “Stalin’s prostration,” the general went a little too far, since it seems no one wrote about Stalin’s “heavy drunkenness” during these days of his mythical solitude. And if he wrote and the general knew about it, then why shouldn’t he say so directly, or rather, point out the source of this rumor.

However, despite the publication of the Visit Log, the flow of false publications to justify the existing myth about Stalin’s incapacity in the first days (first week, first decade) of the war did not stop. On the contrary, some authors managed to use the publication of the Journal to... confirm the myth! The most successful in this was the glamorous pseudo-writer and pseudo-historian E. Radzinsky, who describes the situation that developed in the first hours and days after the start of the war, having not only the data from the Visitors' Log, but also the unpublished memoirs of Y. Chadayev, who was the manager at that time. affairs of the Council of People's Commissars.

Y. Chadayev had access to Stalin’s office, since only he was entrusted with keeping protocol records of all meetings of the Government and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee that took place in his Kremlin office.

Since, as Chadayev states in his memoirs, he “was the only one whom Stalin allowed to write down,” his memoirs, telling about the dramatic beginning of the war, written after Stalin’s death, are of great interest to researchers. It seems to us that it is high time to publish Chadayev’s manuscript, which is still classified and stored in the secret fund of the Archive of the October Revolution. The presence of Y. Chadayev himself in the office of I.V. Stalin was not recorded in the Visitors' Register.

By the way, cited by E. Radzinsky in his two-volume book “Stalin. Life and Death" excerpts from the manuscript of Y. Chadayev indirectly confirm the version of V.M. Zhukhrai that Stalin arrived in the Kremlin on the morning of June 22 seriously ill: “At dawn, members of the Politburo plus Timoshenko and Zhukov were gathered at Stalin’s house. Timoshenko reported: “The German attack should be considered a fait accompli, the enemy bombed the main airfields, ports, large railway communication centers...”. Then Stalin began to speak, he spoke slowly, searching for words, sometimes his voice was interrupted by a spasm.”. Chadayev drew attention to the difficult physical condition of the leader immediately after his arrival in the Kremlin: “He arrived at work after a short nap. He looked tired, tired, sad. His pockmarked face was drawn. He showed a depressed mood. Passing by me, he answered my greeting with a slight movement of his hand.".

In short, there were clear signs of a seriously ill person.

In his memoirs, Y. Chadayev describes in detail the situation associated with Stalin’s absence in the Kremlin for three days, June 28, 29 and 30. Indeed, there are no entries in the Visitor Registration Journal for June 29 and 30, although on June 28 Stalin received visitors from 19:35 to 00:50.

At least the journal records the admission of 21 people. To demonstrate how E. Radzinsky, with the dexterity of an experienced magician, was able to use this gap in the Visitor Registration Register, we will have to cite rather extensive quotes from the memoirs of Y. Chadayev: “On the morning of June 27, members of the Politburo, as usual, gathered at Stalin’s. After the end of the meeting... I left the office and saw through the window how Stalin, Molotov and Beria were getting into the car. After hesitating a little, Poskrebyshev said: “Apparently, the Germans have already taken Minsk.” Soon the government phone rang, and Poskrebyshev explained that Vlasik, the head of Stalin’s security, had called and said that the Boss, as well as Malenkov, Molotov and Beria, were in the People’s Commissariat of Defense. Then Vatutin told me that their appearance... was denied with great bewilderment. The drug addict's workers, seeing Stalin, stopped in a wary daze, unable to comprehend whether they were actually seeing the Leader...

Entering Tymoshenko's office, Stalin immediately said that they had arrived to familiarize themselves on the spot with incoming messages from the fronts and develop additional measures...

Stalin stood silently at the operational map, and it was clear that he was holding back his anger and rage. At a sign from Tymoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin remained in the office.

- Well, what is there near Minsk? Has the situation stabilized?

- I'm not ready to report yet.

- You are obliged to constantly see everything in full view and keep us informed of events, now you are simply afraid to tell us the truth.

Zhukov, still in a nervous state before Stalin’s arrival, flared up:

- Comrade Stalin, allow us to continue our work.

- Maybe we're disturbing you? - Beria interjected.

“You know,” Zhukov said irritably, “the situation at the fronts is critical, the commanders are waiting for instructions from the People’s Commissariat, and therefore it is better if we do it ourselves - the People’s Commissariat and the General Staff.”

Beria “passionately”:

- We can give instructions too.

Zhukov:

- If you can, give it.

“If the party orders it, we’ll give it,” said Beria.

“That’s if he orders it,” Zhukov answered without changing the sharpness of his tone, “but for now the matter has been entrusted to us.”

There was a pause. Zhukov approached Stalin:

- Excuse me for being harsh, Comrade Stalin, we will certainly sort it out, come to the Kremlin and report on the situation.

Stalin looked at Timoshenko.

“Comrade Stalin, we must now first of all think about how to help the fronts, and then inform you,” said Timoshenko.

“You are making a grave mistake by separating yourself from us... We must think together about helping the fronts,” Stalin replied. Then he looked around at the members of the Politburo with a depressing look and said:

- Indeed, let them figure it out themselves first, let's go, comrades.

And then he left the office.

Coming out of the People's Commissariat of Defense, he angrily said: “Lenin created our state, and we screwed it up”...

...On the afternoon of June 27, I went to see Poskrebyshev. The government phone rang, Poskrebyshev answered:

- Comrade Stalin is not here, and I don’t know when he will be.

- Should I call the dacha? - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Lev Mehlis asked as he entered.

“Call me,” Poskrebyshev said.

Mehlis habitually dialed the number of the Near Dacha on the turntable and waited for half a minute. But no one answered.

“It’s not clear,” said Poskrebyshev. - Maybe I came here, but then the security would call me.

We waited a few more minutes. Realizing that there was no point in waiting, we went to Molotov. At this time the phone rang, and Molotov answered someone that he did not know whether Stalin would be in the Kremlin...

The next day I came to Stalin's reception room. But Stalin did not come. Everyone was perplexed - what happened?

The next day I again went to the reception to sign papers. And Poskrebyshev told me immediately and definitely:

- Comrade Stalin does not exist and is unlikely to exist.

- Maybe he went to the front?

- Well, why are you tormenting me! He said: no and there won’t be...

...In the evening I went again with papers to Poskrebyshev - and again. Stalin did not appear. I had accumulated a lot of papers, and since Voznesensky was the first deputy, I asked him to sign. Voznesensky called Molotov, then listened to him for a long time and, hanging up, said:

- Molotov asked to wait one day and asks the Politburo members to meet with him in two hours. So let these documents stay with you...

Voznesensky picked up the turntable, waited a minute and said:

- No one at the dacha answers. It’s unclear, it’s clear that something happened to him at such a difficult moment.”

And again, late in the evening, Chadayev goes to Stalin’s reception room.

“The owner is not here and won’t be here today,” Poskrebyshev said.

- And he wasn’t there yesterday?..

“Yes, and he wasn’t there yesterday,” Poskrebyshev said with some irony...

I assumed that Stalin was ill, but did not dare ask.

And so he didn’t come... Those closest to him were alarmed, to say the least. We all knew then: little time passed without one or another employee being invited to see him. And now the phones are silent, only one thing is known: he is at the Near Dacha, but no one dares to go to him. During these days of his solitude, members of the Politburo gathered at Molotov’s and began to decide what to do? According to the dacha attendants, Stalin was alive and well. But he disconnected from everyone, doesn’t accept anyone, doesn’t approach telephones. The members of the Politburo unanimously decided: everyone should go.”.

Now let's see how E. Radzinsky interpreted this episode with the absence of I.V. Stalin in the Kremlin for three days, which Y. Chadayev writes about.

“So what really happened? - asks the pseudo-researcher and answers his question as follows: - As we have already said, Stalin’s favorite hero was Ivan the Terrible. In his personal library there was a book - “A.N. Tolstoy. "Ivan the Terrible", play. Moscow, 1942."

In the most terrible year of the war, this play was published, and in the midst of defeats he read it. I read carefully - the author’s style was corrected with a sweeping handwriting, and he crossed out lamentations like “ah-ah” from the king’s speech. He wants the formidable king he loves to speak like him, just as dryly and laconicly. Particularly interesting is the cover of the book, apparently written in thought by the Owner. Many times the word “teacher” is written on it. And one more thing - “we will endure.”

We will endure - that's what he was thinking about then. But let’s not forget the word “teacher” that he wrote on the play about the terrible king...

No, this one iron Man I didn’t behave like a nervous young lady. Then, in the People's Commissariat of Defense, having understood the new mood, he drew conclusions: Minsk will fall any day, a German avalanche will roll towards Moscow, and his pathetic slaves will be able to rebel out of fear. And he behaved like Tsar Ivan - a teacher. Ivan the Terrible’s favorite trick is to pretend to be dying, watch how his ill-fated boyars behave, and then rise from his sickbed and brutally punish so that others will be discouraged. Ivan, as is known, also practiced disappearing from the capital, so that the boyars would understand how helpless they were without a king.

And he acts like a teacher. Of course, Poskrebyshev - his “sovereign eye” - and the head of the NKVD Beria know everything and listen to what their comrades say without him.

But the experienced courtier Molotov immediately understood the game - and is afraid to sign important papers. Not signing is proof of loyalty. The owner chose them well: without him, his comrades are “blind kittens,” as he will later call them. Leaving the “boyars” alone, he made them feel their insignificance and understand: without him, the military would sweep them away.

Molotov is in a hurry to arrange a trip for members of the Politburo to the dacha. There, a great actor plays a familiar play - “The Retirement Game”.

Only one other researcher could have come up with such an absurdity, but he puts forward his version carefully, with great doubts, unlike E. Radzinsky. This is an American historian of Russian origin, I. Kurtukov, who believes that at some point on June 29-30, 1941, Stalin actually abdicated power and it is only necessary to establish whether he did this under the influence of depression, in the heat of the moment, or deliberately in order to test his comrades, force them to ask him for a return to power, similar to how Ivan the Terrible forced his boyars to bow to him.

“It is difficult to say whether this was a sincere, impulsive act or a subtle move, calculated precisely for the Politburo to gather and ask him back to power, but the fact clearly took place.”.

The conversation that Stalin allegedly had with the arriving delegation is cited by Y. Chadayev from the words of Bulganin (who himself was not present at the time - Aft.):

“We were all struck then by the sight of Stalin. He looked emaciated, haggard... a sallow face covered with pockmarks... he was gloomy. He said: “Yes, there is no great Lenin... He should have looked at us, to whom he entrusted the fate of the country. There is a stream of letters from Soviet people in which they rightly reproach us: is it really impossible to stop the enemy, to fight back? There are probably some among you who wouldn’t mind shifting the blame, of course, to me.”. (I can imagine the look of his yellow eyes and how his comrades rushed to answer. - Remarque by E. Radzinsky).

Molotov: “Thank you for your frankness, but I declare: if someone tried to direct me against you, I would send this fool to hell... We ask you to return to business, for our part we will actively help”

Stalin: “But still think: can I continue to justify hopes, to bring the country to a victorious end. Maybe there are more worthy candidates?

Voroshilov: “I think I can unanimously express my opinion: there is no one more worthy.”

And finally, E. Radzinsky’s summary: “They beg earnestly. They know: whoever is not diligent is doomed. The game is over: now that once again they themselves begged him to be the Leader, he seems to have been invested with power again by them.

Using the Visitor Registration Log, I check what Chadayev wrote... He was wrong by only one day. On June 28, Stalin was still receiving visitors. But on June 29 and 30 there are no entries in the Journal.

Eureka! This is the discovery of the century! E. Radzinsky positions himself as an exposer of the persistent legend that Stalin, shocked by Hitler’s attack, became confused, fell into prostration, and then, leaving his comrades in the Kremlin in bewilderment, retired to the Near Dacha, taking absolutely no action. No, this is not so, this sage assures:

“I knew his biography (lessons learned in Civil War, when the Bolsheviks, who had lost three-quarters of their territory, were able to win), and all this seemed very strange to me.

But after reading Chadayev’s memoirs, I was able to understand Stalin’s behavior».

Poor Ya. Chadayev! If he had known what a bad joke his memoirs would play after 50 years, he would hardly have started writing them. However, if you look at it soberly, then Ya. Chadayev’s memoirs have nothing to do with it. It is important who will interpret the facts presented in them and for what purpose. Moreover, repeating ourselves, we note that these memoirs should be published as soon as possible, introduced into scientific circulation, so that they can be used not only by evil anti-Stalinists, but also by conscientious researchers interested in the search for truth.

Even from those fragments of Ya. Chadayev’s memoirs cited by E. Radzinsky, the “discovery” allegedly made by E. Radzinsky does not at all follow. He himself claims that he had at hand not only the memoirs of Ya. Chadayev, but also materials from the Register of Visitors to Stalin’s Kremlin Office.

So open these materials and place them next to Ya. Chadayev’s manuscript, and already from the first line of the given fragments of the manuscript you will understand that the author of the manuscript has confused a lot. Let's start with the first sentence: “On the morning of June 27, members of the Politburo, as usual, gathered at Stalin’s. After the end of the meeting... I left the office and saw through the window how Stalin, Molotov and Beria were getting into the car..." From the further narration it follows that the trio headed to the People's Commissariat of Defense, and Malenkov joined them somewhere along the way.

We open the Journal and make sure that there was no morning meeting of Politburo members in Stalin’s office. Stalin's very long stay in the Kremlin was in the afternoon from 16:30 to 2:40 at night or already in the morning of June 28. Perhaps Y. Chadayev was mistaken by a day (as E. Radzinsky claims), and everything he writes about in the above passage happened on June 28? But no! And on June 28, Stalin did not have a morning reception. Again it was only evening from 19:35 to 1:50 at night (already on June 29). During both of these receptions, Stalin worked intensively, receiving 30 people on June 27 and 21 people on June 28.

Yes! The highly respected manager of the Council of People's Commissars made a mistake here. The next two days remain (June 29 and 30), during which Stalin was really absent from the Kremlin, and the Kremlin servants could really gossip on the topic: “What’s wrong with the Master?” This, by the way, follows from the notes of Ya. Chadayev: here is the grinning Poskrebyshev, and Stalin’s all-knowing security. Indeed, Stalin was not in the Kremlin for two days, as eloquently evidenced by the Visitor Registration Log. But this is not yet a reason to doubt Stalin’s capacity, much less to attribute to him insidious plans to pacify disobedient boyars by simulating his departure. Everything that the memoirist described so colorfully - the events that took place in the People's Commissariat of Defense - took place not on June 27, but on June 29, for which there is convincing evidence. So this is also the work of Stalin!

Why should we assume that if Stalin is in the Kremlin, then he is working, and if he is not in his office, then he is sitting unshaven in the Near Dacha and carefully crossing out some lines that he did not like in his reference book “Ivan the Terrible”, that is, in the play by A. N. Tolstoy, released in the midst of the most severe defeats of the Red Army in... 1942?!

According to Radzinsky, this is exactly how it turns out. I saw a gap in the Visitor Registration Log - it means the Owner is on strike, cleaning himself up like Ivan the Terrible! Why not analyze Stalin’s work schedule, which may have developed spontaneously, fortunately, by the time the writer was poring over his killer work, sources for such an analysis were a dime a dozen.

However, he (the sources) had no need for him, he needed to find a crack, where to put his nickel, to find in this ill-fated decade of black days for the country, at least two days, maybe even one day, when the Master tested his servants hard. According to the principle of the well-known saying: “If I don’t eat it, I’ll at least take a bite” (this refers to the question of being able to eat a bucket of apples in one sitting).

So, it turns out that you can’t trust Ya. Chadayev’s memories at all? Why, as we will show a little later, he described the situation with the leader’s three-day absence from the Kremlin office very conscientiously, but only from his point of view. However, since he described not only what he observed with his own eyes, but also heard in the corridors of power with his own ears, it is no wonder that annoying inaccuracies crept into his memoirs, which E. Radzinsky so cleverly took advantage of, like a circus juggler.

But what is valuable in these passages is the refrain of the author’s concern about the state of health of the leader, who throughout the entire period described, from June 22 to June 30, looked like a sick person. “We were all struck then by the sight of Stalin. He looked emaciated, haggard... a sallow face covered with pockmarks... he was gloomy,” this is how Ya. Chadayev describes I.V.’s condition. Stalin according to Bulganin, when members of the Politburo arrived at his Near Dacha on June 30.

Now let’s return to N.S.’s report. Khrushchev at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, in which he stated:

“It would be wrong not to say that after the first severe setbacks and defeats at the front, Stalin believed that the end had come. In one of his conversations these days, he stated:

- What Lenin created, we have lost all of it irrevocably.

After that he for a long time in fact, he did not direct military operations and did not get down to business at all and returned to leadership only when some members of the Politburo came to him and said that such and such measures must be immediately taken in order to improve the situation at the front.

Thus, the terrible danger that loomed over our Motherland in the first period of the war was largely the result of the vicious methods of leading the country and the party on the part of Stalin himself.

But the point is not only the very moment of the start of the war, which seriously disorganized our army and caused us heavy damage. Even after the start of the war, the nervousness and hysteria that Stalin showed during his intervention in military operations caused serious damage to our army.”(N.S. Khrushchev. Report at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU on February 24-25, 1956, “On the cult of personality and its consequences.” “Izvestia of the CPSU Central Committee,” 1989, No. 3).

In his memoirs, Khrushchev repeatedly addressed this topic, “creatively” developing it, while referring to the testimony of those people who directly worked with Stalin, since Khrushchev himself was in Ukraine at that time. So, referring to the memoirs of L.P. Beria, which he allegedly shared with Khrushchev, he writes:

“Beria said the following: when the war began, members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin’s place. I don’t know if it was everyone or just a certain group that most often gathered at Stalin’s. Stalin was morally completely depressed and made the following statement: “The war has begun, it is developing catastrophically. Lenin left us a proletarian Soviet state, and we screwed it up.” That's literally how I put it.

“I,” he said, “resign from leadership,” and left. He left, got into the car and drove to a nearby dacha.”.

This version was picked up by some historians in the West, about which, in particular, R.A. Medvedev writes:

“The story that Stalin fell into a deep depression in the first days of the war and refused to lead the country “for a long time” was first told by N.S. Khrushchev in February 1956 in his secret report “On the Cult of Personality” at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev repeated this story in his “Memoirs,” which his son Sergei recorded on tape in the late 60s. Khrushchev himself was in Kyiv at the beginning of the war; he knew nothing about what was happening in the Kremlin, and in this case referred to Beria’s story.

Khrushchev stated that Stalin did not govern the country for a week. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, many serious historians repeated Khrushchev’s version; it was repeated in almost all biographies of Stalin, including those published in the West.

In a well-illustrated biography of Stalin, published in the United States and England in 1990 and the basis for a television series, Jonathan Lewis and Philip Whitehead, without reference to Khrushchev and Beria, wrote about June 22, 1941: “Stalin was in prostration. During the week he rarely left his villa in Kuntsevo. His name disappeared from the newspapers. For 10 days the Soviet Union had no leader. Only on July 1 did Stalin come to his senses" (J. Lewis, Philip Whitehead. "Stalin". New York, 1990. P. 805)".

So, the period of Stalin’s “incapacity” from 2 days, according to E. Radzinsky, and 3 days, according to Zhukhrai, “grew” into a week, and then into a 10-day period, that is, until July 3, when he spoke on the radio with an appeal to the people.

This vile gossip was widely circulated both among historians of the Second World War and among writers and journalists writing on military topics.

Thus, the famous writer Valentin Pikul reproduced it in the unfinished epic “Stalingrad”, the famous historian General D. Volkogonov had a hand in its dissemination, who concluded that Stalin “felt confusion and uncertainty” from the very first minutes of the war and that “ Stalin had difficulty comprehending the meaning of Zhukov’s words when he informed him about the start of hostilities.

D. Volkogonov also claims that “from June 28 to June 30, Stalin was so depressed and shocked that he was unable to prove himself as a serious leader.” That this is not so is shown above, namely, he deliberated continuously from 16:30 on June 27 to 2:35 on June 28, and then from 19:35 on June 28 to 0:50 on June 29.

On June 29, Stalin was busy preparing a number of important documents, including the “Directives of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in front-line regions.” The draft of this directive was prepared by A.S. Shcherbakov, V.M. Molotov and A.I. Mikoyan. But after the Stalinist edition, the Directive became stricter and more demanding: "Treacherous attack fascist Germany on the Soviet Union continues. The purpose of this attack is the destruction of the Soviet system, the seizure of Soviet lands, the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the plunder of our country, the seizure of our bread and oil, the restoration of the power of the landowners and capitalists.” At the end of the Directive it was said: “In the war imposed on us with Nazi Germany, the question of life and death of the Soviet state is being decided, whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement.”.

The version of Stalin's incapacity during the first week (within 10 days) after the start of the war became widespread and practically became the belief of 3 generations of the majority of Soviet people (Russians). If only this fact, which had already become “historic,” was reported by the head of the party and the Soviet government (N.S. Khrushchev would become Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 2 years after the report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU)! And after all, V. Pikul himself, a popularly beloved writer, described in such detail “Stalin’s insanity” in his “Stalingrad”. And the majority of the military believed General D. Volkogonov.

Finally, this nonsense found its way into textbooks on modern history, and it is being studied in all seriousness by the grandchildren and even great-grandchildren of those who brought liberation from the people of the USSR and many European countries. brown plague under the leadership of I.V. Stalin.

Yes, the authors teaching aid“The Course of Soviet History, 1941-1991”, published in 1999, A.K. Sokolov and B.S. Tyazhelnikov presents schoolchildren and their teachers with the following myth about the crisis of leadership in the USSR at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War:

“The news of the start of the war shocked the leadership in the Kremlin. Stalin, who received information from everywhere about the impending attack, viewed them as provocative, with the goal of dragging the USSR into a military conflict. He did not rule out armed provocations on the border. He knew better than anyone to what extent the country was not ready for a “big war.” Hence the desire to delay it in every possible way and the reluctance to admit that it has broken out after all. Stalin's reaction to the attack by German troops was inadequate. He still expected to limit it to military provocation. Meanwhile, the enormous scale of the invasion became clearer with each passing hour. Stalin fell into prostration and retired to a dacha near Moscow. Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.M. was instructed to announce the beginning of the war. Molotov, who at 12 noon on June 22 spoke on the radio with a message about treacherous attack on the USSR and Nazi Germany. The thesis about the “treacherous attack” clearly came from the leader. They seemed to emphasize that the Soviet Union did not give a reason for war. And how was it possible to announce to the people why a recent friend and ally violated all existing agreements and agreements!

Nevertheless, it became obvious that some action needed to be taken to repel aggression. The mobilization of conscripts 1905-1918 was announced. birth (1919-1922 were already in the army). This made it possible to put an additional 5.3 million people under arms, who were immediately sent to the front, often right into the thick of battle. An Evacuation Council was created to remove the population from combat-torn areas. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command was formed, headed by people's commissar Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko. Stalin actually avoided taking charge of the strategic leadership of the troops. The leader's entourage behaved more decisively. It took the initiative to create an emergency governing body of the country with unlimited powers, which Stalin was asked to head. After some hesitation, the latter was forced to agree. It became clear that it was impossible to escape responsibility and that we had to go to the end together with the country and people. On June 30 it was formed State Committee Defense (GKO)".

So, the myth about Stalin’s inappropriate behavior in the first days of the war has a strong tendency to be preserved in people’s minds as an indisputable truth, and there is every reason to fear that with the current approaches of conscientious researchers to studying its nature and their attempts to refute this myth, the situation is unlikely will change. One should not be deluded by the optimistic conclusion of O. Rubetsky: “Recently, thanks to the efforts of some researchers working on this issue, as well as the publication of Journals recording visits to the office of I.V. Stalin’s myth that Stalin “fell into prostration on the first or second day of the war and retired to a dacha near Moscow,” where he stayed until the beginning of July, was destroyed.”

Although, indeed, according to the materials successfully selected by the author in this article, and his own arguments, it is simply indecent to say that Stalin withdrew from business from June 23 to July 2, that is, for ten whole days.

However, the assertion of Zhukhrai that Stalin was absent from the Kremlin on June 23-25 ​​for health reasons, and Y. Chadayev that Stalin was absent from his Kremlin office for 3 days at the end of the first week of the war (June 28-30) have not been refuted with arguments.

And finally, the sacramental question remained practically unanswered - for what compelling reason did Stalin refuse (or fail) to speak on the radio and address the people on the first day of the war? Any attempts to answer this question look unconvincing, including those by O. Rubetsky himself:

“Why Stalin did not act on the first day at 12 noon, giving this right to Molotov, is understandable - it was not yet clear how the conflict was developing, how wide it was, whether it was a full-scale war or some kind of limited conflict. There were suggestions that the Germans might make some statements or ultimatums. And most importantly, there was reason to believe that the Soviet troops would do to the aggressor what they were charged with - they would deliver a crushing retaliatory blow, transfer the war to enemy territory, and it was possible that in a few days the Germans would ask for a truce. After all, it was precisely confidence in the ability of the Soviet Armed Forces to cope with a surprise attack that was one of the factors (along with the understanding of the incomplete readiness of the troops for a major war and the impossibility, for various reasons, of starting a war with Germany as an aggressor) that gave Stalin reasons to abandon the development preemptive strike against the Germans in 1941".

Such arguments could convince anyone and as many as they wanted, but not a million ordinary people(people), who neither then, at noon on June 22, 1941, nor throughout the war could understand why, in these critical hours for the country, the beloved leader, almost a demigod, did not turn to his people to give them confidence in victory over the enemy . And after the end of the Great Patriotic War, and decades later, everything soviet people who survived in this pitch-black meat grinder, remember what the strongest feelings gripped them at the moment of V.M.’s speech. Molotov. The most important of these feelings, the main question they asked themselves and each other, was “What’s wrong with Stalin?” According to everyone, only two reasons could become an obstacle to his performance: death or serious illness.

But most importantly, Stalin himself knew this very well, that for the common people no other arguments simply existed. Therefore, what?! We will try to answer this question a little later, but now we will focus on justifying the argumentation system for this answer. Without answering this question, you can convince yourself as much as you like that this myth has been dispelled, but at the same time new myths arise, which were mentioned above.

June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Group of Army Group Center Heinz Guderian writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the Brest fortress, which was visible from our observation points, they were changing the guards to the sounds of an orchestra. The coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops."

21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German serviceman who crossed the border Bug River by swimming. The defector was sent to the detachment headquarters in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

23:00. German minelayers stationed in Finnish ports began to mine the exit from Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.

June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier identified himself Alfred Liskov, soldiers of the 221st Regiment of the 15th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht. He said that at dawn on June 22, the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was transferred to higher command.

At the same time, the transmission of Directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts began from Moscow. “During June 22 - 23, 1941, a surprise attack by the Germans on the fronts of LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. An attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. “The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.”

The units were ordered to be put on combat readiness, to secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and to disperse aircraft to field airfields.

Bring the directive to military units before the start of hostilities fails, as a result of which the measures specified in it are not carried out.

“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”

1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm.”

3:05 . A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt roadstead.

3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The fleet's air surveillance, warning and communications system reports the approach of a large number of unknown aircraft from the sea; The fleet is in full combat readiness."

3:10. The NKGB for the Lviv region transmits by telephone message to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.

Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. Moscow, June 23, 1941. Anatoly Garanin/RIA Novosti

From the memoirs of the chief of the 90th border detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “Without finishing the interrogation of the soldier, I heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant’s office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken..."

3:30. Chief of Staff of the Western District General Klimovsky reports on enemy air raids on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.

3:33. The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reports on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

3:40. Commander of the Baltic Military District General Kuznetsov reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.

“The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships was foiled."

3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov is calling Stalin and reports the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Tymoshenko and Zhukov arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is convened.

3:45. The 1st border outpost of the 86th August border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. Outpost personnel under command Alexandra Sivacheva, having entered into battle, destroys the attackers.

4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships was foiled. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”

4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Border Detachment, including the 1st Border Outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, come under heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. Border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.

4:10. The Western and Baltic special military districts report the beginning of hostilities by German troops on the ground.

4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, there is big number killed and wounded.

4:25. The 45th Wehrmacht Infantry Division begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Residents of the capital on June 22, 1941, during the radio announcement of a government message about the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Evgeniy Khaldey/RIA Novosti

“Protecting not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe”

4:30. A meeting of Politburo members begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of a war and does not exclude the possibility of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.

4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.

5:00. German Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenburg presented to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov“Note from the German Foreign Office to the Soviet Government,” which states: “The German Government cannot remain indifferent to the serious threat on the eastern border, therefore the Fuehrer has ordered the German Armed Forces to ward off this threat by all means.” An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.

5:30. On German radio, the Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels reads out the appeal Adolf Hitler to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union: “Now the hour has come when it is necessary to speak out against this conspiracy of the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow... In this moment“The greatest military action in terms of its length and volume that the world has ever seen is taking place... The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the security of Europe and thereby save everyone.”

7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the beginning of hostilities against the USSR: “The German army has invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!”

“The city is burning, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”

7:15. Stalin approves a directive to repel the attack of Nazi Germany: “The troops with all their might and means attack enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.” Transfer of “directive No. 2” due to saboteurs’ disruption of communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the combat zone.

9:30. It was decided that at noon, with an appeal to to the Soviet people In connection with the outbreak of war, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, will speak.

10:00. From the speaker's memories Yuri Levitan: “They’re calling from Minsk: “Enemy planes are over the city,” they’re calling from Kaunas: “The city is burning, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?” “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” A woman’s crying, excitement: “Is it really war?..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

10:30. From a report from the headquarters of the 45th German division about the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are resisting fiercely, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized a defense with infantry units supported by 35–40 tanks and armored vehicles. Enemy sniper fire resulted in heavy casualties among officers and non-commissioned officers."

11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts.

“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"

12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov reads out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: “Today at 4 o’clock in the morning, without making any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed us with our cities - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others - with their planes, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Raids by enemy planes and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the bandit attack and expel German troops from the territory of our homeland... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally our ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader, Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.

13:00. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree “On the mobilization of those liable for military service...”
“Based on Article 49, paragraph “o” of the USSR Constitution, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Baltic special, Western special, Kiev special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North -Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

Those liable for military service who were born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization. The first day of mobilization is June 23, 1941.” Despite the fact that the first day of mobilization is June 23, recruiting stations at military registration and enlistment offices begin to operate by the middle of the day on June 22.

13:30. Chief of the General Staff General Zhukov flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the Main Command on the Southwestern Front.

June 22, 1945 meeting of the Normandy-Niemen regiment at Le Bourget airfield (France). From left to right: engineer-captain Nikolai Filippov, major Pierre Matras, engineer-major Sergei Agavelyan, captain De Saint-Marceau Gaston and others. Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. RIA Novosti/RIA Novosti

14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blocked in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.

14:05. Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano states: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops entered Soviet territory.”

14:10. The 1st border outpost of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded commander of the outpost continued to command the battle.

15:00. From the notes of the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a systematic withdrawal remains open. There is now plenty of evidence both for and against this.

What is surprising is that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Heavy artillery fire is conducted only in the northwest of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air Force have an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation."

Of the 485 border posts attacked, not a single one withdrew without orders.

16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis took the positions of the 1st border outpost. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev was one of hundreds committed by border guards in the first hours and days of the war. On June 22, 1941, the state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of which were attacked on the very first day of the war. Not one of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.

Hitler's command allotted 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet border posts held their defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outpost. Forty-five outposts fought for up to two months.

06/22/1941 Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The workers of Leningrad listen to a message about the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Boris Losin/RIA Novosti

Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.

17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for weeks.

“The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland”

18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the believers with a message: “Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all kinds of agreements and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. She endured trials with him and was consoled by his successes. She will not abandon her people even now... The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland.”

19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff ground forces Wehrmacht Colonel General Franz Halder: “All armies, except the 11th Army of Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, came as a complete tactical surprise to the enemy along the entire front. Border bridges across the Bug and other rivers were everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in a barracks arrangement, the planes were parked at airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken off without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.”

20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, prescribing Soviet troops go on a counteroffensive with the task of defeating Nazi troops on the territory of the USSR with further advance into enemy territory. The directive ordered the capture of the Polish city of Lublin by the end of June 24.

06/22/1941 Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. June 22, 1941 Nurses provide assistance to the first wounded after a Nazi air raid near Chisinau. Georgy Zelma/RIA Novosti

“We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can.”

21:00. Summary of the Red Army High Command for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Kristinopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and occupy the towns of Kalwaria, Stoyanuv and Tsekhanovets (the first two are 15 km and the last 10 km from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere it met decisive resistance from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy aircraft.”

23:00. Message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o'clock this morning Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before had generously lavished his assurances on the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were at war...

No one has been more staunchly opposed to communism over the past 25 years than I have been. I will not take back a single word that was said about him. But all this pales in comparison to the spectacle unfolding now.

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers as they stand on the border native land and guard the fields which their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see them guarding their homes; their mothers and wives pray - oh, yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, patron, their protectors...

We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to pursue a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.”

June 22 came to an end. There were still 1417 days ahead terrible war in the history of mankind.

Let's mark with dotted lines, with strokes, some seemingly insignificant episodes, which, when put together, even then signified our future Victory.

In the sky above the Brest Fortress

Memorial plaque in the Brest Fortress

The 45th German Division fought at Brest in full force until July 1, 1941. The Brest Fortress, which was the first to take the blow, did not give up. Then, two assault battalions, reinforced with artillery, were left against a handful of our fighters, surrounded on all sides and deprived of water and food.

The revival of Russia began with it.

300 years later, in 1941, Smolensk again stood as an unbreakable wall on the path of foreign troops. The Battle of Smolensk began on July 10, 1941. It was a large residential city. There was no defensive line prepared there. Already both the “Molotov Line” and the “Stalin Line” are deep behind German lines. The road to Moscow is open. Hitler knew this, and planned to take Smolensk on the move, in 12 days. But this battle lasted two months.

Battle for Smolensk

It was there, near Smolensk, that “Operation Barbarossa” finally collapsed.

We continue - with dotted lines, strokes...

Already on July 14, we used rocket artillery for the first time. “07/14/1941 at 15:15 the battery of captain I. A. Flerov struck the Orsha railway junction, where German wagons with ammunition and tanks with fuel were parked..... The enemy suffered heavy losses, and panic arose in its ranks. Those of the Nazis who survived were taken prisoner. Soviet soldiers affectionately called this miracle weapon “Katyusha”, and German soldiers nicknamed it “Stalin’s organ” (Stalinorgel).

Aviation was increasingly used to destroy German tanks. She inflicted blows with special thermite balls and bottles with a flammable mixture.

On August 30–31, our pilots destroyed more than 100 tanks. At the same time, 8 enemy airfields were subjected to air strikes, where 57 aircraft were destroyed. So we weren’t the only ones losing planes on the ground at the beginning of the war.

On August 11, the Chief of the German General Staff, Franz Halder, wrote in his diary: “The general situation shows more and more clearly that the colossus of Russia ... was underestimated by us.”

Yelnya

We achieved our first significant success near Yelnya, where the 24th Army spent from August 30 to September 8 offensive operation. The plan of the then General Georgy Zhukov was based on a classic two-way envelopment with the encirclement and defeat of the Germans in parts.

At 7 o'clock in the morning, about 800 guns, mortars and rocket launchers rained down a barrage of fire on the enemy. After four days of stubborn resistance, the enemy began to retreat under the threat of encirclement. On September 6, Yelnya was liberated. On September 8, the Elninsky ledge, which jutted into our defenses, was cut off. Five German divisions lost 45 thousand people in a week of fighting on one sector of the front.

Now - I ask for a moment of attention.

During the defeat of France and its entire army, during the defeat of the British expeditionary forces in France, and the capture of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, the German army lost 45,774 killed. That is, the total German losses in a week near Yelnya in September 1941 are comparable to the losses for a whole year (!) of the war in Europe. “Here, near Yelnya, the Soviet Guard was born. The first four rifle divisions (100, 127, 153 and 161st), which especially distinguished themselves in battle, were awarded the title “Guards”.

And all this too - 1941.

The price of first successes

Near Smolensk, our irretrievable losses amounted to 486,171 people, and sanitary losses - 273,803 people. Scary numbers. But the Germans’ tank divisions also lost half of their personnel and vehicles, with total losses amounting to about half a million people. Here for the first time - already in the first months of the war - we began to reach parity in losses.

Who was the last defender of the Brest Fortress?

These people deserve the greatest admiration.

COLONEL GENERAL GUDERIAN

ABOUT THE DEFENDERS OF THE BREST FORTRESS

Museum of the Defense of the Brest Fortress

This book cannot limit itself to one episode with a ram in the sky over the Brest Fortress. Its defense is like a tuning fork: the Brest Fortress set the heroic tone of the entire Great Patriotic War. And even though we only became aware of the defenders’ feat after the war, the Germans knew. They knew their fate.

It would seem: how can ancient fortifications of the century before last protect against weapons of the 20th century - tanks, airplanes, flamethrowers, asphyxiating gases (and they were also used against the defenders of the fortress)?

The fortifications of Brest looked impressive, but only externally. By the way, one of the designers of the “modernization” of the forts in 1913 was the tsarist officer Dmitry Karbyshev - the same indomitable General Karbyshev, whom the Germans, together with other prisoners of the Mauthausen concentration camp, would turn into an ice block in the cold in February 1945.

The Brest Fortress attracts amazing coincidences: in a camp for Soviet prisoners of war, General Karbyshev became close to the same Major Pyotr Gavrilov, who from June 22, 1941 led the defense of the fortress. On July 23 (I repeat – JULY) Gavrilov was taken prisoner, seriously wounded. Not a week later, not ten days later - a month and one day after the start of the war. By some miracle, Major Gavrilov survived in German captivity. After his release, he was reinstated in rank and taken back into service. And in 1957, when the whole country learned about Brest’s feat, Gavrilov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The earthen rampart of Brest with casemates, in principle, created some opportunities for defense. In 1939, the Poles also did not surrender immediately. They heroically defended the fortress from the armored corps of General Guderian for three days. On September 14 and 16, seven attacks were repelled. And they left the fortress only on the night of September 17: the forces were unequal, there were only 2–2.5 thousand Poles. At dawn the Germans entered it. They did not stay in Brest and soon handed it over to our troops. By the way, it was there that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed in 1918 – with the same Germans.

Guderian in his memoirs, however, does not praise the Poles, focusing more on the chaos in the German units. “On September 14... I quickly began the march to Brest in order to use surprise to achieve success... An attempt to take this citadel with a sudden attack by tanks failed only because the Poles placed an old Renault tank at the entrance gate, which prevented our tanks from breaking into the city... The 20th Motorized Division and the 10th Tank Division launched a joint attack on the citadel on September 16. They stormed the crest of the rampart, but the attack floundered because the infantry regiment... did not follow the order to advance directly behind the artillery barrage. When the regiment, to whose advanced units I immediately went, belatedly and without orders again launched an attack, it, unfortunately, suffered heavy losses without achieving success. My adjutant... tried to stop the fire that the units advancing from behind were firing at their own advanced units, but was shot down by a Polish sniper.”

So, the fortifications of the fortress allowed the Poles to hold out for three days - this is known. Alas, we do not know exactly how many days our defenders of the fortress held out. More precisely, how many weeks, months.

We do not know the name of the man who scratched on the wall with a bayonet: “I am dying, but I am not giving up. Goodbye, Motherland. 20.VII.41.” He didn't sign up.

July 20... This means that this soldier had been fighting in the dungeons of the Brest Fortress for a month, practically without food or ammunition. Our soldiers had canned food and ammunition, but no water at all. The Germans quickly realized this and blocked access from the ruins of the fortress to the river. They waited until the last defenders, who dug into the ground among the mountains of corpses decomposed in the heat, simply died of thirst. Despite this, only the organized defense of the fortress, by some miracle, continued until August 1941. But for a long time afterwards the Germans were afraid to approach the dungeons. Like zombies rising from hell, black shadows rose from there at night, and machine gun fire sounded. According to German sources, the last pockets of resistance in Brest were suppressed only in September. When Kyiv and Smolensk had already fallen. There are other legends. The North Caucasian press published a story about how, already in late autumn, at the moment when the SS men were lined up on the parade ground to be awarded for their next “feats”...

“...A tall, fit Red Army officer emerged from the underground casemates of the fortress. He was blind... and walked with his left arm outstretched. His right hand lay on the holster of his pistol, he was in a torn uniform, but walked with his head held high, moving (by touch) along the parade ground. Unexpectedly for everyone, the German general suddenly clearly saluted the Soviet officer, the last defender of the Brest Fortress, followed by all the officers of the German division. The Red Army officer took a pistol from his holster and shot himself in the temple. When they checked his documents - party and military cards - they found out that he was a native of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a senior lieutenant of the border troops.”

Last name: Barkhanoev. She is not among those whose names are immortalized on the plates memorial complex"Brest Hero Fortress". There are no names of 3/4 of the defenders, who forever remained Unknown Soldiers. But there really are quite a lot of other Caucasian – including Vainakh – surnames. So it's a good legend, correct. It goes around on the Internet under the name “ The Last Defender Brest Fortress". However, this is not entirely accurate; this hero was not the last defender.

The writer Sergei Smirnov, thanks to whom we learned about the feat of the heroes of Brest, for many years tried to find out who was the last, or the last. One of the chapters of his famous book, awarded the Lenin Prize, is called “The Last”. Smirnov recorded the amazing story of the Jewish violinist Stavsky, who was later shot in the ghetto. This story was given by Sergeant Major Durasov, who himself was wounded near Brest, was captured and remained in the work team at the German hospital.

“Once,” Durasov recalls, in April 1942, “the violinist was two hours late for work and, when he arrived, he excitedly told his comrades what had happened to him. The Germans stopped him on the road and took him to the fortress. There, among the ruins, a wide hole was punched in the ground, going somewhere deep down. A group of German soldiers stood around her with machine guns at the ready.

- Get down there! - the officer ordered the violinist. – There, in the dungeon, one Russian is still hiding. He doesn't want to give up and shoots back. You must persuade him to go upstairs and lay down his arms - we promise to spare his life.

When the violinist came down, a shot rang out in the darkness.

“Don’t be afraid, come here,” said the unknown man. “I just shot into the air.” This was my last cartridge. I myself decided to go out - my food supply had long since run out. Come and help me...

When they somehow climbed up, the last of his strength left the stranger, and he, closing his eyes, sank exhaustedly onto the stones of the ruins. The Nazis, standing in a semicircle, silently looked at him with curiosity. In front of them sat an incredibly emaciated man, covered with thick stubble, whose age was impossible to determine. It was also impossible to guess whether he was a fighter or a commander - all his clothes hung in rags.

Apparently, not wanting to show his weakness to his enemies, the unknown man made an effort to get up, but immediately fell on the stones. The officer gave the order, and the soldiers placed an open can of canned food and cookies in front of him, but he did not touch anything. Then the officer asked him if there were still Russians there, in the dungeon.

“No,” answered the unknown person. – I was alone, and I went out only to see with my own eyes your powerlessness here, here, in Russia...

By order of the officer, the musician translated these words of the prisoner to him.

And then the officer, turning to his soldiers, said:

- This person - a real hero. Learn from him how to defend your land..."

This was in April 1942. The name and fate of the hero remained unknown.

The Brest Fortress was founded, to put it modern language, one of the main algorithms of that war. Its defenders could have been killed. It was possible to be captured. But it was impossible to defeat them.

Time after time, the destroyed centers of resistance came to life again and the next day they were snarled by fire, and after the next report on the “final” clearing of the fortress, the German military cemetery in its vicinity continued to expand. When Major Gavrilov led the defense on June 24, he had 400 fighters.

Slightly more than that of the Spartan king Leonidas, who immortalized himself over the centuries.

From the inscriptions on the slabs of the Brest Fortress memorial:

SHUMKOV Alexander Ivanovich

R. in 1913 in the city of Konstantinovka, Donetsk region, in the Red Army from 1939, graduated from junior courses. lieutenants, lieutenant, commander of the 9th rifle company

SHUMKOVA Lyubov Sergeevna

R. in 1919 in the village of Romanovo, Lebedyansky district, Lipetsk region, the wife of Lieutenant A.I. Shumkov, commander of the 9th rifle company of the 84th joint venture, died on June 22, 1941.

SHUMKOVA Svetlana Aleksandrovna,

Moscow Anabasis of the gallant General Blumentritt

If I take Kyiv, I will take Russia by the feet; if I take Petersburg, I will take her by the head; Having occupied Moscow, I will strike her in the heart.

Napoleon I

It is clear that in the reports of the Sovinformburo our people praised themselves. How else? We need to maintain morale. It’s not a good idea to sprinkle ashes on your head... But the fact is that the Germans praised us no less!

True, this became clear after the war, when the diaries of Hitler’s generals were published. If a German military leader had said this out loud while unsuccessfully storming or retreating from Moscow, he would have been stripped of his orders and rank and shot in front of the line. The Wehrmacht also did not stand on ceremony with this.

In 1946–48, the Americans tried to find out from prisoners German generals, what is the secret of the invincibility of the Russian army. These battered warriors were not suitable for the role of Malchish-Kibalchish, and they answered questions honestly. As a result of these interviews, or interrogation reports, the book “Fatal Decisions of the Wehrmacht” appeared, which the American editor presented quite frankly: “We Americans must benefit from the unsuccessful experiences of others.”

One of those who was forced to talk about their defeats was the chief of staff of the 4th Wehrmacht Army, General Gunther Blumentritt1. Surprisingly, this fascist speaks much more positively about the enemy - the Russians - than some of our own “liberal” publicists do today. Although in some places its purely European denseness even evokes tenderness - and yet the second war was fought by a man against us. In general, very interesting Russia obtained by General Blumentritt.

“Close communication with nature allows Russians to move freely at night in the fog, through forests and swamps. They are not afraid of the dark, endless forests and cold. They are no stranger to winter, when the temperature drops to minus 45. The Siberian, who can be partially or even fully considered Asian, is even more resilient, even stronger... We already experienced this ourselves during the First World War, when we had to face the Siberian Army Corps "

Yes, the Siberians, who came to the aid of Moscow, managed to impress the polished German officer. Immediately he remembered us and all the past...

“For a European, accustomed to small territories, the distances in the East seem endless... The horror is intensified by the melancholic, monotonous nature of the Russian landscape, which has a depressing effect, especially in the gloomy autumn and painfully long winter. The psychological influence of this country on the average German soldier was very strong. He felt insignificant, lost in these endless spaces.”

This is how it turns out. We saw the Krauts as monsters, stranglers, destroyers of people. But it turns out that their subtle mental organization suffered from the vastness of the Russian expanses... They had to act according to Freud - through force to squeeze out of themselves their psychological European complexes on this oppressive boundless land. Burn, shoot, rape. And why did such subtle natures bother with us? But the characteristic, you see, is interesting. You can't come up with something like this on purpose. In short, Blumentritt doesn’t like our nature, but he values ​​the Russian soldier highly, based on his own bitter experience of two wars.

“The Russian soldier prefers hand-to-hand combat. His ability to endure hardship without flinching is truly amazing. This is the Russian soldier whom we came to know and respect a quarter of a century ago.”

Are you filled with respect? That’s why they shot prisoners right on the march, throwing the corpses on the side of the road. Or were they afraid and therefore committed atrocities? No, we, Slavic subhumans, cannot understand the subtleties of the enemy’s mental organization. What follows is even more interesting. It turns out that the Germans did not know our defense potential! Secrecy was well established in the pre-war USSR, which the intelligentsia considered a stupid spy mania. Let me emphasize that these memories do not refer to the spring of 1945, when we stood on the outskirts of Berlin, but to the autumn of 1941, when the Germans advanced to Moscow.

“It was very difficult for us to get a clear picture of the equipment of the Red Army... Hitler refused to believe that Soviet industrial production could be equal to German. We had little information regarding Russian tanks. We had no idea how many tanks Russian industry was capable of producing per month. It was difficult to even get maps, since the Russians kept them a great secret. The maps we had were often incorrect and misleading.

We also did not have accurate data about the combat power of the Russian army. Those of us who fought in Russia during the First World War thought it was great, and those who did not know the new enemy tended to underestimate it.”

There were, as it turns out, cool heads at the top of the German generals. And they decided to speak out - while the war had not yet begun.

“Field Marshal von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South and, after Field Marshal von Manstein, our most talented commander during the Second World War, said the following about the approaching war in May 1941:

“The war with Russia is a senseless undertaking, which, in my opinion, cannot have a happy ending. But if, for political reasons, war is inevitable, we must agree that it cannot be won during the summer campaign alone.”

But then the war began - and the Germans were at a loss. Not Europe, gentlemen, this is not Europe at all for you. Yes, we are Scythians...

“The behavior of the Russian troops, even in the first battles, was in striking contrast with the behavior of the Poles and Western allies in defeat. Even surrounded, the Russians continued stubborn fighting. Where there were no roads, the Russians remained inaccessible in most cases. They always tried to break through to the east... Our encirclement of the Russians was rarely successful.”

The war continued and presented more and more unpleasant surprises.

“From Field Marshal von Bock to the soldier, everyone hoped that soon we would be marching through the streets of the Russian capital. Hitler even created a special sapper team that was supposed to destroy the Kremlin.

When we came close to Moscow, the mood of our commanders and troops suddenly changed dramatically. We discovered with surprise and disappointment in October and early November that the defeated Russians had not ceased to exist at all. military force. Over the past weeks, enemy resistance has intensified, and the tension of the fighting increased every day ... "

Blumentritt hardly read “War and Peace” and about the club people's war he, of course, didn't hear. But he constantly dwells on Napoleon’s fate in his memoirs. No, comparing Hitler with Bonaparte was not a naked invention of Soviet propaganda. The Germans themselves thought so.

“Deep in our rear, in vast forested and swampy areas, the first partisan detachments… They attacked transport convoys and supply trains, forcing our troops at the front to endure great hardships. Memories of Great Army Napoleon haunted us like a ghost. The book of memoirs of Napoleonic General Caulaincourt, which always lay on Field Marshal von Kluge’s desk, became his bible. There were more and more coincidences with the events of 1812.”

More and more coincidences? What did you want? Second Patriotic War!

But the episode with the French again attacking Moscow in 1941 seems absolutely amazing, as if invented by an inventive screenwriter. However, no, this is not science fiction, but the authentic memoirs of a Wehrmacht general.

“The four battalions of French volunteers operating as part of the 4th Army turned out to be less resilient. Field Marshal von Kluge addressed them with a speech, recalling how, during the time of Napoleon, the French and Germans fought here side by side against a common enemy. The next day, the French boldly went into battle, but, unfortunately, they could not withstand either the enemy’s powerful counterattack or the severe frost and blizzard. They had never had to endure such trials before. The French legion was defeated... A few days later it was withdrawn to the rear and sent to the West.”

Battle on the Borodino field. Autumn 1941

If I were writing a movie script from the era Napoleonic wars, then I would give up on strict adherence to historical truth and insert this episode with the French legion, in the gray uniform of the Wehrmacht, dying on the snowy field of Borodino. There would be truth here on a different level – artistic.

“And suddenly a new, no less unpleasant surprise befell us. During the battle for Vyazma, the first Russian T-34 tanks appeared... As a result, our infantrymen found themselves completely defenseless. At least a 75 mm gun was required, but it had yet to be created. In the Vereya area, T-34 tanks, as if nothing had happened, passed through the battle formations of the 7th Infantry Division, reached artillery positions and literally crushed the guns located there.”

He trampled them right into the dirt

It’s not enough to kill a Russian soldier, he must also be knocked down!

Frederick II the Great

But maybe this same Blumentritt was a renegade in the Wehrmacht, a kind of moral monster, despite his high position? Maybe he was the only one among the German militarists who paid tribute to the enemy? Not really.

Here is a book with the catchy title “1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron ones” by Briton Robert Kershaw. It is based on a series of interviews with surviving veterans of the campaign against Russia. These are the most ordinary soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht. “The Russians don’t give up. An explosion, another, everything is quiet for a minute, and then they open fire again..."

“We watched the Russians in amazement. They didn’t seem to care that their main forces were defeated..."

“Loaves of bread had to be chopped with an axe. A few lucky people managed to acquire Russian uniforms...” “My God, what are these Russians planning to do to us? We’ll all die here!..” However, maybe this too - truth in the trenches, but those who led the invasion and saw, so to speak, the whole picture in volume, have a different opinion? In the memoirs of German military leaders - and this is a huge literature - there is, of course, a lot of narcissism, attempts to justify themselves, to explain themselves to their descendants. Nevertheless, all military generals as one give credit to the Russians - starting from the first days of the war.

Colonel General (later Field Marshal) von Kleist, in the summer of 41 - commander of the 1st Panzer Group, which was advancing in Ukraine:

“The Russians showed themselves to be first-class warriors from the very beginning, and our successes in the first months of the war were simply due to better training. Having gained combat experience, they became first-class soldiers. They fought with exceptional tenacity and had amazing endurance..."

General von Manstein (also a future field marshal):

“It often happened that Soviet soldiers raised their hands to show that they were surrendering to us, and after our infantrymen approached them, they again resorted to weapons; or the wounded man feigned death, and then shot at our soldiers from the rear.”

Diary of General Halder (1941):

“It should be noted the tenacity of individual Russian formations in battle. There have been cases when garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.” (Record dated June 24.) “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere until last person... It is striking that when artillery batteries are captured, etc., few surrender.” (June 29.) “The fighting with the Russians is extremely stubborn. Only a small number of prisoners were captured." (4th of July.)

Field Marshal Brauchitsch (July 1941):

“The uniqueness of the country and the unique character of the Russians gives the campaign a special specificity. The first serious opponent."

I will add that for the Nazis he was the last. In general, everything is clear and quite obvious. But in order to finish with the Germans, I will give the entire story described by the commander of the 41st Wehrmacht Panzer Corps, General Reinhart. About how the Germans first saw the Soviet KV heavy tank. I think the story is amazing.

“About a hundred of our tanks, of which about a third were T-IVs, took up their starting positions for a counterattack. From three sides we fired at the Russian iron monsters, but everything was in vain... The Russian giants, echeloned along the front and in depth, came closer and closer. One of them approached our tank, hopelessly stuck in a swampy pond. Without any hesitation, the black monster drove over the tank and crushed it into the mud with its tracks. At this moment a 150 mm howitzer arrived. While the artillery commander warned of the approach of enemy tanks, the gun opened fire, but again to no avail.

One of the Soviet tanks came within 100 meters of the howitzer. The gunners opened fire on him with direct fire and scored a hit - it was like being struck by lightning. The tank stopped. “We knocked him out,” the artillerymen sighed with relief. Suddenly, someone from the gun crew screamed heart-rendingly: “He’s gone again!” Indeed, the tank came to life and began to approach the gun. Another minute, and the shiny metal tracks of the tank slammed the howitzer into the ground like a toy. Having dealt with the gun, the tank continued its journey as if nothing had happened.”

So where are we going? To Sebezh? To Idritsa? Luckily for us, it rained for the whole day. It was possible to take a break from the air robbers who were hunting for literally every car. It will emerge in low-level flight from behind the treetops and there will be fire from all the side trunks. From cannons, machine guns. Of course, everyone in the car jumps out and rushes into the ditch; the driver either abandons the car on the road or jerks it into the forest. If a car left on the road does not immediately catch fire, the fascist plane makes a second or third pass to set it on fire. And at the same time it scatters small fragmentation bombs on both sides of the road. The calculation is precise - whoever will survive after such a scrape is already morally depressed, the front-line roads are paralyzed. And not only roads - the enemy bombed groves, forests, bombed everywhere where he expected our military units to be concentrated, not to mention massive air strikes on cities, airfields, and crossings.

In the first days of the war, we became acquainted with the Ju-87 dive bombers. A single-engine monoplane with predatory curved wings, designed for targeted bombing, for striking bridges, railway junctions, and for processing the enemy’s leading edge. Ju-87 carried out rampages on the roads of Belgium and France, terrifying refugees, and bombed Warsaw. Their attack really made a depressing impression. They walked at an altitude of about one and a half thousand meters, in a chain of up to thirty vehicles. Here the front one, swinging its wing, falls into a sheer drop, with the roar of the engine intensifying with each second. The howl grows, drills into the brain, bites into every nerve. Now a bomb is released from under the belly, the plane comes out of its dive, and the bomb, equipped with sirens, rushes towards the ground, ending the terrifying howl with a thunderous explosion. Meanwhile, the next one falls into a dive, with the same roar. Comes out of a dive so low that you can see the pilot's face. Having been bombed, everyone fits into the tail of the chain in order to dive again when it comes to his turn in this devilish carousel. The main task of the attack is to sow panic and suppress mentally. The Soviet soldier got used to everything, and also adapted to the attacks of the Yu-87. A good, securely dug gap and - let the sirens buzz in the sky, let the bombs lie nearby, as long as there is not a direct hit.

We drove in the pouring rain to Osveya to look for the headquarters of the 112th division. We stopped in Sebezh. Sebezh and Bigosovo were once border points with bourgeois Latvia.

At the military telephone center in Sebezh we were told that in the morning the Germans bombed Idritsa. According to unverified information - however, there was little verified information these days - Lelyushenko's tank brigade is fighting in the Idritsa area. Let's take down our tanks in battle! How many times have we filmed the formidable armadas of our tanks marching across Red Square?

After the end of the war, I returned to Moscow from Berlin by car. On the outskirts of the roads on the way from Brest to Minsk, I saw many of our T-26s, which had been stationed there since the first days of the fascist invasion.

I remember being struck by the brightness of the green paint. As if freshly painted, they stood there for four years, growing into the ground, paralyzed by the enemy. The paint passed the test. And the armor on tanks, which were a formidable weapon in Spain in 1937, turned out to be vulnerable in 1941. Then the mighty T-34s were just beginning to roll off the production lines, crushing the Nazis near Moscow, in Stalingrad, on the fields of Belarus, Ukraine, East Prussia, and in Berlin.

July 9, 1941, 18th day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group “South”: The 11th Army is gradually drawing up its forces to the Dniester and is preparing to cross it in the Mogilev-Podolsk region. The balance of forces is as follows: in front of the front of the 30th Army Corps (five German and three

July 10, 1941, 19th day of the war, the Finns are advancing. 00.13 – The Commander-in-Chief called me by phone. The Fuhrer contacted him once again and expressed extreme concern that the tank divisions would be sent to Kyiv and suffer useless losses (in Kyiv - 35% of the population are Jews; all bridges for us

July 11, 1941, 20th day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group South: Russian attacks on the right flank of Schobert's army (11th Army) apparently caused a significant weakening of the Romanian formations. The command of the 11th Army reports that it considers these formations incapable of

July 14, 1941, 23rd day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group “South”: The enemy launched a very strong counterattack against the northern flank of the army group in the Zvyagel area, and in some areas he even managed to advance. This attack forced us to bring the 25th into battle.

July 15, 1941, 24th day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group South: The 11th Army has driven back the enemy on its right flank, but it still continues to resist south of the Dniester. The 17th Army wedged itself into Stalin's line. The enemy is undertaking fierce

July 24, 1941, 33rd day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group South: The situation at the front of the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions is deteriorating. These divisions are too weak to hold back the onslaught of large enemy forces retreating in front of the front of Schwedler's group and the 17th Army. Strengthening them through

July 25, 1941, 34th day of the war Situation at the front: At the front of Army Group “South”: Some advance of our troops was noted on the northern flank and in the area south of Kyiv. On the southern flank of the 1st Panzer Group the situation continues to remain somewhat tense. All in all

July 26, 1941, 35th day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group South: The enemy again found a way to withdraw his troops from the threat of the emerging encirclement. These, on the one hand, are fierce counterattacks against our forward detachments of the 17th Army, and on the other hand, a large

July 27, 1941, 36th day of the war Situation at the front: Heavy thunderstorms broke out at the front of Army Group South. All movement froze. You can only try to move the tank wedge aimed at Uman further south in order to intercept railway and highways

July 28, 1941, 37th day of the war. Situation at the front: There were no significant changes. OKH sent an order to the headquarters of Army Group South, requiring the offensive of the 1st Panzer Group not in the southeast, but in a southern direction - to Uman. On the front of Army Group Center, the Russian

July 30, 1941, 39th day of the war Situation at the front: At the front of Army Group South, the results of the long-term grinding of Russian troops operating in Ukraine are gradually beginning to show. The enemy retreats. Despite this, due to the low activity of the Romanians and given the presence

July 31, 1941, 40th day of the war Situation at the front: Army Group “South”: The lack of new information about the location of fresh enemy forces identified by our reconnaissance in the area south of the 11th Army makes us think that they are in the same area. result of successful

July 2, 1941 Eleventh day of the war. Diary entry: “Torrential rain in the morning. I think I have the flu, it's ruining everything. In Sebezh they found out that Idritsa had just been bombed. We are going to Osveya. On the road, the artillery major asked to be told that he had moved the guns to the line west of the road. To whom

July 4, 1941 Thirteenth day of the war. A signalman from the 385th regiment, a young political instructor with two “cubes” in his buttonholes, came for us when it was still dark. Having loaded ourselves with film and taken our cameras, we followed him. We had to go far. Kopyak is not one of those commanders who, with his staff

July 6, 1941 Fifteenth day of the war. Near the village of Volyntsy they removed sappers building a bridge, heard artillery fire, found a battery of heavy 152-mm guns from the shots, removed the battery and the firing cannons. And when the enemy spotted the battery and opened a methodical attack on it

Two trains passed towards each other across the border with Germany in Brest. A train with wheat and coal thundered towards the Reich - the USSR continued to fulfill the clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement on the supply of raw materials. And from Germany a fast train from Berlin to Moscow rushed by. There were almost no passengers in it.

In the Red Army units located along the border with Germany, only the guards did not sleep. Almost half of the officers were not on the ground. The day before they were given leave until the evening of Sunday, June 22.

Defector at the outpost

On the very bank of the Western Bug in the town of Sokalsk, at a Soviet border post, a car from a neighboring town is waiting. There is no German translator at the outpost, but one is needed very urgently. They had already sent to Sokalsk for a German teacher from a local school, but he went fishing.

At nine in the evening on June 21, a border guard patrol detained a German corporal. He was soaked to the skin. He demanded that he be taken to the commander. The corporal introduced himself as Alfred Liskov, said that he was a communist, that he knew the time when the Germans were planning to attack the Soviet Union. The head of the border post, Major Bychkovsky, did not understand German well, and he did not believe in the attack, but he decided to quickly take Liskov to Vladimir-Volynsk, where there was definitely an interpreter.

Interrogation of Liskov

By half past midnight, a truck with a German defector, Major Bychkovsky and two soldiers drove into the courtyard of the commandant’s office. The translator was woken up.

“I am Alfred Liskov, corporal of the 115th Wehrmacht Infantry Division. I am 30 years old, I am a communist. A carpenter by profession. I have two children and a wife in the town of Kolberg in Prussia. I swam across the Bug to inform the Soviet commanders about the impending attack by the German army.”

“Units of the Wehrmacht on the evening of Saturday June 21 received orders to prepare for the offensive. It starts at 4 am today. The offensive will go along the entire front. Artillery preparation will begin at half past four.”

Major Bychkovsky contacts the district commander by phone. He conveys everything that Liskov said. The commander doesn't believe it. Then Bychkovsky calls the army commander over the commander’s head. He also listens to the major skeptically, but passes on his report to Moscow.

Trouble in the General Staff

Liskov's report is transferred to the Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov. Zhukov wakes up People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, who comes to the General Staff. They are trying to find Stalin.

German sabotage detachments and assault infantry detachments are being pulled up to the bridges over the Bug. They have orders to seize bridges and crossings by half past two in the morning and prevent the Soviet border guards from destroying them.

Stalin is found at the Blizhnaya dacha in Kuntsevo. The leader is sleeping. The NKGB officer who received the call from Zhukov refuses to wake Stalin. They persuade him for about half an hour.

Rising and performing

A wake-up call began in the German units stationed along the border with the USSR. The soldiers put on their ammunition and form marching columns to move into attack positions.

Stalin was finally awakened. He listened to Zhukov and said that “this Liskov of yours did not appear by chance.” He ordered Zhukov and Timoshenko to go to the Kremlin. Then he demanded that Poskrebyshev’s personal secretary summon People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov to the Kremlin. Stalin quickly gets ready and goes to the Kremlin.

German sabotage detachments and grenadiers quietly seize almost all crossings across the Bug and other rivers along the border along the entire front line from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Just as quietly, six border posts are being destroyed in the Bialystok area. The personnel were partially killed with melee weapons, and partially captured.

First salvos

Corporal Liskov and Major Bychkovsky return to the outpost. The German teacher has returned from fishing and is summoned to Bychkovsky. The teacher again translates Liskov’s words to the major. Bychkovsky asks: “Where exactly will the artillery strike be delivered and at what time?” Liskov begins to answer, at that moment the roar of guns is heard from the west. The glass in the outpost headquarters is rattling and cracking.

Bombers and fighters take off from Luftwaffe field airfields and fly towards the USSR.

Zhukov and Timoshenko convince Stalin to accept a directive on active counteraction to the Wehrmacht in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. Stalin refuses. As a result, Directive No. 1 is adopted. Units of the Red Army must not succumb to provocations and avoid direct clashes with the enemy until further notice.

German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg receives a telegram from Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Instructions in the telegram. Schulenburg must convey to Molotov that Germany, in order to ensure the security of the Reich and violation Soviet Union Treaty of 1939, is forced to begin active military actions. Essentially, this is a declaration of war.

First bombings

German He-111 and Ju-87 bombers bomb Kyiv, Minsk, Kaunas, Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Soviet airfields and the location of Red Army units.

Corporal Liskov was sent under escort to Lvov. From there he should be taken to Kyiv, and then to Moscow. Major Bychkovsky commands the defense of the border post.

Violated the order and saved the fleet

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Oktyabrsky, having received Directive No. 1, decided not to carry out the order. He ordered that all available artillery be prepared to repel the air raid. At 4.12 German bombers appeared over Sevastopol. The fleet was withdrawn from the harbor and fought off the raids with heavy fire. Not a single warship was sunk. In Sevastopol itself, residential buildings and warehouses were damaged.

Brest Fortress

Wehrmacht grenadiers storm the Brest Fortress. With the first attack they occupy almost half of the fortress, but the border guards counterattack and knock the Germans out of new positions. German divisions bypass the fortress and continue to advance deep into the USSR.

Declaration of war

Schulenburg arrives in the Kremlin and delivers a note declaring war to Molotov. “The USSR concentrated all its troops on the German border in full combat readiness. Thus, the Soviet government has violated treaties with Germany and intends to attack the Reich from the rear while it fights for its existence. The Fuehrer ordered the German armed forces to counter this threat with all means at their disposal."

Molotov conveys Schulenburg's note to Stalin. Stalin is silent. Molotov mutters: “We don’t deserve this.”

Several fighter planes that miraculously survived the bombing take off from a field airfield of the Soviet Air Force in Moldova. In the sky they come across a flight of new Su-2 bombers. One of the fighters mistakes them for Germans and attacks. The bomber squadron commander's Su-2 was shot down and another bomber was damaged. The fighter lands at the airfield, the commander of the IAP (fighter aviation regiment) runs towards the pilot, and as he runs he pulls a pistol out of his holster. For shooting down his “bomber,” the pilot will be shot right on the spot, but at that moment German Ju-87s dive onto the airfield. The air regiment commander's head is torn off by a bomb explosion. The pilot manages to escape execution. His name is Alexander Pokryshkin.

Order to counterattack

Stalin demands from Timoshenko and Zhukov to draw up Directive No. 2. Red Army units were ordered to attack German troops along the entire front line.

Near the Lithuanian town of Alytus, German advanced units run into the well-prepared defense of the Red Army. The Wehrmacht's advance in this area was stopped. There is a battle going on.

Goebbels at the microphone

At nine in the morning Moscow time and seven in Berlin time, the chief propagandist of the Reich, Joseph Goebbels, begins his daily radio program. In it he talks about the beginning of the war with the Bolsheviks. He explains it by saying that “the Reds provoked our troops, regularly invaded the territory of the Reich and were preparing for war.” In Berlin and other German cities, people gather in squares and discuss the news.

Stalin is silent at the Politburo meeting. They expect decisions and orders from him, but he brushes them off. He sits down with Molotov to write the text of an appeal to the Soviet people.

Rumors about war are spreading around Moscow, but there is no confirmation. There is nothing on the radio about the German attack.

Beginning of the retreat

German troops approach Grodno. The Red Army is retreating. The remnants of the Soviet infantry division try to gain a foothold in the city, but two powerful air raids destroy most of the soldiers. The rest retreat.

Counterattack

Directive No. 2 reaches some parts of the Red Army from Moscow. They are trying to launch a counterattack. They attack without preparation, without support from the flanks, without knowing exactly which side the enemy is on. Several divisions are surrounded, several are completely destroyed. Communication with the army commander and military districts has been disrupted. There is no communication between neighboring parts.

Appeal to the Soviet people

At noon, the voice of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov sounded from all the country's loudspeakers and radio outlets. Stalin refused to read the appeal. Residents of the USSR learned about the beginning of the war with Germany.

German troops entered Grodno and, without stopping, move on

Calling up reservists

Recruitment centers are opening at military registration and enlistment offices, and the recruitment of reservists begins. All men born between 1905 and 1918 are subject to conscription. In Moscow, Leningrad and other cities, queues form at military registration and enlistment offices.

The Luftwaffe is again bombing Minsk, Kyiv, Sevastopol, Kaunas, the Hanko naval base, and dozens of cities in Ukraine and Belarus.

The center of Minsk is almost completely destroyed.

The Germans were left without water

The advanced units of the Wehrmacht had covered more than 25-30 kilometers since early morning. The soldiers are exhausted. Field kitchens cannot keep up with the avant-garde. The infantrymen's canteens ran out of water. In most parts the losses are small. The Germans are advancing along the roads, the Red Army is retreating through forests and rough terrain.

Ran out of goals

German bomber pilots report that they have nothing to bomb. Soviet airfields, barracks, arsenals, concentrations of armored vehicles and other military facilities were destroyed. Pilots receive permission to hunt for individual units of equipment and manpower.

Soviet border guards in the Sokal area launch a counteroffensive and push the Germans back beyond the Bug. But the losses are so great that the border guards and the infantry attached to them have to retreat again.

Corporal Liskov flies to Moscow

Alfred Liskov is taken to one of the field airfields near Lvov. Almost on the last surviving plane he is taken to Moscow.

Reference:

Alfred Liskov will speak to workers and soldiers in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities of the USSR. He will write leaflets calling on German soldiers to surrender. In August 1941 he would join the leadership of the Comintern. In September, he had a personal quarrel with Georgi Dimitrov, the future leader of post-war Bulgaria. In October he will go with the Comintern on evacuation to Bashkiria. In December 1941 he would be arrested, presumably following Dimitrov’s denunciation. He will be accused of spying for Germany, anti-Semitism and treason. In February 1942, Liskov would be shot in one of the NKVD camps in Bashkiria.

Stalin leaves for his dacha

Joseph Stalin leaves the Kremlin. Members of the Politburo are told that the leader has gone to the Near Dacha and has been ordered not to let anyone in to see him.

Soviet planes attack Finland

The Finnish army has not taken any active action since the morning. But Soviet aviation (new Su-2 bombers) began to bomb Finnish cities and ports, and artillery on Hanko Island began to shell Finnish territory.

At five in the evening the Finns repulsed the last attack of the day by the Soviet Air Force. Finnish losses - about 1,500 civilians killed and wounded, about 300 military personnel killed. USSR losses - 65 bombers and fighters shot down.

Encounter battles

Soviet divisions continue to launch counterattacks. But these throws are scattered and poorly organized. There is no coordination between parts. As a result, personnel losses reach 90% in some divisions.

A German grenadier goes to a newly shot down Soviet tank and a killed Red Army tankman (outskirts of Grodno).

The first prisoner of war camps

By evening, there were several tens of thousands of Soviet prisoners in the Bialystok-Brest area alone. The German soldiers and officers did not know what to do with them. They have no orders in this regard, and the field police, which are engaged in escorting prisoners, cannot keep up with the vanguard of the army. Officers make local decisions. Some leave the Red Army soldiers to simply sit on the roadsides without any security. Others assign two or three infantrymen to the prisoners. Still others simply shoot those who surrender.

By seven in the evening, by order of the commander of Army Group Center von Bock, executions were prohibited. The surrendered Red Army soldiers are lined up and sent to the western bank of the Bug. There they are collected in fields hastily fenced with barbed wire. On one such field there can be up to 5 thousand prisoners. They are not really protected or fed. The wounded do not receive medical care. Many Red Army soldiers flee from such camps on the first night.

Churchill calls for support for the USSR

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill addresses the nation on the BBC.

"The Nazi regime has worst traits communism. “He has no foundations or principles other than greed and the desire for racial domination. In its cruelty and furious aggressiveness it surpasses all forms of human depravity. Over the past 25 years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than me. I won't take back a single word I said about him. But all this pales in comparison to the spectacle now unfolding. The past with its crimes, follies and tragedies disappears.

I see Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields that their fathers have cultivated since time immemorial.

I see them guarding their homes, where their mothers and wives pray - yes, for there are times when all pray - for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, their protector and support.

I see tens of thousands of Russian villages, where livelihoods are torn from the ground with such difficulty, but where primordial human joys exist, where girls laugh and children play.

I see the vile Nazi war machine approaching all this with its dapper, spur-clanging Prussian officers, with its skilled agents who have just pacified and tied a dozen countries hand and foot.

I also see the gray, trained, obedient mass of the fierce Hun soldiers, advancing like clouds of crawling locusts.

We have only one unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can turn us away from this, nothing. We will never come to an agreement, we will never enter into negotiations with Hitler or with anyone from his gang. We will fight him on land, we will fight him by sea, we will fight him in the air, until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his very shadow and freed the nations from his yoke. Any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state that goes with Hitler is our enemy...

This is our policy, this is our statement. It follows that we will provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can...”

Preparing for a counteroffensive

There is no connection between divisions and military districts, there is no connection between the armies and Moscow. General Pavlov, commander Western Front, gives orders to those few units that he can reach. They were all ordered to prepare early in the morning to go on the offensive and drive the Germans out of the territory of the USSR.

On the bombed airfields of the Red Army lie the skeletons of burnt-out aircraft. In total, 1,489 vehicles were destroyed on earth during this long day. Another 385 in the air. From the Soviet military aviation, standing at the border, there were a little more than 400 aircraft left.

The commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District, Ivan Kopec, having received a summary of the losses for the day, escorted the adjutant out of his office, wrote a letter home and shot himself.

Nine divisions of the Red Army are surrounded. It is impossible to calculate personnel losses. On June 22, in some areas, the Wehrmacht advanced 60-120 kilometers deep into Soviet territory.

The radio repeats the appeal of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov to the Soviet people. After the broadcast, the first front-line report comes. Its general meaning: the German offensive was stopped, the enemy lost several thousand soldiers and officers, hundreds of tanks and aircraft. The Red Army successfully launched a counteroffensive.

Stalin does not get in touch. None of the Politburo members dare to go to his Near Dacha.

The advanced units of the Wehrmacht were finally brought food and water. There is a thick layer of dust on the soldiers. They look with curiosity at damaged and abandoned Soviet armored vehicles.

Columns of captured Red Army soldiers are being transported to the western bank of the Bug. There are about 50 thousand of them.

The short summer night takes its toll and darkness thickens over the former border.