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Commander of the 5th Tank Army on Kursk. Fifth Guards Tank Army

Tank forces of the USSR ["Cavalry" of World War II] Daines Vladimir Ottovich

According to the GKO decree of January 28, 1943, the Fifth Tank Army was to be formed by March 30 of the same year. On February 22, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin signed Directive No. 1124821 on the formation of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Millerovo area five days earlier. Directive No. 36736 of the General Staff of the Red Army, sent on February 27 to the commander of the Southern Front, noted that the army included the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky and 29th Tank, 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps, as well as army reinforcement units. By March 5, it was required by order of the Front Military Council to concentrate the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Millerovo area, and the remaining units, formations and institutions were to arrive from March 5 to 12. The use of the army was permitted only upon special instructions from the Supreme Command Headquarters. Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces P.A. was appointed commander of the army. Rotmistrov (see Appendix No. 3).

P.A. Rotmistrov, recalling his appointment to the post of army commander, in the book “Steel Guard” talks in detail about his meeting with I.V. Stalin in mid-February 1943 in the Kremlin. “I.V. Stalin was also interested in the views I expressed on the use of tank armies in offensive operations, writes Rotmistrov. “They boiled down to the fact that tank armies should be used as a means of the front commander or even the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to deliver massive attacks, first of all, on enemy tank groups in the main directions without indicating to them offensive zones, which only hinder the maneuver of tanks. It was felt that Stalin well understood the importance of the massive use of tank troops and he was not the only one who heard me on this issue.” At the end of the meeting, Stalin invited Rotmistrov to lead one of the tank armies. Major General I.A. was appointed first deputy commander of the army. Pliev, second deputy – Major General K.G. Trufanov, member of the Military Council - Major General of Tank Forces P.G. Grishin and the chief of staff of the army - Colonel V.N. Baskakov.

During its formation, the composition of the army was subject to changes more than once, and its location and subordination also changed. Thus, on March 4, Directive No. 211/org of the General Staff was issued on the urgent replenishment of the 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Tank Corps with personnel, weapons, vehicles and other property. The corps was ordered to be loaded at Glubokaya station and sent to Starobelsk by March 7. It included the 266th Mortar Regiment, the 1436th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and the 73rd Motorcycle Battalion. On March 8, a directive was issued from the Supreme Command Headquarters on the transfer of the corps to the disposal of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky for use in the defense of Kharkov. Subsequently, after the arrival of new forces in the Kharkov region from the Headquarters reserve, it was ordered that the 5th Guards Tank Army be transferred to the command of the commander of the Southwestern Front. Thus, only two corps remained in the army (29th Tank, 5th Zimovnikovsky Guards Mechanized). In this composition, according to Directive No. 46076 of the Supreme Command Headquarters of March 19, it was supposed to concentrate by rail in the area of Puhovo station, Rybalchino, Evdakovo station, Khrestiki, Kolomeytsevo by the end of March 24. The army’s “ordeals” did not end there. According to Directive No. 4610 ° of the Supreme Command Headquarters of April 6, it became part of the newly formed Reserve Front. According to Directive No. 12941 of the General Staff of July 6, she was given another corps - the 18th Tank.

While the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army were resolving issues related to the formation and regrouping of troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, they were engaged in combat training. On May 21, General Rotmistrov issued an order to put into effect " Brief instructions on some issues of the combat use of units and formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army in connection with the partial redistribution of tanks and artillery in army units.” Its appearance was due to the fact that the composition and equipment of the compounds were not the same. Thus, the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps and the 24th Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps had T-34 tanks (a total of 65 tanks in the brigade). In the 25th and 31st tank brigades, the first tank battalions were equipped with T-34 tanks (31 tanks in the battalion), and the second battalions were equipped with T-70 tanks (31 tanks in the battalion).

The Instructions noted that “the experience of combat operations of tank and mechanized corps has shown that in all types of combat the corps commander must have a strong reserve in his hands,” and it is advisable to include not randomly assigned units or units, but one strong tank brigade. For this purpose, it was considered necessary to carry out a partial redistribution of tanks in the tank and mechanized brigades of the 29th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in order to create one strong tank brigade in each corps at the expense of reserve tanks. The 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, equipped only with T-34 tanks, was required to be kept in reserve by the corps commander and used to parry enemy attacks and carry out counterattacks. It had to conduct independent actions in the most important directions, on the flanks of the corps or in the junction between brigades. It was planned to use the 24th Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the same way. The 25th and 31st tank brigades, equipped with T-34 and T-70 tanks, were to be used in the first echelon of the corps together with the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, including for conducting defense together with this brigade or independently. To support the tank attack, corps-based anti-tank artillery and self-propelled artillery regiments should have been brought in.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, engaged in combat training, were preparing for the Kursk strategic defensive operation.

In the chapter “The First Guards Tank Army” we became acquainted with the situation that had developed at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the forces of the parties and their plans. Therefore, let's immediately move on to the description of the hostilities.

On July 5, 1943, the enemy launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. In the Voronezh Front, he struck with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (2nd SS Panzer Corps, 48th Panzer and 52nd Army Corps; about 1 thousand tanks and assault guns) of General G. Hoth and the Kempf army group "(over 400 tanks and assault guns). After fierce five-day battles, the enemy managed to penetrate the defenses in the Oboyan direction to a depth of about 35 km and in the Korochan direction - up to 10 km. On the morning of July 10, General Hoth planned to launch a new powerful blow to the northeast. To this end, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was supposed to defeat the troops of the Voronezh Front southwest of Prokhorovka and push them east. The 48th Tank Corps was to destroy the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Corps on the western bank of the river in front of Oboyan. Pena and continue the offensive from the Novoselovka area in a southwestern direction. The 52nd Army Corps was required to hold its previous positions in readiness to advance through Pena in the Alekseevka-Zavidovka sector.

Due to the tense situation created in the Belgorod-Kursk direction, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N.F. On July 7, Vatutin turned to I.V. Stalin with a request to strengthen the front with two armies from the strategic reserve. They were intended to “strongly cover the Oboyan direction and, most importantly, to ensure the timely transition of troops to a counteroffensive at the most advantageous moment.” Both armies were planned to advance to the areas of Oboyan, Prokhorovka, Maryino and Prizrachnoye. By Stalin's decision, the Voronezh Front was reinforced from the Steppe Front by the 5th Guards Army of General A.S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, by the end of July 9, the tank army was supposed to concentrate in the area of Bobryshevo, Bolshaya Psinka, Prelestnoye, Prokhorovka with the task of being ready to repel the enemy’s offensive, which occupied Kochetovka on July 8. The army of General Zhadov had to reach the river. Psel, take up defensive positions and prevent the enemy from further advancing to the north and northeast.

By the end of July 9, the 5th Guards Tank Army reached the area indicated to it. At eleven o'clock in the evening, General Rotmistrov assigned the following tasks to the troops. 29th Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces I.F. By dawn on July 10, Kirichenko was supposed to take up defense along the line of the southern edge of the forest (5 km south of Maryino), the southern outskirts of Svinnoye, Pogorelovka, Zhuravka. It was necessary to allocate at least two tank brigades to the reserve. The task of the corps is to be ready to repel enemy attacks and proceed to active offensive actions. 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps, Major General of Tank Forces B.M. Skvortsov had two brigades to take up defense along the northern bank of the river. Psel on the river section Zapselets, (lawsuit) Merry, having in reserve one tank and one motorized rifle brigade. 18th Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces B.S. Bakharov was ordered to go to defense along the northern bank of the river. Psel on the site Vesely, Polezhaev, southern outskirts of Prelestnoye, southern outskirts of Aleksandrovsky. The order did not indicate how the change of positions should be carried out, who is responsible for the stability of the defense, and there is also no mention of the fact that the 5th Guards Army, which had the task of organizing a strong defense at this same line, was entering this line.

On the morning of July 10, formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive. However, as a result of the stubborn defense of the troops of the 6th Guards and 69th armies, the enemy's advance was stopped by the end of the day. The enemy's offensive on July 11 in the Prokhorovsk direction was also unsuccessful. However, General Hoth did not give up hope of defeating the troops of the Voronezh Front. He decided to use the forces of the 48th Tank Corps to push back the 10th Tank Corps, attached to the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukova, beyond Psel southeast of Oboyan. Subsequently, turning to the northeast, create conditions for a systematic offensive through Psel of the remaining forces of the 4th Tank Army. The 52nd Army Corps would continue to cover the left flank of the 48th Panzer Corps, ready to exploit its success on its right flank. On the left flank of the army, the 167th Infantry Division was supposed to support the attack of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on Provorot, defeating Soviet units at Leskov, and subsequently advance to the heights east of Teterevin. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was given the task of defeating Soviet troops south of Prokhorovka and creating the preconditions for a further offensive through Prokhorovka.

In turn, the commander of the Voronezh Front, on the night of July 11, decided to launch part of his forces on a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat the main enemy group rushing towards Oboyan and Prokhorovka. For this purpose, it was planned on the morning of July 12 to launch a powerful counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, and by the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies from the Melovoe, Orlovka line in the general direction of Yakovlevo. Units of the 40th, 69th and 7th Guards Armies were also involved in the counterattack. From the air, ground troops covered the 2nd and 17th air armies.

The decisive role in the counterattack was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army. By order of the front commander, the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, numbering only 187 tanks and a small amount of artillery, were transferred to the operational subordination of General Rotmistrov. The army was reinforced by the 10th anti-tank artillery brigade, the 1529th SAU-152 regiment, the 1148th and 1529th howitzer regiments, the 93rd and 148th cannon artillery regiments, the 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments BM-13. All these units had a large shortage of standard weapons and personnel due to losses in previous battles. According to the army headquarters, by July 12 it consisted of 793 tanks and 45 self-propelled guns, 79 guns, 330 anti-tank guns, 495 mortars and 39 BM-13 rocket launchers. P.A. Rotmistrov provides other information: together with the attached tank formations, the army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.

General Rotmistrov decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 18th, 29th and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps along the railway and highway and further to Pokrovka and Yakovlevo. The 18th Tank Corps was to strike along the river. Psel destroy the enemy in Krasnaya Dubrava, Bolshiye Mayachki, Krasnaya Polyana, and then, turning the front to the north, ensure the advance of the remaining forces of the army in a southern direction. The 29th Tank Corps was ordered to strike along railway destroy the enemy in the area of Luchka, Bolshie Mayachki, Pokrovka and be ready for future actions in a southern direction. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps received the task of striking at Kalinin, Luchki to destroy the enemy in the Yakovlevo area, the forest to the east, and then be ready to act in a southern direction. The 2nd Tank Corps was instructed, while remaining in its positions, to cover the army's entry to the battle line, and with the start of the attack to support the tank corps with all its firepower. The commander's reserve included: 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps; detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov (1st Guards Motorcycle, 53rd Guards Heavy Tank, 57th Howitzer Artillery, 689th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiments).

By three o'clock in the morning on July 12, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the division of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps took up their starting positions for the attack. “A combat report has already been signed and sent stating that the army has taken its starting position for a counterattack and is ready to carry out the assigned task. But at four o’clock in the morning,” recalled P.A. Rotmistrov,” followed the order of the front commander, Army General N.F. Vatutina to urgently send my reserve to the 69th Army zone. It turned out that the enemy, by bringing into battle the main forces of the 3rd Tank Corps of the Kempf Operational Group, drove back parts of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions and captured the settlements of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, and Vypolzovka. In the event of further advance of the enemy’s mobile units to the north, not only a threat was created to the left flank and rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, but also the stability of all the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh Front was disrupted.” In this regard, General Rotmistrov ordered the commander of the combined detachment, General Trufanov, to force a forced march into the 69th Army’s zone in the breakthrough area and “together with its troops, stop the enemy’s tanks, preventing their advance in the northern direction.”

By six o'clock in the morning it became known that the enemy's 3rd Tank Corps was continuing its advance and was located 28 km southeast of Prokhorovka. By order of the Headquarters representative, Marshal Vasilevsky, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps to send the 11th and 12th mechanized brigades from the Krasnoe region to reinforce the combined detachment of General Trufanov. The commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps was ordered to deploy the 26th Tank Brigade in the Plot area with a front to the south and cover the left flank of the army. Soon the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered to unite all these units under the command of General Trufanov into an operational group with the task: together with the 81st and 92nd Guards rifle divisions and the 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkin “to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Ryndinka, Rzhavets area and by the end of the day reach the Shakhovo-Shchelkanovo line.”

As a result, the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army were dispersed, and General Rotmistrov lost his powerful reserve. Two of the four brigades remained in the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps: the 24th Tank and the 10th Mechanized.

At 8:30 a.m. on July 12, after air and artillery preparation, the troops of the 6th and 5th Guards Armies and the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the offensive. In the direction of the main attack on the Oktyabrsky state farm site, Yamki, the most powerful in its composition, the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, acted. To the right, between the river. Psel and the Oktyabrsky state farm, its 18th Tank Corps was advancing, and to the left - the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps. The 42nd Guards Rifle Division and the 9th Guards Airborne Division were also involved in the main attack. In this regard, the statement of P.A. is not entirely correct. Rotmistrov that in this tank battle, unprecedented in scope, “in the battle formations of tanks in the direction of the main attack there was almost no infantry from either side.”

At the same time, the enemy strike force also went on the offensive. A major oncoming tank battle began, in which 1,160 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns took part on both sides (on the Soviet side - 670, on the enemy side - 490). In the “Report on the hostilities of the 5th Guards. TA in the period from 7 to 27.7.43.” it was noted that “a tank battle, unusual in its scale, unfolded, in which more than 1,500 tanks took part on a narrow section of the front on both sides.”

The oncoming tank battle was characterized by frequent and abrupt changes in the situation, activity, decisiveness and a wide variety of forms and methods of combat operations. In some directions there were oncoming battles, in others - defensive actions combined with counterattacks, in others - an offensive with repelling counterattacks.

Units of the 18th Tank Corps of General B.S. Bakharov, having broken the fierce resistance of the enemy, by the evening of July 12, they advanced only 3–4 km, losing 55 tanks. The corps commander decided to abandon further fruitless attacks and go on the defensive. Perhaps that is why General Bakharov, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense Stalin dated July 25, was relieved of his post and appointed deputy commander of the 9th Tank Corps.

29th Tank Corps under the command of General I.F. Kirichenko also overcame enemy resistance and by the end of the day advanced 1.5 km. The enemy was forced to retreat to the Greznoye area. At the same time, the corps, which had 212 tanks and self-propelled guns, lost 150 vehicles. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps went on the attack at 10 a.m., knocked out enemy cover and began to slowly advance in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana. However, the enemy, having created superiority in forces and means, stopped parts of the corps, and in some areas pushed them back. Of the 94 tanks that took part in the offensive, the enemy destroyed 54. Units of General Trufanov’s combined detachment managed to stop the advance of the enemy’s 3rd Tank Corps. At the same time, the interaction between units and formations was not properly organized. As a result, the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment attacked the battle formations of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division and the 96th Separate Tank Brigade. After this, the regiment entered into a fire battle with enemy tanks, and then received an order to withdraw. By order of the commander of the 69th Army, General Trufanov was reprimanded, and the commander of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division, Colonel V.F. Trunin was later removed from his position.

The troops of the 5th Guards Army with their right flank, overcoming the resistance of enemy troops, reached the northern outskirts of Kochetovka, and on the left flank they fought defensive battles on the river. Psel. Although the troops of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies took part in the counterattack, they advanced to an insignificant depth. This is mainly due to the lack of time they had to prepare for the counterattack, and poor artillery and engineering support.

Thus, the troops of the Voronezh Front were unable to defeat the enemy group, which had penetrated 30–35 km into the defense. Army General Vatutin reported to Stalin at midnight on July 12: “Rotmistrov’s tank army with the 2nd and 2nd Guards attached to it. TC immediately southwest of Prokhorovka, on a narrow section of the front, immediately entered into a counter battle with the enemy SS tank corps and 17 TD, which moved towards Rotmistrov. As a result, a fierce massive tank battle took place on a small field. The enemy was defeated here, but Rotmistrov also suffered losses and made almost no progress. True, Rotmistrov did not bring in the troops of his mechanized corps and Trufanov’s detachment, which were partially used to fend off enemy attacks on Kryuchenkin’s army and on the left flank of Zhadov’s army.” According to updated data, on July 12 the enemy lost 200 tanks and assault guns out of 420, and the 5th Guards Tank Army lost 500 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 951.

At half past four on the morning of July 13, General Rotmistrov ordered the commander of the 18th Tank Corps to gain a foothold on the occupied line, paying special attention to securing the right flank at the Petrovka-Mikhailovka line. Other corps received the same orders.

However, all attempts by the divisions of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps and the corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army to push back the enemy on July 13 were unsuccessful. At about three o'clock in the morning on July 14, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin: “...Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire field was dotted with burning German and our tanks within an hour. Over the course of two days of fighting, Rotmistrov's 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks, irrecoverable and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps - up to 30% of its tanks. The next day, the threat of a breakthrough by enemy tanks from the south in the area of Shakhovo, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovka continues to remain real. During the night I take all measures to remove the IPTAP shelves. Taking into account the large tank forces of the enemy in the Prokhorovsky direction, here on 14.VII the main forces of Rotmistrov, together with the rifle corps of Zhadov, were given the task of defeating the enemy in the Storozhevoye area, north of Storozhevoye, the Komsomolets state farm, reaching the Greznoye - Yasnaya Polyana line, and even more firmly ensure Prokhorov's direction."

The offensive of the troops of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies on July 14–15 was also unsuccessful. This forced the commander of the Voronezh Front to order a transition to a tough defense on July 16. By this time, as noted earlier, the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht also decided to stop further offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On July 16, the enemy began the systematic withdrawal of his main forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and on the night of July 19 and the Steppe fronts began to pursue him and by July 23 reached the line of Cherkassk, (claim) Zadelnoye, Melekhovo and further along the left bank of the river. Seversky Donets. Basically, this was the line occupied by Soviet troops before the start of the operation. This completed the Kursk strategic defensive operation. The idea of Operation Citadel was finally buried. The Soviet command not only guessed the enemy’s plans, but also quite accurately determined the place and time of his attacks. The transition to deliberate defense played a role.

Subsequently, P.A. Rotmistrov, summing up the results of the battle near Prokhorovka, noted: “At the same time, it should be noted that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was tasked with leaving on July 12 for the Yakovlevo, Pokrovka area, did not complete this task. There were many reasons for this.” He included among them: the superiority of the enemy in forces over the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the main direction; the withdrawal of the active troops ahead and the loss of army deployment lines on July 11, which disrupted the results of two days of intense organizational work; the army commander’s lack of a reserve in the midst of battle to develop success in the direction of the main attack; insufficient artillery and aviation support for the counterattack of the tank army. All these reasons were the result of miscalculations made by both the command of the Voronezh Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army. In addition, the entry of the army into the battle was planned and carried out in the front of a powerful enemy tank group.

On the night of July 24, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army, without the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps transferred to the 5th Guards Army, was withdrawn to the reserve of the Voronezh Front. Commanders and staffs immediately began to put their units and formations in order. The army, together with the 1st Tank Army, was to take part in the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Commander Rumyantsev” (August 3-23, 1943)

In accordance with the plan of the operation “Commander Rumyantsev”, set out in the chapter “First Guards Tank Army”, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army were to build on their success in the direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day to capture the area of Olshany, Lyubotin and cut off the Kharkov retreat routes groups to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km.

10 days were allotted to prepare for the offensive. During this time, the command staff of the 5th Guards Tank Army studied the terrain in the zone of upcoming actions, the nature of the enemy’s defense and organized cooperation. At the same time, military equipment was repaired and supplies were replenished. Telephone and radio communications, as well as communications using mobile devices, were organized with all interacting parts and connections. The army created operational groups that were supposed to move behind the first echelon of advancing troops. In preparation for the offensive, training and exercises were conducted on sandboxes with headquarters officers to practice command and control. Much attention was paid to carrying out measures to disinform the enemy, which made it possible to attract his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure surprise of attacks in the Belgorod area. The army headquarters worked out a plan of interaction and a scheme for introducing the army into battle. Support issues were reflected in the plans of the chiefs engineering troops, reconnaissance and army logistics. The political department drew up a work plan for the period from August 2 to August 5.

The army included one mechanized and two tank corps, a separate tank, motorcycle, two self-propelled artillery, howitzer artillery, anti-tank artillery, guards mortar and light bomber regiments, anti-aircraft artillery division and a separate engineer battalion. The army had 550 tanks.

General Rotmistrov decided to lead the army into the breakthrough in a two-echelon formation: in the first - the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, in the second - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The detachment of General K.G. was allocated to the reserve. Trufanova. To coordinate issues of interaction between the 5th Guards Army, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies at the command post of the commander of the 5th Guards Army, General A.S. Zhadov held a meeting. On it are generals A.S. Zhadov, P.A. Rotmistrov and M.E. Katukov discussed all issues of interaction at the stages of the operation, outlined the routes of movement of the tank corps introduced into the breakthrough in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army.

On the evening of August 2, units of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army (18th and 29th Tank Corps) began moving to their original areas. At two o'clock in the morning on August 3, they concentrated on the line Bykovka, Krapivenskie Dvory, where army artillery, deployed the day before the tanks arrived, took up firing positions.

On the morning of August 3, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the strike forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began carrying out Operation Rail War behind enemy lines. On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards armies had advanced only 4–5 km by mid-day. Therefore, to build up the strike in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were introduced into the battle. The entry was carried out in a narrow zone: the 1st Tank Army - 4–6 km, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - about 5 km. From the air, General Rotmistrov’s formations were supported by the 291st assault aviation division of General A.N. Vitruk and the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of Colonel M.M. Golovni.

Developing the success of the rifle divisions, the tank armies completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced units reached the Tomarovka, Orlovka line, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance were separated. In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the 1st Mechanized Corps was introduced into the battle, which completed the breakthrough of the main enemy defense line and entered the area north of Rakov.

On the morning of August 4, the strike force of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy. By nine o'clock the forward detachments of the first echelon corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached Orlovka and Kozichev. But here they were stopped by the German 6th Panzer Division, reinforced by units of other formations. The enemy, relying on pre-prepared defenses along the impassable Gostenka River, offered stubborn resistance. As a result, part of the 18th Tank Corps of General A.V. Egorova were forced to pause the offensive. The 29th Tank Corps of General I.F. also did not advance. Kirichenko. The army commander was forced to bring up artillery and bring the second echelon of the army into the battle - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps of General B.M. Skvortsova. He was ordered to strike at Kazachev, Udy, bypassing the left flank of the enemy’s 6th Panzer Division and by the end of the day to reach the Zolochev area. But this plan remained unrealized, since the commander of the Voronezh Front demanded that the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps be turned to Belgorod in order to assist the troops of the Steppe Front in capturing the city.

General Rotmistrov, left without a second echelon, urgently brought his reserve into the battle (the detachment of General K.G. Trufanov), giving it the same task as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. At the same time, the 18th Tank Corps was ordered to bypass Orlovka from the northwest to Gomzino, and the 29th Tank Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Guards Army, destroyed the enemy in the Orlovka area.

Carrying out the assigned tasks, the 18th Tank Corps, having bypassed Orlovka from the west, by five o'clock in the evening on August 5, with the forces of the 110th Tank and 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigades, reached the Gomzino line and launched an attack on Shchetinovka. Units of the 29th Tank Corps, having captured Orlovka, continued their success to the southwest. The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Grezny area came into contact with units of the 1st Mechanized Corps. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod.

To increase the pace of the offensive, General Rotmistrov ordered the first echelon formations to conduct combat operations at night. At the same time, tank brigades, advancing in the second echelon of corps and, therefore, having a lower daily consumption of ammunition and fuel, advanced to the first echelon by nightfall. At this time, the rear was pulled up, ammunition, fuel, and tanks restored by repairmen were brought in for the withdrawn units of the first echelon. This refreshment made it possible to maintain high tempo offensive On the night of August 8, the 181st Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Puzyreva, acting as an advance detachment of the 18th Tank Corps, went behind enemy lines along an overgrown country road and suddenly burst into the city of Zolochev. The main forces of the corps, having knocked out the enemy from Shchetinovka and Uda, came to the aid of the 181st Tank Brigade. By evening, the enemy was completely defeated and thrown back from Zolochev to the southwest.

On August 7, the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army liberated Bogodukhov with a sudden attack, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps liberated Grayvoron, cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south.

As a result of the successful actions of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the enemy’s defenses were broken through in a strip 120 km wide. Formations of the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies advanced up to 100 km, and the combined arms armies advanced 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing to the Belgorod-Kharkov direction the divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, the 3rd Panzer Division from Donbass and the motorized division “Great Germany” from the Orel region.

On August 6, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was introduced to I.V. Stalin's plan to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction in two stages.

At the first stage, the troops of the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps were to advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dergachi with access to the Olshany-Dergachi line, where they would replace units of the 5th Guards Army. The 69th Army was entrusted with the task of advancing in the direction of Cheremoshny, capturing this settlement and then moving into the reserve of the Steppe Front. The formations of the 7th Guards Army were ordered to advance from the Pushkarny area to Brodok and Bochkovka, to capture the line of Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin. Part of the army's forces were to advance on Murom and Ternovaya in order to help the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front cross the river. Seversky Donets in the Rubezhnoye area, Stary Saltov. This army was ordered to strike in the direction of Nepokrytaya, state farm named after. Frunze. At the same time, it was proposed to transfer the army to the Steppe Front.

To carry out the second stage (Kharkov operation), it was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to reach the Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy area. The operation was planned to be carried out as follows. The troops of the 53rd Army, in cooperation with the 5th Guards Tank Army, were supposed to cover Kharkov from the west and southwest. The 7th Guards Army was to advance from north to south from the Tsirkuna and Dergachi lines, from the east from the State Farm line. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south - the 57th Army. The troops of the 69th Army were planned to be deployed at the junction between the 5th Guards and 53rd armies in the Olshany area with the task of advancing south to support the Kharkov operation from the south. The left flank of the Voronezh Front was to be brought to the line of Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut. This task was to be completed by the 5th Guards Army and the left flank of the 27th Army. The 1st Tank Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.

At the same time, it was proposed that the forces of the Southwestern Front strike from the Zamosc region on both banks of the river. Mzha na Merefu. Part of the forces of the front was to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, as well as clear the forest south of Zamosc from the enemy and reach the line of Novoselovka, Okhochaya, Verkhniy Bishkin, Geevka.

To carry out the second stage of the operation, Marshal Zhukov and General Konev asked to allocate 35 thousand reinforcements, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KB tanks, four regiments of self-propelled artillery, two engineering brigades and 190 aircraft to strengthen the troops.

Stalin approved the presented plan. According to his decision, from 24 hours on August 8, the 57th Army was transferred to the Steppe Front from the Southwestern Front with the task of assisting the main group of the Steppe Front in capturing the city by attacking Kharkov from the south. The main task of the Southwestern Front is to deliver the main blow to the south in the general direction of Golaya Dolina, Krasnoarmeyskoye, defeat the Donbass enemy group in cooperation with the Southern Front and capture the Gorlovka, Stalino (Donetsk) region. The Southern Front was to deliver the main blow in the general direction of Kuibyshevo and Stalino with the aim of connecting with the strike group of the Southwestern Front. Readiness for the offensive of the Southwestern and Southern fronts - August 13–14. Marshal Zhukov was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, and Marshal Vasilevsky was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 9, began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area the next day. The main forces of the 1st Tank Army by this time had reached the river. Merchik. Troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the Krasnokutsk region, and formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of the city and hung over it from the north. Units of the 57th Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 8, approached Kharkov from the southeast.

On August 10, Stalin sent directive No. 30163 to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, on the use of tank armies to isolate the Kharkov enemy group:

“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it necessary to isolate Kharkov by quickly intercepting the main railway and highway routes in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov.

For this purpose, Katukov’s 1st Tank Army cut the main routes in the area of Kovyaga, Valka, and the 5th Guards. Rotmistrov’s tank army, having bypassed Kharkov from the southwest, cut the tracks in the Merefa area.”

Field Marshal E. von Manstein, trying to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, pulled up the 3rd Panzer Corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which he intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “At the same time,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Tank Army was supposed to strike the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces and the group’s forces in general could no longer hold the front line.”

On August 11, a counter battle took place between the enemy’s 1st Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps, during which he managed to stop the army’s troops. On the same day, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, by its directive No. 30164, ordered the commander of the Steppe Front troops to take all measures to ensure that the 5th Guards Tank Army, without expecting complete concentration, marches along the route Kovyagi, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga and closes the enemy’s escape routes from the area Merefa. Part of the forces needed to take crossings on the river. Mzha on the Sokolovo, Merefa site.

On the morning of August 12, a counter battle broke out again between the 1st Tank Army (134 tanks) and the 3rd Tank Corps (about 400 tanks), during which the enemy forced the army to go on the defensive and then pushed it back 3–4 km. In the middle of the day, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to the aid of the 1st Tank Army. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground troops inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw them back to their original position.

After this, the troops of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the defensive. It was carried out in those combat formations in which they conducted offensive operations, trying to concentrate the main efforts on consolidating the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and reserves of the corps were located at a distance of 2–3 km from the front edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was focal in nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and mine-explosive barriers. The ambushes were located in a checkerboard pattern at a depth of 2–3 km, together with submachine gunners and anti-tank artillery units. Anti-tank areas (an anti-tank artillery division or regiment in each) were created in the corps and army units in the most important directions.

Tank armies had a single-echelon formation and rather low density of forces and means. They carried out defensive actions together with suitable rifle formations of combined arms armies: the 1st Tank Army with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Guards Army; 5th Guards Tank Army with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army.

A quick transition to the defensive and its skillful conduct allowed the 5th Guards Tank Army to repel enemy counterattacks. At the same time, she suffered minor losses over the course of three days - only 38 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On August 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 10165, assigned new tasks to the troops of the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwestern Fronts. They are described in detail in the chapter “The First Guards Tank Army”. Let us only recall that the Voronezh Front was ordered to strike the 1st Tank Army in the general direction of Valki, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the retreat routes of the Kharkov group to the south and southwest. After its defeat and capture of the city of Kharkov, it was prescribed to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug and by August 23-24 to reach the line Yareski station, Poltava, (leg.) Karlovka with the main forces. In the future it was planned to go to the river. Dnieper in the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of river crossings by moving parts. To ensure the offensive of the strike group, it was necessary for the right wing of the front to reach the river by August 23–24. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.

Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan. After unsuccessful attempts to break through the defenses of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army, he decided to bypass it from the left flank. On August 15, units of the SS tank division "Reich" broke through the defenses of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, defending on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and rushed in the direction of Lozovaya, Bogodukhov. General Rotmistrov at 10 o’clock on August 16 ordered the 53rd Tank Regiment (general reserve) and the army’s artillery and anti-tank reserve to move from Bogodukhov to the area south of Lozovaya. By three o'clock in the afternoon they arrived at the designated area, took up defensive positions and, meeting the enemy with fire of all means, stopped his advance. Timely maneuver by reserves largely contributed to the enemy’s refusal to further offensive actions in this direction.

The enemy launched a new attack on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area with the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the Totenkopf tank division attacked Kaplunovka. The attempt by the commander of the Voronezh Front to defeat the enemy’s Akhtyrka group with a counterattack was unsuccessful. He managed to stop the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and even push them back in some places. After Stalin’s intervention, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, and the commander of the Voronezh Front took measures to localize the breakthrough of the enemy’s Akhtyrka group. The 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the 47th Army with the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were brought into the battle. By August 27, they, in cooperation with the troops of the 27th and 6th Guards Armies, the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, defeated the enemy’s Akhtyr group and began to advance towards the Dnieper.

During these days, the 53rd Army of the Steppe Front continued to push back the enemy in the Kharkov direction. The 1st Mechanized Corps began fighting for Peresechnaya, and rifle units cleared the forest northwest of Kharkov. The troops of the 69th Army began to flow around Kharkov from the northwest and west. To speed up the liberation of the city, the 5th Guards Tank Army (without the 29th Tank Corps) was transferred from near Bogodukhov to the area northwest of Kharkov. Breaking enemy resistance, units of the 18th Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps liberated Korotich by the end of the day on August 22, and the tank brigades of the 57th Army reached the Bezlyudovka line and further south, enveloping the Kharkov enemy group from the southeast. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy.

With the liberation of Kharkov, the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ended, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. Their results are summarized in the chapter devoted to the 1st Guards Tank Army.

After the completion of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev, trying to prevent an organized retreat of the enemy to the Dnieper, on August 27, 1943, assigned the 5th Guards Tank Army the task, together with the 5th Guards Army, to push the enemy back from Kharkov to the southwest. By this time, the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army had only 66 serviceable tanks, which was 12% of their original strength. The corps headquarters had a staffing level of officers that did not exceed 30–35%, and almost 85% of the company and battalion commanders were out of action.

Under these conditions, General P.A. Rotmistrov decided to equip the remaining tanks and personnel with one brigade in each corps, strengthen them with artillery and unite them into a consolidated army detachment under the command of General B.M. Skvortsov - commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The rest of the personnel were withdrawn to the concentration area to staff and restore the combat effectiveness of the units.

From the book Battle of Berlin. Collection of memories author Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich

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Third Guards Tank Army May 14, 1943 I.V. Stalin gave instructions to the Deputy Chief of the Main Armored Directorate for Political Affairs, General N.I. Biryukov on the restoration of the 3rd Guards Tank Army by June 5. At the same time, I.V. Stalin and Marshal

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Fifth Guards Tank Army The Fifth Tank Army, according to the GKO decree of January 28, 1943, was to be formed by March 30 of the same year. On February 22, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin signed directive No. 1124821 on the formation five days earlier in the region

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Third Tank Army The Third Tank Army was formed second after the 5th Tank Army. The formation of the 3rd Tank Army began with Directive No. 994022 of May 25, 1942, signed by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky. The directive stated: “Rate

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Fourth Tank Army The birth of the 4th Tank Army, like the 1st, was due to the difficult situation that developed in July 1942 in the Stalingrad direction. According to A. Hitler’s decision on July 23, the troops of the 6th Army of Colonel General F. Paulus were to capture Stalingrad

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Fifth Tank Army The Fifth Tank Army was formed in the Moscow Military District, the second in a row after the 3rd Tank Army. In the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 994021, signed on May 25, 1942 by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, it was said: See: Babajanyan A., Kravchenko I. 1st

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First Guards Tank Army In accordance with Resolution No. GOKO-2791ss dated January 28, 1943, I.V. Stalin and Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On January 30, Zhukov signed directive No. 46021 of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the formation of the 1st Tank Army by February 8, appointment as army commander

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Second Guards Tank Army In the chapter devoted to the 1st Guards Tank Army, it was noted that its formation was carried out on the basis of the GKO decree of January 28, 1943. The process associated with the creation of the 2nd Tank Army proceeded somewhat differently. By

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D.D. Lelyushenko 4th Guards Tank storms Berlin. Before the historic battle By mid-April 1945, the troops of the Red Army, having marched hundreds of kilometers in victorious battles, defeating large enemy groups in East Prussia, Poland and Pomerania, liberated

25.02.1943 - 09.05.1945

The 5th Guards Tank Army was formed on February 25, 1943 based on the General Staff directive of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units.

On April 6, the army became part of the Reserve Front (from April 15 - Steppe Military District). Located in the concentration area southwest Stary Oskol, July 9 was transferred to the Voronezh Front.

During the defensive period of the Battle of Kursk, army troops, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, in an oncoming tank battle in Prokhorovka area stopped the advance of the enemy strike force and inflicted significant damage on it.

During the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic operation, operating as part of the Voronezh (from August 9 - Steppe) Front, the army, in cooperation with the troops of other armies, defeated a strong enemy group and advanced to a depth of 120 km.

On September 10, 1943, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, on October 7 it was included in the Stepnoy (from October 20 - 2nd Ukrainian) Front, as part of which in October - December it fought to expand the bridgehead on Dnieper River southeast of Kremenchug.

In the first half of January 1944, the army took part in the Kirovograd, from January 24 to February 17 in Korsun-Shevchenkovsk and from March 5 to April 17 Uman-Botoshan offensive operations.

On June 23, 1944, after a short stay in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the army was included in the 3rd Belorussian Front, in which it participated in the Belarusian strategic operation. The formations and units of the army introduced into the battle on June 25 in the offensive zone of the 5th Army were defeated in the area Krupki advancing towards the reinforced 5th Tank Division of the enemy and reached the Berezina River north and south of Borisov.

After release Borisova(July 1) the army developed an offensive in the direction Minsk, Vilnius.

Since July 26, formations and units of the army conducted offensive battles in order to complete the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and reach the borders East Prussia.

On August 17, 1944, the army was transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, and from October 5 to 22 participated in the Memel offensive operation.

Since January 8, 1945, as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front. From January 14 to 26 in the Mlawa-Elbing offensive operation. Army troops introduced into the breakthrough on January 17 in the 48th Army zone, by the end of the day reached the Mlavsky fortified area, by the morning of January 19, they defeated the garrison defending it and, developing the offensive towards Elbing, The 25th of January went to Frishes Huff Bay (Vistula), cutting off the main communications of Army Group Center.

From February 9, 1945, as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front, she participated in repelling enemy counterattacks who were trying to push back Soviet troops from the Baltic Sea coast and restore their land communications.

From February 28, 1945, as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front, together with the attached 98th Rifle Corps and the 1st Polish Tank Brigade, it fought to eliminate the remnants German troops near the mouth of the river. Vistula, where she celebrated Victory Day.

On July 9, 1945, the field administration of the 3rd Belorussian Front was turned to the formation of the administration of the Baranovichi Military District, the army was renamed the 5th Mechanized Army and moved to the territory of the Byelorussian SSR, headquarters in Bobruisk.

Commanders:

Lieutenant General T/V Rotmistrov Pavel Alekseevich from February 22, 1943 to August 8, 1944
Lieutenant General T/V Solomatin Mikhail Dmitrievich from August 8 to August 18, 1944
Colonel General T/V Volsky Vasily Timofeevich from August 18, 1944 to March 16, 1945
Major General T/V Sinenko Maxim Denisovichfrom March 16, 1945 to May 9, 1945

Member of the Military Council:

Major General t/v Grishin Petr Grigorievich from April 20, 1943 to July 31, 1945
Colonel Zakharenko Ilya Fedorovich from May 13, 1943 to July 22, 1943
Colonel Syromolotny Ilya Konstantinovich from July 22, 1943 to May 9, 1945

Compound :

4th separate Korsun communications regiment
117th separate repair and restoration battalion
142nd separate motor transport battalion
144th separate motor transport battalion
281st separate motor transport Vilna battalion
20th separate headquarters company
36th evacuation tractor company
2623rd Army Hospital slightly injured
82nd separate medical reinforcement company
1127th separate cable-pole company
30th supply station
58th Army Base
1528th Field Army Quartermaster Depot
2566th Field Army Food Depot
editorial office of the newspaper “Forward for the Motherland”

Composition of the army from September to December 1944

as part of the 1st Baltic Front:

3rd Guards Tank Kotelnikovsky Red Banner Corps
29th Tank Znamensky Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Suvorov II Class Corps
6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Korsun Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division
47th mechanized Dukhovshchinskaya Red Banner Order of Suvorov II degree brigade - since October 1944
201st Separate Light Artillery Brigade - since August 1944
21st Motorized Engineering Order of Kutuzov Brigade - since August 1944
678th howitzer artillery regiment Kirovograd RGK
689th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment Molodechno RGK
76th Guards Mortar Regiment of Rocket Artillery
14th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Kovno Regiment
376th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Vilna Regiment
1051st self-propelled artillery regiment - until October 1944
1st Separate Guards Red Banner Motorcycle Regiment
994th Znamensky Aviation Regiment
99th Pontoon-Bridge Battalion - to October, from November to December 1944

PERSONNEL

Total: 41

Officers:

Guards engineer-colonel Galkin Fedor Ivanovich, deputy on the technical side
Art. Lieutenant Gorokhov Arkady Nikolaevich, military dispatcher of the military commandant of the 30th SS, born in 1918.
Art. Lieutenant Goryakov Gennady Aleksandrovich, military dispatcher of the military commandant of the 30th SS, born in 1923.
Major General T/V Zaev Dmitry Ivanovich, 1st Deputy Commander
Guards captain of the a/t/s Zarubin Mikhail Vasilievich, room Chief of the 58th AB, born in 1917.
Major General T/V Kalinichenko Petr Ivanovich, Chief of Staff 12/30/1904 - 11/19/1986
Guards Major and/s Karpov Alexander Petrovich, art. Inspector of the financial department, born in 1904.
Colonel Kostylev Alexander Mikhailovich, head of political department
Art. Lieutenant Svetlitsky Vladimir Andreevich, military dispatcher of the military commandant of the 30th SS, born in 1919.
Captain Kurdyumov Sergey Fedorovich, commander of the repair company of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1913.
Major General T/V Sidorovich Georgy Stepanovich, Chief of Staff 11/21/1903 - 05/06/1985
Guards Colonel Fedorov Alexey Fedorovich, head of the operational department of the headquarters, born in 1908.
Art. Lieutenant Yurov Mikhail Spiridonovich, head of the storage department of the 2566th PAPS, born in 1912.

Rank and file:

Corporal Andreev Nikita Gerasimovich
Sergeant Major Boginsky Leonid Pavlovich, head of food supply of the 142nd OATB, born in 1905.
Red Army soldier Pavel Pavlovich Borovik, student electrician of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1929.
ml. Sergeant Vakula Fedor Trofimovich, storekeeper of fuels and lubricants of the 142nd OATB, born in 1914.
Corporal Dudchenko Semyon Kuzmich, turner of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1907.
Red Army soldier Petr Petrovich Emelyanov, turner of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1914.
Guards Red Army soldier Semyon Ivanovich Ivanov, battery operator of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1913.
Sergeant Kozelsky Ivan Grigorievich, commander of the 281st OATB squad, born in 1912.
Red Army soldier Boris Grigorievich Kudryashov, driver-electrician of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1905.
Art. Sergeant Kuzmin Mikhail Gavrilovich, room platoon commander of the 281st OATB, born in 1914.
Sergeant Lapshov Vasily Nikonorovich, driver of the 142nd OATB, born in 1912.
ml. Sergeant Logvinenko Ivan Ivanovich, art. electrician of the 117th ORVB, born in 1920.
Corporal Makarenko Nikolai Mikhailovich, messenger of the radio expedition of the 4th OPS, born in 1925.
Red Army soldier Evgeniy Petrovich Makeev, welder of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1925.
Corporal Mayatsky Grigory Dorofeevich, fitter-fitter of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1913.
Sergeant Mironov Alexander Vasilievich, squad commander of the 1127th OKShR, born in 1919.
Corporal Oger Ivan Petrovich, art. clerk of the 1528th PAIS born in 1906
Corporal Pertsev Grigory Ivanovich, blacksmith-spring worker of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1914.
Art. Sergeant Rasskazov Alexander Petrovich, driver of the 281st OATB, born in 1908.
Red Army soldier Vasily Antonovich Salamatin, electric and gas welder of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1911.
Corporal Salko Feodosius Ivanovich, fitter-fitter of the 83rd ARVB, born in 1907.
Red Army soldier Nikolai Prokhorovich Skubko, tractor driver 36th ETR, born in 1913
Red Army soldier Ivan Ilyich Smirnov, messenger of the telegraph expedition of the 4th OPS, born in 1925.
Corporal Kharchenko Petr Stepanovich, accountant of the 1528th PAIS, born in 1897.
Art. Sergeant Khutorny Nikon Prokofievich, driver of the 142nd OATB, born in 1909.
Red Army soldier Kuzma Ivanovich Chernenko, head of the warehouse of the transport and economic department of the 1528th PAIS, born in 1904.
ml. Sergeant Shalygin Georgy Grigorievich, fitter of the repair platoon of the 142nd OATB, born in 1911.

If in your family archive photographs of your relative have been preserved and you will send his biography - this will give us the opportunity to perpetuate the memory of a warrior who took part in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945, on the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

The feat that the soldiers performed in defense and the liberation of the Republic of Latvia led to Our Victory, and the memory of the people who gave their lives for this will not be forgotten.

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5th Guards Tank Army- a Soviet operational military formation within the Armed Forces of the USSR, which participated in many famous battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of a directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units. The main units of the army changed throughout its existence. As a rule, it consisted of two or more Guards tank corps and one or more Guards mechanized corps.

In June 1944, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used as the main unit to build on the success of the Soviet summer offensive in Operation Bagration. The formation was put on the offensive after the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army broke through the enemy defenses, during which it completed the encirclement of Minsk and liberated the city. Next, the army took part in the operation to liberate Vilnius. Heavy losses in this operation, however, led to the fact that the army commander, Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Rotmistrov, was relieved of his post and replaced by Vasily Volsky.

In late 1944, during the Soviet offensive in the Baltics, the 5th Guards Tank Army was used against the German 3rd Tank Army, resulting in the encirclement of German forces in the area

REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE 5TH GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Major General Comrade Baskakov

From 15.00 Major General Rodimtsev’s units went on the offensive in the general direction to the station. Maksimovka, as a result of which they have not advanced at all and occupy the same positions.
5th Guards MK provided assistance to 32 sk. with fire, but due to the passive actions of 32 sk. this assistance also turned out to be unrealistic.
5th Guards MK takes position according to his morning operational report. The corps has losses of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s.
The enemy is not active, with the exception of artillery fire, which is carried out in response to ours.
According to Shabarov’s statement, between 12–13.00 on 19.8.43 at the station. Maksimovka passed 2 echelons of covered cars. With what? Don't know. In addition, during the day there was active traffic of cars Maksimovka - height 217 (both ways).
According to Shabarov’s statement, the pr-k brought up rocket artillery, which predominates in this area.
With an attack of 15-10 tanks, the pr-k captured the grove that is southwest. high 209.5, knocking out Rodimtsev’s units from there.
Rodimtsev decided to act at night in small groups in order to restore his position.

Guards subp. Dokukin

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, pp. 208–209.

COMBAT REPORT No. 74 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 20, 1943

Combat report No. 74 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 12.00 08/20/43.

1. By 12.00 on August 20, 1943, there were no changes in the position of the Army units.

The units occupy areas and borders, as indicated in report No. 73 of 08/19/43.

2. By order of the Army General comrade. Vatutin, transmitted on behalf of Comrade. Yuryev at 3.00 08/20/43 - 29 TK I prepared for actions on MURAF.

The corps continues to remain in the MAL area. SENNYANKA and forests to the north, by 8.00 on August 20, 1943, he carried out reconnaissance of routes to the MURAF area, crossings across the MERLA river, and also entered into contact with the 6th Guards. Army of General CHISTYAKOV and 1st TA of General KATUKOV.

Commander's intelligence verified: 163 SD - occupies the front south of MURAF in the sector 10 SOTNYA, MIRNOE: 71 GSD - defends the front line. PEACEFUL. Svkh. KARLOVKA and the grove north of KHRUSHCHEV NIKITOVKA.

At the turn of 163 SD and 71 Guards. The SD is also defended by a tank corps from the 1st TA. The corps is not replenished with tanks.

At 11.30 on August 20, 1943 from the General of the Army Comrade. VATUTINA, I received a second order also on behalf of Comrade. YURIEVA - during the day of 08/20/43, conduct reconnaissance of movement routes for the concentration of the Army (without 29 TK) in the POLEVOE, DERGACHI area, which was done.

29 TK were ordered to be left in place and ready for action on MURAF.

Due to the fact that during August 19 and 20, 1943, the 5th Guards. The army in the KRYSINO-KADNITSA sector is not solving active problems, I believe that the further use of 5 GZMK here is not advisable and therefore I ask you to allow 5 GZMK to withdraw 5 Guards from combat formations. Army and concentrate in the area in accordance with the new task of the Army.

4. Shtarm – forest, south. X. AKHRIMTSEV.

COMMANDER OF TROOPS 5 GTA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

CATTLE MISTERS

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GTA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GTA

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 97

PRIVATE COMBAT ORDER No. 20 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE ADVANCED FORCE OF THE ARMY ON CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE DIRECTION OF GAVRILOVKA, August 20, 1943.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE ADVANCED DETAIL OF THE Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Comrade DOKUDOVSKY

Private combat order No. 20 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank

16.30 hour 20.8.43 Map 100,000 1941

Units of the 53rd Army captured Peresechnaya, Gavrilovka, Kuryazhanka on August 20, 1943 and continue to successfully advance.

I order:

The forward detachment of the army consisting of 1 OGKMTsP, 53 Guards. TP, 689 IPTAP – to speak

At 16.30. 20.8.43 and by 20.20. 20.8.43 will concentrate in the forest area, north of the utility room. household (5 km north Gavrilovka).

Upon entering the area, immediately organize reconnaissance in the direction of Gavrilovka, establish contact with the units of the 53rd Army operating ahead, and if these units cross the river. Udy, occupy and defend the existing crossings, ensuring the crossing of the main forces of the army.

Travel route: Zaryabinka, B. Rogozyanka, Polevoe.

Report:

About the performance. Radio signal – 666.

About entering the concentration area. Radio signal – 777.

More information every two hours.

Storm - from 20.00. 20.8.43 in the forest area, north of Polevoe.

Commander of the 5th GTA Troops Member of the Military Council of the 5th GTA

GuardLieutenant General Guard Major General

Tank troops Tank troops

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff 5 GTA

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l. 206.

COMBAT REPORT FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 22, 1943.

Guards General Lieutenant Rotmistrov

7.50 the first echelon left high. 123.1 advanced 1.5 km. The enemy with his tanks from the ravine that sat down. Commune 300–400 m up to 4 heavy tanks, 2 self-propelled guns. Two companies of infantry and up to 3 min. Batteries, division art. from high 182.6 provides resistance. On the line st. Shpakovka begins on 5 microns, brigade commanders are sent into battle formations.

I continue to complete my task.

I have losses.

The neighbor on the right has not yet started moving.

I ask you to provide a fire barrier in the direction of Lyubotin.

Guards gene. Major Trufanov

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 227.

№ 29

COMBAT REPORT No. 77 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 22, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 77. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 11.30 08/22/43

I report:

Army units at 8.00 on August 22, 1943 went on the offensive from the area of the station. SHPAKOVKA (southern railway) to BABAI, bypassing KOROTICH from the east.

When advancing in the direction of KOROTICH, the tanks were met by heavy anti-tank fire and enemy tanks from the area of the northern and northwestern heights. SHORT The attack on our tanks by anti-tank fire and enemy tanks was stopped.

To accomplish the task, units of the 18th TK and 5th GZMK regrouped even closer to the railway and at 10.00 the Army units again went on the offensive.

Our losses from air bombing, anti-tank artillery and enemy tanks are being clarified.

At an observation point in the area 1 km north-east. PERESECHNAYA 5 GZMK Major General SWAN.

COMMANDER OF TROOPS 5 GTA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

CATTLE MISTERS

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GTA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GTA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 100.

COMBAT REPORT No. 87 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 22, 1943

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS. TANK. ARMY.

COMBAT REPORT No. 87, Shtakor 18 tank., forest 2 km. north GRIGORIEVKA,

22.8.43 by 19.00, card 100.000–42

The enemy stubbornly defends at the line: x. SMORODSKY, KAZAROVKA, COMMUNE, KOROTICH, x. SHPAKI his artillery fires from the areas: the forest is sowing. X. SMORODSKY, LYUBOTIN, KOROTICH, x. SPAKI.

110 TBR at 18.05 consisting of: T-34 tanks - 8, MSPB 84 people. Cut the highway and railway. village KHARKOV-BOGODUKHOV northern. KOROTICH continues to advance.
170 TBR consisting of T-34 tanks - 4, T-70 tanks - 2, with 53 GTR - T-34 tanks - 8 reached the northern country road by 14-00. 1.5 km. SHORT Further advance was stopped by strong enemy artillery fire from the KOROTICH, LYUBOTIN area.

Brigade losses for the day: 6 T-34 tanks, 2 personnel killed, 10 wounded, radio out of order.

181 tbr by 17.20 reached 2 km. south Art. PUTTERING.

There are 2 T-34 tanks in service.

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade - southwest. 400 meter.st. PUTTER against the bend of the river. UDY.

Losses for the day: two 76 mm guns were disabled by enemy artillery fire.

Mortar fire from the brigade on the heights. 182.6 2 enemy vehicles were shot down and up to an infantry company was destroyed. The fire of the enemy mine battery in the northeast was suppressed. env. OL. LYUBOTIN (at the bridge). A 75 mm cannon (without a firing pin) and 10 boxes of shells for it were captured.

I decided: having close connection with neighbors, by the end of 22.8. complete the task.
KP – forest 2 km. north GAVRILOVKA.

NP – art. PUTTERING.

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 229.

COMBAT REPORT No. 79 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 22, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 79. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank at 21.50 on August 22, 1943.

I report:

1. During the day, Army units (without 23 TK), following your orders, conducted offensive battles in the direction of KOROTICH, BABAI and thrice repelled enemy counterattacks with a force of up to 2 battalions of infantry and tanks from the STAR area. LYUBOTIN at the station. PUTTERING.

By 19.00 on August 22, 1943, units of 18 TK and 5 GZMK, having broken enemy resistance, captured KOROTICH and received the task:

A) 18 TK and 5 GZMK- create detachments of tanks, anti-tank missiles and motorized infantry led by the best proactive commanders and immediately pursue the enemy with the task of capturing BABAI, POKOTILOVKA and cutting off the escape routes of the Kharkov enemy group to the south.

The rest of the corps forces continue to carry out the task.

b) Motorcycle regiment- set the task of conducting reconnaissance on BUDA.

2. 29 TK continued to defend BOGODUKHOV from the south in readiness to act to the west.

3. Losses and trophies, after clarification, will be reported in the operational report.

Shtarm - forest, northeast. utility room household

NP – nameless. altitude, which is 1 km east. CROSS.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 101.

COMBAT REPORT No. 80 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 23, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU

Combat report No. 80. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 13.45 08/23/43

I am reporting the situation at 13.00 on August 23, 1943:

1. Group of tanks 18 TK in the amount of 7 pieces. with a landing force of motorized infantry, dropped at night from the KOROTYCH area to intercept roads from KHARKOV to MEREFA, reached the KHARKOV, MEREFA highway in the area of the POKOTILOVKA inscription, where it went on the defensive and, at dawn on 08.23.43, fought with the enemy, holding the occupied area.

A detachment of tanks from the 5th GZMK reached the forest 3 km north by dawn on August 23, 1943. BEREZOVOE, where he fights with the enemy.

The main forces of the 5th GZMK and 18th TK are fighting to clear KOROTICH from the enemy, who at dawn on 08/23/43 approached from the direction of LYUBOTIN and occupied it from the south. South and southwest outskirts of KOROTIC.

2. The enemy is putting up stubborn resistance from the forest area in the southwest. KOROTICH and from the heights of the south. SHORT

At 10.00, enemy tanks with a total of up to 20 tanks attacked the battle formations of Army units from the STAR area. LYUBOTIN, LYUBOTIN in the direction of KOROTICH, the enemy attack was repulsed.

In the forests and southwest KOROTICH continues to accumulate enemy tanks from the Lyubotin area.

At 11.30 on August 23, 1943, over 20 enemy aircraft bombed the battle formations of Army units in the area of GAVRILOVKA, KOROTICH.

As a result of the night battle, the combat formations of the Army units were mixed, and as a result, control in the units was disrupted. On the morning of August 23, 1943, measures were taken to restore control and organize the battle; for this purpose, Shtarm commanders were sent to the unit at dawn.

NP – nameless. high 1 km east CROSS.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 103.

COMBAT REPORT OF THE HQ OF THE 994TH LIGHT BOMBER AIR REGIMENT TO THE HQ OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943

COMBAT REPORT

1. The regiment, consisting of 6 aircraft, worked on a special mission of the 5th Civil Aviation Division, and on August 22 carried out 49 sorties, flying 30 hours and 55 minutes.

2. There are 8 serviceable aircraft at the airfield, 1 aircraft is on a long business trip, on instructions from the headquarters of the 5th Civil Aviation.

3. The regiment is 90% provided with shoes and uniforms, food for 12 days, B-70 aviation gasoline for 1.6 refills, motor gasoline for 4.6 refills, MK oil for 7.3 refills, auto scrap for 4.9 refills.

4. Ammunition for personal weapons and Shkas machine guns, 2 sets each.

5. Communication with the headquarters of the city air force. carried out by plane through a liaison officer.

6. A regiment of 14 aircraft can perform communications missions.

Vr. Beginning headquarters 994 A.P.

Art. those. Lieutenant KONUSHKIN

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 246.

COMBAT REPORT No. 89 from the Headquarters of the 18th TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943.

COMBAT REPORT No. 89, Shtakor 18 tank, forest 4.5 km. north GAVRILOVKA,

23.8.43 by 19.00, map 100.000–42

1. The enemy is leading a strong artillery attack. min. fire from the area east. X. RICH, high. 200.0, RAYELENOVKA, KOROTICH, continues to stubbornly defend at the line: x. RICH, SHORT.

Enemy mortar batteries are located in the northern-west gully. and southeast KOROTICH, anti-tank guns are located in the north-east. outskirts.

Enemy aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights in single aircraft.

2. At 2.00 on August 23, 1943, I sent a combined detachment under the command of Lieutenant Comrade Ivashchenko, consisting of 7 tanks with troops, with the task of cutting the railroad. and a highway in the POKOTILOVKA area.

At about 3.50 on August 23, the detachment, according to an oral report from Lieutenant IVASCHENKO, reached the railway station. in the area indicated above and cut it, 2 tanks were knocked out and burned by the enemy (1 of them was a radio tank).

The tank of the detachment commander, Lieutenant IVASCHENKO, was hit and IVASCHENKO was wounded. According to him, the infantry dismounted from the tanks and took up defensive positions; he did not know the detachment’s further actions.

At 10.00 from the 11th Tank Brigade, I sent a group of reconnaissance officers to the POKOTILOVKA area with the task of establishing contact with the combined detachment and the reality of the fact of interception of the railway. in the POKOTILOVKA area.

I have no reconnaissance results. I am taking second steps to establish contact with the detachment.

3. Parts and connections of the hull have reached the milestone:

110 TBR consisting of T-34 tanks - 9, T-70 tanks - 5 - in the area of the mounds 1 km. northeast SHORT

170 TBR consisting of T-34 tanks - 5, T-70 tanks - 1 - landing 300 meters. south highway that north. SHORT

181 tbr consisting of T-34 tanks - 3, T-70 tanks - 2 - 1 klm. north SHORT

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade - took up defense along the railway. village north SHORT

Artillery units have an OP in the area: platf. RESORTNAYA, st. PUTTER, support the action of the hull parts.

4. Condition of the material part:

Tanks on the move T-34 – 18, T-70 – 8

Tanks on the move along the T-34 route - 12

Under repair: current tanks T-34 - 7, T-70 - 3.

On average there are 29 T-34 tanks, 3 T-70 tanks.

Capital. T-34 tanks – 9.

Losses per day: T-34 tanks – 10, of which 9 were irretrievable.

5. KP – forest 4.5 km. north GAVRILOVKA.

NP – grove 1 km. south GAVRILOVKA.

Commander of the 18th Tank Guards. Major General Tank Troops TRUFANOV

Chief of Staff of the 18th Tank Corps, Colonel VOROBYOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 210.

COMBAT REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4TH SEPARATE SIGNALS REGIMENT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943

To the commander of the troops

5th Guards Tank Army

Combat report No. 94, shtapolka 4

As of 19-00 23.8.43 card 100.000 – 40

The 4th separate communications regiment occupies a forest concentration area of 2 km. north Kuryazhanka. The regiment serves the communications center of the 5th Guards. and telephone and mobile communications.

Headquarters Battalion.

The telegraph company provides a communications center and puts equipment in order.

The telephone exchange provides internal telephone service.

RPSS services the headquarters command post with mobile communications equipment.

Armored company: three T-34 tanks are located at the 5th Guards CP. that and one T-34 in the regiment's location. Armored vehicles are located in the police department and operational department of the headquarters.

2. The radio battalion has radio communication: with the GShKA; with the Voronezh Front; with the Steppe Front; with 5 GZMK; 18 TK: 29 TK; with corps artillery; with army artillery units; with headquarters: 7th Guards. A; 57 A; 69 A; 53 A; 5 VA. Radio exchange per day: 28 radiograms received - 685 g; transmitted - 18 radiograms - 849 groups.

Communication interruption: with the Steppe Front from 22-00 to 14-00 – wave failure and radio malfunction; with GShKA - communication appeared from 22-00 and lasted until 6-00, from 6-00 to 13-15 - great interference; from 18 TC – from 20-00 to 8-00 – no wave passing; from 29 TC from 20-00 to 14-00 the reason is not clear.

The 1st telegraph and cable company, consisting of 2 platoons, provided communication lines: NP 5 GTA - 18 TK; NP 5 GTA – 29 TK. One platoon is located at the regiment's location.

The 2nd telegraph and cable company, consisting of 3 platoons, provides communication lines: TsTS - NP 5 GTA; TsTS - regimental headquarters; CTS - 53 A; TsTS - - 1 building 53 CA. One platoon is in reserve at the regiment's location.

1127 OKShR, consisting of 2 platoons, provides communication lines, the rest put the equipment in order.

1129 OKShR is in reserve and is putting the equipment in order.

08/23/1943 at 11-00, while performing combat missions, the regiment’s armored vehicle came under enemy fire, and the driver of the armored vehicle, Jr., was killed. Sergeant Kapustin and the armored vehicle commander, Senior Sergeant Gvozdarev, were wounded.

Security:

Ammunition, weapons, basic communications equipment in full.

Lack of transport:

Cargo. GAS “AA” – 12 pcs.; passenger cars "Willis" - 8 pcs.; motorcycles – 18; armored vehicles – 2 pcs.

Food:

Rusks – 2.5 s/d; various cereals – 6.7 s/d; pasta - ?; canned meat – 4.4 ppd; live cattle - 8.5 s/d; fats – 3.9 ppd; sugar – 5.7 s/d; dry rations – 1.8 s/d; different canned food – ?

Gasoline – 0.7 ref.; diesel fuel - 1.3 liters; oil – 0.3 dressings; autol – 2.0 req.

Commander of the 4th ops guards. Lieutenant Colonel Gorbachev

Chief of Staff of Guards. Major Shevtsov

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 247.

COMBAT REPORT No. 81 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 23, 1943.

Combat report No. 81 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 22.00 08/23/43

I report on the actions of Army units on August 23, 1943:

1. At dawn on August 23, 1943, the enemy, with a force of up to an infantry battalion with tanks, launched an attack from the Lyubotin area and from BUDA to KOROTICH and captured the southern. and southwest env. KOROTICH, taking advantage of the fact that the tanks 18 TK and 5 GZMK, which entered on the evening of 08.22.43, were sent at night as forward detachments to BEREZOVOE, and the main forces of the corps and infantry by this time were just concentrating in KOROTICH.

Subsequently, having brought up artillery, mortars and tanks, the enemy launched two counterattacks on KOROTICH from the Lyubotin area with the goal of capturing KOROTICH.

Throughout the day, Army units fought in KOROTICH, which prevented the completion of the task - the attack on BUDA.

2. Carrying out the task of attacking BEREZOVOE, BABAI, the advance detachment of the 5th GZMK reached the forest 3 km north by dawn on 08/23/43. BEREZOVOE, where he entered into battle with enemy tanks and artillery. Subsequently, communication with the detachment was interrupted, the crew of the burnt tank of this detachment returned, reporting that three tanks were burned out from the fire of enemy tanks, and the fate of the rest of the detachment was unknown.

According to available data, three tanks of this detachment were stationed in the south. env. KOROTICH, where they dug in and remained throughout the day, fighting with the enemy (data is being verified).

3. The advance detachment of 18 TK, consisting of 7 tanks with a motorized infantry landing force, fulfilling the assigned task, by the morning of August 23, 1943, reached the line of the KHARKOV-MEREFA highway and railway in the POKOTILOVKA area, where it entered into battles with the enemy and, going on the defensive, maintained his position throughout the day.

Attempts by the 170th TBR to connect with a detachment from the KOROTICH area were unsuccessful.

4. At 19.00 on August 23, 1943, after a regrouping of forces, Army units launched a general offensive with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reaching BUDI.

The position of the Army units and the result of the offensive, as well as losses and trophies for 08/23/43 will be reported in the operational report.

NP – without name. high 1 km post. CROSS.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l 104.

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 41 by 24.00 08/23/43 5 Gvardeyskaya Tankovaya, Shtakor forest, 2 km north. utility room household

1. The enemy provides stubborn fire resistance with tanks and artillery. At dawn on August 23, 1943, an enemy infantry battalion with tanks from the Lyubotin area and from BUDA launched an attack on KOROTICH and reached the south. and southwest env. KOROTICH, taking advantage of the fact that the tanks 18 TK and 5 GZMK, which entered on the evening of 08.22.43, were sent at night as forward detachments to BEREZOVOE, and the main forces of the corps and infantry by this time were just concentrating in KOROTICH.

Subsequently, having brought up artillery, mortars and tanks, the enemy launched two more counterattacks on KOROTICH from the Lyubotin area.

Enemy aircraft in groups of 15–30 aircraft repeatedly bombed the battle formations of the army troops.

2. Army troops (without 29 TK) fought throughout the day in the KOROTICH area, which prevented the completion of the task - the attack on BUDA.

At 19.00 on August 23, 1943, after a regrouping of forces, parts of the army launched a general offensive with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reaching the BUDA area.

3. 18 TK from 53 Guards. The TP conducted an offensive battle in the KOROTICH area and repelled enemy counterattacks.

At 19.00 on August 23, 1943, after regrouping, parts of the corps launched a general offensive from the line:

a) 32 MSBR – yellow. road north SHORT

b) 181 TBr – 1 km north. KOROTICH (ledge behind 32 MSVR).

c) 140 and 170 TBr – northern. env. garden that sowing SHORT

By the end of the day, units of the corps, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, are fighting in the KOROTICH area, having the task, together with the 5th GZMK, to destroy the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reach the BUDA area.

As a result of the battle on August 23, 1943, parts of the corps destroyed:

Enemy tanks – 4 pcs.

Guns of different calibers – 6 pcs.

Mortars – 4 pcs.

The Yu-88 plane was shot down by fire.

T-34 tanks – 10 pcs.

Of these, irrecoverable losses – 6 pcs.

85 m/m guns – 2 pcs.

120 m/m mortars – 2 pcs.

Cars – 5 pcs.

Personnel killed - 19 people.

Personnel injured - 32 people.

The corps has tanks on the move:

T-34 tanks – 18 pcs.

T-74 tanks – 8 pcs.

53 Guards TP has tanks on the move:

T-34 tanks – 20 pcs.

T-70 tanks – 2 pcs.

Total tanks on the move: T-34 – 38 units, T-70 – 10 units.

Security:

Screw cartridges –1.6 b/c

Food 7 s/d.

Shtakora task force 1.5 km. south GAVRILOVKA.

4. 5th Guards ZMK - During the day, he conducted an offensive battle in the KOROTICH area and repelled counterattacks by enemy tanks and infantry.

From 19.00 on August 23, 1943, after regrouping, parts of the corps launched a general offensive from the line:

a) 24 Guards. TBR - and 12 Guards. MBR - northern okr. SHORT

b) 10th and 11th Guards. MBR – north-east. env. garden that sowing SHORT

By the end of the day, parts of the corps were fighting in the KOROTICH area, with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reaching the BUDA area.

On August 23, 1943, corps units destroyed:

Enemy tanks: destroyed – 2

Hit – 2

Guns – 4

Machine guns – 4

Cars – 3

Soldiers and officers - up to 150 people.

Hull losses for 08/23/43

T-34 tanks – 4 pcs.

Cars – 2 pcs.

Radio stations – 1 pc.

Personnel killed - 23 people.

Injured - 34 people.

The corps has tanks on the move:

T-34 – 35 pcs; T-70 – 5 pcs.

Security:

Ammunition 45 and 76 m/m rounds – 1 b/k

Screw cartridges 1,2

Food 2 s/d.

Shtakora task force 1 km north. SHORT

5. 1 OGKMTSK with 689 IPTA (3 guns) - the army commander’s reserve was concentrated in the northern garden. KOROTICH is ready to act in the direction of BUDA - MEREFA.

The regiment has tanks on the move: T-34 - 6 units; active motorized infantry bayonets - 120 people.

Security:

45 and 76 m/m shots – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges – 1

Food – 3 s/d

Regimental losses for 08/23/43

Personnel killed - 12 people

Injured - 6 people.

6. 29 TK with one brigade (25 Tank Brigade) continues to defend BOGODUKHOV from the south at the line: railway. booth 1 km south X. SEMENOV YAR, south. env. X. MUSICKS.

The remaining brigades of the corps from 17.30 on August 23, 1943 were on the march to the concentration area of the northern utility forest. household (6 km. north-east. PERESECHNOE).

The corps has tanks on the move:

T-34 – 93 pcs.

T-70 – 11 pcs.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 m/m rounds – 2 b/c

Screw cartridges – 2 b/c

Food for 5 days-dachas.

Shtakor - on the march to the corps concentration area.

7. Communication with army troops: radio, telephone, telegraph, mobile means and communications officers.

8. The weather is clear, the roads are passable for all types of transport.

STARM – in the forest 2 km north. utility room household/ 3 km north-east. CROSS-CROSS

NP – bezim. high 1 km north-east CROSS-CROSS

CHIEF OF STAFF

5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY

GUARDS MAJOR GENERAL

TANK FORCES

BASKAKOV

HEAD OF OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

GUARD COLONEL

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 82

COMBAT REPORT No. 82 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 24, 1943

To the Commander of the Steppe Front, Colonel General Comrade. Konev.

Combat report No. 82. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. By 12.00.

24.8.43 Card 100,000 1941

I report:

The enemy in front of the army front continues to provide strong fire resistance from the area of LYUBOTIN, STAR. LYUBOTIN, from the forests and heights to the west, south and east of KOROTICH.

Up to 20 tanks and up to a battalion of motorized infantry, reinforced with artillery, were discovered in KOROTICH.

Army units: 18 TK, 5 GZMK, 1 OGKMTsP, from 4.30. 24.8.43

continue actions to destroy the enemy in KOROTICH.

Overcoming strong enemy resistance and suffering losses, the units made little progress.

29 TK (without 25 TBr) completes concentration in the forest area, north of Kuryazhanka

NP – nameless. high 1 km. eastern Peresechnaya.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l.235.

COMBAT REPORT No. 84 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 25, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 84. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 20.40 25.8.1943

I report:

29 TK - at 13.00 on 25.8.43 attacked the enemy in the direction of the farm department. KOMMUNAR /2 km. zap. KOROTICH/, BUDI, MEREFA.

The enemy continuously conducted strong artillery fire. At 13.40. attacked from the forest to the east. temporary storage facility KOMMUNAR with 8 tanks, the counterattack was repulsed. At 15.40. The enemy launched a second counterattack with 6-8 TIGER tanks, which was repulsed.

At 18.00 the corps is fighting for the grove, south. temporary storage facility KOMMUNAR, repelling the third attack of enemy tanks from the direction of LYUBOTIN.

2. 5 GZMK – 24 TBR, 10 GV. ICBMs, self-propelled artillery regiment - at 16.00 they reached their starting position for an attack in the direction of the storage farm. KOMUNARA, BUDY.

3. 18th TK - at 16.00 received an order to attack the enemy in the direction of the storage facility. COMMUNAR, BE.

4. Losses - up to 20 T-34 tanks. Up to 10 enemy tanks were burned. The data is being checked.

PP – nameless. high 1 km. eastern CROSS.

Commander of the 5th Guards Troops. TA Member of the Military Council of the 5th Guards. TA

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l. 236.

COMBAT REPORT No. 85 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 26, 1943

To the commander of the steppe front, Colonel General comrade. Konev.

Combat report No. 85. Shtarm 5th Guards Tank. 13.30

26.8.43

I report:

Army units during 8/25/43, the night of 8/26/43 and the first half

day 26.8.43, fulfilling the task, with varying success they fought with the enemy at the line

dept. temporary storage facility Kommunar, storage farm. Communar, Korotich. We took possession of the storage facility. Communard and repelled four enemy attacks. In the area dept. temporary storage facility Kommunar, storage farm. During August 25, 1943, more than 50 enemy tanks operated against army units.

During 25.8.43 and during the night of 26.8.43, army units knocked out and destroyed up to 15 enemy tanks.

The enemy is conducting strong barrage artillery, mortar and tank fire from the western forest area. and southwest Tvh Kommunar. At 10.00 on August 26, 1943 from the direction of the department. temporary storage facility Communard up to 15 enemy tanks again attacked units of the 29th TK and 5th GZMK at the temporary storage facility. Communar. The attack was repulsed. 5 enemy tanks destroyed.

In the area of the storage farm. The communar captured a prisoner, who testified that he belonged to the 44th PP of the SS Viking Division and, as part of the battalion, arrived to replenish the SS Viking Division on 8/23/43.

18 TK- supported the advance of 29 TK and 5 GZMK with fire while being at the line of the railway. d. to the north. env. Korotich.

By 10.00 on August 26, 1943, the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Army, consisting of 13 tanks, arrived in the Gavrilovka area. The brigade received the task: after mastering the railway line. south temporary storage facility Communard to develop success in the direction of Buda, Merefa.

NP- bezim. altitude 1 km. eastern Peresechnaya.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l. 247.

COMBAT REPORT FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 27, 1943.

COMBAT REPORT No. 91,

Shtakor 18 south of 1.5 km KURYAZHANKA, 8.40, 27.8.43, map 100.000

1. By 7.40 32 MBR with reinforcement parts reached 50-60 m. d. Booth zap. 1 km Korotich

2. The tank offers resistance - 2 heavy tanks, guns. bullet fire from the western environs. Korotich.

3. I roll out artillery to fight tanks into an open position. The infantry crawls forward.

Commander of 18th Tank TRUFANOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 278.

COMBAT REPORT No. 87 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 27, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Army General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 87. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 14.00 08/27/43

I report:

1. Motorized infantry with anti-tank artillery of the Army during the night of 08/27/43, continuing to carry out the task, by 7.00 on 08/27/43 reached the line of 200 meters north. railway KHARKOV - POLTAVA in the railway area. booth that app. KOROTICH 1 km, bypassing the storage farm. COMMUNARY from the west and east.

During the night the enemy delayed the advance of our units with artillery fire and rifle-machine-gun fire.

At dawn on August 27, 1943, the enemy fired tanks from the southern encirclement. temporary storage facility KOMMUNAR - did not allow our tanks to attempt to get to the railroad bed, where our motorized infantry reached during the night.

From 12.00 on August 27, 1943, bypassing the right flank of the 29th TK, the enemy pulled up to 2 companies of infantry with tanks to the storage facility. KOMMUNAR, from the grove south. At the same time, he counterattacked Army units from the direction of the storage farm. KOMMUNAR, trying to cut off our units that passed to the railway.

2. Senior Sergeant BOLDIREV - intelligence officer from the 2nd Guards. Motorcycle battalion 5th Guards. ZMK, which left the RAYELENOVKA area on the night of August 27, 1943, reported that the enemy was taking up defensive positions along the railway line. in the area of the platf. RAYELENOVKA. There is a medical aid station in RAYELENOVKA, where he observed a large number of wounded enemy soldiers and officers.

3. I report that units of the 53rd Army, which were supposed to interact with my tank corps, did not take a single step forward for 3 days and today continue to be inactive, remaining on the northern line. highway going from LYUBOTIN to PESOCHIN.

4. On August 26, 1943, as a result of fierce battles with the enemy in the area of the temporary storage farm. KOMMUNAR has significant losses, and, in particular, in the command staff.

Killed: Commander of the 32nd Tank Brigade - Colonel LINEV.

Head of Operations Department 29 TK - Lieutenant Colonel LUKASHIN.

Shell-shocked Commander of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade - Lieutenant Colonel LIPICHEV.

Injured– Commander of the 110th Tank Brigade – Colonel KHLUPIN and a number of other responsible commanders and political workers.

Detailed data on losses in personnel and materiel are presented in an operational summary.

5. NP – unnamed. high 1 km east CROSS.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 110.

REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE STEPPE FRONT

General of the Army Comrade KONEVU

I report:

Your order No. 00518/OP dated 08/27/43 was received by me at 15.45 on 08/27/43.

In pursuance of your order, I sent headquarters commanders to communicate and clarify the situation at sector 214 SD. I am sending reconnaissance to this division's site.

I keep the 25 Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps in my reserve - in readiness to develop success in the 214 SD sector or in the direction of the storage farm. COMMUNAR, BE.

The Commander of the 53rd MANAGAR has been familiarized with your order.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 112.

COMBAT REPORT OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS HQ

COMBAT REPORT No. 91, Shtakor 18 tank., forest 1 km. southeast FIELD,

by 19.00, 27.8.43, map 100.000–42

1. The enemy is at the previous lines of defense. During the day he conducted artillery fire on the battle formations of the corps units.

Enemy aircraft in batches of 25–30 aircraft bomb our battle formations.

2. Units of the 18th Tank Corps went to the reserve of the Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army with the task of putting the remaining materiel in order and replenishing the combat materiel to full strength.

3. 32 mechanized infantry brigade, 292 mine regiment consisting of six 120 m/m mortars, 1000 iptap - 4 - 45 m/m and 1 - 76 m/m guns, 170 tbr consisting of T-34 tanks - 2, T-70 tanks - 1 – occupy the northern defense. railway SHORT

4. 110 tbr – southern forest. FIELD

5. 170 tbr – southwest forest. FIELD

6. 181 tbr – western forest. SEMENOVKA.

7. Hull parts - forest southeast. FIELD.

8. NP – high. 171, 2 1.5 km. south KURYAZHNOE.

Commander of the 18th Tank Guards. Major General Tank. troops TRUFANOV

Chief of Staff of the 18th Tank Corps, Colonel VOROBYOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 269.

COMBAT REPORT No. 89 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 28, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, ARMY GENERAL Comrade KONEV.

Combat report No. 89 Shtarm 5 Guards Tank 10/12/08/28/43

I report:

1. On the night of August 28, 1943, units of the Army conducted offensive battles with forward detachments with the task of capturing a bridgehead across the railway. village KHARKOV - POLTAVA on the site south of the farm. COMMUNAR. Having met stubborn resistance from the enemy from the line of the railway track. and from the forest area to the south and southwest of the farm. KOMMUNAR - had no promotion.

At dawn on August 28, 1943, the enemy launched two counterattacks with 9 tanks and infantry. Enemy counterattacks were repulsed.

2. On August 28, 1943, he assigned the following task to army units:

Together with units of the 53rd Army, with a decisive attack at 13.00 on August 28, 1943, seize the bridgehead across the railway track. KHARKOV - POLTAVA in the area south of the farm. KOMMUNAR, meaning to further develop the offensive against BUDA.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 113.

COMBAT REPORT No. 90 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 28, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Army General Comrade. KONEVU

Combat report No. 90 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 20.30 08/28/43

I report:

1. The enemy, throughout the entire day of 08.28.43, offered strong resistance to the advancing units of the Army, repeatedly counterattacked with tanks and infantry from the area of a large forest, southwest. temporary storage facility KOMMUNAR in the direction of the farm. COMMUNAR.

In front of the Army front in the sector: dept. temporary storage facility KOMMUNAR - KOROTICH - in total, over 20 enemy tanks were noted on 08/28/43.

2. Army units fought to capture the railway line. south temporary storage facility KOMMUNAR, exposed to strong artillery fire and fire from enemy tanks.

By 20.00 on August 28, 1943, the ADVANCED FORCE 5 GZMK managed to cross the railroad bed in the area of the booth 1 km west. SHORT

The detachment received the task of capturing the heights. 200.0.

According to preliminary data, on August 28, 1943, 10 enemy tanks were destroyed.

3. In the area of the storage farm. KOMMUNAR On August 28, 1943, a prisoner belonging to the reconnaissance battalion of the 106th Infantry Division was captured, who showed that the division was being re-equipped 50 km southwest. KHARKOV (the prisoner does not know the point). The reconnaissance battalion 106 PD, in which the prisoner served, consists of 2 squadrons of 60 people each. in everyone. The battalion arrived in the area of the temporary storage facility. KOMMUNAR 08/25/43

The prisoner personally saw 10 German tanks, of which 4 were Tiger tanks in the railway area. southern canvases temporary storage facility COMMUNAR.

On August 27, 1943, he observed how for several minutes in the area of the storage farm. KOMMUNAR - 3 German tanks were burned, of which 1 was a Tiger.

According to the testimony of the prisoner, SS units are operating in the KOROTICH area, he does not know their radios. He also does not know who acts to the left.

4. NP – on high. 1 km. eastern CROSS.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 114.

REFERENCE OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY

ABOUT THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE ENEMY AND YOUR LOSSES

ABOUT THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE ENEMY AND OWN LOSSES FOR 08/28/43.–

5th Guards Tank Army

Destroyed:

1.Enemy tanks: burned - 8.

Hit - 7

2. Guns of different calibers – 11

3. Machine guns – 23

4. Cars – 7

5. Soldiers and officers - up to 370 people.

Army losses:

1. T-34 tanks burned - 3

Hit – 4

2. T-70 tanks – 2

3. Personnel killed - 51 people.

4. Injured - 169 people.

Note:

The information was compiled on the basis of operational reports of Army units and formations.

Appendix to operational report No. 41.

POM. CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE 5th Guards Headquarters. TA

Guard captain

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 82, l. 101.

COMBAT REPORT No. 91 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 91 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 11 o'clock 30 min 29.8.1943

I report:

1. During the night of August 29, 1943, Army units fought with the enemy to capture the railway line. d. south temporary storage facility COMMUNAR. As a result of the battle, the advanced units of the 5th GZMK reached the high point by dawn on August 29, 1943. 300.0 (1 km southwest KOROTICH).

From 7.00 on August 29, 1943, 25 TBRs of 29 TK were brought into battle with the immediate task of seizing crossings across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area and further advance on OLD VODOLAGA. At 10.00 on August 29, 1943, the brigade fought for BUDA, encountering resistance from enemy tanks and anti-tank artillery from the BUDA line.

2. In the area of the storage farm. KOMMUNAR captured prisoners of the SS division "Reich" and 198 PD, which showed that as a result of the heavy losses they suffered in previous battles, 80-100 soldiers remained in the regiments of these divisions. The SS division "Reich" on August 28, 1943 had only 30 tanks, of which 10 were Tiger tanks.

3. The fact that in the area of the temporary storage farm. KOMMUNAR and the forests to the south there were significant groups of prisoners who were caught by our units, which gives reason to assume that the Germans retreated very hastily, without having time to warn their units about the withdrawal.

4. In the forest area, north. BUDA, units of the 29th TK captured 50 prisoners. Control prisoners were taken from among them, the rest were shot.

I ordered the unit commanders: - from now on, do not shoot prisoners, but deliver them to army headquarters.

5. NP – without name. altitude 1 km east CROSS.

The new NP is equipped at high. 200.0 (1 km. southwest. KOROTICH).

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l. 264.

COMBAT REPORT No. 92 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Troops, Army General Comrade. KONEVU

Combat report No. 92 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 14.30 08/29/43

I report:

1. Units of the Army at 9.30 on August 29, 1943 entered BUDA and are fighting to clear BUDA from the enemy and to take possession of crossings across the river. MEREFA.

From 10.00 on August 29, 1943, in the BUDA area, Army units began establishing crossings across the river. MEREFA, after which they will continue to act on OLD VODOLAG.

2. In the BUDA area, our Il-2 attack aircraft bombed Army units.

I ask you to direct aviation to the southern regions. R. MEREFA and along the border of the river. MJA.

3. NP – translate to southern. slopes of heights north of BUDA.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 117

COMBAT REPORT No. 94 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Combat report No. 94 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank 18.00 08/29/43.

I report:

1. At 17.00 on August 29, 1943, Army units completed clearing BUDA from the enemy and cleared the crossings across the river. MEREFA, at the same time, reconnaissance of fords is being carried out in the area of \u200b\u200belevation. 119.3 and crossings at GIEVKA.

2. At 12.00 on August 29, 1943, the head company of the 25th Tank Brigade broke into BUDI, reached the crossings in the center of the village, and at the same time a column of enemy tanks (10–12 vehicles) departing from the SOUTH direction approached the same crossings. A strong tank battle broke out at the porcelain factory, as a result of which enemy tanks were forced to retreat to the southeast. direction.

25 Tank Brigades were lost by fire - 7 T-34 tanks.

When our tanks approached the crossing west of the porcelain factory, the bridge in the center of the village was blown up by the enemy.

3. I’m with the Shtarm Task Force – south. env. SHORT

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 119.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 47 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Operational report No. 47 by 24.00 08.29.43 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank.

1. Enemy from heights 175.8; 157.9 conducts artillery-mortar and rifle-machine-gun fire.

River crossings MEREFA in the GIEVKA, BUDI section was blown up, the river bed was mined.

2. Army units, starting the offensive from the railway line. KHARKOV - POLTAVA, in the KOROTICH - LYUBOTIN section, during the day of battle on 08/29/43 they captured a height of 200.0; southwest KOROTICH and by the end of the day on August 29, 1943 they occupied BUDA, and with motorized infantry began crossing the river. MEREFA.

3. 29 TK– chasing the retreating enemy, he went to the BUDA area. In the Farf area. head – BUDS of the corps fought with an approaching column of enemy tanks (10–12 units) from the YUZHNY area, as a result of which the enemy suffered losses and retreated to the southeast. direction.

By the end of the day, units of the corps reached the area:

A) 25 Tank Brigade with 33 MSBr- farf. head - WILL BE.

b) 31 and 32 TBR– they don’t have any materiel (tanks), they went to the area of the cuirass. - WILL BE.

The corps has the task of crossing the river. MEREFA, by dawn of August 30, 1943, take possession of the heights. 175.8, then attack on OLD VODOLAG.

As a result of the battle with corps units on August 29, 1943. destroyed:

Enemy tanks burned and knocked out - 9

Self-propelled guns – 1

Guns of different calibers – 3

Machine guns – 17

Soldiers and officers - up to 150 people.

Losses buildings for 08.29.43:

T-34 tanks burned - 4

T-34 shot down – 5

Personnel killed - 24 people.

Injured - 74 people.

The corps has tanks in service: T-34 - 8, T-70 - 7.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 mm rounds – 2 b/c

120 mm mines – 1.3 b/c

Screw cartridges – 1.5 b/c

Food – 3 daily dachas.

Shtakor – grove, 1.5 km north. BUDA - district K.

4. 5 GZMK- by the end of the day, he reached the BUDA area and began crossing the river with motorized infantry. MEREFA.

A) 12th Guards ICBM- at the point of crossing the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area.

b) 11th Guards ICBM– southwest env. BEDS

V) 10 Guards MBR and 24 GV TBR- they do not have materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry, they are concentrated in the forest, western. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of material parts and replenishment.

The corps has a task - crossing the river. MEREFA, by dawn of August 30, 1943, take possession of the heights. 157.9, then attack on OLD VODOLAG.

The corps has tanks in service: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 5.

Security:

120 mm mines – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges – 1.25 b/c

Food – 3 daily dachas.

Shtakor – east. edge of the forest, 1.5 km southwest. SHORT

5. 18 TK- 32 MSBR from 53 Guards. TP reached the south. edge of the forest, BUDA, has the task of crossing the river. MEREFA, by dawn on August 30, 1943, go out to the gardens to the south. surroundings, where to take up defense with a front to the south, to ensure the crossing of Army units.

53 Guards TP has tanks in service: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 1.

For 08/29/43 by the corps destroyed:

Anti-tank guns - 1

6-barreled mortars – 4

Machine guns – 1

Mortars – 3

Losses buildings for 08.29.43:

76 mm guns destroyed – 1

Hit – 3

Personnel killed - 11 people.

Injured - 35 people.

The remaining parts of the corps remained in the previous concentration area during the day of August 29, 1943 and restored the material part.

A) 170 TBr– forest, 1.5 km. south FIELD.

b) 110 TBr– forest, 1.5 km. southeast FIELD.

V) 181 TBr- forest, west SEMENOVKA.

All restored tanks of the corps in the number of T-34 - 19, T-70 - are transferred to the 181st Tank Brigade, which by 9.00 08/30/43 goes into the forest, northern. BEING ready for active action 08/30/43

Security:

120 mm mines – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges – 1.5 b/c

Food – 3 daily dachas.

Shtakor – forest, 1.5 km southeast. FIELD.

5. 1 OGKMTSP- went out to the south. edge of the forest 1 km north. WILL BE. Conducts active reconnaissance on RAKITNOE.

The regiment has tanks in service: T-34 - 4.

Active motorized infantry bayonets - 166 people.

Security:

Ammunition – 2 b/k

Food – 4 days.

8. The weather is clear. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Task Force Shtarm- in the gardens to the south. env. SHORT

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

Guard Colonel

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 83, pp. 1-2.

COMBAT REPORT No. 96 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 30, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Troops, Army General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 96 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank 10.00 08.30.43

I report:

1. 6 am 08/30/43 got in touch with the commander of the 69th Lieutenant General Comrade. KRYUCHENKIN.

We will organize joint actions to seize a bridgehead across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area.

2. During the night, Army units in small groups crossed the river under enemy rifle and machine-gun fire. MEREFA in the BUDA area.

Attempts to transport the tanks were unsuccessful. The tanks that approached the crossing were hit by enemy tank fire and anti-tank missiles from the south. banks of the river MEREFA.

The almost complete absence of motorized infantry in my Army did not allow us to capture and provide a bridgehead for crossing tanks.

Reconnaissance carried out in the direction of GIEVKA and to the southeast of BUDA established that all crossings across the river. MEREFA was blown up by the enemy, and the river bed was mined.

3. Parts 5 GZMK and 29 TK occupy BUDY and the forest to the north.

181 TBr 18 Tk- concentrates in the forest, sitting down. WILL BE in readiness for action on OLD VODOLAG.

4. Shtarm's task force - in the gardens, to the south. env. SHORT

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 121.

COMBAT REPORT No. 97 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 30, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU.-

Combat report No. 97 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 16.30 30.8.1943

I report:

1. I received your combat order No. 0592 dated 30.8.43 at 14.40 on 30.8.43.

Even before receiving a written order, reconnaissance of routes from all units and a headquarters task force were sent in the direction of OLD MERCHIK.

At 14.00 on August 30, 1943, the tanks of the Army units were in BUDA in the combat formations of the infantry of the 69th Army, and the motorized infantry crossed to the southern bank of the river. MEREFA and is fighting to clear it of the enemy. The enemy, occupying commanding heights on the southern bank of the river. MEREFA, provides strong resistance to Army units.

During the day, enemy artillery fire destroyed the river crossing three times. MEREFA, brought by Army units in the BUDA area.

At 15.00 on August 30, 1943, a joint offensive by units of the 69th Army and the 5th Guards began. Tank Army with the task of capturing an infantry bridgehead across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area, in order to further advance on OLD VODOLAG.

The preparation and organization of the offensive were carried out jointly with General KRYUCHENKIN even before receiving your order.

3. In connection with the current situation, I decided:

Using firepower, motorized infantry and some tanks, help the infantry of the 69th Army get out and gain a foothold on the heights south of BUDA, and if successful, advance here with all your might, fulfilling the task you previously set.

If the infantry does not receive the expected advance, then by 17.00 on August 30, 1943 I will withdraw the Army units and begin concentration in the OLD MERCHIK area.

4. Shtarm's task force - in the gardens to the south. env. KOROTICH, later in the FEDOROVKA area.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l. 269.

COMBAT REPORT No. 94 of the Headquarters of the 18th TANK CORPS

COMBAT REPORT No. 94 by 19.00 30.8.43 Shtakor 18 tank., forest 1 km. southeast POLEVOE, map 100.000 – 42 g.

The enemy takes up defensive positions along the right bank of the river. Merefa. Its fire weapons are located in the area of elevation. 175.8 – anti-tank battery, to the east. edge of the forest, in a hollow 1.5 km. zap. BUDA - battery of 6-barrel mortars, south. 1 km. letter "P" inscription p. MEREFA – artillery battery.

The enemy is leading art.min. fire at the location of our units.

32 MSBR consisting of: 1st MSPB, 1st infantry company - 18 people, mine battery 22 people, anti-tank battery 20 people, machine gunner company 12 people, artillery division. 101 people, minbat 85 people. - takes up defensive positions in the southeast. slopes high 182.8.
181 TBR is the reserve of the Commander of the 5th Guards. TA, by 9.30 concentrated in the area - forest 1.5 km. north WILL BE.

Brigade composition: 1st TB - T-34 - 15, T-70 - 6 (arrived in the concentration area), MSPB - 143 people.

The remaining parts of the corps are in the same areas.

The personnel are engaged in the repair of combat equipment and combat training.

NP – high. from elevation 195.9.
The corps commander left in parts.

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 308.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 48 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Operational report No. 48 by 24.00 08.30.43 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank.

Goryuny (2 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

1. The enemy, occupying commanding heights on the southern bank of the river. MEREFA, during the day, provided strong fire resistance to the advancing Army units.

During the day of August 30, 1943, the enemy repeatedly destroyed crossings across the river with artillery fire. MEREFA, induced by Army units.

2. Units of the Army, together with units of the 69th Army, conducted offensive battles during the day of August 30, 1943 with the task of capturing the infantry bridgehead across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area with further development of success at OLD VODOLAG.

Due to strong enemy resistance, which is at the border of the command heights, zap. WHERE it was, it was not possible to break it - the infantry did not have the expected success.

According to the order of the commander of the STEPPE FRONT No. 00592/OP dated 08/30/43, Army units from 17.00 on 08/30/43 began regrouping in the OLD MERCHIK area with the task of advancing in the direction of CHEREMUSHNAY, VALKA.

3. 18 TK- all the restored equipment (tanks) and motorized infantry were transferred to the 181st Tank Brigade, which by 23.00 on August 30, 1943 was concentrated in the south. edge of the forest, 2 km north. OLD MERCHIC.

The brigade has tanks in service: T-34 - 17, T-70 - 5.

Exploded by mines: T-34 – 1.

The remaining brigades of the corps, remaining in the same concentration area - the southern forest. and southeast POLEVOYE, during the day of 08/30/43 the equipment was restored.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 mm rounds – 1.5 b/k

120 mm mines – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b/c.

Food – 2 daily dachas.

Shtakor– in the forest, 1.5 km. southeast FIELD.

4. 5 GZMK- all materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry were transferred to the 12th Guards. TBR, which by the end of the day had completed its concentration in area x. MISHCHENKOV.

The brigade has tanks on the move: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 5.

The remaining brigades of the corps, without materiel and motorized infantry, are concentrated in the forest area, west. SEMENOVKA for restoration of equipment and replenishment.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 mm rounds – 1.25 b/k

120 mm mines – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges - 1.25 b/c.

Food – 2 daily dachas.

Shtakor Task Force– RED DAWN.

5. 29 TK- during the day he fought to capture a bridgehead across the river. MEREFA. From 17.00 on August 30, 1943, having transferred all the equipment (tanks) and motorized infantry to the 25th Tank Brigade, he began regrouping in the OLD MERCHIK area.

By the end of the day on August 30, 1943, the 25th Tank Brigade, consisting of 13 T-34 tanks, completed its concentration in the western area. env. X. MANCHENKO.

The remaining brigades of the corps do not have materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry; they are concentrated in the forest, 2 km north of KURYAZHANKA.

As a result of the battle with corps units, on August 30, 1943. destroyed:

Enemy tanks – 3

Guns of different calibers – 5

Machine guns – 6

Self-propelled guns – 2

Soldiers and officers - up to 200 people.

Hull losses for 08/30/43:

T-34 tanks burned - 1

T-34 shot down - 2

Personnel killed - 7 people.

Injured - 21 people.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 mm rounds – 3 b/c

120 mm mines – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b/c.

Food for 6 days.

Shtakor Task Force– app. env. X. MANCHENKOV.

6. 1 OGKMTSP– consisting of 160 people. Motorized infantry and 4 T-34 tanks, by the end of August 30, 1943, finished concentrating in the eastern area. env. X. MANCHENKOV.

Security:

Ammunition – 2 b/k

Food – 3 daily dachas.

7. Communication with Army troops: radio, mobile equipment and communications officers.

8. The weather is cloudy with light precipitation. The roads are passable for all types of transport.

Shtarm - GORYUNY (2 km north-east. OLD MERCHIK).

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

GUARDS MAJOR GENERAL OF TANK FORCES

BASKAKOV

CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE 5th Guards Headquarters. TA

GUARD COLONEL

BELOZEROV.

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 83, pp. 3-4.

COMBAT REPORT No. 99 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Troops, General of the Army Comrade KONEV.

Combat report No. 99 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 9.30 08/31/43

I report:

1. By 7.00 on August 31, 1943, army units concentrated:

a) 181 TBR – 18 TC in the forest, 1 km south. Art. MERCHIK.

It has 10 T-34 tanks. 4 T-70 tanks.

b) 12 Guards. ICBM 5 GZMK - in the area x. MISHCHENKOV.

Has T-34 Tanks – 13.

c) 25 TBr 29 TK - concentrated in area x. IVASCHENKOV.

It has 13 T-34 tanks.

2. Reconnaissance of the area in the direction of attack was carried out. From 10.00 on August 31, 1943, the brigades went to their starting position for the attack - gardens to the south. env. DOBROPOLYE.

3. Combined corps brigades are united by Major General Comrade. SKVORTSOV.

The corps was given the task of attacking in the direction of DOBROPOLYE, x. BURIVKA, zap. env. CHEREMYSHNAYA - take possession of the high area. 184.7 x. CHELYUKOVKA, high. 200.5 with exit 5 GZMK to the western area. CHERMYSHNAYA. An advanced detachment consisting of a motorcycle regiment and 58 Guards. TP (11 T-34 tanks), - I throw it on ROLLERS.

4. Established contact with the left flank units of ZHADOV’s army and MANAGAROV’s units operating in this direction.

5. By prior agreement, the start of the attack was scheduled for 14.00 on August 31, 1943.

The final decision of Comrade MANAGAROV and have not yet received the timing of the attack. I expect at 10.00 08/31/43.

6. Headquarters - GURINY (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

NP – high. 215.6 (2 km south of Merchik station).

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

Right: Pom. Head of the Operations Department of the Guard Captain (Left)

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 124.

COMBAT REPORT No. 162 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 181ST TANK BRIGADE TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Commander 5 GTA

Copy: To the commander of 5 gmk, 18 tk

Combat Report No. 162

Headquarters 181 TBR 16.50 31.8.43 map 100000 south. outskirts of the village Artel

The brigade, fulfilling the assigned task - to act as an agricultural artel, x. Burivka, x. Chelyukovka, by 16.00 on August 31, 1943, fighting, reached a height of 204.3 and continues to fulfill its task. As a result of the battle, 5 enemy tanks were knocked out. 1 Tiger tank has been completely captured and 2 guns are being fired at the enemy. The enemy is exerting strong art. fire resistance from x. Khvorostov and machine-gun fire mound + 00. Up to 2 mortar batteries fire from direction x. Naryzhny. As a result of the battle, I had losses: 2 T-34, 1 T-70, 15 people were wounded. Of which St. was wounded. Adjutant of the 1st Guards Battalion Art. Ley-t Shkurdalov.

Beginning headquarters 181 t. br Major Popov

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 321.

COMBAT REPORT No. 95 of the Headquarters of the 18th TANK CORPS

COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

COMBAT REPORT No. 95 to 19.00 31.8.43 Shtakor 18 tank., forest 1 km. southeast POLEVOE, map 100.000 – 42 g.

1. Parts of the corps in the former areas.

2. 110 TBR – 1.5 km south of PELEVOE consisting of T-34 tanks – 4.

3. 170 tbr southwest. FIELD

4. 181 TBR, consisting of T-34 - 15 tanks, T-70 - 6 tanks, under the operational subordination of 5 GZMK, concentrated the northern forest. OL. MERCHIK (11.00).

5. 32 MSB - concentrated forest 1.5 km west. SEMENOVKA.

6. Body parts and art. regiments in the former areas.

7. Shtakor – forest 1 km southeast. FIELD.

8. Komkor and NS left in parts.

COMMANDARM 18 TK GUARDS MAJOR GENERAL TRUFANOV

CHIEF OF STAFF 18th Tank Guards. LIEUTENANT COLONEL SEMENOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 318.

COMBAT REPORT No. 215

Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS

Combat report No. 215. Shtakor 5 gZmk,

31.8.43 20.00. Card 100.000 – 42 g.

1. The enemy, after stubborn resistance, retreated beyond the railway line at 20.00. village Kharkov-Poltava and leads a strong art. min. fire from the direction forest east. X. Rogovka, zap. altitude, which is east. X. Rogovka 2 km, and south. the edges of the forest to the east. Likhovki. Observation identified up to 20 tanks in the area. Likhovka.

At 15.30 5 tanks of the pr-ka counterattacked the 12th Guards. mbr from the x direction. Shilov's attack was repulsed.

At 18.30, aircraft of up to 18 Yu-88 and Yu-87 aircraft bombed the battle formations of the units and OP corps.

2. Parts of the hull, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the project, went beyond the railway at 20.00. d.

3. 12th Guards. ICBM with 285 MP and 1104 iptap, at 15.30 they attacked from e.g. high 203.1 and by 20.00 she married. d. in the northern region X. Likhovka. It consists of: T-34 tanks - 9, T-70 - 4, active bayonets - 56. During the day of the battle it had losses - T-34 tanks - 9, personnel killed and wounded about 25- 30 people

4. 181 tbr with 694 iptap, ipa div. 286 MP, consisting of: “T-34” - 5 tanks and approx. 80 people infantry at 14.00 attacked for example. high 204.3 and by 20.00 she married. d. to the right of 12 guards. mbr. During the day of the battle it had losses: 6 T-34 tanks were burned, 1 T-70 tank. 2 T-70 tanks were shot down. 37 personnel.

5. 25 tank brigade with 108 iptap consisting of 8 T-34 tanks and personnel - 35 people. (action of bayonets) 16.30 attacked for the 12th Guards. MBR in the north-east direction. slopes 204.3 and by 20.00 reached the railway line. d. to the left of the ledge and beyond 12 mbr.

Losses per day of tanks: “T-34” - 4, “T-70” - 3, personnel about 20 people.

6. 678 GAP, 409 OTD, 76 mm 1529 ODP, 737 IPA - reserve.

7.Losses inflicted on the project during the day are being clarified.

8. KP - garden that north-east. temporary storage facility Shock

NP – elev. 186.3

9. The corps commander is slightly shell-shocked and is in the area of the command post.

For the corps commander of the Guards. General-Major TV (signature)

For the Chief of Staff of the Guards. captain (signature)

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4949, units hr. 71, l. 316.

COMBAT REPORT No. 102 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, Colonel General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 102. Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. 31.8.1943

I report:

1. Units of the 5th GZMK consisting of 181 Tank Brigade, 25 Tank Brigade, 12 Guards. ICBMs, reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30. 31.8.43 from the border of the river. MERCHIK went on the offensive in the direction of the heights. 188.7, MTF. GRUSHKI, BURIVKA and by the end of the day of August 31, 1943 they were fighting:

12th Guards ICBM - having mastered the MTF. GRUSHKI, high. 207.0, crossed the railway. and 6 tanks reached the heights. 211.1, continues to expand the occupied area, bringing up artillery.

181 TBr – having mastered the highest. 188.7 and DATSKIVKA and repulsing a counterattack of enemy tanks from TETYUSCHINA BALKA, reached the line: heights 203.4, 203.1 and continues to advance to the railway track. d.

25 Tank Brigade - attacked the enemies in the gullies south of DOBROPOLYE, reached the high line. 207.0, BARABASHI and continues to move towards the railway track.

2. ADVANCED FORCE consisting of: 1 OGKMTsP, 53 Guards. TP, having the task of capturing VALKI by the end of the day on August 31, 1943, by 19.00 on August 31, 1943, part of its forces crossed the railroad bed in the area of the booth, 2 km north. eastern KHVOROSTOVO, continues to advance in the direction of LIKHOVKA, high. 184.7.

3. For the night from 31.8.43. on 1.9.43 I assigned the task of 5 GZMK - to firmly secure a bridgehead south of the railway in the BURIVKA area, to put the units in order so that with the dawn of 1.9.43 we could continue to fulfill the task you set.

4. In the afternoon of August 31, 1943, enemy aircraft bombed the formations of Army units three times.

NP – high. Elevation 215.8.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, l. 281.

COMBAT REPORT No. 100 from the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

To the Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Troops, Army General Comrade. KONEVU.

Combat report No. 100 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank 21.00 08.31.43

I report:

1. Units of the 5th GZMK consisting of 181 Tank Brigade, 25 Tank Brigade, 12 Guards. ICBMs reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30 on 08/31/43 from the line of the river. MERCHIK went on the offensive in the direction of the heights. 188.7, MTF. GRUSHKI, BURIVKA and by the end of the day on August 31, 1943 they were fighting:

12th Guards ICBM– having mastered the MTF. GRUSHKI, high. 207.0, crossed the railway. and 6 tanks reached the heights. 211.1 continues to expand the occupied area, bringing up artillery.

181 TBr- having mastered the highest 188.7 LATSKIVKA and repulsing a counterattack of enemy tanks from the side of TETKINA BALKA reached the line: heights 204.3, 203.1 and continues to advance towards the railroad bed.

2. ADVANCED FORCE consisting of: 1 OGKMTSN, 53 Guards. TP, 578 IPTAP, having a task by the end of the day on August 31, 1943, part of the forces crossed the railroad bed in the area of the booth, 2 km northeast. KHVOROSTOVO, continues to advance in the direction of LIKHOVKA, high. 184.7.

3. For the night from 08/31/43 to 09/1/43, I assigned the task of 5 GZMK - to firmly secure a bridgehead south of the railway in the LIKHOVKA BURIVKA area, to put the units in order so that with the dawn of 09/1/43 you can continue to fulfill the task you set .

The ADVANCED FORCE was given the task of developing the attack on VALKI.

4. In the afternoon of August 31, 1943, enemy aircraft bombed the battle formations of Army units three times.

5. During the day of the battle, I have up to 25 tanks knocked out and burned by the enemy. Losses are being clarified.

6. Shtarm – x. GURINY (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK)

NP – high. Elevation 215.8.

7. Infantry 53 Arm. Comrade Managarova is not behind the battle formations of the 5th MK.

COMMANDER OF THE 5th Guards Troops TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL 5th Guards. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 125.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 49 of the Headquarters of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Operational report No. 49 by 24.00 08/31/43 Headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank. GORYUNY (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

1. The enemy was knocked out by Army units from the occupied line - the heights of the southern. DOBROPOLYE and retreated beyond the KHARKOV-POLTAVA railway line, where it provided fire resistance to the advancing Army units.

At 15.30 on August 31, 1943, 5 enemy tanks from the TETYUSHINA BALKA area counterattacked the 12th Guards. ICBM - attack repulsed.

In the afternoon, enemy aircraft in groups of up to 25 aircraft bombed the battle formations of Army units three times.

2. Parts 5 GZMK– composed of: 12 Guards. ICBM, 181 Tank Brigade 18 TK, 25 Tank Brigade 29 TK, reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30 on 08/31/43 from the line of the river. MERCHIK went on the offensive in the direction of the heights. 188, 3 MTF. GRUSHKI, BURIVKA with the task - to master the CHEREMUSHNAYA and then advance on the ROLLERS.

Having broken the enemy's resistance at the high line. south of DOBROPOLYA, repelling a counterattack - 5 enemy tanks, parts of the corps left south. zhel. dor. KHARKOV - POLTAVA, by the end of the day they are fighting on the line:

a) 181 TBr – behind the railway line. in the southern area railway booths (1 km north-east Khvorostov).

b) 12 Guards. MBR - south. slope height 211.1, which is the north. LIKHOVKA.

c) 25 TBr - at the turn of the railway. in the northern highlands area 211.1 (1 km north. LIKHOVKA).

For the night from August 31 to September 1, 1943, the corps was tasked with firmly securing the southern bridgehead. railway in the area of LIKHOVKA, BURIVKA, put the units in order and from the dawn of September 1, 1943 continue to carry out the assigned task.

Corps losses per day of battle:

T-34 tanks – 19 pcs.

T-70 tanks – 6 pcs.

Personnel killed - up to 75 people.

Losses and trophies - to be precise.

The corps has tanks on the move: T-34 - 23 units, T-70 - 4 units.

Active motorized infantry bayonets - 171 people.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 mm rounds – 1 b/k

120 mm mines – 1 b/c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b/c.

Food – 6 daily dachas.

The remaining brigades of the corps (10, 11 Guards Mechanized Brigades and 24 Guards Tank Brigades) do not have materiel (tanks) or motorized infantry. Concentrated in the western forest area. SEMENOVKA for restoration of the material part and replenishment

Shtakor – garden, south. SHOCK.

3. Vanguard Squad consisting of: 1 OGKMTsP, 53 Guards. TP, having the task of capturing VALKI by the end of 08/31/43, crossed the railway line by the end of the day. in the area of the booth (1 km north-east. KHVOROSTOV). The detachment continues to advance in the direction of LIKHOVKA, high. 184.3 ROLLERS.

The detachment has tanks on the move: T-34 – 11.

Active motorized infantry bayonets - 160 people.

Security:

Ammunition – 45 and 76 mm rounds – 1.75 b/k

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b/c.

Food – 3 daily dachas.

4. 18 TK(without 181 Tank Brigade) - does not have materiel (tanks) or motorized infantry.

During the day of 08/31/43, he restored the material in the previous concentration area - forest, south, and southeast. FIELD.

Shtakor – in the forest, 1.5 km southeast. FIELD.

5. 29 TK(without 25 tank brigade) - does not have materiel (tanks) or motorized infantry. Concentrated in the forest 2 km north. KURYAZHANKA for restoration of equipment and replenishment.

Shtakor – in the forest, 2 km north. KURYAZHANKA.

6. Communication with Army troops - radio, mobile vehicles and communications officers.

7. The weather is cloudy with light precipitation. The roads are passable for all types of transport.

Shtarm - GORYUNY (1 km northeast. OLD MERCHIK).

KP – high. from elevation 215.8.

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GV. TA

GUARDS MAJOR GENERAL OF TANK FORCES

BASKAKOV

CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE 5th Guards Headquarters. TA

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 83, pp. 5–6.

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE STEPPE FRONT ON THE LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE ARMY IN JULY-AUGUST 1943, THE NUMBER AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT AND THE NEED FOR COMPLETION OF ARMY MII,

OWL SECRET

CONTROL

5 Guards

TANK ARMY

combatant

Ref No. 00350

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT

Army General Comrade KONEVU.

Having left the area of OSTROZHSK on July 6, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army spent 2 months of heavy offensive battles.

With a counter tank battle near PROKHOROVKA, the Army took part in eliminating the summer offensive of the German army, breaking the main tank group advancing on KURSK from the south. Further, advancing west of BELGOROD towards ZOLOCHEV, and with one corps cutting off the enemy’s retreat from BELGOROD to the south, the 5th Guards Tank Army took part in the capture of BELGOROD.

In connection with the current situation in the BOGODUKHOV area, where the enemy was creating a tank group, with the task of reaching the flank and rear of our troops advancing on KHARKOV from the north, in order to disrupt this offensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army, by order of the Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade. ZHUKOVA, concentrated in the Bogodukhov area for one day, and subsequently, maneuvering in this area, did not give the enemy the opportunity to carry out his plan.

Subsequently, the 5th Guards Tank Army was again transferred to the east and, having received the task of advancing from PERESECHNAY to BUDA, by entering the KOROTYCH area, it created a threat to the enemy of the encirclement in KHARKOV. As a result, the enemy abandoned the city of KHARKOV.

In subsequent battles, the 5th Guards Tank Army received the task of attacking VALKI, which it continues to carry out.

All these battles were fought in critical sectors of the front, where the enemy offered the strongest resistance, often not even taking into account losses.

The SS Panzer Corps, which is considered one of the strongest and most reliable units of the German army, acted against the Army from the first day of entry into battle.

In all these battles, the 5th Guards Tank Army suffered heavy losses in material, weapons and personnel.

During two months of fighting, the Army lost a large number of leading officers. The deputy commander of the 5th GZMK, Major General comrade, was killed. SWAN. Of the 12 brigade commanders, 6 people were killed and wounded. A total of 1,624 officers were out of action. The losses of all personnel are equal - 18,219 people.

The army suffered heavy losses in weapons.

As of 30.8.43 there is a shortage of staff:

	Required by state	Missing.
Howitzer 122 mm

85 mm guns
76 mm guns
45 mm guns
Mortars 120 mm
Mortars 82 mm
Machine guns
Light machine guns
PPSh and PPD

The army is short of staff - 1468 vehicles.

142 radio stations were lost due to enemy fire, making control extremely difficult.

All this suggests that the Army requires replenishment not only with tanks, but also with personnel, artillery, transport, communications equipment, etc. It requires at least a minimum period of time to put itself in order, to familiarize the newly appointed command staff with their units and conducting at least one or two lessons with them based on the experience of the battles of the summer campaign of 1943.

Reporting to you on the state of the Army, I ASK you to supplement it with tanks and other types of combat equipment by at least 80% of the regular strength, in particular, to increase the number of tanks in the Army to at least 450-500 tanks.

In the same case, when the number of tanks in the Army is reduced to 150–200 tanks, the organization of tank brigades is completely disrupted and the opportunity to launch a massive tank attack and develop an offensive in depth is not provided.

Commander of the 5th Guards Troops. TA Member of the military council of the 5th Guards TA

Lieutenant General Tank. Troops of the Guards Major General of the Tank Forces

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards TA

Guard Major General Tank Forces

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UF, op. 2779, units hr. 40, pp. 288–290.

REPORT ON PERSONNEL LOSSES OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 1943.

Name

connections

Killed and died

Got sick

Missing

For other reasons

6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division

1st GKMTSKP

76th Guards min. regiment

678th Gap RGK

689th iptap

1549th tsap

1329th tsap

377th Eng. regiment

82nd department R. medical enhancements

218th r. obs.

Arm. troph. company

Ar.mast. repair avg. St.

Control of the 5th GTA

8263

10.03.2013

On March 6, 2013, a ceremonial meeting and gala concert dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the 5th Guards Red Banner Tank Army, whose headquarters was located in Bobruisk, took place at the Central House of Officers in Minsk. Veteran tankers were honored, generals and officers spoke with memories.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was formed in February-March 1943. As part of the Voronezh, Steppe, 2nd Ukrainian, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, she went through the battle route from Prokhorovka to Danzig, participated in the Battle of Kursk, battles to expand the bridgehead on the Dnieper southeast of Kremenchug, in Kirovograd, Korsun-Shevchenko, Uman-Botoshan, Belarusian, Baltic and East Prussian operations. During the war, 53 of its soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union, 14 holders of the Order of Glory of three degrees, and over 38 thousand received other state awards.

Many formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were awarded military orders, marked with the honorary names of Znamensky, Kirovograd, Korsun, Dniester, Minsk, Kovno, Molodechno, Vilna, Tannenberg. Supreme Commander-in-Chief J. V. Stalin declared 17 thanks to the army troops, the capital of the USSR, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, saluted the heroic tank crews 11 times.

In peacetime, the 5th Guards Tank Army became one of the foremost operational formations in the Ground Forces. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 21, 1974, the army was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In positions from platoon commander to battalion commander in a tank regiment of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the now Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, Lieutenant General, began his career as an officer Yu. V. Zhadobin.

More than twenty years ago, the 5th Guards Tank (from July 1946 to May 1956 - mechanized) Red Banner Army (military unit 43060), the headquarters of which was located in Bobruisk on Kirova Street, 25, ceased to exist. For almost half a century, the army lived the same life with Belarus and the city of Bobruisk, made a significant contribution to the post-war revival and subsequent development of the region.

In August 1992, the 5th Guards Tank Red Banner was reorganized into the 5th Guards Army Red Banner Corps (later the Ground Forces Command) of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.

Events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the 5th Guards Red Banner Tank Army were held in Bobruisk. A solemn ceremony of laying wreaths and flowers at Bakharov’s tank took place on Victory Square. More photos ...

Let's remember the names of the army commanders

The 5th Guards was, perhaps, the only one in Soviet army, in which subsequently served three Marshals of the Soviet Union, a Chief Marshal and two marshals of armored forces, six army generals, the seventh and ninth post-war chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the fourth Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, three deputy ministers...

Over the years of its existence, the 5th Guards Tank Army was commanded by 22 military leaders: Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov (1943–1944); Lieutenant General, Colonel General of Tank Forces Mikhail Dmitrievich Solomatin (1944 - died due to serious injury, 1945–1946); Colonel General of Tank Forces Vasily Timofeevich Volsky (1944–1945); Major General of Tank Forces Maxim Denisovich Sinenko (1945); Lieutenant Generals of Tank Forces Pavel Pavlovich Poluboyarov (1946–1949), Mikhail Fedorovich Panov (1949–1951); Colonel General of Tank Forces Mikhail Efimovich Katukov (1951–1955); Lieutenant Generals of Tank Forces Pyotr Ivanovich Kalinichenko (1955–1958), Vladimir Ivanovich Smirnov (1958–1960), Semyon Konstantinovich Kurkotkin (1960–1965), Boris Sergeevich Likhachev (1965–1967), Soltan Kekkezovich Magometov (1967–1969), Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaitsev (1969–1972), Valery Aleksandrovich Belikov (1972–1974); Lieutenant Generals Vitaly Vasilyevich Saltykov (1974–1976), Ivan Andreevich Gashkov (1976–1979), Pyotr Vasilyevich Ledyaev (1979–1982), Vyacheslav Dmitrievich Khaydorov (1982–1984), Valery Ivanovich Fursin (1984–1987), Anatoly Anatolyevich Ushakov (1987–1989); Major General Valery Vladimirovich Lagoshin (1989–1992); Lieutenant General Stanislav Stepanovich Rumyantsev (1992).

Each of the commanders of the 5th Guards Tank had rich service and combat experience and solid military-academic training. Almost all commanders graduated Military Academy The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR named after K. E. Voroshilov or the Higher Academic Courses under it. A number of them, for example P. I. Kalinichenko and S. K. Magometov, received diplomas from the Higher Academy of Artillery School with honors.

P. A. Rotmistrov, M. D. Solomatin, V. T. Volsky, M. D. Sinenko, P. P. Poluboyarov, M. F. Panov, M. E. Katukov, P. I fought in the Great Patriotic War .Kalinichenko, V. I. Smirnov, S. K. Kurkotkin, B. S. Likhachev, S. K. Magometov, M. M. Zaitsev, V. A. Belikov, V. V. Saltykov.

The heroes of the Soviet Union were M. E. Katukov (twice - 1944, 1945), M. F. Panov (1945) and P. P. Poluboyarov (1945).

In the post-war period, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to P. A. Rotmistrov (1965), S. K. Kurkotkin (1981) and M. M. Zaitsev (1983).

The tank guards always helped the city of Bobruisk when necessary, constantly feeling reciprocal care and attention. The military has glorified Bobruisk more than once in amateur folk art and sports.

Suffice it to recall that the people's theater of the garrison House of Officers was the winner of the All-Army Festival of Warriors' Creativity, dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Victory, the winner of the All-Union Amateur Arts Festival in honor of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power and other competitions. Great credit for this goes to the then artistic director of the theater V. Ya. Karpov (later Honored Cultural Worker of the Belarusian SSR) and the head of the House of Guard Officers, Lieutenant Colonel G. I. Freilekhman.

The townspeople remember how the SKA (Bobruisk) football team competed in the USSR championship (class “B”), how skillfully the army team fought in the boxing ring - two-time champion of the Soviet Union, champion of the USSR Armed Forces and the Spartakiad of friendly armies Anatoly Berezyuk and bronze medalist of the USSR championship Gennady Kaminsky...

After serving in the 5th Guards, its commanders were appointed to higher positions in the Armed Forces of the USSR and sent to military-diplomatic work.

P. A. Rotmistrov(1901–1982) ended the Great Patriotic War as deputy commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army. Then he commanded BT and MB in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, the Far East, headed a department at the Higher Military Academy (later the Military Academy of the General Staff), the Military Academy of Armored Forces, worked as an assistant to the USSR Minister of Defense for higher military educational institutions, and as inspector general Groups of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. First Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces (1962). Doctor of Military Sciences (1956). Professor (1958). He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy cemetery.

M. D. Solomatin(1894–1986) from 1946 he headed the headquarters and temporarily served as deputy commander of the BT and MB of the Soviet Army, worked as head of the department of tactics of higher formations and assistant to the head of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. Since 1959 - retired. Buried in Moscow.

V. T. Volsky(1897–1946) was under treatment since March 1945. He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy cemetery.

M. D. Sinenko(1902–1991) from 1946 he headed the 1st Guards Ulyanovsk Tank School, served as inspector general of BT and MB of the Main Inspectorate of the Soviet Army. Lieutenant General of Tank Forces (1945). Since 1952 - in reserve and retired. Buried in Moscow.

P. P. Poluboyarov(1901–1984) since 1949 - deputy and first deputy commander of the BT and MB, head of the armored personnel carrier, tank forces of the Soviet Army, military inspector-adviser of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Colonel General of Tank Forces (1949). Marshal of the Armored Forces (1962). He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy cemetery.

M. F. Panov(1901–1979) after Bobruisk, he studied at the Higher Academic Courses at the Higher Military Academy, commanded the BT and MB of the Leningrad Military District, the 7th Mechanized (Tank) Army in the Belarusian Military District, served as deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, chief engineering-tactical and command faculties of the Military Academy of Armored Forces. Since 1967 - retired. He was buried in Moscow at the Kuntsevo cemetery. The name of M. F. Panov is given to Metrostroy College No. 53 in Moscow.

M. E. Katukov(1900–1976) from 1955 he served as inspector general of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, deputy head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces, military inspector-adviser of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the Armored Forces (1959). He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy cemetery. The name of M. E. Katukov was given to the 1st Guards Chertkovsky Tank Regiment of the 9th Bobruisk-Berlin Tank Division of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, streets in Moscow, Volokolamsk, Orel and other cities, and secondary school No. 37 in Orel.

P. I. Kalinichenko(1904–1986) since 1958 - first deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District, senior representative of the High Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in the Bulgarian people's army. Since 1963 - in reserve and retired.

V. I. Smirnov(1908–1982) was buried in Minsk at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery.

S. K. Kurkotkin(1917–1990) since 1966 - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, Deputy Minister of Defense - Chief of Logistics of the USSR Armed Forces, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Colonel General (1967). Army General (1972). Marshal of the Soviet Union (1983). Honorary soldier of the 13th Guards Tank Shepetovsky Regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Kantemirovsky Division. He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy cemetery. A street in Naro-Fominsk bears the name of S. K. Kurkotkin.

B. S. Likhachev(1914–2012) in 1967–1975 - First Deputy Commander of the Baltic Military District. Since 1975 - retired. Buried in Moscow.

S. K. Magometov(1920–1989) since 1969 - chief military adviser in Syria, first deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District, chief military adviser in Afghanistan, first deputy head of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. Colonel General (1978). Since 1984 - in reserve and retired. He was buried in the city of Karachaevsk. Schools in Kislovodsk and Karachaevsk and streets in populated areas of Karachay-Cherkessia bear the name of S. K. Magometov.

M. M. Zaitsev(1923–2009) since 1972 - first deputy commander and commander of the troops of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District, commander-in-chief of the GSVG, troops of the Southern direction, military inspector-adviser of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Colonel General of Tank Forces (1976). Army General (1980). Since 1990 - retired. He was buried in Moscow at the Troekurovsky cemetery.

V. A. Belikov(1925–1987) since 1974 - first deputy commander of the Odessa Military District, commander of the North Caucasus and Carpathian Military Districts, commander-in-chief of the GSVG. Colonel General (1977). Army General (1983). He was buried in Kyiv at the Berkovtsy cemetery.

V. V. Saltykov(1925–1997) graduated military service First Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. Colonel General.

I. A. Gashkov(1928–2003) since 1979 - chief of staff of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District, commander of the troops of the Ural Military District, head of the Main Operations Directorate - deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, head of the Higher Officer Courses "Vystrel" named after Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M .Shaposhnikova, representative of the High Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in the Bulgarian People's Army. Colonel General (1982). Buried in Moscow.

P. V. Ledyaev(1938–1997) left Bobruisk for the post of first deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. He was buried in Minsk at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery.

V. D. Khaydorov(1936–1985) after the 5th Guards Army, he served as first deputy commander of the KBVO. He was buried in Minsk at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery.

V. I. Fursin(b. 1940) since 1987 he headed the headquarters of the Moscow Military District and the GSVG (Western Group of Forces).

A. A. Ushakov(1942–2005) since 1989 - senior group of Soviet military specialists in Algeria. He was buried in Bobruisk at the Minsk cemetery.

V.V.Lagoshin from Bobruisk he was sent as a military adviser to Afghanistan.

S. S. Rumyantsev(b. 1940) until recently headed the Mogilev regional organization of the public association “Belarusian Union of Officers”.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Vsevolod GRINYAK,

Commander of the 5th Tank Army on Kursk. Fifth Guards Tank Army

PERSONNEL

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 97

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 82

TsAMO RF, f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, units hr. 67, l. 117

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