Operational - strategic games. Chief of the General Staff (1941)

Zhukov vs. Halder [Clash of military geniuses] Runov Valentin Aleksandrovich

The work of the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941

In 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by G.K. Zhukov carried out his work in parallel in several directions.

Measures continued to strengthen the Red Army and increase its combat power, primarily through the entry into the troops of new types of weapons and military equipment.

Tanks. In this regard, much attention was paid to the creation of large formations of tank troops and equipping them with new military equipment. After the February 1941 conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the creation of large tank formations moved faster. New mechanized corps began to deploy. For their armament, in the first half of the same year, it was possible to produce 1,500 tanks of new designs. All of them entered the troops, but due to lack of time they were not properly mastered. The human factor also played a significant role - many military commanders did not dare to launch new models of tanks into intensive operation without a command from above, but such a command was not forthcoming.

Artillery. By the beginning of the war, artillery management was carried out by the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, which was headed by Marshal Soviet Union G.I. Sandpiper. His deputy was Colonel General of Artillery N.N. Voronov. On June 14, 1941, Colonel General of Artillery N.D. was appointed head of the GAU. Yakovlev. Directly in the troops there were artillery chiefs of districts, armies, corps, and divisions. Military artillery was divided into regimental, divisional and corps. There was also RKG artillery, which consisted of cannon and howitzer regiments, separate high-power divisions and anti-tank artillery brigades. The cannon artillery regiment had 48 122 mm cannons and 152 mm howitzer guns, and the high-power cannon regiment had 24 152 mm cannons. The howitzer artillery regiment had 48 152 mm howitzers, and the high power howitzer regiment had 24 152 mm howitzers. Individual high-power divisions were armed with five 210-mm cannons, or 280-mm mortars, or 305-mm howitzers.

Characteristics of the staffing level of the mechanized corps of the western border military districts as of June 22, 1941

By June 1941, prototypes of rocket launchers, the future Katyushas, ​​were manufactured. But their mass production has not yet been established. There were also no specialists capable of effectively operating these new weapons.

There was a big lag in anti-tank artillery in the Red Army. Only in April 1941 did the Soviet command begin to form artillery brigades of the RGK. According to the state, each brigade was supposed to have 120 anti-tank guns and 4,800 anti-tank mines.

Cavalry. Despite the predilection for cavalry of individual Soviet military leaders, its share in the structure of the ground forces by the beginning of the war had noticeably decreased, and it accounted for only 5% of their total number. Organizationally, the cavalry consisted of 13 divisions, eight of which were part of four cavalry corps. The cavalry division had four cavalry and one tank regiment (almost 7.5 thousand personnel, 64 tanks, 18 armored vehicles, 132 guns and mortars). If necessary, a cavalry division could fight dismounted, like an ordinary rifle formation.

Corps of Engineers. Issues of engineering support were dealt with by the Main Engineering Directorate, which until March 12, 1941 was headed by Major General of the Engineering Troops A.F. Khrenov, and from March 20 - Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar. Engineering units were deployed among the troops, but they technical support was very weak. Basically, the calculation was made on a shovel, an ax and improvised Construction Materials. In peacetime, sappers hardly dealt with issues of mining and demining areas. Since 1940, almost all engineering units of the border military districts were constantly involved in the construction of fortified areas on the new border of the USSR and were not engaged in combat training.

Connection. All issues of strategic communications and supply of troops with communications equipment were assigned to the Red Army Communications Directorate, which since July 1940 was headed by Major General N.I. Gapich. By that time, front-line, army, corps and divisional radio communication sets had been developed and entered into service with the troops, but not all of them had been sufficiently mastered. In addition, many commanders did not trust radio communications, and also did not know how to use it from the point of view of ensuring secrecy of control.

Air defense. To solve air defense problems on a strategic scale, the Main Directorate of the country's air defense forces was created in 1940. His boss at first was Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, and from March 19, 1941 - Colonel General G.M. Stern. On June 14, 1941, Colonel General of Artillery N.N. was appointed to this post. Voronov.

To solve air defense problems, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into air defense zones in accordance with the boundaries of military districts. The zones were headed by assistant district commanders for air defense. To solve specific problems, subordinate to the Main Directorate of the country's air defense forces there were anti-aircraft artillery forces, searchlight, balloon units, as well as fighter aviation formations.

To solve air defense problems, 39 fighter aviation regiments were allocated from the aviation formations of the military districts, which organizationally remained subordinate to the air force commanders of the districts. In this regard, the assistant commander of the military district for air defense, who was subordinate to the anti-aircraft artillery units, had to coordinate all issues of the use of aviation for air defense purposes with the commander of the Air Force.

The military air defense was equipped with anti-aircraft cannons and machine guns, but there were few of these weapons in rifle and tank formations, and in practice they could not provide reliable cover for the entire troop concentration area.

Aviation. Aviation was equipped primarily with aircraft of outdated designs. There were very few new combat vehicles. Thus, an armored attack aircraft designed by A.S. The Ilyushin Il-2, created in 1939, began to enter service only in 1941. Fighter designed by A.S. Yakovlev Yak-1, accepted for mass production in 1940, also began to enter service with the troops in 1941.

The head of the Air Force Main Directorate since April 1941 was Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, who from November 1937 to September 1938 commanded a group of Soviet “volunteer” pilots in China.

Flight performance and combat characteristics of Soviet aircraft

Then, as a result of massive purges among the senior command staff of the Air Force, he made a quick career and in December 1940 became the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force.

There was an increase in the total number of personnel of the Red Army. As of June 22, there were already 5 million people under arms in the USSR Armed Forces. Of this number, the Ground Forces accounted for 80.6%, the Air Force - 8.6%, the Navy - 7.3%, and the Air Defense Forces - 3.3%. In addition, numerous reserves were prepared. At the same time, the level of specialization of reservists was not very high. They proceeded from the fact that more than 1.4 million tractor and car drivers worked on collective farms alone, and they could quickly be transferred to combat vehicles if necessary. Throughout the country, the Osoaviakhim system trained pilots, radio operators, parachutists, and infantry riflemen.

Reconnaissance of a potential enemy. As soon as he took up his new position, G.K. Zhukov called the boss Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova. He arrived exactly at the appointed time and entered the office of the Chief of the General Staff with a large folder in his hands. In a well-trained voice he began to confidently report...

In the last months before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence worked quite actively. Already on January 12, 1941, intelligence report No. 2 of the Office of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that on December 9, the commander-in-chief of the German land army Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, who reviewed the troops and fortifications in the area. The same report reported the arrival of new German units in the border zone, the construction there of barracks for personnel, concrete firing points, loading and unloading areas on the railway and airfields.

Following this, there are frequent cases of violations of the State Border of the USSR by the German side. Thus, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR on January 24, 1941, in his report also reports the deployment in Warsaw of the army headquarters, and on the territory of the border counties - the headquarters of the army corps, eight headquarters of infantry and one cavalry divisions, 28 infantry, seven artillery, three cavalry and one tank regiment, two aviation schools.

F. I. Golikov – Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army

Below it was reported: “From the conclusion of the Convention to January 1, 1941, a total of 187 different conflicts and incidents arose on the border with Germany... During the reporting period, 87 cases of border violations by German aircraft were recorded... Three German aircraft were grounded after flying across the border... which were subsequently released to Germany.

One German plane was shot down as a result of the use of weapons on March 17, 1940, in the area of ​​the 10th outpost of the Augustow Border Detachment.”

In connection with the need to maximize the intelligence and operational work of state security bodies and the increased volume of this work, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on February 3, 1941 adopted a special Resolution on the division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into two people's commissariats: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's Commissariat State Security Commissariat (NKGB). The NKGB is entrusted with the tasks of conducting intelligence work abroad and combating subversive, espionage, sabotage, and terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR. He is also entrusted with the operational development and elimination of the remnants of all anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various segments of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc., as well as with the protection of party and government leaders. The same Resolution ordered the organization of republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and NKVD.

On February 8, 1941, the following Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was adopted on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR. “Assign special departments of the NPO and the NKVMF (Third Directorates) with the following tasks: to combat counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and Navy; identifying and informing, respectively, the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar Navy about all the shortcomings and condition of the army and navy units and about all available compromising materials and information on military personnel of the army and navy.”

The same document determined that “all appointments of the operational personnel of the Third Directorates of the NKO and NKVMF, starting with the operational regiment and the corresponding unit in the fleet, are made by orders people's commissars Defense and Navy." Thus, powerful punitive bodies arose in the structure of the Red Army and Navy, possessing enormous powers and not accountable to the commanders and commanders of the formations under which they operated. It was determined that the head of the 3rd department of the corps was subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the district (front) and the commander of the troops of the district (front), and the head of the 3rd department of the division was subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the corps and the commander of the corps.

On February 7, 1941, the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR reported rumors spreading among the diplomatic corps in Moscow about an impending German attack on the USSR. At the same time, it was indicated that the target of Germany’s attack was the southern regions of the USSR, rich in grain, coal and oil.

Around February 8, the same information was confirmed by the agent of the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican", and on March 9, 1941, a telegraphic report was received from Belgrade from the military attache to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. It reported that “the German General Staff abandoned the attack on the English islands, the immediate task set is the capture of Ukraine and Baku, which should be carried out in April-May of this year, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing for this.”

In March 1941, two more secret messages arrived from Berlin from an agent nicknamed “The Corsican.” The first reported on the preparation of the German Air Force for military action against the USSR.

In the second, Germany’s plans for a war against the USSR were once again confirmed. At the same time, it was indicated that the main target of the aggressor could be the grain-producing Ukraine and the oil regions of Baku. Also cited were statements by the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F. Halder, about the low combat capability of the Red Army. Both of these messages were reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On March 24, 1941, a message was received from the Berlin residency of the NKGB of the USSR about the preparation of the General Aviation Staff for military action against the USSR. And this document emphasizes that “aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular the city of Kyiv.

There is an opinion among aviation headquarters officers that a military offensive against the USSR is supposedly timed for the end of April or the beginning of May. These dates are associated with the intention of the Germans to preserve the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops during their retreat would not be able to set fire to the green grain.”

On March 31, 1941, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR about the advance of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union. There was talk about the transfer of specific formations and units of the German army. In particular, he reported that “at the border points of the General Government against the Brest region, the German authorities proposed to vacate all schools and additionally prepare premises for the arrival of the expected military units of the German army.”

At the beginning of April 1941, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR reported to his superiors that, on his instructions in Berlin, an agent nicknamed “Starshina” met with another agent nicknamed “Corsican”. At the same time, “Starshina,” citing other sources, reported the full preparation and development of a plan for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union. According to available information, “the army’s operational plan consists of a lightning-fast surprise attack on Ukraine and an advance to the east. From East Prussia a blow is simultaneously launched to the north. German troops moving north must link up with the army coming from the south, thereby cutting off the Soviet troops located between these lines, closing their flanks. The centers remain unattended, following the example of the Polish and French campaigns."

S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov during exercises (spring 1941)

On April 5, 1941, the Directorate of Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported on the construction of airfields and landing sites by the Germans in the strips bordering the USSR. In total, from the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built and restored in Poland. During this time, 250 airfields and 150 landing sites were built directly on the territory of Germany itself.

On April 10, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR reports specific data on the concentration to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army German troops on the Soviet border and the transfer of new formations and units there. At the same time, the agent of the Berlin station “Juna” reports about plans for German aggression against the USSR.

On April 21, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NGOs of the USSR received another message from the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria about the receipt by the NKVD border detachments of new intelligence data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border.

At the end of April 1941, Moscow received another message from Berlin from an agent working in Germany under the name “Starshina”, with the following content:

“A source working at the headquarters of the German army reports:

1. According to information received from the liaison officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headquarters of the German aviation, Gregor, the question of Germany’s action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided, and its beginning should be expected any day now. Ribbentrop, who until now had not been a supporter of speaking out against the USSR, knowing Hitler's firm determination on this issue, took the position of supporting an attack on the USSR.

2. According to information received at the aviation headquarters, in recent days there has been an increase in activity in cooperation between the German and Finnish General Staffs, expressed in the joint development of operational plans against the USSR...

The reports of the German aviation commission, which visited the USSR, and the air attaché in Moscow, Aschenbrenner, made a depressing impression at the aviation headquarters. However, they hope that, although Soviet aviation is capable of inflicting a serious blow on German territory, the German army will nevertheless quickly be able to suppress resistance Soviet troops, reaching the strongholds of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.

3. According to information received from Leibrandt, who is a referent on Russian affairs at the foreign policy department, Gregor’s message is confirmed that the issue of moving against the Soviet Union is considered resolved.”

The postscript to this message indicates that it was reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria by the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin on April 30, 1941, but the document does not contain resolutions of any of the named persons.

On the same day, April 30, 1941, an alarming message was received from Warsaw. It stated: “According to intelligence data received from various sources, in recent days it has been established that military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of the General Government are being carried out openly and German officers and soldiers are speaking quite frankly about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union. about a matter already decided. The war should supposedly begin after the end of spring field work...

From April 10 to April 20, German troops moved through Warsaw to the east continuously, both during the night and during the day... Trains loaded mainly with heavy artillery, trucks and aircraft parts travel along the railways in the eastern direction. Since mid-April, Red Cross trucks and vehicles have appeared in large numbers on the streets of Warsaw.

The German authorities in Warsaw gave an order to urgently put all bomb shelters in order, darken all windows, and create Red Cross sanitary squads in every house. All vehicles of private individuals and civilian institutions, including German ones, were mobilized and selected for the army. Since the beginning of April, all schools and courses have been closed, and their premises are occupied by military hospitals.”

This message was also reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On May 6, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army F.I. Golikov made a special report “On the grouping of German troops in the east and southeast on May 5, 1941.” This message directly indicated on many points that Germany was preparing for war against the USSR. The conclusions stated: “In two months, the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12 divisions. With the Romanian and Hungarian armies this will amount to about 130 divisions."

On May 30, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army received a telegraphic report from Tokyo. It reported:

“Berlin informs Ott that the German offensive against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that war will start. The circumstantial evidence I see for this currently is:

The technical department of the German Air Force in my city received instructions to return soon. Ott demanded that BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. The transport of rubber through the USSR has been reduced to a minimum.

Reasons for the German action: the existence of a powerful Red Army does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must maintain a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be driven away as quickly as possible. That's what Ott said."

The message was signed: “Ramsay (Sorge).” But even on this message there is no resolution from any of the leaders of the Soviet state.

On May 31, 1941, on the desk of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov received a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660569 with the following content:

During the second half of May, the main German command, using the forces freed in the Balkans, carried out:

1. Restoration of the Western group to fight England.

2. Increase in forces against the USSR.

3. Concentration of reserves of the main command.

The general distribution of the German armed forces is as follows:

– against England (on all fronts) – 122–126 divisions;

– against the USSR – 120–122 divisions;

– reserve – 44–48 divisions.

The specific distribution of German forces against England:

– in the West – 75–80 divisions;

- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR...

The distribution of German forces against the USSR by direction is as follows:

a) in East Prussia - 23–24 divisions, including 18–19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction against ZapOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - 35–36 divisions, including 24–25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry regiments;

d) in Slovakia (area Zbrov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

e) in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

f) in Moldova and Northern Dobruja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;

g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment.

The reserves of the main command are concentrated:

a) in the center of the country - 16–17 divisions;

b) in the area of ​​Breslau, Moravska-Ostrava, Kattowice - 6–8 divisions;

c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and to the west of it) - 11 divisions ... "

This document says: “Read by Zhukov 11.6.41.”

On June 2, about the concentration of large formations of the German and Romanian armies on the border with the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received certificates from the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the authorized representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in Moldova. Then, certificates from the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine about German military activities on the border with the USSR are received almost every day. On June 11, an agent of the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR, acting under the name “Starshina,” reports about the impending German attack on the USSR in the near future. On June 12, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received a message through the NKVD of the USSR about the strengthening of intelligence activities by the German side on the border with the USSR and in border areas. In accordance with this message, from January 1 to June 10, 1941, 2,080 border violators were detained by Germany.

On June 16, NKGB agents working in Berlin under the nicknames “Old Man,” “Sergeant Major,” and “Corsican” received messages about the timing of a German attack on the Soviet Union in the coming days. At the same time, the structural divisions of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR, in parallel with reports on the state of affairs at the border, continue to engage in routine paperwork.

On June 19, the NKGB of Belarus sends a special message about military mobilization preparations to the NKGB of the USSR fascist Germany to war against the USSR. This message contains extensive information about the redeployment and deployment of German troops to the Soviet border. There is talk of a concentration of a large number of formations, units, combat aircraft, artillery pieces, boats and vehicles in the border areas.

On this day, the resident of the NKGB “Tit”, who worked in Rome, reports that German military operations against the USSR will begin between June 20 and 25, 1941.

On June 20, 1941, a telegraph message arrived from Sofia to the head of the intelligence department of the Red Army. It literally said the following: “The source said today that a military clash is expected on June 21 or 22, that there are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 5 in Finland, 10 in Hungary and 7 in Slovakia. A total of 60 motorized divisions. The courier, who arrived by plane from Bucharest, says that in Romania mobilization is over and military action is expected at any moment. There are currently 10 thousand German troops in Bulgaria.”

There is also no resolution in this message.

On the same day (June 20, 1941), a telegraph message also arrived from Sorge to the head of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate from Tokyo. In it, the intelligence officer writes: “The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable. German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last great European army as well as it was done at the very beginning (of the war), because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR are still no more ineffective than they were in the defense of Poland.

Insest told me that the Japanese General Staff is already discussing the position to be taken in the event of war.

The proposal for Japanese-American negotiations and the issues of internal struggle between Matsuoka, on the one hand, and Hiranuma, on the other, have stalled because everyone is waiting for a solution to the issue of relations between the USSR and Germany.”

This report was received by the 9th department at 17:00 on June 21, 1941, but there is no resolution on it either.

On the evening of June 20, the next intelligence report of the NKGB of the USSR No. 1510 was compiled on Germany’s military preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. It states the concentration of German troops near the border with the USSR and the preparation of fascist troops for military action. In particular, it is said that machine guns and anti-aircraft guns are installed in some houses in Klaipeda, that in the Kostomolota area timber has been harvested for building bridges across the Western Bug River, that in the Radom district of 100 settlements the population was evicted to the rear, that German intelligence sent its agents to the USSR for short periods of time - three to four days. These events cannot be regarded as anything other than direct preparation for the aggression that should occur in the coming days.

As a result of the analysis of all these documents, we can conclude that Soviet intelligence on the territory of Germany and its allies worked quite successfully. Information about Hitler's decision to attack the USSR and the beginning of preparations for this action began to reach the Soviet Union more than a year before the start of the aggression.

Simultaneously with reconnaissance through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GRU, the western military districts also conducted reconnaissance, which constantly and in some detail reported on the preparation of Germany and its allies for war against the USSR. Moreover, as we approached the fateful date, these reports became more frequent and more specific. From their contents there was no doubt about Germany's intentions. The measures that were carried out on the other side of the border could no longer be reversed, but inevitably had to result in a military operation of a strategic scale. This concerned the resettlement of the local population from the border strip, the saturation of this strip with troops, the clearing of the border strip from mines and other engineering obstacles, the mobilization of vehicles, the deployment of field hospitals, the storage of large quantities of artillery shells on the ground and much more.

The top Soviet leadership and the command of the Red Army had information about the composition and deployment of troops in the border military districts of the Soviet Union by the fascist command, which were received and summarized already in early February 1941, almost 5 months before the start of the aggression, and practically corresponded to reality.

However, the fact that many intelligence reports do not have the signatures of the highest leaders of the state and the highest ranks of the country's military leadership suggests that they were either not communicated to these individuals or were ignored by these individuals. The first is actually excluded by the practice of the Soviet bureaucratic machine of that time. The second is possible in two cases: firstly, distrust of information sources; secondly, the stubborn reluctance of the country's top leadership to abandon the vision they had developed for the upcoming course of events.

As is known, in the last peaceful months, the General Staff received orders of only a general nature to the troops. No specific reaction of the Soviet government and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the situation developing at the borders of the USSR was indicated. Moreover, the Soviet leadership and the General Staff constantly warned the local command “not to succumb to provocations,” which negatively affected the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border. Apparently, interaction and mutual information between the bodies of the NKGB, NKVD and the headquarters of the Red Army were poorly established.

Although it should be recognized that measures were carried out by the NKVD aimed at strengthening border security. Thus, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belarusian district, in order to strengthen the protection of the state border, issued a special order on June 20, 1941. In accordance with this order, it was prescribed that “the calculation of people for service should be structured so that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people, with the exception of those returning from detachments, would serve on the border. Set up posts on individual, most vulnerable flank directions for ten days under the command of the assistant head of the outpost.”

Thus, the impression is created that the Soviet leadership deliberately ignored the abundant intelligence information received from various sources about Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR. Some researchers say that this was a special line of behavior of the top Soviet leadership, which in every possible way sought to delay the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the Red Army. Others argue that in 1940 and early 1941, the Soviet leadership was more concerned with internal problems arising in the new territories annexed to the USSR in 1939–1940 than with issues of external threat. IN last years There are also authors who write that the behavior of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and in particular the position of I.V. Stalin, was a manifestation of the leader’s hatred of his people.

Of course, all these are only subjective conclusions of various researchers. What do the facts say? Before me is an extract from the instructions of the Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army dated May 15, 1941. It says:

“At present, the USSR is the only European power that, having powerful armed forces, is not drawn into a world conflict. In addition, the volume of Soviet economic resources so great that Europe, in the face of a continuing naval blockade, can be provided with raw materials and food from this reserve.

It seems that until now the USSR, following survival tactics, seeks to use the depletion of the forces of both belligerents to strengthen its own position... However, the turn of events over the past two months makes it seem that the USSR will not be able to carry out its plans in their original form and, probably, will be drawn into the war earlier than expected.

Indeed, according to numerous reports received recently, the seizure of southern Russia and the overthrow of the Soviet regime is now part of the plan being developed by the Axis countries...

According to other reports, Russia, worried that it finds itself alone in the face of Germany, whose funds have not yet been touched, is seeking to buy time to keep its dangerous neighbor at bay. The Russians satisfy all German demands of an economic nature..."

On the same day, a memorandum from the German Foreign Ministry on German-Soviet relations was adopted. It notes that “as in the past, difficulties arose in connection with the fulfillment of German obligations on supplies to the USSR, especially in the field of weapons.” German side admits: “We will continue to be unable to meet delivery deadlines. However, Germany’s failure to fulfill its obligations will begin to affect only after August 1941, since until then Russia is obliged to make supplies in advance.” Below it was stated: “The situation with the supply of Soviet raw materials still presents a satisfactory picture. The following most important raw materials were delivered in April:

grain – 208,000 tons;

oil – 90,000 tons;

cotton – 8300 tons;

non-ferrous metals - 6340 tons of copper, tin and nickel...

Total deliveries for the current year are calculated as follows:

grain - 632,000 tons;

oil – 232,000 tons;

cotton – 23,500 tons;

manganese ore – 50,000 tons;

phosphates – 67,000 tons;

platinum – 900 kilograms.”

Of course, these supplies stopped with the outbreak of hostilities. But there is numerous evidence that trains with Soviet raw materials were heading to German territory as early as June 22, 1941. Some of them were captured by German troops in the border areas in the first days of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, there was more than enough intelligence information about Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR. G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs “Memories and Reflections” also writes that this information was known to the General Staff, and immediately admits: “During the period of the brewing of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I. IN. Stalin in the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and to prove the need to implement urgent measures provided for in the operational mobilization plan. Of course, these measures would not guarantee complete success in repelling the enemy onslaught, since the forces of the parties were far from equal. But our troops could have entered the battle in a more organized manner and, therefore, inflicted significantly greater losses on the enemy. This is confirmed by the successful defensive actions of units and formations in the areas of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russkaya, Przemysl and on sections of the Southern Front.”

Below G.K. Zhukov writes: “Now there are different versions about whether we knew or not the specific date of the start of the war.

I cannot say for sure whether I.V. was informed truthfully. Stalin may have received it personally, but he didn’t tell me.

True, he once told me:

– One person conveys to us very important information about the intentions of the German government, but we have some doubts...

Perhaps they were talking about R. Sorg, whom I learned about after the war.

Could the military leadership independently and in a timely manner reveal the exit of enemy troops directly to the original areas from where their invasion began on June 22? In those conditions it was extremely difficult to do this.

In addition, as it became known from captured maps and documents, the command of the German troops concentrated on the borders at the very last moment, and its armored troops, located at a considerable distance, were transferred to their original areas only on the night of June 22.”

The closest deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was the head of the Operations Directorate. On the eve of the war, this position was held by Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin. He was a relatively young general (born in 1901), who graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. in 1929. Frunze studied for a year at the Academy of the General Staff, from which he was released early in 1937 due to the arrests of many military leaders.

He served as chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District during the liberation campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, and since 1940 he headed the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. According to the memoirs of many contemporaries, N.F. Vatutin was a competent and thinking person, capable of solving voluminous and complex problems. He had some experience in planning military operations as part of the final operations of the Soviet-Finnish War and the actions of troops of the military district during the liberation campaign. But this experience was clearly not enough to solve problems on the scale of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, even from the available messages, the correct conclusions were not always drawn that could promptly and authoritatively guide senior management. Here, in this regard, are some documents from the military archive.

On March 20, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General F.I. Golikov presented a report to management that contained information of exceptional importance. This document outlined options for possible directions of attacks by Nazi troops during an attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the Barbarossa plan by Hitler’s command, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of this plan.

...According to our military attache on March 14, the report further stated, the German major said: “We are heading east, to the USSR. We will take bread, coal, oil from the USSR. Then we will be invincible and can continue the war with England and America.”

N. F. Vatutin – Head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1939–1941)

However, the conclusions from the information presented in the report essentially removed all their significance. At the end of his report, General F.I. Golikov wrote:

"1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible time for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of a peace honorable for Germany with it.

2. Rumors and documents speaking about the inevitability of war against the USSR in the spring of this year must be regarded as disinformation emanating from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence.”

So, F.I. Golikov served as head of the Intelligence Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff from July 1940. His report was prepared for the country's top leadership and was classified as “exceptional importance.” Such reports are usually prepared very carefully and cannot be based on the words of some “German major.” They require the collection and analysis of dozens, or even hundreds of different sources of information, and, as other military leaders testify, such information was received, including from the military attache in Berlin, and residents of human intelligence in countries allied with Germany.

Now about the agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (now the Main Intelligence Directorate). This body exists mainly to conduct military intelligence in the interests of the country's security and carefully study a potential enemy. The arrival of German troops on Polish territory created ideal conditions for organizing intelligence work in this country. Czechoslovakia, occupied by Germany, was also a good field for Soviet military intelligence activities. Hungary has been considered for many years Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, which required an expanded intelligence network there. The Soviet Union had only recently ended the war with Finland and had no reason to trust its government. Romania was also offended by the rejection of Moldavia and Bessarabia and therefore required constant close attention. And there is no doubt that the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff had its agents in these countries and received relevant information from them. One has to doubt the quality of this agency, information and the correctness of F.I.’s reaction to it. Golikova and G.K. Zhukova.

Secondly, from January 14, 1941 G.K. Zhukov already worked at the General Staff (Politburo Resolution No. P25/85 dated January 14, 1941 on the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of military districts), got up to speed, got acquainted with his deputies, heads of departments and departments. Twice - on January 29 and 30 - he, together with the People's Commissar of Defense, was at a reception with I.V. Stalin. He constantly received alarming information from the Soviet-German border, knew about the Red Army’s unpreparedness for war with Germany, and in early February he gave instructions to the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General G.K. Malandin, by March 22, prepare an updated operational plan in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Then, on February 12, together with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the head of the Organizational-Mobilization Directorate, Major General G.K. Chetvertikov. Zhukov represented I.V. Stalin's mobilization plan, which was approved with virtually no amendments. Thus, it turns out that the General Staff was thoroughly preparing to repel fascist aggression.

The meeting at which the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army made a report took place on March 20, 1941, when G.K. Zhukov had been serving as Chief of the General Staff for almost two months and had done some work to increase the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. At the same meeting, of course, was the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko. Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.I. Golikov reports to the country’s leadership conclusions that are fundamentally at odds with the conclusions of his direct superiors, and S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov does not react to this in any way. Allow this situation, knowing the tough character of G.K. Zhukov, absolutely impossible.

Before me is the major work of retired Colonel General Yuri Aleksandrovich Gorkov, “The Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff,” which the author developed over the course of seven years, being a consultant to the Historical Archive and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff. In the appendix he provides an extract from I.V.’s visit logs. Stalin in his Kremlin office, starting in 1935. From this journal it follows that S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov and P.V. Rychagov (Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force) were received by I.V. Stalin on February 2 and deliberated for almost two hours.

Next time they, as well as S.M. Budyonny and Chetverikov visited this high office on February 12 to approve the mobilization plan.

On February 22, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin except S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukova, S.M. Budyonny, K.A. Meretskova, P.V. Rychagova were also present G.I. Kulik (chief of the Main Directorate of Artillery of the Red Army) and the famous test pilot General M.M. Gromov (head of the Flight Research Institute), as well as all members of the Politburo of the RCP (b). This meeting took place from 17.15 to 21.00.

On February 25, for an appointment with I.V. Stalin is again invited to S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, as well as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, General F.A. Astakhov. The presence of two leading military pilots at a meeting with the head of state speaks either of special tasks for this branch of the Armed Forces, or of some important information received from aerial reconnaissance. The discussion of these issues took almost two hours.

March 1 for an appointment with I.V. Stalin is again invited to S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.I. Kulik, as well as the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P.F. Zhigarev and member of the Economic Council for the Defense Industry under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR P.N. Goremykin. The meeting takes 2 hours 45 minutes.

On March 8, for a meeting with I.V. S.K. arrived at Stalin at 20.05. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, S.M. Budyonny, P.V. Leverages and conferred until 11 p.m.

The next meeting with the military is at I.V. Stalin took place on March 17, 1941, and was attended by S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, P.F. Zhigarev. They deliberated from 15.15 to 23.10, but apparently did not reach a final agreement. Therefore, the next day S.K. was invited to the head of state. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, P.V. Rychagov and G.I. Kulik, who were in I.V.’s office. Stalin from 19.05 to 21.10, and as a result of this meeting, the Politburo resolution on mobilization fees No. 28/155, prepared on March 3, 1941, was adopted.

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In the first game, the North-Western Front of the “Easterns” was headed by the commander of the troops of the Western Special Military District, Colonel General of Tank Forces D. G. Pavlov, and the North-Eastern Front of the “Western”, which opposed him, was headed by the commander of the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District, Army General G. K. . Zhukov. In the second game they switched sides: the Southwestern Front of the “eastern” was commanded by G.K. Zhukov, with opposite side The South-Eastern Front is D. G. Pavlov, and the Southern Front is the commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Lieutenant General F. I. Kuznetsov.
What emerged from the analysis of game documents?
First of all, the developers of the game script from the General Staff, as it turned out, were not much mistaken with the date of the possible start of the war: according to the tasks for the games, the “Western”, together with their allies, without completing deployment, carried out an attack on the “Eastern” on July 15, 1941 d. This is an extremely important fact for the discussion about the events of 1941: even in the documents of the games, reliably hidden from prying eyes, the “eastern” (i.e., the USSR) were considered not as an attacking party, but as an object of aggression by their western neighbors. Thus, six months before June 22, the question of an attack on Germany was not discussed, since it was not raised. M.I. Meltyukhov believes that the decision on war with Germany and the plan for such a war were adopted on October 14, 1940. But in “Considerations on the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941,” which he has With M.I. Meltyukhov in mind, all possible opponents of the USSR were considered both in the West and in the East. And although Germany was considered the main, most powerful enemy, the document does not even contain a hint that the USSR could start a war against it. In the event of a German attack, the “Considerations...” stated as a priority task: “1. Strongly cover our borders with active defense during the period of concentration of troops.”

The beginning of the war with the USSR in Germany was viewed completely differently. The General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces on November 29 - December 7, 1940 (i.e., a month earlier than the Soviet military leaders did) also held a war game on cards under the leadership of the first Ober-Quartermeister (Chief of Operations), Major General F. Paulus. But in this game the reality of the already established outlines for the plan of aggression against the USSR was tested: on November 29, the invasion of German troops into the border zone of the USSR and the battle in it were played out, a “discussion of operational capabilities after achieving the first operational goal” was held. On December 3, the actions of German troops during their advance to the Minsk-Kyiv line were practiced, and on December 7, possible options for action beyond this line were played out. Based on the results of each stage of the game, the grouping of German troops, the distribution of forces in directions, the operational tasks of the formations and other issues were clarified. The results of the game were discussed with the commanders of the army groups and taken into account in the operational documents under the Barbarossa plan, approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

Thus, the games clearly indicated the intentions of the parties: the Wehrmacht was going to attack, the Red Army was planning to repel the attack and then go on the offensive. However, if the German generals considered the actions of their troops after the attack step by step, then in the games held by the General Staff of the Red Army, no tasks related to the actions of the “Easterns” to repel aggression were solved, since it was the initial period of the war that was completely excluded from the game. It was briefly mentioned in the tasks for the games as a stage that preceded them. Thus, according to the instructions for the first game, the “Western”, having carried out an attack on the “Eastern” on July 15, 1941, by July 23-25 ​​advanced through the territory of Belarus and Lithuania 70-120 km east of the border, reaching the line Osovets, Skidel, Lida, Kaunas, Siauliai. However, as a result of the retaliatory strikes of the “eastern”, by August 1, the “western” were thrown back to their original position, to the border. The first game itself began from this position. According to the instructions for the second game, South-Eastern Front The “Western” and their allies began hostilities on August 1, 1941 against the Lvov-Ternopil group of the “Easterns” and invaded the territory of Ukraine to a depth of 50-70 km, however, at the line of Lviv, Kovel, they were met with a strong counterattack from the South- Western Front“eastern” and, having lost up to 20 infantry divisions, by the end of August 8, retreated to a previously prepared line. At the same time, the Southwestern Front not only threw the enemy back to the border, but also transferred military operations to the west of it to a depth of 90-120 km, reaching the armies of the right wing of the front of the Vistula and Dunajets rivers, Only Southern Front“southern” began the game with a small part of the territory of Moldova and Ukraine captured by him.

Let us emphasize: the fact that this is exactly how the initial period of the war developed, according to the initial situation for the games, is of no merit to either G.K. Zhukov, D.G. Pavlov, or F.I. Kuznetsov as commanders of the fronts. This problem was solved for them by the employees of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, who compiled the tasks for the games. But how the “Eastern” managed to repel the attack so quickly and effectively - nothing was said about this in the assignments. Contrary to the above statements of military leaders and historians, in the games there was not even an attempt to consider the actions of the “eastern” (i.e., the Red Army) in the event of an attack by a real enemy, although the opportunity to play out this situation (which, unfortunately, turned out to be the last) presented itself. Its implementation would be very timely and useful, especially in conditions when, according to the above testimony of A. M. Vasilevsky, “the proximity of war was already felt quite clearly.”
Consequently, no matter what the plan for covering state borders was at that time - good or bad, it had absolutely no significance for the games: this plan, in accordance with the initial situation for the games, was successfully implemented, and in a matter of days. Obviously, such an outcome of the initial period of the war was taken for granted by the game developers (i.e., the General Staff), especially in conditions when the overall superiority in forces and means, especially in tanks and aviation, was on the side of the “Easterns.” Thus, according to the conditions of the first game, the North-Western Front of the “eastern” (D. G. Pavlov) had superiority over the North-Eastern Front of the “western” (G. K. Zhukov) in all respects (except for anti-tank guns), and in tanks this superiority was expressed by a ratio of 2.5: 1, and in aircraft - 1.7: 1. And in the second game, the Southwestern Front of the “eastern” (G.K. Zhukov) exceeded the combined Southeastern (D.G. Pavlov) and Southern (F.I. Kuznetsov) fronts of the enemy in the number of tanks (3: 1) and aircraft (1.3: 1), and in terms of the total number of formations and artillery, the ratio of forces was approximately equal. Consequently, G.K. Zhukov was mistaken in his memoirs, claiming that the western side had superiority in forces and means, especially in tanks and aviation.

And, finally, another important feature of the games: the “eastern” ones mainly practiced only offensive tasks. In the first game on the topic “Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of the Urals,” the “eastern” (D. G. Pavlov) carried out the task of defeating the “western” in East Prussia and reaching the river by September 3, 1941. Vistula from Włocławek to its mouth; “Western” (G.K. Zhukov) were the defending side for almost the entire game. And in the second game, the “eastern” (G.K. Zhukov) mainly worked out the issues of attacking in the southwestern direction; defensive tasks, as already noted, they had to solve mainly on the flanks, and on the right wing of the Southwestern Front the defense was already carried out deep in the territory of Poland (the area of ​​Biała Podlaska, Lubartow, Dęblin), and on the left wing - in a small part of the territory of Ukraine and Moldova (Chernivtsi region, Gorodok, Mogilev-Podolsky, Costesti), where the enemy was given temporary “success” according to the initial situation.

So, it turns out that M.I. Kazakov was right when he described the “Easterns” as the attacking side in the games. But in this case, the question is appropriate: if they worked out offensive tasks for the “eastern” ones, were they related to the operational plans of the General Staff in case of war in the West? The answer to this question, in our opinion, is unequivocal: yes, they did.
Firstly, the groupings of forces of the parties created in the games corresponded to the views of the Soviet military leadership that were established in the fall of 1940, set out in the already mentioned “Considerations...” dated September 18, 1940. In this document, the main option considered was the concentration of Germany’s main forces (110 -120 infantry divisions, the bulk of tanks and aircraft) in the south, in the Siedlce, Lublin region, “to deliver the main blow in the general direction of Kiev” with the aim of capturing Ukraine; An auxiliary attack with 50-60 divisions was expected from East Prussia. It was this situation that was created in the games: up to 60 “Western” infantry divisions launched an offensive north of Brest (the first game) on July 15, 1941 “in the interests of the main operation,” which began a little later (August 1-2) south of Brest, where the main forces of the “Western” operated - up to 120 infantry divisions, and together with the allies - up to 150 infantry divisions (second game).
As for the grouping of Soviet troops in the West, the “Considerations...” planned to deploy three fronts here: North-Western, Western and South-Western; To conduct operations in the West, 149 rifle and motorized rifle divisions, 16 tank and 10 cavalry divisions, 15 tank brigades, 159 air regiments were assigned, and the main forces were to be deployed south of Polesie. In the games, the same fronts operated on the “Eastern” side (albeit with a slightly different composition than in “Considerations...”) with almost the same total number of divisions (182), but with a larger percentage of formations and units of tank forces and the Air Force , with a larger number of tanks and aircraft; this took into account the tendency to increase the share of these means of armed struggle in the Red Army.
Secondly, in each of the operational-strategic games, offensive tasks were worked out for each of the options for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, indicated in “Considerations...”. When deploying the Red Army according to the main option, i.e. its main forces were concentrated south of Brest, the “Considerations...” planned “a powerful blow in the directions of Lublin and Krakow and further to Breslau (Bratislav) in the first stage of the war to cut off Germany from Balkan countries, deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries regarding their participation in the war.” Specifically, the Southwestern Front was given the following task: “firmly covering the borders of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, by concentrating troops in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western Front, inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy’s Lublin-Sandomierz group and reach the Vistula. Subsequently, strike in the directions of Kielce, Piotrkow and reach the river. Pilica and the upper reaches of the river. Oder". These tasks formed the content of the second game. Their first part (exit to the Vistula River), as already noted, was considered successfully resolved based on the initial situation. The further task was worked out during the game: in accordance with the directive of the “Eastern” Headquarters, the Southwestern Front (G.K. Zhukov) was supposed to firmly hold the river line. Vistula, capture the region of Krakow, Myslenice, and then by September 16, 1941 reach the line Krakow, Budapest, Timisoara, Craiova. In the game, the offensive of the Southwestern Front in the direction of the main attack reached the line of Krakow, Katowice, Nowy Targ, Poprad, Presov, Kosice, Uzhgorod, and subsequent attacks were planned from the Krakow, Katowice to Czestochowa (south of Piotrkow) and from the Nyiregy Haza area, Kisvarda, Matesalka - to Budapest.

When deploying the main forces of the Red Army north of Brest, their task in “Considerations...” was defined as follows: “to defeat the main forces of the German army within East Prussia and capture the latter.” It was this task that was set before D. G. Pavlov in the first game. It should be noted that when performing it, he did not look as helpless and frivolous as he is sometimes portrayed. Thus, in the article by P. A. Palchikov and A. A. Goncharov “What happened to the commander of the Western Front, General D. G. Pavlov in 1941?” it is argued that the Germans “took into account the lessons of that command and staff game” in which D. G. Pavlov made “rather timid reciprocal steps” and which he lost “with a smile.” But for the Germans, the results of this game in terms of preparing for an attack on the USSR were useless, since, as noted above, the Germans decided back in November-December 1940 where and what attacks they would deliver. The characterization of D. G. Pavlov is given, probably, already taking into account how events developed at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, and based on the widely spread version, according to which in the game D. G. Pavlov defended as unsuccessfully as during the war. But D. G. Pavlov was, we repeat, not the defending side in the game, but the attacking side, and not unsuccessfully attacking. The game began with the fact that the North-Western Front of the “eastern”, headed by D. G. Pavlov, went on the offensive on August 1, 1941 and, in the course of its first operations, crossed the river with its right wing until August 7. The Neman, reaching the approaches to Insterburg (now Chernyakhovsk), in the center, surrounded in the Suwalki ledge the grouping of the 9th Army of the North-Eastern Front of the “Western” (G.K. Zhukov) and reached the line Shitkemen, Filipuv, Rachki (by the way, this line is also indicated in “Considerations...”), and on the left wing - the direction of the main attack - the front troops reached the river. Narew south of the town of Ostroleka. In the same direction, on August 11, D. G. Pavlov introduced a cavalry-mechanized army into the breakthrough, which on August 13 reached the area of ​​Lyubava, Mrochno, Gilgenburg (110-120 km west of the USSR border). However, by this time, G.K. Zhukov, having concentrated a strong (mainly tank) group in the Masurian Lakes region using reserves, launched a sudden flank attack in the general direction of Lomza, under the base of the ledge formed by the “Eastern” group that had advanced far to the west. The mediators “played along” with G.K. Zhukov, designating another counter-attack by the Eastern Front of the “Western” from the opposite side of the ledge from the area of ​​Kossy, Malkinya Gurna in the general direction of Zambruv. Thus, the threat of encirclement was created by up to 20 rifle divisions“eastern”. It was, of course, a dramatic situation. D. G. Pavlov had to suspend the successful offensive on the left wing of the front and urgently transfer from here to the places of the enemy’s breakthrough several rifle divisions, most of the artillery and all tank brigades, leaving only 4 rifle corps at the reached line of Myshinets, Grudusk, Pultusk, Serotsk. The course of events in this situation and decisions taken was not played out, but the chances of success became noticeably greater for the “Western” than for the “Eastern”. But all this, we note, did not happen in the region of Baranovichi or Lida (as stated in some publications), but near the border itself and beyond. And, therefore, the version that G.K. Zhukov “defeated” D.G. Pavlov there and in the same way as the Germans did six months later is devoid of any basis.
So, as a result of checking the operational plan during the games, it turned out that the offensive in East Prussia turned out to be a difficult task due to the presence of powerful fortifications in the area; D. G. Pavlov’s offensive in the directions towards Konigsberg and Rastenburg did not bring the expected success. The offensive of the Southwestern Front (G.K. Zhukov) in the second game turned out to be successful and promised more favorable prospects. There is a clearly visible direct connection between the results of the games and the provisions that were included in the “Refined Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East” drawn up on March 11, 1941. This plan deserves special attention, since it was precisely this plan, due to the errors contained in it, that, in our opinion, led to grave consequences in the preparation for war, which, as it later turned out, was only three months away.

Firstly, in the “Refined Plan...” it was already believed, almost without a shadow of a doubt, that “Germany will most likely deploy its main forces in the southeast from Sedlec to Hungary in order to capture Ukraine with a blow to Berdichev and Kyiv.” Secondly, it was noted that “the most advantageous (emphasized by us - P.B.) is the deployment of our main forces south of the river. Pripyat in order to set itself the first strategic goal with powerful attacks on Lublin, Radom and Krakow: to defeat the main forces of the Germans and in the very first stage of the war to cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of participation them in the war against us...”
Consequently, the “Refined Plan...” finally established the priority of the direction south of Polesie for both the enemy and the Red Army. No matter what arguments this provision of the plan was justified at that time (the main argument will be discussed in more detail below), reality showed that this was a serious mistake by the General Staff of the Red Army. As you know, on June 22, Germany delivered the main blow north of Polesie. Thus, in January 1941, the operational-strategic link of the command staff of the Red Army played out on the cards such an option for the start of hostilities, which was not planned by the real “Western” (Germany), and in March this same erroneous option remained unchanged in the “Refined Plan” …”.

True, the plan did not exclude the deployment of the main group of Germans in East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction. It is logical to assume that the plan provides for an option for deploying Red Army forces appropriate to such a situation. This was done, for example, in the draft operational plan drawn up under the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov (before August 1940), where it was reasonably stated: “Considering that the main German attack will be directed north of the mouth R. San, it is necessary to have the main forces of the Red Army (emphasized by us - P.B.) deployed north of Polesie.” But there is nothing like that in the “Refined Plan...”. Moreover, it (obviously not without the influence of the results of the first game) contains the following provision: “The deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the West with the grouping of the main forces against East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that the fight on this front may lead to protracted battles” (emphasis added by us. - P.B.). Consequently, the authors of the “Refined Plan...” (it, like the previous one, was executed by A. M. Vasilevsky), without excluding Germany from deploying its main group north of Polesie, simultaneously denied the advisability of deploying the main forces of the Red Army in the same direction. Let us think about this alarming situation in the plan of the side that expected to repel potential aggression, but did not consider it necessary to create an appropriate group in one of the likely directions of the enemy’s main attack. Links to complex natural conditions terrain and the presence of heavily fortified areas in East Prussia, which Yu. A. Gorkov cited, are fair, but they hardly explain this paradox. Under B. M. Shaposhnikov, all the conditions were the same, but, as noted above, a different solution was proposed, since in order to repel an aggressor’s attack from this direction, it is not so important what fortifications the aggressor himself has in the rear.
The key to understanding this strange situation is in the same phrase of the plan: it turns out that in the spring of 1941, the General Staff was concerned not at all with enemy attacks from East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction, but with possible “protracted battles” here. But for the defender, protracted battles are not the worst option: if such battles had actually unfolded in these directions with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, then the Germans would not have advanced here to a depth of 450-600 km in three weeks.
The whole point, in our opinion, is that the authors of the “Refined Plan...”, as well as the compilers of tasks for operational-strategic games, proceeded from the presumption of the unconditionally successful repulsion of an enemy attack in the initial period of the war, after which the offensive of the Red Army was supposed to unfold. And for the success of such an offensive on foreign territory, protracted battles were unnecessary. Therefore, East Prussia was assessed as an unpromising direction for possible offensive actions of the Red Army. The southwestern direction was characterized as “the most advantageous” precisely because the offensive in this direction would take place on poorly prepared territory in terms of defense, which, moreover, allowed the use of large formations of mechanized troops and cavalry.
Thus, in the “Refined Plan...”, as in operational-strategic games, the focus was not on defense, but on the offensive, but again after successfully repelling aggression.
And finally, thirdly, another feature of this plan, which was self-critically testified by G.K. Zhukov, who was appointed Chief of the General Staff on February 1, 1941 (he set the task for the Chief of the Operations Directorate, Lieutenant General G.K. Malandin to clarification of the plan): “When processing operational plans in the spring of 1941, the specifics of conducting modern warfare in its initial period. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles. Nazi Germany was placed in the same conditions as us with regard to the timing of concentration and deployment.”
In previous operational plans for 1940 and 1941. it was invariably indicated: Germany could deploy its group on the western border of the USSR 10-15 days after the start of concentration. Let us recall that in operational-strategic games, the “Western” attacked the “Eastern” without completing the deployment. However, it was already known that Germany attacked Poland in 1939, having its armed forces fully deployed. This feature of the outbreak of war did not go unnoticed by Soviet military theory; in particular, it took a central place in the book of brigade commander G. S. Isserson “New Forms of Fighting”. The question of the initial period of the war also arose at the December (1940) meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army. In his speech, the chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District, Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov, sharply criticized the book by G. S. Isserson. “There,” said P.S. Klenov, “hasty conclusions are given, based on the German war with Poland, that there will be no initial period of war, that the war today is resolved simply by the invasion of ready-made forces, as was done by the Germans in Poland, who deployed one and a half million people. I consider such a conclusion premature.” He proposed raising the question of organizing a special kind of offensive operations in the initial period of the war, “when the enemy armies have not yet completed their concentration and are not ready for deployment” in order to influence the mobilization, concentration and deployment of enemy troops in order to disrupt these activities. Thus, we were talking about a pre-emptive strike against the enemy, a defensive operation in the initial period of the war P.S. Didn't touch maples.
This speech at the meeting with a mention of the initial period of the war turned out to be the only one. No one else touched on this topic, no one objected to P.S. Klenov, no one supported him, including the People's Commissar of Defense, who made his final speech. Moreover, S.K. Timoshenko expressed the following opinion in it: “In the sense of strategic creativity, the experience of the war in Europe, perhaps, does not provide anything new.” This conclusion, of course, weakened attention to the problems of the initial period of the war. Since S.K. Timoshenko’s final speech was sent to the troops as a directive document, it can be argued that in this part it had negative consequences for the formation of the views of the Red Army command staff on the possible outbreak of war if it were unleashed against the USSR.
In any case, the General Staff, in the “Refined Plan...”, left the previous scheme for the start of the war: with active defense, covering units ensure the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces of the Red Army, which then go on a decisive offensive with the transfer of military operations to enemy territory. The deployment period for the German armies was assumed to be the same - 10-15 days from the beginning of the concentration; the same period, as G.K. Zhukov testified, was allotted for the Soviet troops.

Consequently, the General Staff of the Red Army completely ignored the experience of German attacks on other countries, deliberately planning measures to mobilize, concentrate and deploy troops for the period after the start of border battles. This was the second biggest mistake of the General Staff, which required colossal efforts not only of the army, but also of the country, as well as considerable time, to eliminate it. This error had to be corrected very soon, but, as it turned out, there was almost no time left for this...

Within a few weeks, the situation on the western borders of the USSR became so complicated that the General Staff was forced to urgently make significant adjustments to the “Refined Plan...”. This is evidenced by “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies,” dated in content from May 15, 1941. At least two features of this document attract close attention to it.
Firstly, unlike other operational plans of this kind, these “Plan Considerations...” were drawn up only in the event of war with Germany and its allies; sections that related to the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war with other potential adversaries are absent from the document.

And this suggests that the General Staff, analyzing the situation developing on the borders of the USSR, came to the conclusion about the immediate danger of war with Germany in the near future.
Secondly, if in previous plans and in operational-strategic games the concept of the Red Army going on the offensive after repelling an enemy attack was laid down, then in “Considerations according to the plan...” the idea was first put forward to “preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at that moment , when it will be in the deployment stage and will not yet have time to organize the front and interaction of the military branches.” Essentially, a pre-emptive strike against the German army was proposed. And for such a proposal, which contradicted the previously accepted concept of war, the General Staff had good reasons. The information about the state of the German army given in “Considerations on the Plan...” showed that the deployment and actions of the Red Army according to the old scheme - the main forces enter the battle 10-15 days after the start of border battles, and the deployment periods of the main forces of the countries are approximately the same - no longer corresponded to the situation: it turned out that Germany “is currently keeping its army mobilized, with its rear deployed, it has the opportunity to warn us in deployment and deliver a surprise attack.” Although it was late - only, as it turned out, five weeks before the war - the General Staff was forced to admit its mistake in ignoring the experience of World War II, which spoke of the possibility of the enemy suddenly going on the offensive “with all available forces, moreover, deployed in advance in all strategic directions.” .
Considering the current situation.

The General Staff proposed to carry out in advance the same measures that Germany had already carried out and without which “it is impossible to launch a surprise attack on the enemy both from the air and on the ground”: covert mobilization (under the guise of training camps) and concentration of troops (under the guise of entering camps) to the western border, a hidden concentration of aviation at field airfields, deployment of the rear and hospital base. Upon completion of these activities, launch a sudden pre-emptive strike on the German army in order to defeat its main forces deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line, and reach the Ostroleka, r., front by the 30th day of the operation. Narev, Lowicz, Lodz, Kreuzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The immediate task was to defeat the German army east of the river. Vistula and in the Krakow direction, exit at pp. Narev, Vistula and capture the Katowice region, after which, advancing in a northern or northwestern direction, “defeat the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.” Note: these are actually the same problems, the solution of which was worked out in operational-strategic games.
Of course, the provision on a pre-emptive strike by the Red Army, formulated quite unambiguously in “Considerations on the Plan...”, is a fundamentally new fact for students of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War. It does not fit at all into the already established concept of this war and that is probably why it is denied with such zeal. Even Yu. A. Gorkov, who himself was the first to fully publish this document, in which things are called by their proper names, immediately tried to prove that in “Considerations according to the plan...” we are supposedly talking more about defense than about offensive, and even if about offensive , then not proactively and not in 1941. In particular, Yu. A. Gorkov interprets the general strategic idea of ​​the May plan in such a way that it supposedly “provided for defense along 90% of the front length for almost a month, and only then, depending on conditions offensive actions were assumed.” But in the plan, in the hand of N.F. Vatutin, a generalizing paragraph is clearly added: “The Red Army will begin offensive operations from the front of Chizhev, Lutowiska with the forces of 152 divisions against 100 German ones. Active defense is provided for on other sections of the state border.” It follows from this that the preemptive strike was planned to be delivered by the main forces of the Red Army (over 70% of the divisions that were part of the fronts planned for deployment on the western border of the USSR). And the stripe of this strike from Chizhev (65 km west of Bialystok) to Lutowiska (60 km south of Przemyslyar) reached 650-700 km, i.e. almost a third of the length of the western border from Memel (Klaipeda) to the mouth of the Danube.
Further in the article by Yu. A. Gorkov it is stated that “the plan of May 15, 1941 did not provide for a pre-emptive strike in 1941.” The emphases made by Yu. A. Gorkov when publishing the plan should obviously testify in favor of such a statement. But the order to complete the development of state border defense and air defense plans by June 1, 1941 was intended, as can be seen from the document, “to protect ourselves from a possible surprise attack by the enemy, to cover the concentration and deployment of our troops and to prepare them for the offensive” and did not in any way remove the issue of a pre-emptive strike. And the order in question belongs to the section, the name of which speaks for itself: “VI. Covering concentration and deployment." Information given in the plan about the non-combat capability of 115 air regiments, “whose full readiness can be counted on by 1/1/42.” , they talk about only one thing: what additional aviation forces can be counted on and when, because the war, of course, did not seem to the General Staff to be a fleeting affair. From the same angle, one should consider the paragraph added by N. F. Vatutin about the need to build and arm fortified areas, including on the border with Hungary in 1942, as well as the paragraph asking to approve the proposal for the construction of new fortified areas; Moreover, on the border with Hungary, according to the plan of May 15, 1941, active defense was provided for.
The most important evidence in favor of preparing a pre-emptive strike precisely in 1941 is that everything said in “Considerations on the Plan...” about the German army was assessed from the standpoint of “the political situation of today” (emphasized by us - P.B.). And it is clear that postponing the implementation of the measures proposed in the plan until 1942 was pointless, since the situation on the western border of the USSR was changing not in its favor every day. The General Staff believed that Germany, whose troops were completely mobilized, and 120 of the 180 divisions that it could field against the USSR were already concentrated on its western border, had only one step left to take before the start of hostilities, namely, to deploy its groups in accordance with plan for war against the USSR. It was necessary, firstly, to urgently eliminate this advantage of Germany (which is why the “Considerations on the Plan...” were proposed as priority measures for the covert mobilization and concentration of troops), and secondly, in no case should the initiative of action be given up to hands of the German command and themselves attack the German army at the stage of its deployment.

Thus, “Considerations on the Plan...” are valuable and convincing evidence of the reaction of the General Staff of the Red Army to the actions of Germany at that time. We emphasize this especially in connection with attempts to consider this document as confirmation of the preparation of the Soviet side for the implementation of the long-standing plan of a “world revolution”. It was also not the fruit of someone’s idle exercises on a strategic topic, for people who had a direct connection to the preparation of previous plans for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces had a hand in it: Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General A. M. Vasilevsky and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin. Thus, the document represented a clearly expressed position of the General Staff on the issue of war with Germany. And this position was that a German attack on the USSR could occur in the near future, i.e. in the summer of 1941.
From the plan of May 15, 1941, it is clearly visible: the General Staff considered a pre-emptive strike as a way to thwart the German attack on the USSR, which, according to many sources, had become inevitable. It is appropriate to note here that the directive on the Barbarossa plan especially emphasized: “Crucial importance must be attached to ensuring that our intentions to attack (emphasized by us - P.B.) are not recognized.” However, in the plan for the transfer of troops to the borders of the USSR, signed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Colonel General F. Halder on February 12, 1941, it was quite accurately predicted that in the period from April 25 to May 15, the offensive intentions of the Wehrmacht would become clearer and “conceal the deployment of troops it is not possible to conduct offensive operations,” and from May 6 there will no longer be “any doubts regarding the offensive intentions” of the German troops. Indeed, by the beginning of May, the secret finally became apparent, as a result of which the Soviet plan of May 15, 1941 was born. The General Staff of the Red Army proposed a solution to the problem that was reasonable from a military point of view, leaving aside all its political, diplomatic and other nuances, because It was impossible not to take into account that over the past 20 months of World War II, the Germans managed four times to forestall the strategic deployment of the armed forces of states that had been subjected to aggression by Germany. “There was enough evidence that Germany was preparing for a military attack on our country - in our century it is difficult to hide it,” recalled A. M. Vasilevsky. - Fears that there would be a fuss in the West about the supposedly aggressive aspirations of the USSR had to be discarded. We came, by force of circumstances beyond our control, to the rubicon of war, and we had to firmly take a step forward.

So, a pre-emptive strike on Germany was proposed. But in this case, one cannot ignore the version of the Hitlerite leadership about the “preventive war” of Germany against the USSR, revived by V. Suvorov. This version has long been exposed, but V. Suvorov is once again trying to shift the blame for starting the war from Germany to the USSR. At the same time, the debate about “preventiveness” is not at all so fruitless, as M.I. Meltyukhov believes, since the subject of the dispute is actually the assertion that the USSR itself initiated its own tragedy of 1941. And one does not need to go into the depths of centuries to find “the starting point of mutual claims” that led to the war: it is important to determine the moment when these claims are translated into specific military-strategic decisions.
It would seem that V. Suvorov proceeds from this. “Historians,” he declares, “still have not answered our question: who started the Soviet-German war of 1941? When solving this problem, communist historians propose the following criterion: whoever shot first is the culprit. Why not use a different criterion? Why not pay attention to who was the first to begin mobilization, concentration and operational deployment, that is, who was the first to reach for the gun?” But V. Suvorov deliberately avoids facts that do not fit into the version he defends. Otherwise, it is easy to see that according to his “other criterion,” Germany was the first to “reach for the gun.” Even the plan of the Soviet command of May 15, 1941, despite the proposal it contains for a preemptive strike on the German army, does not add any arguments in favor of Hitler’s version of “preventive war.”

For Hitler and his accomplices, this Soviet plan, like the previous ones, played no role in the decision to attack the USSR. This decision was made back in July 1940, after which detailed planning for the war began. The main outlines of the German plan of aggression against the USSR were, as already noted, tested in the operational-strategic game at the General Staff of the Ground Forces in November - December 1940; the directive on the plan for the attack on the USSR (plan “Barbarossa”) was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940 ., the OKH directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops was issued on January 31, 1941, and its implementation began already in February 1941. Even the initial date of readiness for action under the Barbarossa plan - May 15, 1941 - was determined in December 1940 .in the above-mentioned directive from Hitler. History decreed that the date of May 15, 1941 coincided with the date of the plan of the Soviet command that we are analyzing. And for this reason alone, this plan cannot in any way appear as a justification for Hitler’s aggression. Nevertheless, the previous plans of the Soviet command and the operational-strategic games of January 1941 were based on the fact that the USSR would not be the attacking party.
But then, what is evidenced by the events carried out by the Soviet side in May-June 1941 (hidden partial mobilization of reserve personnel under the guise of training camps, hidden advance to the western borders of a number of associations and formations, including from internal districts, etc., which were in many respects consistent with those proposed in the plan of May 15, 1941? In our opinion (coinciding with the opinion of V.N. Kiselev, M.I. Meltyukhov, etc.), only about one thing: the plan was reported to I.V. Stalin and in principle was approved by him. Let's say more: this plan could not remain a draft note from the Operations Directorate, could not fail to be reported to I.V. Stalin due to its extraordinary nature. There is no doubt that Stalin, no matter what motives he was guided by , tried in every possible way at that time to avoid war with Germany (which the Germans themselves had no doubt about, assessing the Kremlin’s steps to prevent war as “neurosis based on fear”).

However, the May plan of the General Staff was a document of a special kind: it demanded immediate decisions that did not correspond to Stalin’s above-mentioned position, since the General Staff proposed to deliver a preemptive strike, that is, to give the USSR the initiative in starting a war with Germany. It was impossible to simply reject this proposal as unacceptable, because the same document clearly stated that Germany was actually ready to attack the USSR in the near future under conditions favorable to the Wehrmacht and extremely unfavorable to the Red Army.
As A. S. Orlov correctly noted, no one knows what Stalin was really thinking about then. But the totality of the facts of that time gives reason to assume that Stalin, having agreed (though not completely) with the proposals of the General Staff, demanded the strictest observance of secrecy and precautions in order not to give Germany a reason to start a war, at least before the measures proposed by the General Staff were completed on the strategic deployment of the Red Army.
Supporters of the version of a “preventive war” of Germany against the USSR can only declare that these events themselves were the reason for the Wehrmacht attack on June 22, 1941. This is what V. Suvorov does when he states: “June 13, 1941 is the moment when 77 Soviet divisions of the internal districts “under the guise of training camps” rushed to the western borders. In this situation, Adolf Hitler... struck first.”

But for such a statement, you need to be sure that Hitler knew about the content of the Soviet plan or had an idea about the nature of the measures being carried out by the Soviet side. However, V. Suvorov does not provide such data. “I don’t know,” he admits, “what was known to German military intelligence in the first half of June and what was unknown to it.” In this regard, we note that any of the activities carried out by the General Staff in May - June 1941 could be attributed by intelligence to the preparation of not only an offensive, but also a defense.

This, in particular, is evidenced by intelligence report No. 5 of the department for the study of foreign armies of the East of the OKH General Staff for the period from May 20 to June 13 (i.e., just in time for the date that V. Suvorov is diligently exploiting!). It notes that the strength of the Red Army in the European part of the USSR increased by 5 rifle, 2 tank divisions and 1 tank (motorized) brigade and is: rifle divisions - 150, cavalry - 25.5, tank - 7, tank (mechanized) brigades - 38. Further, the intelligence report stated that the situation with conscription into the Red Army had basically not changed, that the ongoing transportation of Soviet troops in a western direction served “only to replenish formations with reserve military personnel to wartime states and train them in summer camps,” that regroupings within individual groups troops are associated with the exchange of formations that local offensive attacks by the Russians are possible in Southern Bessarabia and in the Chernivtsi region. And finally, the general conclusion of German intelligence: “...basically, as before, defensive actions are expected” (emphasized by us - P.B.).
Thus, the German leadership did not have at its disposal convincing data to accuse the Soviet Union of preparing aggression against Germany. If the Nazis had such information, they would not have failed to use it in official documents at the beginning of the war. But they never collected any facts for these documents. And it is no coincidence that in a note from the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet government dated June 21, 1941, after accusations against the USSR of espionage, propaganda activities, and the anti-German orientation of Soviet foreign policy, as evidence of the “intensity of military preparations of the Soviet Union”, ... a report of the Yugoslav military attache in Moscow dated December 17, 1940 (!). The following passage is quoted from this report in the note: “According to data received from Soviet circles, the rearmament of the Air Force, tank forces and artillery is in full swing, taking into account the experience of modern war, which will basically be completed by August 1, 1941. This deadline is obviously is also an extreme (temporary) point, until which one should not expect tangible changes in the Soviet foreign policy". It seems that there is no need to prove that on such grounds one can declare war at any time on any state that has an army and is modernizing it.
Further in the same memorandum it is noted: all doubts of the German leadership regarding the intentions of the Red Army “were completely dispelled by messages received by the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht in recent days. After the general mobilization in Russia, at least 160 divisions were deployed against Germany,” and “the created group of Russian troops, especially motorized and tank formations, allows the Supreme High Command of Russia at any time to begin aggression on various sections of the German border,” where the Red Army formations “ concentrated and deployed in readiness for attack.” But it is well known that by June 22, there was no “general mobilization” in the USSR, much less concentrated and deployed “in readiness to attack” Soviet troops. And although the measures according to the May plan of the General Staff began to be partially implemented, by the beginning of the war the Red Army, for a number of reasons (including those mentioned above), was not ready for either offensive or defensive and was not even put on combat readiness.

And the German leadership, on the contrary, in June completed preparations for an attack on the USSR, begun in 1940. Even on April 30, 1941, i.e., before the Soviet command had any thoughts about launching a pre-emptive strike by the Red Army, and even more so before the start of any relevant practical measures, the date of the attack on the USSR was finally set - June 22. From May 22 for German railways a schedule of accelerated movement was introduced, according to which the main forces of the Wehrmacht were actually openly concentrated and deployed to the border of the USSR. On June 5, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, Field Marshal General W. Keitel, sent the time calculation approved by Hitler for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan to the executors. On June 8, the army groups and armies were finally informed of the tasks under this plan, and on June 10, the command of the active army received an order on the date of the start of operations against the USSR - June 22, 1941. Let us note that the Nazis did all this before June 13, and therefore the entire system of “argumentation” of V. Suvorov, tied to this date, collapses due to the lack of foundation. And on June 14, at a meeting with Hitler in Berlin, reports from the commanders of the troops in the East on readiness for operations were heard.
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany carried out, as the International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg Trials established, a carefully prepared attack on the Soviet Union “without any warning and without a shadow of legal justification. It was obvious aggression.” This is also evidenced by all the documents (including those mentioned above) published after the Nuremberg trials. V. Suvorov’s reasoning about what would have happened if Hitler had not attacked Stalin on June 22, but, for example, decided to seize Gibraltar and therefore “postponed Operation Barbarossa for two months” - such reasoning already belong to the realm of fruitless fortune-telling, arising from the lack of facts to prove the unprovable.
Of course, everything that has been said cannot be a consolation in the light of the misfortune that the day of June 22, 1941 brought to our people. The reasons for it are diverse and diverse. It seems that the conclusions that were drawn based on the results of the operational-strategic games in January 1941 also played a negative role: on June 22, the resistance to the enemy was organized by the same commanders who, from the mentioned games, could not help but come away with the persistent conviction that the initial period of the war will be undoubtedly successful for the Red Army, that the Soviet troops will have to mainly attack, that the offensive will unfold on the territory of the attacking enemy, etc. The indisputable facts of the mass heroism of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, shown in the first days of the war, are often (and not unsuccessfully) covered up major shortcomings and even failures made at the highest military level in planning the first operations of the war, in the training of troops and headquarters, and in resolving many other issues on which the country’s defense capability, combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the Red Army ultimately depended. Documents published recently give reason to assert that the date of a probable attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany - the summer of 1941 - was determined correctly by the General Staff of the Red Army, but too late. The General Staff made its main miscalculation, as already noted, in March 1941, when erroneous provisions were introduced into the “Refined Strategic Deployment Plan...” that had long been inconsistent with the experience of World War II and the actual situation.

It also seems that there are no sufficient grounds to consider the main mistake of that time to be Stalin’s miscalculation in determining the timing of Germany’s attack on us (which he allegedly attributed to 1942), and from this to deduce shortcomings in the planning of military operations and in the implementation of measures to prepare the Red Army for repelling aggression. But, of course, Stalin bears personal responsibility for refusing to give permission to bring the troops of the western border districts to full combat readiness, which could significantly affect the results of the combat operations of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, even despite the incompleteness of the concentration and deployment of its units and formations .
These and other mistakes turned into the greatest tragedy for our people and their army. As is known, the most difficult situation at the beginning of the war arose in the Western Front. It was his command that Stalin blamed for the first failures of the Red Army. In the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0250 of July 28, 1941, announcing the verdict in the case of generals D. G. Pavlov, V. E. Klimovskikh, A. T. Grigoriev and A. A. Korobkov, the leader in his own hand wrote the lines of accusation “for cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without the permission of the high command, collapse of command and control, inaction of the authorities,” he personally inserted into the text of the order the words “and this gave the enemy the opportunity to break through the front.”

But on June 22, not only the Western Front collapsed: the entire concept of war, developed by the General Staff and approved by the General Staff itself, collapsed. high level. Unfairly accused D. G. Pavlov and his closest assistants were only the first defendants for everything, including the mistakes of Stalin and the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. The latter, too, very soon, under various pretexts, were relieved of their positions, while Stalin himself, as always, was not answerable to anyone. The blood of the Soviet people had to pay for the mistakes made before the war. “Historians exploring the reasons for the failures of the armed struggle with Germany in the first period of the war,” noted G.K. Zhukov, “will have to carefully understand these issues in order to truthfully explain real reasons, as a result of which the Soviet people and country suffered such heavy sacrifices.” The articles we mentioned in periodicals on this topic are a serious step in the study of these reasons. But the urgency of the task itself has by no means been removed. The declassification and publication of documents still hidden from historians may shed additional light on the true background of the events of the spring and summer of 1941.
Notes
New and recent history. 1993. No. 3. P. 29-45.
National history. 1994. No. 3. P. 4-22.
Suvorov V. Icebreaker. M., 1992.
National history. 1994. No. 3. P. 3.

The Red Army was created by the Bolsheviks together with former officers of the tsarist army. These class enemies of the “world proletariat” became the foundation for the new army.

According to some estimates, about 200 officers of the tsarist army of various ranks served in the Red Army during the years civil war.

Among them, Egorov, Brussilov and Boris Shaposhnikov stood out most clearly.

These people were motivated by different motives, for example, among them there were opportunists like M. Tukhachevsky who, having joined the Red Army, immediately joined the Bolshevik Party.

Others like B. Shaposhnikov fundamentally long time did not join the Bolshevik Party adhering to monarchical ideals.

This is exactly what Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov was. Trotsky called him a Russian chauvinist who denied proletarian internationalism and the ideology of Bolshevism.

He became the head of the General Staff of the Red Army three times, the author of new concepts of combat operations and the author of the monumental work “The Brain of the Army”

STUDIES

Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov was born in large family. Father, Mikhail Petrovich, served as a private hire, mother, Pelageya Kuzminichna, worked as a teacher. At his birth on September 20 (October 2, new style), 1882, the family lived in Zlatoust, then moved to Belebey.

Boris Mikhailovich's childhood and youth were connected with the Urals; in 1898 he began studying at the Krasnoufimsk Industrial School. IN late XIX V. the family moved to Perm, where in 1900 B.M. Shaposhnikov graduates from a real school and decides to enter a military school.

The choice of a military profession occurred for very prosaic reasons - education at a military school is free.

In order not to burden his parents, who had two younger children - Evgeniy and Yulia - and four already adults from his father’s first marriage, Boris decided to follow the army line. In 1900, due to illness, Shaposhnikov missed exams and was unable to enter a military school.

In 1901, the young man achieved his goal and entered the Moscow Infantry School (later called Alekseevsky), which he graduated in 1903 with the 1st category.

Studying at the school was not easy, but Shaposhnikov was not burdened by either the severity of discipline or the intensity of each day of classes. The thirst for knowledge and internal composure helped him somehow immediately, without friction, enter the intense rhythm of the educational process.

Shaposhnikov wrote:

“The subjects that were taught to us gave not only special training for the platoon commander, but also contributed to our purely military and general development.”

In addition, the school was located in Moscow, which made it possible to increase the intellectual level of the cadet. There he became familiar with art.

In his senior year, B.M. Shaposhnikov was promoted to army non-commissioned officer; his skillful actions during the maneuvers near Kursk in 1902 were taken into account. He was also given command of a platoon of newly recruited junior class.

This is how he described it:

“It was difficult, but I worked independently, made a schedule of classes and was involved in the daily education of young cadets.

This was of great benefit for my subsequent service. When I joined the company as a second lieutenant (after graduating from college), I was not like a puppy thrown into the water and unable to swim, but immediately took up a familiar task.”

The cadets had little free time, but it was not wasted. Boris's cherished desire to join the theatrical arts came true.

He recalled:

“In the winter of 1902/03 I became interested in the theater. And how could one not get carried away when the talent of Chaliapin, Sobinov and other young talents blossomed during this season. The Art Theater, headed by Stanislavsky, also expanded its work. Solodovnikov’s then private troupe had a good opera cast. Many of us were fans of Petrova-Zvantseva, one of the best singers in Russia as Carmen. She shone in the ballet Geltser... My studies continued to go well, the theater did not detract from me, and I got a lot of pleasure.”

Just before graduation from college, B.M. Shaposhnikov again took part in the maneuvers near Zvenigorod. This time he commanded a platoon, with whom he worked for the entire school year.

ISSUE AND SERVICE

Two years of study are left behind.

At the final exams, using a 12-point grading system, Boris Shaposhnikov scored 11.78 and was the best. His name was inscribed on a marble plaque. In addition, he received a privilege in the distribution of vacancies and chose the 1st Turkestan Rifle Battalion, stationed in Tashkent, where the young second lieutenant went, spending his due vacation with his family.

Later, recalling his four years in Turkestan, he paid attention to three details.

Firstly, only six of the battalion's officers were relatively young.

“And therefore,” Shaposhnikov recalled, “we walked around in the battalion “on tiptoes,” and although by law we had the right to vote at officer meetings, we never cast it, listening to what our elders said.”

Secondly, the relationship with the sergeant majors, who were often a threat not only for the soldiers. I had to call on not only all my knowledge for help - here the cadets’ eccentricities also came in handy.

Thirdly, asking his subordinates, Boris Mikhailovich never made any concessions to himself: at 8:30 in the morning he reported to the battalion, stayed there until the lunch break and then, at the prescribed evening hours, conducted the prescribed classes in his company, supervised the non-commissioned officer -officers.

The young second lieutenant’s exactingness found an appropriate response among the recruits and helped them quickly learn the wisdom of soldiers.

At the summer shooting in the camp, carried out under the supervision of a general who had arrived from St. Petersburg, the 3rd company showed excellent results. And the entire battalion was recognized as the best in the Tashkent garrison.

Already in the first year of officer service B.M. Shaposhnikov was noticed by his superiors.

He is taken to the district headquarters for two months to prepare a new mobilization schedule, then sent to Samarkand to the district school of fencing instructors, where he simultaneously learns horse riding and equestrian training.

In the future, they offer a place of service at the district headquarters, but Boris Mikhailovich refuses, since in his thoughts he already had the Academy of the General Staff, and for those who had not served in the ranks for 3 years, the road there was closed.

Upon returning from Samarkand to his battalion B.M. Shaposhnikov received a promotion - he was appointed head of the training team with the rights of a company commander.

In 1906, he was promoted to lieutenant, and since January 1907, Boris Mikhailovich has been preparing to enter the Academy of the General Staff.

Having passed the district tests, he goes to the capital and takes the entrance exams, scoring 9.82 points (for admission it was enough to score 8 points).

Already in the 1st year, he acquired thorough knowledge, passed the transfer exams well, but most importantly, he “matured” spiritually, began to better understand people, and appreciate their actions.

Both at the school and at the academy, his development as an officer was greatly influenced by experienced and talented teachers, among whom were professors Colonels A.A. Neznamov, V.V. Belyaev, N.A. Danilov and others.

Before receiving the corresponding position on the General Staff, it was necessary to serve another 2 years as a company commander in the army, and Shaposhnikov again went to Tashkent.

When the time came to choose a new place of service, already within the General Staff, he chose to transfer to the Western District, but not to the district headquarters, but to the division. The post of senior adjutant of the 14th Cavalry Division, which was part of the Warsaw Military District, turned out to be vacant and

stationed in Czestochowa.

He arrived there at the end of December 1912, having just received another rank of captain.

The position of senior adjutant of the General Staff is actually the position of the head of the operational department, whose responsibilities included operational, mobilization issues and combat training of division units.

Units of the 14th Cavalry Division were located not only in Czestochowa (regiment and horse battery), but also in other cities and villages.

FIRST WORLD

It was an anxious time. There was fighting in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary and Germany strengthened their border garrisons.

Having familiarized himself with the operational plan in case of war, B.M. Shaposhnikov saw what a difficult task was assigned to the 14th Cavalry Division. Located directly on the border, it was supposed to be the first to repel an enemy attack and cover the strategic deployment of the Russian armies.

And Boris Mikhailovich tried to do everything in his power to strengthen the regiments and batteries, increase their mobility and training. While inspecting units, he conducted classes with officers, encouraging them to be more active and better prepare soldiers for battle.

In the spring of 1913, the inspection of reconnaissance squadrons at a 30-verst (32 km) crossing was completed, and artillery firing was carried out. In the summer, a general divisional cavalry training took place, followed by cavalry and rifle brigade exercises.

Shaposhnikov develops a new mobilization plan for the division headquarters, often travels to the regiments and brigades of his division with inspections, establishes human intelligence, remains behind the chief of staff and carries out his duties.

From the very beginning of the First World War, the cavalry division, strengthened by B.M. Shaposhnikov gave a lot of strength and energy, came into contact with the Austro-Hungarian units and showed praiseworthy perseverance.

Holding back the enemy's pressure, the division covered the flank of a large operational group of the Southwestern Front. And then the famous Battle of Galicia unfolded. In the fall, the Russian army achieved impressive success in this sector, and the 14th Cavalry Division made a significant combat contribution to it.

True to the principle of “being closer to the troops,” Captain B.M. Shaposhnikov shared with his superiors and subordinates all the difficulties of a large operation. The headquarters was located next to the advanced regiments.

On October 5, 1914, in the battle near Sochaczew, the captain was shell-shocked in the head by a close explosion of an artillery shell, but did not leave his combat post. For over three years B.M. Shaposhnikov spent time on the fronts of the First World War. Thanks to his contribution, the division became one of the best on the Southwestern Front.

REVOLUTION AND ENTRY INTO THE RED ARMY

February revolution of 1917 B.M. I met Shaposhnikov with the rank of colonel and as chief of staff of the Cossack division.

And in September he was appointed commander of the 16th Mengrel Regiment, which had the richest battle history. He was greeted in the regiment with caution, since everyone remembered the Kornilov mutiny, and the soldiers greeted each new officer with suspicion.

But soon everything got better. B.M. Shaposhnikov took care of the needs of the soldiers and attended all meetings of the regimental committee. And when at the committee meeting after October revolution In 1917 he was asked how he felt about the socialist revolution, he directly answered that he recognized it and was ready to continue serving.

In December, a congress of the Caucasian Grenadier Division, which included his regiment, was held, where the issue of choosing a new division commander was discussed. B.M. was chosen as such. Shaposhnikova.

He managed to do a lot in the month during which he commanded the division. Inspections of the supply of units, demobilization and farewells of senior citizens were organized, and revolutionary discipline was strengthened. But illness broke him.

After a two-month stay in the hospital, B.M. Shaposhnikov was demobilized on March 16, 1918, after which he became a judicial official. He performed his duties quickly and punctually, which pleased both the judge and the assessors.

Dissatisfied with the quiet civil life, thinking about his future fate, Boris Mikhailovich came to the firm conviction that it was necessary to return to the army.

Having found out that N.V. was appointed head of the newly established Volga Military District. Pnevsky, former major general, B.M. Shaposhnikov wrote a letter to the latter on April 23, 1918, which contained the following lines:

“As a former colonel of the General Staff, I am keenly interested in the issue of creating a new army and, as a specialist, I would like to provide all possible assistance in this serious matter.”

Boris Mikhailovich's letter did not go unanswered.

Voluntary entry into the ranks of the Red Army in May 1918 was for B.M. Shaposhnikov was not only a return to his usual profession, but also the beginning of a new stage in his life. He is appointed to the Operations Directorate of the Supreme Military Council to the position of assistant director of the department.

By the fall of 1918, it became obvious that the first organizational form of command and control of Soviet troops had outlived its usefulness. At the beginning of September, the Supreme Military Council ceased to exist. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RMRC) was formed as the highest military body. B.M. Shaposhnikov, transferred to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, headed the intelligence department there. Maintaining contact with the fronts and carefully studying intercepted enemy documents, he sought to penetrate as deeply as possible into the enemy’s plans and more accurately determine the location of his main forces and reserves.

This painstaking, unnoticeable work was reflected in instructions to the troops and had a beneficial effect when units of the Red Army resisted the enemy’s onslaught or went on the offensive themselves.

For several months he served under N.I. Podvoisky - first in the Higher Military Inspectorate, then in Ukraine: there Nikolai Ilyich served as People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, B.M. Shaposhnikov was the first assistant to his chief of staff. From him, Boris Mikhailovich learned to assess the situation not only from a purely military, but also from a political perspective.

In August 1919 B.M. Shaposhnikov returns to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR to his previous position. And later he was appointed head of the Operations Directorate of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Forces of the Republic.

During this difficult time for the young state, he had to work with such military leaders as P.P. Lebedev and E.M. Sklyansky, here he met M.V. Frunze.

The result of the service of B.M. Shaposhnikov in the Red Army during the Civil War, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in October 1921.

B.M. Shaposhnikov, M.V. Frunze and M.N. Tukhachevsky. 1922

INCREASING PROFESSIONALISM

There was a Civil War, but even during this tense time B.M. Shaposhnikov thought about the future, and his first step was to generalize the combat experience of the Red Army.

Recalled:

“The Academy instilled in me a love for military history, taught me to draw conclusions from it for the future.

In general, I have always gravitated towards history - it was a bright lamp on my path. It was necessary to continue to study this storehouse of wisdom.”

The first period of service in the Red Army turned out to be very fruitful in this regard. In 1918–1920 B.M. Shaposhnikov prepared and published a number of works in magazines and collections that brought undoubted benefit to young Soviet commanders.

After the war, Boris Mikhailovich served as assistant chief of staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) for more than four years. At the same time, he invested a lot of effort and knowledge into resolving the issue of transferring the army and navy to peaceful lines.

Then a period came in his life when he held senior command posts and was directly associated with the troops.

Being commander of the troops of the Leningrad (1925–1927), Moscow (1927–1928) military districts, chief of staff of the Red Army (1928–1931), commander of the troops of the Volga military district (1931–1932), chief and military Commissioner of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze (1932–1935), commander of the Leningrad Military District (1935–1937), B.M. Shaposhnikov strove to ensure that military units and headquarters institutions, every commander and Red Army soldier in peacetime were in constant combat readiness, as required in war.

For the first time in the Red Army, he applied the methodology of conducting exercises and maneuvers with the participation of intermediaries and neutral communications, often visited the troops at training fields, shooting ranges, training grounds, and command exercises, and at the same time never checked the regiment in the absence of its commander.

He was a champion of strict discipline, but an enemy of shouting.

BRAIN ARMY

In the mid-20s of the XX century. B.M. Shaposhnikov began to create the main book of his life, which he called “The Brain of the Army.”

This major military-scientific work covered a wide range of issues of command and control and substantiated the need for a single governing body in the Red Army - the General Staff.

The first book of capital work was published in 1927, the second and third - in 1929. Many of the recommendations set out in this work were implemented and are still in effect to this day.

In other words, we can safely say that the three-volume work “The Brain of the Army” was very relevant. Its publication caused a great resonance in the press.

It said that in this major study “all the traits of Boris Mikhailovich as a major military specialist were reflected: an inquisitive mind, extreme care in processing and defining formulations, clarity of perspectives, depth of generalizations.”

At the same time, Boris Mikhailovich developed the country’s military doctrine, participated in the work of statutory commissions, and resolved many other issues, which brought him into the ranks of prominent military theorists of his time.

The idea of ​​B.M. Shaposhnikov on the creation of the General Staff in the Red Army had both supporters and opponents.

Different points of view could not help but clash.

Chief of Staff of the Red Army M.N. Tukhachevsky entered the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR with a proposal to carry out such a reorganization so that the Headquarters of the Red Army could really influence the development of the Armed Forces, being a single planning and organizing center. This proposal, like a number of previous ones, was not accepted. One of the arguments was the fear that

“There will be one rapporteur who plans, carries out, and inspects, therefore, has all the criteria in his hands. There is almost nothing in the hands of the leadership: agree and follow the lead of the headquarters.”

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RKKA

The selection of a candidate for the position of Chief of Staff of the Red Army was a serious problem. And not at all because there were not enough experienced military leaders, but not everyone was suitable for such a post.

The Chief of Staff must have, not to mention deep military knowledge, combat experience and a keen critical mind, a number of specific qualities.

The choice fell on Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. Solid theoretical training, combat experience, practice of commanding troops, knowledge of the staff service and the peculiarities of work in the center made him the most suitable candidate.

In May 1928, at the suggestion of I.V. Stalin was approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR by B.M. Shaposhnikov as Chief of Staff of the Red Army.

Boris Mikhailovich, soon after his appointment, made proposals to reorganize the central apparatus.

Twice he turns to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs K.E. Voroshilov with a report in which he asked to review the distribution of responsibilities of the Headquarters and the Main Directorate of the Red Army (GU RKKA). B.M. Shaposhnikov wrote that the Red Army Headquarters should become the leading link in the overall system of military command and control.

Presenting his projects, developed on the basis of a thorough study of the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, he must receive confirmation or rejection only from the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, and not from one or another department of the People's Commissariat.

The headquarters of the Red Army should be the main planning and administrative body in the hands of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The report indicated that the combat training of troops in peacetime should also be organized and controlled by the Red Army Headquarters, since it is he who will lead them in the event of war.

Shortcomings were also noted in mobilization work, from which the Red Army Headquarters was actually excluded, while only it, which develops plans for strategic deployment, can assess the state of mobilization work and manage it.

Shaposhnikov saw a way out of this situation at that stage in transferring troop control from the Main Directorate of the Red Army to the Red Army Headquarters.

“The opinion of the Chief of Staff,” wrote Boris Mikhailovich, “must be heard on this or that issue, and taken into account by the People’s Commissariat departments as one of the main ones.”

In January 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted a resolution to transfer all mobilization work to the Headquarters of the Red Army.

Subsequently, centralization continued until in 1935, instead of the Red Army Headquarters, a single and comprehensive body for managing the life and combat activities of the Red Army was created - the General Staff.

Boris Mikhailovich was one of those Soviet military leaders who, clearly understanding that command cadres constituted the core of the army, took care of their upbringing and training. He always did this, regardless of what position he held—whether it was a staff position or a command position.

But there were also periods in his life when personnel training became a direct duty.

Principles of training and education of personnel, which B.M. Shaposhnikov adhered to, he persistently and consistently carried out when for 3.5 years (1932–1935) he was the head of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

Teaching and scientific activity B.M. Shaposhnikova received due assessment - in June 1935 he was awarded academic title professor. The Higher Attestation Commission, making its decision, noted that he was a military scientist of exceptional erudition and great generalizations, famous not only in the USSR, but also abroad.

Merits of B.M. Shaposhnikov in this field are indisputable.

But the academy gave him a lot too. In the theoretical discussions held, his views on the nature of possible military operations of the Red Army were formed, and ideas about the probable forms of operations and strategic interaction of the fronts took shape.

The leadership of the academy came to B.M. Shaposhnikov was an important step towards further military activities.

AGAIN AT THE HEAD OF THE GENERAL STAFF

In the spring of 1937, after a second two-year command of the Leningrad Military District, B.M. Shaposhnikov was appointed Chief of the General Staff

And in 1938 he was introduced to the Main Military Council. This gave the Chief of the General Staff the opportunity to directly influence the adoption of the most important decisions in matters of national defense.

Boris Mikhailovich served as Chief of the General Staff for three years, and during this time he acquired many students and followers who helped him turn the General Staff into the brain of the army.

The result of the enormous work of the entire headquarters under the leadership of B.M. Shaposhnikov presented a report to the country's leadership on the strategic deployment of the Red Army in the Western and Eastern theaters of military operations, which received full approval in 1938 at the Main Military Council.

Subsequently, students and followers of B.M. Shaposhnikov after his departure due to illness from the General Staff, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin called it “Shaposhnikov’s school.”

Workers to the General Staff of B.M. Shaposhnikov chose from among those who had excellently graduated from military academies and who had proven themselves to be thoughtful leaders in the troops.

Such employees, with a relatively small staff, successfully coped with difficult responsibilities.

The proposals and plans emanating from the General Staff during these years were distinguished by reality, foresight and comprehensive validity. Undoubtedly, he had a great influence personal example Boris Mikhailovich.

His restraint and politeness in relations with people, regardless of their rank, discipline and utmost diligence when receiving instructions from managers - all this instilled in his employees the same sense of responsibility for the assigned work.

The coordinated work of the General Staff, headed by B.M. Shaposhnikov, contributed to the successful conduct of such campaignsmajor operations of 1938–1940, such as the defeat of the Japanese militarists at Khalkhin Gol, the campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, etc.

Hard work B.M. Shaposhnikova was highly appreciated. In May 1940, he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. But illness again caused him to leave the post of Chief of the General Staff.

DURING THE WAR

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the question of the Chief of the General Staff arose again. K.A. Meretskov and G.K. Zhukov, who headed the General Staff after B.M. Shaposhnikov, were quite mature generals who had the skills to command large military formations.

However, they did not have time to acquire the experience necessary for a General Staff officer.

Therefore, at the end of July 1941, B.M. Shaposhnikov again headed the General Staff and became a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

During this most difficult time for the country, during the days of the Battle of Smolensk, the defense of Kyiv and the battle of Moscow, working practically without sleep or rest, the 60-year-old marshal completely undermined his health.

In May 1942 he was forced to contact the State Committee Defense with a request to transfer him to a less responsible area.

The request was granted, instructing Boris Mikhailovich to monitor the activities of military academies, organize the collection of materials for future history war, organize the development of new regulations and instructions.

But even in the short time that was given to him, he did a lot. These are new Combat and Field Manuals, a number of articles devoted to the operations of the Red Army, and management of the publication of a three-volume monograph about the Battle of Moscow.

Under the direct leadership of Shaposhnikov, the work of all major headquarters was restructured. All large-scale operations in the initial period of the war were developed with his direct participation.

He warned of the destruction military operation near Kharkov and his warnings were not heeded, which ended in disaster

In June 1943, Boris Mikhailovich received a new and, as it turned out, last appointment, becoming the head of the Academy of the General Staff, which was then called the Higher Military Academy named after K.E. Voroshilov.

He did not stop for a minute his extensive organizational and military-theoretical work, carefully training officers and generals capable of operational work at headquarters and command of large formations and formations of troops.

In a short time, the academy trained more than one hundred highly qualified general staff officers and military leaders who demonstrated high combat and moral qualities on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

His selfless work as a tireless warrior was noted with high awards.

In February 1944 B.M. Shaposhnikov was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, in November - the Order of the Red Banner (secondary), in February 1945 - the third Order of Lenin. Previously, he was also awarded two Orders of the Red Star, medals “XX Years of the Red Army” and “For the Defense of Moscow”.

DEATH

Giving the outstanding military leader the highest military honor, Moscow said goodbye to him with 24 artillery salvoes, as if merging with the thunder of the decisive offensive of the Red Army at the front.

Name B.M. Shaposhnikov was awarded to the Higher Rifle and Tactical Courses “Vystrel”, Tambov Infantry School, streets in Moscow and Zlatoust. He was buried on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

CONCLUSION

Such a unique person was the Russian patriot Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov

Photo from the archives of the German General Staff. 1940

In January 1941, Zhukov took part in 2 bilateral operational-strategic games on maps. Initially, one game was planned, November 17 - 19, 1940, on the topic: “Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of a fortified area,” during which it was planned to give practice to senior command personnel in the organization, planning and management of front-line and army offensive operations, to study the Baltic theater of military operations and East Prussia, as well as familiarize yourself with the basics of defensive measures of troops.

Later, the start date of the game was postponed and linked to the end of the December meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, while the scope of the game expanded significantly: in addition to the game in the north-west direction, a second game was also envisaged - in the south-west.

Both games were held in three stages, at each of which the participants, in accordance with the tasks, made decisions and prepared written directives, combat orders, operational reports and other official documents.

In the first game, which took place from January 2 to 6, 1941, Zhukov commanded the “Western”, attacking from the territory of East Prussia and Poland.

The North-Western Front of the “Eastern” (comfront of D. G. Pavlov) stopped the “Western” and went on the offensive, fulfilling the task of reaching the lower reaches of the Vistula River.

According to the conditions of the game, the “East” had approximately one and a half superiority in forces (in tanks - almost three times). In the first days, Pavlov’s troops crossed the Neman, capturing the Suvalka ledge (surrounding a large “Western” group in it), and on the left wing they broke through the front led by Zhukov.

A cavalry-mechanized army was introduced into the breakthrough, which entered the area located 110-120 km west of the State Border of the USSR. In response, Zhukov launched a counterattack, leading to the encirclement and loss of Vostochny, after which the game was stopped by mediators.

In the second game, which took place from January 8 to 11, 1941, Zhukov commanded the “Eastern” group, which repelled the aggression of the “Western”, “Southwestern” and “Southern” forces in Ukraine and Bessarabia. The second game ended with the Vostochny decision to attack Budapest, break through to Lake Balaton and cross the Danube.

On January 14, 1941, by the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the Chief of the General Staff and Commanders of Military Districts,” Army General Zhukov was appointed to replace Kirill Meretskov, to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, which he held until July 1941.

In general, the activities of Georgy Konstantinovich as Chief of the General Staff are assessed ambiguously by modern historians. Taking into account the level of knowledge and character of the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade G.K. Zhukov, the future Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, who commanded the 7th Samara Cavalry Division in 1930, noted on November 8, 1930 in his certification:

Georgy Konstantinovich himself wrote later:

And the frequent changes of senior command staff in the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in the pre-war years did not contribute to the high-quality development of plans and the creation of a competent team of professionals.

At the XVIII Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in February 1941, Zhukov was elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

May - June 1941

Occupying the post of Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in February - July 1941, Zhukov took part in drawing up “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies.” The plan dates no earlier than May 15, 1941. This document stated, in particular:

Considering that Germany currently keeps its army mobilized, with its rear deployed, it has the opportunity to warn us of its deployment and launch a surprise attack. To prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give the initiative of action to the German command, to forestall the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize the front and interaction of the military branches. “Soviet military-strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War in modern historiography”

After listing the tasks assigned to the troops of the fronts, it was proposed:

People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov reported the contents of the document to Stalin. If it is implemented, a strike is proposed through the territory of Southern Poland in Katowice, with a further turn either to Berlin (if the main enemy group retreats to Berlin), or to the Baltic Sea, if the main German forces do not retreat and try to hold the territory of Poland and East Prussia.

An auxiliary attack by the left wing of the Western Front was supposed to be carried out in the directions of Siedlce - Dęblin, with the aim of pinning down the Warsaw group and capturing Warsaw, as well as assisting the Southwestern Front in defeating the enemy's Lublin group.

Modern historians do not know whether the plan was accepted. The document is not signed, although the places for signatures are indicated in it. According to Zhukov in an interview on May 26, 1965, the plan was not approved by Stalin. However, Zhukov did not specify which plan was accepted for execution and was in effect at the start of the war - June 22, 1941.

As stated in the study “1941 - lessons and conclusions” (M. Voenizdat - 1992), the General Staff had two options for repelling aggression, carried out on the basis of general “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its Allies for 1940-1941”, dated autumn 1940. And according to one of the options, “Southern”, preparations for war were underway.

On the evening of June 21, 1941, Zhukov, according to the recollections of General I.V. Tyulenev, commander of the Moscow Military District in June 1941, called the districts and warned commanders about a possible attack by Germany and its allies in the next 24 hours.

On June 21, 1941, at a meeting in the Kremlin (from 20:50 to 22:20), Zhukov and S.K. Timoshenko proposed draft Directive No. 1 to Stalin. According to Zhukov, after a tense discussion they were able to convince him.

Directive No. 1 to the commanders of the troops western districts was adopted a few hours before the Axis invasion.

The Great Patriotic War

During the Great Patriotic War, he held the posts of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army (June-July 1941), member of the Headquarters of the High Command (from June 23, 1941), Headquarters of the Supreme Command (from July 10, 1941), Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (from August 8, 1941), commander of the Leningrad Front (from September 14), commander of the Western Front (from October 10).

From August 26, 1942 he was Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief; from August 27, 1942 - first deputy People's Commissar defense of the USSR.

He commanded the following fronts: Reserve, Leningrad, Western (at the same time he was the commander-in-chief of the Western direction), 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian.

Georgy Zhukov. 1941

On June 22, 1941, after the German attack, Zhukov prepared Directives No. 2 (departed at 07:15) and No. 3 (departed at 23:50) of the People's Commissar of Defense (signatures of Timoshenko and Zhukov), which contained orders to repel Wehrmacht attacks , - “to attack with all forces and means” where the enemy has crossed the border, but not to cross the border themselves (Directive No. 2) and “to launch a decisive attack on German troops” (Directive No. 3).

The command of the border districts was unable to fulfill the tasks set in the Directives due to the fact that the troops were not brought to combat readiness in a timely manner. The factor of surprise also played a role.

Soon, contact with some formations was lost, and the troops themselves began a disorderly retreat, without offering organized resistance to the enemy. The offensive of June 23-28 turned into a series of ineffective counterattacks that did not lead to the expected results and a change in the operational situation.

The troops of the Southwestern Front, where Zhukov was stationed as a representative of the commander-in-chief since June 23, were unable to encircle and destroy the advancing enemy groups, as envisaged by pre-war plans, although they managed to seriously slow down the advance of the German troops, using the Red Army's superiority in armored vehicles, which was almost completely lost during the famous battle in the Dubno region, where the Red Army suffered a tactical defeat.

The troops of the Western and Northwestern Fronts, which did not have a significant advantage over the German troops in manpower and equipment, suffered serious losses when attempting to launch counterattacks.

The Western Front, which received the main blow from Army Group Center, was soon virtually destroyed.

At the end of July 1941, after a series of defeats and cauldrons, units of the Red Army, on July 28, 1941, were forced to leave Smolensk ( more details...).

On July 29, 1941, Stalin removed Zhukov from the post of Chief of the General Staff and appointed him commander of the Reserve Front, where Georgy Konstantinovich continued the counterattacks undertaken as part of the Battle of Smolensk, and then carried out the Elninsky offensive operation with the forces of the 24th and 43rd armies.

It was planned that the Red Army troops would “cut off the German wedge” in soviet front, formed as a result of the Battle of Smolensk, and will be surrounded by 8 enemy divisions. Although on the night of September 6–7, in conditions of heavy rains, the Germans managed to withdraw troops from the pocket, the Elninsky operation became the first successful offensive operation of the Red Army since the beginning of the war.

The losses of Soviet troops in the Elninsky operation amounted to 31,853 people out of 103,200 who participated (31% of whom were killed and wounded), German losses amounted to 8-10 thousand killed and wounded

After the completion of the Elninsky operation (by order of September 11, 1941), Zhukov was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. The task was set to keep Leningrad from being captured, to release it until the Germans created a defense around the city - to break through to meet Kulik, whose troops were supposed to break through to meet Zhukov.

The 42nd and 55th armies, concentrated on the southern sector of the front in a zone approximately 25 km away, all the artillery of the Baltic Fleet, 125 thousand sailors who went ashore, 10 divisions were placed at the disposal of the front commander people's militia…

Kulik, on approximately the same section of the front, was supposed to break through to Leningrad from the area of ​​the station. MGA by the forces of the 54th separate army. According to some estimates, “the operation failed due to the small number of troops” allocated by Zhukov in support of Kulik.

The German military command also considered the capture of Leningrad as a likely “heavy moral blow” to the Soviet people, since Leningrad was the so-called “cradle of the Great October Revolution” and the city of the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Bolsheviks. In July 1941, when visiting the headquarters of Army Group North, Adolf Hitler emphasized that with the capture of Leningrad, for the Russians -

From a military-political and strategic perspective, for Germany, in addition to the capture or blockade of Leningrad as a major industrial center of the USSR, reunification with units of the Finnish army, which was advancing on the city from the North, was also of great importance. It was also believed that once the Germans “reached Leningrad,” “the Russian Baltic Fleet would lose its last stronghold and would find itself in a hopeless position.”

On August 21, having rejected a number of proposals from the leaders of the main command of the ground forces, Hitler, in his instructions, determined the most important tasks for the coming period:

On September 17, the enemy's advanced units break through to Gulf of Finland west of Leningrad, cutting off the troops of the 8th Army from the main forces of the front. The Oranienbaum bridgehead is formed to the west of the city. The next day, the Germans capture Slutsk and break into Pushkin.

The situation seemed critical, and Zhukov took extreme measures, hoping first of all to restore the troops’ confidence in their strengths and capabilities:

On September 17, he gives a stern order to the military councils of the 42nd and 55th armies, in which he demands to immediately shoot all commanders, political workers and soldiers who left the line of defense without an order.

On September 22, he sent a coded telegram to the 8th Army, where he ordered the army command to “personally lead” the soldiers into battle and warned of the imminent execution of all commanders who left Peterhof without permission as “cowards and traitors.”

Some publications claim that on September 28, 1941, Zhukov allegedly sent an encrypted telegram to the troops of the Leningrad Front under No. 4976, which, in particular, ordered: “Explain to all personnel that all families of those who surrendered to the enemy will be shot and upon returning from captivity they will also be everyone was shot”... [see. comment - 2]

On September 25, the headquarters of Army Group North informs the main command of the German ground forces that with the forces remaining at its disposal it is not able to continue the attack on Leningrad.

It would be naive to assume that General Zhukov’s mission on the Leningrad Front was limited only to signing “cannibalistic orders” and “filling up the noble enemy with corpses” in the name of an illusory goal. The relative stabilization of the front on the approaches to the city was achieved thanks to: painstaking, round-the-clock work on maps, trips to units and subunits, competent operational-tactical planning, solving the most complex problems of supplying and transporting troops under blockade conditions. Zhukov devoted a lot of time to studying the forces and means available to the enemy, interacting with Headquarters, the party and economic leadership of the city of Leningrad.

Zhukov in October 1941. Photo from the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, published on Stalin’s personal orders

Under the command of Army General Zhukov from September 14 to October 6, 1941, the troops of the Leningrad Front, together with Baltic Fleet courageously held the defense on the near approaches to the city. For the first time during the war, German troops were forced to move from a strategic offensive to a long trench siege. Before the start of Operation Typhoon, the Wehrmacht failed to capture Leningrad and reunite with the Finnish army.

The disruption of the plan for the lightning capture of Leningrad was of great military-strategic significance for the Soviet command. Stuck near Leningrad, the Wehrmacht lost the opportunity to turn the forces of Army Group North towards the Moscow direction to reinforce the troops of Army Group Center advancing there. Only the remnants of the 4th Panzer Group turned to Moscow (about half of the original forces remained in it), but near Leningrad they were forced to leave two divisions of the 12th and 8th Panzer. [cm. comment - 3] .

After stabilizing the front near Leningrad, Zhukov was recalled to the central direction of the Soviet-German front (he headed the Reserve Front from October 8 and the Western Front from October 10), where the main forces of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts were surrounded and destroyed by German troops in the first half of October ( 16th, 19th, 20th armies and Boldin army group of the Western Front, 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front, etc.). On October 12, the Germans captured Kaluga, on October 15 - Kalinin, and on October 18 - Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets.

During the second half of October and November 1941, the troops of the Western Front under the command of Zhukov conducted an active defense in order to wear down the enemy forces and prepared to launch a counteroffensive.

After the battles at the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga line, our troops were consolidated in defensive positions east of these points, equipped, re-armed and prepared for private counterattacks against the enemy groups that had emerged by that time.

- Shaposhnikov B. M: “Battle for Moscow: Moscow operation of the Western Front November 16, 1941 - January 31, 1942” .

On the night of December 5-6, 1941, the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation began by the troops of the right wing of the Western Front with the support of the left wing of the Kalinin Front under the command of Konev.

The troops of the Western and other fronts inflicted a significant defeat on the formations of Army Group Center under Field Marshal von Bock during the counteroffensive near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942).

The losses of Soviet troops amounted to 372 thousand killed and wounded, or 37% of the number of troops at the beginning of the operation.

As a result of the successful offensive, the threat of a quick capture of the USSR capital by the enemy was removed. The front line moved away from Moscow by 100-250 km. The first major defeat of the Wehrmacht in World War II had an inspiring moral effect on the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition.

That year, Zhukov commanded Soviet troops in four major offensive operations:

• Moscow counter-offensive (until January 7, 1942);
• Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942);
• First Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942);
• Second Rzhev-Sychevsk operation - (Operation "Mars") (November 25 - December 20, 1942)

Operation plan "Mars"

Significant successes of Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 led to an active offensive by the Red Army along the entire front. But already in January 1942 it began to choke due to increased resistance from German troops, due to interruptions in reinforcements and ammunition from the Red Army, and due to the Headquarters’ overestimation of the successes achieved. Losses in the relatively ineffective Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation amounted to 776,889 people - 73.3% of the number of troops at the beginning of the operation.

During the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in the summer of 1942, the enemy front again held out, Soviet troops advanced 30-40 km. This operation did not lead to the outflow of German forces from the southern direction of the Soviet-German front, but the transfer of divisions of Army Group Center to it was not allowed. Losses in the operation amounted to 193,683 people (56.1% of the original number). The infamous Operation Mars, carried out simultaneously with the initial phase of Operation Uranus, was not directly prepared by Zhukov as front commander. During its preparation, he was a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters in the Stalingrad direction. However, the coordination of the efforts of the Western Front (front commander Konev) and the Kalinin Front (front commander Purkaev) during the operation was entrusted to him.

The main objective of the operation was supposed to encircle and destroy the 9th Field Army of the Wehrmacht, but this was not possible for a number of reasons. The losses of Soviet troops in it amounted to 215 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1315 tanks and self-propelled guns in 25 days. Thus, the average losses of Soviet troops in one day of combat (8666 people and 52.6 tanks) significantly exceeded the losses in the Stalingrad offensive operation (6466 people and 38.9 tanks).

At the same time, the offensive actions of the Red Army in the Rzhev area did not allow the German command to transfer units as additional reserves from the central direction of the Soviet-German front to the south, where they could influence the course and outcome Battle of Stalingrad.

“Mars” is one of the striking examples of the emergence of a positional crisis at a qualitatively new level of development military equipment and operational art. Tanks that were in the First world war became one of the tools for solving the problem of breaking through the front; in World War II they themselves often found themselves victims of new means of struggle. Anti-tank guns mowed down advancing tanks with the same terrifying speed and efficiency as machine guns and rapid-fire guns stopped infantrymen on the Marne. In the late autumn of 1942, tanks increasingly began to encounter anti-tank artillery in its most dangerous form - self-propelled guns completely protected by anti-shell armor.

In addition, Zhukov, as a representative of the Headquarters, coordinated the actions of the armies of the Stalingrad Front between the Don and Volga rivers in the first half of September 1942.

In addition to the operational activities of the commander, Zhukov, according to the version put forward by him and Vasilevsky in their memoirs, is also a co-author (together with Vasilevsky) of the key Soviet military plan of 1942 - the plan strategic operation"Uranus", on the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad. The plan, which, according to the memoirs of Zhukov and Vasilevsky, bears their and I.V. Stalin’s signatures, has not yet been published, despite the expiration of the statute of limitations.

At the beginning of 1943, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the fronts in Operation Iskra during the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade.

After Iskra, Zhukov participated in the preparation of Operation Polar Star, which was entrusted to S.K. Timoshenko. It was supposed to defeat Army Group North, liberate the Leningrad region and create the preconditions for a successful offensive in the Baltic states. ( more details...)

On January 18, 1943, Zhukov was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He became the first marshal of the USSR since the beginning of the war.

Since March 17, Zhukov was in the Belgorod direction of the emerging Kursk Bulge. Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky spoke about Zhukov’s activities as a representative of the Headquarters on the Central Front during that period:

From July 5, during the defensive and offensive stages Battle of Kursk Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Western, Bryansk, Steppe and Voronezh fronts.

At the end of August-September, during the Chernigov-Poltava operation, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts during operations to pursue the enemy, who was retreating to the Dnieper.

Liberation of Ukraine (1944)

As a result of the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge was formed, which Zhukov and Vatutin, in a report to Stalin on January 11, 1944, proposed to cut off.

According to Manstein's memoirs, the 42nd Army Corps of the 1st was surrounded tank army and the 11th Army Corps of the 8th Army: 6 divisions and one brigade. According to the research of I. Moshchansky - 10 divisions and one brigade.

During the operation, General Konev accused Zhukov and Vatutin of inactivity regarding the encircled German group, which led to its breakthrough from the encirclement. As a result of Konev's appeal to Stalin, the internal front of the encirclement was completely transferred under Konev's command. This episode further complicated the relationship between Zhukov and Konev.

After Vatutin was seriously wounded, Stalin ordered Zhukov to lead the 1st Ukrainian Front. The troops under the command of Zhukov carried out the offensive Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation in March-April 1944 and reached the foothills of the Carpathians.

On April 10, 1944, Marshal G.K. Zhukov was awarded the highest military award - the Order of Victory. The first among those awarded. There were no orders, since they were not made at the Mint but in a jewelry watch workshop.

In the summer of 1944, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts during Operation Bagration. The operation, well provided with material and technical means, was completed successfully. The advance was not 150-200 km, as planned, but 400-500.

During the offensive, Zhukov, on July 8 (independently of Vasilevsky, who proposed the same idea) put forward a proposal to transfer one tank army from the 1st Ukrainian Front, which had excess forces and means, to Vasilevsky’s group of fronts and to the 2nd Belorussian Front, with simultaneous strengthening of this grouping by one combined arms army from the Headquarters reserve and a number of other units, for a surprise attack on the still extremely weakly defended East Prussia.

However, the idea was rejected. As G.K. Zhukov later noted:

I think that this was a serious mistake by the Supreme Commander, which subsequently entailed the need to carry out an extremely complex and bloody East Prussian operation.

In July 1944, Zhukov also coordinated the actions of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which launched attacks in the Lvov, Rava-Russian and part of the forces in the Stanislavsky directions. In November 1944, he was appointed commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On final stage war, the 1st Belorussian Front, led by Marshal Zhukov, together with the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Konev, carried out the Vistula-Oder operation, during which Soviet troops liberated Warsaw and defeated Army Group “A” of General J. Harpe and Field Marshal F. with a dissecting blow. Scherner.

The losses of Soviet troops in this operation amounted to 193,215 people. Of this number, the 1st Belorussian Front lost 77,342 out of 1,028,900 people (7.5%), while the 1st Ukrainian Front lost 115,783 out of 1,083,800 people (10.7%), that is, 1 .5 times more.

Despite the fact that Zhukov's front went on the offensive two days later than the neighboring 1st Ukrainian Front, the pace of the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front so exceeded the rate of advance of the neighboring two fronts that this led to the exposure of the flanks by 100-150 km from the north and from south of the forward units. The width of the front by the end of January 31st reached 500 km.

February 10 - April 4, the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the East Pomeranian operation, losing 52,303 out of 359,600 people (14.5%). The 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky lost 173,389 out of 560,900 people (30.9%).

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front ended the war by participating in the Berlin operation, losing 179,490 of 908,500 people (19.7%), while the 1st Ukrainian Front lost 113,825 of 550,900 people (20.7%). ) .

On May 8, 1945 at 22:43 (May 9 at 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin) Zhukov accepted the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany from Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.

Zhukov and two Victory Parades

On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took part in the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. The parade was commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky.

On September 7, 1945, the Victory Parade of the Allied Forces in World War II took place in Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate; Marshal Zhukov hosted the parade from the Soviet Union. The parade was commanded by English Major General Nares.

Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich

General Staff in the pre-war years

Publisher's abstract: This book was written in 1969, but is being published for the first time only now, when it becomes possible to use in print facts that were previously considered closed. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov (1898-1972), in his historical and memoir book, spoke about his service in the General Staff of the Red Army and explored some aspects of the activities of this most important body of the Soviet Armed Forces in the pre-war years. The book is written on a broad documentary basis and personal memories of the author. Designed for the general reader.

Chapter 1. From headquarters to the General Staff of the Red Army

Chapter 2. Strategic leadership and military scientific work

Chapter 3. On the eve of the Second World War

Chapter 4. Strengthening the security of the USSR

Chapter 5. The danger of fascist aggression is growing

Chapter 6. On the eve and in the first days of the Great Patriotic War

Applications

Notes

From the publisher

We express our gratitude to the daughter of Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov researcher Institute of the International Labor Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences to Candidate of Economic Sciences Valentina Matveevna Zakharova for active assistance in preparing the book for publication.

The activities of the General Staff of the Red Army in the pre-war years were great and multifaceted. To cover all its aspects, more than one monograph would be required, and it is quite clear that, when starting work on this historical and memoir work, it was impossible to set such a goal.

The author would like to show the reader, within the framework of what is accessible, only some aspects of the activities of the General Staff related to the preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces to repel the impending aggression of fascist states, talk about those most important events that were carried out with the participation of the author, and pay tribute to the remarkable General Staff officers of the pre-war period, who selflessly gave all the strength and knowledge for a complex and responsible matter.

As is known, the General Staff of the Red Army was not formed immediately, but as a result of a long search for an organizational structure and the complex evolution of the central bodies of military command, carried out at various stages of the development of the armed forces. Therefore, it would be legitimate to briefly talk about the predecessors of the General Staff, their functions and role in organizing the country’s defense.

Considering the solution to the problems of building the armed forces and strategic planning - the basis of all the activities of the General Staff, the author, analyzing and assessing events, used not only personal memories and impressions, but also, first of all, numerous archival documents, materials related to the assessment of the international situation, took into account the most important decisions of the party and government, the economic capabilities of our state, the level of development of military theoretical thought, military equipment and weapons.

A comprehensive documentary substantiation of a number of provisions in this work is also necessary because the majority of readers have a fairly general idea of ​​the activities of the General Staff in the pre-war years, obtained from military memoirs. The military reader, having critically considered what is presented in this work, will more clearly imagine both the historical moments of Soviet military development and some current problems.

I express my gratitude for the assistance in preparing this work to Major General of Aviation M. T. Chernyshev, Colonels N. V. Eronin and V. G. Klevtsov, as well as Colonel N. E. Tereshchenko for the selection and verification of archival documents.

From headquarters to the General Staff of the Red Army

Central bodies of military administration during the civil war. Headquarters of the Red Army in the transition period from war to peacetime and during the years of military reform. Mixed system of military development and the Headquarters of the Red Army. The headquarters of the Red Army became the General Staff. General Staff during the transition to a unified personnel principle for the construction of the Red Army. General Staff and Military Academy of the General Staff.

After the creation of the world's first Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, its leaders repeatedly debated for a number of years about what to call the central body in the system of higher education. military organization- Headquarters or General Staff. Disputes around this important issue arose naturally. If the name "General Staff" was adopted, it was necessary to centralize the operational and administrative functions of many leading army institutions into a single command body. Giving great importance the principle of centralization in the armed struggle, the party and government during the civil war still could not agree to this due to the prevailing situation. The inopportuneness of raising this question was obvious: the newly created proletarian army did not have its own highly qualified personnel; it was very dangerous to completely entrust leadership in the central military apparatus to military experts - people from classes socially alien to the revolution; the creation of such a large and complex military mechanism as the General Staff required considerable time, and history has allocated extremely limited periods for organizing the defense of the young Soviet Republic from the pressing forces of internal and external counter-revolution. And this thing was completely new after the Great October Revolution. The experience of military experts from the old army recruited to serve in the Red Army was little suitable for building armed forces that were new in spirit and tasks. Some surviving institutions of the former General Staff were cumbersome and did not meet the challenges that arose. Therefore, before making the final decision to create one or another military command body, it was necessary to make sure of the feasibility of this at a certain stage in the development of the armed forces.

Given these circumstances, leading figures of the party and government were cautious about the proposals of some military experts regarding the creation at that time of a central military command body called the General Staff. Nevertheless, they attached great importance to the staff service: after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, some organs of the old military department were retained, and in particular the Main Directorate of the General Staff (1), serving mainly demobilized tsarist army. Former generals and officers assigned to the General Staff were registered. Some of them serving in the Red Army had a postscript added to their official title, for example: “Chief of Staff of the 15th Army of the General Staff I. I. Ivanov.” In the fall of 1918, 526 former General Staff officers served in the Red Army, including 160 generals, 200 colonels and lieutenant colonels. This was the most prepared part of the old officer corps.

Despite the fact that during the civil war there was formally no single body similar to the General Staff, practically centralized operational management of the armed struggle was carried out through the Field Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, which had broader powers in relation to other bodies of the military department.

At the final stage of the civil war, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, along with the general problems of building armed forces in a period of peace, faced the question of organizing the central bodies of military command. The development of proposals on this issue was entrusted to the Field Headquarters and a specially created commission headed by former General P. S. Baluev.

On January 21, 1920, in the report “On the organization of the country’s armed forces” presented to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, signed by Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, Chief of the Field Headquarters P. P. Lebedev and Headquarters Commissar, member of the RVOR D. I. Kursky, it was recommended at the expense of the Field Headquarters RVSR and the All-Russian Main Staff to create the Main Directorate of the General Staff or the Great General Staff - the highest operational body of the armed forces, which was supposed to develop plans for war and operations, the combat activities of the armed forces, transmit orders from the commander-in-chief to the active army and navy, and give tasks to other departments and departments , arising from operational considerations, as well as to collect various information necessary for the conduct of war. At the same time, it was envisaged to have a General Staff as the highest administrative body of the armed forces in combat and administrative matters, in charge of the formation, organization and training of troops, as well as serving rear units and institutions of the army and navy.