home / Self-development/ Separatists. Some issues of organization and tactics of actions of illegal armed groups of the Chechen Republic Illegal armed groups in Chechnya

Separatists. Some issues of organization and tactics of actions of illegal armed groups of the Chechen Republic Illegal armed groups in Chechnya

Oleg Petrovsky

Since the beginning of the counter-terrorism campaign in Chechnya, dozens of militant field commanders have been killed by federal forces. But for now, the vast majority of those involved remain at large. Moreover, new names and nicknames of “emirs”, “front commanders” and “ministers of defense of Ichkeria” who live on robbery and violence are appearing in Chechnya. Most of them have a criminal background, solid combat experience and, as a result, a certain amount of capital acquired in the war. Ytra has received fresh data from the Russian special services on those field commanders who are still alive and continue to resist our military.

Leaders of illegal armed groups
(as a rule, “ministers” of Dudayev and Maskhadov, “brigadier and division generals”, “regiment commanders and separate brigades" etc.)

1. Abdul-Malik Mezhidov- Gelayev’s closest associate, former Deputy Minister of Sharia Security. Participated in Basayev's raid on Budennovsk in 1995. He led the kidnapping of General Gennady Shpigun on March 5, 1999 at Grozny airport. Took part in the invasion of Dagestan in August 1999. According to operational data, in the fall of this year he went out with his gang to the territory of Ingushetia several times.

2. Abdulkhadzhiev Aslambek, nickname "Big". Longtime friend of Basayev. He took part in the war in Abkhazia in the early 90s as part of Shamil Basayev’s “separate battalion”. He broke out of blockaded Grozny with his squad in February 2000. In spring and autumn he was in the mountains near Shatoy. According to operational data, he may be in Georgia.

3. Abu Abdullah Jafar- citizen of Pakistan, Pashtun, member of the terrorist group "Al-Badr" ("Full Month"). Known as one of Khattab’s sponsors, he sent several tens of thousands of counterfeit dollars to Chechnya. He fought under the leadership of Khattab in Dagestan, commanding a detachment of 200 Arab mercenaries. According to some reports, he is still in Chechnya.

4. Abu Dar (Darr)- citizen of Saudi Arabia. A representative of the extremist organization Al-Haramain, which sponsors militants. He is considered a close friend of Arbi Barayev. At the end of June 2000, with a detachment of Arabs, he was surrounded near the village of Serzhen-Yurt in the Shali region of Chechnya. After a week of fighting with a group of militants, he broke into the mountains. Presumably he is in one of Khattab’s detachments.

5. Abu Umar- one of the bloodiest personalities around Khattab. Instructor-miner of the highest qualification. He mined roads in Grozny back in 1995. He took part in an attack on a military unit in Buinaksk in 1998, was blown up by a mine, and was wounded. Personally instructs terrorist groups heading to Russia. According to intelligence services, this man’s people staged a terrorist attack in Volgograd on May 31, 2000, when two military construction workers were killed and 12 people were injured. Almost all the bombers who carry out sabotage in Chechnya and the North Caucasus went through this man.

6. Arsanov Vakha- former policeman, until 1991 - traffic police officer. It has been fighting since 1994. In 1996 he became "commander Northwestern Front". Vice-President of Ichkeria. Commands a small detachment of militants. The bases are located in the center of the Argun Gorge. Does not have an influential role among field commanders. According to operational data, he traveled to Afghanistan and Georgia. Until recently, he was subordinate to the "Borz" detachment, whose fighters joined the detachments of Basayev and other field commanders and was involved in many high-profile kidnappings in Chechnya.

7. Atgeriev Turapl-Ali(detained and placed in the FSB Lefortovo pre-trial detention center). Former traffic police officer, 31 years old. In 1996, together with Salman Raduev, he participated in the attack on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye. Former minister State Security of Ichkeria. IN last war did not take an active part in the hostilities. Apart from his personal guard, he had no armed supporters.

6. Akhmadov Rizvan. A gang of six Akhmadov brothers specializes exclusively in kidnappings. According to the latest information, one of the brothers was captured by the special services. Kidnappers are the Akhmadov brothers: Abu, Rizvan, Ramzan, Uvays, Ruslan, Apti. Three British citizens and a New Zealander were executed with particular cruelty - the heads of the foreigners were cut off. In 1999, near the Dagestan village of Gunib, Polish citizens Sofia Fischer-Malanovskaya and Eva Markhvinskaya-Wirval were kidnapped. They specialize in kidnapping the mothers of missing soldiers in Chechnya. Valentina Erokhina from Perm and Antonina Borschova from Rostov-on-Don were captured by the Akhmadovs. ITAR-TASS photojournalist Vladimir Yatsina was kidnapped and shot. According to the latest information, they are hiding in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia.

7. Baraev Arbi Alaudinovich- native of the village of Alkhan-Kala. An ardent Wahhabi. During the first Chechen campaign he commanded the Jamaat unit. Now he is the commander of the Islamic Special Purpose Regiment. In January 1996, he took 29 Rostov power engineers hostage. Organizer of more than 70 (!) kidnappings of foreign citizens, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President Valentin Vlasov, FSB employees, NTV and ORT journalists, businessmen and clergy. Organizes attacks on military personnel and police officers. According to operational data, he is located in Grozny. Uses the documents of an employee of the Russian special services.

8. Basaev Shamil Salmanovich- the one-legged head of Shura. Leader of irreconcilable militants. Recently I got married for the third time. A field commander who has been fighting since the early 90s. He was Deputy Minister of Defense of Abkhazia. He studied guerrilla warfare tactics in Afghanistan. Wounded eight times, shell-shocked seven times. Leader of irreconcilable militants. Located in the Vedeno district of Chechnya. Supporter of "war to the bitter end."

9. Basnukaev Akhmed- “Brigadier General”, “Commander of the Urus-Martan Front”. He “lit up” in the story with Andrei Babitsky. Participated in the battles for Grozny.

10. Gelayev Ruslan (Khamzat)- a repeat offender with three convictions. "Division General". During the fighting in the village of Komsomolskoye in March 2000, he lost about 1,200 people killed. With a small detachment he went to the mountains. Gelayev moves around the border of Georgia and Ingushetia. According to operational data, it has its base in the Pankisi Gorge of Georgia. Recruits militants among Chechen refugees in the Akhmetovsky region of Georgia. Has disagreements with Basayev and Khattab.

11. Gelikhanov Sultan- former head of the state security department of Ichkeria. Came under the complete influence of Basayev. During the first Chechen campaign he was considered an influential field commander. Participated in negotiations with federal representatives.

12. Ismailov Aslanbek Abdullaevich- “general”, “deputy commander of the armed forces of Ichkeria”. Developed a plan for the defense of the Chechen capital. Supporter of Yandarbiev. He was responsible for the defense of one of the sectors of Grozny. According to representatives of the militants, he commanded the defense of the city. As Maskhadov’s press service reported, he died while escaping from encirclement. There is no other evidence of his death.

13. Koriev Magomed- former “head of the department for combating organized crime” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ichkeria. Personally executed the hostages. In November 1999 he was wounded near Argun.

14. Maskhadov Aslan Alievich- President of caves and dugouts. Located in Chechnya. A few days ago he was wounded again and miraculously escaped capture.

15. Saikhan Zaurbekov

16. Suleymanov Ruslan

17. Udugov Movladi Saidarbievich- a failed journalist. "Vice Prime Minister" of the government of Ichkeria. Married three times. Awarded the Order of "Honor of the Nation". The main ideologist of Chechen militants. One of the richest people in Chechnya. According to some reports, he is hiding in Turkey. Sponsors the publication of the newspaper "Ichkeria" and other printed organs of Chechen militants.

18. Khambiev Magomed (Makhmad) Ilmanovich- "Minister of Defense of Ichkeria." According to some reports, in mid-November he was wounded near the village of Benoy. Does not play significant role among field commanders. In fact, he retired. Known for his "duel" with Basayev. Accuses the latter of the invasion of Dagestan in 1999.

19. Khasuev Abubakar Yakubovich- head of the "Military-Patriotic Union of Chechnya". Had a conflict with influential field commanders.

20. Khasukhanov Islam Sheikh-Akhmedovich- "Chief of the operational headquarters under the President of Ichkeria." “Lost” with the start of the counter-terrorist campaign in Chechnya.

21. Khattab- Chechen of Jordanian origin. Nicknames “Black Arab”, “One-armed Ahmed”. Fought in Afghanistan. It is particularly cruel. Personally cut the throats of captured soldiers. Moves in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky and Vedeno regions of Chechnya.

22. Yusupov Ramzan

23. Yandarbiev Zelimkhan Abdulmuslimovich- militant poet. "Vice President of Ichkeria." In mid-1995, he commanded the defense of Grozny. On this moment is abroad, organizing financial assistance to militants. According to operational data, he visited Pakistan. Has real estate in Turkey and Azerbaijan. One of the "Ichkerian" millionaires.

Mid-level field commanders
(simply "generals", "ministers" without portfolio, "colonels" and "lieutenant colonels")

Abalaev Aidamir- “Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ichkeria”, a supporter of Maskhadov. With a detachment of about 250 people, he is located in the village of Alleroy, Nozhai-Yurtovsky district of Chechnya.

Abu Al-Walid- Arab field commander, “right hand” of Khattab. According to radio interception data, he was killed during an operation near Serzhen-Yurt in the summer of 2000. There is no other information about death.

Ampukaev Shirvani

Asludinov Magomed

Akhmadov Daud Dabaevich- field commander. Former special representative of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ichkeria. Supporter of last year's invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev Shirvani- In 1995, commandant of the village of Bamut. "Prefect" of the Vedeno district. By latest messages, wounded as a result of a special operation by the FSB Directorate in the Chechen Republic on October 27, 2000. He died from his wounds and was buried in the Vedeno region of Chechnya. The Russian Prosecutor's Office does not have evidence of death. The search for the body is underway.

Bataev Zelimkhan Murtselovitch

Beysamirov Ibrahim

Bimurzaev Saleh

Dalaev Ali

Dataev Islam

Dzhabrailov Apti

Dimaev Ali- “Brigadier General”, one of those close to Aslan Maskhadov. Moves across the Chechen-Dagestan border.

Zakaev Akhmed- field commander. During the first Chechen campaign he commanded the “front”. Former actor of the Grozny Theater, “Minister of Culture” of Ichkeria, Deputy Prime Minister. To spite Udugov, Maskhadov appointed him “Minister of Information.” In mid-August 2000, he was wounded during a special operation in the village of Gekhi, Urus-Martan region. According to operational data, it is located in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia.

Ismailov Sharpudin - former director state television company of Ichkeria

Kilay Bibulatov

Magomedov Khalid

Madaev M.

Markaev Hussein

Movsaev Turpal- relative (brother) of the “chief counterintelligence officer” of Ichkeria, executioner Abu Movsev, who was killed last summer.

Murtazaev Akhmed

Ozniev Umar Amarbekovich

Patsaev Sultan- “general”, commander of the “special purpose regiment No. 007 “Borz” of the “Ministry of Sharia Security” of Ichkeria.

Pashayev Zhabir

Saydaev Mikhail (Mumadi, Umadi) Minkailovich- "Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria", former major of the Soviet Army. Maskhadov's right hand. Arrested on September 27 by FSB officers in Urus-Martan. He is in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center.

Suleymanov Arbi

Takaev Said-Husein Lechaevich

Khalilov Rabbani- one of the field commanders of the Jordanian Khattab. The Rabbani detachment operates in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky and Vedeno regions of Chechnya, near the border with Dagestan.

Khachukaev Khizir- “Brigadier General”, deputy of Ruslan Gelayev. Field commander who defended the village of Samashki back in March 1996. During the current campaign, he commanded the “southeastern sector” of defense in Grozny. He personally shot the militant truce who was negotiating surrender with Bislan Gantamirov. Demoted to private by Maskhadov for participating in negotiations with Akhmad Kadyrov and Vladimir Bokovikov in Nazran.

Husain Movladi

Tsagaraev Magomed Magomed-Salievich- one of Barayev’s deputies. His militants operate in Grozny and Urus-Martan. According to operational data, he personally shot and killed Imam Urus-Martan Idrisov. The organizer of all the latest terrorist attacks in Grozny.

Eldarov Sulima Shirvanovich- former head of the Nozhai-Yurtovsky District Department of Internal Affairs, subordinate to Maskhadov. He is located with a gang near the regional center of Nozhai-Yurt. Eldarov's militants make solo attacks. So, in December in Nozhai-Yurt they shot two military men.

Emir Adam

Commanders of groups and individual militant detachments

Abduldzhan Dolguev- “general”, Basayev’s deputy, led the actions of the militants during the invasion of the Novolaksky region of Dagestan. According to some reports, he was killed in the fall of 1999 near Argun.

Abu Al Khaled, Abushev Alkhazur, Akbulatov Lechi, Albastov Almirza

Amriev Adam- ("Emir Adam"?) - Field commander who controlled the village of Assinovskaya and Sernovodsk.

Arsabiev Umar-Khadzhi

Arsaliev Magomsoyat Montaevich- field commander who participated in terrorist attacks against the heads of local administrations. According to one version, he was killed. Posthumously awarded the Maskhadov Order.

Arsanukaev Abu- “Brigadier General”, former head of Dudayev’s security service, “Deputy Prosecutor of Chechnya”. Detained in the village of Tsa-Vedeno. “Commander” Apti Arsanukaev, a former police officer, is also wanted.

Astamirov Isa- "Brigadier General". "Vice Prime Minister of Ichkeria." According to some reports, he was killed in Grozny in early February 2000. According to others, it was destroyed by the military in May. Posthumously awarded the Maskhadov Order.

Akhmadov Apti- field commander. According to some reports, he was killed by Pskov paratroopers in a battle near the village of Ulus-Kert in March of this year.

Bazaev Akhmed "Sniper", Bakaev Aliskhan Musaevich, Baraev Suliman, Bachaev (Batchaev) Rasul, Bekmurzaev Emir Saikhan, Visangeriev Zubayir (Zubair), Daudov Zubair, Dashaev Alkhazur, Dzhumaev Emirkhan, Dombaev Curie, Eriskhanov K., Zakharov Viktor Sergeevich, Larsanov Isa, Magomadov Nuradi Daudovich, Madiev Ruslan Musaevich, Mazashev Moudi, Matuev Khamzat Alievich

Natuev Umar, 26 years. "Khattab's Deputy for Technical Affairs." Organizer of explosions in Vladikavkaz. Detained in the fall of this year by officers of the Regional Organized Crime Control Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

Ozniev Ali Edylbekovich, Saraev Adam, Smirnov Vladimir (Arabic name Abdul-Malik) Ivanovich, Suleymanov Eli, Taramov Akhmed

Balaudi Tekilov- former representative of the President of the Chechen Republic in Russia.

Temirov Isa- former deputy head of the Chechen parliament, subordinate to Basayev. He commanded a detachment of militants in Grozny who defended Minutka Square and the village of Michurina in November, December 1999 - January 2000.

Tokarzai Ahsan, Tulaev Shaa Saidovich

Tutuev Visam (Isami)- personal cameraman of Movladi Udugov, participant in the invasion of Vdagestan. Turned himself in to the FSB Directorate of the Republic of Dagestan in the city of Khasavyurt in May 2000.

Umarov Akhmed- field commander, resident of the village of Mayturup. Organizer of terrorist attacks. Ransoms militants placed in pre-trial detention centers. Prepares winter bases for extremist detachments.

Umarov Isa- brother of Movladi Udugov. "Secretary of the Security Council" of Basayev and Khattab. An ardent opponent of Russia. Ideologist of Chechen militants. Oppositionist Maskhadov.

Haldimuratov Aslanbek

Khamzatov Movladi- "Brigadier General". Involved in kidnappings. Detained at a checkpoint in the village of Goyty on April 1, 2000.

Khatuev Mogomed- former “chief of border and customs services” of Ichkeria, “brigadier general.” Friend of Basayev. Dozens of hostages were held at Khatuev’s militant bases. In January 2000, he was seriously wounded in the Vedeno region of Chechnya.

Chekhaev Zaurban Abdulkhadzhievich, Chichiev Usman, Shovkhalov Shamil Sharipovich, Elisultanov Sultan, Elmurzaev Beslan, Eliuprzaev Makhma, Emir Supyan, Ependiev Turpal.

Members of illegal armed groups

Abdulaev Lechi Said-Emievich, Azdamirov Agdan, Ayubov Salman, Baitukaev Aslanbek, Bisaev Batyr (Alaudin) Kerim-Sultanovich, Borgeshvili Omar, Kushtov Issa Salambekovich, Magomadov Dzhambulat, Magomadov Lema, Magomadov Mukhtar, Maigov Ramzan, Muradov Zendi Dzedovich, Mutaev Isa, Talkhadov (Dalkhadov) Moharbi, Ulybaev Mikhail, Khutsaev Arbi Supyanovich, Emiev Makhmad-Saleh.

Accomplices

Belkharoev Yakub, Borshchigov Rizvan, Vahabov Ruslan, Vakhidov Magomed, Visa Rasuev, Visaitov Emin, Visaragov Ruslan, Gabaev Ibragim, Makhtiev Khasan Shalautdinovich, Sabdulaev Makhala, Saidov Arbi, Takaev Khasan Vakhaevich, Umarov Khamzat, Khambiev Umar.

The nature of the actions of illegal armed groups.
The changed geopolitical conditions have posed little-explored problems for the Russian Armed Forces, since the troops, carrying out the tasks of restoring the constitutional order and disarmament of illegal armed groups (IAF) in the Chechen Republic, were faced with qualitatively new circumstances, a fundamentally atypical operational situation for them, which can be characterized by as a large-scale internal armed conflict that has all the signs of a local war. The nature and scale of this conflict were such that they required the involvement of formations and part of the group of general purpose troops of the Russian Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies of the Russian Federation in the combat zone.
Attempts to solve emerging problems using traditional methods inherent in ordinary situations in conditions of internal armed conflict in many cases do not allow achieving the desired effect, leading to loss of initiative, collapse of elements of the management cycle, which ultimately jeopardizes the implementation of decision taken and leads to unnecessary casualties.
This circumstance predetermines the direction and need for the formation modern concept the use of groupings of general purpose troops in interaction with other troops, military formations and bodies in armed conflict and local war, in accordance with which theoretical provisions, composition, forms of use and methods of action, a control system and targeted training of joint groupings of troops (forces) will be developed , intended for military operations to eliminate armed conflict both on the territory of the country and in regions that are strategically important for Russia.

For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command, similar to the events of 1995, created three defensive lines:
- internal - with a radius of up to 1 km around Minutka Square;
- medium - at a distance of up to 1 km from the internal border;
- external - passed along the outskirts of Grozny.

The defense system of the Grozny illegal armed formations was characterized by the following features:
1. the presence of an extensive network of underground communications, pre-prepared bases and warehouses with weapons, ammunition and food, a large number of shelters and basements to protect militants during bomb attacks;
2. a flexible communication system that allows you to quickly respond to changes in the situation;
3. the presence of mobile groups and reserves, which were quickly transferred to necessary directions;
4. mining approaches to strong points and laying directional landmines; the presence of containers with chemical toxic substances (chlorine and ammonia), prepared for explosion, etc.
A focal defense system was created within the city, which included firing positions of armored vehicles, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and anti-tank barriers. The lower floors of houses in the main directions were equipped for long-term firing points. Windows and entrances to the basements of houses on the outskirts of Grozny, along main streets and at intersections were covered with bags of sand, stones and bricks. Loopholes were left for observation and firing. Most of the armored vehicles and artillery were camouflaged in residential areas and businesses. Firing positions for snipers and anti-aircraft gunners were created on the roofs and upper floors of buildings, and important objects and approaches to individual military camps were mined. Street intersections in Grozny were littered with reinforced concrete slabs, heaps of gravel, sand and other materials. Pillboxes were being built. They were built at crossroads, connecting communication passages with adjacent courtyards for hidden occupation and maneuver. Persons responsible for the defense of neighborhoods and streets were appointed, and the commandant service was strengthened.

The management system of illegal armed groups in Grozny included city defense headquarters, headquarters and command posts of detachments and groups. Each organ and control point of an illegal armed formation and the commander of a separate detachment had mobile communications equipment.
Control points, weapons storage bases, ammunition, medicine and food warehouses were also created in advance. Military camps and bases were used to deploy control points. There was a fairly well-functioning system of centralized leadership of all armed formations in the Chechen Republic. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic independently managed their paramilitary structures. The main control points of the armed formations were located in the capital of the republic, reserve ones - in other areas.

A characteristic feature of the militants' communication system was the use of small-sized radios such as Motorola and Kenwood, the use of closed communication channels by the top leadership of the illegal armed formations. The stability of the communication system was ensured by a wide network of repeaters. The militants' radio communications were characterized by strict communication discipline and the use of covert troop control measures, including coded messages about their location and planned activities.

For reconnaissance, illegal armed groups used predominantly the local population, mainly women, girls, old people and children, who practically freely approached columns, positions and areas where troops were concentrated, entered into conversations with military personnel, calculated the approximate number of troops, equipment and weapons, and then passed on the information obtained to the militants.
Reconnaissance was also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups from special forces. The leaders of the intelligence agencies of the illegal armed formations also used hostage-taking in order to obtain and verify information about our troops, mainly in relation to the Russian population. Threatening to kill and holding family members hostage, the militants demanded from relatives certain information about the troops and only upon receiving this information guaranteed the release of the hostages.
Reconnaissance of targets for artillery and fire adjustment were carried out by specially appointed spotters. Typically disguised as local residents or refugees, they were located on the top floors of high-rise buildings or cruised past locations and positions federal troops.
One of the methods of conducting reconnaissance of illegal armed groups was the interrogation of captured or taken hostage military personnel of the Armed Forces and internal troops.
The militants received a significant part of the information from our radio networks by listening to them, especially from units of the internal troops and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which did not fully use closed communication channels.
The beginning of the first stage of the assault on the city of GROZNY was characterized by stubborn resistance from illegal armed groups in strongholds along the troop movement routes.

The defense of Grozny was organized into sectors, which were assigned to groups (combat, reserve numbering up to 500 people), consisting of detachments of 100 people, which in turn are divided into groups of 10-20 people each, armed with small arms and grenade launchers. Infiltrating through the battle formations of the federal troops to their rear, these groups operated in squads of 4-7 people. (commander - also a radio operator, 1-2 snipers, 1-2 grenade launchers armed with RPG-7, 1-2 machine gunners or machine gunners, who, as a rule, have 2-3 disposable RPGs or RPOs). In the basements and attics of many houses on streets suitable for vehicle traffic, stocks of RPG rounds (disposable RPGs and RPOs) were concentrated. The so-called “leaving reserves” tactics, widely used recently by guerrilla groups around the world, were used. There were several sabotage and reconnaissance groups from special detachments, in particular named after Sheikh Mansur, the battle flag and documentation of which were captured when the detachment left the city. Total number militants concentrated in Grozny amounted to up to 6,000 people.

A characteristic feature of the tactics of gangs What happened was that when carrying out air and artillery strikes, the militants took refuge in shelters and prepared basements of houses to reduce losses, and also tried to get as close as possible to the positions of the federal troops. The tactics of action became more and more diverse and sophisticated, while at the same time they were continuously improved.
Despite the blockade of the city, the militants were able to penetrate Grozny, delivering ammunition, food and medicine, and also evacuate the wounded. The main exit routes for militants were the following areas: Kirova, Chernorechye, Aldy, Starye Promysla, Staraya Sunzha. When trying to overcome the minefields, the militants made passages in them, driving animals into the minefields, and on the night from January 29 to January 30, 2000, when a large detachment (more than 400 people) left, people.
During the hostilities, the leadership of the illegal armed formations actively carried out reconnaissance activities to clarify the grouping and deployment of units of the combined group. Facts were noted indicating that the militants were using a reconnaissance and warning system for air and artillery strikes.
The system for supplying militant groups with weapons, ammunition, food and other material resources included pre-prepared warehouses and bases.
The militants paid significant attention to conducting psychological warfare. To raise morale, the leadership of the gangs actively spread misinformation about significant losses of federal forces. To distribute fakes, the leaders of illegal armed groups attracted foreign correspondents, whose task was to select and edit photo and video materials about the imaginary victories of militants and atrocities of federal troops, as well as disseminate these materials in the media and on the Internet. In the Grozny region, a detachment of militants operated under the guise of Russian military personnel and carried out executions of civilians.

The strengths of illegal armed groups include:
* high mobilization capabilities;
* a clear control system that ensures the centralization of the leadership of armed formations with the autonomous nature of their combat operations;
* proximity to the structures of army-type formations, the presence in their composition of units and subunits of various purposes (motorized rifle, mountain rifle, tank, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, communications and others);
* national-ethnic and religious community of the contingent, helping to resolve issues of moral and psychological support and maintaining discipline;
* the presence of a professionally trained contingent of mercenaries.

The weaknesses of the organizational structure of illegal armed groups were:
* lack of units and units of logistics and technical support;
* a significant number of militants with a criminal past and criminal inclinations, who were corrupting illegal armed groups from within and giving rise to conflicts both between individual militants and formations.
The management of illegal armed groups was carried out centrally using modern means of communication. Active reconnaissance of the group of federal troops and combined units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was constantly carried out. Communications of Dagestan and Ingushetia were used to deliver weapons, ammunition and mercenaries to Chechnya.
The main reasons for the militants’ successful actions were:
1. thorough reconnaissance and preparation for raids;
2. skillful disinformation, surprise, swiftness, decisiveness and coordination of actions;
3. high personal professional training most militants.
From the first days of hostilities, federal troops were faced with the widespread use of snipers by illegal armed groups. The scope of their actions was such that military experts rightfully started talking about a “sniper war.”
Lone snipers operating in Chechnya were, as a rule, professional mercenaries, many of them were athletes. They were thoroughly prepared to conduct sniper warfare in populated areas and mountains; they planned and coordinated their actions in advance, chose advantageous positions, and established communications. The favorite place for snipers were corner apartments, from where they could fire in several directions. At prepared positions, caches were installed in which a sniper rifle and ammunition were camouflaged. To make detection difficult, fire was usually carried out by snipers from deep inside the rooms.
The general management of the city's defense was carried out by A. Maskhadov, and direct by Sh. Basayev. In accordance with the city defense plan, the leadership of the illegal armed formations intended to conduct fighting within 20 days after the start of the assault on the city in order to inflict maximum defeat on federal troops. In the future, it was planned to make a breakthrough and leave the city to the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

conclusions
1. The federal forces, which carried out the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic, were actually opposed by a well-prepared, mononational army, reinforced by mercenaries from other states, psychologically prepared for death.
2. The tactical methods used by illegal armed groups were distinguished by a variety of forms and methods of armed struggle, but they were based on general rules, which can be attributed to the principles of their combat use. The main ones were:
* close connection with the local population;
* actions predominantly by small detachments and groups;
* thorough reconnaissance and selection of the target, place and time of attack;
* use of infiltration and concentration tactics in the area of accomplishing the assigned task;
* avoidance of protracted positional combat operations;
* skillful use of terrain and limited visibility conditions;
* exhaustion of the enemy;
* psychological support for subversive activities;
* blocking units of federal troops (checkpoints, checkpoints) in areas of deployment, depriving them of the ability to maneuver forces and means with simultaneous fire and psychological influence;
* covert penetration into the entire depth of the area where federal units are located, simultaneous impact from several directions;
* high controllability of detachments and groups, their mobility and high professionalism.
INVFs quickly changed their tactics of action, reacting to weak, patterned aspects in the actions of federal troops. In this case, methods prohibited by the Geneva Conventions were used, such as the capture and execution of hostages from among the civilian population, and terrorist acts.
3. The defense of the city was characterized by the following features:
- a pre-prepared system of multi-layered defense, which included heavily fortified strongholds and lines;
- militants’ knowledge of the area and city;
- the presence of an extensive system of underground communications, a large number of shelters and basements;
- the militants have poisonous substances chemical substances;
- the possibility of secretly moving from one area of the city to another;
- keeping civilians in the city and using them as “human shields”;
- the presence of pre-established warehouses and bases with weapons, ammunition and food, including in underground shelters;
- an effective control and communication system that allows you to quickly respond to changes in the situation;
- the presence of mobile groups and reserves, the ability to quickly transfer them to the necessary directions;
- mining approaches to strong points and laying directional landmines.

The experience of suppressing the gangster activities of Islamic extremists during the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus region indicates that the tactics of the gangs opposing the federal troops have undergone significant changes. Currently, along with traditional forms, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and retain important strategic objects, and is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed actions by small (15-20 people) and large (up to 500 people or more) in groups. At the same time, the fundamental principles of the tactics of gangs are still surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short duration of raids.

The most important factor determining the specifics of the actions of gangs is the conduct of systematic “harassing” actions that force troops to resort to defensive tactics, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. Moreover, they create the impression of the gangs’ ability to strike in any place, sometimes completely unexpected. “Harassing” and “Exhausting” operations form the basis of the tactics of the gangs, who, as a rule, sought to avoid a direct clash with large forces of federal troops. The basis of their actions in this case is anticipation in opening fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company and especially the events in Dagestan have shown, bandit formations in some cases, when achieving a tactical advantage, make attempts to capture and long-term hold an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support for the population. This indicates a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and federal troops and the commitment of the leaders of the gangs to long-term and fierce resistance.

Organization and arming of illegal armed groups in Chechnya

An armed formation is a large paramilitary unit, led by an authoritative political or military leader, created to forcefully protect the interests of a certain financial, economic and political (religious) group. An armed formation, as a rule, includes representatives of one or more related teips (jamaats).

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Groups, in turn, are divided into combat groups, designed to directly carry out an operation in a specified area, and reserve groups, designed to build up efforts and planned (usually within a week) replacement of warring militants.

Grouping is divided into five or six detachments (100 people or more), led by amirs (field commanders).

Squad, as a rule, consists of three groups.

First- a central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in combat mode with the amir and does not have a permanent location.

Second group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in locality. This group is subordinate, controlled and has contact only with the Amir. The group members were trained in a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply secretive and engaged in legal social activities.

Third group - a group of “helpers”. These are like-minded people and supporters of the emir living at home. In order to save financial resources, this group is not constantly with the detachment. If the emir orders them, they come to him and carry out the task, then return home again and do their usual business or act independently with the consent of the emir.

Thus, central the group is the main formation of the detachment and consists of three platoons By three branches in everyone. The group is armed only with weapons that are easy to carry, as it is constantly on the move, attacking and leaving. The time, place and target of the attack are appointed by the Amir.

Approximate weapons and equipment of a gang unit:

Radio stations - 2 pcs., binoculars - 2 pcs., terrain map - 2 pcs., 7.62 mm cartridges for PC-1000-1300 pcs., 5.45 mm - 500–600 pcs., 4 pcs. RPG-18 "FLY"; Each fighter has a flask for water, spare clothes, a cape, a sleeping bag, medicine, and dry rations for 7 days

Tactics of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of military operations and terrorist acts.

The leadership of the extremists had previously identified three areas for carrying out an armed action in the Republic of Dagestan: to the west of BOTLIKH, near the settlement. ANDI and GIGATLI district. Accordingly, three armed formations were created: the main and central one under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, the northern one - Shervani Basayev and the southern one - Bagautdin. In total, the formations were estimated to number up to 3,000 militants. The formations were structurally divided into battalions (50–70 people each), companies (15–20 people each) and platoons (5–7 people each).

Preparation for operations and terrorist attacks

The preparation stage for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct preparation of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the operation area included:

Studying the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

Reconnaissance of the locations of federal troops, their security and defense systems, weapons and ammunition storage areas, military equipment, the nature of the troops’ activities, advance routes for subsequent ambushes and road mining.

During reconnaissance, detailed video recording was carried out.

Direct preparation of the operation:

Development of the plan (distribution of forces and means to objects, time and sequence of the operation.).

Creation of warehouses and caches of weapons, ammunition, food and water supplies.

Recruitment of local residents on the basis of religious, national and related principles, ideological indoctrination of identified supporters and carrying out propaganda activities with their help to attract as many as possible more residents to their side.

Negotiating with the administration and local residents by persuasion, bribery or threat in order to ensure their support and carry out joint actions with the militants or not interfere with their actions against the Federal forces;

Creation of units and recruitment of mercenaries from among local residents.

Combat training of units in base camps and training centers.

Toolkit

Some issues of organization and tactics of actions of illegal armed groups of the Chechen Republic

Introduction

Organization and arming of illegal armed groups in Chechnya

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Grouping is divided into five or six detachments (100 people or more), led by amirs (field commanders).

Squad, as a rule, consists of three groups.

First- a central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in combat mode with the amir and does not have a permanent location.

Second the group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in a populated area. This group is subordinate, controlled and has contact only with the Amir. Members of the group were trained at a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply secretive and engaged in legal social activities.

Approximate weapons and equipment of a gang unit:

Tactics of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of military operations and terrorist acts.

Preparation for operations and terrorist attacks

The preparation stage for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct preparation of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the operation area included:

Studying the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

Reconnaissance of the locations of federal troops, their security and defense systems, storage areas for weapons and ammunition, military equipment, the nature of the troops' activities, advance routes for subsequent ambushes and road mining.

During reconnaissance, detailed video recording was carried out.

Direct preparation of the operation:

Development of the plan (distribution of forces and means to objects, time and sequence of the operation.).

Creation of warehouses and caches of weapons, ammunition, food and water supplies.

Recruiting local residents on the basis of religious, national and related principles, indoctrinating identified supporters and carrying out propaganda activities with their help to attract as many residents as possible to their side.

Creation of units and recruitment of mercenaries from among local residents.

Combat training of units in base camps and training centers.

Conducting operations and terrorist attacks

The operation of the armed formations of Chechen extremists and local separatists can be divided into four periods:

Reconnaissance of exit routes and capture of approaches to populated areas.

The departure of advanced detachments, the disarmament of police officers and engineering equipment in the area.

Exit and occupation of the area by the main group.

Conducting combat operations against federal troops and withdrawal.

Reconnaissance of exit routes and capture of approaches to populated areas was carried out at night by head patrols of 5–8 people (machine gunners 1–2, grenade launchers 2–3). After approaching populated areas and occupying the outermost houses or outbuildings, observation was organized by the head patrols, then, if there was no danger, a command was given for the actions of the forward detachments.

Advance detachments, as a rule, captured a populated area from two directions. After the disarmament of the police officers, they carried out ideological indoctrination of the population aimed at convincing the residents that the militants were only fighting for the faith among the “infidels.” At the same time, measures were taken to organize a surveillance system, communications and area engineering equipment. At the same time, local residents were used to equip dugouts, shelters for militants and equipment, and ammunition depots.

After the complete capture of populated areas and partial of their engineering equipment, at night, in vehicles (KAMAZ, UAZ, URAL and cars) using blackout means, the main forces of illegal armed groups (IAF) left.

To accommodate the main forces of the illegal armed groups, they occupied suitable houses of local residents (advantageous in terms of location), buildings of hospitals, schools, and enterprises. Residents of occupied houses were expelled under the threat of airstrikes and artillery raids by federal forces. At the initial stage, under the guise of “Sharia laws,” food, livestock, and property were taken from some residents. Later, with the outbreak of hostilities, the militants openly engaged in looting, robberies, stealing vehicles for transportation, engineering equipment (tractors, bulldozers, etc.) for restoring roads and equipment for trenches.

With the beginning of hostilities against federal troops, the armed formations of Chechen extremists and Dagestan separatists used classic techniques in mountains and settlements:

Capturing dominant heights, passes, advantageous routes and placing fire weapons there.

For firing, closed firing positions, caves and basements of houses in populated areas were widely used.

Anti-aircraft installations to cover the militants, as a rule, were at commanding heights, but lethal fire was opened after the target reached a minimum distance.

Mining of the area was widely used.

As a feature of combat operations, it should be noted the use of small groups consisting of a mortar crew, a grenade launcher and a pair of snipers. Sniper shooting was carried out under the cover of the sound of mortar and grenade launcher shots from caves or other shelters.

After the capture of the area from several settlements, work was carried out to penetrate the militants into the rear of the FV to organize centers of resistance in the depths of the areas where troops were located (Buinaks, Makhachkala, in Khasavyurt and Kizlyar, for example) in order to divert part of their forces. Sabotage groups were sent with the task of cutting off the supply routes for troops (the road to Botlikh).

After the air strikes, camouflage and engineering equipment were strengthened.

Repeating the experience of military operations in Chechnya, a strict rotation of militants was organized. The replacement of those who had already fought with fresh ones was carried out from the reserve group; the withdrawal was carried out by command in cars to Chechnya to pre-prepared recreation centers.

To carry out the withdrawal, the militants used small cover groups (1–2 mortar crews, 2 heavy machine gun crews, 2 snipers, 2 grenade launchers, 1–2 AGS-17 crews).

Video footage of the fighting was carried out, especially when the situation developed favorably for the militants; the video materials were then used to raise the morale of the Islamists (carrying out demonstrative strikes on helicopters).

Before the outbreak of hostilities in the Republic of Dagestan, religious extremists, as one of the methods of delivering weapons to the “Kadar zone” of Dagestan, used the delivery of manure by heavy vehicles for spring field work. Weapons and ammunition, as a rule, were covered with manure in sealed packaging, which prevented the inspection of these vehicles at checkpoints and checkpoints of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Russian Military Troops.

Peculiarities of combat operations by militants in the territory

Chechen Republic in October 1999

Realizing the futility of open armed confrontation with the FS, the leadership of the BF adopted the tactics of focal defense, ambushes, “traps”, rapid raids and raids by mobile units, especially at night. For this purpose, the settlements of Ishcherskaya, Goragorsk, Naurskaya, Alpatovo, Vinogradnoye were turned into defense centers. The militants, as in the first Chechen conflict in 1994, use guerrilla warfare methods based on constant reconnaissance, speed and military cunning.

Without entering into direct confrontation with the FS, the BF prefer to operate in small groups (3–5 people), including a grenade launcher, a sniper, a machine gunner and 1–2 machine gunners. They do not count on the result of inflicting large losses, but rather short shelling, but often and successfully, without losses on their part.

The most effective actions are on mobile fire weapons. Mortars, ZU, KPVT, DShK, AGS, sections of rocket launchers are installed on vehicles of the "UAZ, JEEP" type. At night they travel using “Swedish glasses” or “Quakers” on their cars, without turning on the headlights. Fire is conducted from temporary firing positions (5–6 shots), then the location quickly changes.

When conducting reconnaissance, patrolmen use horses, which significantly increases their maneuverability. When performing tasks, scouts often disguise themselves as refugees or shepherds, acting in groups of 1-2 people. When setting up ambushes, they practice careful camouflage, let the enemy pass through them, and then open fire from the rear and flanks.

During the defense of the site, the following methods are used

Immediately before the start of the artillery barrage, the militants make a rapid dash forward to a safe zone and hide in the area. After the motorized riflemen go on the attack, they shoot them point-blank from a distance of 100–150 meters. There were cases when militants managed to get within range of throwing a grenade.

On the route of advance of our troops, the presence of strongholds is indicated, where 2-3 people are in position. Gradually retreating, they lure units of federal forces in a direction favorable to themselves, after which they launch an attack on the flank.

In the first minutes of the battle, snipers knock out the command staff and the most active soldiers and sergeants, trying to sow panic.

They calmly and boldly take advantage of the carelessness of our military personnel, taking advantage of the fact that our locations are always a “passage yard.” For small rewards (cigarettes, beer) you can find out whatever you want.

Training of militants of illegal armed groups of Chechnya

1. “Fleas and dogs” tactics or Mujahideen strategy

The "fleas and dogs" tactic is translated as a flea bites a dog and immediately moves to another place . The essence is that the Mujahid attacks the enemy (infidel) and immediately moves to another place, otherwise he dies. The action movie is constantly on the move. Gradually there are more Mujahideen, they continue to attack more often and immediately retreat. As a result, the resistance of the infidels begins to weaken, management and control is reduced, first in individual places, and then in regions. With each attack by the Mujahideen, the enemy's losses increase and their morale is lost.

The Mujahideen attack first in groups, and then in units and formations. They act in an organized and thoughtful manner. Having received trophies and reinforcements, as well as having obtained information about their troops from prisoners, they begin to plan and carry out large-scale operations. They try to recruit prisoners, and those who agree are exchanged and they begin to give the necessary information. According to the plans of the field commanders, the infidels become dependent on the Mujahideen, weaken morally, financially and physically, while the Mujahideen, on the contrary, grow stronger, become more organized, experienced and financially secure. After this, a plan is developed to deliver the final blow to the leadership center of the infidels. As a result, the enemy must be blocked or destroyed.

2. Movement

Due to the specific nature of the Baltic Fleet's combat operations, special attention is paid to individual training. The choice of type of movement depends on the characteristics of the FS actions, weather conditions and terrain. The optimal size of a moving group of Mujahideen is from 8 to 11 people.

Types of transportation:

Moving in a column - movement one after another at a distance of 5 to 10 meters. The amir moves forward at the head of the column, and his deputy at the tail of the column. As a disadvantage of such movement: the large stretch of the column, weak control and vulnerable when attacked from the front, but strong when attacked from the flanks;

Movement in two columns - carried out in a narrow place or where there are mountains on one side. Amir leads the first column, and his deputy leads the second. When attacked from the front and rear, the columns are strong, but from the flank they are weak;

Movement in line used when attacking federal forces or in areas where the enemy is believed to be present. Amir is in the center, the deputy is on one of the flanks.

Crawling methods:

"tiger" - carried out in an open area, eyes directed towards the enemy, weapon behind the back;

"worm" - in the enemy’s position, eyes directed towards the enemy, weapons in full combat readiness, movement speed is low, high energy expenditure;

"monkey" - used when there is a half-height fence (bushes, wall, etc.) for invasion, attack, reconnaissance; weapons - in the hands, on the shoulder or behind the back;

"on the back" - used to move under an obstacle, the weapon is in combat readiness;

"cast" - used in mined areas, weapon behind the back, eyes towards the enemy, hands, before moving, probe the space in front of him in search of a mine, tripwire;

rotation "roulette" used over short distances to change firing positions or cross a visible (under fire) area;

"crocodile" - for moving on all fours in marshy areas, with the weapon on the back.

Overcoming dangerous places:

Open area - the group is taken by the Amir to a safe place, disguised, intelligence agencies are sent, escape routes are outlined, and then the groups can pass along one path or through several passages;

Going through roads in dangerous places - the group is taken to a safe place, reconnaissance agencies are sent, safe passage is determined, and then the transition is carried out;

Passage through villages (with civilians) - if possible, do not enter the village; when going around, the direction of the wind is taken into account;

Minefield - to be detected and bypassed in advance by intelligence agencies;

Water hazard - find a ford, preferably with natural camouflage (reeds, bushes, algae, etc.)

3. Conventional signs of combat control

The front side of the hand is the person’s face, the back side is the back of the head;

If the fighter being called is behind you, raise your hand to shoulder level with the front side forward and move your hand back and forth, if in front, then vice versa;

Move your fist up and down quickly;

Raised palm - stop, stop;

Rotational movement of the fist above the head from left to right - come back, come back;

A hand above the head with spread fingers pointing downward - gathering around the amir or mujahid;

Movement of the hand with the face down - lie down, on the contrary - stand up;

Fist of the hand directed to the side - direction of movement (right, left)

Rotate the index finger around the eye, and then point it in any direction - conduct reconnaissance of the area;

I put one hand to my mouth and closed my eyes with the other - I didn’t understand the signs;

Two hands with clenched fists intersect above the head, canceling the order;

Weapons pointed towards the enemy - indicating the location of the enemy;

Place your fist behind your back on your other shoulder - organize an ambush;

A fist with a thumb pointing up is a request for readiness (ready - answer with the same sign, if not, then thumb down);

Raised hand up with a clenched fist - stand in a column, in two columns - two hands up, and in a line - hands with fists to the sides;

4. Camouflage

Requirements for the leadership of gangs to carry out camouflage activities:

study the location area, your location, soil soil, natural shelters and obstacles, presence and condition possible ways retreat and free maneuvering, places of possible mining, as well as the presence of water sources;

choose a place for a trench so that it is easier to dig;

mask the soil on the spot or take it to another place and mask it there;

after the trench is ready to stand where the enemy should be and see if there are any shortcomings;

You can’t go to extremes and disguise yourself too much or too little:

enemy positions must be visible;

It is prohibited to leave sparkling and reflective things near a trench or location, light fires, take off clothes, leave noticeable traces and any unmasking objects (multi-colored clothes, bottles, canned food, etc.);

change a person's silhouette:

mask areas of the body with mud or coal, you can use shadow;

vehicle camouflage:

pour machine oil over the car and fill it with soil (sand, etc.).

Fundamentals of the combat use of illegal armed groups

1. Intelligence organization

Reconnaissance occupies a special place in the tactics of gangs. To conduct it, the local population is used mainly (mainly women, old people, children), whose representatives almost freely approach columns, positions and areas of concentration of troops, enter into conversations with military personnel, calculate the approximate number of troops, equipment and weapons, and then pass on the obtained information to the militants. Reconnaissance is also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups, as well as groups of reconnaissance officers with communications equipment operating in passenger vehicles. Militant intelligence pays special attention to determining the location of troop command posts.

The reconnaissance group that ensures the invasion may consist of one or several people. One of the main requirements for the group is thorough reconnaissance. They carefully study roads, locations of military installations, and mined areas. The location of the federal forces is determined (concentrated in one place, dispersed throughout the territory in groups), what state the enemy is in (attack, defense, waiting to move, etc.), routes of advance to the enemy’s location.

Conditions that must be observed during reconnaissance:

Preliminary preparation of invasion and escape routes;

Give orders to each group, explain its combat mission;

Have backup programs (plan);

Prevent information leakage;

Determine a resting place;

Indicate the routes and type of transport on which you will travel;

Stealth;

Surprise;

Patience;

It is forbidden to talk;

It is necessary to discover the weakest points in the enemy’s defenses;

Physical training;

Fluent in the art of silent combat;

Take all the people you meet along the way with you.

Information that needs to be obtained during reconnaissance :

Where are the buildings, defensive structures, cannons, machine guns, etc. located?

Number of enemy infantry;

Armament, mission and purpose of the federal forces;

Minefields and wire fences;

Time and place of divorces and fees;

Time and place of food;

Time and place of curfew;

Time and place of operation of the energy generator;

Light source location;

Places and number of posts, time of their change;

Place and time of administration;

Availability of warehouses (weapons, ammunition, products and spare parts).

2. Conducting ambushes

Traditional gang tactics include ambushes, attacking checkpoints, units on the march, supply and communications facilities, and are widely used. Ambushes are set up in gorges and narrowing roads. Depending on the goals of the attack, ambushes in a number of cases act selectively, skipping reconnaissance, security, and launching a sudden fire attack on the main forces of our troops, mainly on control points on the march and rear units. At the same time, during the fighting in Mountainous Dagestan, the bandits switched mainly to night actions and actions in conditions of limited visibility, especially active in inclement weather. A new element of the militants’ tactics is the organization of fire ambushes at commanding heights in order to destroy helicopters of federal troops on take-off and landing sites.

Noteworthy is the tactics of gangs of formations operating in groups that include a sniper, a grenade launcher and a machine gunner. Having positioned itself in a dispersed manner, the group deliberately provokes a response from the troops with machine gunner fire. The sniper is positioned at a distance of 400–600 m from the intended targets. The objects of destruction for small groups and lone militants are single vehicles and military personnel Russian troops(primarily officers). Like snipers, the latter strive to act with certainty and primarily hit military personnel without body armor.

At its core, the tactics of militants during ambush operations consist of a short fire raid from an ambush and retreat to a safe place (hit and run). Since the beginning of our operations to clear populated areas, militants have widely used mining of buildings, individual objects, weapons, equipment, and even corpses. Militants, especially mercenaries, operate on a “rotational basis,” that is, when they conduct combat operations for up to three days, and then go to rest at a base in a safe area (from Tandov, the Blue Lake area in the Botlikh direction).

3. Organizing an attack on the post

According to field commanders, there are two ways to attack a post:

First way- The group is divided into three parts. The grenade launcher and machine gunner take a permanent position 50 meters from the post, while the machine gunners secretly approach the post as close as possible. The grenade launcher begins the battle, and then the machine gunner and grenade launcher conduct continuous aimed fire at the post. At this time, they begin to advance to the post. At the beginning, two flanking groups take positions in the nearest shelters and open fire, and the central group rushes ahead of them 15–20 m, lies down and opens fire. Subsequently, the flanking groups rush forward and so on until they reach the post.

Second way attack is the same as the first, but with this method of attack the machine gunners move on the offensive through one (one moves - the other covers).

At the same time, you must remember that you cannot attack a post that is near your village. It is necessary to leave the village on the other side, go around the settlement, and then attack the post.

Conclusion

In general, the analysis of modern tactics of gangs allows us to draw the following conclusions:

In the North Caucasus region, federal troops are confronted by a well-trained operationally tactical enemy, equipped with the latest types of small arms, a cruel and uncompromising enemy who uses a complex of sabotage and terrorist methods and elements of combined arms combat tactics to achieve his extremist goals.

The ferocity of the armed confrontation showed that the invasion of Dagestan by gangs was preceded by long and thorough preparations, carried out with the active assistance and participation of both special services, extremist international Islamic organizations, and illegal armed groups operating semi-legally on the territory of Chechnya.

Terrorism remains an integral component of gang tactics, including the use of explosive devices, murder, kidnapping, bodily harm, torture, blackmail and threats.

Modern tactics of gangs

The experience of suppressing the bandit activities of Islamic extremists in the Republic of Dagestan indicates that the tactics of the gangs have undergone significant changes. Currently, along with traditional forms of insurgent activity, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and retain strategically important objects, and is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed actions by small (15-20 people) and large (up to 500 or more people) groups. At the same time, the fundamental principles of action tactics are still surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short duration of raids.

An important factor, which determines the specifics of the actions of the gangs, is the conduct of systematic “harassing” actions that force the troops to resort to defensive tactics, forcing them only to react to the operations of the gangs, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya.

"Disturbing" activities drain government resources and disrupt communications. Moreover, they create the impression of the militants' ability to strike anywhere, sometimes completely unexpected.

“Harassing” and “harassing” operations form the basis of the tactics of gangs, which, as a rule, strive to avoid direct confrontation with large forces of federal troops. The basis of their actions in this case is anticipation in opening fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances. After a clash, bandits, as a rule, carry away the corpses of their accomplices, taking their weapons and documents. At the same time, since the Chechen campaign, it has become traditional to violate the bodies of killed RA servicemen.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company and especially the events in Dagestan showed, bandit formations in some cases, when achieving a tactical advantage, make attempts to capture and long-term hold an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support. This indicates a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and federal troops and the commitment of the leaders of the gangs to long-term and fierce resistance.

A feature of the military operations of gangs in Dagestan was the use of offensive actions, which were predominantly objective or zonal (in a certain area) in nature and were carried out with the goal of capturing administrative centers or tactically important objects (dominant heights, passes). In this case, first of all, the opportunity to deliver an unexpected swift blow to the enemy was used. When organizing an offensive, special attention is paid to achieving surprise, choosing the location and direction of the attack. Much attention is paid to making maximum use of the terrain. Thus, the entry of gangs from Chechnya into Dagestan was carried out along a relatively gentle slope, while federal troops had to recapture hard-to-reach areas in the mountains from the militants.

During the armed counteraction to federal troops, bandit formations also carried out active defensive actions, which were aimed at holding bases and base areas in mountainous Dagestan. Particular attention was paid to the defense of mountain passes of dominant heights, passages, road junctions (trails), and populated areas.

A characteristic feature of the actions of the gangs is that preparations for conducting defensive actions in Dagestan (especially in the Kadar zone) began in advance. The main efforts of the militants were concentrated on equipping strongholds and resistance centers, on the approaches to which ambushes and guards were set up, observation posts were located mainly on dominant heights. The strongholds were equipped in engineering terms and prepared for long-term defense. Mining of roads, areas of terrain, and approaches to populated areas was actively carried out. A network of control points, bases (warehouses) for storing weapons, ammunition, medicine and food were created in advance.

There were a small number of militants directly at the positions, directly guarding populated areas and conducting reconnaissance. With the beginning of the attack by the RA units, using hidden approaches and communication passages, the main forces of the militants, who had previously been in shelters (caves, basements, etc.), moved to firing positions.

During the offensive of superior forces, the militants, after a short-term shelling of units of federal troops, retreated, as a rule, in small groups to a new line, using passages, ravines and all kinds of paths. The withdrawal is carried out under the cover of fire from previously prepared positions and ambushes, as well as mine-explosive barriers. Being well versed in the terrain, militant groups skillfully used this type of maneuver.

After emerging from the attacks of the federal troops, the gangs sought to occupy new advantageous positions. Sometimes, if possible, they went behind the advancing troops, which made it possible to defeat them in the back. In this regard, the militants quite effectively used the tactics of “infiltration” with the subsequent unification of small groups in the area of the attack target. This tactical technique was actively used by the militants when they were being pursued by federal troops, during which the bandit groups, if they could not break away from our troops, took up a perimeter defense and fought a stubborn battle until nightfall. Then, using good knowledge of the area, they infiltrated in small groups through the battle formations of the units surrounding them.

During operations of federal troops to clear populated areas, bandits, without coming into direct contact with our units, fired at them and quickly retreated to safe areas. If the troops did not consolidate on the achieved lines, with the onset of darkness the militants returned to their old areas and again began active operations. This was the case, for example, in the Kadar zone.

Having become convinced after firing strikes by Russian aviation and artillery on strongholds and resistance centers of the futility of attempts to impose positional battles on the Federal Forces group, the bandit formations changed their tactics, retreating from the outskirts into the interior of populated areas to positions previously prepared in engineering terms.

Ambushes, attacks on checkpoints, units on the march, supply facilities and communications were widely used. Ambushes were set up in gorges and narrowing roads. Depending on the objectives of the attack, the ambushes in a number of cases acted selectively: they skipped reconnaissance and security and carried out a surprise fire attack on the main forces of our troops, mainly on control points on the march and rear units. At the same time, during the fighting in mountainous Dagestan, the bandits switched mainly to night operations and actions in conditions of limited visibility, especially active in bad weather. A new element of the militants’ tactics is the organization of fire ambushes at commanding heights in order to destroy helicopters of the Federal troops at the take-off and landing sites.

Noteworthy is the tactics of gangs operating in groups that included a sniper, a grenade launcher and a machine gunner. Having settled down in a dispersed manner, the group deliberately caused a fire reaction from the troops with the machine gunner's fire. The sniper, having identified firing points, hit them, and when the equipment moved forward, it was destroyed by the grenade launcher. The sniper was positioned at a distance of 400–600 meters from the intended targets. Objects of destruction for small groups and lone militants. Like snipers, the latter sought to act with certainty and primarily hit military personnel without body armor.

At its core, the militants' tactics during ambush operations consisted of a short fire raid from an ambush and retreat to a safe place ("hit and run"). Since the beginning of our operations to clear populated areas, militants have widely used mining of buildings, individual objects, weapons, and even corpses. There were actions by militants, especially mercenaries, on a “rotational basis”, when they fought for 1–3 days and then went to rest at a base in a safe area (from Tando to the area of the blue lake in the Botlikh direction).

Realizing the futility of long-term organized resistance to the actions of Russian troops, the leadership of the gangs began to actively work to prepare militant bases in the southern mountainous and forested regions of the Chechen Republic and establish a centralized network for managing them. For this purpose, transshipment bases were created and travel routes were prepared for the transfer of mercenaries from the territory of Georgia and Azerbaijan to the territory of Chechnya.

Reconnaissance occupies a special place in the tactics of gangs. It was carried out mainly by the local population (mainly women, old people, children), whose representatives almost freely passed to the columns, positions and areas of concentration of troops, entered into conversations with military personnel, calculated the approximate number of troops, equipment, weapons, and then transferred the obtained information to the militants. Reconnaissance was also carried out by special reconnaissance and sabotage groups, as well as groups of reconnaissance officers with communications equipment operating in passenger vehicles. Militant intelligence paid special attention to determining the locations of troop command posts.

The organization of the gangs’ communication system, which was built on the basis of stationary and mobile radio communications, also deserves attention. For this purpose, portable radio stations from the old fleet of R-105M (R-109) were mainly used; a network of amateur radio stations was also widely used; in addition, the militants had a number of foreign-made radio stations (Motorola, etc.).

The command of the group of federal troops took into account the experience of the Chechen campaign, during which there were facts of militants entering into communications on the frequencies of our formations and units, attempts by them to transmit false messages and commands, in particular, to strike certain targets (areas) where troops were located . In Dagestan, such attempts were thwarted by electronic countermeasures.

The gangs in Dagestan were also armed with air defense systems (ZU-23, ZPU, MANPADS), including foreign-made ones, which were distributed among detachments and groups of militants. To fight primarily against helicopters, small arms and even anti-tank grenade launchers were used. In order to increase the survivability of fire weapons, the militants placed them in populated areas, near residential buildings, in courtyards, barns and were well camouflaged.

Thus, based on preliminary conclusions from the experience of military operations in the Republic of Dagestan, it is possible to determine the main types of actions of illegal armed groups. Among them:

Defense in populated areas with the involvement of significant forces and means (up to 300 or more people), in the Botlikh-Tsumadinsky and Novolaksky directions in populated areas, militants built powerful fortified strongholds, approaches to strongholds in populated areas were usually mined, the entire the area in front of them was swept using landmarks. To fire and adjust fire at night, militants widely used light flares. To repel attacks by army aviation, all types of weapons were used, including grenade launchers.

Ambush operations with extensive use of mine explosives. Ambush locations were prepared in advance. Firing positions were set up, mines and landmines were installed.

Active sabotage and terrorist activities.

Having lost control of the mountainous part of the Republic of Dagestan (Botlikh-Tsumadin direction) and having suffered heavy losses in open clashes with federal troops, the militants began to rely on organizing and carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions.

Creation of a network of support bases in the mountainous regions of the Republic of Dagestan, in the border regions of Chechnya.

In the mountainous regions of the Republic of Dagestan (in the Kadar zone) a large number of bases and warehouses with stocks of weapons, ammunition, medicine and food were equipped. In the interests of ensuring the actions of the militants, an extensive network of caches with material and financial resources was also created. Among other most characteristic manifestations of gang tactics, it seems possible to highlight the following:

Systematic organization of sabotage, raids, raids. At the same time, the retreat to areas where large militant forces are based is carried out, as a rule, under the cover of captured hostages.

To conduct combat operations, commit sabotage and terrorist acts, groups (5-10 people) and formations of up to 300 people or more were created, depending on the assigned tasks.

Penetration of militant groups and formations into objects was carried out, as a rule, in conditions of limited visibility or at night, often under the guise of local residents, refugees, and police officers.

Targets for attack were selected in both tactical and operational depth in accordance with the militants’ strategy of “transferring the war to Russian territory,” which was confirmed by terrorist attacks in Buinaksk, Volgodonsk, Moscow and other populated areas.

The militants skillfully disguise their terrorist actions. The “addiction to constant danger” syndrome played a negative role in this regard.

An analysis of the tactics of gangs cannot be objective without taking into account their qualitative characteristics that determine their strengths and weaknesses. It is advisable to pay special attention to the strengths of gangs, which include:

Intelligence organization. It provides bandit formations with continuous information about the deployment and movements of federal troops, their numbers, composition, combat effectiveness and vulnerabilities. As a rule, bandits have a widely deployed network of agents among the local population.

Local conditions. Bandits often mix with the local population, which increases their ability to act unexpectedly. To identify them among the local population, it is effective to introduce regime and access control over the movement of the population.

Awareness. The militants' knowledge of gangs local peculiarities gives them the opportunity to exercise effective psychological pressure on the local population. This strong point should be neutralized by establishing good relationships between the command and control bodies of the federal troops (forces) with local authorities and the population. A significant addition to this is the organized participation of local anti-bandit militias in operations.

Determination, discipline and physical training of militants. Field commanders, as a rule, are well prepared, trained, and have a high level of determination to defend the interests of their cause to the end, reinforced by firm, sometimes even cruel, discipline. At the same time, not all ordinary militants possess these qualities and give in to panic much more easily, especially in conditions that are unfavorable for them.

The weaknesses of gangs are:

lack of personnel and resources. The most vulnerable to the actions of gangs is the destruction of their supply bases, blocking the delivery routes for reinforcements, weapons and food. This neutralizes the active activities of the gang for a certain time.

The vulnerable side of gangs is their dependence on the local population. Its reduction or complete absence significantly reduces the effectiveness of their actions. In this regard, one of the main tasks is to gain and retain support from the local population.

There are political, religious and ethnic differences among the bandits.

Definitions of psychological training, its essential content, the factor of novelty and its role in the formation and manifestation of psychological qualities, psychological mechanism, organization and conduct of psychological training during training, education and psychological training itself.

Organization of psychological training.

Directions of psychological training, principles of its organization.

The role and place of the psychologist in conducting psychological training.

Psychological model of modern combat.

The tasks of psychological training, the form and methods of their implementation when learning to drive combat vehicles and during tactical training.

The concept of psychological preparation

Psychological training of military personnel is a system of targeted influences aimed at developing and consolidating in soldiers psychological readiness and sustainability, mainly based on self-improvement of personal and development of professionally important qualities, gaining experience of successful actions in simulated extreme conditions of a combat situation.

A more accessible understanding of the essence of psychological preparation was, in our opinion, formulated by the famous Russian physiologist I.P. Pavlov: “The point here is not only in the strength of the interacting stimuli, but in their novelty... The main reaction of the passive-defensive reflex is not to force, but to novelty."

Why does the above quote, in our opinion, outline the essence of psychological preparation? What is it about? During the training and education of any military specialist, it is provided for the formation of a wide range of necessary to perform professional activity qualities And in general, the problem is being solved successfully. However, the experience of combat operations shows that not every quality previously formed can manifest itself in a serviceman when operating conditions change (weather, terrain, visibility, fire exposure, etc.), especially when moving to real combat. There are many examples when a warrior successfully hits a target during training sessions and is far from in the best possible way fires when the battle conditions change, when passive defensive reflexes actually contribute to the behavior of a warrior that is inappropriate to the situation and reduces the effectiveness of combat activities.

That is, the factor of novelty sometimes plays a decisive role in the manifestation of previously formed qualities in a person, and therefore in the performance of an exercise. And the task is to provide for and place the trainee in such conditions in peacetime, during training and education, in which the psychological qualities necessary to perform a combat mission will be developed. In other words, during daily combat training, reduce to a minimum everything new, unknown that a person may encounter in battle.

What is the psychological mechanism of psychological preparation? Due to what internal and external influences on the psyche of a serviceman is it influenced? These and other questions can be answered if we come to an understanding of the main theoretical and practical task of psychological training - the purposeful formation and consolidation of mental images of the model of their upcoming or future actions in military personnel. And the logic here should be as follows: the greater the number of upcoming mental images that are most appropriate to the combat situation, we form in a serviceman, the less likely he is to find himself in a situation of uncertainty, the unknown, which usually entails the triggering of a passive-defensive reflex in a person, and therefore inadequate actions .

To better understand this issue, let us consider what essentially constitutes a mental mode of action?

A mental image, or in other words, what a person saw, heard, experienced, etc. is nothing more than a psychological model of action (combat) in the mind of a warrior. This is not a photograph that captures any situation, but much more. This is a rather time-consuming process of reflecting not only objective reality, but also recreating previously experienced, seen, etc. images, with the aim of building a warrior’s future activity that is adequate to the actual situation. The regulator of such activity is the motives and needs of the serviceman, his attitude, and the operational structure is professional actions. That is, it will be methodologically correct if, in the course of all daily activities in organizing psychological training, we direct our conditions to the formation of both conceptual and figurative foundations for the model of upcoming actions.

At the same time, it is very important to take into account that the way of performing this or that action is determined both by its substantive content (where, how, with whom to go, what to take with you), and its significance for the serviceman (whether it is necessary to go there). You can be perfectly prepared professionally in terms of the ability to drive, fly, hike, etc., have sufficiently developed professional quality, but if the conceptual basis of the model of upcoming actions, which is the fundamental basis of the semantic orientation on behavior in battle, is not developed, it can be said with great certainty that the task will not be completed with due efficiency.

In this regard, when organizing psychological training, it is important to proceed from the principle of advancing the formation of the conceptual basis of the model of combat operations in relation to the figurative one. This means that any plan for the implementation of psychological training should begin through the activation of beliefs in the necessity and importance of the tasks assigned, the consolidation of motivational attitudes, the accumulation of ideas about battle conditions, etc. For these purposes, proven methods of psychological training associated with mainly with the verbal, oral influence of commanders and other specialists on the psyche of personnel - persuasion, suggestion, etc.

However, attitude alone is extremely insufficient to solve the problems of psychological training. The success of a warrior’s actions largely depends on how well the mental images he has formed correspond to reality. To do this, a warrior must sensually fill the mental image of a model of combat work: perform practical actions during training, exercises, shooting, missile launches day and night. Under these conditions, methods can be widely used to consolidate the figurative basis of the combat model by hardening the necessary professionally important qualities. They may include: exercises and training on special simulators, simulators, training fields, at airfields; physical and sports exercises to overcome special obstacle courses, obstacles, rubble, water boundaries; special sports games and competitions; psychological exercises for the targeted development of cognitive, emotional and volitional qualities; psychological training on putting together a team, developing compatibility, collectivism, interchangeability, etc.

Science has developed a significant number of different approaches to understanding organization and conducting psychological training. Without setting the task of analyzing them, we proceeded from the fact that psychological training is carried out in the course of education (educational structures), training (combat training bodies) and during the conduct of psychological training activities. Considering the fact that training, education and psychological preparation itself are closely interconnected and interdependent, it is very important to consider what qualities, properties, mental processes and states are formed in each of the listed areas.

Carrying out the most general analysis, we can state that in the process of education, military personnel develop skills and habits of behavior in various conditions, and therefore develop volitional qualities; the development of the emotional-volitional sphere of the personality and its adaptation to new conditions is carried out; military personnel are purposefully focused on overcoming possible difficulties in combat conditions, they are instilled with perseverance, bravery, bravery, courage, conviction in the rightness of their actions, etc.

In the process of training, the moral and combat qualities and feelings necessary for the successful defense of the Fatherland are formed and tempered (the same courage, fortitude, boldness, determination, initiative, readiness for battle, a sense of collectivism), motivational attitudes are activated; through the accumulation of relevant knowledge, ideas about modern combat are formed, and consolidation of skills and abilities contributes to the development of psychological readiness, stability, etc.

However, it would be wrong to reduce psychological preparation only to training and education. training and education are much broader in terms of the tasks to be solved than psychological preparation. There are a number of such tasks, especially in the formation, development and hardening of the psychological and special qualities necessary for combat, which can only be solved in the process of psychological preparation. For example, consolidation and development of skills and abilities necessary to perform a specific task; activation of traits cognitive processes, motives, abilities characteristic of a particular military specialist, or such special qualities of a fighter as prudence, eye, thinking, coordination of movements, resistance to overload, etc.

That is, along with training and education, in the process of which psychological preparation is partially carried out, a number of tasks are solved, allowing us to conclude that it is independent, has its own ways, means, forms and methods (auto-training, accumulation of ideas about combat situations and adaptation to them, psychocorrection, psychorehabilitation, etc.). It is this circumstance that often introduces some uncertainty into issues related to the organization of psychological training.

In this regard, it is very important to clearly distinguish between the content of general, special and targeted psychological training. Thus, in the course of general psychological training, which is carried out in the process of training and education, professionally important qualities necessary for combat are formed (courage, heroism, bravery, etc.), which must correspond to the general goals and requirements for personnel.

Special psychological training is less connected with training and education and is closer to independent psychological preparation for performing the task. It is characterized to a greater extent by specific methods (simulators, ideomotor training, studying the main characteristics of targets, etc.). During special psychological training, issues of understanding the combat mission, convincing soldiers of the need to carry it out unquestioningly, and activating readiness and other specific professionally important qualities for these purposes are resolved. It is during special psychological training that issues of reducing the elements of uncertainty in the general system of upcoming actions are resolved to the greatest extent, and specific qualities necessary specifically for performing this task are formed and activated.

Targeted psychological preparation is carried out for a specific battle, for a specific flight, campaign, launch, etc. It is least related to training and is aimed at increasing the activity of personnel, mobilizing their psyche to complete the assigned task.

Organization of psychological training

The main directions of psychological training of military personnel are: the formation in soldiers of scientifically based knowledge about combat operations, ideas about future war, convictions, readiness for heroism, performing selfless acts in the name of victory over the enemy; increasing the level of psychological stability and endurance of military personnel, developing unpretentiousness, unpretentiousness, moderation in desires and needs; instilling trust in commanders and superiors, an attitude of unquestioning obedience and obedience, trustworthiness and loyalty to state policy; reducing mental trauma, increasing the level of professional and combat skills and abilities, physiological and psychological endurance of military personnel.

The effectiveness of the work carried out will largely depend on how punctually the principles of psychological modeling of confrontation with the enemy will be observed; professional and tactical conditionality of the content of psychological training to the tasks being solved in various branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the military, ensuring the safety of actions during exercises and training. In addition, it is very important to maintain the psychological correspondence between training and combat missions; the problematic nature of the created combat training situations; psychological confrontation modeling the adequacy of mental states and actions to battle conditions.

The question involuntarily arises: who and where will carry out such meaningful work on organizing psychological training? The current regulatory documents regulating the conduct of psychological training emphasize that its organization is entrusted to both psychologists located in combat training structures and psychologists in educational structures.

The accumulated work experience shows that the effectiveness of the activities of psychological officers of combat training bodies is higher where their main attention is focused on the implementation of psychological analysis of types of combat activity; developing recommendations for the formation of the necessary professionally important qualities in the process of combat training; developing psychological models of classes, exercises, maneuvers and developing proposals for commanders to create optimal levels of mental tension of personnel by means of simulating psychological factors of combat, creating psychological training simulators in parts of the educational and material base, educational places, firing ranges, shooting ranges, etc. The described work experience allows us to purposefully and effectively solve the problems of psychological training.

As for the officers of psychologists of educational structures, their work in the field of psychological training is actually carried out in close cooperation with combat training bodies, guided by functional responsibilities, in particular the position "... to take part in the psychological training of personnel and the conduct of combat, the decision of training combat and other tasks, carry out measures to maintain their psychological stability." It is important to note that in the main unit where psychological training is carried out in the regiment, all work on its organization and implementation is entrusted to the regiment psychologist.

Considering the importance and insufficient development of approaches to organizing psychological training at the regimental level, there is a need to describe in more detail the methodology for its implementation, paying special attention to the issue of introducing psychological elements in the process of combat training.

Advanced experience among the troops shows that psychological model modern combat is created by:

Uses various means imitations (training explosives, nuclear explosion simulators, training explosive formulations, imitation grenades and landmines, explosive packages, smoke bombs, flares (signal), fire mixtures, blank cartridges, etc.).

Broadcasts of recordings of battle noise effects (shots of tanks, guns, explosions of shells, mines, sound low-flying aircraft, etc.).

Creation of fires, models of damaged equipment, all kinds of engineering barriers and obstacles used suddenly (imitation minefields, wire and inconspicuous fences, ditches, traps, rubble, barricades, destroyed sections of roads and bridges).

Organization of real counteraction to the enemy (trained group of personnel, two-way play by two platoons, etc.).

By implementing various compositions of the above means, depending on the tasks being solved, the type of weapons and the type of troops, the psychologist, together with officers of the combat training bodies, commanders and staffs, can consciously introduce into the process of combat training activities various psychological factors that can cause both positive activity of the warrior, and negative psychic phenomena. Thus, the creation of a threat to the lives of personnel is accompanied by the action of a danger factor, the real impact of fire is surprise, a lack of uncertainty information, the implementation of unplanned actions is the novelty of the situation, etc. A skillful, thoughtful introduction to educational process These factors make it possible to actually simulate individual elements of modern combat, and therefore solve the problems of psychological preparation.

To be convincing and practically consolidate the stated theoretical premises, we will consider the process of psychological training of personnel using the example of conducting classes in driving combat vehicles and during tactical training.

The main tasks of psychological training of personnel when learning to drive combat vehicles are:

overcoming the negative impact of a long stay in the specific conditions of a moving machine on maintaining attentiveness and speed of reaction when operating the machine;

formation of strong-willed qualities necessary for successfully driving combat vehicles in terrain and conditions, as well as for boldly overcoming various obstacles and obstacles;

overcoming “phobia of water” among personnel when driving combat vehicles through water obstacles.

The successful solution of these tasks is mediated by the exact fulfillment of the requirements of the manual on the rules of driving combat vehicles, the Driving Course, and the Manual for training in overcoming water obstacles; purposeful and persistent actions of trainees, creation of a difficult environment during driving lessons, close to the conditions of real combat reality; increasing the time of continuous stay of trainees in a moving car; performing exercises after receiving heavy physical activity; choosing sections and routes that require a lot of effort to control the machine; setting special tasks for observation in motion, as well as constant improvement of acquired skills and qualities during tactical training, exercises, shooting and other trips to the field.

Psychological training of personnel in the process of everyday combat training is carried out by practicing at each lesson certain elements of the psychological hardening of soldiers. Their development in mandatory included in the lesson plan. So, for example, to form a conceptual basis for a model of upcoming actions (combat) during tactical training classes, it is advisable to set the following goals:

during the training process: familiarization of personnel with the military equipment of the unit;

a clear demonstration of the superiority of our equipment over that of the enemy, the capabilities of weapons and military equipment to protect against weapons of mass destruction.

In this lesson, the goals of psychological preparation can be achieved by: setting up a stand for comparative performance characteristics of our equipment and weapons and similar equipment of the enemy; real actions of trained crews, crews and personnel in the conditions of application of training recipes; demonstration shooting from standard weapons: individual shooting, shooting as part of a squad and platoon.

Similarly, they think through the elements of psychological training of personnel at each lesson in all academic disciplines.

The main burden of solving the problems of psychological training, in particular in forming the figurative basis of the combat model, falls on tactical and fire training classes (for driver mechanics - in driving classes). During combat training, it is necessary to include in the training plan the development of elements of psychological hardening of personnel, through the formation of a conceptual and figurative basis for the model. As an example, let’s look at the topics and goals of psychological conditioning during tactical training.

Lessons 1–2:

"Actions when rising by alarm." During the lesson, it is important to explain the essence of the psychological requirements for a warrior for this type of action; conduct training for personnel on sudden rise on combat alert and announcement of a muster outside normal hours (1–1.5 hours after lights out, in the middle of the night, 1–1.5 hours before rise, while performing other tasks during the daytime) .

Lessons 3.

"Actions of a motorized rifle soldier in battle." To familiarize personnel with the psychological qualities necessary in modern combat, to reveal the essence of psychological training of a squad, crew, crew, and its content.

Lessons 4.

Organize: the presence of a real, actively opposing enemy (group of personnel); create a model of modern combat using simulation tools, noise, sound and light effects; perform an exercise in attacking a real enemy, hand-to-hand combat in a trench; practice the actions provided for in the lesson plan after physical activity (thrown march from the place of permanent deployment to the training field).

Lessons 5.

Perform: actions in the conditions of application of educational formulations of chemical agents; imitation of a nuclear explosion and actions during it: hand-to-hand combat with a real enemy, training in the fight against incendiary weapons, extinguishing real fires on mock-ups of military equipment and terrain.

In the process of working on the topic “Fighting tanks, armored vehicles and PTS of a potential enemy”, carry out:

Lesson 1.

Focusing on vulnerable areas of enemy equipment, on areas that cannot be hit when firing from a cannon and machine gun (specially prepared posters).

Lesson 2.

Demonstration of vulnerable spots of armored vehicles and unaffected areas when firing from them on real objects (models); practicing and demonstrating exercises to master the methods and techniques of combating armored vehicles during the actual running-in of personnel; imitation of enemy fire using imitation means (explosive packages, fire mixture).

During the field exit, work out complex use all means of psychological conditioning used in previous classes (creating a model of modern combat, the presence of a real actively opposing enemy; the use of training recipes for firepower; creating fires, etc.). In particular, during the offensive:

1) work out the following actions with the personnel of the units:

in conditions of active imitation of the enemy (explosions, shooting with blank cartridges);

in the presence of a real enemy (part of the personnel) opposing the attackers;

when overcoming simulated fields (mine);

in the conditions of application of educational formulations of chemical agents;

firing blank shots, shells from infantry fighting vehicles over the heads of the attackers;

in personal protective equipment.

At the next lesson - actions in the presence of a real opposing enemy; imitation of a night battle using noise, sound, and light effects;

2) for tank units:

exercise in overcoming simulated minefields, mine-explosive obstacles;

organize the presence of a real actively defending enemy;

create a model of modern offensive combat using simulation tools;

perform actions in protective equipment using training agent formulations.

When working on the topic "Squad (tank, infantry fighting vehicle) in defense in the first two lessons, it is advisable to: explain to the personnel the psychological features of conducting a defensive battle; reveal the essence of the psychological qualities necessary for a soldier in defense, bring to his attention the features of the actions of a potential enemy in an offensive battle, his strengths and weaknesses, and:

a) for motorized rifle units -

organize actions in the conditions of real use of training formulations of chemical agents, means of simulating a nuclear explosion, with the designation of the enemy (part of the personnel, dummies, imitations);

carry out active actions of the advancing enemy (variant of a two-sided game) with real engineering equipment of the squad's firing position.

In subsequent classes, create a model of a night battle with a real enemy using noise, sound and light effects; perform exercises to practice methods of dealing with incendiary agents and extinguishing fires at night;

b) for tank units -

create a model of defensive battle using simulation tools, noise, sound and light effects,

simulate the presence of a real attacking enemy (part of the personnel or another platoon of the company),

striking and performing combat missions wearing protective equipment,

fighting fires at equipment sites and on the ground at night, as well as simulating losses in manpower (dummies of the dead, wounded), extracting the wounded from the tank, and providing assistance to them.

When working on the topic “Squad (tank infantry fighting vehicle) in march guard and on the march,” it is necessary to explain the essence of the psychological qualities necessary for personnel to successfully perform combat missions in march guard and on the march; perform an exercise in real actions to overcome obstacles and zones of contamination with training agent formulations; organize the actions of a real enemy in the form of sabotage groups; to practice the skills of conducting disometric control and partial special processing when meeting and conducting combat with a real opposing enemy in the conditions of: actions when overcoming training minefields, mine-explosive obstacles; combating incendiary agents, extinguishing fires on equipment models; firing blank shots over the heads of advancing personnel; overcoming water obstacles.

These are the elements of psychological training of military personnel in the process of practical training in tactics. Similarly, it would be possible to present a list of activities and recommendations for introducing elements of psychological training when conducting other types of classes. Each branch of the Armed Forces, branch of the armed forces, and ultimately each unit or subdivision has its own specific features of organizing and conducting psychological training. It is very difficult, and in fact impossible, to provide recipes for each individual case. In this sense, a very large field of activity opens up to regimental psychologists. Only initiative, creativity, great competence and knowledge of the tasks being solved by personnel make it possible to successfully organize and carry out work on psychological training of personnel.

At the same time, the psychologist, together with the commanders and officers responsible for organizing combat training, must constantly remember that the practical implementation of the principles of psychological training is achieved if the following are provided: high tempo actions day and night in difficult weather conditions (rain, fog, snowfall, ice, sandstorms); quick and abrupt change of tactical situation during training; shooting from all types of small arms; testing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, crossing water barriers, overcoming contamination zones, fighting fires; prolonged use of protective equipment against weapons of mass destruction; fighting tanks and low-flying air targets, with enemy landings and sabotage groups.

The outlined approach to organizing and conducting psychological training of military personnel is not final. There may be various methodological techniques that will significantly enrich the content of the work being done to prepare the warrior’s psyche for battle.

Materials seized from militants

The following materials were obtained from one of the liquidated bases of Chechen militants and are published so that our units have the opportunity to prepare in advance for the peculiarities of military operations in Chechnya and other similar regions.

HOW TO NEUTRALIZE AND BREAK THE ENEMY'S MILITARY TACTICS

AND DIVERSIFY AND IMPROVE OUR TACTICS

(Khattab’s instructions for the winter-spring period of 2001)

The commander should not get bogged down in providing his groups with food, uniforms, ammunition and medicine. For this purpose, responsible people must be appointed, whom the commander controls. The main time of the commander should be occupied with the development of various operational-tactical plans and sabotage operations.

In the war against the infidels, we do not lack Mujahideen who are ready to give their souls in the path of Allah and there is no problem in the influx of fresh Islamic youth into our ranks. The main problem is the commanders, their ability to clearly organize military operation, where the enemy is dealt a significant blow with minimal losses among the Mujahideen. Our commanders, on the contrary, are almost proud of the fact that there are many suicide bombers and many wounded in their group. They do not ask themselves the question - how and through whose fault this happened, we will all have to answer to Allah for this. Unsuccessful military operations with heavy losses break the spirit of the Mujahideen, and they begin to doubt their commanders. In this letter we must consider two main questions: how to study and break the enemy's tactics that they use against us today; how to improve and diversify our military tactics and how to impose them on the enemy.

Compared to the first war, the Russians changed their tactics: they tried to use a large number of armored vehicles - one type of long armored column should have mentally suppressed the enemy, but this tactic did not bring success in the fight against the Mujahideen. The Russians tried to take into account their mistakes in the last war. Today they have adopted a different tactic of warfare, using the following scheme: infantry is deployed and used everywhere as the main force, and armored vehicles as auxiliary; rapid landing of troops and special forces from helicopters to the places where the Mujahideen are supposed to be located and combing the area with the support of helicopters; sudden raids and raids by riot police and special forces on populated areas based on targeted tips from their informants. These groups quickly respond to any rumors and information about the location of the Mujahideen. Contrary to previous tactics, the Russians advance their troops at night and make ambushes near the bases of the Mujahideen and on their roads, or surround the house and wait until the morning.

Today we propose the following scheme to neutralize this tactic: we will supply every field commander with anti-personnel mines, and we will send an instructor to teach the Mujahideen how to mine. During combing, it is necessary to quickly mine the forest paths along which Russian infantry walk (during combing, civilians do not walk through the forests). It is also necessary to mine the approaches to the Mujahideen bases. The second mine must be hidden on a tree from above, after the first explosion, wait 1.5 - 2 minutes and, when help comes to the wounded, detonate the second mine through a cord (wire) or remote control. After the Russians leave, the unexploded mines must be removed and hidden near the path for use next time.

We will send each field commander several Strela missiles with instructions on how to use them. Every field commander must purchase barrels for KPVT, DShK and make simple guns that fire at least one shot. It is necessary to have a supply of cartridges for them, as well as 7.62 mm BZT for setting up ambushes along the helicopter flight route. Machine guns can be hidden at the ambush site so that rotating mujahideen do not carry a large load with them.

After we warned the informers and, by decision of the Sharia court, began to execute them, we significantly broke the Russian program, but did not completely solve this problem. The next step is to pit the informers against the Russian intelligence services. For example, buy an old abandoned house or garage, make a warehouse there with various military equipment, mine it, and then leak information through informers. Another option: make an ambush and wait for the Russians on the way to the “punctured” address. After this, they will not trust the informers and, perhaps, eliminate one of them. They will have to rely on their own information, which, in most cases, is not reliable. Use the names of informers on the radio and in notes so that the Russians stop trusting them. You can throw incriminating things, cartridges, grenades, uniforms, etc. into their yards and houses.

In a number of cases, the Russians take advantage of the mujahideen's carelessness and weak tactics of tracking the enemy. It is not enough to guard a street or alley unnoticed - Russians can bypass an unnoticed street if they realize that it is under surveillance. The Mujahideen need to constantly monitor enemy bases and notify their own in time. Many times we were caught by surprise and, apart from shooting back from machine guns, there was no resistance; the most successful options were when we managed to kill one or two Russians. It is known when in one day 6 Mujahideen became martyrs. This is a very careless tactic. It is necessary to mine the fence along the perimeter (where the Russians can take up positions), lead the cord into the house and carry out an explosion in the event of a Russian attack. After several significant losses, the Russians will reduce their activity. But at the same time, we should not wait for the Russians to come and surround the house - this is the last option. After the Russians begin to move out of the base, it is necessary to move several Mujahideen along their route and strike. Even one shot from the "Fly" is enough to upset the enemy's plans. This time is enough for the Mujahideen to change their location or prepare for battle. Therefore, there should be constant surveillance on the outskirts of villages.

We will provide the commanders with the necessary number of radios; it is also necessary to introduce the tactics of mining the approaches to the bases at night, and removing the mines in the morning. Every commander should have night vision devices.

Now let's consider the issue of improving and strengthening our military tactics.

Guerrilla warfare requires small mobile groups that are well prepared and trained to fight this war. For this period, our tactics are conducting a mine war, which bleeds and weakens the enemy before inflicting a strong decisive blow on him.

The enemy is trying to adapt to the mine war: they are sending out sappers with mine detectors. It is necessary to scatter small nails in mining areas (from 100 m to 1 km) that do not puncture tires, then the mine detector becomes useless. Russian infantry is looking for tripwires on the ground. It is necessary to install high guy wires at the level of the Ural cabin, 2.5 - 3 meters. These tripwires cause great damage to Russian infantry. Approaches to land mines must be covered with one or two anti-personnel mines. We will send you mines that are almost impossible to neutralize and teach you how to use them. We will also send you mines with a remote fuse and ask you to use them for a backup explosion when help approaches the wounded. This is called a double strike.

Today we must strike powerfully, trying to avoid large losses among our own. The issue of advancing large columns is the most painful for the Russians. They drive infantry all over the place, trying to discover ambush sites, trying to secure their columns and avoid nervous tension among their soldiers (especially riot police) on the march. There are ways to strike convoys without the direct participation of a large number of Mujahideen. For example, install camouflaged grenade launchers, RPOs, etc. at the level of armored vehicles and draw a cord from them 400 - 500 meters. When equipment appears in the affected area, close the contacts. This should be especially used in case of damage to railway trains. railway Enemies today use it as the most economical way to transport equipment and manpower. You can attach “Flies” and flamethrowers both on trees and on flat terrain. The Russians may be able to detect these surprises, but they are not able to thoroughly comb the entire route within a radius of 200 meters from the road.

A big request to commanders is to fire at least five shots from a sniper rifle or grenade launcher at Russian dog posts within 24 hours, especially during the month of Ramadan. Shelling must be carried out at different times of the day from different directions in order to constantly keep the enemy in suspense. The winter initiative must be ours. Snow is a natural camouflage. A helicopter flies low in winter. It is necessary to make an ambush along their routes. After the shot, you can trample footprints in the direction of the informers' houses. It is necessary not only to mine and blow up their administrative buildings, but also to burn them.

We must be prepared for a war with the infidels for hundreds of years, so after the death of the commander there should be no squabbles and confusion in the group. Each commander must have at least 2 deputies in his group who are privy to his plans and understand the situation. The military emir should know about them. If the commander becomes a suicide bomber, the group must work as clearly as before.

We ask field commanders to send a list of their deputies to the military emir, to convey combat experience and their thoughts on combat tactics in order to exchange experience with other commanders.

THE WAR CONTINUES!

These materials were obtained from one of the liquidated bases of Chechen militants and are published so that our units have the opportunity to prepare in advance for the peculiarities of military operations in Chechnya and other similar regions.

It is important to have an idea of how the leadership of the militants thinks, what they breathe, their educational and cultural level, the level of communication with subordinates, units, etc.

Absolutely

secret

As we previously noted, we need to improve and diversify our military tactics and neutralize the enemy. And we ask you to send your proposals, opinions on these issues, and share your experience to VVMSH.

After much effort and labor that we put into creating bases in the mountains, it turned out that the Russians could find them and destroy them. This may occur due to an unsuccessful choice of location for the base (not far from forest roads where people often go), or information about the location of the base becomes known to FSB informants, or the base is poorly camouflaged (new paths have been trodden, visible from above). The reason may also be the careless behavior of the Mujahideen themselves. When a base or its supposed location is discovered, the base is subjected to massive artillery fire and missile and bomb attacks from the air. Then the infantry moves to this place to clean up. In other cases, when a base was discovered, the Russians began to practice deploying special forces. groups for a quick and surprise attack on the base. This is often done at night or in the morning. As a rule, they are led to the location of the base by a guide - a munafik.

First. It is necessary to set up a post at a distance of 300-400 m from the base during the day, and at 50-2100 m from the base at night. Usually Russian infantry moves out early - before or after dawn. Thanks to the advanced post, the Mujahideen have the opportunity to take timely measures: retreat or encircle the Russian infantry according to a pre-drawn up plan (scheme). In cases of retreat, it is necessary to quickly mine the base and its approaches (make a trap).

Second. It is necessary to systematically conduct observation from heights or convenient points from where roads and approaches to the base are clearly visible. It is extremely important to do this, at least during the movement of Russian equipment and infantry in a given zone, or when they receive information from a contact from a nearby village. There are cases when the Mujahideen discovered Russian infantry in broad daylight, only when it approached the base at a distance of 100–150 m. Of course, in this case there is no need to think about serious resistance; it is necessary to quickly leave the encirclement.

Third. One of the most important points. It is necessary to mine roads at a distance of 300 m from the base's retractable post. It is advisable to stretch the cord, and this cord must be constantly checked. In this case, there is more guarantee that the explosion will take place. Other explosive systems may not work. Detonate only when the main group of Russians approaches the mined area, having previously let the advanced reconnaissance group through. Several explosions from the ground and from above from the trees will sow panic among the enemy. It is not profitable to get involved in a positional machine gun fire, since the special. Russian groups have more advanced weapons. And losses in forest battles, even one in ten, are not beneficial for us.

In the tactics we propose, the Russians suffer heavy losses, panic arises among them and the main advantage they hoped for is lost - surprise. And the Mujahideen can use this moment to encircle and subsequently destroy an enemy group according to a pre-drawn up scheme. It is good to use duplicate explosions (via cords).

Fourth. When leaving, be sure to mine the base, having previously scattered small nails around. And be sure to mark the location of the mines on the base diagram.

Fifth. It is very important to create trap bases. To do this, it is necessary to create something like a base (dugout, toilet, trodden paths, etc.), then it is necessary to “leak” information. First, fire shots from the base-trap site. Then spread the rumor that young militants are being trained there. When Russian intelligence appears, it is necessary that they see smoke from a fire, a horse tied to a tree, hear music, or create any other imitations that confirm that the Mujahideen base is probably located here. After this we must wait for the Russians to arrive. It is necessary to mine the territory, the base. Several people will come to check the base first, and the main group of Russians will take a position around the base. Places convenient for occupying positions should be mined first, especially from above. Explosions must be carried out at the same time. Then, after firing, which the enemy will probably open in panic, duplicate explosions can be made. At the same time, it is necessary to mine the road along which the Russians came. If possible, make an ambush at the same time. This tactic is good because we call the enemy to where it is convenient for us to fight him. This is easier than looking for the enemy in hard-to-reach places. To carry out this operation, 2-3 Mujahideen are enough. With this tactic, the commander can effectively use his entire group. And as our prophet (pbuh) said, “War is a trick” And we must adhere to Sunni.

Sixth. Only the physical elimination of munafiks is not enough to paralyze their activities. They find more sophisticated and careful methods in their dirty work. We must think about how to pit the munafiks against their Russian masters. So that the munafiks and their relatives completely lose confidence in the Russians. For example, put zinc or some kind of ammunition in the informer’s garden, having previously “snitched” on the informer that he is supplying weapons to the Mujahideen. It is more convenient to do this on the eve of the inspections, making the same “leak” about buried ammunition. You can send a letter to the commandant's office on behalf of the munafik to call the Russians and blow them up or fire at them on the way. Usually the Russians send no more than three pieces of equipment. And as a rule, Russians respond to signals from the population to show how they maintain law and order.

1. Compile a clear list of munafiks executed by us according to the verdict of the Sharia Court.

2. Constantly patrol the village, especially at night, and eliminate special forces. groups of Russians who terrorize the population. This operation must be filmed with a video camera and these video frames must be made public with appropriate explanations.

The Supreme Military Majlis-Shura gives the following to commanders of directions, groups and ordinary Mujahideen

ORDER

each commander must prepare and conduct at least 1–2 base-trap operations;

carry out at least two operations to discredit the munafiks in front of the Russians on the territory you control;

carry out at least two “house-trap” operations on the territory under your control, especially in the so-called safe places (Shali, Znamenskoye, Tolstoy-Yurt, Achkhoy-Martan, Shchelkovskaya).

in the near future, each direction commander will organize a group of 25 people, which should include snipers, machine gunners, and grenade launchers to participate in a large operation;

organize children to shout “Allahu Akbar” in front of the occupiers’ commandant’s offices. Encourage children with small gifts. Such speeches greatly break the morale of Russians;

organize a committee of women who will initiate rallies against the occupiers. It is necessary to support these women and their families financially to the best of our ability; each women’s committee must be strictly assigned to a specific sector and a specific direction commander.

To fulfill the previous order, direction commanders need to draw up a clear list of group commanders subordinate to them and send them to the VVMSH, in order to avoid uncontrolled expenditure of funds and ammunition. This point of the order is motivated by the fact that some group commanders use means by simultaneously contacting several direction commanders.

Rumors are spreading among people that the Russians are leaving in November, then in a month, then in two. Commanders should not build their military program based on these rumors. Such rumors discourage the Mujahideen, and they plan simple short-term operations. We need to plan our military strategy based on the fact that the war with the Russian infidel will be long-term.

May Allah give us all the strength, health and greatness to work for the triumph of Islam.

Allah Akbar!

Military Amir VVMSH

Amir HATTAB. 03.12.2000

Directorate of Internal Troops of the NKVD

North Caucasus District

Top secret

Ex. No. of mountains Pyatigorsk

commander of the 1st rifle division VV NKVD Major General Comrade. Vetrov mountains. Krasnodar

From the experience of the KGB-military operations carried out to eliminate banditry in the North Caucasus, the regions of which are similar in their geographical location to the mountainous regions of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the following has been established.

I. Features of the conditions for combating banditry in the mountains

The area is high mountainous with deep gorges, with steep cliffs in places. The gorges are cut by numerous gullies and ravines, covered with forest, thickets and bushes. This provided good hiding places for gangs and made it difficult to carry out military operations (movement, reconnaissance, observation, communications).

The rapid flows of mountain rivers, especially during rainstorms and melting snow, as well as the lack and poor quality of wheeled roads, and in some places their complete absence, made it difficult for the troops conducting operations to move and maneuver.

Sudden changes in weather: fog, rain, storm, etc. (which is a common occurrence in the mountains) - in some cases led to the disruption of the planned plan and confusion among the officers, who were not prepared to make a quick decision on the changed situation.

The issue of organizing radio communications in mountainous conditions is especially difficult due to the fact that it, as a rule, requires studying the passage of radio waves during the day and night in the mountains.

Material support for troops (delivery of food and ammunition), due to the lack of products that are small in weight, volume and high in calories, is difficult and requires a significant amount of pack transport.

The bandits' knowledge of the area and training in moving in the mountains, as well as family ties bandits with the local population, which served as a material support base for the gangs and a source of information about the movement military units and units, often made it possible for gangs to escape attack.

Special, unknown to a significant number of our troops, including officers, national, cultural and everyday customs and mores (which is important in terms of intelligence activities, deployment of troops, the use of guides, etc.), as well as the presence of tribal remnants, the strength of authorities and religious fanaticism influenced the organization of measures to combat banditry.

The presence of a large amount of weapons and ammunition among the population, left to them by the German command and collected on the lines of combat between Red Army units and German troops, is a source of weapons for the bandits.

II. Tactics of gang groups

From the experience of fighting banditry in the North Caucasus, it was established that bandit groups, depending on the current situation, changed their tactics, namely:

FIRST PERIOD(the period of the first 3 months after the liberation of the territory from the German occupiers). The activities of gang groups were characterized by great activity. The bandits sought to retain entire areas and maintain fascist order in them. To achieve this, bandit groups united into large groups of several hundred people with a single leadership. The tactics of gang groups during this period were characterized by:

preparing defense lines with the deployment of guards and ambushes at distant approaches, good organization of reconnaissance through observation from commanding heights and through one’s relatives and accomplices;

when the situation was favorable for the bandit groups, they engaged in open battle with military units, trying to inflict as much damage as possible on our troops;

they widely used the technique of encircling and destroying small units, using units entering deep gorges, setting up ambushes in them and on paths in the form of fire bags, and often leading fighters to their ambushes with false runs;

they set up ambushes that missed reconnaissance and security and rained heavy fire on the columns, causing great damage to our troops;

When the gang was surrounded, the bandits took up a perimeter defense and fought a stubborn battle. In cases where they were convinced of the advantage on the side of the units and subunits operating against them, the gangs, trying to evade the battle, scattered with the onset of darkness and, using their knowledge of the area, hid individually or in small groups;

Taking into account the current situation, in order to defeat these bandit groups, several large security and military operations were organized and carried out with the involvement of a large number of troops, as a result of which the main bandit groups were defeated. However, during these operations, our troops suffered losses in manpower and equipment, and a number of operations were not successful.

Significant losses in our units and the unsuccessful conduct of individual operations are explained by the following:

Unit headquarters and officers did not study the operational situation well and did not have constant business contacts with the NKVD, so they learned about the presence of bandit groups when the KGB-military operation was already ripe and had to be carried out immediately. As a result, the units did not have time to study the area of operation and prepare combat operations, they carried out them hastily and ill-considered, especially in the correct use of the terrain, the organization and use of combat formations and in matters of material support;

the issues of ensuring march and combat were poorly understood: security, reconnaissance, communications and surveillance, as a result, units fell into ambushes, fire bags and suffered losses in people and equipment;

they sent out small groups of fighters (5-7 people), who, when surrounded, could not independently decide the outcome of the battle and died;

hastily organized offensives and attacks on bandit camps without sufficiently closing all escape routes from the area where the gangs were located with barriers gave them the opportunity to escape from the attack;

the detention of citizens by our ambushes and their release after verification in a number of cases led to the fact that those released turned out to be scouts for gangs, as a result of which the ambushes came under fire and suffered losses;

some of our units went out on operations armed exclusively with machine guns, which led to the fact that bandits armed with rifles, using the ballistic properties of their weapons, fired with impunity from distances inaccessible to fire from machine guns;

Our units, moving, as a rule, along the bottom of gorges and paths, did not occupy commanding heights, which made it possible for the bandits to use them for observation and shelling, as a result of which our troops suffered significant losses.

SECOND PERIOD. After the defeat of large gangs in mountainous areas North Caucasus a significant number of small scattered gangs of 5-40 people appeared. The leaders of these gangs were career bandits, German agents and traitors to the Motherland - former German burgomasters, elders and policemen.

Gangs began to be based in the areas and around settlements where they were residents, supporting close connection with relatives and gang associates. At the same time, the gangs switched to another tactic of action, namely:

fearing that our agents would penetrate the gang, they only allowed big authorities and their relatives into their camps;

They did not accept open battle even with our small units. The battle was fought only by force, hiding under the cover of night or fog;

organized ambushes, attacked small groups and individual detachments, disarmed killed soldiers, took off their uniforms and changed into military uniforms;

They stole large numbers of livestock from farms and pastures.

In this situation, operations involving a large number of troops did not produce the necessary effect, so our tactics also changed, namely:

it was necessary to use small RPGs and IGs capable of rapid maneuvering;

through undercover activities of the NKVD, the use of data from the Armed Forces and the use of permanent reconnaissance and search groups, accurately identifying the lairs of gangs and, acting quickly and secretly, destroying them,

Systematic educational work among the population and repeated raids in populated areas destroyed the bandit base.

During the KGB-military operation to eliminate these scattered small gangs, a significant number of them were eliminated, some of the gangs disintegrated, and in groups or individually the bandits began to surrender.

During combat operations, the following shortcomings were identified.

Intelligence data was not always verified and in many cases was implausible, and sometimes late, which led to unnecessary exhaustion of the forces of the fighters and to the failure of the operation.

Lack of camouflage during the period of concentration in the initial areas and inability to covertly bring units to ambush sites. Weak discipline among personnel during the period of service in ambush and secrecy.

Slowness of action. Lack of time coordination between individual squad groups in closing the escape routes of the surrounded gang.

Underestimation of the service for searching and prosecuting gangs who escaped from the attack.

THIRD PERIOD The struggle of parts of the district against banditry took place in a situation where:

bandit groups, losing their base of support, disintegrated, some of them went into illegal status, some turned up to the garrisons and NKVD bodies to confess;

career bandits and complete traitors to the Motherland began to split into small gangs (2-5 people) and strictly secrecy, breaking family ties.

Only individual gangs retained their membership of up to 25 people.

During this period, the tactics of gang groups were characterized by:

attack and killing from ambushes of single and small groups of military personnel, as well as party activists;

robberies and murders of citizens on roads, farms and villages. The bandits took away mainly food, salt and clothing;

cattle rustling.

In this situation, our methods of dealing with them changed accordingly.

A significant number of small RPGs were sent to areas affected by banditry, which, by combing ravines and hollows, as well as reconnaissance of trails and traces in the forests, established gang lairs, surrounded and destroyed them.

Ambushes and secrets were placed along more likely gang routes.

The NKVD bodies, through undercover activities, continued to work to dismantle the gangs on the one hand, and on the other, they established the exact location of the gangs and targeted military groups at them.

In the third period of the fight against banditry, the following main shortcomings were noted:

RPGs and groups of military detachments were not always led by officers or experienced non-commissioned officers; some groups, when moving, did not provide themselves with adequate reconnaissance and security measures, as a result of which they came under sudden fire from bandits and lone bandits, suffering losses.

The heads of the RPG - officers - could not determine their place in the RPG, moved forward and died from the first shots of the bandits, which led to disorganization of management and a large number of officer losses.

Poor knowledge of the map on the part of middle-level officers.

THE FOURTH PERIOD. After the eviction of the Karachais, Chechens, Ingush and Balkars from the North Caucasus, part of the bandits who had been legalized before the eviction, as well as part of the population of these areas who had evaded eviction, joined the bandit groups operating in the mountainous regions, deprived of main bases, but possessing a significant amount of weapons, including and automatic, small gangs intensified their actions. Their techniques and methods at this stage are determined as follows.

Deprived of the support of the population and being daily under RPG combat, the bandit groups began to constantly change their locations.

Taking revenge for the resettlement of their relatives, bandit groups set up ambushes and themselves track down our RPGs, inflicting losses on the latter, committing murders of party-Soviet and collective farm activists and civilians who arrived in these areas.

The bandits fight extremely stubbornly.

In accordance with this, in the tactics of combating them, the best results are obtained by ambushes and secrets created by garrisons on the probable routes of movement of the bandits, interacting with the active actions of RPGs.

Based on the experience of fighting banditry in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus and the likelihood of units of your division fighting banditry in the mountains of Crimea,

I SUGGEST

Study these instructions with all the officers of the division and in practical work Avoid making the mistakes listed above.

Teach officers to perfectly read a map of mountainous areas, be able to determine the steepness of slopes and cross-country ability from a map, know how to make calculations for a march and take measures to preserve the strength of fighters.

In the form of lectures (conversations), study the national, cultural and everyday characteristics of the population in the area where the formation operates and their impact on operational military activities.

To familiarize officers with the geographical and climatic features of Crimea.

Conduct classes with unit personnel on the following topics:

a) on tactical training: “Conducting reconnaissance of gangs in mountainous conditions” and “Elimination of a gang group entrenched in dominant, inaccessible heights”;

b) on fire training: “Rules of shooting in the mountains.”

Persistently and routinely train troops to perform surveillance duties.

In each platoon, company, train 3 - 5 soldiers to transmit orders

light signals and flags according to a specially developed signal table and alphabet.

When organizing radio communications, take into account the need to train all officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel of communications units in the ability to organize radio communications in mountainous conditions, focusing on the acquisition of skills by radio operators in choosing a location for deploying a radio station, using the appropriate types of antennas and methods of their installation, methods of transporting the radio station and power supplies .

When organizing communications via a radio network system or individual areas, officers must take into account the peculiarities of selection the best radio waves for work in mountain conditions, especially for low-power radios when working at night.

To overcome steep cliffs and mountain streams, units intended to be deployed in mountainous areas should be equipped with alpine equipment and taught how to use it.

Continuously study the operational situation and, without looking away from the NKVD bodies, promptly receive operational guidance and analyze them at headquarters,

The unit commanders and their staffs must thoroughly analyze each operation carried out by the units and, no later than 10 days from the date of completion of the operation, carry out a detailed analysis with the officers of the unit.

When analyzing, analyze the following questions in detail:

preparation for the operation: study of the operational situation, topographical and ethnographic features of the operation area, planning the operation;

material support for the operation, equipment for delivering ammunition and food to the mountains, measures against possible natural phenomena in the mountains;

organization and conduct of agent and military reconnaissance;

measures to ensure against sudden raids by gangs, ambushes;

organization of communications, identified tactics of bandits;

analysis of the main combat episodes;

shortcomings in the preparation of the operation and shortcomings of each unit in conducting combat operations;

reports.

Chief of Internal Troops of the NKVD North Kazakhstan region, Major General GOLOVKO

Chief of Staff of the Internal Troops of the NKVD North Kazakhstan region, Colonel TABAKOV

RGVA, f. 38650, op. 1, d. 129, part. I - N.

Top secret

"I approve"

Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR

State Security Commissioner 2nd rank

KOBULOV

" " July 1944

INSTRUCTIONS

troops participating in the operation to eliminate banditry in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus

I. Objectives of the operation

1. The task of the Chekist-military operation is to completely eliminate the main personnel bandit groups and their leaders Israilov Hassan, Magomadov Idris and Alkhastov Ibi, who are the core of bandit formations in the North Caucasus.

II. Conditions for the operation

4. Bandits in the fight against troops use the following tactics:

a) careful observation of troops using optics;

b) setting up ambushes in gorges, at turns of paths, at river crossings;

c) when surrounded, the bandits will try to leave the encircled area in small groups and alone along unknown paths, rock terraces, or hide in caves, crevices, forests;

d) conducting fire combat in order to cover the exit from encirclement or gain time until a favorable moment facilitating separation from the troops (the onset of night, fog, rain, etc.).

The bandits in the area of their bases have equipped fire stations, made of stone, with loopholes, and use old towers as fire stations. OTs are occupied in places that allow immediate shelter (near a cliff, near rock crevices, in bushes);

e) tracking down our service squads and attacking them;

f) dressing in a Red Army uniform;

g) high activity in combat with troops, the desire to preempt the opening of fire, accuracy in shooting, reluctance to surrender alive. To achieve success, troops need great endurance and the art of sudden action.

7. Previous operations often ended unsuccessfully for the following reasons:

a) incorrect calculation of forces and means by commanders when making a decision to liquidate a gang: almost always, most of the forces and means were allocated for active operations in strike-fighter units, which created an unnecessary, multiple superiority over the gang, while the area of operation remained unsurrounded...

b) the troops poorly camouflaged their concentration in the area of operation and their battle formations; no maneuvers were carried out to distract the bandits from the true purpose of the troops. As a result, the bandits quickly discovered both the concentration of troops and their battle formations;

c) due to poor study of the area, the troops did not cover all possible routes of movement for the bandits, and they left. Some of the bandits, without engaging in battle with the troops, hid in caves, forests, crevices and were not detected by us;

d) military and human intelligence, both before the start and at the time of the operation, worked unsatisfactorily.

III. Actions of troops by stages of operation

8. Tasks of the first stage

Within the boundaries of the combat areas, completely clear the area of bandits and those who have evaded resettlement, preventing them from infiltrating into their rear areas.

To complete the task, it is necessary to: obtain a “language”, obtain from him information about gang hiding places, their composition, routes of movement in the mountains, find experienced guides, obtain objects for agent combinations.

Using covert maneuvers, moving in small groups and carefully camouflaging them, hide the purpose of the operation and the movement of troops from the bandits,

10. Advancement should be preceded by the deployment of OPs at the command heights ahead and the dispatch of scouts to areas of the terrain that are not visible from the heights.

11. The search for gangs and those who have evaded eviction should be carried out by 10–25 people allocated from RPG units.

In the rear of the RPG, set up NPs and secrets for the required time to detain those trying to break through to the rear,

12. A regiment, battalion, or company must always have a reserve. A regiment is no less than a company, a battalion is up to a platoon, a company is up to a squad. As part of the regimental and battalion reserve, have heavy machine guns, 82-mm mortars, snipers and search dogs.

13. Communication with neighboring units and units, as a rule, should be visual. At night, it is mandatory to display service outfits at junctions.

14. In order to prevent gaps in movement between units and for ease of management, the movement of units should be regulated by predetermined equalization lines. Leveling lines should be established in areas convenient for observation and orientation.

At night, on the leveling lines, set up a network of patrols, secrets, and ambushes to detain those trying to break through to the rear.

15. At halts and overnight stays, it is imperative to have security to protect against a sudden raid by a gang. Deploy squads on the slopes of ridges, at heights that make it possible to control and shoot through dangerous areas.

17. Tasks of the second stage of the operation.

Create a tight encirclement ring around the Khildikhoroevsky and Maistinsky gorges so as not to let a single bandit through.

18. The encirclement ring is made up of a combination of different types of outfit: ambushes, barriers, secrets, observation posts located along the front and in depth, which intercept all exits from the encirclement ring. The location of the units should be continuously improved as a result of studying the area. At night, increase the number of squads using all personnel, with the exception of the reserve.

20. The regimental sector must be divided into battalion, company and platoon combat areas. In each combat area, for actions to detain bandits who have broken through from the encirclement and in other unforeseen cases, have a reserve, which should include a missile launcher, a mortar, an anti-tank gun, a sniper and a search dog.

21. The choice of location for the deployment of service units and their armament are of great importance for the successful solution of tasks. NPs must be hidden, numbering at least 3 people. Place them on the slopes of command heights in places with a large field of visibility towards the enemy’s area and the possibility of visual (signals) communication with the command post. The NL composition should be dispersed within a radius of 15–20 meters. Weapons: rifle, binoculars, grenade, alarm equipment or telephone.

At points with the best view of the area along the encirclement ring, place officer NPs. Use secrets and ambushes to cover the edges of forests and bushes, paths, terraces, and exits from gorges. The location of the secret must allow viewing of the entire overlapped area. The size of the secret and ambush is determined by the terrain. The weapons are mixed: rifles, machine guns and, of course, a sniper.

22. In addition to the network of official outfits, widely use the simplest technical barriers that would make sounds when passing them: throwing dry brushwood, laying stones so that when you touch them they make noise when falling, stretching twine with tin cans hung on it etc. Particularly dangerous areas should be mined by PPM.

24. By the onset of darkness in combat areas, stop all movement of personnel. Everyone must be in their places and, by straining their hearing and vision, detect the movement of the bandits.

25. Objectives of the third stage of the operation

Elimination of bandits and removal of those who evaded eviction in the surrounded area.

27. The RPG battle formation should be given the shape of an arc, extreme points in which - scouts, observers - must move forward, occupy command points that make it possible to view the gorge, identify the location of gangs, and their routes of movement. Dedicate a separate RPG to search in each small gorge. which begins the search from the top of the gorge. The RPG operating along the main gorge searches with a slight step back in relation to the RPG operating along its spurs.

The interaction between individual RPGs and the reserve must be clearly established, otherwise the bandits will run from one gorge to another.

28. The reserve moves along a route from which it can quickly provide assistance to RPGs operating in the main directions.

29. If the operation is not completed during daylight hours, all RPGs must reach the established leveling line by the end of the day. The head of the operation must give instructions at night about ensuring joints, which areas to block with squads in order to prevent bandits from breaking through to the rear. Search for a gang continue the next morning according to a pre-developed plan and additional instructions that will be given by the head of the operation in accordance with new data on the situation.

IV. RPG action in the mountains

31. In the mountains, bandits can hide anywhere, so the search must be carried out not only in the gorges, but also in the entire area adjacent to the gorges, which is included in the encirclement according to the combat order.

32. The search for bandits is carried out by reconnaissance and search groups. Each of them is given a specific strip or area of terrain to search for (a gorge, a ridge of heights, etc.). The dividing lines between RPGs must pass through a clearly visible area, and communication must be visual.

34. The search is carried out by carefully examining possible hiding places: caves, rock crevices, stone piles, bushes, buildings, cellars in houses, etc. - by finding traces and following the trail.

35. Before inspecting local objects, it is necessary to find a secret way to approach them. The forward movement is ensured by a sniper or a fighter with an RP, who observes the possible location of the bandit in readiness to immediately open fire. After inspecting the area at one line, from behind cover, inspect the second line to be inspected and move in the same order. Actions to inspect the area by one must be supported by observation and fire support by the other.

36. Before descending into the gorge, set up observation posts on both edges of the gorge consisting of snipers and fighters with RP in readiness to cover with fire the groups descending into the gorge.

Search in gorges should be carried out both along the bottom and along its slopes, and those searching along the bottom should act with a ledge back in relation to those searching along the slope (ridge). This order best ensures fire interaction between individual RPG fighters.

38. When discovering a cave:

a) establish covert surveillance of the exits and cover them with fire from RP and snipers;

b) move to the cave secretly;

c) before examining the cave, call out and offer to leave, warning that the cave is surrounded. If you do not receive an answer or refuse to go out, throw grenades at the cave, and then carefully inspect it. If there are local guides, send them first into the cave;

d) when inspecting the cave, look for and seize weapons, ammunition, documents and food.

40. Pursue the gang with all your might. The squads and neighboring RPGs show the direction of the gang's departure with rockets or report on the radio.

When pursuing, keep in mind that the gang can leave part of the force, and the rest can be left in the shelter to create a fire bag.

To counter this, guarding the flanks and rear is mandatory. If the terrain allows, pursuit should be carried out by reserve forces.

41. To slow down the departure of the gang through gorges and gorges, make a fire barrage by firing from heavy machine guns and mortars.

43. During an operation in the mountains, there are cases of a gang being discovered earlier than it noticed the troops. This exceptionally advantageous position is used as follows:

a) upon a signal, the entire group is carefully masked;

6) the gang is allowed into the fire bag;

c) when the whole gang is drawn into the bag, open organized fire;

d) shoot the bandits ahead silently;

e) if the gang leaves in the opposite direction, make a covert detour and act with a sudden fire raid.

V. Organization and conduct of military reconnaissance

VI. Actions of units during sudden gang attacks

51. Small units (groups) when moving in the mountains:

a) it is prohibited to ride in groups on the same cart, walk crowded, stop in closed areas, break away from each other over long distances, carry weapons in the “behind” position or leave them on the carts;

b) comply with the following requirements:

keep weapons ready to immediately open fire;

walk from each other at a distance of 3–5 meters;

when traveling with a convoy, go behind the cart or from the side of the cart, closing the latter from the point from which the gang can fire;

distribute responsibilities for monitoring the area among the group personnel (forward, right, left, back);

Before going around the bend of the road (trail) from behind the shelter, inspect the terrain ahead.

52. In the event of a sudden attack on a gang:

quickly find cover and crawl to another point of cover unnoticed by the gang;

strive to rise higher in order to find the place from which the gang is firing, take an advantageous position for shooting and fight to the last bullet;

Having identified the gang, immediately open fire. If you are passive and lose your composure, you will inevitably become a victim of a gang. Do not shoot aimlessly; observe and assist comrades;

bandits, as a rule, approach the corpses of killed soldiers, search them, and mock them.

The survivors should take a vantage point for shooting, carefully disguise themselves and destroy the bandits approaching the corpse.

No one has the right to leave the battlefield while there is an opportunity to defeat the gang

53. If an ambush of bandits is detected in advance along the route of movement, take a more advantageous position, secretly go to the location of the gang and destroy it.

Head of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR

Lieutenant General SHEREDEGA

...July 1944 RGVA, f. 3^650, he. I, d. 129, pp. 71 - 86.

CONVENTIONAL ABBREVIATIONS

RPG - reconnaissance and search group

IS - fighter group

OT - firing point

NP - observation post

RP - light machine gun

PTR - anti-tank rifle

PPM - anti-personnel mine

Publication by V.B. VEPRINTSEV, I.A. MOCHALIN

REMINDER

for the commander of an intelligence agency for conducting reconnaissance in the city

Using optical surveillance equipment, patrolmen begin reconnaissance of a populated area by inspecting it from a distance, from a distance that allows them to determine by characteristic features whether there is an enemy there.

Presence of enemy troops in a populated area can be detected by the increased barking of dogs, the smoke of camp kitchens, the firing of stoves at unusual times, the absence of people in the fields and gardens, especially during field work. Traces of tanks and combat vehicles when entering (exiting), the sounds of engines operating indicate the presence of mechanized units and subunits. The presence of antenna devices on the outskirts or near a populated area, a pole cable communication line or traces of shallowly dug cables, and a landing site for helicopters indicates the location of a command post.

Determine the firing point installed in the foundation of the house, it is possible by the cleared sector for shooting (by the absence of part of the fence or by cut down trees, etc.), the difference in color from the general background, the reinforcement of the walls with additional masonry or sandbags. In winter, the embrasure can be seen by the steam escaping from it. In wooden houses, fire points can be detected by fresh filing of logs when constructing embrasures, strengthening walls, and coating them with compounds that impede fire. Embrasures are usually located closer to the corners of buildings. In buildings prepared for defense or occupied by enemy observers, there are usually no signs of life and it seems that there is no one there, but it is precisely this emptiness that should alert the scouts. When inspecting a populated area, you should pay attention to bushes, trees, individual buildings, deep ditches, ravines on the outskirts, where the enemy can place security units, as well as roofs, attics, windows of tall buildings, factory chimneys, from where he can conduct observation. After inspection From a distance, watchmen, hiding behind trees and bushes, from the side of vegetable gardens and outbuildings and the rear of residential buildings, penetrate into the populated area and inspect the buildings on the outskirts, if there are residents in them, they question them.

In a populated area rural type The sentinels are moving through the vegetable gardens, orchards, and courtyards. You should not move close to buildings or in areas visible from windows and doors; it is advisable to conduct reconnaissance of an urban-type settlement with two pairs of patrolmen. Moving at short intervals in pairs at the same level on opposite sides of the street, they conduct surveillance, covering each other.

When inspecting buildings from the inside, the senior watchman remains outside, ready to assist the watchmen and maintaining visual contact with the commander. When patrolmen inspect the building from the inside, they always leave the front door open. Upon entering a residential building, you first need to interview the owner and not let him go until the inspection is completed. Particular attention should be paid to attics and basements.

In an empty room, on the street and in the yard It is not recommended to touch any things or objects, as they may be mined. In such cases, it is necessary to use a grapple, a long pole or a rope from behind cover. The door is opened by kicking into the lock area, and if it opens outward, then again using a rope or a “cat”. The safest way to enter a building (room) is to use breaks in the walls. If the situation allows for their execution, you can use charges explosive, hand grenades, shots from a grenade launcher or a combat vehicle gun.

Doors and windows in buildings are often mined by the enemy, in addition, they may be under his supervision. Therefore, you need to enter the room carefully, in readiness to open fire, or, against machine gun fire, open the door in the castle area, kick it open, throw a grenade inside and rush inside immediately after the explosion. When booby traps are detected, the command is immediately reported, and the locations of their detection are indicated. The actions of the patrolmen inspecting a populated area must be monitored by the commander. Following the sentinels, he moves a patrol squad into the populated area.

If the scouts operate in combat vehicles, then the patrol squad at high speed passes through the streets (areas) already inspected by the patrols, taking up positions convenient for observation and advantageous for combat, and only then does the settlement pass through the core of the reconnaissance body.

The patrol squad overcomes small settlements in one rush, immediately following the patrols to its opposite outskirts.

In large populated areas the patrol core advances behind the patrol squad(s) as they inspect from block to block. Detected mined buildings and barriers are indicated by signs or inscriptions on the walls. Inscriptions, conventional signs, and road signs made by the enemy are copied and, together with the documents found (captured), are sent to the senior commander. When leaving a populated area, further movement is organized so that local residents cannot determine the true direction of the scouts’ actions.

When conducting reconnaissance in a populated area, reconnaissance units can also perform reconnaissance and combat missions, in particular, act as assault groups. Great importance has personnel trained in the techniques of scout movement in urban environments. Thus, a wall can be overcome only after a preliminary inspection of it. opposite side with a swift throw. Before crossing open areas of terrain (road intersections, streets, spaces between houses), you must make sure that there is no enemy.

Inspect the area advisable because of the cover. In this case, the most common mistake is to unmask oneself with elements of equipment (barrel of a weapon, radio antenna, surveillance equipment, etc.). You should move under the windows of the building, bending down below the edge of the window with maximum speed. Window openings in semi-basement rooms must be jumped over (stepped over). The use of doorways for entry and exit should be avoided whenever possible. If necessary, you should leave the building with a swift rush, bending low, to a pre-designated shelter under the cover of fire from a comrade.

In a populated area scouts can move both along and “through” buildings, using breaks in the walls. Moreover, the latter method of transportation should be given preference. When crossing open areas, smoke and fire cover are widely used, natural shelters, service and improvised means of camouflage are used. Movement is carried out quickly from shelter to shelter along a pre-planned route, and the distance between shelters should not be significant. When moving as part of a group, it is advisable to maintain a distance between scouts of 5–6 m (8–12 steps) to reduce the risk of fire damage. In the building, you should avoid moving along window and door openings; in corridors, move only along the walls.

Success of the assault group's actions will largely depend on properly organized fire engagement of the enemy. The correct choice of firing positions in window and door openings, breaches, attics and roofs is of great importance. When firing from behind a wall, the scout must take a position to the right (left) of it, but not from above. When firing from door and window openings, as well as breaks in walls, it is more advisable to take a firing position in the depths of the room.

Toolkit

Some issues of organization and tactics of actions of illegal armed groups of the Chechen Republic

Introduction

Organization and arming of illegal armed groups in Chechnya

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Grouping is divided into five or six detachments (100 people or more), led by amirs (field commanders).

Squad, as a rule, consists of three groups.

First- a central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in combat mode with the amir and does not have a permanent location.

Approximate weapons and equipment of a gang unit:

Tactics of Chechen extremists during the aggression on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan in August-September 1999

The tactics of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of military operations and terrorist acts.

Preparation for operations and terrorist attacks

The preparation stage for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct preparation of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the operation area included:

Studying the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

Separatists. Some issues of organization and tactics of actions of illegal armed groups of the Chechen Republic Illegal armed groups in Chechnya

Organization of psychological training.

(Khattab’s instructions for the winter-spring period of 2001)

ORDER

I SUGGEST

CONVENTIONAL ABBREVIATIONS

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