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World War II Navy. French Navy in World War II

Beginning of the war, USSR Baltic Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, USSR Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, USSR Northern Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, USSR Pacific Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, post-war combat trawling

The Soviet fleet, before the start of the war with Germany, but already during the Second World War, took part in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, but it was reduced mainly to artillery duels between Soviet ships and Finnish coastal fortifications.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

The sinking of the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine"

Having attacked the USSR in 1941 on June 22 at three o'clock in the morning, air Force Nazi Germany first carried out air raids on the main base of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR Naval Forces in the city of Sevastopol, and an air raid was also carried out on the city of Izmail.

German aviation, in order to block the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, dropped electromagnetic mines on the main fairway of the base and in the Northern Bay area.

Fairway is a navigational passage that is safe for navigation.

A memorable event for history was the order given by Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev at 6 minutes of the same day and the same hour to open fire on opponents who had invaded the airspace of the USSR. This was the first order to repel the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War.

German contact mine in Australian waters during the Second World War

A large number of USSR naval bases were also subjected to Nazi air attacks. Because of this German strategy, the main enemy of the USSR Navy was not the enemy’s naval forces, but the air and land forces.

The fate of the Second World War, as well as the Great Patriotic War that was part of it as an integral part, was decided mainly on land, which is why the plans and actions of the fleet almost completely depended on the interests of the ground forces in the coastal territories. As the war progressed, sailors from the navy were often sent to the ground forces. Many auxiliary and transport vessels were converted into warships, becoming part of the navy.

In other words, the situation in this war required the fleet to be flexible and unconventional.

USSR BALTIC FLEET DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

From Directive No. 21 of the Barbarossa Plan: “In relation to the Soviet Union, the navy performs the following task: protecting its own coastline and preventing enemy naval forces from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. Since once German troops reach Leningrad, the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last base and find itself in a hopeless position, major naval operations should be avoided before then. After the liquidation of the Russian fleet, the task will arise of completely restoring communications across the Baltic Sea, including supplying the northern wing of the army, which will need to be secured (mine sweeping).”

Due to the fact that the enemy managed to mine the waters in the operational zones without interference Soviet fleet, our ships often went to the bottom without even having time to fire a shot at the enemy.

The Baltic people go to the front. Leningrad, October 1, 1941.

On August 28, the main base of the Baltic Fleet at that time, the city of Tallinn, was captured, which led to a blockade of the Baltic Fleet with minefields in Leningrad and Kronstadt. Despite this, the USSR surface fleet in the Baltic Sea still played an important role. The ships, although they were limited in movement, could freely fire at the enemy. During the defense of Leningrad, ships of the Baltic Fleet actively participated in the air defense of the city, firing at enemy aircraft with fire from their large-caliber installations.

Thus, the battleship Marat, which on September 23 was attacked by German bombers, as a result of which it was actually broken into two parts, nevertheless remained in service for a long time and fired at the enemy as a non-self-propelled floating battery.

The submarine fleet in the Baltic Sea operated very successfully: at the cost of large losses, it managed to break through the naval blockade and make a major contribution to the destruction of the enemy’s sea communications.

The Baltic Fleet also assisted the ground forces in January 1943 during the breakthrough and subsequent lifting of the land blockade of Leningrad.

USSR BLACK SEA FLEET DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

As noted above, the high combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet thwarted German attempts to disable its main forces in the very first days of the war.

As the war progressed, Romanian, Bulgarian and German naval forces actively acted against the Black Sea Fleet.

The fleet took part in the defense of Sevastopol and Odessa. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet headed the Sevastopol defensive region. Defensive detachments were formed from Black Sea sailors. The fire of the ship's guns protected from enemy aircraft. The besieged Odessa was supplied by transport ships and warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Despite heroic defense both Sevastopol and Odessa, both cities were taken by the Germans.


Defense of Sevastopol. Painting by A. A. Deineka.

Landing barges on the way to landing on the Kerch Peninsula.

The largest Soviet landing operation in the history of the war on the Kerch Peninsula in 1941-1942 was of great importance. This operation started quite successfully, but in the end the USSR troops were surrounded and defeated.

In 1942-1943, the Black Sea Fleet took part in the battle for the Caucasus. The fleet's submarines from the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti made 600-mile crossings with the aim of disrupting enemy sea communications. Navy ships and marines played great importance in the battle for Novorossiysk.

Throughout the war, the Black Sea Fleet (not counting its flotillas) landed 13 troops. The most famous and completely successful for the USSR in 1943 were the landings in the area of ​​South Ozereyka and Stanichka, the defense of “Malaya Zemlya”, the Novorossiysk and Kerch-Eltigen landing operations, as well as the Konstanz landing.

The Azov flotilla, part of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in the liberation of ports on the Sea of ​​Azov.

Ships and personnel of the Black Sea Fleet took part in the liberation of Crimea in 1944, as well as the cities of Nikolaev and Odessa.

NORTHERN FLEET OF THE USSR DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

During the war, the tasks of the Northern Fleet included covering the coastal flank of the 14th Army from enemy landings and shelling from the sea, protecting its sea routes, as well as striking enemy communications, disrupting its transport operations and depriving it of initiative at sea.

Landing of troops in the Great Western Litsa Bay.

The Northern Fleet also landed troops and reconnaissance troops behind enemy lines. The landings in the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay in 1941 and 1942 played a significant role in the battles for the defense of the Arctic. During the Soviet offensive in 1944, the fleet landed troops in the Malaya Volokova Bay, in the port of Linahamari and in the Varanger Fjord.

It should be noted that the ships of the Northern Fleet took a large-scale part in the anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection of the Arctic convoys of the Allies, which supplied the USSR with assistance under the Lend-Lease program.

The importance of the Northern Fleet in the Great Patriotic War is great: the fleet destroyed over two hundred warships and auxiliary vessels of the enemy, a large number of enemy transports, it also ensured the passage of dozens of allied convoys, the fleet personnel on the land fronts destroyed tens of thousands of enemy personnel.

USSR PACIFIC FLEET DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Since until August 1945 the Soviet Union did not take part in the war with Japan on Pacific Ocean, part of the ships and personnel of the Pacific Fleet free from military operations was transferred through the Northern Sea Route to other fleets and flotillas conducting large-scale military operations.

After the outbreak of hostilities against Japan, during the Manchurian Operation in 1945, aircraft of the Pacific Fleet bombed naval bases, airfields and various other military installations of Japan in North Korea. The Pacific Fleet laid minefields on the approaches to Vladivostok (the main base of the Pacific Fleet) and

Petropalovsk-Kamchatsky, and minefields were also placed in the Tatar Strait. The fleet actively attacked enemy shipping and also assisted the Far Eastern Front troops conducting an offensive along the eastern coast of North Korea.

In August 1945, the Pacific Fleet landed troops that captured the ports of Yuki, Racine and Odetzin on the northeast coast of Korea. An operation was also carried out to seize naval bases. From August 11 to 25, the fleet participated in the Yuzhno-Sakhalin operation, as a result of which all of Sakhalin became part of the USSR. In parallel, from August 18 to 25, the fleet participated in the Kuril landing operation, as a result of which USSR troops occupied 56 islands of the Kuril ridge (they became part of the USSR in 1946). Airborne landings were also carried out in Port Arthur and Dalny, which ended in success for the Soviet troops.


Soviet and American sailors celebrate the surrender of Japan. Alaska, 1945.

The Second World War ended on September 2, 1945 with the surrender of Japan to the Allies, but peace between the USSR and Japan was never signed. The state of war ended only in connection with the signing of the Joint Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan on October 19, 1956

POST-WAR COMBAT TROWING

After the war, a colossal number of mines remained in the seas, rivers and lakes, which greatly threatened the safety of navigation. Because of this, the sailors continued to carry heavy military service engaged in trawling minefields placed during the war. The largest number of mines was concentrated in the Baltic, Barents and Black Seas, as well as in the area of ​​the Novaya Zemlya Straits.

For example, in Gulf of Finland During the war years, the navies of both belligerent sides installed about 67 thousand mine installations of various types.

Large-scale mine sweeping operations were completed only by 1953, when almost complete safety of navigation was ensured in all seas, rivers and lakes. But, nevertheless, some mines remained there to this day. Thus, according to various estimates, about 150 thousand mines were installed in the Baltic Sea. Of these, only about 50 thousand were neutralized and accounted for in the period before 1953. Mine sweeping, although not on the same scale as it was after the war, continues to this day.

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This is an article from the project "History of the Russian Fleet". |

This section provides information on the qualitative and numerical composition of the navies of the states that participated in the hostilities of the Second World War. In addition, data is provided on the fleets of some countries that officially occupied a neutral position, but actually provided assistance to one or another participant in the war. Ships that were unfinished or entered service after the end of the war were not taken into account. Vessels used for military purposes but flying a civilian flag were also not taken into account. Vessels transferred or received from one country to another (including under Lend-Lease agreements) were not taken into account, nor were captured or restored ships taken into account. For a number of reasons, data on lost landing ships and small ships, as well as boats, are given at minimum values ​​and in fact may be significantly higher. The same applies to ultra-small submarines. When describing the tactical technical characteristics data was provided on the time of the last modernization or rearmament.

Characterizing warships as weapons of war at sea, it should be noted that the purpose of such a war was the struggle for sea communications, as a means for the largest, most massive transportation. Depriving the enemy of the opportunity to use the sea for transport, while at the same time making extensive use of it for the same purposes, is the path to victory in the war. To gain and use supremacy at sea, a strong navy alone is not enough; it also requires large commercial and transport fleets, conveniently located bases and government leadership with a maritime mindset. Only the totality of all this ensures sea power.

To fight the navy, you have to concentrate all your forces, and to protect merchant shipping, you have to divide them. The nature of military operations at sea constantly fluctuates between these two poles. It is the nature of military operations that determines the need for certain warships, the specifics of their weapons and tactics of use.

In preparing for war, the leading maritime states applied various military naval doctrines, but none of them turned out to be effective or correct. And already during the war, with the utmost effort, it was necessary not only to adjust them, but to radically change them to suit the planned military actions.

Thus, the British Navy, based on outdated ships of the interwar period, placed its main emphasis on large artillery ships. The German Navy was building a massive submarine fleet. The Royal Italian Navy built fast light cruisers and destroyers, as well as small submarines with low technical specifications. The USSR, trying to replace the Tsarist Navy, quickly built ships of all classes of outdated models, relying on the doctrine of coastal defense. The basis of the US fleet was made up of heavy artillery ships and outdated destroyers. France strengthened its fleet with light artillery ships with limited power reserve. Japan built battleships and aircraft carriers.

Fundamental changes in the structure of fleets also occurred with the massive introduction of radars and sonars, as well as the development of communications. The use of aircraft identification systems, control of artillery and anti-aircraft fire, detection of underwater, surface and air targets, and radio reconnaissance also changed the tactics of fleets. Large naval battles faded into oblivion, and the war with the transport fleet became a priority.

The development of weapons (the emergence of new types of carrier-based aircraft, unguided missiles, new types of torpedoes, mines, bombs, etc.) allowed fleets to conduct independent operational and tactical military operations. The fleet was transformed from an auxiliary force of the ground forces into the main striking force. Aviation became an effective means of both fighting the enemy fleet and protecting one’s own.

Considering the course of the war in conjunction with technological progress, the development of fleets can be characterized as follows. IN initial stage During the war, the ever-increasing German submarine fleet actually blocked the sea communications of Great Britain and its allies. To protect them, a significant number of anti-submarine ships were required, and their equipment with sonar turned submarines from hunters into targets. The need to protect large surface ships, convoys and ensure future offensive operations required the massive construction of aircraft carriers. This characterizes the middle stage of the war. On final stage To conduct massive landing operations in both Europe and the Pacific, there was an urgent need for landing craft and support vessels.

All these problems could be solved only by the United States, whose powerful economy during the war years turned its allies into debtors for many years, and the country into a superstate. It should be noted that deliveries of ships under Lend-Lease agreements took place as part of the rearmament of the United States, i.e. the allies were given outdated ships, with low performance characteristics or without proper equipment. This applied equally to all recipients of assistance, incl. both the USSR and Great Britain.

It is also necessary to mention that both large and small US ships differed from ships of all other countries in the presence of comfortable living conditions for the crews. If in other countries, when building ships, priority was given to the quantity of weapons, ammunition, and fuel reserves, then American naval commanders put the comfort of the crew on a par with the requirements for the combat qualities of the ship.


(without sent/received)

Table continuation

The total number of military fleets of 42 countries (possessing military fleets or at least one ship) that took part in World War II was 16.3 thousand ships, of which, according to incomplete data, at least 2.6 thousand were lost. In addition, The fleet included 55.3 thousand small ships, boats and landing craft, as well as 2.5 thousand submarines, excluding midget submarines.

The five countries with the largest fleets were: USA, Great Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan, which had 90% of warships from total number, 85% submarines and 99% small and landing craft.

Italy and France, with large fleets, as well as smaller ones, Norway and the Netherlands, were unable to effectively manage their ships, sinking some of them and becoming the main suppliers of trophies to the enemy.

It is possible to determine the significance of types of ships in military operations only taking into account the stages of the war. Thus, at the initial stage of the war, submarines played a dominant role, blocking enemy communications. In the middle stage of the war, the main role was played by destroyers and anti-submarine ships, which suppressed enemy submarine fleets. In the final stage of the war, aircraft carriers with support ships and landing ships took first place.

During the war, a merchant fleet with a tonnage of 34.4 million tons was sunk. At the same time, submarines accounted for 64%, aviation - 11%, surface ships - 6%, mines - 5%.

Of the total number of warships sunk in the fleets, approximately 45% were attributed to aviation, 30% to submarines, and 19% to surface ships.

Greek merchant fleet(Greek Ελληνικός Εμπορικός Στόλος ) was a participant in World War II, along with the Greek Navy. The merchant fleet became involved in the war approximately a year before Greece entered the war and continued its participation in the war after the liberation of Greece (October 1944), for another 11 months.

History professor Ilias Iliopoulos notes that the participation of the Greek merchant marine in the war corresponds to the thesis of the American naval theorist, Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan, that a nation's sea power is the sum of its navy and merchant fleet. Iliopoulos notes that in ancient times the “great state of the sea” of Athens (Thucydides) was the sum of the potentials of the Athenian military and merchant fleet and that Athens then had about 600 merchant ships.

Background

According to the most conservative estimate, on the eve of World War II, the Greek merchant fleet was the ninth largest in the world in terms of tonnage and consisted of 577 steamships. Considering the fact that the top ten included the Axis countries - Germany, Italy and Japan - as well as the fleet of occupied France (see Vichy Regime), the importance of the Greek merchant fleet for the anti-fascist coalition was more than significant. Professor I. Iliopoulos writes that the Greek merchant fleet had 541 ships under the Greek flag, with a total capacity of 1,666,859 GRT, and 124 ships under foreign flags, with a capacity of 454,318 GRT. According to Iliopoulos, the Greek merchant fleet was in fourth place in the world, and the Greek dry cargo fleet was in second place.

Researcher Dimitris Galon, based on German sources, writes that in 1938, a year before the outbreak of World War II, the Greek merchant fleet was in third place in the world, after England and Norway, with 638 ships, with a total capacity of 1.9 million GRT. 96% of all ships in the Greek merchant fleet were bulk carriers.

According to Rear Admiral Sotirios Grigoriadis, the Greek merchant fleet before the war had 600 ocean-going steamers and 700 Mediterranean motor ships. 90% of ocean-going ships were bulk carriers. Grigoriadis confirms that the Greek pre-war fleet was ahead of the fleets of Sweden, the Soviet Union, Canada, Denmark and Spain, but notes that the Greek fleet did not exceed 3% of the world fleet, while the then first fleet in the world, the British, in 1939 had 26 .11% of the world fleet tonnage. However, within a few months of the war, the situation at sea for Britain worsened sharply. By mid-1940, the British Navy had only 2 months' worth of fuel. By September 1941, the British merchant fleet had lost 25% of its ships. In this regard, the Greek merchant fleet acquired great importance for the Allies, and especially for Britain.

The War Trade Agreement, signed in January 1940 with the government of then neutral Greece, with the support of Greek shipowners and the Greek sailors' union, essentially transferred one of the world's largest fleets to the British government and excluded the transportation of Axis goods by Greek ships.

Video on the topic

Prelude to World War

As a result, Greek volunteers in Spain belonged mainly to 3 groups: sailors of the Greek merchant fleet - Greeks living in exile - Greeks of the island of Cyprus, which were under British control. Greek merchant seamen made up a significant part of the Greek Company of the Rigas Fereos International Brigades.

In addition to sending volunteers, the main task of the Union of Seafarers of Greece, with its center in Marseille, led by Kamburoglou, who was later shot by the Germans in France, was the uninterrupted supply of the Republicans. Due to the threat of submarines, cargo was more often delivered to the ports of Algeria, from where it was transported by caique to Spain. On the last shoulder, most of the Greek sailors were armed: 191. Many sailors volunteered for the Republican army immediately upon arrival in Spain. Others, such as officers Papazoglou and Homer Serafimidis, joined the Republican navy:210.

A significant contribution of the Greek sailors was their refusal to work on ships carrying cargo for Franco, in contrast to ships carrying cargo from the USSR, despite the fact that the latter were constantly under threat from Italian submarines and German and Italian aircraft:219.

The beginning of World War II and the seamen's union

With the outbreak of the World War, the pro-communist Union of Sailors of Greece (ΝΕΕ, in 1943 was reorganized into the Federation of Greek Seamen's Organizations, ΟΕΝΟ), located in Marseilles, not forgetting the “class struggle”, gave the directive “Keep the ships moving.”

After the surrender of France, the leadership of the Greek sailors' union moved to New York.

Period from the beginning of World War II (September 1, 1939) to the beginning of the Greco-Italian War (October 28, 1940)

During this period, many Greek merchant ships chartered by the Allies were sunk in the Atlantic, mostly by German submarines. Some Greek ships were confiscated in ports under the control of the Axis forces and their allies. The total losses of the Greek merchant fleet in this first period of the war reached 368,621 BRT.

Already in the first month of the war, the commanders of German submarines received the following instructions on September 30, 1939: “... since the Greeks sold or chartered a large number of (merchant) ships to the British, Greek ships should be considered enemy.... When attacking, submarines must remain invisible...” . However, at that time, some German submarine commanders still observed maritime ethics.

Memorial to the German submarine U-35 in Ventry, Ireland

The Greek steamship Ioanna (950 GRT) was stopped on June 1, 1940 by the German submarine U-37, 180 miles from the Spanish port of Vigo. The crew was ordered to abandon the ship, which was then sunk. Captain Vasilios Laskos, himself a former submariner and who died in 1942 while commanding the Greek submarine Katsonis (Υ-1), together with his crew, sailed on boats for 3 days in a stormy sea until he was picked up by fishermen. Laskos and his crew headed to Lisbon, where there was already a colony of 500 Greek merchant seamen whose ships had been sunk by German submarines. All of them were put on the Greek merchant ship Attica and transported to Greece.

A similar case is described in his book by the senior mechanic of the Greek steamship Adamastos, Konstantin Domvros. The steamship was stopped on July 1, 1940 in the North Atlantic by the German submarine U-14. The steamer was sunk. The crew were left in lifeboats 500 miles from land, but were not shot.

Over time, such cases became fewer and fewer and the sinking of Greek merchant ships was accompanied by the death of their crews.

This period is also marked by the participation of Greek merchant ships in the Dunkirk evacuation. One of the Greek losses during the evacuation was the steamer Galaxias (4393 BRT), sunk by German aircraft in the French port of Dieppe at the beginning of the operation. The participation of Greek merchant ships in the Dunkirk evacuation found its way into Churchill's memoirs.

Period from the beginning of the Greco-Italian War (October 28, 1940) to the beginning of the German invasion of Greece (April 6, 1941)

Of the 47 mobilized passenger ships, 3 were converted into floating hospitals (Attica, Hellenis and Socrates). The cargo-passenger Polikos, Andros, Ionia and Moshanti (the last 2 without Red Cross markings) were also used as hospitals.

During this period, losses of the Greek merchant fleet were mainly the result of the activities of the Italian Navy (Regia Marina Italiana). These were cargo ships and motor vessels mobilized by the Greek government and used as transports. The losses also included Greek ships confiscated in Italian ports immediately after the Greek government rejected the Italian ultimatum and the outbreak of war. Total losses during this period, including the continuing losses of the Greek merchant fleet in the Atlantic, reached 135,162 GRT.

Period from the beginning of the German invasion (April 6, 1941) to the complete occupation of Greece (May 31, 1941)

Greek cargo and passenger ship Andros. Used as a floating hospital. Sunk by German aircraft on April 25, 1941.

In October 1940, the Greek army repelled an Italian attack and transferred military operations to Albanian territory. This was the first victory of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition against the Axis forces. The Italian Spring Offensive from 9 to 15 March 1941 in Albania showed that the Italian army could not change the course of events, which made German intervention to save its ally inevitable.

At the request of the Greek government, by the end of March 1941, Great Britain sent 40 thousand of its soldiers to Greece. In doing so, the British occupied a second line of defense along the Aliakmon River, away from the front line in Albania and the potential theater of operations on the Greek-Bulgarian border.

The German invasion, from German-allied Bulgaria, began on April 6, 1941. The Germans were unable to immediately break through the Greek defense line on the Greek-Bulgarian border, but advanced to the Macedonian capital, the city of Thessaloniki, through the territory of Yugoslavia. A group of divisions of Eastern Macedonia was cut off from the main forces of the Greek army fighting against the Italians in Albania. German troops reached the rear of the Greek army in Albania. The road to Athens was open to German divisions.

Along with the losses of the Greek Navy, which lost 25 ships during this period, the losses of the Greek merchant fleet during the month reached 220,581 GRT, which was 18% of its potential. All losses, both of the Greek Navy and the Greek merchant fleet, were the result of the Luftwaffe.

Among other ships, Luftwaffe aircraft sank floating hospitals, despite the signs of the Red Cross and their full illumination at night (Attica April 11, 1941, Esperos April 21, Hellenis April 21, Socrates April 21, Polikos April 25 and "Andros" April 25.

The main target of the German planes was Piraeus (9 sunken ships), other Greek ports, but the entire Aegean Sea (88 sunk ships) was a zone of continuous attacks by German planes on warships and merchant ships.

The losses of the Greek merchant fleet associated with the battle for Crete (17 sunk ships) reached 39,700 BRT.

Big number Greek merchant ships, carrying Greek military units and refugees, as well as British, Australian and New Zealand units, followed the ships of the Greek Navy to Egypt and Palestine.

The period from the beginning of the occupation (31.5.1941) until the end of the Second World War (15.8.1945)

Greek steamer Calypso Vergoti Sunk by a German submarine on June 29, 1941 in the Atlantic.

During this period, the Greek merchant fleet lost most of its potential. Greek merchant ships were sunk by Axis forces at all latitudes and longitudes globe. A large number of Greek ships, confiscated by the Germans and Italians, were sunk by the Allies. The losses of this period also included Greek ships confiscated by the Japanese in the ports of Japan and China. Total losses of the Greek merchant fleet during this period amounted to 535,280 GRT.

Among the many heroic acts of Greek merchant seamen of this period, two were recorded in support of British forces in North Africa.

On February 2, 1943, the Greek merchant ship Nikolaos G. Koulukoundis (captain G. Panorgios), despite the shelling of Italian and German planes and ships, managed to deliver a cargo of gasoline to Libya for the 8th British Army. British Prime Minister Churchill visited the ship on February 4 to personally express his gratitude to the crew.

A similar act by the Greek ship "Elpis" (captain N. Kouvalias) received official gratitude from the King of England.

During this period, Greek merchant ships took part in convoys to England and Murmansk, which is reflected in Churchill's memoirs.

Along with the Greek corvettes "Thombasis" and "Kryesis", ships of the Greek merchant fleet were also included in the allied landing in Normandy. Steamships "Agios Spyridon" (captain G. Samothrakis) and "Georgios P." (Captain D. Parisis) were sunk by crews in shallow water to create a breakwater. The steamships "America" ​​(Captain S. Theofilatos) and "Ellas" (Captain G. Trilivas) continued to deliver troops and cargo to the Normandy coast.

It should be noted that the crews on the ships to be sunk were recruited from volunteers, after an appeal to two secretaries of the Greek seamen's union, one of whom was the communist Antonis Abatielos.

One of the losses of the last years of the war was the steamer Pilevs (4965 BRT), torpedoed by the German submarine U-852 on March 13, 1944 off the coast West Africa. For the murder after torpedoing Greek sailors, the crew of U-852, after the war, was put on trial.

By the end of the war, the number of Greek merchant ships sunk by German submarines reached 124.

Losses

In total, during the war years the Greek merchant fleet lost 486 ships, with a total capacity of 1,400,000 GRT, which accounted for 72% of its potential. About half of these losses occurred in the first 2 years of the war. By comparison, the British fleet lost 63% of its potential. Against the backdrop of total allied losses reaching 4834 ships and a total of 19,700,000 GRT, Greek losses look especially high. Of the 19,000 Greek merchant seamen who served on merchant ships during the war, 4,000 sailors died, mostly as a result of their ships being torpedoed. 2,500 sailors were left disabled. 200 sailors who survived the sinking of their ships or captivity suffered serious or irreparable damage to their mental health.

Greek merchant fleet after the war

Museum ship Hellas Liberty in June 2010

Even during the war (1944) and at the request of the emigration Greek government, the US government provided 15 Liberty-class ships to the Greek shipowners M. Kulukoundis K. Lemos and N. Rethymnis.

In recognition of the enormous contribution of the Greek merchant fleet to the Allied victory and the losses it suffered, at the end of the war, the US government provided Greek shipowners who had lost their ships in the Atlantic with 100 Liberty ships on preferential terms. Each of the 100 ships was offered for $650,000, with 25% down payment and a 17-year loan with interest, guaranteed by the Greek government. In subsequent years, but on current commercial terms, Greek shipowners purchased another 700 Liberty ships.

If, according to the original idea, the Liberty were built as “ships for five years” and their massive breakdown occurred in the 1960s, then the Greek shipowners operated these ships for another two decades. The last Liberty owned by Greek shipowners was decommissioned in 1985. To a certain extent, the Liberty served as the starting point for the post-war rise of the Greek merchant fleet (under Greek and other flags), firmly “holding its leading position in the world merchant fleet” to this day.

In recognition of Liberty's contribution to the rise of the Greek merchant fleet, in 2009, one of the last Liberty ships in the world was converted into a museum ship, Hellas Liberty, and placed in permanent berth in the Greek port of Piraeus.

Greek Seamen's Union after the war

With the defeat of the Democratic Army, many merchant seamen found themselves in exile in countries of Eastern Europe and in the USSR. Antonis Abatielos, one of the two union secretaries noted in historiography at the Normandy landings, was sentenced to death in 1947 for organizing a wartime strike. The execution was overturned, thanks to Abatielos's prominence in the world trade union movement and the efforts of his wife, the Englishwoman Lady Betty Abatielou. Abatielos was released only 16 years later, in 1963.

One of the most famous merchant navy officers, Dimitris Tatakis, was martyred in January 1949 in a concentration camp on the island of Makronisos.

Veterans of the Greek merchant fleet note that the “first fleet in the world” owes its rise not only and not so much to Greek shipowners, but to the work and sacrifices of Greek sailors, both during the war and in the post-war years.

Maintaining truly powerful naval forces is a burdensome task for any economy in the world. Few countries could afford the Navy, which consumed enormous material resources. Military fleets became more of a political instrument than an effective force, and having powerful battleships was considered prestigious. But only 13 states in the world actually allowed this. Dreadnoughts were owned by: England, Germany, USA, Japan, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Turkey (the Turks captured and repaired one abandoned by the Germans in 1918 "Goeben").

After the First World War, Holland, Portugal and even Poland (with its 40-kilometer coastline) and China expressed a desire to have their own battleships, but these dreams remained on paper. Only the rich and industrialized could build a battleship on their own. the developed countries, including Tsarist Russia.

The First World War was the last in which large-scale naval battles took place between the warring parties, the largest of which was the Naval Battle of Jutland between the British and German fleets. With the development of aviation, large ships became vulnerable in the future impact force transferred to an aircraft carrier. Nevertheless, battleships continued to be built, and only the Second World War showed the futility of this direction in military shipbuilding.

After the end of the First World War, the hulls of giant ships froze on the stocks of the victorious countries. According to the project, for example, French "Lyon" was supposed to have sixteen 340 mm guns. The Japanese laid down ships, next to which the English battlecruiser "Hood" would look like a teenager. The Italians completed the construction of four super battleships of the type "Francesco Coracciolo"(34,500 tons, 28 knots, eight 381 mm guns).

But the British went the furthest - their 1921 battlecruiser project envisaged the creation of monsters with a displacement of 48,000 tons, a speed of 32 knots and 406 mm guns. The four cruisers were supported by four battleships armed with 457 mm guns.

However, the war-weary economies of states did not require a new arms race, but a pause. Then diplomats got down to business.

The United States decided to fix the ratio of naval forces at the achieved level and forced other Entente countries to agree to this (Japan had to be “persuaded” very harshly). On November 12, 1921, a conference was held in Washington. On February 6, 1922, after fierce disputes, it was signed "Treaty of the Five Powers", which established the following world realities:

no new buildings for 10 years, except two battleships for England;

the ratio of fleet forces between the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy should be 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75;

after a ten-year pause, no battleship can be replaced by a new one if it is younger than 20 years;

the maximum displacement should be: for a battleship - 35,000 tons, for an aircraft carrier - 32,000 tons and for a cruiser - 10,000 tons;

The maximum caliber of guns must be: for battleships- 406 mm, for a cruiser - 203 mm.

The British fleet was reduced by 20 dreadnoughts. Regarding this treaty, a famous historian Chris Marshall wrote: “How the former British Prime Minister A. Belfour could sign such an agreement is absolutely beyond my understanding!”

Washington Conference determined the course of the history of military shipbuilding for a quarter of a century and had the most disastrous consequences for it.

First of all, the ten-year pause in construction, and especially the limitation of displacement, stopped the normal evolution of large ships. Within the contractual framework, it was unrealistic to create a balanced project for a cruiser or dreadnought. They sacrificed speed and created well-protected but slow-moving ships. They sacrificed protection - they went down into the water "cardboard" cruisers. The creation of the ship is the result of the efforts of the entire heavy industry, therefore the artificial limitation on the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the fleet led to a severe crisis.

In the mid-1930s, when the proximity became obvious new war, the Washington agreements were denounced (dissolved). A new stage in the construction of heavy ships has begun. Alas, the shipbuilding system was broken. Fifteen years of lack of practice dried up the creative thought of the designers. As a result, ships were initially created with serious defects. By the beginning of World War II, the fleets of all powers were morally obsolete, and most of the ships were physically obsolete. Numerous modernizations of the courts have not changed the situation.

During the entire Washington pause, only two battleships were built - English "Nelson" And "Rodney"(35,000 t, length - 216.4 m, width - 32.3 m, 23 knots; armor: belt - 356 mm, towers - 406 mm, wheelhouse - 330 mm, deck - 76-160 mm, nine 406 mm, twelve 152 mm and six 120 mm guns). Under the Washington Treaty, Britain managed to negotiate some advantage for itself: it retained the opportunity to build two new ships. The designers had to rack their brains about how to fit maximum combat capabilities into a ship with a displacement of 35,000 tons.

First of all, they abandoned high speed. But limiting the weight of the engine alone was not enough, so the British decided to radically change the layout, placing all the main caliber artillery in the bow. This arrangement made it possible to significantly reduce the length of the armored citadel, but it turned out to be very powerful. In addition, 356-mm plates were placed at a 22-degree angle inside the hull and were moved under the outer skin. The tilt sharply increased the resistance of the armor at high angles of impact of the projectile, which occurs when firing from a long distance. The outer casing tore the Makarov tip off the projectile. The citadel was covered with a thick armored deck. 229 mm traverses were installed from the bow and stern. But outside the citadel, the battleship remained practically unprotected - a classic example of the “all or nothing” system.

"Nelson"could not fire the main caliber directly at the stern, but the unfired sector was limited to 30 degrees. The bow corners were almost not covered by anti-mine artillery, because all six two-gun turrets with 152-mm cannons occupied the rear end. The mechanical installation moved closer to the stern. All control of the ship was concentrated in a high tower-like superstructure - another innovation. Latest classic dreadnoughts "Nelson" And "Rodney" laid down in 1922, launched in 1925, and commissioned in 1927.

Shipbuilding before World War II

Washington Treaty limited the construction of new battleships, but could not stop progress in shipbuilding.

First World War forced experts to reconsider their views on the conduct of naval operations and the further technical equipment of warships. Military shipbuilding had to, on the one hand, use all production achievements modern industry, and on the other hand, by putting forward their demands, encouraging industry to work on improving materials, structures, mechanisms and weapons.

Armor

Regarding the production of armor cemented plates of large thickness in post-war period few improvements were made, since their quality almost reached its limit at the beginning of the 20th century. However, it was still possible to improve the deck armor by using special tough steels. This innovation was especially important due to the increase in combat distance and the emergence of a new threat - aviation. Deck armor in 1914 weighed about 2 thousand tons, and on new battleships its weight was increased to 8-9 thousand tons. This is due to a significant increase in horizontal protection. There were two armored decks: the main one - along the upper edge of the armor belt, and below it - anti-fragmentation. Sometimes a third thin deck was placed above the main one - the platoon deck, for tearing off the armor-piercing tip from the shells. A new type of armor was introduced - bulletproof (5-20 mm), which was used for local protection of personnel from shrapnel and machine-gun fire from aircraft. In military shipbuilding, high-carbon steels and electric welding were introduced to build hulls, which made it possible to significantly reduce weight.

The quality of the armor remained almost equivalent to that of the First World War, but the caliber of artillery on the new ships increased. There was a simple rule for side armor: its thickness should be greater than or approximately equal to the caliber of the guns fired at it. We had to increase the protection again, but it was no longer possible to greatly thicken the armor. The total weight of armor on old battleships was no more than 10 thousand tons, and on the newest ones - about 20 thousand! Then they began to make the armor belt inclined.

Artillery

During the First World War, as in the pre-war years, artillery developed rapidly. In 1910, ships of the type were launched in England "Orion", armed with ten 343 mm cannons. This gun weighed 77.35 tons and fired a 635-kg projectile at a distance of 21.7 kilometers. The sailors realized that "Orion" just the beginning in increasing the caliber, and the industry began to work in this direction.

In 1912, the United States switched to a 356-mm caliber, while Japan installed 14-inch guns on its battleships ( "Congo") and even Chile ( "Admiral Cochrane"). The gun weighed 85.5 tons and fired a 720 kg projectile. In response, the British laid down five battleships of the type in 1913. "Queen Elizabeth", armed with eight 15-inch (381 mm) guns. These ships, unique in their characteristics, were deservedly considered the most formidable participants in the First World War. Their main caliber gun weighed 101.6 tons and sent an 879-kg projectile at a speed of 760 m/s to a distance of 22.5 kilometers.

The Germans, who realized it later than other states, managed to build battleships at the very end of the war Bayer And "Baden", armed with 380 mm guns. The German ships were almost identical to the British, but by this time the Americans had installed eight 16-inch (406 mm) guns on their new battleships. Japan will soon switch to a similar caliber. The gun weighed 118 tons and shot 1015-kg projectile

But the last word still remained with the Lady of the Seas - the large light cruiser Furies, laid down in 1915, was intended to install two 457 mm guns True, in 1917, without ever entering service, the cruiser was converted into an aircraft carrier. The forward single-gun turret was replaced by a 49-meter-long take-off deck. The gun weighed 150 tons and could send a 1,507-kg projectile 27.4 kilometers every 2 minutes. But even this monster was not destined to become the largest weapon in the entire history of the fleet.

In 1940, the Japanese built their super battleship "Yamato" armed with nine 460-mm cannons mounted in three huge towers. The gun weighed 158 tons, had a length of 23.7 meters and fired a projectile weighing between 1330 before 1630 kilograms (depending on type). At an elevation angle of 45 degrees, these 193-centimeter products flew to 42 kilometers, rate of fire - 1 shot per 1.5 minutes.

Around the same time, the Americans managed to create a very successful cannon for their latest battleships. Their 406 mm gun with barrel length 52 caliber produced 1155-kg projectile with speed 900 km/h. When the gun was used as a coastal gun, that is, the limitation of the elevation angle, inevitable in the turret, disappeared, the firing range reached 50,5 kilometer

Guns of similar power were designed in Soviet Union for planned battleships. On July 15, 1938, the first giant (65,000 tons) was laid down in Leningrad; its 406-mm cannon could throw thousand-kilogram shells over 45 kilometers. When in the fall of 1941 German troops approached Leningrad, they were one of the first from a distance of 45.6 kilometers to be met by shells from an experimental gun - a prototype of the main caliber guns of a never-built battleship, installed at the Naval Research Artillery Range.

Ship turrets are also being significantly improved. Firstly, their design made it possible to give the guns large elevation angles, which became necessary to increase the firing range. Secondly, the loading mechanisms of the guns were thoroughly improved, which made it possible to increase the rate of fire to 2-2.5 rounds per minute. Thirdly, the aiming system is being improved. In order to correctly aim a gun at a moving target, you must be able to smoothly rotate turrets weighing more than a thousand tons, and at the same time this must be done quite quickly. Before World War II, the highest rotation speed was increased to 5 degrees per second. Anti-mine weapons are also being improved. Their caliber remains the same - Ш5 - 152 mm, but instead of deck installations or casemates they are placed in towers, this leads to an increase in the combat rate of fire to 7-8 rounds per minute.

Battleships began to be armed not only with main-caliber guns and anti-mine (it would be more correct to say anti-destroying) artillery, but also with anti-aircraft guns. As the combat qualities of aviation grew, anti-aircraft artillery strengthened and multiplied. By the end of World War II, the number of barrels reached 130-150. Anti-aircraft artillery was adopted in two types. Firstly, these are universal caliber guns (100-130 mm), that is, capable of firing at both air and sea targets. There were 12-20 of these guns. They could reach the plane at an altitude of 12 kilometers. Secondly, small-caliber automatic anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of 40 to 20 millimeters were used to fire at aircraft quickly maneuvering at low altitude. These systems were usually installed in multi-barrel circular installations.

Mine protection

The designers also paid great attention to the protection of battleships from torpedo weapons. With the explosion of several hundred kilograms of powerful explosives filling the warhead of a torpedo, gases with colossal pressure are formed. But water does not compress, so the ship's hull gets instant blow, like a hammer made of gases and water. This blow is delivered from below, under water, and is dangerous because a huge amount of water immediately rushes into the hole. By the beginning of the First World War, it was believed that such a wound was fatal.

The idea of ​​an underwater defense device originated in the Russian Navy. At the beginning of the 20th century, a young engineer R. R. Svirsky came to the idea of ​​a peculiar "underwater armor" in the form of intermediate chambers separating the explosion site from the vital parts of the ship and weakening the force of the impact on the bulkheads. However, the project was lost in bureaucratic offices for some time. Subsequently, this type of underwater protection appeared on battleships.

Four onboard protection systems against torpedo explosions were developed. The outer skin had to be thin so as not to produce massive fragments; behind it there was an expansion chamber - an empty space that allowed explosive gases to expand and reduce pressure, then an absorption chamber that received the remaining energy of the gases. A light bulkhead was placed behind the absorption chamber, forming a filtration compartment, in case the previous bulkhead allowed water to pass through.

In the German on-board protection system, the absorption chamber consisted of two longitudinal bulkheads, with the inner one being 50 mm armored. The space between them was filled with coal. The English system consisted of installing boules (convex hemispherical pieces made of thin metal on the sides), the outer part of which formed an expansion chamber, then there was a space filled with cellulose, then two bulkheads - 37 mm and 19 mm, forming a space filled with oil, and filtration compartment. The American system was distinguished by the fact that five watertight bulkheads were placed behind the thin skin. The Italian system was based on the fact that a cylindrical pipe made of thin steel ran along the body. The space inside the pipe was filled with oil. They began to make the bottom of ships triple.

Of course, all battleships had fire control systems that made it possible to automatically calculate gun aiming angles depending on the range to the target, the speed of their ship and the enemy ship, and communications that made it possible to transmit messages from anywhere in the ocean, as well as to find the direction of enemy ships.

In addition to the surface fleet, the submarine fleet also developed rapidly. Submarines were much cheaper, quickly built and inflicted serious damage on the enemy. The most impressive successes in World War II were achieved by German submariners who sank during the war years 5861 merchant ship (counted with a displacement of over 100 tons) total tonnage 13,233,672 tons. In addition, they were sunk 156 warships, including 10 battleships.

To the beginning of World War II England, Japan And USA had in their arsenal aircraft carriers. One aircraft carrier had and France. Built her own aircraft carrier and Germany, however, despite a high degree of readiness, the project was frozen and some historians believe that the Luftwaffe chief had a hand in this Hermann Goering who did not want to receive carrier-based aircraft beyond his control.

  1. Friends, I propose this topic. We update with photos and interesting information.
    The theme of the Navy is close to me. I studied for 4 years as a schoolboy at the KYUMRP (Club of Young Sailors, Rivermen and Polar Explorers). Fate didn’t connect me with the navy, but I remember those years. And my father-in-law turned out to be a submariner quite by accident. I’ll start, and you help.

    On March 9, 1906, a decree “On the classification of military vessels of the Russian Imperial Navy” was issued. It was this decree that created the submarine forces of the Baltic Sea with the first formation of submarines based in the naval base of Libau (Latvia).

    Emperor Nicholas II “deigned to command the highest” to include “messenger ships” and “submarines” in the classification. The text of the decree listed 20 names of submarines built by that time.

    By order of the Russian Maritime Department, submarines were declared an independent class of naval ships. They were called "hidden ships."

    In the domestic submarine shipbuilding industry, non-nuclear and nuclear submarines are conventionally divided into four generations:

    First generation submarines were an absolute breakthrough for their time. However, they retained the traditional diesel-electric fleet solutions for electrical power supply and general ship systems. It was on these projects that hydrodynamics was worked out.

    Second generation endowed with new types of nuclear reactors and radio-electronic equipment. Another characteristic feature was the optimization of the hull shape for underwater travel, which led to an increase in standard underwater speeds to 25-30 knots (two projects even exceeded 40 knots).

    Third generation has become more advanced in terms of both speed and stealth. The submarines were distinguished by their larger displacement, more advanced weapons and better habitability. For the first time, electronic warfare equipment was installed on them.

    Fourth generation significantly increased the strike capabilities of submarines and increased their stealth. In addition, electronic weapons systems are being introduced that will allow our submarines to detect the enemy earlier.

    Now design bureaus are developing fifth generations submarine

    Using the example of various “record-breaking” projects marked with the epithet “the most”, we can trace the features of the main stages of development submarine fleet Russia.

    MOST COMBATIVE:
    Heroic "Pikes" from the Great Patriotic War

  2. Messages merged March 21, 2017, time of first edit March 21, 2017

  3. The nuclear submarine missile cruiser K-410 "Smolensk" is the fifth ship of Project 949A, code "Antey", (according to NATO classification - Oscar-II) in a series of Soviet and Russian nuclear submarine missile cruisers (APRC), armed with P-700 Granit cruise missiles and designed to destroy aircraft carrier strike formations. The project is a modification of 949 “Granite”.
    In 1982-1996, 11 ships out of 18 planned were built, one boat K-141 Kursk was lost, the construction of two (K-139 and K-135) was mothballed, the rest were cancelled.
    The cruising submarine "Smolensk" under the name K-410 was laid down on December 9, 1986 at the Sevmashpredpriyatie plant in the city of Severodvinsk under serial number 637. Launched on January 20, 1990. On December 22, 1990 it went into operation. On March 14, 1991 it became part of the Northern Fleet. Has tail number 816 (1999). Home port Zaozersk, Russia.
    Main characteristics: Surface displacement 14,700 tons, underwater 23,860 tons. The maximum length according to the water line is 154 meters, the greatest width of the hull is 18.2 meters, the average draft according to the water line is 9.2 meters. Surface speed 15 knots, underwater 32 knots. Working diving depth is 520 meters, maximum diving depth is 600 meters. Sailing autonomy is 120 days. Crew 130 people.

    Power plant: 2 OK-650V nuclear reactors with a capacity of 190 MW each.

    Weapons:

    Torpedo and mine armament: 2x650 mm and 4x533 mm TA, 24 torpedoes.

    Missile armament: P-700 Granit anti-ship missile system, 24 ZM-45 missiles.

    In December 1992, she received the Navy Civil Code prize for missile firing with long-range cruise missiles.

    On April 6, 1993, it was renamed “Smolensk” in connection with the establishment of patronage over the submarine by the administration of Smolensk.

    In 1993, 1994, 1998 he won the Navy Civil Code prize for missile firing at a sea target.

    In 1995, he performed autonomous combat service to the shores of Cuba. During the autonomy, in the Sargasso Sea area, a main power plant accident occurred; the consequences were eliminated by the crew without loss of secrecy and using safety measures within two days. All assigned combat service tasks were completed successfully.

    In 1996 - autonomous combat service.

    In June 1999, he took part in the Zapad-99 exercises.

    In September 2011, he arrived at JSC CS Zvezdochka to restore technical readiness.

    In August 2012, the slipway stage of repairs was completed at the APRK: on August 5, 2012, a docking operation was carried out to launch the ship. The final stage of work was carried out afloat at the finishing quay.

    On September 2, 2013, at the Zvezdochka dock, during pressure testing of the boat’s main ballast tank, the pressure cap of the seacock was torn off. No harm done. On December 23, after the repairs were completed, the APRK went to sea to carry out the factory sea trials program. During the repairs on the cruiser, the technical readiness of all ship systems was restored, including the mechanical part, electronic weapons, hull structures and the main power plant. The submarine's reactors were recharged and the weapons system was repaired. The service life of the submarine missile carrier has been extended by 3.5 years, after which it is planned to begin work on a deep modernization of the ship. According to a message dated December 30, he returned to his main base point Zaozersk (Murmansk region), having made the transition to his home base from the city of Severodvinsk ( Arhangelsk region), where it underwent repairs and modernization at the Zvezdochka defense shipyard.

    In June 2014, in the White Sea, APRC, together with rescuers from the Ministry of Emergency Situations, took part in the rescue of the Barents boat. In September, the cruiser participated in tactical exercises of heterogeneous forces of the Northern Fleet.

    The Nation's Favorite

    The Third Reich knew how to create idols. One of these poster idols created by propaganda was, of course, the hero-submariner Gunther Prien. He had an ideal biography of a guy from the people who made a career thanks to new government. At the age of 15, he hired himself as a cabin boy on a merchant ship. He achieved the captain's diploma solely thanks to his hard work and natural intelligence. During the Great Depression, Prien found himself unemployed. After the Nazis came to power, the young man voluntarily joined the resurgent Navy as an ordinary sailor and quite quickly managed to prove himself with best side. Then there were studies at a privileged school for submariners and the war in Spain, in which Prin participated as a submarine captain. In the first months of World War II, he immediately managed to achieve good results, sinking several British and French ships in the Bay of Biscay, for which he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd class from the commander of the naval forces, Admiral Erich Raeder. And then there was a fantastically daring attack on the largest English battleship, Royal Oak, at the main British naval base at Scapa Flow.

    For the accomplished feat, the Fuhrer awarded the entire crew of U-47 the Iron Cross, 2nd degree, and the commander himself was honored to receive the Knight's Cross from Hitler's hands. However, according to the recollections of people who knew him at that time, fame did not spoil Prin. In his interactions with his subordinates and acquaintances, he remained the same caring commander and charming guy. A little more more than a year the underwater ace continued to create his own legend: cheerful reports about the exploits of U-47 appeared almost weekly in film releases of Dr. Goebbels’ favorite brainchild “Die Deutsche Wochenchau”. Ordinary Germans really had something to admire: in June 1940, German boats sank 140 ships from Allied convoys in the Atlantic with a total displacement of 585,496 tons, of which about 10% were Prien and his crew! And then suddenly everything became quiet at once, as if there was no hero. For quite a long time, official sources reported nothing at all about Germany’s most famous submariner, but it was impossible to hush up the truth: on May 23, 1941, the Navy command officially acknowledged the loss of U-47. She was sunk on March 7, 1941, on the approach to Iceland by the British destroyer Wolverine. The submarine, waiting for the convoy, surfaced next to the guard destroyer and was immediately attacked by it. Having received minor damage, U-47 lay down on the ground, hoping to lie down and leave unnoticed, but due to damage to the propeller, the boat, trying to swim, created a terrible noise, upon hearing which the Wolverine hydroacoustics initiated a second attack, as a result of which the submarine was finally sunk, bombarded with depth charges . However, the most incredible rumors about Prin and his sailors continued to spread in the Reich for a long time. In particular, they said that he did not die at all, but that he had started a riot on his boat, for which he ended up either in a penal battalion on Eastern front, or to a concentration camp.

    First blood

    The first casualty of a submarine in World War II is considered to be the British passenger liner Athenia, which was torpedoed on September 3, 1939, 200 miles from the Hebrides. As a result of the U-30 attack, 128 crew members and passengers of the liner, including many children, were killed. And yet, for the sake of objectivity, it is worth admitting that this barbaric episode was not very typical for the first months of the war. At the initial stage, many German submarine commanders tried to comply with the terms of the 1936 London Protocol on the rules of submarine warfare: first, on the surface, stop a merchant ship and put an inspection team on board for a search. If, according to the terms of the prize law (a set of international legal norms regulating the seizure by warring countries of merchant ships and cargo at sea), the sinking of a ship was allowed due to its obvious belonging to the enemy fleet, then the submarine crew waited until the sailors from the transport transferred to lifeboats and retreated to a safe distance from the doomed ship.

    However, very soon the warring parties stopped playing gentlemanly: submarine commanders began to report that single ships they encountered were actively using artillery guns installed on their decks or immediately broadcast a special signal about the detection of a submarine - SSS. And the Germans themselves were less and less eager to engage in politeness with the enemy, trying to quickly end the war that had begun favorably for them.
    Great success was achieved on September 17, 1939 by the boat U-29 (Captain Shuchard), which attacked the aircraft carrier Coreys with a three-torpedo salvo. For the English Admiralty, the loss of a ship of this class and 500 crew members was a big blow. So the debut of German submarines as a whole turned out to be very impressive, but it could have become even more painful for the enemy if not for the constant failures in the use of torpedoes with magnetic fuses. By the way, technical problems At the initial stage of the war, almost all its participants experienced it.

    Breakthrough at Scapa Flow

    If the loss of an aircraft carrier in the first month of the war was a very sensitive blow for the British, then the event that occurred on the night of October 13-14, 1939 was already a knockdown. The planning of the operation was personally led by Admiral Karl Doenitz. At first glance, the Royal Navy anchorage at Scapa Flow seemed completely inaccessible, at least from the sea. There were strong and treacherous currents here. And the approaches to the base were guarded around the clock by patrolmen, covered with special anti-submarine nets, boom barriers, and sunken ships. Nevertheless, thanks to detailed aerial photographs of the area and data received from other submarines, the Germans still managed to find one loophole.

    The responsible mission was entrusted to the U-47 boat and its successful commander Gunther Prien. On the night of October 14, this boat, having passed a narrow strait, sneaked through a boom that was accidentally left open and thus ended up in the main roadstead of the enemy base. Prien made two surface torpedo attacks on two English ships at anchor. The battleship Royal Oak, a modernized 27,500-ton World War I veteran, suffered a massive explosion and sank with 833 crew, also killing Admiral Blangrove on board. The British were taken by surprise, they decided that the base was being attacked by German bombers, and opened fire in the air, so that U-47 safely escaped retaliation. Returning to Germany, Prien was greeted as a hero and awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. His personal emblem "Bull of Scapa Flow" after his death became the emblem of the 7th Flotilla.

    Loyal Leo

    The successes achieved during World War II owe much to the German submarine fleet to Karl Doenitz. Himself a former submarine commander, he perfectly understood the needs of his subordinates. The admiral personally met everyone returning from military campaign boat, organized special sanatoriums for crews exhausted from months at sea, and attended the graduations of the submariner school. The sailors called their commander “Papa Karl” or “Lion” behind his back. In fact, Doenitz was the engine behind the revival of the Third Reich's submarine fleet. Shortly after the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement, which lifted the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, he was appointed by Hitler as “Führer of U-boats” and led the 1st U-boat Flotilla. In his new position, he had to face active opposition from supporters of large ships from the Navy leadership. However, the talent of a brilliant administrator and political strategist always allowed the submariner chief to lobby the interests of his department in the highest public spheres. Dönitz was one of the few convinced National Socialists among senior naval officers. The admiral used every opportunity presented to him to publicly praise the Fuhrer.

    Once, speaking to Berliners, he became so carried away that he began to assure his listeners that Hitler foresaw a great future for Germany and therefore could not be wrong:

    “We are worms compared to him!”

    In the first war years, when the actions of his submariners were extremely successful, Doenitz enjoyed Hitler's complete confidence. And soon it came finest hour. This takeoff was preceded by very tragic German fleet events. By the middle of the war, the pride of the German fleet - heavy ships of the Tirpitz and Scharnhost type - were actually neutralized by the enemy. The situation required a radical change in the guidelines in the war at sea: the “battleship party” was to be replaced by a new team professing the philosophy of large-scale underwater warfare. Following the resignation of Erich Raeder on January 30, 1943, Dönitz was appointed his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy with the rank of Grand Admiral. And two months later, German submariners achieved record results by sending 120 Allied ships with a total tonnage of 623,000 tons to the bottom during March, for which their chief was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. However, the period of great victories was coming to an end.

    Already in May 1943, Doenitz was forced to withdraw his boats from the Atlantic, fearing that he would soon have nothing to command. (By the end of this month, the Grand Admiral could draw terrible results for himself: 41 boats and more than 1,000 submariners were lost, among whom was Doenitz’s youngest son, Peter.) This decision infuriated Hitler, and he demanded that Doenitz cancel the order , while declaring: “There can be no question of ending the participation of submarines in the war. The Atlantic is my first line of defense in the west." By the fall of 1943, for every Allied ship sunk, the Germans had to pay with one of their own boats. IN recent months During the war, the admiral was forced to send his people to almost certain death. And yet he remained faithful to his Fuhrer to the very end. Before committing suicide, Hitler appointed Doenitz as his successor. May 23, 1945 new chapter The state was captured by the Allies. At the Nuremberg trials, the organizer of the German submarine fleet managed to avoid responsibility on charges of giving orders, according to which his subordinates shot sailors who escaped from torpedoed ships. The admiral received his ten-year sentence for carrying out Hitler’s order, according to which captured crews of English torpedo boats were handed over to the SS for execution. After his release from West Berlin Spandau prison in October 1956, Doenitz began writing his memoirs. The admiral died in December 1980 at the age of 90. According to the testimony of people who knew him closely, he always kept with him a folder with letters from officers of the Allied navies, in which former opponents expressed their respect for him.

    Drown everyone!

    “It is prohibited to make any attempts to rescue the crews of sunken ships and vessels, transfer them to lifeboats, return overturned boats to their normal position, or supply the victims with provisions and water. Rescue contradicts the very first rule of warfare at sea, which requires the destruction of enemy ships and their crews,” the commanders of German submarines received this order from Doenitz on September 17, 1942. Later, the Grand Admiral motivated this decision by the fact that any generosity shown to the enemy costs his people too dearly. He referred to the Laconia incident, which occurred five days before the order was issued, that is, on September 12. Having sunk this English transport, the commander of the German submarine U-156 raised the Red Cross flag on his bridge and began rescuing the sailors in the water. From the board of U-156, on an international wave, a message was broadcast several times that the German submarine was conducting rescue operations and guaranteeing complete safety to any ship ready to take on board sailors from the sunken steamer. Nevertheless, after some time, U-156 attacked the American Liberator.
    Then air attacks began to follow one after another. The boat miraculously escaped destruction. Hot on the heels of this incident, the German submarine command developed extremely strict instructions, the essence of which can be expressed in a laconic order: “Do not take prisoners!” However, it cannot be argued that it was after this incident that the Germans were forced to “take off their white gloves” - cruelty and even atrocities have long become common occurrences in this war.

    Since January 1942, German submarines began to be supplied with fuel and supplies from special cargo underwater tankers, the so-called “cash cows,” which, among other things, housed a repair crew and a naval hospital. This made it possible to transfer active fighting to the very coast of the USA. The Americans turned out to be completely unprepared for the fact that the war would come to their shores: for almost six months, Hitler’s underwater aces hunted with impunity for single ships in coastal zone, shooting at brightly lit cities and factories with artillery guns at night. Here’s what one American intellectual, whose house overlooked the ocean, wrote about this: “The view of the boundless sea space, which used to inspire life and creativity so much, now makes me sad and terrified. Fear permeates me especially strongly at night, when it is impossible to think about anything else except about these calculating Germans, choosing where to send a shell or torpedo ... "

    Only by the summer of 1942, the US Air Force and Navy managed to jointly organize reliable defense of their coast: now dozens of aircraft, ships, airships and private speed boats were constantly monitoring the enemy. The US 10th Fleet organized special "killer groups", each of which included a small aircraft carrier equipped with attack aircraft and several destroyers. Patrolling by long-range aircraft equipped with radars capable of detecting the antennas and snorkels of submarines, as well as the use of new destroyers and ship-borne Hedgehog bombers with powerful depth charges, changed the balance of forces.

    In 1942, German submarines began to appear in polar waters off the coast of the USSR. With their active participation, the Murmansk convoy PQ-17 was destroyed. Of his 36 transports, 23 were lost, while 16 were sunk by submarines. And on April 30, 1942, the submarine U-456 hit the English cruiser Edinburgh with two torpedoes, sailing from Murmansk to England with several tons of Russian gold to pay for supplies under Lend-Lease. The cargo lay at the bottom for 40 years and was lifted only in the 80s.

    The first thing that submariners who had just gone to sea encountered was terrible cramped conditions. This especially affected the crews of series VII submarines, which, being already cramped in design, were also packed to capacity with everything necessary for long-distance voyages. The crew's sleeping places and all free corners were used to store boxes of provisions, so the crew had to rest and eat wherever they could. To take additional tons of fuel, it was pumped into tanks designed for fresh water(drinking and hygienic), thus sharply reducing her diet.

    For the same reason, German submariners never rescued their victims desperately floundering in the middle of the ocean.
    After all, there was simply nowhere to place them - except perhaps to shove them into the vacant torpedo tube. Hence the reputation of inhuman monsters that stuck with submariners.
    The feeling of mercy was dulled by constant fear for one’s own life. During the campaign we had to constantly be wary of minefields or enemy aircraft. But the most terrible thing was the enemy destroyers and anti-submarine ships, or rather, their depth charges, the close explosion of which could destroy the hull of the boat. In this case, one could only hope for a quick death. It was much more terrible to receive heavy injuries and fall irrevocably into the abyss, listening in horror to how the compressed hull of the boat was cracking, ready to break through with streams of water under pressure of several tens of atmospheres. Or worse, to lie aground forever and slowly suffocate, realizing at the same time that there will be no help...

    Wolf Hunt

    By the end of 1944, the Germans had already completely lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Even the newest boats of the XXI series, equipped with a snorkel - a device that allows you to not surface for a significant period of time to recharge batteries, remove exhaust gases and replenish oxygen reserves, could no longer change anything (the snorkel was also used on submarines of earlier series, but not very successfully). The Germans only managed to make two such boats, with a speed of 18 knots and diving to a depth of 260 m, and while they were on combat duty, World War II ended.

    Countless Allied aircraft, equipped with radar, were constantly on duty in the Bay of Biscay, which became a veritable graveyard for German submarines leaving their French bases. Shelters made of reinforced concrete, having become vulnerable after the British developed the 5-ton concrete-piercing Tallboy aerial bombs, turned into traps for submarines, from which only a few managed to escape. In the ocean, submarine crews were often pursued for days by air and sea hunters. Now the “Dönitz wolves” were getting less and less a chance to attack well-protected convoys and were increasingly concerned about the problem of their own survival under the maddening pulses of search sonars, methodically “probing” the water column. Often, the Anglo-American destroyers did not have enough victims, and they attacked any discovered submarine with a pack of hounds, literally bombarding it with depth charges. Such, for example, was the fate of U-546, which was simultaneously bombed by eight American destroyers! Until recently, the formidable German submarine fleet was not saved by either advanced radars or enhanced armor, nor did new homing acoustic torpedoes or anti-aircraft weapons help. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the enemy had long been able to read German codes. But the German command until the very end of the war was completely confident that the codes encryption machine Enigma is impossible to crack! Nevertheless, the British, having received the first sample of this machine from the Poles in 1939, by the middle of the war created an effective system for deciphering enemy messages under the code name “Ultra,” using, among other things, the world’s first electronic computer, “Colossus.” And the British received the most important “gift” on May 8, 1941, when they captured the German submarine U-111 - they got into their hands not only a working machine, but also the entire set of hidden communications documents. From that time on, for German submariners, going on the air for the purpose of transmitting data was often tantamount to a death sentence. Apparently, Doenitz guessed about this at the end of the war, since he once wrote in his diary lines full of helpless despair: “The enemy holds a trump card, covers all areas with the help of long-range aviation and uses detection methods for which we are not ready. The enemy knows all our secrets, but we know nothing about their secrets!”

    According to official German statistics, out of 40 thousand German submariners, about 32 thousand people died. That is, many more than every second!
    After Germany's surrender, most of the submarines captured by the Allies were sunk during Operation Mortal Fire.

  4. Submarine aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy

    The Japanese Navy during World War II had large submarines capable of transporting up to several light seaplanes (similar submarines were also built in France).
    The planes were stored folded in a special hangar inside the submarine. The takeoff was carried out in the surface position of the boat, after the aircraft was taken out of the hangar and assembled. On the deck in the bow of the submarine there were special catapult skids for a short launch, from which the plane rose into the sky. After completing the flight, the plane splashed down and was removed back to the boat hangar.

    In September 1942, a Yokosuka E14Y aircraft, taking off from the boat I-25, raided Oregon, USA, dropping two 76-kg incendiary bombs, which were expected to cause extensive fires in forest areas, but , did not occur and the effect was negligible. But the attack had a great psychological effect, since the method of attack was not known.
    This was the only time the continental US was bombed during the entire war.

    The I-400 class (伊四〇〇型潜水艦), also known as the Sentoku or STO class, were a series of Japanese diesel-electric submarines during World War II. Designed in 1942-1943 to serve as ultra-long-range submarine aircraft carriers for operations anywhere in the world, including off the US coast. Submarines of the I-400 type were the largest among those built during World War II and remained so until the advent of nuclear submarines.

    Initially it was planned to build 18 submarines of this type, but in 1943 this number was reduced to 9 ships, of which only six were started and only three were completed in 1944-1945.
    Due to their late construction, submarines of the I-400 type were never used in combat. After Japan's surrender, all three submarines were transferred to the United States, and were sunk by them in 1946.
    The history of the I-400 type began shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when, at the direction of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, development of the concept of a submarine aircraft carrier for attacking the US coast began. Japanese shipbuilders already had experience of deploying one reconnaissance seaplane on several classes of submarines, but the I-400 had to be equipped with a large number of heavier aircraft to carry out its tasks.

    On January 13, 1942, Yamamoto sent the I-400 project to the naval command. It formulated the requirements for the type: the submarine had to have a cruising range of 40,000 nautical miles (74,000 km) and carry on board more than two aircraft capable of carrying an aircraft torpedo or an 800-kg aircraft bomb.
    The first design of submarines of the I-400 type was presented in March 1942 and, after modifications, was finally approved on May 17 of the same year. On January 18, 1943, construction of the lead ship of the series, I-400, began at the Kure shipyards. The original construction plan, adopted in June 1942, called for the construction of 18 boats of this type, but after Yamamoto's death in April 1943, this number was halved.
    By 1943, Japan was beginning to experience serious difficulties with the supply of materials, and plans to build the I-400 type were increasingly reduced, first to six boats, and then to three.

    The data presented in the table is largely conditional, in the sense that they cannot be perceived as absolute numbers. This is due, first of all, to the fact that it is quite difficult to accurately calculate the number of submarines of foreign states that participated in the hostilities.
    There are still discrepancies in the number of targets sunk. However, the given values ​​​​give a general idea of ​​the order of the numbers and their relationship to each other.
    This means that we can draw some conclusions.
    Firstly, Soviet submariners have the smallest number of sunk targets for each submarine participating in combat operations (the effectiveness of submarine operations is often assessed by sunk tonnage. However, this indicator largely depends on the quality of potential targets, and in this sense, for the Soviet fleet it was completely not acceptable. Indeed, but in the North the bulk of the enemy’s transports were small and medium-tonnage ships, and in the Black Sea such targets could be counted on one hand.
    For this reason, in the future we will mainly talk simply about sunken targets, only highlighting warships among them). The next in this indicator is the United States, but there the real figure will be significantly higher than indicated, since in fact only about 50% of the total number of submarines in the theater of operations participated in combat operations on communications, the rest performed various special tasks.

    Secondly, the percentage of lost submarines from the number of those participating in hostilities in the Soviet Union is almost twice as high as in other victorious countries (Great Britain - 28%, USA - 21%).

    Thirdly, in terms of the number of targets sunk for every submarine lost, we surpass only Japan, and are close to Italy. Other countries are several times superior to the USSR in this indicator. As for Japan, at the end of the war there was a real beating of its fleet, including its submarine fleet, so comparing it with the victorious country is not at all correct.

    When considering the effectiveness of Soviet submarines, one cannot help but touch upon one more aspect of the problem. Namely, the relationship between this efficiency and the funds that were invested in the submarines and the hopes that were placed on them. It is very difficult to estimate in rubles the damage caused to the enemy; on the other hand, the real labor and material costs of creating any product in the USSR, as a rule, did not reflect its formal cost. However, this issue can be considered indirectly. In the pre-war years, industry transferred 4 cruisers, 35 destroyers and leaders, 22 patrol ships and more than 200 (!) submarines to the Navy. And in monetary terms, the construction of submarines was clearly a priority. Before the third five-year plan, the lion's share of allocations for military shipbuilding went to the creation of submarines, and only with the laying down of battleships and cruisers in 1939, the picture began to change. Such funding dynamics fully reflect the views on the use of naval forces that existed in those years. Until the very end of the thirties, submarines and heavy aircraft were considered the main striking force of the fleet. In the third five-year plan, priority began to be given to large surface ships, but by the beginning of the war, it was submarines that remained the most massive class of ships and, if the main focus was not placed on them, then huge hopes were pinned.

    To summarize a short quick analysis, we must admit that, firstly, the effectiveness of Soviet submarines during the Second World War was one of the lowest among the warring states, and even more so such as Great Britain, the USA, and Germany.

    Secondly, Soviet submarines clearly did not live up to the hopes and investments placed on them. As one example from a number of similar ones, we can consider the contribution of submarines to the disruption of the evacuation of Nazi troops from Crimea on April 9-May 12, 1944. In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 combat campaigns damaged one (!) transport.
    According to commanders' reports, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this. Yes, this is not very important. After all, in April and twenty days of May the enemy conducted 251 convoys! And these are many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine protection. A similar picture emerged in the Baltic in the last months of the war with the mass evacuation of troops and civilians from the Courland Peninsula and from the Danzig Bay area. In the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-tonnage ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine protection, in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 combat campaigns sank only one transport, a mother ship and a floating battery.

    The most likely reason for the low efficiency of domestic submarines may lie in their very quality. However, in the domestic literature this factor is immediately dismissed. You can find a lot of statements that Soviet submarines, especially the “S” and “K” types, were the best in the world. Indeed, if we compare the most general performance characteristics of domestic and foreign submarines, then such statements seem quite justified. The Soviet submarine of the "K" type is superior to its foreign classmates in speed, in surface cruising range it is second only to the German submarine and has the most powerful weapons.

    But even when analyzing the most general elements, there is a noticeable lag in submerged swimming range, diving depth and diving speed. If we start to understand further, it turns out that the quality of submarines is greatly influenced by elements that are not recorded in our reference books and are usually subject to comparison (by the way, we also, as a rule, do not indicate the depth of immersion and the speed of immersion), and others directly related to new technologies. These include noise, shock resistance of instruments and mechanisms, the ability to detect and attack the enemy in conditions of poor visibility and at night, stealth and accuracy in the use of torpedo weapons, and a number of others.

    Unfortunately, at the beginning of the war, domestic submarines did not have modern electronic detection equipment, torpedo firing machines, bubble-free firing devices, depth stabilizers, radio direction finders, shock absorbers for devices and mechanisms, but they were distinguished by the great noise of the mechanisms and devices.

    The issue of communication with a submerged submarine was not resolved. Almost the only source of information about the surface situation of the submerged submarine was a periscope with very poor optics. The Mars-type noise direction finders in service made it possible to determine by ear the direction to the noise source with an accuracy of plus or minus 2 degrees.
    The operating range of the equipment with good hydrology did not exceed 40 kb.
    The commanders of German, British, and American submarines had hydroacoustic stations at their disposal. They worked in noise direction finding mode or in active mode, when the hydroacoustic could determine not only the direction to the target, but also the distance to it. German submariners, with good hydrology, detected a single transport in noise direction finding mode at a distance of up to 100 kb, and already from a distance of 20 kb they could obtain a range to it in the “Echo” mode. Our allies had similar capabilities at their disposal.

    And this is not all that directly affected the effectiveness of the use of domestic submarines. Under these conditions, deficiencies in technical characteristics and support for combat operations could be partially compensated only by the human factor.
    This is where, probably, lies the main determinant of the effectiveness of the domestic submarine fleet - Man!
    But among submariners, like no one else, there is objectively a certain main man, a certain God in a separate closed space. In this sense, a submarine is similar to an airplane: the entire crew may consist of highly qualified professionals and work extremely competently, but the commander is at the helm and it will be he who lands the plane. Pilots, like submariners, usually either all emerge victorious or all die. Thus, the personality of the commander and the fate of the submarine are something whole.

    In total, during the war years in the active fleets, 358 people acted as commanders of submarines, 229 of them participated in this position in combat campaigns, 99 died (43%).

    Having examined the list of commanders of Soviet submarines during the war, we can state that most of them had a rank corresponding to their position or one step lower, which is normal personnel practice.

    Consequently, the statement that at the beginning of the war our submarines were commanded by inexperienced newcomers who took positions thanks to the political repressions that took place is unfounded. Another thing is that the rapid growth of the submarine fleet in the pre-war period required more officers than the schools produced. For this reason, a crisis of commanders arose, and they decided to overcome it by recruiting civilian sailors to the fleet. Moreover, it was believed that it would be advisable to send them specifically to submarines, since they know the psychology of the captain of a civilian vessel (transport) most well, and this should make it easier for them to act against shipping. That's how many captains long voyage, that is, people who were essentially not military became submarine commanders. True, they all studied at the appropriate courses, but if it’s so easy to make submarine commanders, then why are schools and many years of study needed?
    In other words, an element of serious damage to future efficiency was already built into it.

    List of the most successful domestic submarine commanders: