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Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. Briefly

Bicycle Day - April 19, 1943 - the date when Dr. Albert Hofmann deliberately, the first person, took LSD.

Since then, April 19 is considered bicycle day! What does Hoffman have to do with it? LSD? And a bicycle? Let's go back a little to history...

History of Bicycle Day (from Wikipedia)

Three days earlier, he accidentally, not yet knowing about the effects of diethylamide, absorbed a certain amount of the substance with his fingertips.
On this day he deliberately took 250 micrograms of LSD. After some time, the symptoms that he had already felt before began to appear - dizziness and anxiety.
Soon the effect became so strong that Albert could no longer form coherent sentences and, observed by his assistant, notified of the experiment, he rode home on his bicycle. During the trip, he experienced the effects of LSD, making this the date of the world's first psychedelic experience with LSD.
The effect of LSD was manifested in the fact that Hofmann's subjective sensations - very slow driving - did not correspond to the objective ones - very high speed.
For Hofmann, the familiar boulevard on the way to the house turned into a painting by Salvador Dali. It seemed to him that the buildings were covered with small ripples.
On April 22, he wrote about his experiment and experience, and later included this note in his book LSD: My Problem Child.
After Hofmann reached home, he asked his assistant to call a doctor and ask a neighbor for milk, which he had chosen as a general antidote for poisoning.
The arriving doctor could not find any abnormalities in the patient, except for dilated pupils.
However, for several hours, Hofmann was in a state of delirium: it seemed to him that he had become possessed by demons, that his neighbor was a witch, and that the furniture in his house was threatening him.
After this, the feeling of anxiety receded and was replaced by multi-colored images in the form of circles and spirals, which did not disappear even with closed eyes.
Hofmann also said that he perceived the sound of a passing car in the form of an optical image.
Albert eventually fell asleep, and in the morning he felt somewhat tired, and all day, according to him, sensory sensitivity was heightened.

From Hofmann's diary (material from pda.velorama.ru)

19.04.1943, 16:20: Taken orally 0.5 cc. 1/2 ppm solution of diethylamide tartrate = 0.25 mg tartrate. Diluted with approximately 10 cc of water. No taste.

17:00: There is dizziness, anxiety, visual distortions, symptoms of paralysis, and a desire to laugh.

Addition from 04/21: I went home on my bike. 18:00 - approx. 20:00 the most severe crisis. (See special report).

This is where the notes in my lab notebook break. I could write last words only with great effort. It now became clear to me that it was LSD that was responsible for the amazing incident on the previous Friday, since the changes in perception were the same as before, only more severe. I had to strain to speak coherently. I asked my laboratory assistant, who was informed about the experiment, to accompany me home. We went by bicycle as there was no car due to wartime restrictions. On the way home, my condition began to take on threatening forms. Everything in my field of vision trembled and distorted, as if in a distorting mirror. I also had the feeling that we couldn't move. However, my assistant told me later that we were driving very fast. Finally, we arrived home safe and sound, and I could barely ask my companion to call our family doctor and ask the neighbors for milk.

Despite my delusional, unintelligible state, I experienced short periods of clear and effective thinking - I chose milk as a general antidote for poisoning.

The dizziness and feeling that I was losing consciousness had become so strong by this time that I could no longer stand and had to lie down on the sofa. The world around me has now changed even more horribly. Everything in the room was spinning, and familiar objects and pieces of furniture took on grotesque, menacing shapes. They were all in constant motion, as if possessed by inner restlessness. A woman near the door, whom I barely recognized, brought me milk - I drank two liters throughout the evening. It was no longer Frau R., but rather an evil, treacherous witch in a painted mask.

Even worse than these demonic transformations outside world, there was a change in the way I perceived myself, my inner essence. Any effort of my will, any attempt to put an end to the disintegration of the external world and the dissolution of my “I” seemed futile. Some demon possessed me and took over my body, mind and soul. I jumped up and screamed, trying to free myself from him, but then I sank and lay helpless on the sofa. The substance I wanted to experiment with captivated me. It was a demon who scornfully triumphed over my will. I was gripped by a terrible fear of going crazy. I found myself in another world, in another place, in another time. It seemed that my body was left without feelings, lifeless and alien. Was I dying? Was this a transition? At times it seemed to me that I was outside my body, and then I clearly realized, as an outside observer, the fullness of the tragedy of my situation. I didn’t even say goodbye to my family (my wife, with our three children, went that day to visit her parents in Lucerne). Could they understand that I was not experimenting recklessly, irresponsibly, but with the greatest care, and that such a result could not in any way have been foreseen? My fear and despair increased, not only because the young family was about to lose their father, but because I was afraid of leaving my work, my chemical research, which meant so much to me, unfinished halfway through a fruitful, promising path. Another thought arose, an idea full of bitter irony: if I were to leave this world prematurely, it would be because of lysergic acid diethylamide, which I myself gave birth to in this world.

By the time the doctor arrived, the peak of my hopeless condition had already passed. My lab assistant told him about my experiment, since I still couldn't form a coherent sentence myself. He shook his head in disbelief after my attempts to describe the mortal danger that threatened my body. He found no abnormal symptoms except severely dilated pupils. And the pulse, and the pressure, and breathing - everything was normal. He saw no reason to prescribe any medications. Instead, he walked me to the bed and stayed to watch over me. Gradually, I returned from the mysterious, unfamiliar world to the calming everyday reality. The fear subsided and gave way to happiness and gratitude, normal perceptions and thoughts returned, and I became confident that the danger of madness had finally passed.

Now, little by little, I began to enjoy the unprecedented colors and play of shapes that continued to exist before my closed eyes. A kaleidoscope of fantastic images washed over me; alternating, variegated, they diverged and converged in circles and spirals, exploded with fountains of color, mixed and turned into each other in a continuous stream. I clearly noticed how every auditory sensation, such as the sound of a door handle or a passing car, was transformed into a visual one. Each sound generated a rapidly changing image of a unique shape and color.

Late in the evening my wife returned from Lucerne. Someone told her on the phone that I had come down with a mysterious illness. She immediately returned home, leaving the children with her parents. By this time, I was far enough away to tell her what happened.

Exhausted, I fell asleep and woke up the next morning refreshed, with a clear head, although somewhat physically tired. A feeling of well-being and new life flowed through me. When, later, I went for a walk in the garden, where after spring rain the sun was shining, everything around sparkled and sparkled with a refreshing light. It was as if the world had been created anew. All my senses vibrated in a state of highest sensitivity that lasted throughout the day.

This experiment showed that LSD-25 behaves like a psycho active substance with extraordinary properties and strength. In my memory, there was no other known substance that would cause such profound mental effects in such ultra-small doses, that would generate such dramatic changes in human consciousness, in our perception of the internal and external world.

Even more significant was that I could remember the events that took place under the influence of LSD in great detail. This only meant that the memory function of consciousness was not interrupted even at the peak of the LSD experience, despite the complete collapse of the usual vision of the world. Throughout the experiment I was always aware of my participation in it, but despite understanding my situation, I could not, with all the efforts of my will, shake off the world of LSD. Everything was perceived as completely real, as a disturbing reality, disturbing because the picture of another world, the world of familiar everyday reality, was still completely preserved in memory, available for comparison.

Another unexpected aspect of LSD was its ability to produce such a deep, powerful state of intoxication without further hangover. On the contrary, the day after the LSD experiment I was, as I already described, in excellent physical and mental condition.

I realized that LSD, a new active substance with such properties, should find application in pharmacology, neurology, and especially psychiatry, and that it should attract the attention of appropriate specialists. But at that time I did not even suspect that the new substance would also be used outside medicine, as a drug. Since my self-experiment had shown LSD in its terrifying, diabolical aspect, I least of all expected that this substance could ever find use as a kind of recreational drug. Moreover, I was unable to recognize a strong connection between LSD exposure and spontaneous visionary experiences until subsequent experiments were conducted at lower doses and in different settings.

The next day I wrote to Professor Stoll the above-mentioned report of my extraordinary experience with LSD-25 and sent a copy to the director of the pharmacological department, Professor Rothlin.

As I expected, the first reaction was incredulous surprise. Immediately there was a call from the department; Professor Stoll asked: “Are you sure you didn’t make a mistake when weighing? Is the dose mentioned really correct?” Professor Rothlin called and asked the same question. I was confident about this because I had done the weighing and dosing with my own hands. However, their doubts were somewhat justified, since until that moment there was no known substance that would have even the slightest psychic effect in smaller milligram doses. The existence of a substance with such potency seemed almost incredible.

Professor Rothlin himself and two of his colleagues were the first to repeat my experiment with only one third of the dose that I used. But even at this level, the effects were still quite impressive and completely surreal. All doubts about the statements in my report were eliminated.

For a snack, a cycling video :)

Warsaw ghetto

Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto - episode. Armed resistance to German fascists by prisoners of the Warsaw ghetto. Happened in the spring of 1943

“Many wars of liberation carried within themselves the germ of inevitable defeat, but none of them bore the stamp of such deep tragedy as the last fighting impulse of the remnants of the inhabitants of the Warsaw ghetto, which flared up on the graves of their loved ones, without a rear, almost without weapons, without an insignificant chance to win
"(Polish historian Ben Mark)

What is a Jewish ghetto?

Ghetto (Italian: ghetto) - parts of large cities set aside for the forced settlement of people discriminated against on national, racial or religious grounds (Wikipedia).

The first Jewish ghetto in Europe was created in Venice by decree of local authorities on March 29, 1516.

“The Jews should all settle together in the houses of the Court, which is located in the Ghetto near San Girolamo. Jews should not go out at night. On one side of the ghetto they can exit through a bridge, and on the other through big bridge. Two gates are to be built, guarded by four Christian guards, and paid for by the Jews."

With the development of civilization, during the Enlightenment, when European intellectuals proclaimed the liberal principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity, the laws of the ghetto were abolished, and Jews received the right to live where they wanted.
Once again, a ghetto for Jews recreated Hitler's fascist regime. In September 1939, the head of the Main Directorate of Reich Security, Heydrich, ordered the dissolution of Jewish communities and the concentration of Jews in special limited areas of large cities.

Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

1939, November - the core of the Jewish Military Union (Zionist-Revisionist Beitar organization) was created
1940, October 3 - The forced relocation of Warsaw Jews into the ghetto begins. The ghetto was divided into three almost isolated parts: Central, the area of the Tebbens-Schultz factories, the area of brush workshops
1940, November 15 - Jews are prohibited from leaving the Warsaw ghetto

“It was raining, but it was warm. The streets were swarming with people wearing white armbands. Everyone ran back and forth excitedly, like animals in a cage that had not had time to get used to it. At the walls of the houses, on piles of wet, mud-splattered feather beds, women and children howled, who were also screaming. These were Jewish families thrown into the ghetto at the last moment and without the slightest chance of getting any kind of roof over their heads. On the territory of an already resettled area, which could accommodate at most 100,000 people, there should now be more than half a million living. Against the backdrop of a dark street, in the light of the headlights, a square of gates stood out with freshly planed wood, cutting off the ghetto from the world of free people” (V. Shpilman “The Pianist”)

1941, August 31 - the Nazis allowed the opening of primary and Sunday schools in the ghetto, prohibiting the teaching of history and geography in them
1942, April 18 - 52 people are killed in the Warsaw ghetto. The event is known as "Night of Blood"
1942, May 5 - Teachers of the Warsaw Ghetto established a special day for children dedicated to games, theater and treats
1942, January 20 - Hitler approved the concept of the “final solution to the Jewish question”
1942, June - in the Warsaw ghetto - about 450,000 people
1942, July 22 - the beginning of the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto, until September 12, about 265 thousand Jews were sent to the Treblinka death camp; about 25 thousand Jews were killed on the streets of the city
1942, July 28 - an attempt by activists of various parties in the Warsaw ghetto to create a common fighting organization failed
1942, December 2 - The charter of the Jewish Combat Organization was signed (belonged to the socialist Anti-Fascist Bloc, the ideological opponent of Beitar) under the leadership of M. Anelevich
1943, January 18 - an attempt at a second mass deportation to Treblinka failed due to armed resistance. The fighting lasted 4 days. The Nazis managed to send only 6 thousand people to Treblinka
1943, April 19 - Massive Nazi attack on the central ghetto. The official start of his rebellion

By 16:00 on April 19, having broken through the defenses, the Germans reached Muranovskaya Square. It was here that the only long positional battle of the entire uprising began. Muranovo Square was the center of the Jewish Military Union (one of the ghetto militant organizations belonging to the Beitar movement). The main headquarters was located in house number 7. A tunnel led into the basement of house number 7, through which the Union fighters received weapons and ammunition from the city (In total, the EMU had 6 tunnels in different parts ghetto. One of them, however, was discovered by the Germans even before the uprising) It was through this tunnel that the AK liaison Jozef Leibski was delivered on the night of April 18-19 that heavy machine gun, which was installed in the attic of house number 17 and significantly strengthened the position of the rebels. In the battles on April 19 on Muranivska Square, the Germans lost a tank and more than a hundred soldiers. But they couldn’t take the position. The position on Muranivska Square (with flags of the uprising) was captured by the Germans only on April 22

1943, April 20 - German offensive in the brush workshop area. The rebels detonated a mine under the ghetto gate; the Nazis, having lost several dozen people killed, retreated
1943, April 24 - Rabbi Menachem Zemba, the spiritual leader of the Warsaw ghetto, died. On the eve of the uprising, the Catholic Church offered to rescue the three surviving Warsaw rabbis, but Zemba refused to leave

Having suffered significant losses, the Nazis decided to burn down the central ghetto. It was set on fire first by air bombs, and then by special groups of arsonists. Many soldiers and inhabitants of the ghetto died in the fire, others took refuge in bunkers, where they suffered from terrible overcrowding, lack of water and food. During the day, the rebels stayed in bunkers, and at night, dressed in German uniforms, they set up ambushes. Gradually the Germans discovered the bunkers and bombarded them with gas bombs.

1943, April 27 - A detachment of the Polish Home Army under the command of Major Henryk Iwanski arrived to help the rebels through an underground passage. The purpose of the detachment was to organize the withdrawal of part of the rebels from the ghetto. The Poles gave a serious battle to the Nazis, covering the retreating, among whom there were many wounded. Ivansky was wounded, his son Roman and brother Eduard died. The Germans lost about 100 people killed and another tank

The attitude of the Poles towards the uprising, the Jews and Hitler's “final solution” was. Some underground organizations supported the Nazis' policy of exterminating Jews (the anti-Semitism of the Poles was taken into account by the Nazis, so they created most of the death camps on Polish territory). Some tried to resist the Germans. From the warehouses of the Home Army (subordinate to the Polish government in exile) in various ways to the ghetto. From June 1942 until the start of the April uprising, 3 RKM machine guns, 100 pistols, 7 rifles, 15 machine guns and about 750 grenades were delivered. After the start of the uprising - 4 more RKM machine guns, an LKM machine gun, 15 FM machine guns, 50 pistols, 300 grenades. However, the help was insufficient and not always on time. The organization of Polish communists and left-wing socialists, the Army of Ludow, tried to help the Jewish underground fighters with weapons, led the rebels out of the Warsaw ghetto, but the Army of Ludow began to actively operate only at the end of 1943–beginning of 1944, when most of the Jewish population of Poland was destroyed

1943, April 29 - From the reports of SS Brigadefuehrer Jorgen Strop: “The progress of the big operation on 04/29/43. ...A total of 36 bunkers intended for housing were discovered. 2,359 Jews were extracted from these and other shelters, among them 106 died in battle...
1943, May 2 - From the reports of SS Brigadeführer Jörgen Strop: Progress of the major operation: “2.05.43. 27 bunkers were found... Among the wounded were 4 German policemen and 4 Polish policemen.”
1943, May 5 - a small group of fighters from the Jewish combat organization entered the ghetto from the Aryan side and led civilian Jews into the city. Covering their retreat, on May 6, almost the entire group died.
1943, May 6 - From the reports of SS Brigadeführer Jörgen Strop: Progress of the major operation: 05/06/43... An SS Unterscharführer was wounded... A total of 47 bunkers were destroyed. 2 people from the barrage detachment were wounded.”
1943, May 8 - The Germans surrounded the bunker of one of the leaders of the armed struggle, Mordechai Anelevich, all five entrances to it were blocked. The use of gases made the rebels' situation hopeless. Many Jewish fighters, including M. Anielewicz, committed suicide
1943, May 16 - Report from SS commander J. Stroop: “The Jewish quarter of Warsaw no longer exists, 56,065 Jews were destroyed”
1943, June 5 - The last armed clash with the rebel Germans. On Muranivska Square, a group of Jews from the underworld fought the Germans

Heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

Mordechai Anilevich (1919-1943) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Combat Organization (belonged to the socialist Anti-Fascist Bloc, the ideological opponent of Beitar)
Israel Kanal (1920–43) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Combat Organization
Eliezer Geller (1918–43) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Combat Organization
Marek Edelman (1922–2009) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Combat Organization
Hanoch Gutman (1921–43) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Combat Organization
Pavel Frenkel (1920-1943) - commander of the Jewish Military Union
Yitzhak Zuckerman (1915-1981) - one of the rebel commanders, participated in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944
Zharyakh Artshtein (1923–43) - one of the rebel commanders, his detachment continued to fight throughout the summer of 1943
Michael Klepfisch (1913–43) - covered the machine gun embrasure with his chest
Tsivya Lyubetkina (1914-1978)
Leon Rodal (1913-1943)
David Afelbaum (??? - April 28, 1943) - one of the founders and commanders of the Jewish Military Union

On April 27, the commander of the Polish detachment, Henryk Iwansky, suggested that David Appelbaum leave the ghetto, but he refused, since there was no contact with many EMU groups located in other places, and Appelbaum considered it impossible to leave, abandoning his fighters. On April 27 he was seriously wounded. He died on April 28. On April 29, the remaining EMU fighters, having lost all their commanders by that time, left the ghetto through the Muranovsky tunnel and were stationed in the Mikhalinsky forests

David Vdovinsky (1895-1970) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Military Union
Kalmen Mendelsohn (1902-1985) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Military Union
Joseph Zellmeister (1901-1968) - one of the commanders of the Jewish Military Union
Henryk Iwanski (1902-1978) - Major of the Polish Army, commander of the support group for the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto

, executive editor of "Red Star" in 1941-1943.

At that time, newspapermen had such an unwritten rule, or rather, an immutable law: on the eve of holidays, say, the anniversary of the Red Army, October revolution or May 1, do not talk about the tasks of the troops. It was supposed to wait for Stalin’s speech or order, and then popularize and explain the “leader’s” attitudes. This time we broke tradition and published the editorial “!”, in which the “secrets” of the Headquarters were revealed. The article contained the following lines:

“The decisive time has come, on which the future of humanity depends.

We won the winter campaign of the Patriotic War... We must remember that the expulsion of the enemy from the borders of our Motherland has just begun... The enemy has not yet been defeated, he is still strong, still capable of striking. The spring calm on the fronts does not mislead us. This is the calm before the storm, before the big battles that will not take long to arrive.

The Germans will undoubtedly try to use the summer to improve their affairs. They did not abandon the idea of launching an offensive in order to break the deadlock where the adventurous strategy of the Hitlerite command had led them.

Of course, the power of the German military machine has been significantly undermined by the defeats inflicted on it by the Red Army. However, the Germans will undoubtedly undertake new adventures. They continue to bring the remnants of their reserves to the Soviet-German front and accumulate military equipment.

Our task is to meet fully armed any attempts of the enemy, to prepare for decisive battles with the Nazi enslavers. We must not only thwart the adventurous plans of the Nazis, but inflict such powerful blows on the enemy that would decide the outcome of the war...”

Everything is correct, except that regarding the “remaining reserves” and the “outcome of the war” we took wishful thinking as reality. It was still too early to say that the Germans were gathering the remnants of their reserves. We have gotten ahead of ourselves when talking about the outcome of the war. No matter how powerful a blow we inflict on the enemy, it will not decide the “outcome of the war.” As we know, it was still far away from its end - two whole years! But it was important, we believed, to publicly declare something that the Headquarters for some reason kept secret - the summer offensive that the Germans were preparing.

The newspaper also contains many articles on military-tactical topics.

First of all, the article “Soviet Motorized Infantry” by Colonel A. Poshkus attracts attention. At the beginning of the war, our motorized infantry was not yet one of the main branches of the military, like, say, cavalry in the years civil war. Perhaps that is why some military leaders still lived by old ideas, overestimating the role of cavalry in this war. Life has shown that the cavalry corps and divisions that fought in the Patriotic War acted confidently and valiantly, but did not decide their fate major operations. An interesting fact about the overestimation of the capabilities of the cavalry: the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Army General I.V. Tyulenev, an old horseman, turned to Stalin with a proposal to form a cavalry army. As General F.E. Bokov told me, the Supreme Commander seized on this idea and considered it tempting. However, the General Staff decisively rejected it, and Stalin was forced to agree with this.

Motorized infantry is a different matter. Poshkus speaks about its strength and power, based on the experience of the actions of his 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps:

“While still studying at the academy, I had a good idea of the role of motorized infantry in modern warfare. But here, looking at the motorized units deployed in all their formidable glory, organized and equipped in a modern way, perhaps for the first time I felt this enormous force on tracks in wheels. In the mighty movement of tanks and motorized infantry, I almost physically felt the pulse modern warfare».

Motorized infantry, the author emphasizes, creates opportunities for broad and bold maneuver. Corps formations more than once made marches of 120–150 kilometers during the night and suddenly appeared where the enemy least expected them. The author gives the following example. After a big rush, it was in the dark that parts of the corps burst into the village where the headquarters of the enemy division was located. Our soldiers saw the usual picture for the rear: German soldiers were carrying buckets of water from a well, officers were working in the courtyards morning exercises. The division headquarters was destroyed and captured.

The article emphasizes that the power of motorized infantry is fully used only with competent, well-practiced interaction with tanks:

“The success of a motorized infantry battle is always decided, first of all, by its complete and constant, not artificial, but organic interaction with tanks. In our connection such interaction has been achieved. Suffice it to say that during the entire period of hostilities we never had cases where motorized infantry lagged behind tanks, there were no those disastrous gaps between combat vehicles and people that lead to failure. The inextricable connection with tanks is the basis of motorized infantry combat operations. Tanks usually act more decisively, sensing motorized infantry behind them. They break enemy resistance along the path of its movement and act mainly against enemy infantry. Motorized rifle units suppress anti-tank artillery and destroy machine gunners. Infantry sees more than tanks..."

And further mature reasoning, also based on experience, in particular, Battle of Stalingrad: “When you think about what motorized infantry gave to tanks, first of all you come to the thought: motorized infantry increased the survivability of tanks. The life of a tank, an organic part of mechanized forces, has become more durable. Motorized infantry knows the price of a tank very well. Tanks are its armor. If she does not protect them with all available means, she will lose this shell. No matter how strong a tank’s armor is, it can still turn out to be eggshells if it is not covered in a timely manner by an artillery fire shield. When tanks come under anti-tank artillery fire, motorized infantry units must raise this fire shield in time and shield the tanks with it. This means that artillery must never lag behind tanks on the battlefield. We have repeatedly practiced attaching 45-mm guns to tanks, and this experience has fully justified itself. Mutual cover for each other is the law of motorized infantry and tanks on the battlefield and on the march.”

I must say that this is the first article in the newspaper that so broadly reveals the role, significance and place of motorized infantry in modern combat.

Of great interest is the journalistic article by the commander of the motorized mechanized brigade, Colonel P. Boyarinov, “The Maturity of the Commander.” The author refers to the words of Suvorov, who mentored his godson Alexander Karachay, taught him: “The constant sophistication of your eye will make you a great commander.” Using many combat examples, the author shows how important it is to have an accurate eye. He emphasizes that modern combat is deep combat. You can skillfully organize a breakthrough of the front line. But success will depend not only on this. It is determined primarily by the strength of attacks on the reserves, by the depth of the enemy’s defense. IN modern conditions We need an eye that allows us to give a correct assessment of enemy forces throughout their entire depth.

Also interesting is the brigade commander’s point of view on the disputes that sometimes arise - what the academy teaches and what combat teaches. What's more important?

“I myself studied at the Frunze Academy and the Academy of Motor Mechanization. However, when I had to face the conditions of modern warfare, it seemed to me that I had lost my knowledge. Why did this happen? The war required greater mobility, tireless activity, eye and speed. When, thanks to experience, these qualities appeared, we quickly remembered everything we had been taught... Practice has taught us to replace outdated provisions with new ones.”

I should note that such speeches aroused the interest of commanders and military leaders in the newspaper, and the desire to hold discussions on topical issues of military affairs.

Military counterintelligence SMERSH was created in the Soviet Union in 1943. Only 70 years later, the “top secret” classification was removed from many operations carried out by counterintelligence officers.

The main task of this unit was not only to counter the German Abwehr, but also the need to introduce Soviet counterintelligence agents into the highest echelons of power fascist Germany and intelligence schools, the destruction of sabotage groups, conducting radio games, as well as in the fight against traitors to the Motherland. It should be noted that the name of this special service was given by I. Stalin himself. At first there was a proposal to name the unit SMERNESH (that is, “death to German spies”), to which Stalin stated that Soviet territory There are plenty of spies from other states, and it is also necessary to fight them, so it is better to call the new body simply SMERSH. Its official name became the counterintelligence department SMERSH of the NKVD of the USSR. By the time counterintelligence was created, the battle of Stalingrad was left behind, and the initiative in the conduct of military operations began to gradually pass to the Union troops. At this time, territories that had been under occupation began to be liberated; people fled from German captivity a large number of Soviet soldiers and officers. Some of them were sent by the Nazis as spies. Special departments of the Red Army and Navy needed reorganization, so they were replaced by SMERSH. And although the unit lasted only three years, people still talk about it to this day.

The work of counterintelligence officers in searching for saboteurs and agents, as well as nationalists and former White Guards, was extremely dangerous and difficult. To systematize the work, special lists, collections and photo albums of those people who needed to be found were compiled. Later, in 1944, a collection of materials concerning German intelligence agencies at the front was published, and a few months later a collection on Finnish military intelligence.
Active assistance to the security officers was provided by identification agents, who in the past had assisted the fascists, but later turned themselves in. With their help, it was possible to identify a large number of saboteurs and spies who operated in the rear of our country.

The search and front-line reconnaissance was carried out by the 4th department of SMERSH, headed first by Major General P. Timofeev, and later by Major General G. Utekhin.

Official information states that during the period from October 1943 to May 1944, 345 Soviet counterintelligence officers were transferred behind enemy lines, of which 50 were recruited from German agents. After completing the tasks, only 102 agents returned. 57 intelligence officers managed to infiltrate enemy intelligence agencies, of which 31 later returned, and 26 remained to carry out the task. In total, during this period of time, 1,103 enemy counterintelligence agents and 620 official employees were identified.

Below are examples of several successful operations carried out by SMERSH.

Junior Lieutenant Bogdanov, who fought on the 1st Baltic Front, was captured in August 1941. He was recruited by German military intelligence officers, after which he completed an internship at the Smolensk sabotage school. When he was transferred to the Soviet rear, he confessed, and already in July 1943 he returned to the enemy as an agent who had successfully completed the task. Bogdanov was appointed platoon commander of the Smolensk school of saboteurs. During his work, he managed to persuade 6 saboteurs to cooperate with Soviet counterintelligence agents. In October of the same 1943, Bogdanov, along with 150 students from the school, was sent by the Germans to carry out a punitive operation. As a result, the entire personnel of the group went over to the side of the Soviet partisans.

Beginning in the spring of 1941, information began to arrive from Germany from Olga Chekhova, a famous actress who was married to A.P. Chekhov’s nephew. In the 20s he left for Germany for permanent residence. Very soon she gained popularity among Reich officials, becoming Hitler's favorite and making friends with Eva Braun. In addition, her friends were the wives of Himmler, Goebbels and Goering. Everyone admired her wit and beauty. Ministers, Field Marshal Keitel, industrialists, Gauleiters, and designers repeatedly turned to her for help, asking her to put in a word with Hitler. And it doesn’t matter what they were talking about: the construction of missile ranges and underground factories or the development of “weapons of retaliation.” The woman wrote down all requests in a small notebook with a gilded cover. It turned out that not only Hitler knew about its contents.

The information that Olga Chekhova conveyed was very important, since it came “first hand” - from the Fuhrer’s inner circle, Reich officials. Thus, the actress learned about when exactly the offensive near Kursk would take place, about how long military equipment produced, as well as the freezing of the nuclear project. It was planned that Chekhova would have to take part in the assassination attempt on Hitler, but at the very last moment Stalin ordered the operation to be interrupted.

German intelligence officers could not understand where the information leak came from. Very soon they found the actress. Himmler volunteered to interrogate her. He came to her home, but the woman, knowing in advance about his visit, invited Hitler to visit.

The woman was arrested by SMERSH officers at the very end of the war, allegedly for harboring Himmler’s adjutant. During the first interrogation, she gave her operational pseudonym - “Actress”. She was summoned to an appointment first with Beria, and then with Stalin. It is clear that her visit to the Soviet Union was kept strictly secret, so she was not even able to see her daughter. After returning to Germany, she was provided with lifelong maintenance. The woman wrote a book, but did not say a word about her activities as an intelligence officer. And only a secret diary, which was discovered after her death, indicated that she actually worked for Soviet counterintelligence.

Another successful operation that caused significant damage to enemy intelligence was Operation Berezino. In 1944, about 2 thousand German soldiers, led by Colonel Scherhorn, were surrounded in the forests of Belarus. With the help of saboteur Otto Skorzeny, Hitler's intelligence decided to turn them into a detachment of saboteurs that would operate in the Soviet rear. However, quite for a long time the detachment could not be detected, three Abwehr groups returned with nothing, and only the fourth established contact with the encircled.

For several nights in a row, German planes dropped the necessary cargo. But practically nothing reached its destination, because instead of Colonel Scherhorn, who was captured, Colonel Maklyarsky, who was similar to him, and State Security Major William Fisher were introduced into the detachment. After conducting a radio session with the “German colonel,” the Abwehr gave the order to the detachment to make its way into German territory, but not a single German soldier managed to return to their homeland.

It must be said that another of the most successful operations of Soviet counterintelligence officers was the prevention of an attempt on Stalin’s life in the summer of 1944. This was not the first attempt, but this time the Nazis prepared more thoroughly. The start of the operation was successful. The saboteurs Tavrin and his radio operator wife landed in the Smolensk area, and, using a motorcycle, headed towards Moscow. The agent was dressed in military uniform Red Army officer with orders and the Star of the Hero of the USSR. In addition, he also had the “ideal” documents of the head of one of the SMERSH departments. To avoid any questions at all, an issue of Pravda was printed especially for the “major” in Germany, which included an article about awarding her the Hero’s Star. But the leadership German intelligence did not know that the Soviet agent had already reported about the impending operation. The saboteurs were stopped, but the patrolmen immediately did not like the “major’s” behavior. When asked where they were coming from, Tavrin named one of the distant settlements. But it rained all night, and the officer himself and his companion were completely dry.

Tavrin was asked to go to the guardhouse. And when he took off his leather jacket, it became completely clear that he was not a Soviet major, since during the “Interception” plan to capture saboteurs, a special order was issued regarding the procedure for wearing awards. The saboteurs were neutralized, and a radio station, money, explosives and weapons, which none of the Soviet military had ever seen before, were taken from the sidecar of the motorcycle.

It was a Panzerknacke, a miniature grenade launcher that was developed in the laboratory of the German State Security Main Directorate. It could easily fit into the sleeve of an overcoat. In addition, Tavrin also had a powerful explosive device as a backup option, which was placed in his briefcase. In the event that the assassination attempt had not been carried out the first time, Tavrin planned to leave the briefcase in the meeting room. During interrogations, he confessed to everything, but this did not help him. The saboteur was later shot.

Radio games conducted by Soviet intelligence services on air are also well known. Carrying out such games with the enemy on the radio provided an excellent opportunity to supply German headquarters with disinformation. In total, 183 radio games were held during the war. One of the most famous and successful was the radio game “Aryans”. In May 1944, an enemy plane with 24 German saboteurs on board landed near the Kalmyk settlement of Utta. Fighters were sent to the landing area. As a result, 12 paratroopers and saboteurs were captured. During the subsequent radio game, 42 radiograms containing disinformation were transmitted to Berlin.

SMERSH existed until 1946. After the war, military counterintelligence again became part of various intelligence services: first the MGB, and then the KGB. But even now the work of SMERSHevites during the war evokes delight and admiration.

SMERSH is an abbreviation for “Death to Spies”, which was the name of a number of counterintelligence agencies of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. SMERSH was created on April 19, 1943 and existed for only 3 years, until 1946. However, even this historically insignificant period was enough for part of the liberal-minded public to enroll SMERSH in the repressive and punitive bodies of the Stalinist regime.

Top secret

It is difficult to say for sure, perhaps because the Red Army soldiers returning from captivity passed through it, through the sieve of the filtration camps, or the fact that the most famous dissident of the Soviet era, A.I. Solzhenitsyn, was arrested by SMERSH played a role. The service of the GUKR SMERSH operational staff was extremely dangerous - on average, an operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. During the battles for the liberation of Belarus alone, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing.

The activities of this organization now, in recent years two or three, aroused increased interest, even the cinema burst out with a couple of series on this topic, in fairness, it is worth saying that in terms of quality this film production is inferior to the film adaptation of Bogomolov’s “Moment of Truth”. In general, it is worth considering the work of SMERSH closely and there is nothing more objective than the documents of SMERSH itself, which at one time were not intended for a wide range of readers.

The tasks assigned to SMERSH were:

“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into units and institutions of the Red Army;

c) taking the necessary intelligence-operational and other [through the command] measures to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the possibility of unpunished passage of enemy agents through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable for espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

d) the fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the Red Army [switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];

e) combating desertion and self-mutilation at the fronts;

f) checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) performing special tasks people's commissar defense

“Smersh” bodies are exempt from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section” (from the State Defense Committee Resolution on the approval of the regulations on the State Budgetary Institution “Smersh” of the USSR NGO)

Why did the need to create such a counterintelligence service as SMERSH arise precisely in 1943?

Abwehr activity was high from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In 1942, German special services began to sharply increase the scale of operations against the USSR; in 1942, up to 1,500 people were simultaneously trained in special schools and training centers of the Abwehr and SD. The training lasted from one and a half (for so-called ordinary spies) to three (for spy radio operators and saboteurs) months. Taken together, all intelligence schools, points and courses produced approximately 10 thousand spies and saboteurs per year. The task was set to conduct an intelligence study of changes in infrastructure to a much greater depth; they started talking about the need to obtain data on everything related to the mobilization and strategic deployment of reserves of the USSR Armed Forces, their morale, level of discipline and training. They demanded not only to assess the state of defense and the concentration of technical means in the direction of the main attack, but also to find out the capabilities of the Soviet economy to cope with the urgent needs of the troops in conditions when the massive movement of industrial enterprises and research institutes to the eastern regions of the country continues. In cooperation with the SD, the Abwehr was to launch active sabotage activities in industry and transport with the aim of destroying communications, transport hubs, disabling mines, power plants, defense plants, storage facilities for fuels and lubricants, and food warehouses. The Abwehr switched to more aggressive and offensive activities. The massive recruitment of agents and the unprecedented size of their deployment were considered at that time as proof of the ability of Hitler’s intelligence leaders to analyze, understand changing conditions and adapt to them

In 1943, Abwehr activity reached its peak. The head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, made a trip to Eastern front in June 1943. At a meeting in Riga, attended by the heads of the Abwehrstelle and field intelligence agencies, and the heads of reconnaissance and sabotage schools, Canaris positively assessed the activities of the Abwehr III department - he was impressed by the message of the head of Abwehrkommando 104, Major Gesenregen, about mass arrests and executions of Russians who do not accept “ new order" Canaris said so: “Our counterintelligence service is helping the Fuhrer strengthen the new order.” As for the first and second Abwehr departments in Army Group Nord, he assessed their actions as unsatisfactory. “Our intelligence department and sabotage service,” he said, “have lost their offensive spirit, which I always insisted on. We do not have agents in Soviet headquarters, but they should be there. I resolutely demand the mass deployment of agents. I have created as many schools for you as you need... “In 1943, the scale of sending agents into the Soviet rear increased almost one and a half times compared to 1942...

It must be said that the Abwehr did not care much about the quality of agents; the quality of training was sacrificed for the sake of quantity. Perhaps the Abwehr professed a philosophical law about the inevitable transition from quantity to quality. But, in any case, such “Stakhanov methods” of sending spies and saboteurs to the rear of the Red Army inevitably led to tension in all counterintelligence services of the Red Army and the NKVD, and created favorable conditions for the work of the most valuable and experienced agents. It is interesting that the Abwehr leadership sometimes suffered from clearly adventuristic plans, setting, frankly speaking, tasks on a cosmic scale for its agents. So in August 1943, a group was sent to the Kazakh SSR, which, relying on the help of local nationalist elements, was supposed to launch agitation among the population for the separation of Kazakhstan from Soviet Union and for the formation, no more and no less, of an independent state under the protectorate of Germany. Another example, on May 23, 1944, a landing of an enemy heavy-duty aircraft was recorded in the area of the village of Utta, Astrakhan region, from which a detachment of saboteurs in the amount of 24 people was landed, led by an official German intelligence officer, Captain Eberhard von Scheller. This group was sent by the German intelligence agency "Valli I" “to prepare a base on the territory of Kalmykia for the transfer of 36 (!) squadrons of the so-called “Kalmyk Corps of Doctor Doll” to organize an uprising among the Kalmyks. SMERSH made its debut and tested its strength Battle of Kursk. SMERSH made titanic efforts to ensure the secrecy of this strategic operation. One of the sources of information for German intelligence were defectors.

From the report of the UKR “Smersh” of the Bryansk Front, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR B.C. Abakumov about the results of the operational security measures codenamed “Treason to the Motherland” on June 19, 1943.

Top secret

In May this year The most affected by the betrayal of the Motherland were the 415th and 356th SD of the 61st Army and the 5th SD of the 63rd Army, of which 23 soldiers went over to the enemy.

One of the most effective measures to combat traitors to the Motherland, among others, was to carry out staging operations under the guise of group surrenders to the enemy of military personnel,

which were carried out on the initiative of the Smersh Counterintelligence Directorate of the front under the leadership of experienced operatives from the army's counterintelligence departments. The operations took place on June 2 and 3. in sections 415 and 356 with the task: under the guise of surrendering our military personnel, to get close to the Germans, throw grenades at them, so that the enemy in the future, every time a group or individual traitors cross over to his side

met with fire and destroyed. Three groups of military personnel from the 415th and 356th Infantry Divisions were selected and carefully checked to carry out the operations. Each group included 4 people.

In the 415th Infantry Division, one group consisted of division reconnaissance officers, the second - of penal soldiers. One group of division scouts was created in the 356th Infantry Division.

Interesting stuff. It should not be surprising that there were defectors in June 1943; this also happened in 1945. Both the Germans and ours scattered millions of leaflets permitting capture throughout the war. This is what Helmut Klaussman, 111th Wehrmacht PD, recalled: “In general, there were defectors on both sides, throughout the entire war. Russian soldiers ran over to us even after Kursk. And our soldiers ran over to the Russians. I remember that near Taganrog two soldiers stood guard and went to the Russians, and a few days later we heard them calling over the radio to surrender. I think usually defectors were soldiers who just wanted to stay alive. They usually ran across before big battles, when the risk of dying in an attack overpowered the feeling of fear of the enemy. Few people moved either to us or from us due to their convictions. It was such an attempt to survive in this huge massacre. They hoped that after interrogations and checks you would be sent somewhere to the rear, away from the front. And then life will somehow form there.”

The activities of this organization now, in the last two or three years, have aroused increased interest, even the cinema has launched a couple of series on this topic. In fairness, it is worth saying that in terms of quality this film production is inferior to the film adaptation of Bogomolov’s “Moment of Truth”. In general, it is worth considering the work of SMERSH closely and there is nothing more objective than the documents of SMERSH itself, which at one time were not intended for a wide range of readers.

The tasks assigned to SMERSH were:

“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into units and institutions of the Red Army;

d) the fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the Red Army [switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];

e) combating desertion and self-mutilation at the fronts;

f) checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.

Why did the need to create such a counterintelligence service as SMERSH arise precisely in 1943?

In 1943, Abwehr activity reached its peak. The head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, traveled to the Eastern Front in June 1943. At a meeting in Riga, where the heads of the Abwehrstelle and field intelligence agencies, the heads of reconnaissance and sabotage schools were present, Canaris positively assessed the activities of the Abwehr III department - he was impressed by the message of the head of Abwehrkommando 104, Major Gesenregen, about the mass arrests and executions of Russians who did not accept the “new order." Canaris said so: “Our counterintelligence service is helping the Fuhrer strengthen the new order.” As for the first and second Abwehr departments in Army Group Nord, he assessed their actions as unsatisfactory. “Our intelligence department and sabotage service,” he said, “have lost their offensive spirit, which I always insisted on. We do not have agents in Soviet headquarters, but they should be there. I resolutely demand the mass deployment of agents. I have created as many schools for you as you need... “In 1943, the scale of sending agents into the Soviet rear increased almost one and a half times compared to 1942...

It must be said that the Abwehr did not care much about the quality of the agents; the quality of training was sacrificed for the sake of quantity. Perhaps the Abwehr professed a philosophical law about the inevitable transition from quantity to quality. But, in any case, such “Stakhanov methods” of sending spies and saboteurs to the rear of the Red Army inevitably led to tension in all counterintelligence services of the Red Army and the NKVD, and created favorable conditions for the work of the most valuable and experienced agents. It is interesting that the Abwehr leadership sometimes suffered from clearly adventuristic plans, setting, frankly speaking, tasks on a cosmic scale for its agents. So in August 1943, a group was sent to the Kazakh SSR, which, relying on the help of local nationalist elements, was supposed to launch agitation among the population for the separation of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union and for the formation, no more and no less, of an independent state under the protectorate of Germany. Another example, on May 23, 1944, a landing of an enemy heavy-duty aircraft was recorded in the area of the village of Utta, Astrakhan region, from which a detachment of saboteurs in the amount of 24 people was landed, led by an official German intelligence officer, Captain Eberhard von Scheller. This group was sent by the German intelligence agency "Valli I" “to prepare a base on the territory of Kalmykia for the transfer of 36 (!) squadrons of the so-called “Kalmyk Corps of Doctor Doll” to organize an uprising among the Kalmyks. The Battle of Kursk became the debut of SMERSH and a test of its strength. SMERSH made titanic efforts to ensure the secrecy of this strategic operation. One of the sources of information for German intelligence were defectors.

Top secret

In May this year The most affected by the betrayal of the Motherland were the 415th and 356th SD of the 61st Army and the 5th SD of the 63rd Army, of which 23 soldiers went over to the enemy.

One of the most effective measures to combat traitors to the Motherland, among others, was to carry out staging operations under the guise of group surrenders to the enemy of military personnel,

In the 415th Infantry Division, one group consisted of division reconnaissance officers, the second - of penal soldiers. One group of division scouts was created in the 356th Infantry Division.

This is what Helmut Klaussmann, 111th Wehrmacht PD, recalled: “In general, there were defectors on both sides throughout the war. Russian soldiers ran over to us even after Kursk. And our soldiers ran over to the Russians. I remember that near Taganrog two soldiers stood guard and went to the Russians, and a few days later we heard them calling over the radio to surrender. I think usually defectors were soldiers who just wanted to stay alive. They usually ran across before big battles, when the risk of dying in an attack overpowered the feeling of fear of the enemy. Few people moved either to us or from us due to their convictions. It was such an attempt to survive in this huge massacre. They hoped that after interrogations and checks you would be sent somewhere to the rear, away from the front. And then life will somehow form there.”

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