EntranceHannibal and Scipio Africanus: the battle of two brilliant warriors. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder: brief biography, photo The Syrian War and the last years of Scipio
In 218 BC, the troops of the famous Carthaginian commander Hannibal attacked the city of Saguntum, which was allied with Rome.
Thus began the Second Punic War. The main battle This war was fought near the city of Zama, located near Carthage. It happened in 202 BC and became a great victory for Rome. Led by Scipio Africanus, the Romans lured Hannibal into a trap.
Scipio for a long time studied how Hannibal fought and controlled his troops in order to later successfully use this knowledge against him. At the beginning of the war, Carthage's troops won a major victory at the Battle of Cannae. After her, Scipio was sent to capture New Carthage, located where Spain now lies.
On one side the city had reliable fortifications, on the other side there was a lagoon. The basis of Roman victories was usually a numerical advantage, but Scipio, not having one, decided to use cunning. One night, the water level in the lagoon dropped significantly, and the Roman commander decided to attack the city simultaneously from two sides. The Romans walked through shallow water and broke into the city. Scipio acted in a similar way during the assault on Zama.
The capture of New Carthage, according to Scipio's calculations, was supposed to recall Hannibal to Italy. Knowing this, Scipio himself crossed to the coast of North Africa in 205 BC, where the city of Utica fell before him.
Another achievement of Scipio was that he won over the local king Massinissa. After this, the Roman commander sent his troops to Carthage. Only by this time was the Senate of Carthage able to recall Hannibal back from Italy.
About eighty thousand people took part in the Battle of Zama, forty thousand on each side. The Roman army numbered ten thousand mounted soldiers. Carthage fielded three thousand cavalry and eight dozen elephants. Despite the fact that elephants were considered at that time the most dangerous weapon, which was terribly difficult to handle on the battlefield, those deployed by Carthage hardly posed a serious threat, since they were not properly trained.
The clash between the armies took place on an open field. Hannibal placed elephants in front of the army. Behind them took place a line of Libyan warriors, and then stood the experienced soldiers whom Hannibal had brought with him from Italy. Mounted units were located on the flanks. Scipio arranged his troops in columns. In the gap between the columns, he placed light infantrymen, creating the illusion that his soldiers were standing in lines. All this was supposed to help him cope with the elephants. It was these animals that launched Hannibal's attack. At the same time, the Carthaginian cavalry advanced. Scipio ordered the line to be held. Another order soon followed, according to which the light infantrymen left the columns. At the same time, the drums beat loudly and the trumpets of the Romans howled. Having achieved the desired effect, they scared the elephants, and the mahouts lost control of the animals. The elephants ran back, crushing Hannibal's warriors and proving completely useless in the battle. Scipio's cavalry, which included Numidian horse archers, moved forward, attacking the Carthaginians from the flanks.
All this allowed Scipio's heavy infantry to line up in battle formations and move towards the enemy. Roman soldiers clashed with the mercenaries of Carthage. They began to retreat, preventing the Libyans from entering the battle. Hannibal and his veterans himself headed into the thick of the battle. Scipio did not hide behind the backs of his soldiers either.
The advantage of the Romans was undeniable. In an attempt to escape, the Carthaginian mercenaries attacked their fellow Libyans. The Roman cavalry finished off the enemy infantry, surrounding him. During the battle, Carthage lost twenty thousand people, and the Romans lost four times less.
Managing to escape to Carthage, Hannibal appeared before the Senate and said that the Battle of Zama marked defeat in the war.
Participation in wars:
Second Punic War. Syrian war.
Participation in battles:
Capture of New Carthage. Battle of Becula. Under Ilip. Under Bagradis. Under Zama. With Magnesia
(Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus) Roman general, conqueror of Hannibal, consul
At first 2nd Punic War Scipio took part in several unsuccessful battles for the Romans, including the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC. e. After Roman defeat at Cannae Scipio formed a legion from the surviving warriors.
Four years after his death in Spain Publius And Gnaeus Scipioni Contrary to the expectations of the consuls and the people, none of the eminent citizens put forward their candidacy for the post of proconsul of Spain, although the election day had already been set. And when, on the appointed day, the citizens of Rome appeared on the Campus Martius, then no one volunteered to be proconsul, except the young Publius Scipio, who was twenty-four years old at the time.
At the end of 210 BC. a top-staffed legion led by Publius Scipio was sent to Spain. A praetor was appointed assistant to Publius. Mark Seelan, and Scipio appointed the legate Gnaeus Laelius as commander of the fleet. In the spring of 209 BC. e. As a result of a successful operation, Scipio captured New Carthage. Here 18 warships, 63 transport supplies, a treasury with 600 talents, grain reserves, 10 thousand free men and hostages from Carthage’s allies, the Iberians, were captured.
The citizens of New Carthage were released. Scipio granted the city the right to maintain its self-government. Young men and able-bodied slaves were rowed onto the ships and shipyards of New Carthage with the promise of freedom once the war was over.
Hostages from the Spanish tribes who were in New Carthage were sent home. All these measures allowed Scipio to achieve his political goal - many Spaniards went over to the side of Rome, which allowed Scipio to replenish his army.
In the spring of 208 BC. e. Scipio moved to Andalusia, where he defeated Hasdrubal Barku under Becula. In the battle, the Punics lost 10 thousand people killed and 12 thousand captured. The remnants of Hasdrubal's army moved to Italy to join the army Hannibal.
In this regard, Scipio had to allocate part of his troops to Italy (8 thousand Gauls and Iberians, 2 thousand infantry and a thousand horsemen).
In the spring of 206 BC. e. Carthage launched a new offensive against Scipio in Spain. However, in the battle of Bekul-Ilil, the Punian army - about 70 thousand people - was defeated, and Scipio occupied the last city in Spain - Gades.
Here the commander met with the Numidian king Masinissa, who promised Scipio his support if his troops landed in Africa. Scipio went to Libya to meet with the Lydian king Syphax and also achieved his support for the period of the future campaign.
After this, he returned to Rome, but instead of the expected triumph, he appeared before the Senate with a report on military operations in Spain. Despite opposition, he was granted consul rights, but most importantly, he managed to achieve the implementation of his plan - transferring the war to Africa. He understood that as soon as his legions landed there, Hannibal would inevitably be recalled from Italy.
The Senate did not allow Scipio recruit an army in Italy and did not provide him with assistance from public funds. Scipio could recruit only volunteers into his army and make do with his own funds and loans from private individuals. However, many tribes that had previously supported Hannibal, primarily the Etruscans and Sabels, now began to provide free assistance to Scipio.
The base for the expedition to Africa was Sicily, where there were two legions left here for the defeat at Cannae. Here Scipio had about 300 horsemen who did not express a desire to go to Africa. The commander offered them a kind of exchange - the transfer of horses and weapons to his detachment of volunteers, hardened in previous battles. Thus, Scipio, without special expenses, formed a sufficiently combat-ready formation.
After that Scipio returned to the south of Italy, where he captured Hannibal's last strategic frontier - Lokrami. Here they left a garrison, and Scipio returned to Sicily, where he completed the final preparations for landing in Africa.
In the spring of 204 BC. e. Scipio with an army of 30 thousand sailed to the shores of Africa. Having landed near Utica, his troops set up camp and began to besiege the city. With the help of Masinissa's cavalry, Scipio devastated the Carthaginian fields. However, despite a six-week siege, he failed to capture the city. Syphax did not keep his word and remained on the side of Carthage. Soon an army approached the city Hasdrubal (son of Gisgon), connected with Syphax.
Scipio had to lift the siege of Utica and fortify himself on a small peninsula. In the spring of 205 BC. e. Scipio's troops managed to put an end to the military camps of both Hasdrubal and Syphax and begin a new siege of Utica.
Taking into account the defense capability of Carthage, as well as the possibility of Hannibal returning from Italy, Scipio did not immediately storm Carthage, but only organized a blockade of it, depriving him of the possibility of supplies and assistance from the allies.
By this time, Hasdrubal and Syphax, with an assembled army of 30 thousand people, moved towards Scipio. Leaving a small detachment at Utica, Scipio went out to meet the enemy and, together with Masinissa defeated him on Great Plains.
The Carthaginian Senate decided to summon Hannibal from Italy and make peace with Rome. He even sent his representatives to the Roman camp. And although Scipio said that he came to win, and not to conclude agreements, he expressed his readiness to conclude an agreement on his own terms. The Senate accepted the terms of peace and sent its representatives to Rome with orders to sign peace. However, negotiations in Rome dragged on, and in 202 BC. e. Hannibal landed at Leptis.
Leaving a small detachment to guard his camp, Scipio went away from Hannibal through the valley of the Bagrad River. This path brought Scipio to the very center of the supply of Carthage and its internal regions and at the same time brought him closer to the Numidian reinforcements of Masinissa.
Having learned that Scipio's actions had endangered a vital area, the Carthaginian Senate demanded that Hannibal give the Romans battle. Instead of going north to Carthage, Hannibal moved west to meet Scipio, who at this time united with Masinissa and again continued his retreat. The Punic army was lured into an area in which there was an acute shortage of water. Both armies stopped at the village of Naragarra, where a personal meeting and negotiations took place between both commanders. However, the meeting did not lead to results.
The next day it started Battle of Zama Naragarra. Scipio arranged the legions in three lines with enough distance between them for the passage of elephants, which would inevitably come under cross-fire from javelins. On the flanks were cavalry under the command Lelia and Masinissa.
The elephants, frightened by the shouts, trumpets and darts, rushed to run towards their warriors. The cavalry surrounded Hannibal's troops from the flanks and went to their rear. The Punics, led by Hannibal, fled the battlefield. IN battle of Zama the Punes lost from 10 to 20 thousand people. Roman losses amounted to 1.5 thousand killed and wounded.
Scipio sent 10 talents of gold, 1,500 talents of silver, items made of Ivory and the most prominent of the prisoners.
Realizing that it was impossible to take Carthage without a long siege, Scipio agreed to make peace. He himself dictated to Carthage its terms, according to which Carthage remained free, but its possessions remained only in Africa. All lands and property seized from him were returned to Masinissa. Carthage transferred its navy to Rome, in addition to 10 ships, transport ships and all war elephants. The main condition for peace was the prohibition of Carthage to fight without the consent of Rome. Rome also received from Carthage an indemnity of 10 thousand talents, payable over 50 years.
Upon returning to Rome Scipio celebrated a magnificent triumph and received honorary nickname African.
Scipio's victories in the 2nd Punic War brought him widespread popularity in Roman society.
From 199 to 184 BC Scipio Africanus was in the position of princeps of the Senate and had a huge influence on the entire political life of Rome. In foreign policy, Scipio and his supporters advocated the creation of a number of states dependent on Rome from the conquered areas, while leaving them some independence. Peace treaties evidenced this line: with Carthage after the 2nd Punic War, with Philip of Macedon after 2nd Macedonian War and with the king of Syria Antiochus III. New colonies were created in northern Italy and on the Adriatic coast.
In domestic politics, Scipio’s group advocated the widespread allocation of land to low-income citizens, primarily veterans, as well as relief military service Roman soldiers.
When war broke out between Rome and the Syrian king Antiochus III, one of whose squadrons was commanded by Hannibal, who had found refuge in Syria, it was decided to put Publius Scipio’s younger brother at the head of the expeditionary forces. Lucia. himself Publius Scipio Africanus made a legate under his brother. However, the real commander was Publius himself. He practically directed the military operations; finances were in his hands.
In 189 BC. e. V Battle of Magnesia Antiochus III was finally defeated. According to the concluded peace, Syria lost its possessions in Europe and Asia Minor and the right to conduct offensive wars With Western states. Antiochus III was entrusted with the responsibility of handing over Hannibal.
A few years later, a group led by Marcus Porcius Cato accused those who returned to Rome Lucius and Publius Scipioni in state unreliability, which consisted in the fact that they achieved peace from Antiochus III through bribery. The Senate demanded a report on financial affairs from the Scipios. At the trial, Publius managed to defend the honor of his family name, but he was forced to leave Rome and retire to his estate in Lithorne, where he died in 183 BC. e.
Biography
Serval Zor
Re: -2353 date: 01/06/2020 / 13:51:22
I wonder why people don't try to imagine what they are writing about.
About Zama. How do you imagine the events?
By the time Hannibal returned, Scipio already owned the Bagrad River valley, approached Carthage and controlled the “vital lands.” What kind of invasion are we talking about then? Theater of the Absurd, isn't it?
And Hannibal, according to sources, flatly refused to oppose Scipio, realizing that there was no chance. And he even sent envoys of the ruling Carthaginian council “through the forest.” They say that only the commander can decide when to engage in battle.
The council's envoys nodded their heads, admitting that Hannibal was right, after which they stopped sending money to the overly independent warrior. Hannibal, in response, defiantly forced the recruits sent from Carthage to plow the land, hinting that, if necessary, he would live on pasture (at the same time, showing how much he valued these same recruits).
However, no matter how much Hannibal swaggered around, it was clear that he would still have to perform. He was just waiting for the right moment.
Scipio, having all the trump cards in his hands, decided to provoke the enemy by “exposing himself.”
Scipio divided his army into two and sent it over long distances (there was even a reason - the pursuit of Syphax's son Hermine, who had gathered a considerable army).
In this way, Hannibal was given a fabulous chance in a hopeless situation - to make a breakthrough, unite with his allies and, if possible, attack the Roman armies in parts.
And he took a risk, as he risked throughout the 17 years of the war against Rome.
They were just waiting for his throw.
Massinissa and Laelius, according to the instructions, abandoned the slowest units, and themselves with cavalry and light infantry arrived to join Scipio at the agreed point X.
Hermine could not find her bearings so quickly (and why should she? The prince lacked neither experience nor talent), leaving Hannibal alone with an enemy army superior in number and quality.
(Yes, I read Wikipedia and I know what numbers are written there. But I also know that they were taken from Appian, and he was the only Roman historian (by the way, the latest and most patriotic) who claimed that there were more Puns under Zama. The rest they were generally bashfully silent about the numbers, as if they had taken in water in their mouths, or at best got off with remarks like “two equal commanders with equal armies”).
The rest was a matter of technique, although it didn’t turn out entirely smoothly. Judging by the fact that Massinissa “disappeared” somewhere for most of the battle, and that the Romans generally experienced some difficulties when trying to envelop them from the flank (probably from one flank, and not from two, as is officially believed). Why from one? Because trying to envelop the fighting cavalry is obviously absurd, given the numerical superiority of the enemy. There was no problem calculating that Massinissa and Laelius would overturn cavalry that was several times inferior to them.
Apparently, there was a cavalry flank battle (distracting), there was the same false attack by recruits in the center (with the goal of tying up, entertaining and delaying) and an attempt to go around on the other flank (with the hope of not winning, but escaping with the most combat-ready units from the trap) . The trick with the cavalry was a success, the attack in the center failed (the recruits mixed up too quickly under the onslaught of the Romans, partially blocking the trajectory of the main attack with their retreat), and the breakthrough of the veterans on the flank (including through the retreating recruits) was stopped by a reserve prepared in advance in case of surprise.
Everything was played out like clockwork.
It could be argued that my conclusions are fictitious. But in any case, it is more logical than other interpretations. Otherwise, there are too many obviously inexplicable absurdities:
1. Why did Hannibal carry out a full-fledged attack on the Roman system, although he had never done this before in 17 years due to the suicide of the act.
2. Why didn’t Hannibal carry out false attacks, which he always used in both successful and unsuccessful battles?
3. Why, after the “first line attack” on the Roman legions, there was nowhere for them to retreat (too big a problem for the master of false attacks and retreats and enticements; again, he had been planning an escape route for 17 years, but then suddenly he didn’t foresee the obvious).
4. And where, for God’s sake, did Hannibal get dozens of elephants? No one can give a clear answer. Must have fallen from the sky. But they really have nowhere to come from. On his campaign to Italy (for which Hannibal had been preparing for a long time), he collected 37 elephants, and then suddenly five dozen were taken, despite the fact that all the “African reserves” of these animals had already been wasted in two previous battles on the Great Plains. If we discard the version that Scipio, who controls the central regions of the Carthaginian state, was personally involved in the capture, the option of purchase remains. But from whom? The Ptolemies were allies of Rome and would definitely not have agreed to such a setup (for themselves first of all). The Seleucids could, but did not sell. Otherwise, they would definitely have found out about this, the more likely the enemy would be and then there is such a reason for accusations. But there were no accusations. So that's also a minus.
There were probably no elephants, at least not in the quantities indicated.
In the spring of 204 BC. e. Publius Cornelius Scipio landed with troops in Africa, striking at the very heart of Carthage. Despite his consular powers, he commanded a small army - he had only two legions and 7,000 volunteers recruited in Italy. For two years he expanded the bridgehead for further offensive. He managed to gain a foothold in Africa and win over the Numidians, excellent horsemen and shooters, to his side. Using tactics adopted from Hannibal, Scipio defeated the Carthaginian commander Gisgon and seized the initiative. After this, Scipio occupied Tunisia and took control of the food supply routes to. The position of the Carthaginians became more and more difficult.
Map of Scipio's African campaign 204−202. (pinterest.com)
Return of Barka
The successes of the Romans in Africa required drastic measures - Hannibal Barca was called from Italy to protect the capital. By this time he was an experienced military leader, and his skill as a commander was legendary. He was 45 years old, he knew how to convince people and lead soldiers. At a critical moment for the state, he returned to Africa to destroy the Roman army and punish the traitor Numidians. Together with Hannibal, his veterans who had already fought with him in Italy for 15 years arrived in Africa. These were experienced warriors, personally loyal to Hannibal.
Hannibal Barca. (pinterest.com)
Hannibal landed south of Carthage and immediately began active operations. He had to replenish the army (the commander especially counted on Numidian mercenaries), liberate Carthage from the food blockade and throw the Romans into the sea. Soon troops from Italy arrived to him, which consisted of Celts, Iberians and Moors. The Carthaginian forces grew to 35 thousand people, and in addition to infantry and cavalry, the army included war elephants. From large city Hadrumeta Hannibal moved northeast and camped near the city of Zama, 150 km west of Carthage.
On the eve of the battle
Soon the Romans approached Zama, whose army was also reinforced by the Numidians. According to ancient authors, before the battle there was a meeting between Hannibal and Scipio. The Punic tried to reconcile with Publius, reminding him how changeable fate can be (after all, just recently the Carthaginian army stood under the walls of Rome), and offered peace. But Scipio, angered by the treacherous violation of peace by the Carthaginian Senate, did not accept Hannibal’s conditions. This is how he concluded his speech: “You can either surrender yourself and your Fatherland to our discretion, or defeat us on the battlefield.” Hannibal had no choice.
Source: pinterest.com
The battle was supposed to decide not only the outcome of the war, but also who would get the role of hegemon in the world. Carthage defended its independence, the Romans fought for peace. Here is what the Greek historian Polybius wrote about the upcoming battle: “Never before have there been troops so tested in battle, so happy and skilled in military affairs; Never before has fate promised such valuable rewards to the fighters. The winner was to gain power not only over Libya and Europe, but also over all other countries of the world hitherto known to us.”
Balance of power
Scipio lined up his troops as follows: in the center in two lines he built infantry (in the first line there were hastati - young soldiers, in the second - principles and triarii - veterans), cavalry was located on the flanks. Under Zama, the Romans used a dismembered battle formation, which allowed them to combine riflemen and heavy infantry in formation and make quick formation changes.
Roman soldiers during the Second Punic War. (pinterest.com)
Hannibal had 80 elephants under Zama - more than ever before (however, the elephants were poorly trained). He decided to build elephants in front of his front in order to frighten the Romans and force his way through their formation like a battering ram. The infantry was lined up in three lines: in the first, the Celts and the Iberians, who arrived in time to him from Italy. In the second line are Carthaginian mercenaries recruited in Africa and a detachment of Macedonians. Hannibal veterans lined up in the third (reserve) line. The Numidian and Carthaginian cavalry were located on the flanks.
Source: pinterest.com
The ratio and size of the armies that fought at Zama is still a matter of debate, but it is likely that the forces of the parties were approximately equal (about 35 thousand people on each side), but the Romans had superiority in cavalry, and the Punics, respectively, in infantry.
Elephant attack
The battle began with an attack on the Roman front. Dozens of elephants moved towards Scipio’s army, but he managed to prepare in advance. The roar of trumpets was heard, the throwers showered the elephants with arrows and darts, which plunged the animals into panic. The animals turned back and began to trample their own troops - especially Hannibal's cavalry. Those elephants that moved forward passed through the Roman maniples, formed at intervals along the front, without harming them.
Immediately after the flight of the elephants, Scipio attacked Hannibal's horsemen with cavalry and defeated them. The Roman cavalry rushed to pursue the fleeing and dropped out of the battle, but the flanks of the Carthaginians were exposed.
Battle of Zama, elephant attack. (pinterest.com)
Infantry fight
The infantry (except Hannibal's veterans) moved towards each other. The Punes advanced in two echelons, the Romans in a single formation. Despite the swiftness of the attack of the Celts and Ligurians of Hannibal’s first line, the Roman front was not broken through, and soon the legionnaires themselves pushed back the Gauls, advancing in deep formation. The second line of Hannibal's army did not take part in this attack. The Italian detachments of the Carthaginians were scattered, but the attempt to attack the second line of the Punics ended in failure - the hastati maniples choked in blood. The principles from the second line came to the aid of their comrades and led the next attack. At their expense, Scipio extended the front and enveloped the enemy from the flanks. Despite fierce resistance, the Carthaginian phalanx was cut, and now the second line ceased to exist. Further on the path of the Romans stood fresh forces that did not take part in the battle and consisted of Hannibal’s veterans.
Instead of immediately rushing to attack the Punic third line, Scipio showed composure and reorganized his troops. He gathered all the infantry in one line, leaving the hastati in the center and building the triarii on the flanks for a simultaneous attack with all forces. This mirrored Hannibal's formation at Cannae. The Roman troops showed iron discipline. But despite all the preparations, the Romans were unable to break through the Carthaginian line. Neither side could prevail.
The outcome of the battle was decided by the Roman cavalry, which returned to the battlefield and struck Hannibal in the rear. After a stubborn battle, the Carthaginians faltered. The massacre began, Hannibal's army ceased to exist, and he himself barely escaped. The Romans probably lost about 5 thousand people.
Soldiers of Hannibal's army. (pinterest.com)
Results of the battle
This is how Polybius describes the battlefield: “Everything was drenched in blood, filled with wounded and dead, ... heaps of corpses bleeding and piled on top of each other, as well as weapons scattered everywhere in disorder along with people.” It was all over for Carthage. The greatest commander of the Hellenistic world was later struck down by the Roman consul. “The worthy has met the worthy,” as the proverb says. This marked the beginning of a new era - power over the Mediterranean passed to Rome.
The Battle of Zama is a rare example of a clash between two true geniuses of war. Scipio's subtle understanding of tactics and strategy and excellent knowledge of the enemy helped Rome not only survive, but also defeat the formidable Carthage. It is ironic that the same two legions that once fled the battlefield at Cannae were the basis of Scipio's army at Zama. Peace was soon concluded. The Second Punic War ended with the victory of Rome, and just 55 years later Carthage would be completely destroyed by the Romans. For Scipio, the Battle of Zama became the zenith of his career. It is interesting that both great commanders ended their lives in exile and obscurity, thus their fates were linked until the very end.
When Scipio crossed from Sicily to Africa, Hannibal had not yet been defeated and stood with a small army in Lower Italy. One might ask why Scipio did not first attack Hannibal here, where he could easily gain a great advantage over the enemy and end the war? The answer to the question will be this: in this case, Hannibal would have been able to avoid a decisive battle with superior enemy forces and would ultimately have withdrawn his army to Africa. And if he had arrived there before Scipio, it would have been very difficult for the latter to gain a foothold in Africa and enter into an alliance with the Numidians.
It would, perhaps, be more correct to pose the opposite question: why didn’t Hannibal earlier voluntarily clear Italy, where he could no longer hope for any positive achievements? The answer will be this: Hannibal did not strive for victory over Rome, but only for the conquest of the world on acceptable terms, and believed that the Romans would, after all, pay a decent price for the cleansing of Italy. Even when
Scipio landed in Africa, Hannibal did not immediately follow him. He knew that the Romans would not be able to achieve particularly large successes and, in any case, would not strike the city of Carthage itself, whose fortifications had a perimeter three times larger than that of Rome at that time (26,905 m), and if his fellow countrymen managed to cope with Scipio without him, while the Romans, for their part, will not be able to oust the Punes from Italy, the forces will be to some extent in balance, and on such a basis peace can be concluded.
Only when Scipio had already been in Africa for two years and, thanks to his enterprise and luck, achieved unexpectedly major successes, namely, captured Syphax and found a strong ally in Masinissa, did Hannibal finally leave Italy and with the remnants of his army came to Africa for the last fight . His arrival gave the Carthaginians the courage to reject the already concluded peace and even break the truce, so now everything depended on which side would have the superiority of military forces. In addition to Hannibal’s veterans, his brother Mago’s troops, Balearic, Ligurian and Celtic, also arrived in Africa; began recruiting among African tribes, and even Carthaginian citizens themselves took up arms.
It was not possible to win over most of the Numidian tribes to his side - and precisely those whose nomadic camps lay closer to Carthage: Masinissa called them to arms to help the Romans.
Both sides prepared intensely for the fight. With wise calculation, Hannibal established his headquarters not in Carthage itself, but in a small seaside town, Hadrumet, 5-6 marches south of Carthage. Here he better protected his veterans from corrupting contact with the capital; here he could hold the new detachments being formed more firmly in his hands; from here he could attack Scipio from the rear if he moved towards Carthage itself, and he himself was covered by Carthage from the flank in case the Romans wanted to attack him before the completion of his preparations. It seems that three quarters of a year passed before Hannibal advanced on the Romans, still having only very weak cavalry.
He had serious reasons for this. Scipio had not yet united with Masinissa; This means that if it were possible to overtake him before this connection, or to stand between the allies and keep them apart, then the Punics would be guaranteed victory. Scipio still did not hold any harbor in his hands and only had a stronghold as a fortified camp (castra Corneliana), located on a peninsula near Utica, which he unsuccessfully tried to take by storm. From here he moved into the interior of the country and made several crossings through the fertile valley of Bagrad (Mejerda), ruining and devastating the country.
Then news reached him that Hannibal had marched against him from his rallying point, Hadrumet, and had camped at Zama, the more westerly of the two cities that bore that name.
Scipio's position was critical. If he remained, waiting in the Bagrada valley, and Hannibal attacked him here before the arrival of Numidian reinforcements, then defeat would be inevitable.
If he returned to his seaside camp, he would be locked there by Hannibal, decisively cut off from Masinissa and would be completely dependent on the enemy without any hope of turning his fate differently. His expedition will be wrecked, and it will be good if he can transport the army back to Sicily without great losses.
At this moment, legend dates the notorious personal negotiations between Hannibal and Scipio, in which the Carthaginian acts as a party asking for peace. There is no doubt that this meeting of two generals, as Konrad Lehmann establishes, was generated by the imagination of Ennius. At that moment, Hannibal least of all thought about asking the Romans for peace, and Scipio was very far from unconditional confidence in victory.
According to legend, three spies were captured in his camp, but he did not punish them, but in the proud consciousness of the superiority of his forces, he ordered to show them everything and release them to Hannibal. This story was borrowed almost verbatim by Ennius from Herodotus from his History of the Persian Wars, from Ennius it passed into Roman tradition, and then through Polybius was accepted into the current account of historiography. We see how carefully we should treat the reports of our sources. We try to derive our judgments more from general position things than from these free plexuses of fantasy. Neither Scipio nor Hannibal loses at all from such a critical approach to them. Here the same thing is repeated that we have already observed in the study of the Persian Wars: in the right light, the heroism of the Greeks did not diminish at all when we reduced the number of the Persian army so much. A picture painted by legend and poetry should not be considered false because it is not painted in the same colors as history is written. They only speak a different language, and the only question is how to correctly translate this language into the language of history.
Scipio managed to make a great decision that puts him in the ranks greatest commanders world history and imparts an inner truth to all the poetic images invented by Ennius in his praise: this decision consisted in the fact that he placed all his hopes on courage, cut off the possibility of retreat for himself, refused communication with the sea, the last chance of salvation in case of failure, and, realizing that it was dangerous to wait for Masinissa, he went to meet him inland. He stepped aside and left Hannibal. Near the city of Naraggara, on the border of what is now Tunisia and Algeria, he united with the troops of Masinissa and began to await the arrival of Hannibal here, who had no choice but to take a decisive battle.
We saw how the scales wavered in this battle until the last moment. But if we want to fully comprehend how much mental strength was needed in order to give the order to march on Naraggara, as well as to conduct the battle itself with imperturbable calm, then we must weigh both of these moments in their mutual connection: consider the battle in connection with the entire strategic situation, and the courage of a strategic step should be measured by the severity with which the battle was played out.
The desperate courage of Scipio's decision is reflected in a very remarkable way in the incorrect name with which tradition associates the battle down to the present day - Zama. Even after the victory, Scipio did not dare in his message to Rome to give his strategic situation, to show in its entirety how this march was carried out into the interior of the country, away from the sea shores; he does not indicate the place of the battle itself, mentioning only the name of Hannibal’s main headquarters during his last transition; this name began to denote the battle itself, and this obscured the entire strategic picture so much that historians could hesitate in choosing between Western and Eastern Zama. Scipio's march can be compared with the movement of the Silesian army from Mulda through Saala in October 1813 or with the retreat from Ligny to Wavre in 1815; both of these operations were strategic victories over Napoleon. And if Scipio, instead of boasting about the unheard-of courage of his decision, prefers to hide and disguise the danger to which he was exposed on the path to victory, then this reminds us of the case of Moltke, when he, fearing the vultures of criticism, outlined his most brilliant and boldest strategic step - entry into Bohemia with a split army - as “an application to unfavorable conditions of the situation.”
Even after the Naraggar victory, Scipio with his insignificant forces could not think about the siege and capture of Carthage. Both morally and economically, Rome was so exhausted by the long war that it could not and did not want to allocate new funds for it; Meanwhile, the groupings of the Greco-Macedonian states developed into such relations that Rome faced the pressing question of intervention and a new war. Just as before Scipio's departure for Africa, Roman politicians did not approve of the expedition and predicted failure, so after the victory they raised their voices again; but only now they pulled in the opposite direction and demanded that the fight continue until complete victory over the enemy, right up to the destruction of Carthage. However, the winner at Naraggar showed that he knew how to correctly take into account not only his strength, but also its limitations. How often they blamed him for rushing to make peace, not wanting to cede the glory of final victory to his successor. This reproach, while claiming to be deadly sharp, showed only the envy of the critics, and in our days it should not be repeated. Much time would have passed before Scipio's successor, in the fight against Hannibal and the impregnable walls of Carthage, would inherit this glory. Scipio better understood the benefits of his home city and accepted the peace now offered at the insistence of Hannibal. The conditions of this peace were essentially not very different from those that Scipio himself a year ago, before the arrival of Hannibal, set for the Punes and which the Roman people found at that time: quite acceptable. Thus, the significance of the battle of Naraggar lay not so much in its positive side - in the very victory won here by Rome; it was rather of a negative order; Carthage was broken in its last rise, and its citizens lost hope for the future. The most important of the new conditions added to the peace treaty was that Carthage had no right to wage any war without the consent of Rome, and, therefore, recognized its full sovereignty.
Of course, with the conclusion of peace, it would be difficult to say with certainty whether this condition would remain a dead letter or whether it would really put an end to the independent Carthaginian policy. The submission of the defeated city depended in the future on international relations, on Macedonian and Syrian politics, on internal development Carthage and Rome. What followed showed that the defeat at Naraggar finally broke the strength of Carthage.
Six years later, in 195, when the Romans also conquered Macedonia in a short time without the participation of Carthage, the Carthaginians, at the request of the Romans, expelled Hannibal from their hometown, and only this event gave the peace treaty its true meaning.
Knows two great commanders world history- Hannibal and Napoleon, whose glory was in no way diminished by their final defeat. Before their greatness, history has always been tempted to judge their victors more harshly than themselves - so as not to create the impression that the winner is superior to the vanquished. No matter how much the Romans extol Scipio or the English Wellington, however, in all cases where national pride was not involved, they speak about them with very restraint, and about Wellington even with some disdain; The least recognized was the one who most has the right to be called the winner of Napoleon in strategy - General Gneisenau. Here it was generally difficult to talk about comparison with Napoleon, since the Prussian commander was not Gneisenau, but Blücher, and no one even thought of placing Blücher as a strategist along with Napoleon.
Let history give this satisfaction to the vanquished, since their opponents received a rich reward in the victory itself. We, however, in our special study must judge more carefully. We will talk about the commanders of modern times later, but about Scipio it should be said directly that he, as our entire presentation has already shown, can rightfully lay claim to a place, although, of course, not higher than Hannibal, but still next to him. Sober Rome, with its strict, authoritarian forms of statehood, does not allow the individual to emerge as independently as we saw in Greece. common feature- discipline - so prevails over everything personal that we are almost afraid to talk about genius, which must always have an extremely strong individuality. But perhaps we should not skimp on this word when we are talking about the man who gave the Roman army new forms of tactics, dared to go on an expedition to Africa and to march from the Bagrad Valley to Naraggara - who firmly and confidently, through the most dangerous crisis, fought a battle with Hannibal and finally managed not to exceed the measures in his demands and conclude a proper peace.
However, we know about Scipio not only these general abstract traits of greatness, as they emerge from the events themselves. We have the opportunity to look straight into the commander’s face in the portrait that Mommsen’s creative power was able to recreate from various sources and with which I want to complete my description of the Second Punic War. With this research I have managed, I hope, to prove the great importance of Scipio as a commander and statesman; it remains to supplement this evidence with the last decisive feature: Mommsen gives a characterization of Scipio at the moment when he appears before the Roman people as a candidate for the post of commander-in-chief in Spain, where the Roman troops were completely defeated.
“The son was coming to avenge the death of his father, whose life nine years ago he had saved on the banks of the Ticino; he was a courageously handsome young man with long hair, modestly blushing with shame when, in the absence of another, more worthy candidate, he volunteered to take a high but dangerous position; a simple military tribune, now at once elevated by the choice of centuries to the highest position - all this made an extraordinary and indelible impression on the Roman townspeople and peasants.
Indeed, the image of this hero is marked by some miraculous power of charm. That cheerful and confident, half sincere and half feigned enthusiasm that he radiated around him created a dazzling aura for him. He had enough ardent imagination to ignite hearts, and enough prudence to obey the demands of prudence in everything and not lose sight of small details; he was not so naive as to share the blind faith of the crowd in his divine inspiration, and was not straightforward enough to destroy this faith himself; however, in the depths of his soul, he was convinced that the special mercy of the gods was overshadowing him, in short, this was the real nature of the prophet; being placed above the people, he at the same time stood outside the people; he was unshakably faithful to the word once given and was distinguished by a royal mindset; however, he considered it a humiliation for himself to accept the ordinary royal title and at the same time could not even imagine that the state institutions of the republic would bind him like any other citizen; he was so confident in his greatness that he knew neither envy nor malice at all, condescendingly recognizing other people's merits and forgiving other people's mistakes; he was an excellent commander and a subtle diplomat without that repulsive imprint that is characteristic of both of these ranks; a true Roman patriot with a Hellenic education, eloquent and courteous, Publius Scipio easily won the hearts of women and warriors, his countrymen and Spaniards, the hearts of his rivals in the Senate and the heart of his greater (according to Mommsen, I would say differently) Carthaginian enemy. Soon his name was on everyone’s lips, and he became a star, which, it seemed, was destined to bring victory and peace to his homeland.”
Note to the 3rd edition. 1. In the first two editions, I fully cited in this place Appian’s account of the battle of Zama, so that the reader could compare this version with mine and directly see what incorrect descriptions of battles we find in ancient authors - descriptions that have nothing in common with actual events and should simply be discarded in toto. Regarding the aforementioned Appian story, no one denies this, since here we have the happy opportunity to draw truthful information from another source. But this is not enough. We must have the courage to reject obviously legendary stories even in cases where we do not have the opportunity to replace them with something better.
It is not easy to decide on this, and only very gradually scientific world gets used to the correct standards. In view of this, I strongly recommend that the reader familiarize himself with Appian’s story, but I myself, unfortunately, for the sake of saving space, must refuse to reprint it on these pages.
2. Veith, in his revised volume of his work “Die Antiken Schlachtfelder” (III, 2), in its main features, both tactical and strategic, adheres to the understanding of the campaign of 202, which was developed by Konrad Lehmann and me; Moreover, through extremely careful geographical and topographical research, he establishes with all possible accuracy the very place of the battle. In particular, he, like us, places the battle not near Zama, but near Naraggara and believes that the saving moment for the Romans was, firstly, the echelon tactics developed by Scipio in Spain, and secondly, the return of the cavalry, distracted at first by the Punians. But I cannot agree with all that Feit found it possible to borrow from Polybius and weave into his construction.
Faith believes that Lehman and I were too skeptical of Polybius's story; he himself sees in this story only one indisputably erroneous point - the incongruity that the Carthaginian citizens are depicted first as cowards and then as brave men. But this error consists only of an incorrect interpretation of the behavior of the Carthaginians, but does not distort the facts themselves; Such mistakes are quite excusable. I hold exactly the opposite opinion: in my opinion, one would rather forgive a single fact than an explanation that claims to be convincing and at the same time represents such obvious absurdity that it disappears by itself. Be that as it may, there are still such inconsistencies as the fact that Hannibal almost won the battle, although his two first lines fought among themselves; the retreat of the Roman hastati remains due to the excessive amount of blood and corpses on the field. All these fables obviously came here from the same arsenal as Hannibal's wigs, rowing on land, the midday tides near New Carthage and much more that Polybius, with all his critical flair, so thoughtlessly borrows from his sources. As for the tactical evolutions built on similar material by Feit, they are absolutely fantastic pictures. This is all the more inevitable since defense through Hannibal’s 80 mythical elephants plays a very prominent role in them, and yet Feit, when calculating the forces (p. 681), himself comes to the conclusion that the Carthaginians had no more than 15-20 elephants.
It turns out that Scipio, because of these few elephants, radically changed the usual Roman battle formation. This is all the less likely since elephants were usually used not against infantry, but against cavalry. Scipio, according to Feit (p. 691), could have learned about Hannibal’s intention to move his elephants against the infantry in this battle from the fact that the elephants were in front, and, therefore, had to move first. I cannot imagine that Hannibal showed so little foresight.
Since he had conceived something extraordinary, it was, of course, clear to him that his technique would be especially effective if applied unexpectedly.
Consequently, Hannibal had to order that the elephants line up first, as usual, along with the cavalry and only in last minute came forward to cover the infantry; this could be done at the very end of the journey - over several hundred steps. If everything stated above is not enough, then this consideration alone clearly shows what a children's fairy tale this whole story with elephants and with the passages left in advance for them in the Roman formation is, so that the elephants obediently use these corridors kindly provided to them. Exactly how Hannibal appears to have actually used his elephants has been outlined above.
The fact that the entire legend about the African campaign was intertwined with the conscious fiction of some poet, Konrad Lehmann provided additional direct evidence by discovering a similar story from Herodotus as the source of the story of the spies ("Jahrb. f. klass., Philologie", 1896. , Bd. 153, No. 68). Polybius had enough critical sense to exclude the story of the duel between Scipio and Hannibal, which, of course, arose from the same source; however, the critic overlooked that the anecdote with the spies, and the personal meeting of both commanders, and the battle of the Punics among themselves, and the battlefield impassable due to corpses and blood - all this deserves just as little faith. Old Laelius himself, confusing genuine memories with images of the Ennian poem, could have told Polybius these details, but the voice of criticism was silent. After all, even Thucydides was similarly misled by his hospitable Spartan friend and accepted his story about the treason of Pausanias as true.
Feith’s other deviation from my concept is also very significant: he does not agree that Scipio left the region of Zama and reached Naraggara to receive reinforcements from Masinissa; according to Feith, the Roman army was in Naraggar even before the approach of Hannibal. If so, then in a most unexpected way we must greatly lower our opinion of the strategic abilities not only of Scipio, but also of his great adversary. Scipio's unheard-of bold decision - to leave his place and go in a direction from which his return path was cut off - disappears, and Hannibal is reproached for having, without any urgent need, set out from Hadrumet ahead of schedule and gave a decisive battle without finishing his preparations. Meanwhile, if at the time of the Carthaginians' departure from Hadrumetum Scipio was standing in the vicinity of Zama, Hannibal, apparently, had in mind to attack him with superior forces - and then his premature sortie is justified; if Scipio was already in Naraggara, then his union with Masinissa should have been considered an accomplished fact, and Hannibal had no reason to interrupt his preparatory work and, without gathering all his strength, to set off on a campaign.
Such, so to speak, reduction in the value of two major historical values, of course, could not serve as an argument against the facts if these facts themselves were provable. In this case, however, we see the opposite.
The arguments given by Feith (p. 639) are very unclear and completely unconvincing. We have a similar case in the battle of Lechfeld, where in the same way historical meaning The personality of Emperor Otto depends greatly on whether the battle took place on the left bank of the river or on the right.
My position that Scipio himself subsequently did not fully admit the unheard-of courage of his departure to Naraggara is dismissed by Faith (p. 641) as psychologically implausible; success, he believes, in the eyes of contemporaries even more than in the eyes of descendants, serves as a justification for risk. I can refute this argument about psychological implausibility with historical analogies. When Napoleon entered the rear of the Austrian army in 1800 in order to cut off its retreat, in order to more accurately capture the enemy, he had the courage to divide his own army into several parts and send it along various roads that the Austrians could use. As a result, he was exposed to the extreme risk of being defeated at Marengo if the seconded Desais did not arrive in time with reinforcements. However, it never occurred to Napoleon to boast after the victory of his courage (in which he would certainly have been justified); on the contrary, he simply gives a false account of the battle, turning courage into wise forethought. To give another example: Moltke's greatest strategic deed must undoubtedly be recognized as his entry into Bohemia with two divided armies, with the danger that one of them might be attacked by the main forces of the Austrians before the second arrived in place. Although the entry was brilliantly successful, the conceit of military critics was by no means bowed to success; they constantly tried to prove that only unprecedented luck or an unprecedented mistake by the enemy brought Moltke victory, and the field marshal himself finally took up his pen (1867) to defend himself against these attacks.
Sann, in his "Untersuchungen zu Scipios Ferdzug in Afrika", page 24, quite rightly gives the grounds on which Veit forces Scipio to go to Naraggara. But his own arguments with which he justifies Scipio’s position at Zama are equally unconvincing; Zann believes that Scipio hoped to cover Masinissa's offensive in this way. This would be a grave mistake. Where did Masinissa come from?
Of course, from the west. Why would Scipio, covering his allies, expose his own army to the danger of attack from Hannibal’s superior forces, when he could simply have instructed the Numidians to join the Romans along one of the more northern roads mentioned in the sources.
Let me sum up the debate. If the battle took place at Naraggara, then Scipio’s arrival in this area has only one explanation: under the pressure of necessity, the Roman makes a heroic choice and, seeing in courage the only path to salvation and victory, leaves Hannibal inland, to Naraggara itself, so that here connect with Masinissa. Feith's explanation that Scipio went here of his own free will cannot be considered satisfactory. If the battle took place at Zama, then it is not clear why Hannibal accepted it. He expected another strong force of cavalry from Vaermina, who did join him a few weeks after the battle. The fact that he nevertheless accepted the battle of Naraggara, already knowing about the union of Scipio with Masinissa, seems quite natural if we take into account how far he went in pursuit of the enemy, and in what an unfavorable strategic position he placed Scipio; if both armies had met in the vicinity of Zama, Hannibal would have lost very little
He would have won a lot by delaying the decisive battle for a few more weeks and, in the meantime, receiving much needed cavalry reinforcements from Vaermina. So Feit is right when he assigns Zama as the place where the battle took place; but he is wrong in accepting an unsatisfactory explanation for Naraggara (a campaign into the interior of the country with the aim of devastating the area).
Feith is mistaken in believing (p. 658) that the maneuver by which Scipio extended his front at the expense of a second (or third) line was, in my opinion, a surprise to the Carthaginians. I myself say that Scipio developed echelon tactics back in Spain and applied it in the battles on the “Great Plains”. Hannibal, of course, knew this and, therefore, was prepared for similar techniques on the part of Scipio. Nevertheless, Hannibal counted on victory and was to some extent right, since he had an advantage in infantry; and even according to the testimony of the Romans themselves, Hannibal, thanks to this superiority, would inevitably have won if the Roman-Numidian cavalry had not returned in time and attacked the Carthaginians from the rear.
One of the most significant results of my research in the field of ancient warfare was the statement that the Romans developed echelon tactics only during the Second Punic War under the command of Scipio. The first who agreed with me at a time when Mommsen stubbornly rejected it was Fröhlich. He responded to my work with the article: “Die Bedeutung des zweiten punischen Krieges für die Entwicklung des römischen Heerwesens”, 1884. Kromeyer and Veit also now came to my point of view. “Scipio’s echeloning of the Roman battle order in depth into three independent lines and his brilliant flank evolutions, made possible only by this innovation, were what snatched victory from the hands of his great enemy,” writes Kromayer. This is absolutely fair, but it contradicts Kromeyer’s idea that the Romans from time immemorial mastered the art of maneuvering the smallest tactical units - maniples.
For anyone who mastered such an art, flanking movements, as Scipio conducted them at Naraggar, not only did not represent anything special, but were simpler than ever; Moreover, one can even say that for them the Scipionic system would not be progress, but a step back, not an improvement in tactics, but, on the contrary, a transition to cruder forms. Even Kromayer and Feith could not fail to see that between the helpless immobility of Roman tactics at Cannae and the Naraggar maneuvering some significant transformation must have taken place, and that here one must look for one of the great deeds of Scipio. But wishing at the same time to preserve the idea of the extraordinary subtlety of the imaginary ancient Roman Quincunx-Taktik (chess order tactics), they fall into an insoluble internal contradiction.
When I first (in "Histor. Zeitschr.", Bd. 51, 1883) published my discovery (as I dare call it), the main objection that I raised to myself was that Polybius was not only nothing does not report any reforms in Roman infantry tactics during the Second Punic War, but even apparently knows nothing about them.
At present, the question is so clear that this objection is no longer raised by anyone; even Kromeyer now adheres to my theory at this decisive moment. But I want to draw your attention to one more thing: a person like Polybius is in the dark regarding this important event, like Scipio's military reform! Whoever weighs this fact correctly will not fail to draw a further methodological consequence from this - that we should be extremely skeptical about all the details, all the turns of phrase in ancient writers when they relate to issues of tactics. How little contemporaries can sometimes know about the most fundamental reforms of tactics, even writers who specialize in military affairs, the reader can judge if he reads Volume IV of this work (p. 466), which contains the reasoning of a very competent person - Goyer (Nouet) - about the situation in the French revolutionary troops. Here we can also point out that 100 years after Frederick the Great in Prussian General Staff they no longer knew anything about his strategy (cf. vol. IV, p. 438).
It can be assumed that Hannibal returned to Africa in the fall of 203 and that the battle of Naraggar took place in August 202 (Lehman, p. 555).
Proven by Konrad Neman.
"Berliner Dissert." 1914
"Rome Kampf urn die Weltherrschaft", page 61
Women's question
Genius is more than the ability to perform at full capacity. This is the ability to clearly see the surrounding reality and be guided by it. Only a few men have been endowed with such a gift for a long time. Napoleon Bonaparte possessed it in his youth. When he moved his huge Army towards Moscow, he believed that it was destined to be so. So, of course, it was, only fate turned out to be different from what Napoleon pictured for himself.
The young Publius Scipio was perhaps the only one of all the Roman leaders to understand that in reality their enemy was Carthage, the city, and not Hannibal, the man. In Spain he realized a truth that had eluded higher command. Long after him, Henry IV of France remarked that “Spain is a country in which large armies starve and small ones are destroyed.” (Napoleon learned this the hard way.)
Scipio found himself on a huge peninsular semi-desert plateau, where cities were located at a great distance from one another, and supplies were scarce; where, over vast areas, horsemen were more appropriate, rather than slow infantry, which had proven itself so well in the small Italian valleys. He very quickly understood why the Carthaginians kept in three separate formations - to provide for themselves. They were located in separate camps, but fought all together. If he goes after one of these formations, the other two may follow him, just as they did when they destroyed his father and his uncle. And Scipio kept his army close to his base at New Carthage, the terminus of the sea route to Rome, near the important mines of the Silver Mountains. These mines began to produce silver every day in the amount of 20,000 drachmas, which was vital for exhausted Rome.
Scipio knew that he could not afford the luxury of delay. Behind him, Rome struggled in the grip of severe economic exhaustion, spending what was left of its temple treasures to raise new legions, suppress more uprisings (even in Eritrea), and lose more lives in battle. This required even more replacement legions while Hannibal waited, like a magician watching his trick take place. (And Scipio hurried Laelius with tons of precious silver and trophies for the temple of Jupiter, who was called his father.)
Hannibal's huge shadow hung over all of Eastern Spain. Iberians of aristocratic origin recalled his courteous manner. In the Kastulon citadel, above the mines, his wife gave birth to a son. The militant Celtiberians and Ilergets were waiting for his word. Almost all of these taciturn, introspective men had relatives in his Italian army. Scipio understood that it was useless to launch a campaign in Spain until he managed to gain support from at least part of its inhabitants. Perhaps Scipio's circle suggested another, simpler idea. The best way the fight against Hannibal was to imitate him.
Scipio's condition was now close to that of this mysterious African on the banks of the Trebbia, during a hail storm. He felt his strength stretched that hot day in Cannes. Those hours left scars on his soul. He thought sadly about them in the darkness near the deserted tomb of Jupiter. Scipio felt a growing contempt for his fellow military leaders, who loudly complained about the degenerate African, this cruel monster, the director of countless tricks, the treacherous Phoenician. Scipio's main desire was to understand the true essence of Hannibal.
It was incredibly difficult for a Roman who grew up among death masks and evidence of the valor of his ancestors, forget about all these traditions and become himself. This European could not fully understand the Eastern Semites, but he could follow the thought of another person. Scipio prepared to use his own weapons against Hannibal.
After the first hours of bloodletting and looting in New Carthage (the tradition of Roman troops after the capture of enemy cities), Scipio ordered his legions to sheathe their swords. Moreover, he demanded that the native Spaniards not be treated as enslaved tribes. He put captured artisans to work in the shipyard and promised them freedom after the end of the war. He needed these Spaniards to expect reward from Roman rule, and in his plans he imagined that Roman Iberia would provide an annual supply of precious silver. As a proof of his goodwill, he released all the Iberian and Celtiberian hostages he found in New Carthage. All of them were relatives of the ruling leaders. Scipio effectively told them:
The Senate and the Roman people will free you from your strict Phoenician masters. From now on you will have law and order and be protected by the Roman people, who always triumph over their enemies.
Scipio knew how to win sympathy. He perfectly understood the instinctive desire of barbarian leaders to be on the winning side. He also correctly counted on the influence that noble Iberian women had on their husbands. In his early youth, he experienced the influence of ardent girls and married ladies. He believed that women had individuals beyond the childbearing and domestic duties required of Latin wives. His legionnaires touched on the "feminine" theme in one of their rude songs:
Publius Cornelius says: Gold is for centurions, Silver - for triarii, And all the hot girls - For Publius Cornelius.
Among the hostages was an Iberian woman who took all the girls and small children under her wing. She was the daughter-in-law of one of the influential leaders of the tribe. Scipio put on a whole performance while receiving this Iberian lady. Through his interpreters, he greeted her in a special way. He personally distributed toys to young children. This woman's thoughts seemed to be occupied with something else. She made this clear to the young Roman general, who wore his snow-white toga as a robe of honor. Surprised at first, Scipio understood the reason for her concern. She was afraid for the blooming girls crowding behind her. Then he called several young military leaders to his side. In front of the woman, he announced to them that these noble Iberian girls should, under all circumstances, be treated as Scipio's sisters.
This gallant scene, however, was interrupted by an unexpected complication. Several young military leaders brought one Spanish girl they had chosen. She was a dark-eyed beauty from an unknown family, whom zealous young men had chosen for the pleasure of their proconsul. After a moment of stupor, Scipio deftly extricated himself from the awkward position. This girl, he declared, was beautiful and attractive; accordingly her family should be informed that, by order of the proconsul, she would be returned to the custody of her father.
Whatever the effect of this attitude toward women, Scipio won the friendship of Indibilus and several influential leaders from the east coast, from New Carthage to Tarraco beyond the Ebro River. There, in the north, the Ilergetae were at least calm, but the strong Celtiberians of the middle plains remained faithful to their alliance with the Carthaginians. Scipio created a certain myth about himself, a myth about his personal benevolence. This myth will disappear with the first defeat from the Carthaginian weapons.
Scipio paid attention to everything. To compensate for the weakness of his cavalry, he came into contact with the Moors and Numidians on the nearby African coast. In addition, he tirelessly trained his obedient legions. Since they cannot maneuver with the speed of the Carthaginian cavalry, they must at least move quickly from place to place. Following this tactic, he completely abandoned the traditional rigid frontal movement of a massive triple line of legions. (Hannibal broke this formation from the front, surrounding it on the flanks and rear with his strike force. Scipio witnessed this happen at Cannae.) He also quickly rearmed the Romans with longer, double-edged Spanish swords and formidable iron javelins. They later became an everyday weapon in Caesar's army. Both words, gladius (sword) and pilum (javelin), owe their origins to the Spanish Celts.
Scipio was surprised to discover how few true Carthaginians took part in the battles. His enemies relied on an alliance with other, more physically powerful peoples. Alliances, as Scipio saw firsthand in Italy, could collapse due to fear or the possibility of higher rewards elsewhere. In addition, the young Roman commander was perplexed at how strange the chambers left by Hannibal and Hasdrubal were in the palace above the harbor in New Carthage. There were no military paraphernalia or trophies in the rooms of the Barka brothers. In the corner wall niches there were altars and papyri with Greek texts for reading. The only mask found was not a death mask, but a theatrical one. A map of the Iberian Peninsula, skillfully executed on a silver plate, was also discovered there. It depicted roads, mountain ranges and rivers, like a painting. In Rome, Scipio had only a sheet indicating the distances on the roads of Italy from one place to another. He memorized the image of Spain carefully as he prepared to march against his enemy.
In the summer of 208 BC. e. Hasdrubal forced the Romans to oppose him. Hannibal's brother settled for winter quarters in the central lands among the Carpetans. Now he marched southeast, towards the spurs of the Silver Mountains near Castulon. Thus, he created a threat to the mines in the possession of the Romans. Scipio had to leave the coast to move southwest into the mountains. While doing this, he did not for a moment forget that, approaching one Carthaginian army, he had no idea where the other two might be.
Hasdrubal at Becula
“Hasdrubal was always a brave man,” Polybius tells us. “He defeated with determination worthy of his father Barka. Most commanders do not realize the consequences of failure... but Hasdrubal left nothing unattended in his preparation for the fight. It seems to me that he is worthy of our respect and imitation.”
Without a doubt, Scipio had respect for his rival. Not long before this, the witty Hasdrubal had made a laughing stock of one very capable Roman military leader, Claudius Nero. Nero managed to drive the Carthaginian army into one of the dead-end valleys of Spain, much like Fabius did with Hannibal in Italy. Then Hasdrubal began negotiations with Nero, discussing all week the conditions for leaving the valley, while his army, meanwhile, got out of the trap behind him. At the end of the week, Hasdrubal broke off the negotiations to leave himself, and Scipio arrived to replace Nero. Hasdrubal and Nero were destined to meet again, but not in Spain.
Scipio was probably not convinced that Hannibal had forced his brother to leave Spain that summer, but the Senate gave him orders to prevent Hasdrubal from crossing the Pyrenees.
Scipio discovered the Carthaginians in an elongated valley below the city of Becula. Hasdrubal camped on a low plateau hidden behind the hills with a small river flowing below. It was impossible to calculate the number of his troops. (In fact, Hasdrubal had 25,000 Africans and Spaniards under his command, while the Roman army numbered 30,000, plus an unknown number of Spanish allies.)
The position was difficult to attack, but Scipio had to attack. He did this carefully, crossing the river. After a long delay at the bottom of the plateau, Scipio climbed it with lightning speed. He regrouped his troops, leaving the weaker lightly armed units in the center, while the heavily armed legions, commanded by Laelius and himself, climbed up the dry riverbeds at the ends of the plateau to the flanks. Thus, he encircled the Carthaginian camp, placing his greatest forces on the flanks.
This maneuver of Scipio was crowned with success after a difficult battle on the slopes of the plateau. He took the Carthaginian camp in a pincer movement, crushing Hasdrubal's lightly armed forces, destroying or capturing 8,000 enemy soldiers. His legionaries plundered the camp.
However, the Carthaginian heavy forces left, along with 32 elephants and all the horsemen. Hasdrubal was heading towards the Pyrenees.
Scipio could not follow. Two other Carthaginian armies were waiting for him, watching him, and New Carthage had to be defended. Scipio sent reinforcements north to the mouth of the Ebro, where Hannibal crossed ten years earlier.
Hasdrubal nevertheless headed north with his small mobile army to the upper reaches of the Tagus River. Somewhere along his route, he conferred with Mago. They decided that Mago would first go to the Balearic Islands for new additions to the slingers, and then return by sea to Northern Italy, where all three sons of Hamilcar Barca would meet. Hasdrubal moved towards the Pyrenees, to the western pass, guarded by friendly Basques. In the distant land of the Celts, he also found himself among friendly peoples and carried away many people with him, heading towards the Rhone (autumn had come and it was too late to try to cross the Alps).
Rumors of Hasdrubal's approach reached Rome through Marseilles. The city was still mourning the death of two consuls at the hands of Hannibal. It seemed as if the angry gods were descending on the Roman leaders who opposed the Carthaginian magician. There is not a single person left who has proven his abilities. Old age made Fabius insolvent. As for the young Scipio, he had some success, but he allowed Hasdrubal to slip away and in any case could not abandon his army in Spain. And now again, ten years later, Rome felt in danger. In the north, Etruria was leaving the unification; Liguria helped the Cisalpine Gauls.
“All these failures befell us,” people said, “when we were confronted by one enemy army and one Hannibal. Now there will be two powerful armies and two Hannibals in Italy.”
The new Carthaginian will appear precisely in the most dangerous place, on the Po River. After this, won't Hannibal himself be able to complete the job?
During the elections in the crisis year, two consuls were elected - two people who did not enjoy much fame. Claudius Nero, who had campaigned against Hasdrubal in Spain, became consul for the patricians. His task was to control Hannibal's actions. A certain Livius, who had no desire to serve, became consul from the plebeians and had to take command of the northern army. The elections, the ritual of sacrifice and the planning of military operations were carried out, as in all previous times, in accordance with Roman traditions. No one really expected that Nero and Livy would be equal to the two sons of Hamilcar Barca.
Message from the Po River
After the snow melted (207 BC), Hasdrubal crossed the Alps more successfully than Hannibal, and, apparently, along the same pass. As before, the Roman command hoped to intercept the Carthaginians in the mountains. But the newcomers descended down the Po River, replenishing their ranks with the stern Ligurians and lifting the spirit of the windy Gauls. They locked the Roman advance forces in Placentia, as Hannibal had done, and circled the Apennine ridge from the south and east. Hasdrubal still had a dozen remaining elephants, and he was moving quickly.
Here an event occurred that had consequences for the entire Mediterranean. Leaving the banks of the Po, Hasdrubal sent a message to his brother. In it, he arranged a meeting of their armies in Umbria, on the Adriatic coast. Six horsemen, four Gauls and two Numidians, carried this letter. Some of them apparently were told what it contained. Probably one of the Gauls paved the way for them to the south, bypassing the enemy camps, to Hannibal’s positions in Lucania.
Hannibal was there, but he broke through the Roman line to the Adriatic coast. At this point, he was returning to gather his scattered troops and advance north, overcoming strong resistance, into the valley of the Ophid River, to where the battlefield of Cannae was nearby.
Envoys from the Po River attempted to follow him, but were captured by Roman foragers near Tarentum. Hasdrubal's letter was given to Claudius Nero, not to Hannibal.
At that moment, the excited Nero was struck by one of those foresights that allows ordinary people to do extraordinary things. He expressed his thought in the following words: “The situation is developing in such a way that it is no longer possible to wage a further war in the usual ways.” He left his army opposed to Hannibal, and with one selected legion and a thousand horsemen armed with pikes, he moved from the borders under his control in the south to join Livy in the north and inform him of the news of Hasdrubal's rendezvous. He sent a letter to the Senate with an explanation, but did not wait for permission to leave his army. Instead, he sent messengers ahead with the order that the villages along his route should deliver replacement horses, mules, carts - anything that tired people could use to travel further - to the roads. The pace he set could only be maintained by a legion.
(It is often said, although this is not true, that Nero wore out his army and left the usual number of camp fires burning in order to deceive Hannibal. He took only 7,000 men with him, and left over 30,000 in fortified positions near the river, while While other forces held Tarentum in Hannibal's rear, Nero simply realized that he could not waste precious days while one of the Carthaginian brothers did not know what the other was doing, while the Romans knew what they were both doing.)
Hannibal waited with Ophid for a message that never reached him, unable to advance north without finding out which road Hasdrubal would take to move south. The legion he sent with a horse escort did not bring him information. For once, mounted reconnaissance failed him.
Hasdrubal, having passed Rimini, reached the Adriatic coast. Like trained dogs gathering together at the sight of a bear, Roman formations converged east of the Apennines. They gathered under the command of Livy south of the Metaurus River. Having crossed it near the city of Fan, the Carthaginians discovered a Roman formation in front of them. The places were unfamiliar to Hasdrubal, although there were Gauls with him who knew these roads. He paused for a moment to study the situation, and perhaps in the hope of receiving instructions from Hannibal.
Nero reached the Roman lines near the Gallic Seine under the cover of darkness. He warned in advance that no news of his approach should be spread. Under cover of darkness, his exhausted men gathered in the tents of Livy's army to avoid setting up new tents. Livy and his staff insisted that the legion coming from the south rest before the battle, but Nero, who knew Hannibal from personal experience, assured that delay was like death. The Roman army must attack immediately. That's what they decided on.
However, violation of discipline almost failed both consuls. A reconnaissance detachment of the Carthaginians noticed the presence in the enemy camp of people who showed all signs of fatigue after a hard march. And the trumpeter, who called Livius to battle in front of the tent, had to sound the trumpet twice, contrary to the established rule. The astute Hasdrubal realized that he was facing two Roman consuls instead of one and that the enemy's forces had increased. He withdrew his own units and that night tried to escape to the upper reaches of the Metaurus in order to escape along the Flaminian road to the south. His march to the west began successfully, but the guides could not find the way to this road in the darkness. When dawn broke, the Romans blocked his exit onto the Via Flaminius. Perhaps he could have retreated to the Po River, but instead he lined up his troops in preparation for battle.
The Battle of Metaurus is known as one of those that changed the course of history. In this battle in last time The Italians lined up against the Roman legions, the harbingers of Caesar's empire. Hasdrubal arranged his army according to national groups - Ligurians, Gauls and Spanish-Africans. He gave the elephants to the Ligurians. For some time the huge animals charged into the ranks of the approaching Romans. Reinforcements of the Ligurians and Gauls rushed into the river. They did not have time to come to the aid of Hasdrubal.
For several hours there was no advantage on either side. But here Claudius Nero upset the balance of power. He was at the very end of the right flank of the Roman formation with 7,000 soldiers occupying a small hill protected by a shallow ravine. The enemies who were in front of him turned out to be Gauls, and the Gauls did everything they could, but they did not cross the ravine to appear before him. Seeing the Gauls in front of him and hearing the sound of a trumpet and warlike cries at the other end of the long line, Nero realized that the legions of Livy in this place were tightly welded to the Spanish-Africans of Hannibal. After listening to all this for a long time, he left his position again. At the same time, he left part of his cavalry, which was supposed to act energetically on the crest of the hill.
Then he led his weary legion around the battle.
Nero marched behind the Roman line, along the road, to flank the rear of Hasdrubal's heavily armed army. His legion was still safe and sound. This had a decisive influence on the hand-to-hand combat of the tired people.
When his ranks wavered, Hasdrubal rode up to his soldiers to raise their spirits and was killed. After this, the disciplined Romans advanced deeply towards the leaderless group of allies. The Gauls, having suffered little, left, and the reinforcements turned back along with the fugitives. There were survivors among the Spanish-Africans, but there was no one who could take Hasdrubal's place. His army ceased to exist. In the Carthaginian camp, Livy's legions freed 4,500 Roman prisoners. The Roman army was badly damaged, but still remained combat-ready and encouraged by their unexpected victory.
That night Claudius Nero led his legion south. After six days of an astonishing trek (210 miles), he returned to his camp near the Ophid River. He walked with such speed that the inhabitants of the villages along his route knew nothing about the battle that had taken place before his arrival.
In the Roman Forum, the Senate met from dawn to dusk. Citizens came and went, crowding around stands and churches, hanging on every word coming from the battle fronts.
“Vague rumors arose that two horsemen from the city of Narnia appeared near the Umbra Gate with the message that the enemy was completely defeated. At first no one believed it. But then a letter arrived from Lucius Manlius concerning the news brought by the horsemen from Narnia. This letter was delivered through the Forum to the Curia. The people rushed there in such impatience and confusion that the messenger could not get closer to the doors of the curia. Suddenly a rumor spread that the horsemen themselves were approaching the city. People of all ages rushed to see everything with their own eyes and hear the good news with their own ears. The crowd rushed to the Milvian Bridge... Since the consuls Marcus Livius and Gaius Claudius [Nero] had survived with their armies and destroyed the enemy leaders with their legions, the Senate declared a three-day prayer of thanksgiving.”
As soon as Nero reoccupied his camp on the banks of the Ophid, he ordered that “the head of Hasdrubal, which he had brought with him and carefully preserved, should be thrown up at the enemy outpost. And so that the African captives, chained, would be exposed to the enemy. Moreover, two of them should have been freed from their chains and sent to Hannibal so that they could tell him what had happened.”
Everything was done as he ordered.
A ceremonial meeting was arranged for the two consuls upon their return to Rome. Then the Senate ordered that Etruria and Umbria be cleared of those who provided assistance of any kind to Hasdrubal.
The rejoicing in Rome continued for many months. People heard that Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, received his brother's head and immediately withdrew his troops from Ophid. Taking with him many Lucanians, he liberated the Gulf of Taranto as far as Metapontum and went into the Bruttian mountains. Here, on the border of Italy, he began to wait. Nobody dared to attack him.
“The Romans also did not provoke him while he was inactive - so they believed in the strength of this one man around whom everything was collapsing.”
End of Barkid power
For the first time since he left New Carthage twelve years ago, Hannibal lost the initiative in the great war. He probably thought with irony that his enemies, with their enormous forces in Italy, were making no attempt to oppose him. True, he did not allow them to understand how weak his own troops had become. Only the skeleton of his Italian army survived, plus a few Lucanian peasants, Greek sailors, Roman deserters and rough Bruttian highlanders. Probably his only protection was his name, covered in incredible legends.
In this tip of Italy he still held larger possessions than Carthage itself. He had ports, although very small, at Locri and Croton, near the beautiful temple on Cape Lacinius. He had enough food for his people and even a supply of silver for their needs. Hannibal inevitably had to wonder whether he should board a ship and try to reach Africa and Spain by sea, where his thoughts were now directed. Perhaps the sense of fatality after Hasdrubal's death made him wait for the battle on his hills. He was probably clear to the harsh fact that if he left Bruttium, his army would disintegrate, while in Spain Mago and other Carthaginian commanders received reinforcements from Carthage in men and ships. And he almost certainly expected that the Roman consuls would fall with all their force on his last possessions. As a Carthaginian, he longed to avenge Hasdrubal's disdainfully discarded head.
All next year the news that he received little by little from the incoming ships aggravated his anxiety. After the harvest, a convoy of grain ships from Spain ended the famine on the Tiber River. The fields of Latium began to be cultivated again. Ship crews released from the fleets returned to farming.
On the other coast of the Adriatic, the king of Macedonia sensed a change in fortune and made peace with the Aetolians, the minions of Rome. This ended Carthage's short alliance with Syracuse and Macedonia. ("If you are defeated, even your friends will abandon you.")
And then there was a terrible defeat in Spain. At Ilipa, Mago and the Carthaginian commanders, including the Numidian Masinissa, mobilized all their enormous forces in battle with the young Roman proconsul. During the battle, Scipio moved his ranks to crash into the flanks of the Carthaginians and drive their remnants towards the ocean shore. Hades remained the last stronghold, and Hannibal knew that its inhabitants, like the Macedonians, would not support Carthage if necessary. If only he could be near Ilipa before the start of this battle!
Hades began to flirt with Scipio, and the Romans entered the city. Ancient Hades, like Tarentum, opened its gates to rulers who will never leave it.
Some of the Iberians and Celtiberians began to resist, but it was too late. Indibil escaped from the Romans, but was quickly overtaken. The Illurgian fortress, lost in the mountains, resisted Roman siege technology, and its men and women died in the streets from the swords of the legionnaires. The city of Astapa burned down along with its inhabitants. Hannibal knew them well. Castulon, his wife's family stronghold, surrendered. Far to the north, the Ilergetae and Edetanes were plundering Roman supplies. Scipio's legions drove them into the valley and cut them into pieces.
Scipio achieved submission through the power of fear. Spanish military units fought with him against their feudal enemies. Scipio rewarded them all. But with my own own people he could be merciless. Across the Ebro River, one of the legions rebelled against its command. Scipio summoned 35 instigators to New Carthage. There they were surrounded by his legionnaires and whipped to death in pillories.
In the new year, the Romans started deadly games in New Carthage. Sword-wielding gladiators entered the arena, pretending to fight in the name of the god of war. After the pantomime ended, the blood in the arena was washed away and incense was lit in its place.
Hannibal thought sadly about young Scipio, who was so reminiscent of Fabius and at the same time was not like him. Be that as it may, Scipio achieved complete dominance over Spain. The power of the Barkids family ended after just over thirty years.
Magon survived. He massacred some of the judges of Hades. Then, with several ships and 2000 supporters, he went out into the bay and unexpectedly approached New Carthage from the sea. Losing strength, he sailed to the Pitius Islands and the Island of Minora to recruit the din of people, as he had planned with Hasdrubal. From Croton, Hannibal sent a message to Carthage, saying that Mago had landed on the Ligurian coast to lead the resistance there and prevent the legions from occupying the Po River line.
Having landed in the harbor of Genoa, Mago disappeared into the foothills. The brothers were very far from each other: Mago was near the Alps, and Hannibal was at the tip of Italy.
As the thirteenth year of the war began, the Romans in Italy seemed to be in hibernation. They were exhausted. They had a lot to restore and even more to process. After all the hardships of recent years, they were glad to relax. Publius Cornelius Scipio, with his insight, resolutely opposed this hibernation.
Feast at the good Syphax
Great Battle at Zama, in which Scipio opposed Hannibal, began not at all in the hot spring of 202 BC. e. It began several years earlier in the mind of Publius Scipio, and what he did during these years was largely connected with what happened on the plain of Zama.
Already in May 206 BC. e. (shortly after Ilipa) Scipio made the first attempt to reach Africa. What happened to him there is completely incredible and reminiscent of an adventure novel, but it really happened.
After Ilipa, as usual, the young proconsul sent magnificent spoils to Rome, where he was eager to obtain an important political post. He hoped, with the help of a now experienced army and his gifted military leaders Marcius and Laelius, to take possession of the rest of Spain. Having completed this, he planned to cross the strait to take the war to Africa and force Hannibal to leave Italy and return to the defense of Carthage. This idea was simple, like any brilliant idea. His father had harbored such an idea even before him and began to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Syphax, the king of the Numidians, who had previously supplied Hannibal with horses. The elder Publius Scipio planned to turn Spain into a base for an African expedition, as Hannibal did before his campaign against Rome. What Hannibal did was an excellent example worthy of imitation.
Perhaps, when the young Scipio boarded the pentecontor in the port of Tarraco and set out to sea, he did not imagine that he was changing the essence of his republic: it ceased to be an Italian state and became an empire stretching across the sea to new horizons. This was, naturally, the cherished dream of the heads of the families of the Emilians and Scipios. Scipio himself, however, was simply a military commander of the army, to whom consular power was transferred in case of extreme danger. Moreover, his authority did not extend beyond the Pyrenees. (Nero was in danger of bringing shame upon himself and the entire Claudian family when he risked a march from southern Italy and became famous for it.) Scipio’s power virtually ended with the conquest of Spain - upon his return to Rome, nothing awaited him except the usual parade and the admiration of his wife . Instead, Scipio strived with all his heart to win the war over Hannibal. The fact that it was as incredible as perching Mount Pelion on Mount Ossa did not stop him.
The short sea voyage was pleasant, although risky. Scipio received only guarantees of safety from the king of the wild and unreliable people Syphax, who insisted on their personal meeting on the African coast. Another pentecontor accompanied the proconsul's vessel, more for reasons of prestige than safety. Both ships rounded Cape Shiga - the meeting place. In a small harbor, seven Carthaginian galleys were anchored, blown by the breeze. At the sight of the Roman ships, the sailors lined up in the galleys, ready for battle.
With amazing courage, Scipio continued to send his pentekontoros into the harbor, without stopping at the battle posts. A gust of wind drove them past the Carthaginian galleys to the pier, where they, as guests, could count on the patronage of the African king. The Carthaginian sailors realized this and did nothing.
In the master's palace, Scipio met face to face with another guest, a Carthaginian. It was Hasdrubal, son of Gisgon, a shrewd, middle-aged aristocrat who commanded troops with Mago, son of Hamilcar, at Ilipus! Scipio must have been confused for a moment.
Syphax gave a gala dinner in honor of their meeting. He was glad to see the distinguished rivals of the Spanish war reconciled in his home. An elderly man skilled in difficult negotiations, Syphax was proud of his ability to control the warlike Numidians. His capital Kirta was located on the border with the possessions of Carthage, and Syphax treated the six-story houses there and the huge temple of Iolaus with all the respect of a member of the tribe. He also had a growing respect for the Roman victories in Iberia and for the eagle-profiled commander who could so freely walk through his door. Syphax was able to mobilize tens of thousands of skilled horsemen; however, he understood that he must not offend the Romans, but at the same time he could not turn his back on the Carthaginians. Over the meal, Scipio described in the most ardent terms (through translators) the advantages of the Roman form of government.
Syphax, who was not eager to take a personal part in the war, advised Scipio to take the opportunity to establish friendly relations with Hasdrubal. Scipio replied that he was glad to do so. He had no hostile feelings towards his enemy - moreover, he found his company pleasant.
The Numidian concluded:
Then why not agree to peace?
Scipio said that this is a completely different matter.
He is just one of the military leaders, carrying out the orders of the Senate and the Roman people, who decide when to end the war and make peace.
This man, Hasdrubal said to the owner of the house after Scipio left, is even more dangerous in conversation than in battle.
The Roman took with him Syphax's promise to become an ally. The Carthaginian received assurance that he would never cease to be a friend of Carthage.
Scipio, however, had other thoughts. What he needed most was good African horsemen. To get them, he won over to his side the brilliant commander of the cavalry, who contributed to the death of his father and fought against Scipio himself at Ilipa. Masinissa, king of the Massilians, was educated in Carthage. He was loyal to Carthage until he saw that the remnants of the Carthaginian army were sent west to the island of Hades, where the cavalry could not operate. In addition, Masinissa was in debt to Scipio, who freed his young nephew from captivity. And Scipio was not afraid to meet Masinissa alone at night. The leader of the African rebels became a victim of the Roman's charm and his own ambitions. At this point he was disinherited. Masinissa promised that when the proconsul landed with his army on the African coast, he would join him with numerous Numidian cavalry.
Now Masinissa - it was obvious - was going to keep his word, while Syphax had no such intention. However, Masinissa had no opportunities. He was little more than a fugitive to Spain, while Syphax had both power and power. Scipio cared little that Masinissa hated the very name of Syphax.
Something nevertheless bothered him greatly because he abandoned his plan to invade Africa across the strait. Perhaps he realized after visiting Syphax that a long march along the coast to Carthage was impractical? Maybe he was afraid for his base in Spain? At that time, there was a wave of resistance in the hinterlands. The Ilurgi fought to the death; the women and children of Astapa huddled inside the fortress walls, ready to be burned by their men rather than surrender to the Romans. Hannibal's shadow still lay on the ground.
Scipio founded a colony in the beautiful valley of Betis, which was to be “Latinized” in the future. Leaving his army, but taking with him the priceless Laelius, he boarded a ship sailing to Rome. It was the eve of elections in the new year.
Fabius opposes Scipio
Immediately after his arrival, the conqueror of Spain met with opposition in the form of senior senators. Since he had left his command post without permission, ancient law prohibited him from entering the city. His behavior forced the senators to leave the walls of the Senate to hear him at the temple of Bellona, the sister of Mars. And here his convictions prevented him from winning the triumphal entry, which he boldly demanded. Only the winner with the rank of consul, who was not Publius Cornelius Scipio, was awarded the ceremonial meeting.
This was exactly what the young warrior wanted. Due to his popularity, the Senate could not help but allow him to enter the city as an ordinary citizen through the city gates. Taking advantage of this, Scipio staged a whole spectacle of his appearance: he was followed by veterans and Spanish prisoners, and in front of him were carts with silver ingots. People have always been eager for spectacles, especially with trumpets and trophies. Scipio then led the entire procession to the temple of Jupiter, his patron god, to sacrifice at least 30 bulls, and gained another huge audience. According to legend, he was as flawless as his snow-white toga. Future clients gathered at his door in the morning, waiting for his appearance. His statements became famous on Via Sacra. Every day it was a new statement, always brilliant and unexpected.
“I didn’t come here to fight a war, I’m here to end it.” And again: “Until now, Carthage has waged war against Rome; now Rome will lead it against Carthage.”
The popular assemblies agreed with his every word, and Scipio was to solemnly take up the post of consul in the coming year. With his arrival, the Emilian-Scipio group acquired dominant influence. Claudius Nero, who won the victory at Metaurus, went into the shadows with the defeat of the Claudius group. Licinius Crassus, an inconspicuous figure who occupied the ancient post of head of the pontiffs, became second consul. Since tradition forbade the senior pontiff from leaving Italy, Licinius was assigned to lead the command of the troops fighting Hannibal in Bruttium. Sicily was the bridge leading to Africa.
As consul, Scipio had the rank he needed, but he did not have the power to withdraw from Sicily. His proposal to lead an army here and lead it from here to Carthage met with severe rebuff.
Behind the opposition was an unshakable previous concept: the agrarian position of a group of landowners ("Agriculture and Italy"), which longed only for the return and colonization of Cisalpine Gaul (where the Carthaginian Mago stood at the head of the Ligurians and Gauls). Much more difficult to overcome was the ancient tradition, according to which the republic expanded only within its land borders through the combined efforts of national legions and allies. Hannibal disrupted this traditional line of defense for thirteen years.
The eccentric Scipio brought to life a completely new idea of the role of the individual in history, of a real emperor who led the Romans to sea, into the rich, trading and dangerous outer Hellenistic world.
Perhaps only Scipio clearly saw where the policies of the old leaders were leading the Roman state. Satisfied with the victories in Spain and at Metaurus, they allowed Hannibal to hold his position in Italy. Subconsciously, they believed that it was impossible to force him to leave. They were only thinking about how to protect themselves against him. And Carthage remained untouched. Another year, two or five, and they would inevitably begin peace negotiations, after which their great enemy would sail back with his undefeated army to a city that had suffered no damage in about twenty years of conflict except the loss of some of its treasures.
On the steps of the Temple of Jupiter, Scipio repeated the rumors that had reached him:
“Hannibal spends his leisure time in the temple of Juno Lacinia on the southern shore. He ordered the casting of a bronze slab on which descriptions of his victories would be engraved. - And Scipio listed them: - At Ticino, at Trebbia, at Lake Trasimene, at Cannae. I’ll be surprised if he doesn’t add at the end: victory over the Roman people.”
To obtain the consent of the Senate to his plan for a campaign from Sicily, Scipio threatened to carry it out before the popular assemblies, which supported any of his attempts to end the conflict. This was tantamount to disobedience to the will of the elders and turned the Senate leaders against this warrior from Spain. A heated debate began. Fabius Maximus opposed the African expedition, which meant against Scipio.
The slower spoke with the wiles of a tried orator and with the repressed hostility of a very old man towards a youth who had achieved the same fame as himself. Why, he asked the senators, should he challenge a man younger than his own son?
He paid tribute to Scipio's "daily growing glory of our very brave consul." He energetically tried to diminish his own glory and turned to younger senators.
“I kept Hannibal from conquering so that you, people whose strength is constantly growing, could defeat him.”
And he suddenly reproached them in the face. Why, he asked, while Hannibal was here, one might say, at their door, should they go to Africa in the hope that he would follow them? Let them achieve peace in Italy first before taking the war to Africa.
“Tell me, God forbid this happens! “What if the victorious Hannibal comes against our city, because what has already happened can happen again, will we not have to recall our consul from Africa, as we recalled Fulvius from Capua?”
He gave his listeners a sense of the dangers of the African coast and the fate of another consul, Regulus, who invaded it. He grossly downplayed Scipio's achievements in Spain. What did Publius Cornelius do that was so significant there? Did he travel safely along the friendly coast to take command of the army that was already there and trained by his late father? Yes, he took New Carthage - when none of the three Carthaginian armies were there. What, then, is Scipio counting on, jeopardizing the fate of Rome with his campaign in Africa, when not a single port and not a single friendly army is waiting for him there? For an alliance with the Numidians, with Syphax? In Spain, his Celtiberian allies turned against him, and his own warriors rebelled. On the other hand, at Metaurus the two consuls joined forces to prove that any stranger could be defeated in Italy. And - “where Hannibal is, there is the center of this war.”
Fabius asked the Senate to consider whether Scipio was acting for the sake of the state or in the name of his own ambitions. He had already endangered the fate of Rome when he crossed to the African coast on two ships without the permission of the Senate, although he was then a Roman commander.
“In my opinion,” he concluded, “Publius Cornelius was chosen as consul for the sake of the republic, and not for his own sake. Our armies were recruited to defend the city and Italy, and not so that the consuls could, like autocratic tyrants, transfer troops wherever they please.”
It was a strong performance by Fabius, a man of great authority. Scipio stood with an expression of obvious disdain for the Senate on his face. He made no attempt to object to the charges. He replied that he was satisfied with their intention to form their own opinion about his life and actions, and would agree with this opinion. As for his plan, couldn't they make a stronger argument than Hannibal himself? Hannibal had nothing to fear in invading Italy, although he faced the Roman people's army. Nothing like this existed in Africa.
Ironically, the debate in the Senate turned into a debate about Hannibal himself and the actions that should have been taken against him. Although Scipio lost the argument, he won what he wanted - permission to act as he needed. The Senate allowed him to cross from Sicily to Africa, “if he believes that this will benefit the state.” However, and this is almost incredible, he denied Scipio the right to withdraw legions or more than 30 ships from Italy beyond those needed for Sicily. In addition, he could summon anyone he wanted or build ships - but with his own money.
What followed was done entirely on the initiative of one man, Scipio, driven by personal ambition. At first everything was done with his money and at his own risk.
The two regular legions that awaited him in Sicily consisted of long-forgotten soldiers from Cannae serving their exile.
Two hills in Lokra
These legions, the fifth and sixth, "were tired of growing old in exile." For them, Scipio's arrival was like an unexpected appearance of God. He returned them to active actions, and what actions! Land in Africa to obtain the riches of Carthage and achieve final victory! From that moment on, the legionnaires, forgotten since the time of Cannes, already aged, responded to Scipio with dog-like devotion.
The young consul brought with him from Italy about 7,000 volunteers who preferred to serve him in the war-touched expanses of Africa, rather than on the battlefields that had seen Hannibal, where an epidemic raged in the camps of the regular army. All these volunteers already had experience of service and were picky in relation to military leaders. In addition, Scipio doubled their salaries. Despite his politeness, this Spanish commander recruited people selectively. When the noble enthusiasts of Syracuse (the base of his operations) formed a volunteer force, armored, mounted, and glittering, he kindly told them of the cruelties of war, and generously promised to free them from these hardships if they would donate their equipment to the experienced warriors.
At the same time, Scipio tried to establish friendly relations with Syracuse, who were still licking their wounds after the bloody purge organized by Marcellus. Most Greek homeowners made claims for damage caused by Roman soldiers. The young champion of the new order listened to their complaints and promised compensation.
His quaestor, appointed by the Senate, was a bumbling, red-haired plebeian, Marcus Porcius Cato. This Cato (who was forever famous for the phrase “Carthage must be destroyed”) was distinguished by rustic Puritanism and a keen sense of which way the wind of politics was blowing. Besides everything, he was the protege of the elderly Fabius. When he protested his boss's careless handling of money, Scipio said that he was responsible for the security of the state, and not for how much money would be spent. The enmity between the future censor and the energetic leader lasted for a long time.
While Scipio trained his fledgling army (more than 12,000 but less than 20,000 men) on rough terrain, he thought about how to help it. He sent a call to former military leaders with experience in engineering, who collected transport ships with the greed of a miser. From experience gained in Spain, he knew that the Romans had two advantages over the Carthaginians: their brilliant siege warfare and their naval strength. He had to use these two advantages against Hannibal. If his fleet is stronger, the Sicilian base will become mortally dangerous for Carthage; if weaker, it will bring disaster.
A myth arose among the Latin chronicles that at that moment all the allied cities of Italy, especially the Etruscan community, opened their shops with shipbuilding materials for Scipio, despite the opposition of the Senate. And that within 45 days, 30 brand new ships were built and launched to universal cheers. These 30 galleys were equipped with rowing mechanisms, with the help of which the Romans mastered the art of navigation in ancient times. It was a great story, but such mechanisms never existed. In 204 BC. e. the Etruscan cities were branded with shame for their recent rebellion, and with the appearance of Mago they would revolt again. Everywhere the allied cities indignantly declared that they were unable to pay their annual share, “despite the wrath of the Romans.” The Senate refused to hear their dignitaries until the deliveries were made. In fact, Scipio brought 30 ships from Italy and managed to find the same number off the coast of Sicily. Not having a stronger battle fleet than this, he decided to prepare the expedition for the campaign.
This myth, in turn, has led some modern historians to present the matter as if Scipio prepared his expedition without any help from ungrateful Rome. This is also not true. The credit really goes to Scipio, the Roman Senate and, incidentally, Hannibal. The differences between Scipio and his government lay in their ideological disputes. The majority in the Senate was right in believing that Scipio, with the larger army of another consul, could wear down Hannibal with years of war of attrition. Scipio understood this perfectly. But he was able to foresee what would follow in the end: an exhausted Italy, freed from Hannibal, would never want to enter into a new conflict and invade Africa. (And Scipio's fame would be correspondingly less.) The Senate did little to help him at first, because he had nothing to help him. The threat of Hannibal's breakthrough to Rome was real if superior military forces did not block it. It was great skill (which is rarely recognized) on the part of the one-eyed Carthaginian to hold off a significant Roman force on his hills for three years. Scipio's plan to rush to the sea with his small army, despite everything being against him, required great composure on his part.
To encourage his recruits and gather information, Scipio first sent his assistant Laelius to the sea. With a sufficiently strong detachment, Laelius crossed the sea and reached the port, which the Romans called Hippo the King (now Bona), west of Carthage. Here he landed to plunder the countryside and meet Masinissa, who arrived accompanied by only a few horsemen, although Hippo was within his family domain. What Masinissa reported was far from encouraging. Syphax went over to the side of the Carthaginians.
Why does Consul Scipio hesitate? - asked Masinissa. - Tell him to come quickly.
The young Numidian warned Laelius that the Carthaginian fleet had put to sea in search of him. And the Roman raiders immediately left for Sicily.
Scipio took much of the booty they brought, but the thought of the sea quickly faded. Carthage, alarmed by Laelius's raid, gathered all its forces to fight back. Guard posts and signal beacons were established on capes along the African coast. A fortress wall was erected in the city, the army was recruited and money was collected, and at the same time the shipyards on the inner harbors were feverishly working.
The results were not long in coming. The fleet, which Laelius had overlooked, went to sea again, with chests of treasures, with reinforcements of 6,000 people, with 800 Numidians, their horses and 7 elephants. He eluded the Roman guard ships, as did Mago's fleet, and came to Genoa with orders for Mago to place himself at the head of the Ligurians and Gauls and try to link up with Hannibal. To assist Hannibal himself, a convoy of 100 ships, unescorted, but with people, a cargo of grain and silver, headed straight to Locrum in Bruttium. An unforeseen circumstance upset these plans. The storm scattered the convoy, and 20 transport ships were sunk by Roman galleys. Some of the surviving ships returned safely to Carthage, but not a single ship reached the coast where Hannibal was located.
It became obvious that the half-disbanded Roman fleet was inactive: the once vigilant ships, in the days of Otacilius, no longer plied the sea. With growing alarm, Scipio heard that Hannibal had left his land lines and moved towards Locr.
Scipio loaded all the forces at hand, with ladders and mechanisms, onto the first galleys that came up, and headed towards Locr. They were located a short distance from the coast of Sicily, but outside the zone of his authority. Scipio ignored this circumstance in the heat of impatience to get ahead of the Cannes magician. Despite the haste, he made sure to take ships and equipment with him.
Locri was the larger of the two ports Hannibal retained in Bruttium. A small Roman detachment, as always, had already entered it with the help of cunning: a group of artisans from Locri was allowed to return home from Sicilian captivity on the condition that they would let the Roman detachment outside the city wall. The city was located between two hills protected by fortresses, and the Roman detachment penetrated only into the southern citadel. A certain Pleminius, one of Scipio’s commanders, commanded here. The Carthaginian garrison was driven to the opposite hill.
Hannibal, rapidly approaching from the north, gave orders to his garrison to march that night when he approached to attack the citadel occupied by the Romans. The townspeople, who considered the Roman soldiers as liberators, took water into their mouths and took refuge in their homes.
On this day Scipio's galley entered the harbor, and his cohorts filled the streets between the hills. His scouts took the northern road and saw the approaching Carthaginian cavalry. In the evening, Hannibal's vanguard approached the city wall. Scipio's cohorts hurried out of the gates to form a battle formation. When Hannibal arrived, he found the enemy's fleet in the harbor and a strong army in the city. His troops did not take with them either assault ladders or catapults. Having taken his garrison from the citadel, Hannibal left.
This bloodless clash of armed forces was almost an accident. Most likely, Hannibal only later learned of Scipio’s presence. Nevertheless, this instilled courage in Scipio's legionaries, who met the invincible Carthaginian and saw his retreat.
Sailing to Africa
The Locrians had such consequences that they almost ruined the whole matter for Scipio. His legate, Pleminius, proved himself to be a notorious beast when he was put in command of the captured port. In his sadistic spree, he executed the leaders of Locris who collaborated with the Carthaginians, sent young women to brothels, removed treasures from the city temple, and finally flogged two tribunes of the Roman army. The inhabitants of Locri, who regretted the change of owners, sent their envoys with a complaint to Rome.
Scipio could be cruel in achieving his goals: he condemned the leaders of the rebellion in Spain to public torture, and his legionaries rattled their swords in approval, but he was not as ferocious as Marcellus. For reasons known only to him, Scipio supported Pleminius. The Senate investigated both this incident and Scipio's act. The flogging of tribunes, who had immunity under Roman law, was an insult, and the desecration of a temple was an insult to the gods. Moreover, the Roman consul in Sicily was again endangering his life outside the zone of his legitimate authority. To these considerations the Senate added the secret report of Quaestor Cato on Scipio’s behavior in Syracuse. The report accused the consul of behavior contrary to the interests of Rome.
Scipio seemed to relax in the evening, chatting with the Greeks over a cup of wine. A military leader, he walked around in sandals and a light Greek chiton and attended sports games in the gymnasium. Ironically, the new debate over Scipio ended with representatives of the Senate being sent to Sicily to investigate, with the power to remove him. Scipio prepared to receive the inspectors by staging a dress rehearsal for the invasion. Along the shore, the senators kept galleys ready for battle. In the harbor, several hundred confiscated transports lay dead anchored. The arsenals contained mountains of grain and weapons. Ballistas and catapults, mostly captured in Syracuse, were waiting at the piers. Most importantly, new legions marched back and forth on the parade ground, coordinated like machines.
The senators had enough experience to appreciate the high level when it occurred. Pleased with the appearance of this new army, which cost the treasury almost nothing, they returned to Rome to extol Publius Cornelius Scipio as a worthy son of his father, a brave warrior, an adherent of ancient traditions.
This was the beginning of favor towards Scipio on the part of the Senate, and after this Scipio began to enjoy their full support. Following the lavish invasion parade, Scipio demanded that the real invasion begin. When his warriors boarded the ships, he suffered a crushing blow, which he hid. Envoys arrived from Syphax and reported that the leader of the Numidians believed that he should be betrayed to Carthage. A personal letter warned Scipio against waging a campaign in which Syphax would act as his opponent. "Don't land in Africa."
Scipio did not make this warning public. To explain the appearance of the Numidians at the location of his camp, he said that their king, Masinissa, asked him to hurry. Then Scipio gave the order to everyone to board the ships.
At dawn, Scipio boarded the flagship, which, along with the war galleys, stood in wait, preparing to escort a convoy of 400 different ships and approximately 30,000 soldiers, including the crews of the warships. On deck, he personally slaughtered a sacrificial sheep and threw its entrails into the sea. Witnesses said that he called on the power of Neptune to help the Roman ships.
Scipio prayed: “Give me the strength to try my luck in the fight against the Carthaginians.”
The trumpets sounded, and Scipio called on the pilots to lead the ships to the coast of Sirte, east of Syracuse. When the last ship of the convoy was out of earshot of the crowd gathered on the shore, he changed his orders. The pilots were supposed to lead the ships directly to Carthage.
Two weeks passed before a galley arrived from Africa with the first report of the expedition. It was announced to the waiting crowd in Syracuse: “Victorious landing, the city has been captured in one blow along with eight thousand prisoners and huge trophies.” As evidence, prisoners and boxes of valuables were presented on board the galley.
Things, however, were not going too well.
Scipio's darkest hour
Africa has awakened from its peacetime slumber to resist the invader. Poets have always considered the woman to be the symbol of Africa. According to legend, the queen of Carthage was Dido, conquered and then abandoned by Aeneas, the supposed “ancestor” of the Romans. Carthage itself, according to legend, was founded by the runaway daughter of the Tyrian king. Her name was derived from the deified name Tinnit (Great Mother), the temple in whose honor was crowned by the hill of Birsa. It symbolized the struggle of Africa against Europe, the achievements of ancient culture against barbarism. Regulus, the invader, himself believed that he would become a conqueror of the African coast, but found himself thrown back into the sea.
Elusive forces unexpectedly set out to confront Scipio, also a Roman consul, after his daring and successful crossing in midsummer 204 BC. e. He landed on the coast near Utica. This seaside city, which was older than Carthage (the Romans called it Utica), aroused, like the maritime empire of Carthage, the envy of Marcellus and, in addition, occupied an important strategic position, since it was located near the mouth of the Bagrada River, closer than 20 miles from its youngest sisters, Birsa. He expected to be able to conquer or attack Utica with lightning speed. By doing this, he could have a fortified base, open to the sea, within a day's march of Carthage's protective earthworks. Unexpectedly, this Phoenician-Greek city resisted and repelled the attack. Scipio had to wage a siege in a hostile country.
The coast itself turned out to be hostile. Scipio hoped that he would raise interior lands- tens of thousands of Numidians subordinate to Syphax - against the Carthaginians. However, Syphax, as he had warned Scipio, mobilized his military resources to help Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgon, who had few men. And to some extent, the woman was to blame. It was Sophonizba, the daughter of the cunning Hasdrubal. Sophonizba, a young beauty, took lessons in music and seduction from Greek teachers. She was devoted to her father and Carthage. Hasdrubal sealed his agreement with the old Numidian by giving him Sophonizba as his wife, so that she would report on what he was doing and influence him. She did both very well.
Masinissa also played his part when he appeared on the siege line. Scipio believed that he could take advantage of some of the exiled leader's Numidian horsemen. There were only two hundred of them. Masinissa had no visible resources other than hand weapons and inexhaustible fortitude. He said with a laugh that he would have been overtaken and killed if he had not spread rumors about his death.
A woman, a mysterious old tribal leader, a night robber, and a silent, hostile coast with almost no harbors all combined to create problems for Publius Cornelius that could not simply be solved by the force of arms of his legionaries. Winter came, and Utica still resisted him, while the Carthaginian-Numidian army was mobilizing on the plain. Scipio replenished his supplies a little by emptying the fertile basin of Bagrada, and the ships also brought some grain from Sardinia. He moved his camp to a rocky promontory east of Utica. Here he brought his galleys close to the shore and sent teams to engage in the siege, which had to be ended. He named his camp "Castra Cornelia". Preparing the camp for defense against Syphax and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgon, he sent optimistic reports to the Senate (in front of the skeptical Cato), knowing that he could be recalled at the first news of defeat.
Winter storms interrupted its active communication with the northern shores. They also gave him the opportunity to take a break from the attacks of the growing Carthaginian fleet. Of all the dangers on the African coast, this was the most important.
Incredibly, the winter of 204/203 BC. e. found two masters of warfare, Hannibal and Scipio, on the cape and peninsula, both on the enemy coast. For several months, both took almost no part in the events. That said, Hannibal, since Scipio had only limited communication with his Senate, may have had a clearer picture of the sea picture.
Exhausted but stubborn, Rome held firm at sea with her 20 legions and 160 warships, not counting the African expedition. From Hades on the ocean shore to the coast of Dalmatia, legions were encamped, and in their iron grip were the islands, from the Balearics to Sicily, which were now in the whirlpool of war.
In Spain, across the Ebro River, the last center of resistance was dying. Mago could not advance further than the Po River. For the first time, Rome firmly held a bridgehead on the African coast. The city of Carthage was still safe on a fortified promontory. But the Romans were now the rulers of the maritime empire, which is what the Barkids aspired to. Now Carthage itself was causing Hannibal's alarm.
He reluctantly yielded to pressure from two Roman armies, defending the gorges and roads leading through the valleys to gain precious time. Now his enemies threatened Consencia, Bruttium's largest trading city, while Hannibal held on to Croton, the last port of evacuation.
The irony of the situation did not fail to hurt him. On a cape near Croton stood the temple of Juno Lacinia - an ancient Greek shrine that Hannibal had to hold at all costs. This temple served as his vantage point and a quiet place for reflection - a kind of Tifata on the sea. Here, at the entrance to the sanctuary, he placed his memorial bronze plaque. By this time, the Carthaginian commander had seen and read countless Latin tablets testifying to the distinctions, titles and victories won by the Roman patricians. He studied their laws, carved in stone. Now he has erected his own memorial, a list of his victories won over fifteen years in Italy.
It was a farewell gesture from a man who never wanted to go to war. Hannibal has not lost his sense of humor.
Great Plains Solution
When spring arrived, Scipio left the Castra Cornelia camp. He did this while the stormy season had not yet ended and before the Carthaginian fleet could put to sea.
During the winter months, his small force of cavalry outwitted and scattered a large volunteer army of horsemen from Carthage - it was Masinissa's horsemen who lured the zealous Carthaginians to where the trained Roman cavalry waited, hidden in the bushes. After such success, Scipio's cavalry began to grow.
Scipio himself winter time conducted peace negotiations with both Syphax and Hasdrubal, whose camps bordered his cape. Scipio remembered the desire shown during their meeting by Syphax to end the war. During long debates, the emissaries discussed this issue: perhaps withdraw all armies and restore the status quo? Scipio said neither “yes” nor “no,” while his military leaders, present at the negotiations under the guise of servants, carefully assessed the situation, the readiness and strength of the two hostile camps: Hasdrubal’s Carthaginians set up their winter quarters away from the Numidian tents. In the end, Scipio reluctantly admitted that he did not have the authority to guarantee Syphax what he wanted.
While the old Numidian was pondering the apparent reluctance of the Romans, and while an unofficial truce existed, one night fires broke out in both camps, and as the Carthaginians and Numidians jumped up to put out the flames, they came upon the swords of Scipio's legionaries. Masinissa's horsemen burst into the empty camps, and Hasdrubal and Syphax barely had time to wake up and escape. After the fire, the Romans inherited a lot of booty, warehouses and horses.
By hook or by crook, Scipio and Laelius led the Africans away from the siege line of the Castra Cornelia camp.
Following this, Scipio ruthlessly and without any delay took advantage of his advantage as an experienced commander and the discipline of his army. The fire in the camps forced the Carthaginians to return to their city and the Numidians to Cyrta, Syphax's stronghold in the west. Three weeks passed before the leaders strengthened and regrouped their followers in the lands called the Great Plains. Syphax's Carthaginian wife insisted on his energetic actions. He was helped by the unexpected arrival of help. 4,000 Celtiberians arrived from the west coast. These were veterans with extensive military experience. How and why they came to Carthage has never been revealed. Apparently, they crossed to Africa to enter service, which ended in Spain.
At first, everything in Africa turned out quite well for the Celtiberians. With unexpected courage, Scipio withdrew his two best legions with their growing cavalry, Numidian and Roman, from the line of defense. After five days of forced march, almost light, he reached the mobilization center of the Carthaginians and Numidians on the Great Plains.
The ensuing battle, pitting some 16,000 Romans against an allied army of twenty thousand, had disastrous consequences for Carthage. Laelius and Masinissa attacked the flanks of the Carthaginians. Scipio's advanced legions struck from the front. The Carthaginian center, the core of which was the Celtiberians, was surrounded by fast cavalry and converging ranks of heavily armed infantry. The Celtiberians made no effort to escape. Being Spaniards from the new Roman province of Spain, they knew that they would pay with their lives and chose to die with weapons in their hands. It is known that it took considerable effort from the legionnaires to put an end to them.
Scipio took another advantage over his enemies. He had two excellent generals, Laelius and Masinissa. He released Masinissa on a wild pursuit of the fugitives into Numidia, to the west, and then sent Laelius with vigorously marching cohorts to support Masinissa and keep an eye on him. Leaving the defense line at Utica to fend for itself, Scipio struck at Tunis, located on a large lagoon opposite Carthage. Tunisia was famous for little other than its quarries and merchants, but its lagoon served as a safe harbor for the Carthaginian fleet.
Scipio saw in Tunisia what he feared most - the enemy fleet was leaving its station. Without wasting a minute, he rushed on horseback, accompanied by a small detachment (the legions followed him), to the Castra Cornelia camp. Here the Roman galleys were equipped with siege engines and sent to bombard Utica, while the transport ships, without any protection, anchored. Scipio galloped to his camp. There he himself, the crews of the ships and all the soldiers at hand immediately turned into engineers. Since Scipio's few war galleys were in no condition to go to sea, they were used as screens. Probably no one except the Romans thought of building a protective wall from sailboats, and only the warriors from the seven hills managed to figure out how to do it. They lined up the heavy transport ships bow to stern, in several rows towards the galleys, removed masts and crossbars to tie the ships together, and threw boarding bridges from the galleys to the outer row of ships. The legionnaires then armed themselves and prepared equipment to defend their unique wall of ships.
The Carthaginian flagship made the mistake of staying on the open sea waiting for its enemies to leave the harbor, which, of course, did not happen. When the Carthaginian galleys moved towards the coast of Utica the next day, they found a wall of transport ships manned by warriors, and lost even more time, puzzled by this new tactic. The Carthaginians, however, were as skilled sailors as the Romans were skilled craftsmen. The conflict at Utica ended with the Carthaginians victoriously towing about 60 Roman sailing ships. And Scipio had to guard the Castra Cornelia camp for some time.
Meanwhile, Masinissa rushed like a whirlwind through his ancestral land Massaliev to break the resistance created around his enemy Syphax, depose Syphax himself and put the wounded leader in chains to demonstrate him in the countryside. Where the opposition was strong, Laelius intervened with his heavily armed infantry and defeated it. But this was the land of Masinissa's ancestors. The townspeople were left without a leader when Syphax was chained, and the Bedouins only wanted to follow the victors.
Kirta fell, and at the entrance to the palace Masinissa saw Sophonizba waiting for him. Legend has it that she begged the young Numidian not to let her, a Carthaginian, fall into the hands of the Romans. Poets claim that Masinissa was crazy about her. And Masinissa probably consolidated his victory over the wounded Syphax by taking his young wife. Laelius, who had arrived to establish law and order in this disorganized conquered land, protested, saying that Sophonizba was an agent of the Carthaginians and was now a prisoner of the Senate and the Roman people. Masinissa, feeling his strength returning, did not listen to him. Nevertheless, Laelius forced him to turn to Scipio for a solution to this issue.
The three men returned to the lines of Utica, where Scipio decided that the wounded Syphax should be sent as a captive leader to Rome. Both must have remembered their meeting when Syphax's hospitality protected the young proconsul. The myth that surrounded Sophonisba said that Syphax accused her of fraudulently ruining his friendship with Scipio and that he warned the Roman general that she would do the same to Masinissa. It is very doubtful that a Numidian, who was endowed with lifelong power, would blame a woman for his downfall. Most likely, the cautious Scipio did not want a Carthaginian woman to become Masinissa’s wife, especially one like Sophonizba. Scipio urgently needed Numidian cavalry.
The two of them discussed this, and Masinissa left the Roman's tent to meditate alone at night. He also needed his ally, because without the Roman legions Masinissa could not resist the power of Carthage.
And the legend ends the story of this woman with a scene as if from a Greek tragedy, which Livy described with taste. Masinissa allegedly sent one of his Numidians back to the palace at Cyrtae with poison in a cup and demanded that Sophonizba make a choice: die or go as a prisoner with Syphax to Rome. After which she told the messenger: “I did not expect such a wedding gift from my husband.” And drank poison.
Be that as it may, the Carthaginian woman was killed. The old Numidian, chained, was brought to Rome along with other evidence of Scipio's victory. The hostile coast was conquered. As a reward, Masinissa received royal gifts from Scipio, who thereafter addressed him as king. He was given a golden crown, luxuriously embroidered robe and a high government position in the curia. He was crowned in front of a line of legions. He became the first of the eastern monarchs to become known as a protege of Rome.
However, the story of Sophonizba's death outlived the glory of Masinissa.
Carthage calls on its sons to return home
After the disaster on the Great Plains, Carthage felt in danger. Until this time, there were, as often happens, irreconcilable differences in the council of Birsa. A strong peace party bemoaned the failure of the Barcids and demanded reconciliation with Rome, another group insisted on the return of Hannibal, a third urged the need to make more efforts to expel Scipio from the positions he had conquered, where he had conducted informal preliminary negotiations in the winter. In the crowded streets below Birsa, trade guilds, artisans and ordinary citizens loudly demanded Hannibal. Suffet did not know what decision to make.
Between mid-March and late June, Roman legions poured onto the roads in the hinterland, and one Carthaginian field army disappeared into the Great Plains. From the Gulf of Sirte to the border of Numidia, the city was cut off from the continent. Refugees rushed into the city with their belongings, but without food. The crops on the banks of the vital Bagrada River were at the disposal of the enemy. The crowded streets smelled of hunger. All plans have changed.
Three walls now protected the city at the tip of the cape; garrisons took up positions within them; the fleet guarded the entrance to the harbor. But the city could not withstand many months without food delivered from the hinterland. The garrison was not prepared to face an army like Scipio's on the battlefield. Deprived of Numidian recruits, the city did not have sufficient numbers to form a new army, and, moreover, did not have anyone capable of leading it against Scipio. Hasdrubal, Sophonizba's father, committed suicide.
The council placed Hanno, a veteran of Hannibal's campaign who had been commander of the heavy cavalry at Cannae, in command of the defense. In addition, the council sent envoys to Mago, in the Alps, and to Hannibal, demanding that they return with their armies to Africa. The council then replaced the commander of the fleet, the over-cautious Bomilcar, with a more suitable one, also named Hasdrubal. Under the command of a new commander, the fleet launched a sortie against Utica and returned, capturing 60 Roman transport ships. These sailing ships, re-armed, were an excellent addition to the large convoy that was needed to bring Hannibal home through a sea infested with enemy ships.
On the Ligurian coast, the faithful Mago had his own fleet and was also very skilled in naval maneuvers. In the small harbor of Croton, Hannibal had several ships moored. However, his foot did not set foot on board a ship for a whole generation. And Carthage demanded Hannibal. The eager crowds at Birsa's three gates never stopped shouting his name.
It was already July (203 BC), and the weather was suitable for going to sea.
Regarding this crisis in historical sources there is not a word. Failure. Sudden - like when a film stops while the next part is being put on. In July, Hannibal awaits Bruttius in the mountains. In early autumn or October, he is already overseas, in Africa, with his army in full equipment. Dunkirk took place during a time period for which there is no written evidence. Latin historiographers chose not to explain how Hannibal got out of Italy.
Modern historians have paid attention to this mystery. One concludes that ships at sea are difficult to find. This is true. Even Nelson was unable to spot Napoleon's convoy as it crossed the Mediterranean to the Nile. However, this does not explain how Hannibal reached the sea undetected. There were two Roman armies in the immediate vicinity. They were able to defeat his troops while boarding ships in order to win his first victory. And of course, his army, when loaded onto transport ships, was spared by the battle fleet, which could have put an end to Hannibal once and for all.
Another historian goes further in his explanation: since the Roman Senate was at that time negotiating a truce (as now became obvious) with the Carthaginian envoys, and since according to Roman law it was not necessary to negotiate while the enemy’s armed forces were on Italian soil, the Senate was interested in the departure of Hannibal and Mago from the peninsula. This is hardly possible. Negotiations with Carthage did not extend to the Carthaginian troops in Italy. Hannibal did not get a day's respite after crossing the snowy pass of the Alpine Mountains. In any case, the Roman fleet intercepted and captured part of Mago's convoy.
The simplest explanation for this mystery can only be one. Hannibal escaped unnoticed, as he had managed to do earlier, crossing the Volturno at Capua.
Croton stands in plain sight near a shallow, crescent-shaped bay, standing in a spot as flat as a table. But beyond this small port, the La Sila hills stretch as far as the eye can see. These hills were held by the Carthaginians, while the Romans, who occupied Consentia, occupied the further slopes.
As the day of departure approached, - when Hasdrubal, the commander of the fleet, arrived with his considerable convoy - Hannibal left the men who were still in his service the choice of whether to follow him or remain in Italy. Most of them decided to accompany him. He did not take with him the weaker group of people, with numerous women and children, who became part of his army in Italy. (The story that he brutally destroyed all those who refused to leave in the temple of Juno Lacinia is simply a bloody tale of the Latins.) Hannibal actually demanded that all the horses dear to his heart be destroyed, since they could not be taken with him on the ships . He also ordered those troops that were to remain in Italy to occupy Carthaginian posts on the hills while the contingents bound for Africa embarked and sailed. The Roman command had no information about his departure, and, apparently, quite a lot of time passed before they were convinced that Hannibal had actually gone to sea.
One of the most incredible facts in the biography of Hannibal is that he arrived in Italy with an army consisting of Spaniards and Africans, and left it mainly with Bruttians, Gauls and numerous Roman deserters. If any elephants survived, they were not taken with us. Hannibal never mentioned the moment when he watched the mountains of Italy and the white speck of the Temple of Juno Lacinia disappear into the horizon. (The description of him gnashing his teeth in anger at being called to Carthage, which did not support him in the war, is a reminiscence of the long-standing misconception of those who believed that Hannibal was planning the war. Carthage could not force him to return to Africa against his will. He prepared for his departure with his usual carefulness. After the Great Plains, the center of the conflict shifted to the African coast, and Hannibal left Italy, like Hamilcar left Mount Eric, without any internal protest.)
The manner of his departure proves that his army heading to Africa could not have been numerous. Later sources estimated its number from 12,000 to 15,000 people, but most likely there were even less than 12,000 in this army. The convoy consisted only of sailing ships. Galleys, with their small decks and large number of oarsmen, could only carry a small number of passengers. In addition, after the autumn equinox, it was dangerous for fragile galleys to go on long journeys due to cold winds and storms. And Hannibal and his fleet commander made a long journey from Croton.
It is now completely clear where the Roman flotillas were and what they were doing at that time. Between 140 and 160 war galleys were based in Ostia, Sardinia and Sicily. A significant part of them accompanied new convoys to Africa, since during these months the main thing was to deliver food and reinforcements to Scipio. (“All eyes were fixed on Africa.”) One detachment intercepted ships that fought off Mago’s convoy.
Mago himself was wounded in the last battle on the Po River, when he tried to withdraw his units from the battle or make a last attempt to break through to Hannibal. Mago died on the way or was shipwrecked during a storm. Most of his ships, filled with Balearians, Ligurians and Gauls, eventually sailed to Carthage.
The Roman flotillas located outside of Sicily were located between Croton and Carthage. They watched the approach of Hannibal's convoy, but in vain.
Hannibal and his fleet commander made a large circle around Sicily. They may have been spotted from a guard post in Malta. However, by that time the Sicilian fleet no longer had time to intercept them. They were not heading towards Carthage. They approached from the east, landing on the east coast in what is now Tunisia, more than 80 miles south of the Sacred Mountain of Carthage. Finding himself on land in this unexpected location, Hannibal quickly moved his army north to Hadrumet, a harbor and fairly Big city, located outside the Roman patrol zone.
Thirty-four years later, Hannibal stood on African soil again. Both of his brothers were dead. And all the concerns of Rome were focused on him, which he threw into confusion with his successful movement from continent to continent. “Hope and anxiety increased every day,” says Livy. - People could not decide whether to rejoice that Hannibal left Italy after sixteen years, or to be alarmed because he arrived in Africa with his army intact. Quintus Fabius [the Slower], who had died shortly before, often said that Hannibal would become a more serious rival in his own land than in a foreign state. And Scipio did not want to deal with Syphax, the king in a country of uncouth barbarians, or with Hasdrubal, a commander who could quickly slip away, or with the irregular troops, which were a bunch of villagers. Hannibal was born, one might say, at the headquarters of his father, the bravest of generals. He left evidence of his great deeds in Spain, and in the land of the Gauls, and in Italy; from the Alps to the Strait of Messina. His army endured inhuman hardships. Many of his soldiers, who could resist Scipio in battle, killed Roman praetors with their own hands and walked through captured Roman cities and camps. All Roman magistrates at this time did not have such a number of attributes of power that they could bear before Hannibal and which were taken from the military leaders who fell in battle.”
The alarmed Senate announced four days of games in the circus arena to appease the gods, while simultaneously holding a feast in honor of Jupiter in his Capitoline Temple.
Shapes of the future
If the Senate was alarmed, Scipio was probably stunned. He expected (and prepared for) Hannibal's arrival in Africa. However, he could not foresee that the “wizard of Cannae” would elude the Roman armies and fight his way through the blockade of the flotilla “with his army intact.” Nor could he foresee that another highly experienced Carthaginian army would be transferred with lightning speed from the banks of the Po River to the banks of Bagrada.
That autumn, in Scipio's conquered positions, Utica continued to show her defiance. He also failed to occupy Bizerte (then Hippo Diarit) on the western shore of the bay. He continued to depend on the port of Castra Cornelia to supply him. Impregnable Carthage mobilized all its resources. Laelius, Scipio's right-hand man, remained in Rome after delivering Syphax there. The intractable Masinissa was in the west, trying at all costs to replenish the ranks of the cavalry and gain all the Massilian lands for himself.
It seemed that all or almost all of the evil prophesied by the late Fabius in Africa was beginning to come true. Will Masinissa be able or willing to join Scipio in time? Could enough of the armed men who had been freed in Italy be transported south to Africa to compensate for Hannibal's arrival? Will these forces be dispatched in a timely manner?
Before anything could happen, winter arrived, ending the main transport link by sea. As in Castra Cornelia a year earlier, Scipio found himself isolated on the edge of the African coast, with the difference that Hannibal was now on this edge with him.
When faced with this crisis, Publius Cornelius Scipio ceased to be merely a brilliant regional commander of Rome and became one of history's outstanding men. He paid for his actions political career, which he so strived for, and incurred the envy and hatred of a man named Cato. Finding himself simultaneously faced with enormous opportunity and great danger, Scipio thought no more about it.
By luck, or thanks to the foresight that brings good fortune, Scipio concluded a truce with the council of Carthage. At the end of the last summer, he needed time to reorganize his troops, while the men of Byrsa needed time to bring Hannibal home after defeats on the Great Plains. Therefore, it is not surprising that they concluded a truce in Africa (this did not work out in Italy), but it happened in an amazing way. Scipio met with the bearded envoys of the Carthaginian council and, after listening to them, proposed his terms for a peace agreement. This was not unusual, and both sides used various tricks, as Scipio did before burning the Carthaginian camps, to gain time. Nevertheless, Scipio brilliantly came up with the idea of offering genuine conditions as deceptive conditions, with the help of which he wanted to end the war.
These conditions were:
Return to Rome all prisoners, fugitives and deserters.
Withdrawal of Carthaginian armies from Italy.
Transfer of Sardinia and Corsica with Sicily by Carthage and the end of interference in the affairs of Spain (the former province of Scipio). Reduction of the number of war galleys to 20. Payment of 5,000 talents of silver as indemnity (about $4,000,000 in money or bullion, which had much greater value than now).
In addition, the issues of supplying provisions to the Roman armies in Africa during the truce and issues relating to the recognition of Masinissa as king in his own country were discussed.
Now, taking into account his position (without consulting the Senate), Scipio seemed to think about all the complexities of the long-term conflict. He highlighted the realities of the coming years - that Carthage should not be destroyed, and Rome should become the ruler of the seas. Moreover, he realized that it would take generations to bring Spain into any kind of order, which is what he intended to do. He may have been thinking about his own return to Spain. Of course, he was not going to demand the surrender of Hannibal, who might have been harmless in Africa without a fighting fleet and without Spain. And then the two continents, separated, could remain at peace.
Knowing the argumentative nature of Carthaginian government officials, Scipio gave them only three days to either confirm the truce and convey its terms to Rome or not. The Council accepted the terms, under the influence of a group opposing the Barkids and hoping to gain time through negotiations. The appearance of the terms of Scipio and the envoys of Carthage in Rome naturally caused the surprise of the elders in the Senate, who could not understand what had come over their commander in the middle of a successful campaign. Like all senators everywhere and at all times, the elders were outraged by the terms that had not been initially discussed by them. Speakers made speeches on behalf of different groups: from those involved in transport, from landowners, from the Claudii against the Scipios. This debate became even more heated after the unexpected arrival of robed envoys from Carthage. Some of them, it is true, confirmed that Hannibal was guilty of actions to which they did not consent. The Romans completely agreed with this. But the majority tried to revive the old treaty that bound Carthage to Rome before the war began. As if we could be talking about him now! The Roman senators, who had deep disagreements among themselves, came to complete unity regarding the old treaty. It should not have been discussed any further. They also recognized that they should be given greater guarantees. Some of them might have suspected that the terms were a ruse, but on whose part and for what purpose? As Fabius told them when they voted to begin hostilities, things in the Senate are completely different from those on the battlefield.
Then news came from the battlefields that Hannibal and Mago had disappeared from Italy along with their troops.
This immediately aroused suspicion and the debate began again. Moreover, the Senate peremptorily recalled Laelius, who was on his way to his commander. The question was posed to him: what did Publius Cornelius mean by these negotiations? Maybe he wanted Hannibal to stay in Africa, and if so, why?
The sophisticated Laelius gave a brilliant answer: “Publius Cornelius did not foresee Hannibal’s departure before the signing of peace.” And he probably convinced the confused senators to trust their commander and send him reinforcements immediately. Whether the Senate signed the peace terms or not is a moot point, and it hardly matters. In the end, the senators agreed with Laelius because they left the decision to the popular assembly, which demanded the full support of Scipio with all available ships, bags of grain and armed men in Italy.
But Scipio made new enemies for himself in the Forum. The Claudian faction gained key positions during new elections after a provisional dictator was named to appoint new consuls. Winter storms raged at sea. Finally, a convoy of 120 transport ships and 20 escort ships left Sardinia under the command of Praetor Lentulus and headed for Castra Cornelia. Another convoy was being prepared under the command of Claudius Nero, who headed for the Metaurus River. But the largest convoy, consisting of 200 ships and 30 galleys, was overtaken by a storm off the coast of Sicily, and most of the cargo ships were thrown ashore near Carthage. The Roman galleys managed to save their crews, but the ships, loaded with food and combat mechanisms, rocked in the surf under the two peaks of the Sacred Mountain.
The sight of them was intolerable to the starving population of Carthage, who besieged the doors of the council until ships, accompanied by war galleys, were sent across the bay to seize provisions, as if sent down to them by the invisible Melqart. In fact, all the Carthaginians perked up as soon as they learned of Hannibal's landing.
At Castra Cornelia, Scipio tried his best to extend the cessation of hostilities for at least a few days. (Nero's convoy was approaching.) He showed restraint by sending envoys to Carthage to protest the seizure of the ships and demand the return of the food he himself needed. His ambassadors ran into a noisy demonstration that shouted the name of Hannibal. Concerned, the council members secretly sent envoys back to their pentekontor, and the Carthaginian battle fleet took it out of the harbor. After the escort returned, fate intervened again. Three triremes from Hasdrubal's formation of ships noticed the Roman ship and, despite the truce, attacked it. The large ship repelled the attack and escaped by approaching the Roman post.
Scipio behaved as if the truce continued - he sent an urgent recommendation to Rome so that the Carthaginians would be protected there from the attacks of the crowd. With the onset of spring, favorable weather for navigation and the arrival of Nero with a new legion were just around the corner. Masinissa was still far to the west, where he took control of more and more cities in the territory of Syphax. Couriers from Kirta brought ominous rumors that the sons of Syphax were gathering cavalry to join Hannibal. Somewhere in the depths of the continent, according to Scipio, the Carthaginian armies were uniting - the remnants of Mago's army with Hanno's recruits from Carthage and veterans of Hannibal.
Undoubtedly, as Scipio concluded, Hannibal would waste no time in beginning to form a new army from these contingents.
One early spring day (the exact date is unknown), Scipio decided not to wait any longer. He had attacked the Carthaginian mobilization center on the Great Plains early the previous year and appears to have been afraid to give Hannibal more time to organize an army. Whatever his reasons, he withdrew all reliable troops from the lines of Utica and marched up the Bagrada River, moving away from his base and naval support. He went without the best part of his cavalry - the Numidians. Every day he sent messengers on horseback to the west demanding Masinissa to appear. He advanced southwest, following the river as long as he could, burning villages, destroying crops, and driving columns of roped captives away from the once prosperous Carthaginian lands.
Such devastation forced the inhabitants of the villages located along the river to urgently send messengers to Hannibal's winter camp at Hadrumet to ask their patron to quickly protect them.
The Council of Carthage also hurried him to oppose Scipio.
Hannibal answered the envoys:
I know better than you what to do.
But they left him after learning about Scipio's march and the fact that the Romans did not yet have Numidian cavalry. Apparently, Hannibal was not yet ready to move. However, he did so immediately.
The huge camp was disbanded. Armed men poured out of huts on the coast. The Ligurians, Gauls, Balearians, Bruttians and Carthaginians in long columns hastily reached to the west, from under the cover of the coastal ridges to the plains. The aging Hanno led his newly recruited cavalry. A detachment of 2,000 Numidians followed one of the rulers loyal to Syphax. 80 elephants wandered along the road.
The cargo was light, so Hannibal moved at high speed to intercept and surprise Scipio before Masinissa joined him. With him came 37,000 people who had not yet been welded into the army.
Ironically, Hannibal was approaching a country that he had only seen as a nine-year-old child, while the Romans were moving through territory that was already familiar to them.
Battle of Zama
Let us take a moment to look at these two rivals, since history does not know another such pair of people who are in opposition to each other. Hannibal is a strategist. He is most dangerous on the field of his choice, where he immediately takes advantage of all the advantages of the terrain. He knows how, like no one else, to direct his best striking forces to a weak area at the enemy’s disposal. It is impossible to foresee where this might happen if Hannibal has the ability to choose the battlefield. Hitherto the crushing blow had usually come from his Spanish-African cavalry, but they were no longer with him.
Scipio is also distinguished by his thoroughness in preparation, although he is daring in his actions. He relies on one tactic, attacking in converging lines of the formation of his legions, which he moves with amazing skill when the battle begins. He completely trusts his disciplined legionnaires, and they trust him. He may or may not have stronger cavalry than his enemy.
Both Hannibal and Scipio understand, unlike most other commanders, that war has only one goal - the establishment of true peace.
The southern plain was still green from the winter rains. Scipio probably received the first warning of Hannibal's approach from Carthaginian spies. They were caught in the Roman camp near the village of Naraggara. It is said that after interrogating the disguised Carthaginians, Scipio ordered them to be led through the entire camp so that they could see everything they wanted, or what he wanted them to see. Then, unexpectedly, he released them so that they could return to the Carthaginian camp, located near the village of Zama.
Learning that Hannibal had been spotted on the march, Scipio led his columns east. He walked towards his enemy until he crossed a small river, not yet dry from the summer heat. (The exact location was never named.) Here, to his surprise, he met Hannibal's envoy, who said that Hannibal wanted to negotiate a truce with him personally.
Now Scipio did not know where the Carthaginian army was waiting. He decided that, apparently, Hannibal no longer hoped to surprise his column on the march, as it had at Lake Trasimene. His Romans were nevertheless six days' march from their base. There were no hills to be seen anywhere to hide behind. Without the support of a strong cavalry, his legions could have a hard time on the plains to which he led them.
While Scipio was thinking, he noticed a fascinating sight. From the west, Masinissa was approaching on horseback, sparkling with new insignia, and behind him was a cloud of horsemen occupying the entire plain. There were 6,000 of them, followed by 4,000 infantry, which no longer mattered much. Scipio, with difficulty, managed to connect with Masinissa before his meeting with Hannibal took place. He now had stronger cavalry than his enemy.
As a result, he released the Carthaginian envoy, answering that he would meet with Hannibal.
The camp could be safely left under the supervision of Lelius and Masinissa.
Their meeting was described by Polybius, who, two generations later, served Scipio's family. From the Carthaginian camp, which was located in a lowland on the other side of the valley, Hannibal rode out on horseback, accompanied by a horse escort. Leaving the escort behind, he dismounted and approached, accompanied by an interpreter. Scipio, for his part, did the same, also taking an interpreter. Although both of them spoke fluent Greek and Hannibal understood Latin, they took advantage of the opportunity to have time to think while the interpreters repeated their words, and, in addition, secured witnesses just in case.
They met in silence. Hannibal was older and taller. His wrinkled, tanned face was wrapped in a headscarf covering his graying hair. He turned his head slightly so he could see with his good eye. Scipio stood bareheaded, holding his helmet in his hand. He was discreetly tense. His handsome face expressed nothing. Apart from the cross on his helmet and the gold inlay on his cuirass, he wore no insignia and was not accompanied by lictors.
After a long pause, Hannibal spoke and waited for translation.
You have achieved success, Roman consul. Besides, fortune smiled on you.
Scipio waited.
“Did you really think,” Hannibal continued, “that Rome could achieve something through war?” That is, more than what you currently have? Did you think that if you were defeated here, you would lose your army? - He thought for a moment. “I would not propose to make peace if I did not think that it would benefit both of us.”
Scipio waited. It was obvious that Hannibal had heard about the conditions for the cessation of hostilities. When Scipio spoke, he asked what terms of Rome Hannibal did not agree with.
Hannibal replied that he did not agree that all the islands, including the smallest ones located between Italy and Africa (such as the Maltese group of islands) and Spain, should be abandoned by Carthage. He did not mention surrendering warships, but he would not have given up runaway slaves or deserters in the Carthaginian army. (Under Roman law, this would have included most of his veterans from Italy.)
In response, Scipio explained that he could not concede more to Carthage than what his government had agreed to when it signed the terms in Rome. (Signed or not, these were the terms proposed by Scipio.)
At this point, both greeted each other and parted. No agreement was possible between them until Hannibal offered more than the terms of surrender that were proposed by Scipio. Instead, he offered less. All that depended equally on them was whether an attempt would be made to destroy each other's armed forces.
That night Scipio seemed to be in high spirits. At a last-minute meeting of military leaders, he could only warn the alarmed Masinissa about the mission of the Numidian cavalry, which was to act as a single unit on one flank. This in itself made Scipio's task easier, because all the other horsemen were now transferred to Laelius at the opposite end of the Roman line. Scipio wondered about the number of elephants seen in the Carthaginian camp. In all other respects his plans were well thought out. The commanders of the legions knew about them. Scipio addressed the military leaders:
Tell people that their hardships will soon end. The day after tomorrow they will receive African trophies. After this, they will be able to go home, each to their own city.
In the Carthaginian camp, Hannibal is said to have walked from squad to squad, talking with people he knew from Italy and with newcomers from Carthage. He calmly instructed the military leaders. Perhaps only Hanno, a veteran of the Alpine campaign, clearly understood what these instructions meant. Others were content to obey strictly, trusting to Hannibal's vast experience. He told them that for sixteen years his Carthaginians had outnumbered the armed Romans and that there were no barriers, no hidden obstacles in this valley of Zama that they could not overcome.
The people there did not have the time to build protective walls and could not bring their own fighting mechanisms. Has anyone seen catapults among their silver eagles?
He seemed cheerful, and this gave hope to his commanders.
Hannibal did not sleep that night because the first stage of his attack began in the last hours of the night. There was almost no water in the camp, as the nearest river flowed across the plain behind the Roman positions. If this had been his old "Italian" army, Hannibal could have brought it out undetected under the cover of darkness. He could neither retreat across the open plain with his motley army, opposed by Numidian forces, nor attempt to hold this position in the absence of a constant supply of water. It took time to get so many elephants moving at such an early hour, when there was barely light on the horizon. The elephants did not want to move in the dark. From his vantage point on the hill, Hannibal watched them leave. Behind them came the men of Mago, the silent Ligurians and the grumbling Gauls, and in addition the wild Moroccans and a few Spaniards. Hannibal equipped these lighter troops with heavy weapons and trained them to move as they now marched, shoulder to shoulder. They were skilled warriors.
Only the messengers who were with Hannibal on the hill saw what was happening in this twilight. His troops did not form the usual long battle formation. The three elements - Mago's troops, Carthaginian recruits and Hannibal's veterans - advanced separately, in three waves. In this way, three small armies could operate separately under the command of their own commanders. And ahead of everyone were the mighty elephants. Hannibal held back the last division, his Bruttian army. He wanted to join her himself and personally command her. He relied on these veterans, planning to save them for use later in the battle when all other formations failed. The Romans wouldn't be able to spot them at first, not in the ghostly light of the early morning.
This was Hannibal's only hope.
And so it happened that three different battles took place on the Zama field instead of one.
When Hannibal set out, the Roman group was already moving towards him, slowly, like a well-oiled single mechanism, with banners and numerous cavalry walking along the edges. The infantry line advanced in its usual three ranks: the front rank, the spearmen and the triarii supporting them. But most of the maniples had unusual open passages between them - gaps covered only by nimble spear throwers.
The armed masses converged in the middle of the field, where Hannibal and Scipio entered into negotiations.
Suddenly all the Roman trumpets and bugles blared at the same time. This frightened the elephants in front of the Carthaginian formation.
And then the purpose of the strange gaps in the center of the Roman buildings became clear. The elephants, in their madness, rushed into them, where they were met with a barrage of projectiles. The huge animals turned back or rushed forward through the ranks. Those that were at the edges tried to turn towards the Carthaginian cavalry. In a matter of minutes, the elephants were uncontrollable and useless, causing only confusion. At this moment, Scipio sent forward his horsemen, who occupied the flanks.
The Carthaginian cavalry was too few in number to take control of the experienced troops of Laelius and Masinissa. Both Roman flanks surged forward, and soon the Carthaginian cavalry was routed, the horsemen scattered across the field, and pursuers and pursued disappeared from sight.
The Ligurians and Gauls had already entered into battle with the main Roman formation, “measuring strength in single combat,” as Hannibal predicted. Mago's men fought so tenaciously that the Roman advance was stopped. The triarii rushed into the gaps, disappearing into the moving masses, and the Romans moved forward again. But the second wave of Carthaginians did not come to the aid of the exhausted Ligurians and Gauls. Hannibal ordered his formations to stay apart. When the survivors of the first wave began to retreat, they were met by Carthaginian weapons aimed at them. Maddened groups of Ligurians and Gauls furiously attacked the Carthaginians, who destroyed them.
The Roman system moved towards this second army of Hannibal, his numerous Carthaginians. These recruits from Carthage itself, commanded by old Hanno, were crushed by the retreating men of Mago. The Roman front line crushed all of his javelin throwers. The legionnaires, hiding behind their shields, rained blows of their swords on them. Their pressure increased when the spearmen from the second rank entered the battle. The Carthaginians fought desperately, holding off the experienced legions. It was already late morning when the Carthaginians retreated, moving to the sides. They left the battlefield littered with wounded and dead.
Behind the dead stood the last line of Hannibal, the veterans of Italy.
Their dark ranks were untouched, waiting. Hannibal kept his great impact force in these early hours. The weakening legionnaires came face to face with the veterans who had until that moment defeated them.
Scipio could not retreat. The sounds of trumpets came from end to end of the legions. The legates galloped towards the stands with reckless boldness, and the cries of the centurions drowned out the groans of the wounded. Orders reached the men in the ranks: rest, regain their weapons, carry away the wounded Romans, clear the battlefield, do not leave the banners. Scipio did not take his eyes off the “Italian” army, which was at a distance of three hundred steps. On both flanks of this army, fugitives from earlier battles were gathered to take the places vacated by the Carthaginian cavalry. In this quick regrouping, Scipio sensed Hannibal in action. There was still no sign of the Roman cavalry returning to the battlefield.
Scipio waited until his legionaries had regained their second wind and their weapons and received water. Then he gave the order again. Three lines of legions reorganized: the spearmen who supported the damaged front line moved to one flank, the triarii to the other. The Roman line lengthened, going beyond Hannibal's battle formation. After that he moved forward again.
Scipio bravely attacked Hannibal's fresh army, throwing equal forces of his tired warriors into it, standing in a long thin line that converged on the enemy's weak flanks. In doing this, he tested the fortitude of his men and the resourcefulness of Laelius and Masinissa.
Thus began the final battle. What might have happened when Hannibal's Bruttians met his legions will never be known, because the Roman cavalry returned. Obeying the orders of Laelius and Masinissa, she approached from the rear of Hannibal's veterans. The Bruttians bravely resisted the cross-attack of the Roman infantry on the flanks. Now their rear ranks had to turn around to meet the stomping cavalry. They fought silently, unbowed. There was no longer any hope left. There were no Carthaginian cavalry left that could cope with the Romans. Scipio celebrated a victory rivaling that of Cannae.
The surrounded veterans were unable to escape from the cavalry. They fought until most of them died.
When a passage formed, Hannibal and several horsemen rushed away. They did not go to the almost deserted Carthaginian camp. There were no significant formations left to defend them because Hannibal had thrown all his forces into the battle in the valley. (Scipio will later say that Hannibal did everything that was humanly possible at the Battle of Zama.)
Hannibal rode without stopping east to Hadrumet, which was 90 miles away. Transport ships with provisions and a small garrison were waiting there. By escaping, he thereby saved his city from humiliation in the event of his capture. He had no illusions about continuing the war. In the wee hours of the day when the Battle of Zama took place, he lost the army he had commanded for sixteen years. Trying to defend the city itself without an army could only cause a siege that would end in starvation.
From Hadrumet, Hannibal sent a warning to the people who were within the city: “We have lost more than a battle - we have lost the war. Agree to the terms that are offered to you.”
While he waited, he heard about how the last resistance in Africa ended. The Numidian horsemen, who were late with their help, arrived from the far west, led by the sons of Syphax. They looked numerous and formidable, but were soon defeated and driven back by the veterans of the Roman army. If they had arrived in time to Hannibal before Zama, the outcome of the battle could have been different. Scipio calmly struck his blow immediately after Masinissa's arrival, before the West Africans arrived. By his devastation of the Bagrada valley, he forced Hannibal to move towards him during that period of time. And now the long-awaited convoys from Italy were approaching, with new legions and the consuls leading them.
Scipio's authority, however, was not subject to any doubt. He won the final victory as commander-in-chief, and Rome pinned hopes on him alone to end the war. After a thorough examination of the fortifications of Carthage from the sea, Scipio did not want to besiege the city. And he never wanted to destroy Carthage either.
Hannibal seems to have read Scipio's thoughts. It will forever remain unclear what these two people agreed upon before Zama. All we know is what Scipio himself decided to make public years later. Of course, they both understood each other extraordinarily.
For Hannibal in Hadrumet relied on the word of Scipio. Scipio's conditions, in any case, will save the city and allow its inhabitants to begin new life, with a new way of life that will remain Carthaginian.
Along the way, Scipio's peace terms last year underwent slight changes. These changes were made mainly by the Senate. They were as follows:
Hand over everything warships, leaving only ten, and all the elephants.
Do not conduct any future military operations in Africa without the consent of the Roman government.
Pay 10,000 talents of silver over fifty years.
Carthage must become a friend and ally of the Roman Republic.
So, in the end, the city of Carthage was forced to accept the terms that the Barcids swore they would never accept - to become a friend of the Romans.
However, at the insistence of Scipio, this great city retained its autonomy. The Carthaginians themselves did not suffer any damage; they retained their government, rural lands and urban territories that they owned before the war. Thus, according to Scipio's terms, there was no interference in the lives of the civilian population. There was no demand for the extradition of Hannibal.
The Romans strictly demanded compliance with further conditions of surrender: those ships that were thrown ashore near Carthage and plundered had to be paid in full. And Masinissa was to receive royal power over all Numidian lands as a reward. As for deserters, as the chronicles report, in accordance with Roman laws, all Roman citizens who surrendered were crucified on crosses, and all Italians were killed.
Historiographers say that when Publius Cornelius Scipio returned in triumph to Rome the following year (201 BC), he contributed 123,000 pounds of silver to the treasury. Crowds of people from farms greeted him along the entire route. However, this triumph of his seems to have been more popular than official. Popular masses the Forum apparently felt that their eccentric commander had failed to truly bring the Carthaginians to their knees after the ordeals of war. The Claudian party in the Senate was jealous of Scipio's unprecedented success. Few of his friends survived. (Of the wartime leaders, only Varro, the forgotten hero of Cannes, survived.) The new people were outraged that he had fraudulently changed the peace terms they had proposed. Many were afraid that the worship of the people could lead him to the royal throne. In the end, the Senate was content to give him the honorary title of princeps senatus (First Citizen) and the title Africanus (African).
“One thing is certain,” as Livy noted, “he became the first commander marked with the name of the nation he conquered.”