The period of the first Chechen war. Chechen war briefly

First Chechen War
	Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol region
	Khasavyurt agreements, withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya.
Territorial changes:	De facto independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
Opponents
Russian Armed Forces	Chechen separatists
Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia
Commanders
Boris Yeltsin Pavel Grachev Anatoly Kvashnin Anatoly Kulikov Victor Erin Anatoly Romanov Lev Rokhlin Gennady Troshev Vladimir Shamanov Ivan Babichev Konstantin Pulikovsky Bislan Gantamirov Said-Magomed Kakiev	Dzhokhar Dudayev † Aslan Maskhadov Akhmed Zakaev Zelimkhan Yandarbiev Shamil Basayev Ruslan Gelayev Salman Raduev Turpal-Ali Atgeriev Hunkar-Pasha Israpilov Vakha Arsanov Arbi Baraev Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev Apti Batalov Aslanbek Ismailov Ruslan Alikhadzhiev Ruslan Khaikhoroev Khizir Khachukaev
Strengths of the parties
95,000 troops (February 1995)	3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia)
Military losses
About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures)	17,391 dead and prisoners (Russian data)

First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian government forces (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

Background to the conflict

With the beginning of “perestroika” in various republics Soviet Union, including in Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"Chechen Revolution" 1991

On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.

More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 missile launchers ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand small automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)

As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

In fact, government system CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.

In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. For the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus railway 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.

A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.

1993 political crisis

In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year, and a regime was established in the republic personal power Dudayev, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.

Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)

After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

Beginning of the Civil War (1994)

Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, Dudayev’s supporters lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

Progress of the war

Deployment of troops (December 1994)

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, on initial stage fighting, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city or normal communications.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved towards the Presidential Palace and occupied the building by January 9 Petroleum Institute and Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief General Staff Armed forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were also given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, since the militants had now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed to conduct nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.

Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of forceful actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.

The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as participants in illegal armed forces, but as “self-defense units”. Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to be in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

Militant attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.

Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of ​​the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist groups, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

Khasavyurt Agreements (August 31, 1996)

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon the wounded and prisoners began to appear there Russian soldiers. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, representatives state power, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”

In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”

As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission collected information about what was happening in the Chechen war, searched for missing persons and prisoners, and contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of the militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with the field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.

In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. The following year, 1996, more than 230 million liters were produced drinking water for residents of the North Caucasus.

In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.

During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to recipients on Red Cross letterheads, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contact with each other, since all types of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the restoration and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages.

In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.

In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.

Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.

Results

The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Losses

According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

Commanders

Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic

1. Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
2. Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
3. Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
4. Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
5. Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
6. Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
7. Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)

In art

Movies

• “Cursed and Forgotten” (1997) is a feature-journalistic film by Sergei Govorukhin.
• “60 hours of the Maikop brigade” (1995) - documentary Mikhail Polunin about the “New Year’s” assault on Grozny.
• “Blockpost” (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
• “Purgatory” (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
• “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
• DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2

Music

• "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about Yuri Shevchuk's "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
• Yuri Shevchuk’s song “The boys were dying” is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Batyanya Battalion Commander” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step March” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
• Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
• Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
• The song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
• Blue berets - " New Year", "Reflections of an officer at the hotline", "Two turntables on Mozdok."

Books

• “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
• “Chechen Blues” (1998) - novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
• May Day (2000) - story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
• “Pathologies” (novel) (2004) - novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
• I was in this war (2001) - novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.

The first Chechen war lasted exactly one year and nine months. The war began on December 1, 1994, with the bombing of all three Chechen air bases - Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Grozny-Severny, which destroyed all Chechen aviation, including several "corn bombers" and a couple of antediluvian Czechoslovak fighters. The war ended on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements, after which the federals left Chechnya.

Military losses are depressing: 4,100 Russian troops were killed and 1,200 missing. 15 thousand militants were killed, although Aslan Maskhadov, who led the military operations, claimed that the militants lost 2,700 people. According to Memorial human rights activists, 30 thousand civilians in Chechnya were killed.

There were no winners in this war. The federals were unable to take control of the territory of the republic, and the separatists did not receive a truly independent state. Both sides lost.

An unrecognized state and preconditions for war

The only Chechen whom the whole country knew before the start of the war was Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of a bomber division, a combat pilot, at the age of 45 he became a major general of aviation, at 47 he left the army and entered politics. He moved to Grozny, quickly rose to leadership positions and became president in 1991. True, the president is just the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. But the President! He was known to have a tough temperament and determination. During the riots in Grozny, Dudayev and his supporters threw the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, out of the window. He crashed and was taken to the hospital, where Dudayev’s men finished him off. Kutsenko died, and Dudayev became a national leader.

Now this has somehow been forgotten, but Dudayev’s criminal reputation was known back in that period in 1993. Let me remind you how much noise the “Chechen advice notes” caused at the federal level. After all, it was a real disaster of the national payment system. Fraudsters, through shell companies and Grozny banks, stole 4 trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia. Exactly a trillion! Let me say for comparison that the Russian budget in that very year 1993 was 10 trillion rubles. That is, almost half of the national budget was stolen using Chechen advice notes. Half the annual salary of doctors, teachers, military personnel, officials, miners, half of all government income. Huge damage! Subsequently, Dudayev recalled how money was brought to Grozny by trucks.

These are the marketers, democrats and supporters of national self-determination that Russia had to fight in 1994.

Beginning of the conflict

When did the first Chechen war begin? December 11, 1994. This is what many historians and publicists believe out of habit. They think that the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 began on the day when the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the need to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. They forget that ten days earlier there was an air strike on airfields in Chechnya. They forget about the burnt corn fields, after which no one either in Chechnya or in the Russian armed forces doubted that there was a war going on.

But the ground operation really began on December 11. On this day, the so-called “Joint Group of Forces” (OGV), which then consisted of three parts, began to move:

• western;
• northwestern;
• eastern.

The Western group entered Chechnya from North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Northwestern - from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. Eastern - from Dagestan.

All three groups moved straight to Grozny.

The OGV was supposed to clear the city of separatists, and then destroy the militant bases: first in the northern, flat part of the republic; then in the southern, mountainous part.

In a short time, the OGV had to clear the entire territory of the republic from Dudayev’s formations.

The North-Western group was the first to reach the outskirts of Grozny, on December 12, and got involved in battle near the village of Dolinsky. In this battle, the militants used the Grad multiple launch rocket system, and that day they did not allow Russian troops to reach Grozny.

Gradually two other groups joined in. By the end of December, the army approached the capital from three sides:

• from the west;
• from North;
• from the east.

The assault was scheduled for December 31st. On New Year's Eve. And the eve of the birthday of Pavel Grachev, the then Minister of Defense. I won’t say that they wanted to predict victory for the holiday, but this opinion is widespread.

Storm of Grozny

The assault has begun. The assault groups immediately encountered difficulties. The fact is that the commanders made two serious mistakes:

• Firstly. The encirclement of Grozny was not completed. The problem was that Dudayev’s formations actively took advantage of the gap in the open encirclement ring. In the south, in the mountains, militant bases were located. The militants brought in ammunition and weapons from the south. The wounded were evacuated to the south. Reinforcements were approaching from the south;
• Secondly. We decided to use tanks on a massive scale. 250 combat vehicles entered Grozny. Moreover, without proper intelligence support and without infantry support. The tanks turned out to be helpless in the narrow streets of urban areas. The tanks were burning. The 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade was surrounded and 85 people were killed.

Parts of the Western and Eastern groups were unable to penetrate deep into the city and retreated. Only part of the North-Eastern group under the command of General Lev Rokhlin gained a foothold in the city and took up defensive positions. Some units were surrounded and suffered losses. Street fighting broke out in various areas of Grozny.

The command quickly learned lessons from what happened. The commanders changed tactics. They abandoned the massive use of armored vehicles. The battles were fought by small, mobile units of assault groups. Soldiers and officers quickly gained experience and improved their combat skills. On January 9, the federals took the building of the Petroleum Institute, and the airport came under the control of the OGV. By January 19, the militants left the presidential palace and organized a defense on Minutka Square. At the end of January, the federals controlled 30% of the territory of Grozny. At this moment, the federal group was increased to 70 thousand people, it was headed by Anatoly Kulikov.

The next important change occurred on February 3rd. To blockade the city from the south, the command formed the “South” group. Already on February 9, it blocked the Rostov-Baku highway. The blockade is closed.

Half the city turned into ruins, but victory was won. On March 6, the last militant left Grozny under pressure from the United Forces. It was Shamil Basayev.

Major fighting in 1995

By April 1995, federal forces had established control over almost the entire flat part of the republic. Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken under control relatively easily. Remained outside the control zone locality Bamut. The fighting there continued intermittently until the end of the year, and even into the next year 1996.

The operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Samashki received quite a public response. The propaganda campaign against Russia, professionally carried out by Dudayev’s Chechen-Press agency, seriously influenced the world public opinion about Russia and its actions in Chechnya. Many still believe that civilian casualties in Samashki were prohibitively high. There are unverified rumors about thousands of deaths, while the human rights society Memorial, for example, believes that the number of civilians killed during the cleansing of Samashki is in the dozens.

What is true here and what is an exaggeration is now impossible to discern. One thing is certain: war is cruel and unfair. Especially when civilians are dying.

Advancement in mountainous regions was more difficult for federal forces than marching across the plains. The reason was that troops often got bogged down in the defense of militants, and even such unpleasant incidents occurred as, for example, the capture of 40 paratroopers of the Aksai special forces. In June, the federals took control of the regional centers of Vedeno, Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt.

The most socially significant and resonant episode of the first Chechen war of 1995 was the episode associated with events going beyond the borders of Chechnya. The main negative character of the episode was Shamil Basayev. At the head of a gang of 195 people, he carried out a raid on trucks in the Stavropol Territory. The militants entered the Russian city of Budennovsk, opened fire in the city center, broke into the building of the city department of internal affairs, and shot several police officers and civilians.

The terrorists took about two thousand hostages and herded them into a complex of city hospital buildings. Basayev demanded the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya and the start of negotiations with Dudayev with the participation of the UN. Russian authorities decided to storm the hospital. Unfortunately, there was a leak of information, and the bandits managed to prepare. The assault was not unexpected and was unsuccessful. The special forces captured a number of auxiliary buildings, but did not break into the main building. On the same day they made a second assault attempt, and it also failed.

In short, the situation began to become critical and the Russian authorities were forced to enter into negotiations. The then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was on the phone line. The whole country tensely watched the television report when Chernomyrdin spoke into the phone: “Shamil Basayev, Shamil Basayev, I am listening to your demands.” As a result of negotiations, Basayev received a vehicle and left for Chechnya. There he released the 120 remaining hostages. In total, 143 people died during the events, 46 of them were security forces.

Military clashes of varying intensity took place in the republic until the end of the year. On October 6, militants made an attempt on the life of the commander of the United Armed Forces, General Anatoly Romanov. In Grozny, on Minutka Square, in a tunnel under the railway, the Dudayevites detonated a bomb. The helmet and body armor saved the life of General Romanov, who was passing through the tunnel at that moment. As a result of his injury, the general fell into a coma and subsequently became deeply disabled. After this incident, “retaliation strikes” were carried out on militant bases, which, however, did not lead to a serious change in the balance of power in the confrontation.

Fighting in 1996

The New Year began with another hostage-taking episode. And again outside of Chechnya. This is the story. On January 9, 250 militants carried out a bandit raid in the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. First, they attacked a Russian helicopter base, where they destroyed 2 non-combat-ready MI-8 helicopters. Then they captured the Kizlyar hospital and maternity hospital. The militants drove up to three thousand townspeople from neighboring buildings.

The bandits locked people on the second floor, mined it, and barricaded themselves on the first floor, and put forward demands: the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, the provision of buses and a corridor to Grozny. Negotiations with the militants were conducted by the authorities of Dagestan. Representatives of the federal forces command did not participate in these negotiations. On January 10, the Chechens were provided with buses, and the militants with a group of hostages began moving towards Chechnya. They were going to cross the border near the village of Pervomaiskoye, but did not get there. Federal security forces, who were not going to put up with the fact that the hostages were taken to Chechnya, opened warning fire, and the convoy had to stop. Unfortunately, as a result of insufficiently organized actions, confusion occurred. This allowed the militants to disarm a checkpoint of 40 Novosibirsk policemen and capture the village of Pervomaiskoye.

The militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The confrontation continued for several days. On the 15th, after the Chechens shot six captured policemen and two negotiators - Dagestan elders, the security forces launched an assault.

The assault failed. The confrontation continued. On the night of January 19, the Chechens broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya. They took with them captured police officers, who were later released.

During the raid, 78 people died.

Fighting in Chechnya continued throughout the winter. In March, the militants tried to retake Grozny, but the attempt ended in failure. In April, a bloody clash occurred near the village of Yaryshmardy.

A new turn in the development of events was brought about by the liquidation of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by federal forces. Dudayev often used the Inmarsat satellite phone. On April 21, from an aircraft equipped with a radar station, the Russian military located Dudayev. 2 SU-25 attack aircraft were lifted into the sky. They fired two air-to-ground missiles along the bearing. One of them hit the target exactly. Dudayev died.

Contrary to the expectations of the federals, the removal of Dudayev did not lead to decisive changes in the course of hostilities. But the situation in Russia has changed. The presidential election campaign was approaching. Boris Yeltsin was keenly interested in freezing the conflict. Negotiations continued until July, and the activity of both the Chechens and the federals noticeably decreased.

After Yeltsin was elected president, hostilities intensified again.

The final battle chord of the first Chechen war sounded in August 1996. The separatists again attacked Grozny. The units of General Pulikovsky had a numerical superiority, but they could not hold Grozny. At the same time, militants captured Gudermes and Argun.

Russia was forced to enter into negotiations.

The article briefly talks about the first Chechen war (1994-1996), which was waged by Russia on the territory of Chechnya. The conflict led to heavy losses among Russian military personnel, as well as among the Chechen civilian population.

1. The course of the first Chechen war
2. Results of the first Chechen war

Causes of the first Chechen war

• As a result of the events of 1991 and the secession of republics from the USSR, similar processes began in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The nationalist movement in the republic was led by former Soviet general D. Dudayev. In 1991, he proclaimed the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI). A coup d'etat took place, as a result of which representatives of the previous government were overthrown. The nationalists took over the main government institutions. Boris Yeltsin's introduction of a state of emergency in the republic could no longer change anything. The withdrawal of Russian troops begins.
  CRI was an unrecognized republic not only in Russia, but throughout the world. Power relied on military force and criminal structures. Sources of income new government there was slave trade, robberies, trafficking in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through the territory of Chechnya.
• In 1993, D. Dudayev carried out another coup d'état, dispersing parliament and the constitutional court. The constitution adopted after this established the regime of personal power of D. Dudayev.
  On the territory of the CRI, opposition to the government arises in the form of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The council enjoys the support of the Russian government, it is provided with material assistance, and Russian special forces are sent to provide support. Military clashes between Dudayev’s detachments and representatives of the opposition take place.

The course of the first Chechen war

• Even before the official declaration of hostilities in early December 1991, Russian aviation launched a massive attack on Chechen airfields, destroying all enemy aircraft. B. Yeltsin signs a decree on the start of hostilities. Russian army begins an invasion of Chechnya. During the first weeks, all northern Chechen regions came under Russian control, and Grozny was practically surrounded.
• From the end of December 1994 to March 1995. Grozny was stormed. Despite the significant superiority in numbers and weapons, the Russian army suffered heavy losses, and the assault took for a long time. In the conditions of street fighting, the heavy equipment of the Russian army did not pose a serious threat; the militants easily destroyed tanks with grenade launchers. The soldiers for the most part were untrained, there were no maps of the city, and there was no established communication between the units. Already during the assault, the Russian command changes tactics. With the support of artillery and aviation, the offensive is carried out by small air assault groups. The widespread use of artillery and bombing turns Grozny into ruins. In March, the last groups of militants leave it. Pro-Russian authorities are being created in the city.
• After a series of battles, the Russian army captures key regions and cities of Chechnya. However, retreating in time, the militants do not suffer serious losses. The war takes on a partisan character. Militants carry out terrorist attacks and surprise attacks on Russian army positions throughout Chechnya. In response, airstrikes are carried out, during which civilians often die. This causes hatred towards Russian forces, the population provides assistance to the militants. The situation was complicated by terrorist attacks in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizlyar (1996), during which many civilians and soldiers died, and the militants suffered virtually no losses.
• In April 1996, D. Dudayev was killed as a result of an airstrike, but this no longer affected the course of the war.
• On the eve of the presidential elections, Boris Yeltsin political purposes decided to agree to a truce in a war that was unpopular among the people. In June 1996, an agreement was signed on a truce, the disarmament of the separatists and the withdrawal of Russian troops, but neither side fulfilled the terms of the agreement.
• Immediately after winning the elections, Boris Yeltsin announced the resumption of hostilities. In August, militants storm Grozny. Despite superior forces, Russian troops were unable to hold the city. A number of other settlements were captured by the separatists.
• The fall of Grozny led to the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements. The Russian army was withdrawing from Chechnya, the question of the status of the republic was postponed for five years.

Results of the first Chechen war

• Chechen War was supposed to put an end to illegal power on the territory of the republic. In general, successful military operations at the first stage of the war, the capture of Grozny did not lead to victory. Moreover, significant losses among Russian troops made the war extremely unpopular in Russia. The widespread use of aviation and artillery was accompanied by casualties among civilians, as a result of which the war acquired a protracted, partisan character. Russian troops held only large centers and were constantly attacked.
• The goal of the war was not achieved. After the withdrawal of Russian troops, power was again in the hands of criminal and nationalist groups.

Reasons are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. A variety of things are usually cited as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya that had to be urgently prevented; a terrible amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which a terrible amount of oil had to be pumped from the Caspian Sea; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And much more. But upon closer examination, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

They became concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population only when they became fully involved in the war. No one had thought about this before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of exploitation of the field, now about 2 million tons are mined there per year, this is complete nonsense. Yes, in Chechnya there was a large oil refinery, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut up and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian Sea was not particularly popular. As for Chechen crime, this is a myth built from our modern one. The fact is that the Chechens turned out to be incapable of the mafia. Or rather, they are capable to the same extent as statehood. The Chechen, anarchic structure of society (from about the 16th century) did not imply the construction of hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-93, Chechnya largely suited everyone in Russia. She set up the special services as a kind of offshore, where weapons could be transported to third world countries through the Northern Airport; as an offshore where it was possible to hire militants to perform a variety of tasks. For example, they fought in Abkhazia Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but detachments of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.

Chechnya, as an offshore, suited large oil (then still state-owned) companies, because it was possible to transport oil through it and lie about the fact that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that everyone is happy, but what happened? And then a completely intra-Moscow event happened. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, intensified. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man, in general, with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it happened, became Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But what can you do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is Chechen. And then the entire propaganda machine, as part of the confrontation with Parliament, is being restructured to “attack this Chechen Khasbulatov!”

That is, if we return to the texts of 1993, it turns out that we do not have a bad parliament there, but Khasbulatov is bad and under him 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that the White House Security Department guarded about 70 other objects, but they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this had intensified to such an extent that if you listen to radio conversations on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the police preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune of being captured in Afghanistan, and for some reason this was blamed on him). One way or another, the campaign was raised. And that’s when conversations started about the Chechen mafia. Then a surprise happens: The White house we took a little and burned a little on October 4, and on the 12th - bang! – and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Many seats in parliament were occupied by communists and Zhirinovites. And then the political strategists (who were not yet called that then) came up with a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, return a fallen province to the fold of the Empire. Nothing raises ratings like that.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai’s plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and shelved), was suddenly taken out from under the cloth: a plan for negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure that should ensure a solution to the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that negotiations were very bad, but forceful pressure was very good. Various political strategists and analysts were cut off from this project after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Ministry of Nationalities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the FSB). This project was partly supervised by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of FSK ( federal Service counterintelligence). But something went wrong. We give the anti-Dudaev opposition money, they take the money, but they do not overthrow Dudayev; we give weapons - Dudayev is also not overthrown; we give weapons with crews - on November 26, 1994, the storming of Grozny takes place (supposedly the opposition, but in fact the tanks were filled with officers hired by the FSK in units near Moscow). We fought a little hybrid. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, he can be given power!” Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But suddenly non-locals climbed out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Then, as always, the foxes hide in the forest, and small blood can only be washed away with large blood. During the year, no one addressed the analysis of errors and returning to the previous stage. Next - the beginning of the war. What's funny is that this war did not raise the rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at a background level. And the elections were won in part because it was then that his team said: “Peace!”, “Peace!” Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev flies to Moscow to negotiate, he is picked up at the ABC special facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya and says: “That’s it, peace has come.” Yeltsin is elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took a third into his team (and the third was Lebed at that time), and appointed him secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) gave his former deputy for Transnistria Tikhomirov carte blanche to win. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. It must be said that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin’s inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that they were a superior force, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared bad news spoil the master's mood. Therefore, paralysis reigned for three days, during which time the Chechens, in surprise, fortified themselves in the city and it was no longer possible to drive them out. After which Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the place, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, a simple one: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

It must be said that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, like a bad dream. We did not rescue our prisoners, although this could have been done in the fall of 1996. Hostage-taking began, the situation was in turmoil, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we came to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya; a year later his remains would be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we will use force. The war machine spun. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade began in Dagestan (this is not funny, at that time Marines- these are the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south began. And here, even against anyone’s will, we were irresistibly heading towards war, because on the other side the machine was spinning. Why? Let's go to the other side and notice that in 1997 Maskhadov won the elections in Chechnya (he won convincingly), and Shamil Basayev took second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not that big, but he knew how to unite very restless local comrades under him. At some point, Maskhadov gave him control for six months (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant success: budget capacity fell 20 times. After which, it seemed his career was over. Having left this post, as promised, six months later, he immediately spoke at the congress of the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring powerful goals of expansion. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, having found himself on the political outcast, found himself on the verge of death not only politically, but also physically. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the start of a war, which would inevitably lead to the unity of everyone and save him from death (at least delay this death). And so it happened.

In the summer of 1999, Basayev was already amassing his forces in the Tsumadinsky region in Dagestan. And what boomed there at the turn of July-August 1999 could have boomed a little earlier, or a little later. One way or another, a war began, which was declared a counter-terrorism operation (although there were no explosions in the cities yet). I don’t want to say that these explosions were carried out by the special services, except for the “Ryazan exercises” the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But the point is different. The fact is that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin’s rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant background values. Every week there is some brutal statement like “to wash in the toilet.” And the rating hop - 7% jumped up until it went to stratospheric heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we don’t know who organized all this, but we know for sure who used it.

Ironically, what failed in the first war (using it as an electoral tool) succeeded perfectly in the second. Afterwards, of course, no one needed the war. For example, already before Putin’s election as president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! That's it, it's already a victory! There are battles in Komsomolskoe.” However, the terrorist attacks strongly reminded us of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen power. But attempts to claim that subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by special services are also, in my opinion, unfounded. However, we see that the reason here turns out to be something much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. Uncontrolled power that does not stop at playing with fire in order to maintain this power.

BACKGROUND The Chechen war, in short, became the most terrible and cruel event for Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Opinions about her are still ambiguous. Some historians and analysts support the authorities’ decision to send in troops, while others say that this difficult conflict could have been prevented and terrible losses could have been avoided. Be that as it may, when talking about the Chechen war, first of all you need to find out the reasons for its outbreak. It should be remembered that this war is divided into two stages. First Chechen War. Second Chechen War.

Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, in September 1991, an armed coup took place in the republic, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev. As a result, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria arose, which immediately declared its independence from the RSFSR. This event occurred on November 1, 1991. Dudayev introduced martial law in the country and refused to negotiate with the Kremlin until the independence of Ichkeria was officially recognized by him. The forces of the republic also captured military bases of Russian troops on its territory.

FIRST CHECHEN WAR () Date - December 11, 1994 - August 31, 1996 Place - Chechnya Result - Khasavyurt agreements Opponents - UNO-UNSO volunteers (Chechen separatists), Arab separatists

PROGRESS OF THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR Deployment of troops (December 1994) Storming of Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995) Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March-April 1995) Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995) Terrorist attack in Budennovsk ( June 1995) Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9–18, 1996) Militant attack on Grozny (March 6–8, 1996) Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996) Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996) Negotiations with separatists (May - July 1996) Operation Jihad (August 6 - 22, 1996) Khasavyurt Agreement (August 31, 1996)

PROGRESS OF THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR In September 1991, “The United Committee of the Chechen People, headed by Dudayev, seized power in Chechnya, announcing the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria. He formed his own army and began to pursue an anti-federal policy. In November 1994, Yeltsin issued an order to suppress the armed rebellion in Chechnya. The war has begun. The Russian command underestimated the enemy. In winter there were bloody battles for Grozny. In the summer of 1995, Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin entered into negotiations with terrorists, and as a result, the bandits left the city and went to Chechnya. At the end of 1995, hostilities intensified throughout the republic. The war became protracted. Moscow has finally realized that it is impossible to solve the problem of Chechnya through military confrontation. On August 31, 1996, a peace treaty was signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first war. The first president of Chechnya, A. Maskhadov, was elected. Chechnya became de facto independent. Both in the center and in Chechnya they understood that the signed agreement did not resolve the conflict.

LOSSES IN THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR Russia lost: people killed missing/deserted/captured people wounded Chechnya lost: people killed thousands killed civilians Almost the entire non-Chechen population left the Chechen Republic.

Russia 1999 15 military operations 2000 4 major military operations 2001 2 major military operations 2002 1 military operation 2003 no major military operations 2004 2 military operations 2005 4 military operations 2006 7 military operations 2007 3 military operations 2008 2 military operations Chechnya 1999 7 terrorist attacks 2000 - 4 terrorist attacks 2001 - 1 terrorist attack 2002 - 6 terrorist attacks 2003 - 6 terrorist attacks 2004 - 9 terrorist attacks 2005 - 1 terrorist attack 2006 - 2 terrorist attacks 2007 - 1 terrorist attack 2008 – 2 terrorist attacks PROGRESS OF THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR

In 1999, Chechen militants attacked Dagestan. Russia unilaterally terminated the 1996 peace treaty. During this time, the Chechen leadership established connections with international terrorist networks, formed special troops, organized the supply of weapons and the flow of funds. The goal is to capture the North Caucasus. The Russian leadership turned out to be powerless. In fact, Chechnya fell out of the Russian Federation. None of the center's peace initiatives had any effect. On September 23, Yeltsin signed a decree on the start of hostilities in Chechnya, and on October 18, federal troops surrounded Grozny. Civilians fled the city. In February 2000, Grozny was captured, but fighting continued until 2003. In March 2003, the Constitution of Chechnya was adopted, and A. Kadyrov was elected president. Gradually, economic life improved, but the political situation still remained difficult: terrorist attacks continued.
THE UNFINISHED WAR After the end of the first Chechen campaign, the fate of more than 1,200 Russian military personnel remained unknown. Some of them were captured by Chechen militants, some lay in foreign soil, and the bodies of more than 500 soldiers were kept in the refrigerators of the 124th forensic laboratory in Rostov until the identification procedure. Thus, politicians and generals actually lost an entire regiment in Chechnya (and this is not counting more than 4 thousand soldiers and officers officially declared dead). At one time, Novaya Gazeta launched a campaign to search for missing people and release prisoners and hostages. This action was called "Forgotten Regiment". As a result, with the help of journalists and readers of the newspaper, it was possible to free more than 150 captured military personnel and hostages from captivity in Chechnya, and to help mothers find and identify the remains of many dead children. In August 1999, after the attack of the Basayev and Khattab gangs on Dagestan, the second Chechen campaign began. And again the problem of prisoners, hostages, and missing persons arose. The authorities, as always, turned out to be unprepared to fully solve these problems.