EntranceCauses of World War 1. Causes and nature of the war
Writing articles about history is always difficult, because, as historians say, true history no one knows. Therefore, the best option would be to outline all the possible factors that led to the start of this world conflict.
Prerequisites for the start of the war
We will explore the reasons for the outbreak of the First World War, based on the situation that developed in each of the participating countries before the start of the conflict, since each of the participating countries in the conflict had compelling reasons for dissatisfaction with other powers, and some tried to expand the scope of their political and economic influence. The immediate reason for the opening of hostilities was, as is known, the murder of an influential nobleman, Archduke F. Ferdinand, in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalists. However, as many historians testify, who carefully studied the situation before the conflict that developed in European countries ah, this murder only served as a detonator for the outbreak of war, but in general, anything could have become such a reason. What national factors indicated the inevitable war? Let's go through individual countries.
Causes of the First World War in Russia
The Russian Empire sought to ensure unhindered access of its fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, insisting on control over the Dardanelles Strait. Russian government also opposed the construction by Germany railway Baghdad-Berlin, openly declaring that this move would harm Russia's rights under the previous Anglo-Russian agreement on this region in 1907. Also, the Russian leadership actively opposed the spread of Austrian influence in the Balkans and Germany in Europe, supporting anti-Austrian as well as anti-Turkish sentiments in Bulgaria and Serbia.
Causes of the First World War in France
France feared new aggression from Germany. The French also sought to preserve their North African possessions, at any cost. However, even more important was the fact that France did not forgive Germany for the defeat inflicted on it by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War, and also dreamed of returning the provinces taken from it in 1971 - Lorraine and Alsace. And, of course, the French were concerned that German goods began to compete successfully in those markets that the French for a long time considered them theirs.
Causes of the First World War in Great Britain
The British also had their own scores to settle with the Germans. Firstly, Germany actively supported the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War at the beginning of the century. Secondly, the British, like the French, could not come to terms with the increasing competition of German goods in European and world markets. Thirdly, the British actively opposed the colonialist activities of the Germans in southwestern and eastern Africa. The above reasons led to the fact that it was the British who initiated the formation of an anti-German coalition - a bloc of states that were somehow dissatisfied with German foreign policy. What about the Germans themselves?
Causes of the First World War in Germany
And Germany at this time sought to maximize the expansion of its possessions. The Germans demanded that their rights be recognized as equal in the African possessions belonging to France, England, as well as Portugal, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. In addition, the German government was concerned about the formation of the so-called Entente - an anti-German coalition created to hinder the European and colonial ambitions of the Germans. Thus, Germany’s desire for both economic and political dominance in the Old World signed the death sentence for the Germans, because sooner or later the war would have started anyway.
Austria-Hungary
This multinational state, unlike Russia, was not so successful in coping with interethnic internal contradictions, and therefore was the main source of instability in all of Europe. In addition, the Austrians made desperate attempts to retain Bosnia and Herzegovina they had captured and also laid claim to dominance in the original Russian territories - the Balkans. Russia really didn’t like the attempts of the Austro-Hungarians to interfere in life Slavic peoples.
Ottoman Empire
This state also had long-standing grievances - the Turks dreamed of regaining the territories taken from them in the Balkans. In addition, war was the only possible option for the ruling layers of the Ottoman Empire to at least somehow preserve the once powerful state, which at that time had already practically collapsed. To preserve statehood, an external enemy was needed, in the face of which people would unite.
Slavic brothers
Specifically, this chapter will focus on Poland, Bulgaria and Serbia. The Poles, in fact, had only one reason for wanting this war to fall apart. The fact is that the seemingly indestructible Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth collapsed and the Poles simply no longer had their own state. Therefore, they sought at any cost to unite the Polish lands and regain independence. As for the Bulgarians and Serbs, it so happened that these countries turned out to be the main rivals in establishing themselves as the leader of the Balkan peoples. In addition, the recent Balkan war, in which these countries were rivals, also had an effect. The Serbs sought to form Yugoslavia by separating from Austria-Hungary and created various nationalist organizations that fought against Turkish and Austrian influence.
Summary
Thus, the main causes of the First World War were the rivalry between the leading European powers for spheres of influence. In addition, the situation was heating up due to massive attempts by various peoples to secede from the already collapsing empires and found their own states, which subsequently came true. A familiar situation, isn't it? Didn’t we observe exactly the same things at the end of the last, 20th century in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union? Fortunately, there was no mass bloodshed and things did not lead to a war on a European and world scale. Apparently, the experience of the most terrible wars already experienced by mankind had an effect.
As we have just seen, any war is always provoked by a whole fusion of political, economic and nationalist reasons, including the revanchist sentiments of some states, the struggle for the independence of individual peoples, trade and colonial expansion. Most of these reasons served as the reason for the outbreak of the Second World War.
The first countries involved in the First World War were Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The event that led to the beginning of the conflict was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. After this, the Austrian-Hungarian government negotiated for a long time about what retaliatory actions to take against Serbia. In addition, the Austrian side was concerned about the expansion of Serbian territory in the period 1912-1913. as a result of the Balkan Wars, as well as the threat that came from the southern Slavs. Another point haunted them: whether Russia would side with Serbia. To prevent this, it was necessary to enlist the support of Germany. For the latter, Austria-Hungary was the only possible ally, so under no circumstances could it be left in a difficult situation.
In 1913, Russia was unable to support Serbia, which needed its help to maintain its position in the Adriatic, and in 1914, by not lending its expected leverage, Russia risked weakening its influence in the Balkans.
The causes and nature of the First World War lay in a tense international situation. Germany understood that war could not be avoided. Only the timing was unknown. After all, it is necessary to find the right moment before rearmament takes place in Russia, military reorganization in France, and a profitable naval treaty is signed between Britain and Russia. Therefore, the German side could regard the outbreak of hostilities as the only way to achieve world domination.
The cause of the First World War was and involved all the major powers. No state was intimidated by the military power of others, so this fact cannot be considered as a deterrent. Countries sought to expand their own weapons production and were not particularly in awe of the military program of their opponents. It would seem that Britain should have retreated before the power of the German fleet, but it wanted to strengthen its influence and gain naval superiority at any cost.
Therefore, by 1914, the causes of the First World War were very serious, they led to the realization that military action could not be avoided. France, as a result of the war of 1870, remained dissatisfied with the loss of the territories of Alsace and Lorraine, while Germany, on the contrary, was satisfied with its position, feeling military superiority over other European states. Besides, late XIX century was marked by an understanding of the need for national independence in a number of countries, which threatened the continued existence of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires and, as a consequence, led to instability in the international system.
The causes of the First World War, according to followers of Marxist theory, lay in the antagonistic sentiments between the Prussian Junker and the Russian landowner. To these were added a fairly long list of other prerequisites: the struggle for iron and coal, routes of communication, spheres of influence, colonies, national contradictions. For example, French President Henri Poincaré spent his childhood in the territory of Lorraine, which was occupied by the Germans. This fact also could not but affect future historical events.
The causes of the First World War are also hidden in the following moments. Russia faced difficulties in moving goods across the Dardanelles, resulting in significant economic damage. She really needed free exit and entry from the Black Sea, since the main export of grain passed through Constantinople. By 1904, an alliance called the Entente was created between Russia and France. A few years later, Russia signed an agreement with England on delimiting spheres of influence in countries such as Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet. Despite reaching an agreement, the Entente during the period of 1907 could not be considered a military bloc, which could not be said about this status. The Entente acquired this status only in 1914 from the moment of the signing of the tripartite agreement between Russia, England and France on the renunciation of the obligation to conclude agreements with their opponents.
In the 20th century the world became different. The desire of governments to start a war in the hope of profiting from their conquests has come to be considered the deepest misconception of political thinking. Humanity agreed that the era of “profitable” wars was over. The world economy has connected countries with thousands of threads, the breakage of which will bring losses to the winner no less than to the loser. Seemingly obvious things that have become a kind of symbol of the 20th century - the next branch of human evolution in the humanitarian aspect, today in the 21st century are suddenly recognized as erroneous. After two of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century, two bloodiest wars and the subsequent arms race, which almost led to an even more destructive nuclear war, humanity has once again decided that forceful confrontation is an appropriate argument in practically any matter.How did the age of world wars begin? What are the causes, culprits and true motives of the warring powers?
Causesfirst world war
The July crisis of 1914, which provoked the outbreak of the First World War, is one of those rare historical events that are surprisingly very carefully and fully documented in the annals of history.At the same time, the main characters in the events of that European drama found it difficult to name its reasons.
In August 1914, shortly after Germany entered the war, a memorable conversation took place between former German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow and his successor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. Bülow then asked: “How did this happen?” And I received a discouraging answer: “Oh, if only I knew!”
Today, both historians and ordinary people who are not indifferent to history retain a certain feeling of the deepest misunderstanding and absurdity of all the events that plunged Europe into a four-year nightmare of a war of extermination.
None of the countries that started the conflict had, in principle, any reasonable reason to start a war. US President Woodrow Wilson summed up the bewilderment of his contemporaries in the following words: “Everyone is looking and not finding the reason why the war began. Their attempts are in vain; they will not find the reason. The war didn’t start for one reason, the war started for all reasons at once.”
But this formulation is hardly correct. This idea was better expressed by the Russian philosopher L.P. Karsavin, who said that the very formulation of the problem of the causality of the First World War, as, indeed, any other historical event, is essentially unscientific (“Philosophy of History”, 1923). Historical research should be aimed not at finding the true or imaginary roots of a phenomenon, which anyway can never be studied in its entirety, but at studying the flow of events in their totality.
Economic reasons for the outbreak of the First World War
Despite almost a century of efforts, historians have not been able to identify an objective economic or political reason for the Second World War.The economic rivalry between England and Germany (and to a lesser extent, other major European powers) was evident long before August 1914. According to the generally accepted opinion, based on the well-developed doctrine of the followers of Marx about the inevitability of military conflicts under capitalism, imperialist competition was to blame . There was not a newspaper that did not publish on its pages at least one detailed article, which clearly proved that England would never allow an increase in German economic power and navy. The reader was told that sooner or later the economic contradictions between the leading imperialist countries were bound to explode the world.
Meanwhile, neither England nor Germany ever set out to undermine the economic well-being of a competitor through war. France and Russia were considered Germany's military enemies: but with the former the Germans had a territorial dispute (Alsace-Lorraine), and with the latter they were quarreled by geopolitical contradictions.
Further, if we take the “economic” point of view about the origin of the First World War, then England and Germany were not supposed to fight each other, but as quickly as possible act together against the United States of America, whose growing industry was challenging both the British and German economies. However, no one in Europe considered the United States as a potential enemy. Therefore, economic competitors are by no means doomed to war with each other, even if we are talking about world leadership.
In the same way, the most acute contradictions in the sphere of the colonial division of the world in England arose not with Germany, but with France, which created the second most extensive colonial empire, and with Russia, which had a conflict with English interests along almost its entire southern border. Despite this, England, France and Russia found themselves in the same military camp.
The role of warmongers has traditionally been attributed to arms companies and associated banking circles. But over the past hundred years, researchers have not been able to find those tycoons and industrial and financial corporations who would have a vested interest in starting a world war, that is, would connect their business interests exclusively with wartime profits and, more importantly, would have such political weight in order to be able to dictate their will to governments. Moreover, some major representatives of the military-industrial complex had to give up their monopoly positions in the arms market with the beginning of the war. Here is a typical story told by Louis Renault, one of the most enterprising and successful French industrialists, the father of the famous automobile brand. At the very beginning of the war, on August 8 or 9, the Minister of War summoned him. When Reno opened the door to his office, he walked from corner to corner with an extremely upset look, endlessly repeating: “We need to have shells, we need to have shells.” Asked by one of the generals present whether he could produce shells, Renault replied that he did not know, since he had never seen them. However, he soon organized and launched the production of shells, after which the state arsenals and the Schneider-Creuzot arms concern lost their monopoly.
In a word, if during the war there were entrepreneurs who began to extract super-profits from military orders, this does not mean that they were responsible for its occurrence - there is absolutely no evidence in favor of this.
Political reasons for the war
The search for the political causes of the First World War also does not provide objective results. Most historians agree that it is impossible to identify a country or group of countries that set themselves the goal of establishing their supremacy through war and planned to carry out territorial conquests. In fact, all military plans did not have a pre-formed strategic vector; rather, the situation developed in a chaotic manner. Territorial claims European countries to each other were insignificant compared to the material damage from a total war; colonial disputes were settled through gentlemen's agreements. Of course, in every major European country there were groups committed to world or regional domination. But their claims were mostly expressed at the level of sentiments and politically unformed ideas. As one German writer lamented in 1912, “The main reason why our situation sometimes appears dubious, even unpleasant, when viewed from the outside in Germany, is the difficulty of presenting any intelligible real goal for the policy necessary for the implementation of the German idea.” .A future military conflict could be considered inevitable and even desirable in government circles; however, no one wanted to look like an aggressor. They were preparing for war and at the same time trying with all their might to delay it or avoid it altogether. The main opposing military alliances and coalitions at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. were concluded not in order to pursue an aggressive policy, but in the hope that they would serve as a deterrent for the opposing side. Individuals from the entourage of the Austrian Emperor and the German Kaiser took a direct course towards war - and only a few weeks before it began.
As Wilhelm II well noted, during the pre-war decades the European world resembled a heart patient: “he can live and live, even for a very long time. Or he may, with the same probability, die at any moment - suddenly and unexpectedly.”
European chauvinism as the reason for the start of the war. National factor
What led to the First World War was not one reason or another, nor their combination, but a long chain of events and actions, held together by a far from unconditional connection. And all we can do is sort through them, like a rosary on which grains of different sizes and denominations are strung.Politicians saw the basis of a lasting European peace in one or another combination of the four great powers - Germany, England, France and Russia. Obviously, the most effective means of maintaining balance would be an Anglo-German alliance or an alliance of three continental states. However, in the way of these agreements, nationalism stood as an impregnable wall, already flavored with a fair share of the latest scientific fallacy- racism.
England suffered the most from national arrogance - the only European country that nurtured a racist ideology on the basis of its own political culture. Too many orders and actions of the British colonial administration had all the signs of racial segregation and genocide.
The idea of national superiority over other nations was presented in English educational institutions as an immutable law of existence. The largest racial theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, son of an admiral and nephew of Field Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain, recalled: “I imbibed this sense of pride from early childhood... I was taught... to consider the French a lower class of people and not to mention them on an equal basis with the English.” Other nations must envy the Indians and Irish who have the good fortune of being subjects of the British crown. “God himself could not knock out of an Englishman the feeling of his own superiority” 3.
Having moved to Germany, where he became Wagner’s son-in-law, Chamberlain published his work “The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century” (1899). The history of mankind was examined by him from a racial perspective. He is not was here as a pioneer; long before him, many of his compatriots worked on this issue. Their investigations, however, did not enjoy authority on the other side of the English Channel. The scientific charm of Chamberlain’s book was such that racial teaching was now unconditionally accepted by the German professors (Chamberlain’s fans in England were Winston Churchill and Bernard Shaw, who called his work “a masterpiece of truly scientific history”).
The sown dragon teeth gave abundant shoots. After the publication of Chamberlain's work, racist literature in Germany and Austria moved into the category of popular reading (The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century itself went through 10 reprints in 12 years; 100 thousand copies were sold before 1914).
Chamberlain argued that the Germans saved Europe from the “eternal darkness” into which it plunged after the collapse of the Roman Empire. This is the chosen race of masters: “The entry of the German... into world history is still far from complete: the German has yet to take possession of the whole world.” He considered the Romanesque and other peoples of the Mediterranean to be half-breeds and a “parody of people.” The Slavs hated everyone en masse, although Russians more than others, seeing in them “the new incarnation of the eternal empire of Tamerlane.” Russian literature made him feel disgusted.
Chamberlain formulated the immediate historical goal for the “Teutonic spirit” - the fight against “Yankified Anglo-Saxonism and Tatarized Slavism.”
In Germany, Chamberlain's ideas fell on fertile ground. The Germans were filled with pride in their brilliant victories of 1866 and 1870, and the stunning successes of German science, industry and trade gave birth to sweet dreams of a cultural right to lead the rest of the world.
On the path to world hegemony, of course, stood the “natural enemies” of Germany. The fight against them was perceived within the framework of the theory of the struggle of races. The French, however, were no longer a cause for concern - they were simply despised. It was believed that “the Latin peoples have passed the zenith of their development; they can no longer introduce new fertilizing elements into the development of the world as a whole” (Moltke). So far, hostility towards England has been expressed in emphasizing the hypocrisy of English politics and its adherence to exclusively mercantile interests. Common place In German historical and journalistic literature, England began to be compared with the decrepit Carthage, and Germany with the rising Rome.
But the attitude towards Russia was panicky: they looked at us with hatred and fear. The idea of cultural and even intellectual backwardness, savagery and despotism of the Russian people is deeply rooted in European minds. At the same time, German historians extolled in every possible way the role of the German element in Russian history - from the notorious Varangians to the Baltic (Baltic) Germans who filled Russian chancelleries, ministries, military headquarters and universities. The most odious exponent of such views was the pan-Germanist V. Hen, who argued in his book “Demoribus Ruthenorum” (1892) that the Russians “have no traditions, roots, culture on which they could rely,” “everything they have is imported from abroad"; they themselves are not able to put two and two together, their souls are “saturated with centuries-old despotism,” therefore “without any loss to humanity they can be excluded from the list of civilized peoples.” These monstrous nonsense found connoisseurs in all layers of German society, and even the leader of the Social Democratic faction of the Reichstag, August Bebel, said more than once that, if necessary, he would shoulder a gun and go to war to protect his homeland from Russian despotism.
The British, French and Russians paid the Germans in the same coin.
Residents of the British Isles since the end of the 19th century. was tormented by an irrational fear of a German invasion, fueled by the press and science fiction writers like William Le Quieux, who dedicated two of his novels to this topic - “ Great War in England in 1897." (1894) and The Invasion of 1910: With a Complete Account of the Siege of London (1906). The German “danger” was even more visible on the market, where it manifested itself in the dominance of German goods, which threatened to undermine English industry, trade, and maritime transport.
The French could not forgive the Germans for the defeat at Sedan and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. Traumatized by this unheard-of humiliation, they preferred “never to talk about it, but to constantly think about it.” The catastrophe of 1870 was seen as an accidental concession of the “Gallo-Roman barrier” to the barbaric onslaught of Germanism. In the future, according to Victor Hugo, “France will strive for only one thing - to restore its strength, stock up on energy, cherish its sacred anger, educate the younger generation so as to create an army of the whole people, work continuously, study the methods and techniques of our enemies, so that to become again the great France of 1792, the France of the idea with the sword. Then one day she will become invincible. Then she will return Alsace-Lorraine.” The annexation of the lost provinces was associated with the return of France to its rightful place among the great powers.
In French popular literature, the image of the enemy—the German—was implanted. Popular novels were populated with numerous German spies(French writers even seriously argued that of all the peoples of Europe, the Germans are most prone to espionage). Stereotypical images of national characters were used: Latin gaiety and love of freedom were contrasted with the barbaric squalor of fat German “pigs”, obsessed with beer and order and, in addition, smelling bad.
In Russian society, an unaccountable hostility has traditionally prevailed towards the “German”, so fully expressed in the famous exclamation: “Scoundrels are Germans!” But individual Russian thinkers, writers, and journalists were already beginning to be alarmed by the brutal belligerence of the German character. Saltykov-Shchedrin, in his book “Abroad,” shared his impressions of a trip to Germany (1881): German “shyness was replaced by conceit, political evasiveness by an unjustified claim to universal domination, modesty by an unsuccessful desire to bribe foreigners with the bourgeois luxury of new quarters... " He expressed his disgust at German militarism in the following words: “Berlin is not needed for anything other than murder”; “the whole essence of modern Berlin, all its global significance is currently concentrated in a building overlooking the Royal Square and bearing the name: Main Headquarters...".
Meanwhile, Dostoevsky had already mourned the “European cemetery”: Germany is “a people that has outlived its strength, dead people and without a future...”, “France is an extinct nation and has said its all,” and in England “the same as everywhere in Europe - a passionate thirst to live and loss higher meaning life."
According to the writer, an insurmountable gulf of alienation has opened up between Russia and Europe. “Lord, what prejudices we have about Europe!” he exclaimed in one of his letters abroad. The Germans, “even if they are scientists, they are terrible fools!.. All the local people are literate, but incredibly uneducated, stupid, stupid, with the most base interests.” Dostoevsky felt with all his skin “that constant, universal, based on some very strong immediate and disgusting feeling, the hostility of Europe towards us; her disgust from us as from something disgusting, in part even some superstitious fear of her before us...” “Europe hates us”; “Europe despises us, considers itself inferior, as people, as a breed, and sometimes we are disgusted by them, completely disgusted, especially when we throw ourselves on their necks with brotherly kisses”; “We are not Europeans for them, we disturb them, we smell bad.” Europeans “cannot recognize us as their own. The Turks and Semites are closer in spirit to them than we Aryans. To all this there is one emergency reason: we bring a different idea to humanity than they do - that’s the reason!” “Europe is ready to boil all Slavs in general with boiling water, like nests of bedbugs in old women’s wooden beds”; “Europe decided to do away with Russia long ago. We cannot hide from their grinding, and someday they will rush at us and eat us.” And in order not to be eaten, you have to eat Europe yourself. This is the Russian Christian “all service to humanity.”
After the Berlin Congress of 1879, bitter attacks on Germany and Germans became commonplace in the Slavophile and liberal press. Bismarck in 1888 wrote about “a ten-year falsification of public opinion by the Russian press, which in the reading part of the population created and nourished artificial hatred of everything German...”. The German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lothar Schweinitz, regretted the inability of the Russian government to cope with the anti-German campaigns of its own press.
Under the influence of these speeches, Russian antipathy towards Germany took on more pronounced forms. In 1887 Alexander III shared with the ministers his observations about the anti-German sentiments of his subjects: “Before I thought it was only Katkov, but now I am convinced that it is all of Russia.”
The paranoid fears that gripped the consciousness of the Europeans greatly contributed to the fact that the military-political alliances of European countries took on less logical configurations.
Schlieffen Plan or Closing Door Plan
The Schlieffen Plan and its political consequences
In 1905, the German General Staff, to counter the Russian-French “encirclement,” developed a rather serious strategic solution, which was called the Schlieffen Plan (Closing Door Plan).The author of this very important project for the course of military operations was General Count Alfred von Schlieffen, a hereditary military man who headed the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906.
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Studying in depth military history, he is with youth was fascinated by the Battle of Cannae (216 BC), which until the end of his life he considered the highest example of military art. He was fascinated by the beauty of Hannibal's plan - the double flanking of a huge Roman square, which led to the almost complete extermination of the encircled legions. A detailed study of the famous battle led Schlieffen to the conviction that “the flank attack is the essence of the entire history of war.” Until the moment when Schlieffen took charge General Staff, German military thought lived by the behests of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, or the great Moltke, the father of the brilliant victories of the Prussian army in the wars with Austria-Hungary (1866) and France (1870-1871). The military doctrine he formulated was based on the fact that in a future war Germany would have to deal with not one, but two opponents - France and Russia. Moltke the elder considered a war on two fronts to be disastrous for Germany, so under him the General Staff concentrated its efforts on developing a strategy for the successive defeat of the Allies. |
The most important thing here was not to miscalculate the direction of the main attack. Since France, living in fear of a new German attack, turned its eastern border into a continuous chain of impregnable fortresses, Moltke the elder came to the conclusion that Germany should confine itself to defense in the west, and concentrate the main forces of the German army against Russian Empire. At that time it was still believed that “the vast expanses of Russia are not of vital interest to Germany.” Therefore, it was planned to defeat the Russian army in the border areas and end the war with the capture of the Russian part of Poland. After this, having transferred troops to the west, it was possible to begin offensive operations against France.
Schlieffen abandoned the doctrine of his legendary predecessor, retaining from it only the Napoleonic idea of “Vernichtungs-Strategie” - a “strategy of destruction” of the enemy. Unlike Moltke, who predicted that future war could last for years or even decades, he believed that Germany's limited financial resources and the German economy's heavy dependence on raw material exports would not allow it to wage a protracted war. “The strategy of starvation,” he wrote, “is unthinkable when the maintenance of millions of armed people requires billions of dollars in expenses.” The time factor became decisive in his strategic calculations. By the beginning of the 20th century. Germany had a well-developed network of modern railways, thanks to which it could mobilize and concentrate troops both in the east and in the west in just a few days. The importance of railway communications was also realized by France, which, by intensifying railway construction, managed to equalize the time frame for the mobilization of its army with the German one. But in Russia the density of the railway network in the western and central regions was much lower than in Germany and even in Austria-Hungary. In addition, due to the enormous extent of the Russian Empire, the Russian General Staff was forced to plan the transfer of troops over a distance several times greater than that which the German military units had to overcome according to the mobilization order. According to the calculations of the German General Staff, the complete mobilization of the Russian army should have taken from 40 to 50 days. Consequently, at the first stage of the war it was possible not to be distracted by the Russian front, but to abandon everything strike forces against France.
Schlieffen considered a frontal breakthrough through first-class French fortresses to be a waste of time and effort. Repetition of Sedan at the beginning of the 20th century. it was no longer possible. Meanwhile, the French army had to be destroyed with one mighty blow. And here Schlieffen proposed using the experience of Cannes. “A battle of destruction,” he wrote, “can still be fought according to Hannibal’s plan, drawn up in time immemorial. The enemy front is not the object of the main attack. What is essential is not the concentration of the main forces and reserves against the enemy front, but the pressure on the flanks. A flank attack should be aimed at more than just one extreme point front, but must capture the entire depth of the enemy’s position. Destruction is complete only after attacking the enemy rear.”
The plan he conceived was not a blind copy of the scheme of the Battle of Cannes. Schlieffen wanted to encircle the French, but not through a double envelopment, but through a powerful breakthrough of one right flank of the German army. To do this, he weakened as much as possible the line of troops on the left flank, stretching along the German-French border, for the protection of which only 8 divisions were allocated, and concentrated a striking fist of 53 divisions against Belgium and Luxembourg. In the rear of these countries there was no insurmountable chain of French fortresses. The only fortress on the path of the right flank of the German army was the “eternal” neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed in 1839 by England, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany itself (then Prussia). Shlifen looked at the matter from a purely military point of view, without taking into account political considerations. Belgium's neutral status had no force in his eyes. According to his plan, with the outbreak of war, the main forces of the German army were to immediately invade Luxembourg and Belgium, pass through them, then, having carried out an approach maneuver in a wide arc, cover Paris from the southwest and press French troops to the left flank of the German army.
If, during the victorious march of the German wing of the approach, the French army rushed with all its might against the weakened left flank of the Germans, then the effect would be of a revolving door: the harder you push such a door forward, the more painfully it hits you on the back and the back of the head. The German right flank, having passed through the enemy's rear, would have destroyed the French army in the fields of Alsace and Lorraine.
The entire operation against France is the grandiose “Cannes of the 20th century.” - was calculated with purely German punctuality, literally by the hour. Exactly six weeks were allotted for the encirclement and defeat of the French army. After this, the German corps should have been transferred to the east.
Schlieffen consciously donated to initial stage wars with East Prussia. The 10 German divisions located there could not withstand the pressure of the Russian “steam roller”, which, as expected, would have been in motion four to five weeks after the start of mobilization.
It is important to note here that the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg even forbade planting long-lived elms on his Brandenburg Hohenfin estate: it’s not worth the trouble, the estate will go to the Russians anyway.
The brunt of the confrontation with the Russian army would have to be borne by 30 Austrian divisions deployed in Galicia and the southern regions of Russian Poland. But a week after the victory over France, half a million German soldiers arrived from the Western Front, would crush Russian power and end the war on the continent - eight to ten weeks after it began.
The effectiveness of the “Schlieffen Plan” depended entirely on the precise implementation by each division, each regiment and battalion of the deployment and concentration schedule developed for them. Any delay threatened to lose the entire case. And Schlieffen, with manic passion, indulged in detailing his plan, trying to foresee any circumstances. At times he came across as crazy. Once, during an inspection tour of the headquarters in East Prussia, Schlieffen's adjutant drew the attention of his boss to the picturesque view of the Pregel River visible in the distance. The general, casting a short glance in the direction where the officer was pointing, muttered: “A minor obstacle.” They said that before his death in 1912, he was terribly worried about the fate of his brainchild. His last words on his deathbed were: “Do not weaken the right flank.”
It subsequently became clear that the Schlieffen Plan was not free from major shortcomings. These included disregard for the neutrality of Belgium, which pushed England into the camp of Germany’s opponents, and an underestimation of the scale of England’s participation in land war. And yet, the Schlieffen military doctrine, which became the shrine of the General Staff, had a powerful psychological impact on an entire generation of German politicians and military personnel. It brought them liberation from the fear of “encirclement” and a war on two fronts. Wilhelm and his entourage firmly understood: ten weeks of vigorous effort - and all enemies would be defeated.
Agadir crisis in Morocco, the Balkan bloc and the arms race
Agadir crisis in Morocco
The death of King Edward VII, which occurred in May 1910, briefly brought all the monarchical courts of Europe closer together. Some calm was brought to the tense relations between the great powers.The complacent mood that reigned in Europe in 1910 prompted the authors of the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica to notify their readers that “soon national differences will remain only in the fields of education and economics.”
As if in mockery of these words in next year One of the most acute crises in relations between Germany and the Entente erupted.
In the spring of 1911, an uprising broke out in Morocco. The French government, under the pretext of protecting its citizens, sent troops into the capital of the sultanate, the city of Fez. In fact, this meant that France acquired a new colony. The German presence in Morocco was limited to two companies operating in Agadir and Mogador (on west bank). In general, there was nothing to stir up a conflict over. But the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, contrary to the wishes of his direct superior, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, convinced the Kaiser to take retaliatory measures. His goal was to prevent Morocco from coming under French rule or, at worst, to receive compensation - the French Congo or at least one port city on the Atlantic coast.
The German gunboat Panther entered Agadir harbor. The arrival of reinforcements was expected soon - the cruiser Berlin, also heading to Moroccan waters.
“Panther Leap” provoked a serious resonance throughout the world, becoming also an important precursor and cause of the First World War. France was taken by surprise, German newspapers were choking with delight. The general tension increased every day. And suddenly England intervened, standing shoulder to shoulder with France. The British government recognized the strengthening of Germany on the Atlantic coast as affecting the interests of England. On instructions from the cabinet, Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George publicly let the German government know that “if Germany wants to fight, it will find Great Britain on the other side.” The British fleet was put on alert.
For the Kaiser, England's sharp demarche came as a complete surprise. Until now, neither he nor anyone else among European politicians had considered the Entente as a military bloc. The British did not support France in the Moroccan crisis of 1905, and during the Bosnian crisis of 1909, they, together with the French, left Russia alone against Austria-Hungary and Germany. The direct threat of war with England frightened Wilhelm, especially since Austria did not show any readiness to support its ally. He didn't dare cross the line.
On August 17, the Kaiser held a meeting with his entourage. It was decided to give in. “At the moment of real danger,” Bülow sneered, “His Majesty was each time imbued with the unpleasant consciousness of the fact that he had never commanded armies in real battles - despite the marshal’s baton, which he so loved to wave, despite the medals and orders with which he He loved to decorate himself so much, despite the pseudo-victories that he was invariably awarded at maneuvers. He understood perfectly well that he was nothing more than an ordinary neurasthenic, devoid of any military leadership talents, and as for naval affairs, with all his passion for them, he was not capable of commanding not only a squadron, but even a single ship.”
During negotiations With By the French, Germany unconditionally recognized the French protectorate over Morocco and was content with the worthless compensation in the form of a swampy area of the French Congo, inhabited mainly by tsetse flies.
By that time, nationalist sentiments in all countries involved in Agadir crisis, have reached their apogee. The Reichstag deputies greeted Bethmann-Hollweg's message about the treaty with France with deathly silence, but the Chief of the General Staff, Moltke the Younger, raged: “If we are once again forced to leave with our tail between our legs, if we again cannot decide to openly declare that we are ready to use the sword , then I will lose faith in the future of Germany and resign..." German newspapers poured out streams of hatred against the Entente. The Entente press, in turn, mockingly relished Germany's diplomatic humiliation.
The following year, a dress rehearsal for the future war took place.
Balkan crisis and partition of Turkey
This time, the match to the powder keg of the world war was brought by Italy and the Balkan states, united by the efforts of Russian diplomacy in “ Balkan blo To". On November 5, 1911, the Italian government officially proclaimed the annexation of the North African possessions of the Ottoman Empire - Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy was playing a win-win game. She knew that there would be no protest from the great powers - there was none. The Entente wanted to see Italy in its ranks, Germany and Austria were afraid of its withdrawal from the Triple Alliance. In the Italo-Turkish War that followed, the Italian squadron bombarded Beirut, the Dardanelles fortifications and captured a dozen Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea.The victories of the Italians demonstrated the complete powerlessness of the Turkish army. The Balkan states did not want to miss such an opportunity and hastily began dividing the Turkish inheritance. In the fall of 1912, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war on Turkey. Military operations resembled the triumphal march of the Allied armies. A month later, the Turks lost all their possessions on the European coast, and the Bulgarian army stood 40 km from Constantinople. The Turkish government turned to the great powers with a request for mediation.
Russia before the start of World War I
Reasons for Russia's participation in the First World War
The division of Turkey by the Balkan states against the interests of Russia caused the strongest indignation of the domestic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by D.S. Sazonov.When the naval flotilla of England and other great powers entered Turkish ports, Russia lost the opportunity to capture and hold the Black Sea straits. In addition, we had to reckon with the prospect of war against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Finally, even the temporary closure by the Turks of the Dardanelles, the sea gate through which 60% of Russian grain exports passed, threatened the Russian economy with multimillion-dollar losses. Therefore, Russia acted in an unusual role as a defender of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. At her insistence, the other great powers agreed to decide at an international conference.
It was no longer possible to correct anything in the current situation: the division of the Ottoman Empire had become a fait accompli.
The military successes of the Serbs and Montenegrins terribly worried Austria, which sought to prevent Serbia from accessing the Adriatic Sea and excessive strengthening of Montenegro. In November, Austria-Hungary held partial mobilization and concentrated large forces on the Serbian border.
Russia, of course, did not stand aside. The reform of the Russian army, begun after the unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War, proceeded at an accelerated pace, and many members of the Council of Ministers were determined to “stubbornly defend our vital interests and not be afraid of the specter of war.” They said that it was time for Russia to stop “growing before the Germans,” that the Russian people “understand better than us the need to free ourselves from foreign influence.” Minister of War Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov with great success developed his thoughts before the sovereign that “we cannot avoid war anyway, and it is more profitable for us to start it earlier,” since “only one good thing will come from the war for us.” He did his best to convince Nicholas II to agree to the mobilization of the two military districts bordering Austria. At the same time, Sukhomlinov showed amazing frivolity: well aware that the decree on mobilization could cause war, he at the same time petitioned for leave for a pleasure trip to the Riviera. In response to the bewilderment of other members of the cabinet, he said without a shadow of embarrassment: “What a problem, the mobilization is not carried out personally by the Minister of War, and as long as all orders are carried out, I would always manage to return on time. I didn’t expect to be away for more than 2-3 weeks.”
All this happened against the backdrop of noisy demonstrations in favor of the Balkan Slavs, in which tens of thousands of people participated.
The French government was also ready to pull the trigger, assuring St. Petersburg that if Germany intervened in the war, France would fully fulfill its allied obligations.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, a staunch supporter of the peaceful course, had to work hard to cool the warlike fervor of his colleagues. On his advice, he was detained under the banner for six months throughout his entire last term of service - this measure made it possible to increase the composition of the army by a quarter without resorting to mobilization, to which Austria would inevitably respond with war.
Unambiguous signals were sent to France and Serbia about Russia’s reluctance to get involved in a war with Austria-Hungary. The Russian military attaché in Paris, Count Alexei Alekseevich Ignatiev, in a conversation with the French Minister of War Alexandre Millerand, stated that although “the Slavic question remains close to our hearts, history has taught us, of course, to think first of all about our own state interests, without sacrificing them in favor of abstract ones.” ideas." To the direct question of the French Foreign Ministry: “What actions will Russia take in the event of an Austrian attack on Serbia?”, the Russian answer was: “Russia will not fight.” The Serbian government received a note from Foreign Minister Sazonov, which read: “We categorically warn Serbia so that it does not at all expect to drag us along with it...”. Under the influence of Russian diplomacy, Serbia withdrew its territorial claims and refused access to the Adriatic Sea.
The German position in the Balkan crisis of 1912 was again influenced by the firm determination of England.
At first, Austria was promised full support, as in 1909, “regardless of the consequences,” in the words of the Kaiser. But last year's events sowed indecision in him. Wilhelm tried to find out which side Great Britain would take. The answer was disappointing. At the beginning of December, messages were received through various channels: the British would not remain indifferent observers of the Austrian invasion of Serbia and would not allow France to be defeated.
At the council of war on December 8, with the participation of the top leadership of the army and navy, Wilhelm could not contain his rage: “Because England... is so jealous of us and hates us so much, because of this, it turns out, not a single other power has already has no right to take up a sword to protect their interests, and they themselves... are going to oppose us! Oh, this nation of shopkeepers! And this is what they call peace policy! Balance of power! IN decisive battle between the Germans and the Slavs, the Anglo-Saxons are on the side of the Slavs and Gauls!” The Kaiser was determined, but wanted to know what Germany's chances were in the war with the Entente.
Moltke’s opinion looked like a direct quote from Sukhomlinov’s speech: “I consider war inevitable, and the sooner it starts, the better...”. But Grand Admiral Tirpitz spoke out against hasty decisions. According to him, the fleet was not yet ready to measure its strength with the English dreadnoughts; it took at least eighteen months to complete the expansion of the Kiel Canal and the construction of a submarine base on the island of Heligoland. Moltke frowned skeptically - there is no need to wait a year and a half, “the fleet will not be ready even then, and the army will be in a less advantageous position by that time; the enemy is arming more intensively than us, we don’t have enough money.” Tirpitz nevertheless insisted on his own. The German sword was not drawn from its scabbard. Bethmann-Hollweg was given the task of “educating the people through the press about the great national interests that will be put in place by Germany if the Austro-Serbian conflict escalates into war. In the event of war, the people should not wonder what Germany is fighting for."
In general, it was in 1912 that the Kaiser’s thinking took on a catastrophic character. Moreover, he saw the coming European apocalypse in the light of the theory of race struggle. Thus, in the margins of one diplomatic report, Wilhelm wrote: “Chapter two of the Great Migration of Nations is over. Chapter three is coming, in which the Germanic peoples will fight against the Russians and the Gauls. No future conference can weaken the significance of this fact, for this is not a question of high politics, but a question of the survival of the race." The Austrian general Count Stürck later heard from the Kaiser the following words: “I hate the Slavs. I know it's sinful. You shouldn’t hate anyone, but I can’t help it: I hate them.”
Contemporaries associated the Kaiser's racist remarks with the influence of Professor Schiemann, who was considered an expert on Russia. Wilhelm showed this Baltic German, obsessed with hatred of the Slavs, unfailing favor. Even earlier, the Kaiser had read with great interest Chamberlain's "The Fundamental Myth of the Nineteenth Century"; the author was awarded the Iron Cross.
Apart from Wilhelm, no other political leader at that time viewed the confrontation between the Entente and the Central Powers in a racial aspect. A psychological turning point was also observed in the behavior of Nicholas II. The king seemed to be overcome by some kind of fatigue, a fatalistic desire to let events take their course. Kokovtsov recalled one of his last reports to the sovereign. This was already in November 1913, after Kokovtsov returned from a trip to Berlin. The Tsar received him at the Livadia Palace in Crimea. Kokovtsov spoke about the warlike mood at William's court and his alarming belief in the proximity and inevitability of war. Nikolai listened attentively: “He never interrupted me during the entire time of my presentation and stubbornly looked straight into my eyes, as if he wanted to believe in the sincerity of my words. Then, turning to the window where we were sitting, he peered for a long time at the vast expanse of the sea stretched out before him and, as if waking up from oblivion, again stubbornly looked at me and said: “Everything is the Will of God!”
Apparently, Nicholas II was still under the impression of the magnificent celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. The celebrations began in February and continued throughout the year. The Emperor and his family made a long trip to Russian cities. Tens of thousands of people standing along the route of the royal train, an endless series of ceremonial dinners, religious processions, prayers, and public festivities were supposed to testify to the inextricable unity of the king with the people. Rasputin could also have influenced the mystical mood of the sovereign, it was then that he finally established his exceptional position under royal family. The king, like his German cousin, was rapidly losing his adequate perception of reality.
The crisis of 1912 finally clarified the balance of power before the decisive battle.
The exchange of threats continued at the beginning of 1913. In the margins of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s report on the situation in the Balkans, Wilhelm wrote: finally, a provocation is needed in order to be able to strike, “with more or less deft diplomacy and a deftly directed press ( provocation) can be constructed... and it must be constantly at hand.”
However, it was already clear that there would be no war again. In the last days of January 1913, Lenin, in a letter to Gorky, said with regret: “A war between Austria and Russia would be a very useful thing for the revolution (in all of Eastern Europe), but there is little likelihood that Franz Joseph and Nikolasha would give us this pleasure.”
Peace came to the Balkans in May. Turkey admitted defeat and lost almost all its European possessions, which went to the countries of the “Balkan bloc”.
On May 24, the wedding of the Kaiser's only daughter, Princess Victoria Louise, and the Duke of Brunswick took place. William invited both of his cousins to the celebration - Georgie (George V) and Nicky (Nicholas II). Both arrived in person. Later, George complained that it was extremely difficult for him to have a heart-to-heart talk with the Russian sovereign: Wilhelm followed them everywhere, fearing that Georgie and Nicky would conspire against him. When they did manage to be alone, Georg could not shake the feeling that “Wilhelm was standing with his ear pressed to the keyhole.”
That was the last meeting of the three royal cousins.
The calm in the Balkans lasted only a month. The former allies were unable to divide the territories captured from Turkey, and the Second Balkan War began at the end of June. Now Greece, Serbia and Montenegro opposed Bulgaria. Soon Romania and Türkiye joined the anti-Bulgarian coalition. The great powers behaved much more restrained this time. A month later, the war ended with the defeat of Bulgaria and a new redrawing of borders between the Balkan states.
Following this, Russian-German relations deteriorated again. The Kaiser tried to increase German influence in Turkey. On July 30, 1913, Otto Liman von Sanders, one of the best German generals, arrived in Istanbul at the invitation of the Turkish government. A little later, forty officer instructors joined him. Sanders was tasked with overseeing the reorganization of the Turkish army. In addition, he was appointed commander of the army corps stationed in Istanbul and a member of the Turkish Military Council.
In St. Petersburg, this news was taken extremely painfully. The work of the German military mission was clearly intended to prepare the Turkish army for war with Russia. They were also afraid that economic development southern Russia will fall under German control. Kokovtsov's negotiations on this issue with Bethmann-Hollweg and Wilhelm II were fruitless. The conflict around Sanders' mission was somewhat defused only in January 1914, when the general, under a plausible pretext, was removed from direct leadership of the Istanbul garrison - he was promoted to marshal of the Turkish army and appointed military inspector of all Turkish troops.
From the very beginning of the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. The great powers began to intensify their arms buildup. Thanks to continued economic growth, governments could afford previously unimaginable military spending.
Germany began to form two new army corps. Maritime program, adopted by the Reichstag in May 1912, intended to increase the number German fleet up to 41 battleship and 20 armored cruisers, not counting light cruisers and destroyers.
In response, Churchill promised the House of Commons that the world would soon see the largest construction in the history of the British Navy: "One torpedo boat a week... One light cruiser every thirty days... one super-dreadnought every forty-five days." In 1914, the British government acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company so that it could fuel ships with liquid fuel instead of coal.
The French government, by law of August 7, 1913, increased the length of service from two to three years and lowered the conscription age from 21 to 20 years. This allowed France to form the largest peacetime army in Europe - 882,907 people, including colonial troops (the pre-war size of the German army was increased to 808,280 people).
In the Russian budget, defense already accounted for about a third of all government spending. At the end of 1913, the “Great Program to Strengthen the Army” was approved, which provided for an increase in the number of ground forces by almost 40%; Much attention was paid to field artillery and naval construction. Within three years, the Russian government planned to have the most first-class army on the continent.
The Austrian and Italian parliaments also approved a significant increase in military spending. All records were broken by tiny Belgium, which expected to more than triple its peacetime army by 1918.
The celebration in 1913 of the centenary of the liberation of Germany from Napoleon's rule resulted in a large-scale anti-French demonstration. The press reminded the Germans that the hour was not far off when they would again have to fight the same “historical” enemy of the German nation.
Militarization in Germany reached such a scale that it was annoying even on the street. Russian publicist Alexander Valentinovich Amfitheatrov recalled how Germany struck him in the spring of 1913: “It seemed to me as if it had been renewed and grown powerfully. I was delighted and horrified. A huge, brilliant culture - as if in an annex to a model military camp. Everything that is strong, strong, healthy is in a military uniform: well-fed, rosy-cheeked, automatically gregarious, ideally trained for human destruction, armed people... And how armed! Admire and tremble! And the civilian population is rather weak, frail, pale and blind: out of ten people, six wear glasses. It was clear that the state forces the country to live in a militarized state, and feeds the military community with the country, of course, not for parades and maneuvers.”
“I don’t know,” Amfitheatrov sums up his impressions, “who in Germany wanted war at that time, and whether the Germans wanted war at all. But the air was filled with war—and, moreover, a war that was obviously victorious” (“The Fight against the German Hero”).
The same feelings were experienced by Protopresbyter of the Russian Army and Navy Georgy Shavelsky, who attended the celebration of the centenary of the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig in 1913: “Here it is, Germany! Slender, united, disciplined, patriotic. When there is a national holiday, everyone is like soldiers; everyone has one idea, one thought, one goal, and harmony and order are everywhere. And here everyone is talking about fighting it... It’s difficult for us, scattered and propagandized, to compete with it.”
However, the so-called common sense refused to dramatize the situation. Maxim Gorky, for example, found that Amphitheaters exaggerated German power. The German military, according to the writer, was “not as strong as... it seems that the German socialists would not allow the country to go to war, and if such a thing happened, the fiery German onslaught would meet with a severe rebuff in Russia, at which point it would break its horns.” .
By the end of 1913, political passions had subsided. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg reminded supporters preemptive strike: “Until now, not a single country has encroached on the honor or dignity of the Germans. Anyone who speaks about war under these conditions must convincingly formulate its goal and prove that this goal cannot be achieved in any other way... If at the present time it is intended to start a war in the absence of reasonable and understandable motives, then this will cast doubt on the future not only the Hohenzollern dynasty, but also Germany as a whole. Of course, we must be bold in our foreign policy, but simply waving a sword on every occasion when neither the honor, nor the security, nor the future of Germany is affected is not only frivolous, but also criminal.”
US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, observing the situation from the outside, concluded: “Conditions promising world peace have never been so favorable as now.”
At the very end of 1913, a Special Meeting was held with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Military, Naval and the Chief of the General Staff. They discussed the mission of General Sanders and the possibility of a joint Russian-English-French strike on Turkey. Kokovtsov, who chaired the meeting, directly posed the question to the ministers: “Is war with Germany desirable and can Russia go to it?”
State Secretary Kokovtsev, currently considering the war to be the greatest disaster for Russia, adhered to the extreme undesirability of Russia's involvement in a European conflict.
Foreign Minister Sazonov also held a fundamentally negative opinion regarding the war with Germany.
He explained this position by the fact that Russia, even together with France (from which assurances of unconditional support had already been received), is unlikely to have a clear chance of winning the war with Germany. The minister pointed out that it was not at all clear how energetically England would be prepared to act. Namely, the participation of British troops could really guarantee victory over Germany.
At the same time, Minister of War Sukhomlinov and Chief of the General Staff General Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky “categorically declared Russia’s full readiness for single combat with Germany, not to mention a one-on-one clash with Austria.”
As a result of the Meeting, the following provisions were adopted:
1) It is necessary to continue to convince Germany that, from the point of view of Russian interests, the command of a German general is inadmissible military unit in Constantinople, and even more so by granting him inspection in the sense of command of one or another district, but at the same time recognizing it as permissible to grant the Chief of the German Military Mission powers for general inspection of the Turkish army.
2) Negotiations in Berlin should be continued until it becomes clear that they are completely unsuccessful.
3) After this, with the consent of France and England, we must move on to the planned measures of influence outside Berlin.
4) In the absence of active support from France and England, further pressure that could lead to war with Germany is unacceptable.
These were the events that preceded Russia's entry into the First World War.
This war lasted approximately 4 years (officially from July 28, 1914 to November 11, 1918). In essence, this is the first military conflict on a global scale, in which 38 of the 59 independent states that existed at that time were involved.
A few numbers:
About 73.5 million people were mobilized;
9.5 million were killed or died from wounds;
More than 20 million are injured;
3.5 million were left crippled.
First World War is a war between two coalitions of powers: the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria) and the Entente (Russia, France, Great Britain, Serbia, later Japan, Italy, Romania, USA, etc.; 34 states in total).
Causes of the First World War
The reason for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist and member of the Young Bosnia organization. However, from the very beginning of the First World War, historians have been concerned with a more significant question: what were the reasons for its outbreak?
There are likely to be many reasons for the outbreak of the First World War. But most historians are inclined to consider the main one to be the competing interests of the largest European powers. What were these interests from the point of view of historians?
Great Britain (as part of the Entente)
Fearing a potential German threat, she abandoned the country’s traditional policy of “isolation” and switched to a policy of forming an anti-German bloc of states.
She did not want to put up with German penetration into areas that she considered “hers”: East and South-West Africa. She also wanted to take revenge on Germany for supporting the Boers during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. In connection with this, it was already waging an undeclared economic and trade war against Germany and was actively preparing in case of aggressive actions on the part of Germany.
France (part of the Entente)
She wanted to recoup the defeat inflicted on her by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
She wanted to return Alsace and Lorraine, separated from France in 1871.
She could not accept her losses in traditional sales markets due to competition with German goods.
She was afraid of new German aggression.
Russia (as part of the Entente)
She demanded a revision in her favor of the control regime over the Dardanelles Strait, because she wanted to have free passage for her fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.
She assessed the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway (1898) as an unfriendly act on the part of Germany. Russia saw this construction as an encroachment on its rights in Asia. Although, as historians note, in 1911 these differences with Germany were resolved by the Potsdam Agreement.
She did not want to put up with Austrian penetration into the Balkans and the fact that Germany was gaining strength and began to dictate its terms in Europe.
She wanted to dominate all Slavic peoples, so she supported anti-Austrian and anti-Turkish sentiments among the Serbs and Bulgarians in the Balkans.
Serbia (as part of the Entente)
Having gained full independence only in 1878, she sought to establish herself in the Balkans as the leader of the Slavic peoples of the peninsula.
She wanted to form Yugoslavia, including all the Slavs living in the south of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Unofficially supported nationalist organizations that fought against Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
German Empire (Triple Alliance)
As an economically developed country, it sought military, economic and political dominance on the European continent.
Since Germany needed markets, and it entered the struggle for colonies only after 1871, it longed to gain equal rights in the colonial possessions of England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal.
In the Entente she saw an alliance against itself in order to undermine its power.
Austria-Hungary (Triple Alliance)
Due to its multinationality, it played the role of a constant source of instability in Europe.
She tried to hold on to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she captured in 1908.
It opposed Russia because Russia took on the role of protector of all Slavs in the Balkans, and Serbia.
USA (supported the Entente)
Here historians do not express themselves specifically, citing only the fact that before the First World War the United States was the world's largest debtor, and after the war it became the world's sole creditor.
These are the reasons given by historians for the First World War.
After the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, events developed as follows:
07/15/28/1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.
19.07 (01.08) Germany declared war on Russia.
21.07 (03.08) Germany declared war on France.
22.07 (04.08) Great Britain declared war on Germany.
The war covered almost all Earth and was carried out on land, at sea and in the air. The greatest threat to Britain was the blockade carried out by Germany with the help of submarines, as a result of which Britain lost ships of the merchant fleet with a total displacement of 7.6 million tons. Free trade, which implies dependence on food imports, made the British population especially vulnerable.
In 1916, in connection with military events in Great Britain, a law on universal conscription was adopted. In addition to military operations in outside world The Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916 posed a threat to the United Kingdom on its own home front. But the most difficult time came at the beginning of 1917. Russia left the war, and Germany launched military operations at sea. On top of all this, the British armed forces suffered a crushing defeat from the Turkish army in Mesopotamia. And although the British were later able to regain their advantage, they lost a huge number of people in the fight for the Suez Canal.
As a result of many bloody battles, Germany lost the war. But although Great Britain ended the war victorious, its position left much to be desired.
England's expenses on the war exceeded 25 billion pounds sterling. The national debt tripled during the war. Interest on the debt and the need to pay pensions placed a heavy burden on the country. The number of killed and missing was approximately 680 thousand people, and the number of mobilized was 5.7 million.
It must also be taken into account that for the first time in history, England became the victim of devastating bombings and strong missile attacks, as a result of which it lost a significant part of its merchant fleet. And since England could only maintain communications and trade with the help of the fleet, these losses were especially significant for her. They needed to be replenished with something.
After the First World War, the United Kingdom received a mandate to administer parts of the German and Ottoman Empires. Tanganyika, parts of Togo and Cameroon, and the small island of Nauru in Pacific Ocean(shared with New Zealand and Australia); from Turkey - Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq. But this was not enough to immediately improve the economy of their country.
From an economic point of view, thanks to the debt and losses that the war entailed, the most pressing problem of the post-war era was the transition from a war economy to a peacetime economy. This process turned out to be more difficult and lengthy than expected, and was still ongoing during the Great Depression. And before the depression ended, preparations for a new war were on the agenda.
Sources:
World History / Ed. G.B. Polyak, A.N. Markova. - M.: Culture and Sports, UNITY, 1997.
Harbottle T.B. Battles of world history: dictionary. - M.: Vneshsigma, 1993.
http://www.firstwar.info/
http://www.hrono.info/1914voina.html
On July 28, 1914, the First World War began. Cause of war served as an aggravation of contradictions between two military-political blocs: the Triple Alliance and the Entente. Both alliances sought political hegemony in the world.
Reason for war was the murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, on June 28, 1914. The heir was killed in Sarajevo, Bosnia, by a member of the Mlada Bosna organization (In 1908, during the revolution in the Turkish Empire, Austria-Hungary captured the region of Bosnia from the empire , populated by Serbs). On June 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum to Serbia. Serbia turned to Russia for help.
July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Soon Germany and its ally Italy, as well as their opponents: Great Britain, France, Russia and other Entente countries, entered the war. The war became global.
Germany did not want to fight a war on two fronts. In 1914, she planned to deliver the main blow to France. Having treacherously violated Belgium's neutrality, German troops invaded Belgium. Troops from France and Britain came to the aid of Belgium. The Entente leadership turned to Russia for help. Without preliminary preparation, two Russian armies entered the territory of East Prussia. The German military command was forced to withdraw dozens of divisions from the Western Front and transfer them to the Eastern Front. Paris was saved. But at the cost of the destruction of two Russian armies in East Prussia.
In 1915. The German military command decided to defeat Russia, knowing about its military-technical problems (lack of officers and weapons). In the spring, the German army went on the offensive against Eastern Front. Emperor Nicholas II turned to his allies for help. But they were silent. Then the country restructured its industry to produce military products, carried out new mobilizations into the army and trained new officers. In the fall of 1915, the advance of the German army was stopped.
On Western Front in 1915 the German side committed a crime near the Belgian river Ypres, opening chlorine cylinders. This gas attack cost the lives of thousands of French soldiers. In 1915, due to increasing disagreements between Italy and Austria-Hungary, Italy withdrew from the Quadruple Alliance (which included Turkey) and joined the Entente. Then Bulgaria took its place in the Quadruple Alliance.
In 1916. The main military operations took place on the Western Front. The German army again tried to defeat France. The battle began in February near the city of Verdun, which lasted 11 months and in which more than 900 thousand soldiers from both sides died. It was called the “Verdun meat grinder”. On the Eastern Front Russian army in the summer of 1916, it launched an offensive against the Austro-Hungarian army, which ended in disaster for the latter. German troops came to the aid of the Austrians.
The three-year war undermined Germany's military strength. The war became the impetus for the start of the revolution in Russia. Revolution of 1917. in Russia complicated the military confrontation between both sides. But the scales were tilting more and more clearly towards the Entente. The US Army also began to fight on her side. The offensive of the Entente troops in the second half of 1918 led to the surrender of Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary and Germany. November 11, 1918 A truce was signed and peace negotiations began.