Myths of new Ukrainian history. Brief history of Ukraine

On August 24, Ukraine celebrated 26 years of independence. And November 21 will mark the fourth anniversary of the start of Euromaidan.

The last date divided the history of Ukraine into “before” and “after”.

Ukraine before November 2013 and after are two completely different countries. Fundamentally different. And, one might say, even hostile to each other. According to its concept, ideology, views on the past and the future.

Therefore, the birthday of today's Ukraine is not August 24, but November 21. Just like the Soviet Union traced its ancestry back to November 7, 1917.

On November 7, 1917, the previous course of Russian history was refracted, and on November 21, 2013, the previous course of Ukrainian history was refracted. Although, naturally, in both cases, long before the revolutionary events, their objective prerequisites had matured in society, which made a turning point, if not predetermined, then quite probable.

In order to understand how this happened and what awaits our country next, we decided to analyze in detail all 25 years of Ukrainian independence.

Let's look to the past to see the future.

Year one. Independence as the fruit of the Great Compromise

Back in early August 1991, there was little to foretell the imminent declaration of Ukrainian independence. Six months earlier - on March 17, 1991 - a referendum was held, in which 70.2% of residents of the Ukrainian SSR voted to preserve Soviet Union. National movement was popular in Western Ukraine and Kyiv, but even in the central regions they were, to put it mildly, wary.

The Verkhovna Rada had a communist majority led by Alexander Moroz. The speaker was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk.

Everything changed within three days.

The putsch of the State Emergency Committee on August 19 and its subsequent failure led to a sharp rethinking by the party nomenklatura of the Ukrainian SSR of its attitude to the preservation of the Union. It was obvious that power in Moscow was gradually passing from Gorbachev to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the USSR, together with the socialist system, was living out its last days in its previous form.

Therefore, isn’t it worth following the example of the Baltic states and declaring independence while there is such an opportunity? So as not to then share power and state assets with the union center on the eve of their privatization?

Both the red directors of the southeast and the Kyiv party apparatchiks were guided by this logic. That is why, united with national forces, they voted for independence on August 24. The compromise of these three groups, having gone through various transformations, became the foundation on which Ukraine lived until 2014.

It was this Compromise that became the progenitor of Ukrainian statehood. Which, thanks to him, was born without war and blood.

On December 1, more than 90% of the republic’s residents voted for independence in a referendum. At the same time, Leonid Kravchuk was elected first president.

Thus, the citizens of the new country, as it were, sanctified the Compromise, showing that they did not want drastic changes: in fact, they voted for the same Ukrainian SSR, but without the all-Union chaos of the times of Gorbachev and perestroika.

Year two. Strength test of Compromise

The first year of independence became the greatest test for Ukraine. The main blow was dealt to the economy. Since January 2, prices have floated freely. The former socialist economic system began to quickly collapse, but a normal market economy had not yet emerged. Chaos began, which was aggravated by the severance of intra-Union economic ties. The people quickly became poor.

To be fair, it should be admitted that Ukraine in this case was rather a follower. The main trend was set by the policy of shock therapy carried out by the Russian leadership. But for millions of Ukrainians, the onset of economic collapse began to be clearly associated with the country's independence.

In addition, already in the autumn of 1992, a gap in the standard of living between Ukraine and Russia became noticeable. In the latter, using funds from oil and gas exports, it was possible to somewhat soften the blow of reforms. In Ukraine there were no such supports.

The coupon-karbovanets, introduced in 1992, quickly depreciated.

This is what the coupon-karbovanites looked like

The people began to murmur. The unrest was especially noticeable in Crimea, where an acute conflict began between Ukraine and Russia over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, which coincided with the growth of pro-Russian sentiment.

The peninsula gradually became a potential hotspot.

At the same time, Kyiv began active Ukrainization of the humanitarian sphere. An attempt was made to separate the Ukrainian parishes from the Russian Orthodox Church, which was only partially successful and led to a split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and a series of acute conflicts.

Against this background, Kravchuk tried to restore the shaken Compromise by nominating one of the leaders of the red directorate of the southeast, Yuzhmash director Leonid Kuchma, to the post of prime minister. He is remembered for his appeal to parliament to tell him what to build. And also words about the need to restore order and search common language with Russia.

But that didn't help much.

Year three. Crisis and return to compromise

Economically, 1993 was even worse than the previous year. It was then that hyperinflation was recorded in Ukraine - prices increased by 10,000%. In June, a strike by Donbass miners began, which grew into mass protests in the region. The formal reason was another price hike.

The conflict for power between the Dnepropetrovsk clan (led by Kuchma) and the Donetsk clan (led by the mayor of Donetsk Efim Zvyagilsky) was then called informal. Then, in fact, the country started talking about these clans for the first time.

Miners' strike in Donetsk

But in reality, the significance of those events was much broader. The strikers' demands were not only anti-government, but also, by today's standards, separatist. Even then, there were calls in Donbass to give it economic independence and autonomy, to restore ties with Russia.

Together with the growing pro-Russian movement in Crimea, as well as the growing socio-economic problems, this has become a critical challenge for Ukrainian independence. In the Kyiv media at that time there were many calls to suppress the “Donetsk rebellion” (in the language of our time - to start the ATO back in 1993).

But Kravchuk and his entourage thought differently then. They agreed to a Compromise. Efim Zvyagilsky was appointed first deputy prime minister (and soon the acting prime minister - Kuchma did not want to work with him and resigned). The protests began to decline.

In the same year, a temporary agreement was concluded with Russia on the basing of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, which reduced the intensity of passions on the peninsula.

In domestic policy However, a rule was gradually established: the Russian-speaking southeast is engaged in economics and business (primarily the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk clans competing with each other), while the humanitarian sphere was left to the nationalists.

The harsh businessmen and red directors of the southeast felt like the real masters of the country and looked down on the strange people in embroidered shirts who were engaged in the Ukrainization of education, rewriting history textbooks and other issues of little significance, from the point of view of strong business executives.

It is curious that the first coming of the Donetsk people to power was marked by the first temporary stabilization of the economy. The Zvyagilsky government gradually reduced inflation, agreed with Russia on energy supplies, and began to restore order in the sphere of public administration. Although the socio-economic situation of the country remained dire. The people languished in poverty, corruption and banditry were rampant.

Returning to the events of the summer of 1993, it should be recognized that if the central government had then decided to use force against Donbass, Ukraine would no longer exist within its current borders. The outbreak of armed clashes, against the backdrop of the peak of an acute socio-economic crisis, would inevitably lead to the collapse of the state and the immersion of its fragments in many years of chaos and anarchy.

But then the country managed to move away from the brink of the abyss.

Year four. Registration of the state

In 1994, Ukraine signed one of the most important agreements in its history - the Budapest Memorandum on the renunciation of nuclear weapons. This decision at that time relieved the tension around our country. Although, as subsequent events showed, the states that signed the memorandum did not in reality become guarantors of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. But more on that later.

In domestic politics, 1994 was an election year. Early elections of the Supreme Council were held in March. For many in Kyiv, their results were a shock - in many districts representatives of the revived Communist Party and the socialists of Alexander Moroz won (after the elections he became the speaker of parliament).

The “Reds” went to the elections under the simple slogan “And under the communists there was food and drink.” Plus they promised to be friends with Russia. Against the backdrop of the economic and humanitarian catastrophe that had occurred in Ukraine by that time, these “messages” turned out to be in great demand.

The trend was caught by Leonid Kuchma, who was in disgrace. He went to the subsequent presidential elections under the slogans of the fight against corruption and with a poster “Ukraine and Russia: fewer rivers, more bridges.” He was actively supported by Russian television.

Kuchma defeated Kravchuk in the second round.

True, it immediately became clear that he would not be a pro-Russian president.

In the summer-autumn of 1994, Kuchma, through intrigue, first split and multiplied by zero the Russian Federation-oriented leadership of Crimea, headed by Meshkov and Tsekov. Meshkov lost the post of President of Crimea in March 1995, but even before that he turned into an insignificant figure.

From then until February 2014, pro-Russian forces were completely marginalized on the peninsula.

At the same time, Kuchma tried not to make any sharp attacks against Moscow, establishing strong male friendships with Yeltsin and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. At the same time, establishing contacts with the West and the IMF.

Later, this policy was called “multi-vector”. A kind of geopolitical Compromise that allowed Ukraine to exist relatively without conflict in a difficult environment.

Year five. Final course selection

Having stabilized the foreign policy situation around Ukraine and extinguished hot spots within the country, Kuchma also decided on an internal course that outlined the vector of development of the state for many years.

The key issue was ownership. Although privatization began back in 1993, it proceeded neither shaky nor slow.

Therefore, in 1995 there was a choice of strategy. There were three options. The first is to turn back and follow the path of state capitalism along which Alexander Lukashenko led Belarus. The second is to take the Eastern European path, allowing large Western corporations into the country. The third is to prefer the Russian path, relying on the cultivation of their own financial and industrial groups.

Kuchma chose the third option. Moreover, it was the most logical from the point of view of the business-industrial environment that actually governed Ukraine.

This decision had far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, it made it possible to create large national capital, which, having gone through the stormy stage of its birth, gradually began to bring back to life the industrial potential of the state, invest in economic development, and create jobs (thanks to which, until 2014, Ukraine was able to avoid the total deindustrialization that occurred in many Eastern European countries).

On the other hand, trying to protect themselves from competition with more powerful Russian and Western financial and industrial groups, the oligarchs erected powerful corruption barriers, establishing a close relationship with the authorities, using it to minimize taxes and maximize profits.

Therefore, when Western partners now complain about corruption and how much more Ukraine needs to do to become “normal” European country“, they mean precisely the presence of a problem in the form of large national capital, which does not want to let competitors into its hunting field and lives by the principle “Texas should be robbed by Texans.”

Also, the presence of national capital created the economic basis for a multi-vector policy (the oligarchs were interested in normal relations with both the West and Russia). And, after this policy came to rest in 2014, the political-economic system created under Kuchma found itself in a deep crisis.

But let's go back to 1995.

If so-called loans-for-shares auctions played a key role in the creation of the largest Russian financial and industrial groups, the Ukrainian oligarchy had a more exotic way of coming into being.

It was born out of complex gas-offsetting schemes. When a private gas trading company was given the right to supply gas to a particular enterprise. Then it became entangled in debts, against which the trader took the products. And, over time, he completely established control over its financial and economic activities. And a little later, this control was formalized through non-competitive privatization.

Year six. The Constitution and Lazarenko

Already in 1996, this scheme almost led to the emergence of a mega-corporation, which brought key sectors of the Ukrainian economy under its control. We are talking about the Dnepropetrovsk company "Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine" (UESU).

It was headed by Yulia Tymoshenko and patronized by the Prime Minister appointed in 1996 former governor Dnepropetrovsk region Pavel Lazarenko.

Pavel Lazarenko

True, the UESU did not immediately establish this control. Her biggest competitors were representatives of Donetsk business, who established the Industrial Union of Donbass (IUD) corporation specifically to work in the gas market.

But soon the Donetsk people were removed from the road.

First, back in 1995, an explosion at the Donetsk Shakhtar stadium killed an authoritative person and the president of FC Shakhtar, Akhat Bragin (also known as Alik the Greek). In the spring, one of the creators of ISD, Alexander Momot, was shot. Soon, the regional governor, Vladimir Shcherban, was dismissed from his post, and in the fall of the same year, his namesake and informal leader of the “Donetsk clan,” Yevgeny Shcherban, was killed right at the airport.

After all these events, UESU became the main player in the gas market, and Lazarenko began to be seen as Kuchma’s main competitor in the struggle for power in the state.

However, Kuchma also achieved certain successes in the same year - he managed to push through the Verkhovna Rada the Constitution, which increased his powers and turned Ukraine into a presidential-parliamentary republic with the dominant role of the head of state.

The emergence of such a powerful institution of the presidency has led to the fact that every election has become a real battle of destruction.

Moreover, it was a battle without rules, which played a negative role in the subsequent history of the country.

Year seven. The fall of Lazarenko, the political start of Tymoshenko and Yanukovych

The year 1997 was marked by several significant events. Firstly, the expansion of Lazarenko and the UESU united a variety of forces against them, including Kuchma himself.

In the summer, the all-powerful prime minister was dismissed and literally immediately went into opposition.

Fortunately, the election campaign for parliament began and Lazarenko headed the Hromada party. His closest ally was Yulia Tymoshenko. It was in 1997 that the whole country learned about it.

Pavel Lazarenko and Yulia Timoshenko

Ukraine also recognized one more person that year - Viktor Yanukovych. He was appointed by Kuchma as governor of the Donetsk region. The appointment was not accidental.

Preparing for war with Lazarenko, the president decided to once again strengthen the Donetsk forces. In place of the murdered Bragin and Shcherban came a new generation of authoritative businessmen, among whom a key role was played by Rinat Akhmetov (who inherited the post of president of FC Shakhtar from Akhat Bragin) and Vitaly Gaiduk (former deputy governor of Shcherban, one of the ideologists of the creation of ISD). Yanukovych was a figure close to both.

After Lazarenko’s resignation, the UESU business empire was destroyed within a matter of months.

The Dnepropetrovsk corporation was deprived of the right to supply gas to enterprises. This sinecure was distributed among other companies, which then became the backbone of the formation of the largest business groups in Ukraine.

Secondly, a Great Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between Ukraine and Russia. It recorded the absence of territorial claims between the two states against each other and removed the issue of the status of Crimea and Sevastopol. In a separate agreement, Ukraine leased the Black Sea Fleet base to Russia for 20 years.

This agreement seemed to emphasize the final post-Soviet normalization and stabilization of relations between the two countries. Ukraine did not join the Union with Russia, like Belarus, but it was ready to be friends in all directions.

Thirdly, under the patronage of the Americans, an association of CIS countries was created under the code name GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). These states were not averse to playing their own geopolitical role, different from Russia, in the post-Soviet space. In particular, in terms of transporting Caspian energy resources to Europe, bypassing the Russian Federation.

This was the first signal about Ukraine’s inclusion in the big world game, in which it might not be on the same side as Russia.

However, the instability of the unification itself and the upheavals of the following years then diverted attention from this issue.

In general, 1997 was long remembered as the calmest year in the “wild 90s.” The hryvnia, introduced in 1996, was stable at 1.8 per dollar. Inflation fell to single digits.

The first Ukrainian since the collapse of the Union, Leonid Kadenyuk, flew into space.

And on the surface of the Earth at that time, Dynamo Kiev, led by the returning Valery Lobanovsky, was smashing Barcelona and Eindhoven. Europe has learned the name of Andrei Shevchenko.

Eighth year. Elections and default

The first party elections in Ukraine took place in the spring. Half of the parliament is elected according to party lists, but this is enough for TV screens to be filled with videos of little-known but rich political forces - the SDPU (o), the Green Party, the pro-government NDP, Natalia Vitrenko’s PSPU and Pavel Lazarenko’s Hromada.

All of them enter parliament with 4-5%. However, the favorites remain the old parties: the SPU (in alliance with the Selyanskaya Party), the People's Movement and the undisputed leader, the Communist Party, which took a quarter of all votes.

With her support, the leader of the Village Party, Alexander Tkachenko, becomes speaker.

The apparent stability of 1997 and the first half of 1998 ends with a crisis that remains in Ukrainian history as a default.

In fact, we did not have a default - it was in Russia, where the ruble exchange rate fell from 6 to 30 per dollar. In our country, there was “only” a two-fold drop - from 2 to 4 hryvnia per dollar.

Pavel Lazarenko, having entered parliament, begins a war against the president, who reciprocates: in the fall, the newspaper Vseukrainskie Vedomosti, close to the oligarch, was closed, and in December, Hromada split into the Lazarenko and Tymoshenko groups - it decided to make peace with Kuchma separately.

In parallel, the process of establishing a domestic business continues. The latter, through offset schemes and privatization, becomes the owner of the largest enterprises.

Western companies, which had their sights set on participating in the sale of shares in energy companies, are flying by.

In the West, they are increasingly writing about total corruption, the establishment of Kuchma’s authoritarian regime and complaining that Ukraine has taken a completely different path from the countries of Eastern Europe.

Year nine. Kuchma-2

Leonid Kuchma ran for a second term in 1999 in very bad conditions. A crisis was raging in the country, the people were impoverished and without wages.

The oligarchs resolved the issue of initial capital accumulation by stealing budget funds and ruining still state-owned enterprises. Naturally, no one paid taxes.

The project is hindered by two people - the leader of the socialists Alexander Moroz and the head of the People's Movement Vyacheslav Chernovol. Rukh had already split into two parts by that time, but Chernovol remained popular in the West of the country. And, if he went to the elections, he could confuse the cards for Kuchma’s team.

But in March, Chernovol unexpectedly dies in a car accident.

Meanwhile, a dirty struggle is being waged around Moroz: he gathers the “Kanev four” (Moroz, Tkachenko, Marchuk and the current emigrant Vladimir Oleynik), which should nominate a single candidate, but the four breaks up, and everyone plays for himself (and Kuchma turns out to be the winner) .

In October, in Krivoy Rog, there was an attempt on the life of Natalya Vitrenko, for which Moroz was accused. The accusation has not been confirmed by anything, but it plays its role: Kuchma and Symonenko advance to the second round.

Kuchma wins. Then there was a lot of talk about total election fraud, but the communist leader did not challenge the victory.

Almost all leading financial and industrial groups bet on the victory of the current president. They were just completing the process of consolidating assets and creating their own media.

And, in exchange for Kuchma's support, they were promised the green light in all directions. The process of creating national capital was entering its final stage.

Year ten. Death of Gongadze

On January 1, 2000, a significant part of Ukrainians is in a hurry to celebrate the beginning of a new century, although it will begin only in a year.

But a new economic age for Ukraine really began in 2000: for the first time after almost 10 years of recession, the economy began to grow.

For the most part, this was facilitated by the devaluation of the hryvnia, which by that time had fallen to 5.5 per dollar, as well as the beginning of economic growth in neighboring Russia and other CIS countries.

But many associated all these successes with the new prime minister - Viktor Yushchenko, appointed to this position at the end of 1999.

In the 90s, he served as head of the National Bank and established close contacts with Western structures.

Victor Yushchenko

By that time, Ukraine was faced with the acute issue of restructuring its external debt.

Relations with the West, after the controversial elections of Kuchma, were bad, and the latter, in order to restore dialogue, decided to appoint Yushchenko as prime minister. According to legend, this was strongly recommended to him from Washington.

At first, Yushchenko was not taken seriously. But he, as it were, on his own began to accumulate the expectations of many Ukrainians.

Moreover, Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko developed vigorous activity. She declared war on barter-offset schemes in the energy sector and positioned herself as an ardent opponent of the oligarchs.

All this, unexpectedly for many, turned Yushchenko into an alternative figure to Kuchma. The West also provided Viktor Andreevich with serious support.

Since mid-2000, there have been rumors that in the United States it is the prime minister who is seen as Kuchma’s successor as president.

However, Kuchma had his own plans in this regard. Back in April 2000, he held a referendum where the people voted to amend the Constitution to expand the powers of the head of state.

He then demanded that parliament implement his results by amending the Basic Law. If this had happened, Kuchma would have established complete control over the Verkhovna Rada, which would have opened the way for him to a third term, which began to be actively discussed that same year.

Another important point: since the summer of 2000, very close contact has been established between Kuchma and the new President of Russia, Vladimir Putin.

In the fall, a proposal was made for the first time to create an international consortium to manage the gas transportation system of Ukraine. Rumors spread throughout the country that closer integration processes were possible.

It was also said that the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko government, which had already broken pots with many influential people in the country and enjoyed too obvious support from the West, was about to be dismissed.

The name of the new prime minister, the head of the State Tax Administration Mykola Azarov, was even mentioned. He had to change course. But that did not happen.

There was a cassette scandal.

Back in September, it became known about the disappearance of the editor-in-chief of the Ukrayinska Pravda website Georgy Gongadze.

And already in November, Alexander Moroz published the legendary “Melnichenko tapes,” which indirectly allow Kuchma to be accused of the murder of Gongadze.

There are many versions of who is behind the cassette scandal. Who actually helped Major Melnichenko record Kuchma, who and why provoked the president against Gongadze.

This is a topic for a separate study. For now, we can state obvious consequences.

Kuchma is beginning to turn into a pariah for the international community. His plan for a third term was buried. With the support of the West, Viktor Yushchenko is moving to the forefront in Ukrainian politics. Ukraine is turning into a field for a major geopolitical battle. The country entered a period of great upheaval.

It was then that many subsequent events were predetermined. First of all, the countdown to Maidan has begun.

Year eleven. The stakes are rising

The cassette scandal fell on prepared ground. During his reign, Kuchma managed to make numerous enemies, who have now all raised their heads together. The main thing was that now there was something to fight for: for Kuchma to leave as quickly as possible and give way to Yushchenko.

George Soros, in particular, directly called him to do this.

Protests began on the streets of Kyiv - “Ukraine without Kuchma.” A tent city of protesters appeared. But the president was not going to give up.

Action "Ukraine without Kuchma"

In February, the tent city was dispersed. On March 9, violent (for those times) clashes between participants in the “Ukraine without Kuchma” action and the police took place.

The protesters were dispersed and mass arrests began.

All this time, Yushchenko did not show support for the protesters. On the contrary, together with Kuchma and Speaker Plyushch, he condemned them, calling them fascists. Viktor Andreevich was then convinced that the president would nominate him as his successor anyway. The main thing is not to get into trouble.

However, such “collaboration” does not save the prime minister: in April the parliament passes a vote of no confidence in him.

What is typical is that the day before he came into conflict with Ukrainian business groups, trying to exclude them from participating in the privatization of oblenergos. But the “national capital” decided to show Yushchenko who is boss in the country.

However, the resignation of the prime minister and the end of the protests did not mean that political life had returned to normal. Ukrainian politics began to actively prepare for the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2002.

A significant part of the elite runs over to Yushchenko, forming together with him the Our Ukraine bloc. The ideology of the future president is being created - the European choice, the fight against corruption.

Kuchma hastily assembles his bloc “For a United Ukraine”. The SDPU(u) party, led by Viktor Medvedchuk, is marching in a separate column.

Meeting between Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma in 2001

The West is increasingly attacking Kuchma. The accusations come one after another. In the eyes of the world community, he becomes a politician like Milosevic. In response, the president turns to Russia. Contact with Putin is strengthening.

Despite all this, the economy continues to demonstrate strong growth - more than 10%. Inflation is falling and household incomes are rising.

Year twelve. The scenario is predetermined

The 2002 elections ended unsuccessfully for Kuchma. According to the party lists, Our Ukraine took first place. The communists were ahead of her by a small margin. The “For a United Ukraine” bloc, led by the head of the presidential administration Vladimir Lytvyn, was only third, gaining almost half as much as the Yushchenko bloc (and only due to the fact that it was actively supported by the “Donetsk people”, ensuring a good result in your region).

The opposition Socialist Party and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc also entered the Rada.

After the elections, it became finally clear that Kuchma’s third term is a pipe dream and the guarantor needs to make a choice.

Either really crown Yushchenko as his heir, as the West and part of the elite pushed him to do, or nominate another successor, or, as some political strategists suggested, amend the Constitution, transforming Ukraine into a parliamentary republic, devaluing the importance of the post of president.

Kuchma rejected the first option. He did not trust Yushchenko; moreover, he was considered a protege of the West, which was unacceptable for “multi-vector” Ukrainian business.

However, Kuchma did not trust not only Yushchenko, but no one at all. That’s why he didn’t want to go for the second option either. As a result, it was decided to take the “third path”.

The signal for its implementation, as well as the impossibility of a compromise with Yushchenko, was the appointment of the enemy leader of Our Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk, as head of the Presidential Administration. The latter became the main ideologist and technologist for amending the Constitution.

In order to prevent a possible alliance between the Donetsk people and Yushchenko (which was possible due to their common dislike for Medvedchuk), Viktor Yanukovych was appointed to the post of Prime Minister.

But then, for the reasons described above, no one perceived him as Kuchma’s successor. Moreover, the whole country has become famous story about his two convictions.

Having come to the conclusion that the soft option with a “successor Yushchenko” does not work, the West increased pressure on Kuchma.

Back in the spring, a scandal began with the supply of the Ukrainian Kolchuga air defense system to Iraq, which was allegedly evidenced on Melnichenko’s films. This caused a harsh reaction from the United States, although the Ukrainian authorities argued that there were no supplies (which, as it later turned out, turned out to be true).

But Bankovaya was not idle either. Ever since the elections to the Rada, a massive campaign to discredit Viktor Yushchenko began.

He was portrayed as a Ukrainian nationalist, a Banderaite, who hates Russian-speaking people and wants to sell Ukraine to the West. The Russian media also actively participated in this campaign, and Russian political strategists, led by Marat Gelman, became one of the main strategists in the Presidential Administration.

The scenario of the future battle in 2002 was actually predetermined: a war between Viktor Yushchenko and the then Ukrainian government with the active use of the theme of the split of the country and with large-scale support from the West and Russia on both sides, respectively.

True, there was a chance, if not to avoid, then at least to soften the intensity of this battle - to actually carry out political reform, reducing the powers of the president. The entire next year passed under the sign of these attempts.

Year thirteen. Constitution and Tuzla

2003 was a successful year for the economy. GDP growth was almost 10%. An increase in activity was recorded in all sectors of the Ukrainian economy.

Entrepreneurs showed optimism and believed in a bright future. Optimism (at least in terms of consumer sentiment) gradually returned to ordinary Ukrainians. People are beginning to talk about Ukraine as a new “economic tiger”.

The sources of growth were the same: an increase in world prices for main export goods, the rise of the Russian market (the main one for Ukrainian exports), the presence of underutilized capacities in industry, an increase in household incomes, low gas prices (thanks to a long-term contract with Russia).

Relations with the Russian Federation generally developed quite rapidly this year. Kuchma and Putin agreed to create a tripartite consortium to manage the gas transportation system (the third party was to be Germany, where Putin’s friend Schröder was then chancellor). It was also announced the creation of a Common Economic Space, which could include Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

True, both projects remained on paper. And not only because of the opposition of the Americans, but also because of the reluctance of Kuchma and the Ukrainian elite to share their influence in the country with the Russians. A good relationship with the Kremlin were important to them in order to fend off Yushchenko and the West, but nothing more.

Multi-vector - first of all.

Therefore, as soon as Kyiv had the opportunity to improve relations with the Americans by sending its contingent to Iraq, Kuchma immediately did so.

Spit Tuzla

That same year, for the first time since the early 90s, the issue of Crimea surfaced. A famous conflict arose around the island of Spit Tuzla, to which Russia began to build a dam. As the Kremlin later explained, the reason for such actions was Ukraine’s alleged plans to give permission to warships of third countries (read: NATO countries) to enter the Sea of ​​Azov.

The conflict was then quickly hushed up, and a decision on the ships was never made. But the “Tuzla crisis” showed that against the backdrop of growing contradictions between the United States and Russia, the Kremlin is ready to react extremely harshly to any issues related to relations between Ukraine and NATO. Although at that time, few people in Kyiv paid attention to this moment, like many others.

In domestic politics, the pro-government camp plunged into endless intrigues and internecine wars, which prevented the implementation of the strategic task of pushing through parliament changes to the Constitution. This process has seriously stalled.

It was secretly sabotaged by the Donetsk people, hoping to push Yanukovych into the presidency, and openly by Our Ukraine and Yushchenko (for obvious reasons).

True, Moroz was among the supporters of political reform. Only at the end of the year, with a big scandal, the changes were voted on in the first reading.

Year fourteen. The first Maidan and the third Great Compromise

The story of the political reform ended in failure already in April 2004, when only seven votes were missing for its adoption in the final reading.

This was a shock for the president's team, which found itself with nothing - they did not have a ready-made successor. Therefore, we had to quickly place our bets on the only one who was at hand with the highest rating of all the government candidates - Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.

It was a fatal decision. Yanukovych was the most convenient opponent for Yushchenko, since the opposition could easily mobilize its electorate against a pro-government candidate with two convictions. In addition, many representatives of the Ukrainian elite treated the ex-governor of the Donetsk region with semi-contempt, and it was difficult to build a united front in his support.

But, on the other hand, Kuchma had no choice - there was very little time left before the start of the election campaign, and attempts to replace Yanukovych as prime minister and, accordingly, the government candidate in the elections could cause a revolt of the “Donetsk people” and their transition to the camp of supporters Yushchenko.

From the very beginning everything went according to the worst-case scenario.

Yanukovych was quickly given the image of a prisoner and a candidate who is even worse than Kuchma. Yushchenko launched a vigorous campaign. Many representatives of the Ukrainian elite began to secretly bet on him, not believing in Yanukovych’s victory.

But the hopes of Yushchenko's political strategists for an easy ride through the electoral field did not materialize.

They underestimated the impact of the anti-nationalist campaign against the leader of Our Ukraine. Instead of trying to refute it, they largely indulged it, trying to mobilize the Western Ukrainian electorate with the theme of the “national idea.”

The flip side of this was the mobilization of the south-eastern voter.

The largest media outlets reluctantly joined this campaign, showing videos “about three types of Ukrainians” into which Yushchenko allegedly wants to divide the country.

In response, supporters of the latter began to create an image of the enemy from the “Donetsk”, painting the inhabitants of this region as entirely bandits.

The economy worked in Yanukovych's favor, as did some effective steps taken by his government. Thus, from the beginning of the year, following the example of Russia, a single income tax rate was introduced in Ukraine - 13%, instead of the existing progressive one with a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 40%.

The GDP growth rate hit a record 13%. Never before or since has the Ukrainian economy grown at such a pace.

Since the fall, pensions and other social payments have been sharply raised.

All this led to the fact that already in September the ratings of Yanukovych and Yushchenko were equal. It became clear that the elections would not take place smoothly. Russia openly played on the side of the prime minister, and the West on the side of the opposition leader.

Both sides created the image of an enemy out of a political rival, pitting their supporters against each other.

The first round of elections ended in a draw. During the second round, the opposition announced massive fraud using absentee ballots (they actually took place) and did not recognize Yanukovych’s victory declared by the Central Election Commission.

Maidan gathered in Kyiv. Moreover, unlike previous protests, it became truly widespread.

At least 100 thousand people immediately came out, and a tent city was set up.

Orange Maidan

Regional councils and city councils in the center and west of the country (including the Kiev City Council) did not recognize Yanukovych’s victory. The capital found itself in the hands of Yushchenko's supporters. Kuchma did not want to use force to disperse them.

At the same time, the Supreme Court accepted a lawsuit to declare the elections invalid. And after several days of hearings, the verdict was announced: to schedule a re-vote for the second round of elections (in fact, the third round of elections).

Seeing the worsening situation in Kyiv, Yanukovych’s supporters gathered at the famous congress in Severodonetsk, where they threatened to secede the southeast from Ukraine. Russia fully supported these actions.

The country is on the brink civil war.

The Great Compromise saved her from her again. In the form of the same political reform. A deal was struck.

Supporters of Kuchma and Yanukovych agree to “leak” the third round of elections in favor of Yushchenko (for which the Central Election Commission was reorganized). In response, Our Ukraine agreed to vote for changes to the Constitution, which, starting January 1, 2006, reduced the powers of the future president.

This turned out to be a strategic decision that prevented war. Unfortunately, not forever. And only for 10 years...

Year fifteen. An attempt to destroy the Great Compromise

At the beginning of 2005, after the inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko, no one in his circle believed that he had made any concessions or compromises.

Everyone quickly forgot that the political reform would come into force on January 1, 2006, as they were confident that within a year everyone would have time to change their game.

And there really were reasons for this.

Enormous international support (the whole world learned about Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, and our country was at the peak of popularity), high level trust (or rather, expectations) of the population, the willingness of even former enemies (Yanukovych’s support groups) to swear allegiance to the new president - all this set one in an optimistic mood.

But Yushchenko made two key mistakes. First, he immediately began to destroy the Great Compromise on which Ukraine had rested from 1991-1993. He immediately abandoned the multi-vector policy, declaring a course towards integration into the EU and NATO.

Within the country, Yushchenko placed emphasis on “national revival” (in his understanding, of course), which resulted in the spread of shavarism and attempts to accelerate the Ukrainization of the humanitarian sphere.

The intensified glorification of the OUN-UPA began, the state apparatus was actively working to create a single local church and support the Kyiv Patriarchate. Against this background, relations with Russia began to quickly deteriorate.

The new president behaved with pointed arrogance in Donbass. During his first visit to Donetsk, where the local elite was already ready to faithfully serve Yushchenko and establish communication with him, he was rude to people right during a meeting in the regional administration.

His catchphrase has become “the president is standing in front of you, not a goose herder.”

In other words, Yushchenko did everything to confirm the main points of Viktor Yanukovych’s election propaganda.

That is why Viktor Fedorovich, who had already been written off as scrap at the beginning of 2005, did not lose his electorate, and since the fall, when the crisis began in the “orange camp,” he began to quickly increase his popularity.

Yushchenko's second main mistake was appointing Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister.

Although this was spelled out in a special agreement, according to which Tymoshenko supported Yushchenko in the elections, the president still had to calculate the risks of appointing the ambitious and uncontrollable Lady Yu to the second most important post in the country.

But he did not calculate, for which he soon paid severely.

Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko

Tymoshenko did not become Yushchenko’s assistant in governing the state, but immediately became his main competitor. The new prime minister was drawing attention to herself, creating the impression that she was the one carrying out the reforms, and the president’s entourage (in which she appointed NSDC Secretary Petro Poroshenko as the main enemy) was sabotaging them for corruption reasons.

By the summer, this had led to an open conflict between Tymoshenko and the president and his people (the so-called “love friends”).

This conflict paralyzed the state system. The declared reforms were not carried out; all energy was spent on mutual squabbles.

All this could not last long, and the explosion occurred in September.

It all started with a press conference by the head of the Presidential Secretariat, Alexander Zinchenko, who accused Petro Poroshenko and other “any friends” of corruption, and ended with Tymoshenko’s resignation from the post of prime minister. Lady Yu went into open and merciless opposition to Yushchenko, the large “orange coalition” was destroyed.

A special memorandum was signed between the president and the “leader of the opposition” (that’s how he was called in the document) Viktor Yanukovych, which marked the collapse of attempts by Yushchenko and the new “orange government” to destroy the Great Compromise.

In subsequent years there were still some efforts in this direction, but they could no longer have any success.

Strategically, the point was set precisely in the fall of 2005. At the same time, the “triune” landscape of Ukrainian politics was formed, which remained unchanged until the 2010 presidential elections.

There is President Yushchenko, who has greatly lost his influence and popularity. And there are two main contenders for the role of his successor - Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych.

Year sixteen. Yanukovych is Prime Minister again, the first conflicts with Russia, the beginning of the story with NATO

Already in the fall of 2005, after the crisis with the resignation of Tymoshenko and the signing of a memorandum with Yanukovych, it became clear that Yushchenko did not have the strength to stop the entry into force of the political reform on January 1, 2006.

Which is exactly what happened.

Changes to the Constitution sharply reduced the powers of the president. The government was now formed not by the head of state, but by parliament. But in reality these changes were supposed to take effect after the elections to the Verkhovna Rada, which were scheduled for March 2006.

These elections were the first to be held according to a purely proportional system (based on party lists), and in them the “orange” political forces reaped the fruits of their split.

First place was taken by the Party of Regions of Viktor Yanukovych - more than 32%. BYuT lagged far behind - just over 22%. "Our Ukraine" by Viktor Yushchenko was only third - about 15%. The Socialist Party of Alexander Moroz and the Communist Party also passed.

Lengthy bargaining began to create a coalition. On the sidelines they whispered that Yushchenko and the Party of Regions would try to create a so-called “broad coalition” in order to overcome the split in the country (as the official pretext).

But these plans were actively tried to be torpedoed by Yulia Tymoshenko, who insisted on restoring a purely “orange” coalition consisting of BYuT, Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party. At the same time, she naturally saw herself in the prime minister’s chair.

Yushchenko's long hesitation was put to an end by the Americans, who in June recommended that he finally agree to the “orange” coalition (the motives for this are discussed below).

Reluctantly, the president was forced to take this step, but due to the mutual distrust of the negotiation participants, the process stalled again, which the regionals immediately took advantage of.

They managed to convince the Socialist Party to create a coalition with the Party of Regions and the Communists. Moroz got the post of speaker. Detractors said that the socialists were paid a large sum of money, but it must be admitted that objectively everything was moving towards the creation of a coalition in which the regionals would participate as the largest faction in the Rada. It was a social trend. And if “Our Ukraine” was not included in it, then one should not be surprised that the socialists were included.

Yushchenko tried to jump into the departing train. Formally preventing Our Ukraine from joining the coalition, he agreed with the Party of Regions to retain several government posts for his people.

A Universal of National Unity was signed, where the idea of ​​the need to overcome the split in the country was conveyed in confused terms. Yushchenko nominated Yanukovych for the post of prime minister. And parliament approved it in July.

For about two months, the appearance of interaction between the president and the prime minister remained, although the regionals very quickly brought the entire government apparatus under their control. And the remaining presidential people in the Cabinet of Ministers (including, for example, Minister of Internal Affairs Yuriy Lutsenko) felt extremely uncomfortable there.

The situation exploded in September.

The main, and, in fact, the only reason for this was Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign Ukraine’s application to join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which opened the way for the country to join the Alliance.

A slight digression is necessary here. When Yushchenko and Yanukovych signed a memorandum in the fall of 2005, it concerned the restoration of the Great Compromise only in domestic politics.

At the same time, Yushchenko believed that he had no obligation to return to compromise in foreign policy (that is, to multi-vector).

On the contrary, since the beginning of 2006, the president has intensified the Euro-Atlantic and anti-Russian vector. Thus, on New Year’s Day, the first gas war between Ukraine and Russia began. Gas transit to Europe was temporarily suspended.

The war ended with the defeat of Ukraine - the previous long-term gas supply agreement, beneficial for the country, was terminated, under which the price of blue fuel was fixed until 2010 at $50 per thousand cubic meters. And under the new agreement, the price immediately almost doubled (and then continued to grow every year).

At the beginning of 2006, Yushchenko tried to interrupt Yulia Tymoshenko’s campaign on the topic “Yushchenko and his beloved friends betrayed the Maidan,” emphasizing the topic of confrontation with Russia. The situation around the Russian Black Sea Fleet facilities in Crimea has worsened, and the blockade of Transnistria has begun.

But that was not the main thing. There was an agreement with the Americans that Ukraine would apply for a MAP in 2006.

That is why Washington did not want Yushchenko to create a coalition with the regionalists, since it did not believe that they would agree to open the country’s path to NATO (the anti-NATO theme was one of the main ones in the PR’s rhetoric).

But after long negotiations with Yanukovych, Yushchenko apparently decided that he had convinced him to support the course of Euro-Atlantic integration, and therefore agreed to his premiership.

However, they probably did not understand each other. And when the time came to sign the application for the MAP, Yanukovych refused to do so.

The crisis broke out almost immediately. Yushchenko condemned the refusal. Then the government gradually removed people from the presidential quota. New chapter The Presidential Secretariat, Viktor Baloga, began preparing forces for an attack on the Yanukovych government. It was then that they first started talking about dissolving parliament.

In turn, the regionals began to lure some of the deputies from BYuT and Our Ukraine to themselves, trying to increase the composition of the coalition to 300 people so that they could override the president’s veto.

Let us note that, despite the permanent political crisis, the economy, after the fall of 2005, again increased its growth rate, household incomes also grew rapidly, and the Ukrainian football team, led by Oleg Blokhin, made it to the World Cup for the first time and immediately reached the quarterfinals.

Many looked to the future with optimism. The idea that Ukraine was becoming a normal country, in which politics was on its own and the economy on its own, was popular.

Year seventeen. Dissolution of Parliament, a new crisis and a new compromise

The crisis in relations between Yanukovych and Yushchenko grew throughout the first months of 2007 and ended with the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada.

Later, Alexander Moroz said that the main reason for this was the reluctance of him and Yanukovych to support the course of integration into NATO (which the Americans demanded).

Perhaps it was so.

But the main internal driver of the process was Yulia Tymoshenko, who skillfully played on the contradictions between the prime minister and the president. The political reform of 2004 gave rise to these contradictions, giving power to the prime minister, but allowing the president to endlessly block decisions of the government and parliament.

Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych

After this, Tymoshenko began to besiege Yushchenko, demanding that he dissolve parliament. The grounds were extremely dubious (the transfer of deputies to other factions, which, according to the Constitution, is not a basis for early elections), and this confused the president.

However, the BYuT leader was stubborn, and the regionals, for their part, only added fuel to the fire by recruiting more and more parties of people’s deputies. And on April 2, Yushchenko signed a decree.

A new confrontation began: the government and parliament did not recognize the decree and appealed to the Constitutional Court demanding its repeal.

The KS stalled for a long time, and the confrontation intensified.

A dual power arose in the country, which at any moment could develop into open conflict. Ukraine found itself one step away from it after Yushchenko tried to remove Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun and install his own acting in his place. The government and the Rada did not recognize this decision, and the government-controlled special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs actually seized the building of the GPU. Yushchenko's appointee was simply not allowed there.

The President responded by ordering the Internal Troops to march on Kyiv. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs reassigned them to itself and forbade them to carry out Yushchenko’s orders.

The situation could easily escalate into armed clashes fraught with civil war.
But at the last moment, the warring parties again came to a compromise. Yushchenko, Yanukovych and Moroz negotiated all night on Trinity Sunday on Bankovaya. They left the building in the morning of May 27 and announced an agreement - there would be early parliamentary elections, but in the fall. Until then, the Yanukovych government operates.

According to unofficial information, a behind-the-scenes agreement was also concluded between the regionals and Yushenko (which was allegedly sanctified by Viktor Baloga) that after the new elections, PR and Our Ukraine would create a new coalition. It was under this promise that Yanukovych agreed to early elections.

But “it didn’t happen as expected.”

Yulia Tymoshenko conducted an extremely effective campaign, scattering election promises like a cornucopia. And she managed to take 30% of the votes. "Our Ukraine" came third with 15%. The formal winner of the elections was the Party of Regions, which gained more than 34%. But the problem for the regionals is that BYuT and Our Ukraine had enough votes between them to create, albeit a fragile (by a margin of only two votes), but a majority in parliament.

And it was difficult for Yushchenko voters to explain why, in such a situation, Our Ukraine is creating a coalition with Yanukovych, and not with Tymoshenko. Moreover, Yuriy Lutsenko, who headed the election list of the presidential bloc, became an active lobbyist for the alliance with her.

Baloga and Yushchenko tried for a long time to come up with a reason to avoid a coalition with Tymoshenko, but to no avail.

Most of the Our Ukraine faction, led by Lutsenko, advocated an alliance with BYuT. Eventually this coalition was created. And at the end of 2007, Tymoshenko returned to the prime minister’s chair. Few people then understood that this was a prologue to her future political defeat in the presidential elections.

And Yanukovych, on the contrary, miraculously escaped from the prospect of creating a “shirk” with “Our Ukraine,” which was deadly for his rating.

The results of 2007 showed that, becoming a hostage to the geopolitical game of external forces, Ukraine could quickly find itself on the brink internal conflict and even civil war. But this lesson was not learned either then or later.

Year eighteen. Abandonment of NATO and the global crisis

In 2008, two events occurred that determined the development of Ukraine until the beginning of 2014.

The first is the failure of the plan for Ukraine to join NATO. At first everything went well here. Tymoshenko signed an application to join the NATO Membership Action Plan, which the Alliance was supposed to approve at its summit in Bucharest.

True, joining NATO was not popular among the population (just over 20% were in favor), but it was decided to correct this issue with a massive information campaign.

However, by that time the geopolitical balance in Europe had changed dramatically. Russia has come to an agreement with France and Germany that Ukraine and Georgia should not receive the prospect of NATO membership. And the MAP, through the efforts of the Germans and French in Bucharest, was failed.

This had several important consequences. Firstly, Yushchenko's big political game is over. Having, in fact, failed to fulfill the main task of his presidency, he finally became a “lame duck”, whose role is only to decide who to transfer power to - Yanukovych or Tymoshenko.

Secondly, external players temporarily removed Ukraine from the big geopolitical game, in fact agreeing with its neutral status.

This prompted leading Ukrainian politicians (except Yushchenko) to return to a multi-vector policy. And if Yanukovych was always committed to it, then active search contacts with Russia by Yulia Tymoshenko surprised many, although it was, we repeat, a natural result of the failure of the MAP.

The consequences of this reversal were felt already in August 2008, when after the war in South Ossetia, Tymoshenko, unlike Yushchenko, did not clearly condemn Russia. This position of the prime minister aggravated the already strong contradictions with Bankova and already in September led to the collapse of the coalition of BYuT and Our Ukraine.

At the same time, they first started talking about creating a coalition between BYuT and the Party of Regions. After Tymoshenko’s transition to a multi-vector system, there really were no fundamental disagreements between the two political forces.

In addition, by the end of 2008, both the elite (except Yushchenko) and the majority of the population had developed a pattern of national consensus around which they could unite. This scheme included the neutral status of the country (we are friends with both the West and Russia), refusal to promote painful topics that split society (history, church, language), granting the Russian language official status in Russian-speaking regions and refusal of forced Ukrainization, as well as the departure from attempts to arrange a redistribution of property.

If a broad coalition had emerged around these ideas in 2008-2010, then the country’s development could have gone completely differently. But the agreements both then and later broke down due to enormous mistrust between potential partners.

And there were too many conflicting figures on both sides. For the voters of Yulia Tymoshenko, Yanukovych was a “prisoner” with whom one could not negotiate anything. And for Yanukovych voters, Tymoshenko was a scoundrel and a thief who, as legend has it, promised to surround the Donbass with barbed wire.

It also played a significant role that a significant part of the “ideological” Maidan activists considered themselves bearers of the “only true teaching” about the path of development of Ukraine and did not accept any alternatives, did not recognize the right to a different opinion from their “blue-white” opponents, regarding any attempts by the “orange” leaders to come to an agreement with the regionals.

The lack of ability to keep their word and make mutual concessions has become the calling card of Ukrainian politicians, which played a fatal role in the tragic events five years later.

At the end of 2008, Tymoshenko created a shaky alliance in parliament from BYuT, part of Our Ukraine and the Lytvyn bloc, thanks to which the Rada was saved from dissolution (which Yushchenko had already tried to do).

But at this time, political battles receded into the background. The main event was the global crisis. It began with the mortgage collapse in the United States and sharply worsened after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The government initially reacted blithely to the alarming news from overseas. But it soon turned out that Ukraine was being hit by an economic tsunami.

The crisis has destroyed almost all sources of growth that previously fueled the Ukrainian economy. In particular, prices for basic Ukrainian export goods began to collapse, and most importantly, the flow of Western loans to Ukrainian banks, which had previously covered the balance of payments deficit, stopped.

Hryvnia exchange rate in 2008

The hryvnia collapsed from 5 to 8 per dollar, the collapse of industry, the collapse of banks, and panic among the population began. There is no trace left of the illusion of “endless prosperity” and the consumer boom that gripped Ukrainians in previous years.

This had significant consequences. Ukraine entered a long period of stagnation (which turned into a collapse after the events of 2014). Dreams were crumbling, disappointment was growing.

Politically, the crisis dealt a colossal blow to Tymoshenko's prospects in the presidential election.

And before that, she had difficulty fulfilling most of her election promises (and immediately forgot about some), and after the crisis this became completely impossible.

Year nineteen. The Putin-Tymoshenko contract and elections

Ukraine welcomed the new year 2009 without gas. That is, it was still in storage, but there was no contract. Control of gas flows meant for Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko control of financial resources for the presidential campaign, and they raced to send emissaries to Vladimir Putin, trying to offer more favorable terms than their rival.

As a result, by January 1, no deal had been reached. Gazprom turned off the valve, and it became clear that there would not be enough gas for heating until the end of winter. And then Tymoshenko decided to take an extreme step: without a government decision, she went to Moscow and agreed on a contract that determined much in the fate of the country for the next five years.

The base gas price was unheard of - $450 per thousand cubic meters. But Tymoshenko received a discount for one year and, moreover, used 11 billion cubic meters of gas owned by RosUkrEnergo. This was enough for her to pass 2009 with an average price of $232. And I didn’t think what would happen then.

Russia received a very strong lever of pressure on Ukraine. Which she then took full advantage of.

Yushchenko harshly condemned the conclusion of the Tymoshenko-Putin contract and finally decided to bet on “drowning” Lady Yu and her prospects in the presidential elections.
Thus becoming an unspoken ally of Yanukovych.

Fortunately, Tymoshenko’s own rating was undermined by the economic crisis, the burden of unfulfilled promises, as well as constant scandals. Like the impending “shirk” between BYuT and the Party of Regions (which Viktor Yanukovych later publicly abandoned), the murder of a man by people’s deputy Lozinsky, the panic over bird flu and the pedophile scandal in Artek.

Despite this, Tymoshenko led a very competent and energetic election campaign, and at some point it began to seem that she had a chance of defeating Yanukovych. The oligarchs phlegmatically observed this process, placing their eggs in two baskets at once.

The main slogan of Tymoshenko’s campaign is Vona pratsyuє

Year twenty. Yanukovych - President

Already at the end of 2009, it became clear that Yanukovych’s rating was slipping and Tymoshenko was unlikely to be able to overcome it. Therefore, the results of the elections, in which Yanukovych won in the second round, were taken for granted by everyone, and Lady Yu’s attempts to challenge their results were unsuccessful.

Inauguration of Viktor Yanukovych

Although for some time it seemed that the country would have to watch a tense struggle between Yanukovych as president and Tymoshenko as prime minister.

But the Ukrainian elite and its representatives in parliament were so tired of political infighting and so exhausted by the crisis that they wanted speedy stabilization.

Therefore, dozens of deputies from BYuT and Our Ukraine immediately defected to the camp of the regionals. Together with the Lytvyn factions and the communists, the PR created a coalition, dismissing the Tymoshenko government and appointing Mykola Azarov in her place.

In the fall of the same year, having strengthened his own vertical of power, Yanukovych, through the Constitutional Court, restored the validity of the previous Constitution, returning to himself the powers of Leonid Kuchma.

The opposition then called it a usurpation of power, but Viktor Fedorovich was little concerned about this. He did the most important thing for himself - he took the government out of the control of parliament (and the representatives of the oligarchs sitting there).

This meant that the path was opened to getting rid of dependence on those people who helped him come to power.

It was from this moment that the countdown began for the internal crisis in Yanukovych’s team, which contributed to the Maidan victory in 2014.

But that was later. In the spring of 2010, urgent problems had to be solved. Throughout 2009, Tymoshenko’s government borrowed money at huge interest rates, which now is the time to repay. At the same time, the price of gas exceeded $300, sending the country’s balance of payments into deep negative territory. A new crisis was brewing.

However, Yanukovych, despite the doubts of many, managed to solve these problems.

On April 21, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed the Kharkov agreements - a $100 discount on gas in exchange for extending the stay of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042. This caused violent protests from the opposition, but they had no effect. The hole in the trade balance was plugged, the hryvnia was saved from falling.

Then cooperation with the IMF was resumed. Due to the received tranche and the restoration of economic growth, the government was able to repay most of Tymoshenko’s debts and itself began to actively borrow funds on the foreign market (through the placement of Eurobonds).

By the end of summer, it seemed that the country was returning to the good old days of Kuchma - multi-vector policy (we are friends with both the West and Russia), economic growth, political stability.

I was a little embarrassed by protests promoted with the support of the opposition, such as the “Tax Maidan” in November 2010, but they quickly fizzled out without any special consequences. Also, the authorities have not yet been threatened by vague rumors about rampant corruption, about the introduction of an “institution of watchers,” about a grandiose construction project in Mezhyhirya.

It seemed that nothing threatened stability. But this was a misleading impression.

Year twenty-one. Conviction of Tymoshenko, worsening relations with Russia and the West

Outwardly, 2011 was one of the calmest years in the history of independent Ukraine. The government was intensively preparing for Euro 2012, economic growth accelerated, wages gradually increased while the hryvnia exchange rate remained unchanged.

However, already this year the first signs of future problems sounded. First of all, relations with Russia worsened. The fact is that due to the rise in oil prices, the price of gas increased again to 300 dollars or more, neutralizing the positive effect of the Kharkov agreements.

Yanukovych appealed to the Russian leadership with a request to revise the generally enslaving formula for calculating gas prices in order to reduce its cost. But an answer came from Moscow: any new concessions will be possible only after Ukraine joins the Customs Union. This association of three countries - Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus - began operating in 2011 and became the first truly functioning integration project in the post-Soviet space.

The Russian Federation wanted to see Ukraine as part of it, and therefore used the “gas lever”.

However, Yanukovych and his entourage, who lived by the principle described above, “Texas should be robbed by Texans,” did not at all want to delegate part of their powers to some supranational bodies.

Moreover, when it came to customs flows, which were one of the main sources of shadow income for the authorities.

Negotiations on gas and other economic concessions to Ukraine from Russia have reached a dead end. The price of gas rose, pressure on the hryvnia exchange rate increased. The hole in the balance of payments began to be closed again through foreign loans.

At the same time, relations with the West began to deteriorate. Yanukovych was never liked there and was considered a suspicious type, prone to corruption and deals with Russia.

But since at first he pursued a fairly careful policy, actively negotiating the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU (including a free trade zone) that would be beneficial for Europeans, the West did not put much pressure on him. Although he continued to assist the opposition in the person of Yulia Tymoshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, because he did not want to create a situation where Yanukovych would remain an uncontested leader.

The authorities didn't like this. Moreover, the opposition was quite active, constantly trying to create some kind of unrest.

Therefore, from the end of 2010, a gradual tightening of the screws began. Yuriy Lutsenko was arrested and several cases were initiated against Yulia Tymoshenko.

After some time, one main thing was singled out from them - about the abuse of power in connection with the signing of a gas contract with Russia to the detriment of Ukraine. The main role was played by the relevance of this topic, taking into account the growing “gas” problems with the Russian Federation.

The trial of Yulia Tymoshenko

The trial of Tymoshenko started in June 2011. The judge was the famous ex-prime minister Rodion Kireev. Tymoshenko did not admit the accusation and mocked both the prosecutors and Kireev.

The West did not like this process from the very beginning, but since everyone expected that it would boil down, in the worst case, to a suspended sentence for Tymoshenko, they were not particularly worried about this.

However, in August, things unexpectedly took a tough turn. After another skirmish with Tymoshenko, Kireev decided to take her into custody. This came as a shock. Never before has a former prime minister been thrown into a Ukrainian prison.

And if the street unrest turned out to be surprisingly sluggish, the reaction of the West was extremely harsh. There they demanded the immediate release of Tymoshenko. And the real crisis erupted in October, when Kireev announced the sentence: seven years in prison.

The EU has stopped negotiations on the Association Agreement. The US threatened sanctions for the first time.

Yanukovych, out of habit, tried to play the Russian card by restoring relations with Moscow, but did not achieve much success. Russia set the same condition - the Customs Union.

Thus, by the end of 2011, Yanukovych faced the threat of a serious crisis. Moreover, it was largely due to changes in the geopolitical balance in Eastern Europe.

Thanks to rising oil prices, Russia quickly recovered from the consequences of the crisis. Its economy grew along with the standard of living of the population. At that time, the EU continued to be in a fever, and the Eastern European members of the European Union, with rare exceptions, plunged into long-term stagnation, surviving only by exporting labor.

Against this background, Russia felt the strength to create an association in the post-Soviet space, so that with more strong positions carry on a conversation with the West. And simply Ukraine’s neutrality (which Yanukovych was ready to guarantee) no longer suited her.

In turn, the attitude of Western countries towards Russia deteriorated greatly after the announcement of Putin’s nomination for the presidency in the 2012 elections. Previously, the US and EU hoped that Medvedev, who was more convenient for them, would remain president, but he chose to give way to GDP.

It has also raised the stakes on Ukraine, which is once again seen as a major prize in the geopolitical struggle for influence in Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the West increased pressure on Yanukovych, from whom he demanded to release Tymoshenko and not agree to join the Customs Union, but, on the contrary, to complete the work of signing the Association Agreement with the EU.

And if Yanukovych agreed to fulfill the second point, he did not want to retreat on the first. Apparently, believing that by removing Tymoshenko from the political arena, he will be able to breathe easy.

Economics, meanwhile, dictated the need to make final geopolitical choices. Hopes that long-term economic growth would resume after the crisis by the end of 2011 have faded. The economy grew, but not at a pace that would allow us to talk about a serious increase in living standards.

This was mainly due to the fact that after the crisis, one of the main sources of growth - the flow of cheap Western loans - never recovered. And without it, it was difficult to expect a resumption of the consumer boom. Growth was observed only in certain areas - agriculture, metallurgy, chemical industry, some branches of mechanical engineering.

The people are tired of waiting for the promised "reduction", especially against the backdrop of constant corruption scandals and rumors about the pace at which the Yanukovych Family, led by his son Alexander, is accumulating its wealth. The gap with Russia in living standards began to grow rapidly.

In order to give impetus to the development of the country, it was necessary to decide which source of financing to join - Russian or Western. But Yanukovych did not want to make this choice.

He wanted to get everything to the maximum, but not give anything in return - neither to Europe nor to Russia.

Year twenty two. European Football Championship

The entire first half of the year passed under the banner of Euro 2012. The European Football Championship has become the brightest and brightest event in the entire history of Ukraine. Despite a lot of problems during the preparation stage, the tournament itself was held almost perfectly.

This allowed the country to forget about existing problems for a while, giving in to the festive mood.

The atmosphere in Kyiv on the eve of the Euro 2012 final

But the holiday ended, and immediately after it the election campaign began. The Rada was elected. By that time, Yanukovych, for the reasons described above, had lost his rating, and the opposition, albeit without Tymoshenko, began to strengthen its position.

Basically, the population's claims (in all regions of the country) against Yanukovych were of a socio-economic nature. People were tired of waiting for their incomes to start growing again; everyone was outraged by the indecent luxury of Yanukovych’s life, total and systemic corruption, and the widespread squeeze-out of business by the Family and other people close to the president.

In terms of humanitarian policy, Yanukovych, unlike Yushchenko, behaved very carefully. He tried not to disturb society with topics dividing the country, and even decided to adopt the law on giving the Russian language official status in Russian-speaking regions (one of the main election promises) only on the eve of the start of the election campaign in the Rada.

Although the law was quite mild and in no way infringed on the rights of the Ukrainian-speaking population, its adoption led to violent protests by the opposition, which decided to raise nationalist slogans to mobilize its electorate in the elections.

In such conditions, the elections did not end very well for the Party of Regions. The opposition, according to the party lists, gained the majority of votes, entering the Rada in three columns consisting of “Batkivshchyna” (in the absence of Tymoshenko, it was led by Yatsenyuk), Klitschko’s UDAR and Tyagnibok’s “Svoboda”. The appearance of the last party in parliament was a complete surprise, especially with a result of more than 10%. They said that she was specifically given the green light by the regionals in order to promote the project of entering the second round of the presidential election against Yanukovych Oleg Tyagnibok.

Opinion polls showed that this was the only candidate that Yanukovych could defeat. But, nevertheless, the very fact of this force entering parliament greatly radicalized the atmosphere in the country.

Xenophobia, provocations on ethnic grounds, readiness for violence, and intolerance towards other people's opinions have entered political life. Soon all this will play a role during the events on the Maidan.

The regions still managed to create a majority thanks to majoritarian deputies. The President changed the Cabinet of Ministers. The prime minister remained the same - Mykola Azarov. But the composition of the government has changed fundamentally. The old guard of the Party of Regions, associated with the country's largest financial and industrial groups, was pushed into the shadows.

And representatives of the so-called Family took the first roles: Sergei Arbuzov was appointed first deputy prime minister, the Ministry of Revenue and Duties was given to Alexander Klimenko, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy - to Eduard Stavitsky.

It became clear that Yanukovych intends to seriously limit the political and economic influence of those people who brought him to power, relying on the creation of his own financial and industrial group.

Including by reducing the “hunting field” for other players. The situation became increasingly tense.

Year twenty-three. The beginning of Maidan

The end of 2012 was marked by a strange story with Yanukovych’s visit to Moscow canceled at the last moment. According to the version spread in the media, the President of Ukraine wanted to finally shake hands with Putin and, in exchange for a discount on gas and financial support, agree to move towards the Customs Union.

However, this plan was allegedly interrupted by representatives of the European Commission, who called Yanukovych and promised him full support if he signed the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.

It is difficult to say how much one can trust this version.

But the fact remains: since the beginning of 2013, the previously almost frozen process of preparation for signing the Agreement suddenly intensified.

At the same time, Yanukovych’s contacts with the Russian side have decreased. Already in the summer it became clear that Ukraine and the EU were close to concluding an Agreement.

Why did the Europeans need this - the answer is obvious. In addition to the economic benefits from the free trade zone (its terms were more loyal to the EU than to Ukraine), the issue of victory in the geopolitical rivalry with Russia was also at stake. After the conclusion of the Agreement, the path to the Customs Union would be closed for Ukraine.

It is still less clear why Yanukovych needed this.

According to one version, in the package with the Agreement, the West unofficially promised the president large-scale financial support, with the help of which Yanukovych hoped to shower voters with “golden loaves” and win the elections.

According to another version, Yanukovych initially did not intend to conclude the Agreement, but wanted to blackmail Russia with it, extracting concessions from it.

One way or another, the Russian Federation’s reaction to the prospect of signing the document turned out to be extremely harsh.

For several days in August, the Russian Federation introduced a new regime for the passage of Ukrainian goods through customs, which virtually paralyzed all Ukrainian exports to Russia. In comments, Russian officials said that this is exactly what the regime will be like if Ukraine signs the Association Agreement.

Russia also made it clear that it would leave the free trade zone with Ukraine. This caused a shock among Yanukovych’s entourage, but they decided not to slow down the launched mechanism for signing the Agreement.

In the fall, an all-out propaganda campaign by the authorities in support of the Association began. Propaganda portrayed it as almost a panacea for solving all Ukrainian problems, creating clearly inflated expectations among citizens.

But another process was going on in parallel. When the Ukrainian authorities decided to probe the West about what kind of assistance it was willing to provide to Ukraine to compensate for losses from the loss of the Russian market and to transfer the Ukrainian economy to European standards, no intelligible answer was received.

It was only said that the IMF could help with loans. True, the latter has already set his own conditions - to freeze wages, increase gas and utility tariffs, and let the hryvnia float freely.

Meanwhile, economists and industrialists, who have finally read the Agreement itself, increasingly began to say that it is unprofitable for Ukraine.

Against such a sad background, Yanukovych resumed contacts with Putin. Several meetings took place, after which the tone of statements by Ukrainian government officials suddenly began to change sharply. They suddenly noticed the shortcomings of the Agreement and loudly asked the Europeans if they would give billions of dollars to compensate for the losses.

In mid-November, the first information leaks occurred that Putin had agreed with Yanukovych that he would give a discount on gas, provide a large loan and at the same time remove the condition for Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union! All this is “just” for refusing the Agreement with the EU.

On November 21, Mykola Azarov announced the suspension of preparations for signing the Agreement with the EU. Almost a month later, in the Kremlin, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on gas for $268, a loan of $15 billion.

Yanukovych could consider himself a brilliant strategist. He achieved everything he wanted. Russia made colossal concessions, and at the same time the Ukrainian government did not give up one iota of sovereignty. The question of joining the Customs Union has been removed.

Ukraine now has cheap gas, a colossal financial resource that could be used in the pre-election year to increase salaries and pensions (without raising the cost of utilities).

Yanukovych could indeed be celebrating a triumphant geopolitical victory. If not for one thing - Maidan...

The opposition, inspired by its success in the elections, began to promote rally activity from the beginning of 2013, launching the “Rise up, Ukraine!” campaign in the cities of Ukraine. The rallies were not numerous, but created a feeling of the constant presence of the opposition in the information field.

The oppositionists tried to work out every high-profile case in the country to the maximum (a typical example is Vradievka).

Preparing for decisive battle was in full swing, but many thought that it would begin no earlier than the calendar date of the elections - in March 2015. Moreover, during the negotiations on association with the EU, the opposition slowed down and practically did not touch the government.

But the country’s unexpected refusal to sign the Agreement gave the opposition an unexpected trump card. A huge number of people, under the influence of the very pro-government propaganda, were waiting for this Agreement, and then it suddenly turned out that it was being cancelled, and without much explanation.

This caused strong discontent, superimposed on all past complaints against Yanukovych - corruption, poverty, squeeze out of business.

Already on the evening of November 21, people came to the Maidan following the call of journalist Mustafa Nayem, distributed through social networks on the Internet. Soon the actions became widespread.

On November 29, Yanukovych went to Vilnius for the EU summit, where the Association Agreement was to be ratified, and publicly refused to do so. Protesters immediately branded the president, saying that he had sold out to Moscow and wanted to turn the country into a Russian colony.

On the night of November 30, Berkut forcibly dispersed the Maidan participants, which caused mass outrage. Together with extreme irritation due to the refusal to sign the Agreement, it led to a huge protest on December 1st.

Then, behind the scenes (and some openly), many large entrepreneurs and oligarchs went over to the side of the protesters, which immediately became evident from the picture shown by the largest TV channels that was loyal to the Maidan. Yanukovych and his Family had already “fed up” quite a few influential people and they decided that the time had come to get even with him.

Mass action on Maidan

But already on December 1, the action turned into violence - the radicals stormed the Presidential Administration. The attack was repulsed. Many were detained. Many were beaten. Opposition leaders and Petro Poroshenko personally called the stormers provocateurs.

Although, as the radicals themselves later stated, their attack was coordinated with the leadership of the opposition parties. But when it became clear that it was not possible to take the AP by storm, politicians hastened to disown the action.

All this gave rise to bad feelings that the protest would not end peacefully this time.

In December, power, contrary to forecasts, remained in power. The outbreak of violence on December 1 spooked the oligarchs around Yanukovych, and Russia's discount on gas and a huge loan instilled temporary confidence that the economy would be fine.

The Maidan entered a sluggish stage and by the New Year, even among its activists, there were growing predictions that it would soon fade away.

Year twenty-four. Victory of Maidan and war

Events reached a new level in January 2014. The day before, parliament passed and the president signed so-called “dictatorial” laws designed to bring participants in protests under articles of the Criminal Code.

On Epiphany Sunday, January 19, radicals from the then little-known Right Sector attacked the positions of internal troops on Grushevsky Street. Street fighting broke out. Opposition leaders feared that Yanukovych would use this as a pretext to clean up the Maidan, and therefore again declared the radicals provocateurs.

Clashes on Grushevsky Street in January 2014

Vitali Klitschko, who persuaded the radicals not to attack the Internal Troops on Grushevsky, was doused with a fire extinguisher

But time passed, the president did not give the order to clean up. And gradually the opposition leaders switched to supporting radical actions.

On January 22, under strange circumstances, three people were killed in Grushevsky. The protesters immediately blamed the authorities for this.

Demoralized by the loss of life, Yanukovych entered into negotiations with opposition leaders.
The next day, the seizure of regional administrations began in all regional centers of Western and - partially - Central Ukraine. Feeling that the president had given up, large businesses openly began to side with the opposition, and a split began even within the Party of Regions faction.

Confrontation grew in general and in society, which was increasingly divided into “us” and “strangers.” Directly opposite pantheons of enemies and heroes were created.

If for Maidan and its supporters the “Berkutovites” were fiends of hell, then for many in the southeast they were heroes fighting against the “Nazis”.

Yanukovych tried to find the possibility of a compromise, persuaded Prime Minister Azarov to resign and even offered the post of head of government to Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Western diplomats joined the negotiations.

And by mid-February it began to seem that a compromise was about to be found, as had happened more than once in the past.

But all hopes were dashed on February 18, when the situation escalated to the limit. The Maidan self-defense tried to break through to the Verkhovna Rada, but the attack was repulsed by Berkut, which, together with the titushki, went on the offensive and captured a significant part of the Maidan. To prevent his further advance, the protesters set their tires on fire.

Everyone expected the final cleanup, but no order came. Instead, Yanukovych entered into negotiations with the opposition, and on February 20, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland were supposed to fly to Kyiv.

But on the morning of this day, bloody events began. Shooting was opened at the Berkut officers and explosives from the protesters' positions. Some dead and wounded appeared among the security forces, after which government troops hastily retreated. The Maidanovites rushed after them, who were met with fire at Institutskaya, and several dozen people were killed.

It is still not clear who shot. Now the Berkut fighters are officially accused of this (they can be seen in numerous videos with weapons and yellow bandages). But they deny shooting at the protesters, saying that the lethal fire was carried out by certain provocateurs.

Massacres played a fatal role. Even before that, finding a compromise was extremely difficult. Too much hatred has accumulated between the opposing sides, external players have too much between their teeth.

After dozens of deaths on the Maidan, the situation worsened sharply.

Although Yanukovych and the opposition leaders signed a certain document on February 21 through the mediation of the heads of the Foreign Ministries of Germany, France and Poland.

Formally, he was the very Great Compromise that could save the country from sliding into war. It provided for a return to the 2004 Constitution (to a parliamentary republic) and holding presidential elections in the fall of 2014. Until then, Yanukovych was supposed to remain the head of state.

This was similar to the compromise agreements that Ukrainian politicians had concluded in previous years. This is exactly how the Western partners apparently perceived this document. Victoria Syumar recalled the words that Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski told the opposition on February 21: “If you don’t sign this agreement, there will be war.”

However, the compromise was only in form, but not in essence. The agreement included a clause on the withdrawal of government troops from the center of Kyiv. After that, the only organized and already armed force in the capital remained the Maidan. From the podium, centurion Parasyuk said that the protesters do not recognize any compromises and Yanukovych must be overthrown.

The President panicked. Realizing that if something happened, there would be no one to protect him, he urgently left for Kharkov, where a congress of south-eastern regions was to meet on February 22.

According to some reports, there he planned to announce the transfer of the center of power to Kharkov, including the Cabinet of Ministers and the State Treasury (that is, taxes would be paid from the entire country to Kharkov, and not to Kyiv).

However, he did not find understanding among any of his close associates. Kernes and Dobkin, as well as Akhmetov’s people, refused to support this idea. Even the regionals close to Yanukovych were tired of his throwing around and were already preparing to negotiate with the new government.

The congress on February 22 ended in nothing; Yanukovych did not appear. But he recorded a video message in which he accused the Maidanists of not fulfilling their part of the agreement.

At this time, the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv actually took power into its own hands. A new speaker was appointed - Alexander Turchinov. The new head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is Arsen Avakov.

But the key decision that parliament made that day was to deprive Yanukovych of his presidential powers in connection with his self-removal from his duties. There is no such wording in the Constitution. Therefore, this decision was a direct violation of the agreements of February 21.

However, the West did not pay any attention to this, recognizing in fact the changes that had taken place.

Yanukovych did not resist. Faced with the reluctance of his comrades to fight for him, he simply fled to Crimea with the help of the Russian military. And from there he was transported to the Russian Federation.

On February 23, Alexander Efremov made a statement on behalf of the Party of Regions, in which he accused Yanukovych of betrayal. Regionalists and oligarchs were already racing to negotiate with the new government.

For the first time in the history of Ukraine, a situation arose when a change of power occurred not through a preliminary compromise, but through the destruction of one part of the country by another. In another part, after Yanukovych’s flight and the capitulation of the Party of Regions, there was no organized force left that would represent the interests of millions of people dissatisfied with the Maidan and his victory.

And this circumstance had a fatal impact on the entire course of subsequent events.

Who knows, if the regionals had not been so cowardly, if they had turned the Kharkov congress into a new headquarters for the organization of forces opposing the Maidan without Yanukovych, then perhaps there would have been no annexation of Crimea, no separatism, no war.

The West, if it saw the presence of resistance, would not recognize Turchinov as acting. President, would have forced the Maidanites to compromise, preventing the subsequent catastrophe with the loss of Crimea and the massacre in Donbass. But history, as we know, does not know the subjunctive mood.

The Party of Regions withdrew from the political scene.

In its place came a new government - those people who stood on the Maidan. Their core consisted of a contingent from the flesh of the previous system. Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, Martynenko, Avakov and most of the other Maidan leaders differed little in their moral and ethical political characteristics from Yanukovych and his entourage. They also came to power mainly to solve their business issues and to control the flow of corruption.

But there was one significant difference. Having come to power on the blood of people who died on the Maidan, and having received a shattered vertical of power, with the state losing its monopoly on violence, they found themselves dependent on the “collective political consciousness"Maidan, which was broadcast through hundreds and thousands of activists who have influence on tens and hundreds of thousands of people.

And this “collective consciousness” has long ago developed a common vision of the situation in the country.

He perceived the compromises of the past not as saving steps that preserved the state, but as acts of cowardice and betrayal that hindered the country’s movement into a bright future.

A bright future was seen as joining the EU and NATO, moving away from Russia at any cost. People who did not support Maidan were perceived not as compatriots with a different point of view on political issues, but as “sub-Ukrainians” whose opinion should not be taken into account.

Those who actively resisted the Maidan were considered enemies of the people, against whom it was not a sin to apply measures of any degree of severity.

Ukrainians must become a unified nation with one language and one idea of ​​the past and future. There were differences in methods - how and how quickly this should be achieved, but no one questioned the strategic goal.

It was considered correct to impose one’s vision of Ukraine’s development path on the entire country and force it to follow it at any cost.

In the first days after Yanukovych’s flight, it seemed that the advance of the Maidan would not meet resistance. But this impression turned out to be deceptive.

The place of the disappeared Party of Regions as a guide for Ukrainians dissatisfied with the change of power was taken by Russia and the structures it controls. The removal of Yanukovych, contrary to the agreements concluded on February 21, was perceived extremely painfully by Russia.

Moscow considered this a blatant treachery on the part of the West, which undermined the authority of the Kremlin - they say, it turns out that right under the nose of the Russian Federation its allies are being overthrown, and it cannot do anything about it.

From the point of view of the Russian Federation, such treachery required a response. And he followed immediately.

On February 23, mass protests began in Sevastopol. In their wake, a group of pro-Russian activists led by famous businessman and philanthropist Alexei Chaly took power in the city. The police, Berkut and most local officials went over to their side.

This became a signal for Russia to act.

Pro-Russian forces were activated in Simferopol with the aim of raising the local Supreme Council to revolt against Kyiv. However, on their own they could not achieve the goal - the deputies were afraid to speak out openly against the central government. In addition, they encountered organized resistance Crimean Tatars.

Therefore, on February 27, Russia had to intervene openly - its special forces (according to other sources - fighters of the Wagner PMC) captured the Supreme Council. Only after this did the deputies find the courage to gather, elect Russian Unity leader Sergei Aksenov as prime minister and announce a referendum on expanding the rights of autonomy. Aksenov and Speaker of Parliament Konstantinov stated that they recognize Viktor Yanukovych as the legitimate president.

The next day, Russian troops, unmarked and wearing balaclavas, took control of all key facilities on the peninsula and blocked Ukrainian military units. And a week later, the new Crimean authorities announced a referendum on joining Russia.

"Little green men" in Crimea

On March 1, the Federation Council gave Putin consent to send troops into Ukraine, and pro-Russian speeches spread throughout big cities in the southeast.

Since the regionals withdrew from active politics, various marginal pro-Russian organizations took on a key role in the organization, supported financially from Moscow.

That is why, despite the widespread anti-Maidan sentiment in the southeast, the protests there were chaotic and poorly understood. Moreover, against the backdrop of the events in Crimea, they immediately took on a separatist character (“we also want to go to Russia!”), thereby removing themselves from the legal field of Ukraine.

Russian curators tried to give them the form of a “struggle for federalization,” but this turned out badly, because people came out to rallies for “it would be like in Crimea,” “for joining Russia.” For pro-Russian residents of the southeast, this seemed like a simple and understandable way to solve all problems at once.

Probably, in Moscow there was an idea that it was necessary to create a new movement, instead of the Party of Regions, which would set conditions for the central government and force it to compromise, but this did not work out.

Firstly, the mentioned Crimea factor had a powerful influence. And not only in the sense that he set a separatist vector in protests in one way or another, but also in the fact that from now on any anti-Maidan protests were interpreted by the Ukrainian authorities unambiguously as separatist and treasonous. What kind of dialogue can you have with them?

Secondly, the Russian curators simply did not have the ability and managerial skills to build some kind of single line with a single leader who could become the personification of the protest movement and who, theoretically, could impose a dialogue on Kyiv and the West. The bet was placed on very insignificant individuals, with whom no one even at the level of their regions wanted to deal.

This was also compounded by the emerging disagreements over the Ukrainian issue in the Kremlin. There, judging by media reports, there was an influential group of people who convinced Putin to limit himself to Crimea and leave the rest of Ukraine alone.

At the same time, the group of the “Orthodox oligarch” Malofeev, with the support of Aksenov and some representatives of the Russian special services, insisted on spreading the “Russian Spring” to the entire southeast.

Taken together, this led to the fact that by the beginning of May, pro-Russian protests in all regions of Ukraine, except Donbass, had come to naught.

The Ukrainian authorities easily defeated them. True, they had to make several concessions. Thus, the law on languages ​​was not repealed (although the Rada voted for this on one of the first days after the Maidan), non-aggression agreements were concluded with local elites in the regions of the southeast.

Dobkin and Kernes remained in Kharkov, Akhmetov established close communication with Yatsenyuk and installed Taruta, who was close to him, as governor of the Donetsk region. No one organized a purge of the “family overseer” of the Odessa region, Avramenko. Finally, the Dnepropetrovsk region was headed by Igor Kolomoisky, who with his team (Gennady Korban and others) turned Dnepropetrovsk into a center of resistance to the “Russian Spring”.

However, if the authorities made concessions, they were only superficial.

In strategic terms - cooperation with the IMF and a course towards the West (EU and NATO), suppression of any attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the Maidan and hint at federalization or the need for dialogue with Russia - nothing has changed. Fortunately, the annexation of Crimea provided justification for such a policy.

Back in early April, Kiev announced the collapse of the “Russian spring.” And it seemed that everything was heading towards this. But then Donbass exploded...

There were three factors that distinguished the situation in this region from other areas of the southeast.
Firstly, anti-government sentiment was especially strong here. Moreover, initially they were not so much pro-Russian as anti-Maidan and regional-autonomist (“Nobody brought Donbass to its knees”).

Secondly, if in other regions almost all influential people swore allegiance new government, then in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions the situation was different. Part of the elite, led by Akhmetov, agreed to cooperate with Kiev. But the other part, associated with the fugitive President Yanukovych and his associates, decided to resist. And there were quite a few of their proteges in government and law enforcement agencies at all levels.

Thirdly, Donbass became the only region where a significant part of the security forces refused to carry out Kyiv’s order to purge pro-Russian forces, and as soon as clashes began, they openly went over to their side.

We are talking about the commander of the Donetsk "Alpha" Khodakovsky and the former "Berkut".

Akhmetov, who together with his associates took control of the Party of Regions after Yanukovych fled, was the first to sound the alarm, anticipating the threat of losing control over Donbass.

Back at the end of March, his people (Boris Kolesnikov, Nikolai Levchenko) raised the issue of the need to expand the rights of the regions and the transfer of part of the powers from the center to the localities. Lugansk elites made similar statements. Thus, the regionals hoped to intercept the autonomist and, in part, anti-Maidan agenda from the pro-Russian forces.

As of the end of March and beginning of April, this plan could still work and, due to relatively small concessions (“small compromise”) on the part of the central government, bring down the separatist wave in the Donbass.

But these proposals met with deep misunderstanding in Kyiv. They believed that the “Russian spring” was on the decline, and therefore there was no need to make any concessions. Anyone who offered them was immediately labeled a traitor and separatist.

Further events were not long in coming. On April 7, pro-Russian figures proclaimed the Donetsk and Kharkov “people’s republics.” "KhNR" existed for less than one day - the regional administration building they captured was cleared by special forces.

In Donetsk everything was more complicated. Local “Alpha” refused to carry out the order to clear the area and, at a meeting of security forces with the participation of Deputy Prime Minister Yarema, made it clear that if someone tries to take the Donetsk Regional State Administration by force, the local security forces will defend it.

Rinat Akhmetov also opposed the assault, fearing that the situation would then get completely out of control. He, along with Nikolai Levchenko, came to the square in front of the Donetsk Regional State Administration and tried to convince the protesters to take the action into a legal direction, to remove the demands for the separation of Donbass from Ukraine, promising to prevent harsh actions by the security forces.

The assault was postponed, Yarema left for Kyiv.

And on April 12, a detachment of members of the “Crimean self-defense” led by the former head of Malofeev’s security service, Igor Strelkov-Girkin, captured Slavyansk.

Girkin in Slavyansk

Akhmetov and the regionals once again turned to Kyiv with a proposal to urgently expand the rights of Donbass in order to stop the conflict in the bud. But the answer was the decision to launch an Anti-Terrorist Operation.

For many in Kyiv, Strelkov’s raid was a real gift. They had long been waiting for a reason to rehabilitate themselves for the shameful surrender of Crimea and wanted to “give battle to Russia” at least somewhere, and at the same time harshly clean up the “anti-Maidan”.

The capture of Slavyansk (officially it was interpreted by Ukraine as an invasion of Donbass by Russian troops) provided an excellent reason for this. The country began to slide towards war.

Subsequently, judging by unofficial leaks in the media, the Kremlin said that Strelkov’s forced march was Malofeev’s initiative, not coordinated with anyone and drawing Russia into the conflict in Donbass against its will. Although this is hard to believe. Especially considering the powerful information support provided to the Strelkovites by state Russian television channels.

Rather, it can be assumed that Russia, perhaps not seeking a large-scale war in the Donbass, nevertheless decided to radicalize the situation in order to still force Kyiv and the West to make concessions and force them to compromise. In particular, to agree on the neutral status of Ukraine and on autonomy for a number of Ukrainian regions, leaving the issue of Crimea out of the equation.

And indeed, five days after the capture of Slavyansk, an international group consisting of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the USA, the EU and the OSCE met for the first time in Geneva, at which the first “peace plan” to resolve the situation in Ukraine was spelled out. It carried traces of that same Great Compromise - it stipulated, in particular, the expansion of the rights of the regions.

However, everything as a whole was formulated very vaguely, and sharply contrasted with the mood in Kyiv. There, on the contrary, the aggravation in Donbass was used as proof of Russia’s treachery and the impossibility of making any compromises (“With whom? With terrorists seizing cities and killing Ukrainians?”).

The West, after Crimea, saw no reason to put pressure on Ukraine to force it to make any concessions to Moscow.

The conflict continued to develop according to its own laws. Since the 20th of April, fighting in Donbass has become regular. A significant part of the region was already controlled by the separatists.

On May 11, the so-called “referendum” on the independence of the “DPR” and “LPR” was held. After him, the “DPR government” was formed, headed by political strategist and Russian citizen Boroday (a person close to Malofeev), which gave Ukraine even more reasons to talk about Russian aggression.

The Ukrainian authorities brought large military units to the Donbass, and battles broke out, with varying degrees of success for both sides. The losses grew, the bitterness grew. Volunteers from all over Ukraine and Russia went to Donbass. The flywheel of war was spinning ever stronger.

Ukrainian military in the ATO zone

In such conditions, presidential elections were held on May 25, in which Petro Poroshenko won in the first round. Many were surprised that Russia did not ignore this fact, but, on the contrary, recognized it. Ambassador Zurabov (an old acquaintance of Poroshenko) returned to Kyiv and there were persistent rumors that a Great Compromise was about to be concluded, which would end the war in Donbass.

Allegedly, even before his election, Poroshenko promised the Kremlin that he would put the Crimea issue out of the equation and give Donbass some kind of special status. And in response, Russia will recall Strelkov and Co. from there.

Immediately after Poroshenko’s inauguration, these rumors seemed to begin to come true. The president announced a truce and then met with Putin, Merkel and Hollande in Normandy (hence the expression “Normandy Four”).

Poroshenko even appointed a special representative for settlement issues in Donbass - Leonid Kuchma. Soon, he, together with Viktor Medvedchuk, Nestor Shufrich, Russian Ambassador Zurabov and OSCE representatives, went to Donetsk, where he met with Borodai and other representatives of the “DPR”.

Leaks of information from the negotiating group indicated that the issue of some kind of autonomy for Donbass and a ceasefire were being discussed. Then the chances of this were, of course, lower than in March, but they still existed.

At least in all the cities of Donbass occupied by the separatists, dual power was maintained. In fact, the previous management structures were in effect, the police were subordinate to Ukraine. But at the same time, indignation at these negotiations grew in Kyiv. There were rallies of volunteer battalions, at which Poroshenko was demanded to fight to the bitter end.

The President hesitated for a long time, but in the end decided to go to war. On the night of July 1, he gave the order to end the truce and begin the offensive. At the ATO headquarters, as Strana already wrote, they proceeded from the fact that the separatists were poorly trained gangs, and Russia would not dare to intervene.

What happens next is well known.

After the successes of July (the north of the Donetsk region and the west of Lugansk were liberated), a series of defeats began. With the active participation of Russian troops, the separatists defeated Ukrainian units on the border with Russia. Then battalion-tactical groups of the Russian Army entered the Donbass and hit the rear of the ATO forces group advancing on Ilovaisk. Ukrainian troops fell into a cauldron, suffered heavy losses, a significant part of the equipment was destroyed, and the entire southern flank of the Ukrainian troops collapsed.

Stunned by this turn of events, Poroshenko agreed to a truce.

On September 5, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Minsk, as well as a peaceful settlement of the situation in Donbass. It contained the same special status, local elections and amnesty. The situation seems to have returned to the state it was on July 1, 2014.

At first it seemed that there was a chance for the agreements to be implemented.

At least the Ukrainian leadership has begun to do its part in a disciplined manner. Thus, the president and then-speaker Turchynov pushed through parliament a law on a special status for Donbass with the argument “otherwise there will be a war, and we have no one to fight after Ilovaisk.”

Judging by friendly dialogue Governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region Kolomoisky with a Russian prankster who introduced himself as Pavel Gubarev, the Ukrainian elite really was in the mood for a compromise in September 2014.

The moral and military-political consequences of Ilovaisk were still strong. And the West, frightened by the prospect of a military defeat of its Ukrainian allies, demanded the implementation of the “Minsk road map.”

But since October the situation began to change. The threat of repeated military defeat has receded. The holes at the front were patched with new units. Oil prices were falling, and Russia clearly had no time for a war with Ukraine. Fighting began for the Donetsk airport. The image of cyborgs protecting him became for Ukrainian society a moral compensation for Ilovaisk, and the sentiment “we need peace at any cost” began to weaken.

But the main thing is that in the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Popular Front, which positioned itself as a “war party,” unexpectedly won many votes. The Rada also included many representatives of volunteer battalions and people with radical views. The general mood of the deputy corps has become quite unambiguous: “no compromises with Russia and separatist terrorists.”

In such a situation, Poroshenko, even if he was initially inclined to implement the political part of Minsk, could not follow this path, as he risked running into accusations of betrayal.

Let us note that Russia did not contribute to the mood for compromise. In November, it held “elections” of the heads of the “DPR/LPR,” which were not provided for by the Minsk agreements, which gave Kyiv a reason to accuse Moscow of completely ignoring them.

By December 2014, the Minsk compromise died without beginning to be implemented.

Since the new year, fighting has resumed in Donbass. The initiators this time were the separatists. Russia did not like that Ukraine was ignoring the agreements, and therefore it wanted to force Kyiv to sit down at the negotiating table again.

Fights, unlike 2014, wore local character- Donetsk airport and Debaltsevo. But the shelling continued along the entire front line, leading to numerous casualties among civilians ( famous examples- Volnovakha and Mariupol).

In military terms, events unfolded unsuccessfully for the Ukrainian side. Control over the Donetsk airport was lost. In February, with the support of the Russians, the city of Debaltsevo was taken into the cauldron, from which with heavy losses, and abandoned military equipment, the troops had to be withdrawn.

Against this background, new negotiations started in Minsk with the participation of Merkel, Hollande, Putin and Poroshenko. But there was an important difference from the situation on the eve of the first Minsk negotiations. Then before Ukrainian army there was a prospect of defeat, and therefore Kyiv had a motive to speed up peace negotiations in order to avoid this defeat.

In February 2015, despite heavy losses, there was no prospect of defeat. It was clear that, apart from Debaltsevo, the separatists would hardly have been able to win new victories. Unless, perhaps, if large-scale support is provided to Russian troops, which was no longer believed in Kyiv.

Therefore, Poroshenko was seated at the negotiating table in Minsk by the leaders of the West, who by that time were determined to make peace with Moscow.

Negotiations in Minsk in February 2015. Photo: sputniknews.com

It was for their sake (or rather, for the sake of receiving financial assistance from the IMF, which for a country where the hryvnia exchange rate exceeded 30 was critically important at that moment) that the president signed the second Minsk agreements. They worsened the negotiating position for the Ukrainian authorities. It described more specifically the logistics of the reconciliation process.

In particular, it was written that the transfer of control over the border to Ukraine would begin after local elections and would end only after changes to the Constitution came into force. That is, the political process was put in first place before the transfer of control over the border to Ukraine.

That is why, literally from the very first days, the Ukrainian authorities began to sabotage the implementation of the political part.

First of all, because they didn’t see any point in it. Poroshenko and his allies from the Popular Front were quite content with maintaining the status quo. When active hostilities (which could lead to new defeats and large losses) are not carried out, but local battles continue (and they can be constantly talked about in the media, mobilizing the people against the aggressor country and recording all their political opponents as agents of the Kremlin ).

Around the demarcation line, its own corruption infrastructure for smuggling and control of commodity flows developed, from which the entire power vertical was fed.

The billions of dollars allocated for the war were also used by structures close to the authorities.

In general, the ruling elite had no reason to stop this celebration of life of their own free will.

However, there were two factors that for some time forced the government to move towards a political settlement.

Firstly, this is Western pressure. Ukraine assumed international obligations within the framework of the Minsk agreements; they were tied to a large complex of relations between the EU and the United States with Russia, and therefore Western partners believed that Kyiv should still follow the path of implementing Minsk-2. Mainly - to prevent the threat of a new war.

Secondly, a significant part of Ukrainian big business was in favor of speedy pacification in the east and normalization of relations with Russia. Moreover, it is not only associated with the Opposition Bloc, but also oriented towards Poroshenko. While the war is going on and the issue of borders and relations with its largest neighbor has not been fully resolved, naturally, one should not count on an influx of investment and an increase in the capitalization of one’s own assets.

The lack of credit resources bled Ukrainian business dry and made the country increasingly dependent on Western support. The national capital was determined to return to multi-vector development. Cautious thoughts on this matter were expressed at the end of 2016, but were in the air much earlier.

Throughout 2015 and 2016, consultations continued between the Russian, Ukrainian and Western sides, during which a preliminary scheme was even developed. After local elections, the former elite (Akhmetov and representatives of the Opposition Bloc) returns to power in Donbass, the region receives a special status, and the border is transferred under the control of Ukraine. Russia is leaving there.

However, this plan caused severe rejection by the “war party” in Kyiv. In addition, the separatists and their curators in Moscow were dissatisfied with him. They did not want to lose power in their “republics”.

Therefore, through joint efforts, they did everything to ensure that this plan remained only on paper.

On August 31, 2015, when parliament was adopting amendments to the Constitution on special status in the first reading, clashes occurred near the Verkhovna Rada. Opponents of the changes threw a grenade at the National Guard. Several people died.

Representatives of the authorities began to express fears that pushing the topic of the “special status of Donbass” could lead to mass unrest (especially since the radicals constantly threatened this).

At the beginning of 2016, when the time came to adopt changes to the Constitution in the second reading, the Popular Front came out sharply against it, without which there would hardly have been any votes.

The issue was shelved.

Throughout 2016, sluggish negotiations took place on how to implement Minsk-2. The West demanded that Ukraine fulfill the political part of the agreements, but at the same time the position of the Ukrainian authorities became tougher - they insisted: first control over the border and only then elections.

And for starters, a complete ceasefire (which was impossible to achieve).

After Trump won the election, many believed that now there would finally be a breakthrough in relations. But this also turned out to be an illusion. The American establishment has tied American President hand and foot in relations with Russia, and therefore no global changes are taking place.

In the Donbass itself, meanwhile, the base for the Great Compromise was gradually destroyed by the efforts of both sides.

This process accelerated sharply after the blockade of uncontrolled territories. The blockade was initiated by Ukrainian radicals, but the separatists clearly played along with them, squeezing out the enterprises of Ukrainian owners under this pretext.

The basis for compromise was also destroyed by the humanitarian policy of the Ukrainian authorities. After a tactical retreat in the spring of 2014, massive Ukrainization began in 2016. The process of decommunization was launched, cities were renamed without the consent of their residents.

People with a different point of view are actively hinted that it is better for them to leave Ukraine or accept a new concept.

In general, everything is being done to show that there will be no compromise. The question is closed. Ukraine will be a single country, with common ideas about the past and future.

At least, that’s what the ideologists of the current government think. What will it really be like?

Three scenarios for Ukraine

The current situation is clearly transitional. Its meaning is that the former class that has ruled Ukraine since the time of Kuchma - the class of national capital and the associated politicians and bureaucrats - wants to continue to live by the principle “Texas should be robbed by Texans.” That is, do not allow competitors from either the East or the West to reach the commanding heights.

Let us note that it is much more difficult to pursue such a policy now than during the multi-vector times of Kuchma and Yanukovych.

The eastern vector is broken, relations with Russia, if not completely terminated, have become semi-legal and can no longer be relied upon to prevent the increase in Western influence.

Dependence on the latter has increased dramatically. And financial, and military-political, and personal. With one call from Washington, Panama can seize Poroshenko’s offshore companies, turning him from a billionaire into a pauper. Moreover, a beggar who, unlike Yanukovych, has nowhere to run.

The same can be said about most other representatives of the current elite. The nullification of the Russian vector made them completely dependent on relations with the West.

True, the current Ukrainian elite, led by Poroshenko, has shown considerable ingenuity and resourcefulness in order to continue to follow the “Texas” principle, even with mere meager things on their hands.

Two factors contribute to this.

The first is quite low commercial interest transnational corporations to Ukraine. Yes, our country is interesting to them as a sales market. We have assets that can be taken under control (land, energy and transport infrastructure, mining). But all this does not promise such a big profit that someone in the West would decide to make real efforts to clear the political space in Ukraine for the entry of their capital.

If we suddenly discovered huge and easily extractable reserves of oil and gas, then the conversation would be completely different.

The second factor is war. It performs a dual function. On the one hand, the unresolved conflict in the east scares off Western competitors who would like to compete for a place in the Ukrainian sun.

On the other hand, the war allows the Ukrainian elite to “sell” their necessity and irreplaceability to the West. Kyiv is opposing Russia, which is beneficial to the West, and therefore why destabilize the situation in Ukraine by starting to demolish an already established system, risking playing into the hands of the Russians. Like, let the Texans continue to rob Texas while they are protecting the Mexican border.

So far this story has worked. Despite the constant criticism of the Ukrainian authorities from the West, neither the EU nor the United States are taking any tough measures against Poroshenko and co.

But Ukraine does not exist on a separate planet. And that’s why changes are coming and will continue to come.

The main factor is that due to political and military instability, as well as unclear rules of the game, there is no access to large investments and cheap money in Ukraine.

Including the development of national business.

Some of its representatives can compensate for this through corruption rent (using budget funds or receiving excess profits through tariff regulation), but this path is not available to everyone. And because of the need to coordinate fiscal policy with the IMF and the West, this will become more and more difficult every year.

Therefore, one way or another, national business will weaken, and its ability to withstand external pressure will decline. Especially after the introduction of the land market, which will deal a blow to the largest agricultural holdings.

Gradually, with the help of anti-corruption structures created with the participation of the West, key representatives of the Ukrainian political and business elite who will resist the course of events will be purged.

And if everything goes as it is, then in ten to fifteen years Ukraine will turn into an ordinary Eastern European country, from which millions of people will leave to work - some to Russia, some to Europe, and those who remain will have a standard of living slightly lower than now in Bulgaria.

At the same time, the remnants of industry, as well as agricultural business, will be controlled by Western European, Chinese and Middle Eastern companies. A significant part of the current oligarchs will be forced to either leave the country or go to prison. Those who remain afloat will lose influence and fade into secondary roles in politics and business.

At the same time, the geopolitical future of such a Ukraine is quite uncertain. It is not clear whether the country will join the EU and NATO, or what its relations with Russia will be. Just as it is unclear what NATO, the EU and Russia will look like in 10-15 years.

But this is, let’s say, an inertial scenario.

The Ukrainian elite can break it in two ways.

The first is the radicalization of the nationalist vector, the final rejection of most democratic freedoms, the clearing of the political space from any competition, the dispossession of part of the oligarchy and the redistribution of its assets among the remaining players. Perhaps a declaration of martial law.

This will allow for some time to prolong the existence of the current clan-corruption model of power.

True, such a scheme carries obvious risks. The most important thing is the risk of running into obstruction from the West, and therefore from the entire international community. This will be a strong blow to the authorities.

Moreover, both separatist and pro-Russian sentiments in the southeast, as well as radical nationalist movements, may simultaneously intensify. The latter will try to take advantage of the turmoil to seize power, just as the Bolsheviks did in October 1917.

As a result, the country will be on the verge of collapse, and the current Ukrainian elite will be under the threat of complete destruction.

The second method is exactly the opposite. Return to multi-vectorism. That is, the restoration of relations with Russia at one level or another, the reintegration of Donbass with a special status, an amnesty, a renunciation of nationalist excesses and pedaling of topics dividing society in domestic politics, a refusal to join NATO, and the declaration of the neutral status of Ukraine.

Taking into account the West’s fatigue from the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the United States and the EU could theoretically agree with this option (at least for the first time).

This path has economic advantages - the end of the war and reconciliation with its largest neighbor will open the way to investment; Ukraine can count on donor assistance from both the West and Russia to eliminate the consequences of the war. This will ensure rapid economic recovery and an increase in the standard of living of the population. National business will receive the necessary impetus for development.

At the same time, this scenario is this moment looks difficult to implement.

Nationalist forces will certainly try to torpedo it. They are already announcing a “night of long knives” if “pro-Russian” forces win the elections. It is very likely that they will try to make their threats come true.

Therefore, in order for the country to follow the “third path,” a lot more needs to be done. Starting from the consolidation of forces advocating the implementation of this scenario, and ending with a radical change in the information policy of the largest media outlets owned by national capital.

In general, any option for the future development of the country is a difficult path, fraught with complete destruction of the existing system in the country, demolition chessboard all its current players.

Awareness of this should, in theory, encourage the Ukrainian elite to be extremely careful and avoid sudden and ill-considered steps. Moreover, relations with Russia are teetering on the brink, and war is smoldering in the east. The "DPR" and "LPR" are listed as the sword of Damocles. Millions of Ukrainian citizens do not accept the current government.

In the event of major upheavals, all this may begin to move again.

The conversation about the future of Ukraine, which began on the first Maidan and reached bloodshed on the second, is still not finished. Moreover, more and more wood is being thrown into the fire of contradictions from all sides.

Will the Ukrainian elite and people have the courage and intelligence to end this curse and follow the path of national reconciliation, refusing to be a tool in the hands of external forces, is the main question on which the future of our country depends.

Inspired by statements by representatives of the Right Sector that the main enemy of Ukraine is Russia, and that Ukrainians must liberate their “ancestral lands” from Muscovites, right up to Voronezh and Rostov.

More than 1000 years ago. Ancient Rus'.

The first clearly recorded East Slavic state formation. Leading centers: Novgorod, Kyiv, Polotsk, Smolensk, Rostov, Chernigov, Ryazan, etc. Colonization in several directions. Active migration to the northern regions, away from the dangerous Steppe. Gradual division into principalities, the borders of which are in no way connected with modern borders. For example, Chernigovskoe was so extended that it was simultaneously located on the territory of the present Kyiv region and on the territory of the present Moscow region. A simple and understandable hint of how one should live and where one’s historical roots are...

Culturally, individual regions differ very little. Naturally, in Novgorod there are certain traditions and dialects that are not close to the people of Ryazan, and in Rostov you can see something that is not very characteristic of Chernigov. But these are trifles, and it is simply impossible to talk about division into some “separate nations”. This is all the same large and diverse Russian Land. All its residents consider themselves equally Russian.

Highlight: Adoption of Christianity in the late 900s. The fact that Christianity came to Rus' in the form of the Eastern tradition predetermined the development of a common national culture. If in the West, with the adoption of Christianity, the Latin unification of religion, culture and thought reigned for hundreds of years, then Orthodox Christianity fully allowed services and books in national languages. Consequently, all cultural development followed original paths, due to the synthesis of the uniquely Russian and the general Christian.

800-600 years ago. First break.

The Mongol invasion in the 13th century did not just cause enormous damage to most Russian lands. It also marked the beginning of the separation of North and South. The defeated and scattered principalities tried to rise one by one, each in their own way. In the north, Moscow and Tver are gradually gaining strength; in the South-West, the Galicia-Volyn lands have been acting as “gatherers” for some time. It is not known how the matter would have ended, but here a third player also appears - the state of Lithuania.

Lithuania is quickly rising and crushing many Russian principalities. In the 1320s, Gediminas captured Kyiv. The next century of the southern Russian lands will be marked by honorable secondary everything Russian. Precisely “honorable”. At least at first. Orthodoxy will be the most widespread religion for a long time, and the Russian elite will still occupy a prominent place in this largest Eastern European state for a long time. But then the situation starts to get worse...

By the way, today's nationalist publicists are very fond of inventing strange stories on the theme that “only Ukraine preserved the Slavs, and only the descendants of the Asian conquerors remained in Russia.” It’s strange to listen to such stories simply because the consequences of the Tatar invasions were approximately the same for everyone. And moreover, the Horde did not reach many northern Russian regions at all, not to mention any “mixing” with the indigenous population. Well, modern genetic research leaves no stone unturned from stupid ideological fantasies.

500-300 years ago. Genocide and awakening.

In 1380, the strengthened Northern Rus' gathered forces and independently clashed with Tatar horde, taking the first serious step towards complete independence. Five years later, the Lithuanian state signed the so-called “Union of Krevo” with Poland, taking the first step towards losing its unique cultural identity. The provisions of the Krevo Agreement required the propagation of Catholicism and the introduction of the Latin alphabet. Of course, the Russian elite was not happy. But I couldn’t do anything.

Further rapprochement between Poland and Lithuania led in 1569 to the complete unification of these countries into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. By that time, the position of the Russian residents was already extremely unenviable. And every year it got worse and worse. The scale of social and cultural-religious persecution to which Russian-speaking residents of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were subjected is difficult to imagine today. Most of those who were eminent and rich tried to “polish” as quickly as possible so as not to be an object of humiliation and a target for their dashing fellow citizens. And the fate of the lower classes was completely unenviable. Kill a couple of peasants from your unloved neighbor along the way if you are returning home to bad mood- practically the norm for a Polish gentleman of the 17th century.

There is no need to go far - remember how the rebellious Bogdan Khmelnitsky appeared. A Polish nobleman attacked his farm, plundered everything, killed his son and took his wife away. Bogdan went to the king to complain, but in response he received only surprise, “why didn’t he sort out the problems himself, since the saber was hanging at his side?”, and was even thrown behind bars. Obviously, the personal stories of ordinary participants in the Uprising were not much more pleasant than this... In general, in 1648 it exploded once again, and in full force. The people have really been driven to the brink - where are modern “revolutionaries” with their naive discontent...

Khmelnitsky's uprising was a success. De facto, as of the mid-17th century, we see for the first time how the territories of several former southern Russian principalities became independent from the power of foreign peoples, for the first time in recent centuries. De jure, Khmelnitsky immediately asked to become a citizen of the Moscow Tsar - under the wing of the only Russian force that existed at that time. And he successfully received this citizenship in 1654. If he had not received it, Poland would have suppressed the most successful of the Cossack uprisings, and would have completely exterminated the remnants of the Russian population. For the successes of the rebels lasted only for the first time, and the rage of the Poles grew every year...

What is especially important here?

1. Former Russian principalities united with the former Russian principalities. However, many cultural differences have already accumulated over several centuries of demarcation. By the way, this was precisely one of the reasons for Nikon’s religious reform which led to a split. Moscow wanted to reduce the misunderstanding between the two branches of the Russian people, and made serious efforts and sacrifices for this.

2. Residents of these territories could speak with Muscovites without translators, and in the same way considered themselves Russians (Rusyns). The Polish-Lithuanian concept of “outskirts” was used along with the book “Little Russia” to designate the territory, but people did not call themselves “Ukrainians”. This word was introduced into circulation by the ideologists of the Polonized elite after the Khmelnitsky Uprising, and for a long time did not find a response among ordinary people.

3. The composition of the new South Russian elite was very diverse. Here are the old Polished Russian nobles, here are the Cossacks, who were a complex mixture in which Russian, Tatar-Turkish, and other roots were intertwined. In the Zaporozhye Sich you could meet either a Scotsman or a Caucasian. Accordingly, everyone looked in his own direction, and nothing good could await the land that found itself under the rule of such a motley company.

4. The ordinary population of the Kiev and Chernigov regions greeted the news of reunification with the Russian Kingdom with absolute delight. This is recognized by almost all contemporaries, regardless of nationality and beliefs.

The last three hundred years. The emergence of "Ukraine".

Moscow granted the Little Russian lands broad autonomy. And as a result, the second half of the 17th century was marked by an endless fratricidal war between Cossack leaders. The hetmans fought one another, betrayed their oath, marched first to Moscow, then to Warsaw, then to Istanbul. They brought the wrath of monarchs on each other, and brought Tatar and Turkish armies against their own people. It was a fun time. True freedom, which almost no one interfered with. Of course, for the common people dying under the Tatar and Turkish sabers, such freedom of leaders I didn't like it. But which Ukrainian leader is interested in the opinions of ordinary people, even now?

Of course, sometimes you could get into trouble. For example, the famous Hetman Doroshenko cheated so many times and became the culprit of the death of so many people that they were ready to kill him in almost all the nearby capitals. And he rushed to Moscow, for the Russian Tsar was the most humane of the surrounding monarchs. Here he was exiled... as a governor to Vyatka. And they punished... with a rich estate near Moscow. By the way, the year before last I passed this estate and the mausoleum of the glorious hetman, decorated with wreaths and yellow-black ribbons.

As a result, the Russian monarchs got tired of all this. In the 18th century, autonomy was eliminated, and Ukraine became a full-fledged part of the country, without any robber intermediaries. Following this, the constant Crimean Tatar threat was eliminated. In place of the wild steppes starting south of Ukraine, new regions were created, inhabited by the Russian people.

On the map of the imperial provinces it is very clear where the conditional ends Little Russian region- these are Volyn, Podolsk, Kiev and Poltava provinces. And also, a significant part of Chernigov. And nothing more. The Kharkov province is already Slobozhanshchina, an intermediate region with a mixed population, which became part of the Moscow state much earlier. The more southern provinces are Novorossiya, settled after the victories over the Crimea, and have nothing to do with the former Hetmanate:

But no one could even imagine that some kind of “independent country of Ukraine” would be carved out along the borders of these provinces in the future. That the old Russian territories that were under Polish rule will be shoved into the same zone with the Novorossiysk steppe regions and separated from the rest of Russia. That the innocently playful “cultural Ukrainianism,” which was popular in Russia and Austria-Hungary in the nineteenth century, and most often followed a single pan-Slavic channel, would soon fall on the fertile soil of the First World War and the Civil War, and turn into radical Ukrainian nationalism.

Already by the beginning of World War II, one could safely say that “Ukraine” had finally come to fruition.
But how? Whereby?

In fact, there was a whole complex of factors:

1. For many centuries in a row, Southern Rus' was part of various states. In the process of the influence of foreign cultures and the reaction of national resistance, new features arose that did not exist in the more independent Northern Rus'. The return of the southern regions to the unified Russian state occurred gradually. Someone was already part of the whole Russian people, some were just getting used to their new neighbors, and others were “foreigners.” Thanks to all this, the result is a complex layer cake in which people of markedly different cultures and beliefs are mixed.

2. At the time of the entry of Left Bank Ukraine into the Muscovite kingdom, linguistic differences did not make it difficult for contemporaries. But the territories that became part of Russia later had already experienced more significant foreign pressure (in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, after the loss of the Left Bank, a harsh campaign was launched against the remnants of Russian culture).

As a result, the conditionally averaged “Little Russian dialect” by the beginning of the twentieth century began to differ even more from Russian than two hundred years before. If in 1654 the southern Russian lands had become part of the Moscow kingdom entirely, then three hundred years later our differences would have been no higher than the differences between Burgundy and Provence. The “gradual nature of reunification” and the increasing foreign pressure on the “laggards” also played a certain role.

3. In the intellectual circles of the 19th century, for the first time, the idea was seriously raised that the “Little Russian branch” of the united Russian people could be considered practically a separate Slavic nationality. Ordinary residents of the Kiev region were of little interest in this idea. But the tsarist government did not like it at all with its obvious hint of possible separatism - and Ukrainian language was limited in rights. Moreover, in Austria-Hungary (which included Galicia) during the preparation for the First World War, and during the war itself, this idea was adopted as an ideological weapon.

True, such a weapon was a double-edged sword. For the “Austrian Little Russians” showed even greater interest in separatist sentiments, since they were part of a completely alien country. But in any case, Austria-Hungary acted much more intelligently than Russia, managing to retain the glory of “an island of cultural Ukrainianness” for its Galicia. And the tsarist government strongly pressed its cultural Ukrainians. And this naturally contributed to the emergence of protest-political Ukrainians. Which fit well with the fashionable socialist-revolutionary sentiments.

4. After the revolutions of 1917, the chaos of civil war begins in the vast expanse from the Don to the Dniester. Different forces are acting at the same time, different “governments” are functioning in parallel. Reds, whites, anarchists... In this whirlwind, the Little Russian population for the first time tried a piece of “national independence”, including according to Galician recipes. This didn't last long. But there were those who liked it. Those who yesterday were still small residents of provincial provinces, and suddenly overnight became the “elite” of a self-made country.

5. Ukraine is already part of the USSR almost modern form. With Donbass and Novorossiya, stuck together on unclear grounds. After the establishment of Soviet power, in line with the general policy of “indigenization,” the forced Ukrainization of the population began. People who have not passed the Ukrainian language exam are not allowed to work in government positions. Publishing and pedagogical activity in Russian is strictly limited. Even in the thoroughly Russian Odessa, children are taught in Ukrainian. Criminal liability has been introduced for negligent managers for non-compliance with new requirements.

This bacchanalia stops only in the thirties, and the opposite extreme begins: newly nurtured figures of Ukrainian culture are branded “bourgeois nationalists” and subjected to repression. And this again leads to the development of underground political Ukrainians... That's it. The events of 1991 are already predetermined. Moreover, the German occupation in the forties added fuel to the fire. Hitler, knowing full well that Russians are strong in unity (just like the Germans), tried to convince the residents of Ukraine as much as possible of their uniqueness and difference from Muscovites. And it turned out well, fortunately some of the soil from representatives of Ukrainian nationalism was already ready.

That's all. It took very little time to transform the ancient Russian region, in which an anti-Polish rebellion broke out three centuries ago, into a huge state with a heterogeneous population...

What useful conclusions can be drawn from this whole story?

Firstly. You cannot leave parts of your people on foreign territory. They will experience the influence of others, and it will be extremely difficult to return them (culturally speaking). Moreover, they may become convinced that they have become a completely separate people, and will begin to assert their young and frail national feeling through hatred of their former brothers.

Secondly. You cannot suppress national feeling if it has already appeared and captured a significant part of the population. But there is no need to purposefully support it with your brothers, friends and neighbors. Their feelings are their business. And even more so, you cannot alternate struggle with support, as was done in the 20-30s of the 20th century. This, I apologize, is some kind of “Yanukovych tactics” - “attacked-surrendered-attacked-surrendered”. Concessions mixed with repression do not bring any good.

Thirdly. We are not to blame for anything, and we don’t owe anyone anything. We saved Southern Rus' in the 17th century from final Polishing and destruction, they fulfilled her requests to join the unified Russian state and granted her broad autonomy. In response, we received betrayals from the hetmans, rivers of blood and a sea of ​​problems. We limited the rights of the Ukrainian language for several decades in the 19th century. However, in the 20th century, vast Russian territories from Odessa to Donbass were actually “gifted” to the newly created Ukrainian republic. Moreover, they carried out targeted Ukrainization. Then there were repressions to which people of different nationalities were subjected. There is no point in apologizing for them either, because everyone took part in their organization - Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Georgians... The “Holodomor” and other politicized episodes are included here.

Fourthly. The presence of vast south-eastern territories with a Russian-speaking population within independent Ukraine is normal from a theoretical point of view. From the historical point of view, it’s not entirely fair. And taking into account modern Ukrainian politics, this is completely unfair. For twenty years in a row, several million Russian people have been deprived of their rights. Most of them cannot send their child to a Russian school, cannot watch a film in Russian in the cinema, and so on. Despite the fact that they are not some kind of migrants in a foreign country. They are on land that belonged to them even before the appearance of “Ukraine” here. They lived in their native country and spoke their native language, just like their fathers and grandfathers... And suddenly - here you go! Now they have every moral right to active resistance, to independence, or at least to full autonomy (just like the Little Russians in late XIX century). And Russia has every moral right to openly support them.

Fifthly. Modern Ukrainian nationalism is a completely unhealthy phenomenon. It is based on the fact that some Russians oppose themselves to other Russians. It implies a hostile attitude towards the people closest in cultural terms, and demands the destruction of all traces of common history, including those (Lenin) that are associated precisely with state support for “Ukrainianism” and its revival. At the same time, nothing like this is observed in Russia. In Moscow there is still Lesya Ukrainka Street and a monument to Taras Shevchenko. And it doesn’t occur to anyone here to break something and rename it (I’m not taking into account anonymous Internet provocateurs on both sides). We are not enemies. And they never were. Moreover, we always had common opponents who did not distinguish us much. Simply strong Eastern Slavs were a bone in their throat. And they will.

You can draw many more conclusions... But you are on your own.
I sincerely believe in the independence and power of your thinking.))

In the future, 2012, one round date will be celebrated - the 1150th anniversary of the birth of Russian statehood. The President of Russia issued a corresponding decree and stated that he considers it appropriate to celebrate the anniversary together with Ukraine and Belarus and declare next year the Year Russian history. According to Medvedev, the invitation is due to the fact that all three countries have “common historical and spiritual roots.”

Minsk's decision will most likely be positive - to celebrate. But Kyiv will probably refuse to participate. Of course, accepting such a proposal means undoing all the efforts of historiography, ideology, philology and pedagogy spent over the past 20 years on the creation of a new ethnic group - “broad and svyadomy” (real and conscious) Ukrainians.

And Ukraine’s response to the “Muscovites” did not take long to arrive. Recently, Verkhovna Rada deputy Liliya Grigorovich took the initiative to celebrate the 1160th anniversary of Ukraine’s statehood in 2012. That is, to legally establish that the Ukrainian state is 10 years older than the Russian one. Where did this date come from? In the Tale of Bygone Years, the chronicler recorded that from 852 the territory of settlement of the Eastern Slavs began to be called “Russian Land”. According to Grigorovich, this “Russian land” was “Rus-Ukraine”.

In general, current Ukrainian history is built for the most part on myths designed to enhance as much as possible the differences between parts of the united Russian people.

Chief among them are the myth of the Soviet occupation and the myth of the extreme antiquity of Ukrainian history. This, so to speak, is the general background against which current Ukrainian historiography is developing. But some “researchers” have temperatures noticeably higher than the hospital average. For example, Ukrainian political scientist Oleg Soskin from time to time produces such pearls that it’s time to fall out of your chair.

“We are Slavs, Aryans, Scythians, we are Rus', and your territory, excuse me, is a Finno-Ugric Turkic territory with a completely different ethnicity and a different language, which has nothing to do with our Slavic, Russian,” - this is what Mr. Soskin said about Russia. Or here’s another: “In reality, Russia is an undeveloped and unsuccessful state that lives only on rent - oil or gas. This country is not competitive from the point of view of the scientific and technical development system.”

Ancient ukry on stamps of Ukraine

“The name of our state “Rus” was stolen by Peter. Natural bandit. Up to his nostrils in blood, he killed everyone. Then they made him a great emperor, and he was a simple Moscow semi-criminal authority,” - this is how Soskin speaks of Peter I.

Yes, in Ukrainian political circles Oleg Soskin is considered an odious figure. However, until relatively recently, he was an adviser to two consecutive presidents of the country and had official status.

Since 1994, he has headed the Institute for the Transformation of Society, which he organized. In 1992–1993 At the same time, he was a senior consultant to the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk on entrepreneurship and foreign economic activity, and an advisor to the Prime Minister on macroeconomic issues. And in 1998–2000. was an adviser to President Leonid Kuchma on economic issues.

Since April 1996, Soskin has headed the Ukrainian National Conservative Party. In 2008, he called Russia an “underdeveloped and unsuccessful state” and demanded the introduction of a visa regime with it. In 2009, he shocked the Ukrainian public with a forecast about the possibility of “a war between Ukraine and Russia in the coming months.” The forecast, thank God, did not come true.

Or here’s another character - the director of the Institute of Ukrainian Studies, academician Petro Kononenko. Also “exposed” as a pioneering historian. For example, during the time of Yushchenko, at his lecture during the scientific student conference “Youth and the State Language,” he told the audience that the Kiev prince Vladimir in the 9th century. did not want to accept Orthodoxy in Constantinople, deciding to do it “on his own land - in Sevastopol.”

Kononenko also mentioned the story ancient india: he reported that in the Mahabharata “one of the clans was Ukrainian and came from Pripyat.”

The academician did not forget to remember Russia: according to him, Moscow was founded by the Tatars, and only then Yuri Dolgoruky took a Tatar as his wife. Kononenko emphasized that Dolgoruky’s son, Andrei Bogolyubsky, was the first descendant of the Kyiv princes who went to war against Kyiv and ruined it.

References to the Mahabharata are, of course, an excess. But in general, Ukrainian historians are very diligently developing the myth of the ancient history of Ukraine. Its essence is that the distant ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived on the territory of the current state of Ukraine since Neolithic times.

The main goal of this politicized theory is to find fundamental differences between Ukrainians and Russians already at the stage of the primitive communal system. The main method is to “shove” the Indo-European tribes into the territory where the ancient Russian statehood was then formed, which is accordingly attributed to the “Ukrainians”. In fact, there is nothing surprising in these efforts - there is a political order, and nationalism is characterized by the desire to prove the “specialness” and “superiority” of one’s people, to “antiquate” their history as much as possible.

In order to further alienate the inhabitants of Ukraine and Russia from each other, modern Ukrainian historical thought attributed the Russians to the Finno-Ugric world, the Muscovites declaring a small admixture of Slavic blood to the core - Finno-Ugric. But Ukrainians are direct descendants of the inhabitants of the ancient Trypillian culture - this Eneolithic archaeological culture was widespread in the 6th-3rd millennium BC. e. in the Danube-Dnieper interfluve. Further, moving from one archaeological culture to another, innovative historians come to Kievan Rus. And this, from their point of view, is a 100% state of “ancient Ukrainians.”

A page from a textbook designed to mold a child into a conscious Ukrainian

When such theories are born in the minds of scientists, it’s not so bad. Ultimately, they can be proven or disproved through discussions and exchanges within scientific community. It’s really bad when these kinds of ideas migrate into school textbooks.

Here are examples. According to the book, which was reprinted four times between 1999 and 2005. “History of Ukraine” by R. Lyakh and N. Temirova (a textbook for high school, approved and recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine), the Ukrainian people are more than 140 thousand years old. That is, the history of the Ukrainian people includes the period before the emergence of modern man.

Or here are the names of paragraphs from a ninth grade textbook: “Ukraine under the rule of the Russian and Austrian empires”, “The colonialist policy of tsarist tsarism in Ukraine”, “Ukraine in the aggressive plans of Napoleon I”, “Huge opposition to Russian tsarism in Ukraine”, “Crimean War and Ukraine”, “Ukrainians in the defense of Sevastopol”...

About the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 it is said that “ economic life Crimea was paralyzed,” the RSFSR was unable to restore these territories after the war. “In such a situation, the inclusion of the Crimean Peninsula into the Ukrainian SSR, which occurred to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the “reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” was initially inevitable.”

By the way, the authors of another popular textbook - “Introduction to the History of Ukraine” - give a very original explanation of Ukraine’s acquisition of Crimea: “The inclusion of the Crimean Peninsula into the Ukrainian SSR ... was an attempt to shift onto the shoulders of Ukraine part of the moral responsibility for the eviction of the Crimean Tatar population from the peninsula and force it to take upon itself the restoration of economic and cultural life on the peninsula.”

Imagine a Ukrainian schoolchild attending a history lesson for the first time in his life. Over the next years, the following version of Ukrainian history was put into his head: until 1991, Ukraine languished under the Muscovite yoke. What did the foreigners do to break the Ukrainians: they starved them, persecuted the best sons of the people like Hetman Mazepa and Bandera. But now we have thrown off the centuries-old yoke and will never again allow invaders to enter our land.

It has long been noted that young nations, at birth and formation, necessarily create history precisely in their own minds. For the countries of the post-Soviet space, the most pressing issue on the path to the formation of national identity is overcoming the “Russia-Moscow complex.” And here any means are good - from glorification to falsification. For some, these processes occur hidden, latent, for others - in an acute form. Ukraine is among the latter.

The result is Kyiv’s attempts to become an alternative center of gravity to Moscow in the post-Soviet space and ignoring, or even countering, Russian initiatives in the political, cultural and spiritual spheres.

So we can say almost for sure that next year Ukraine will not, together with Russia and, possibly, Belarus, celebrate the 1150th anniversary of the birth of Russian statehood. Its statehood, as it turns out, is already ten years older. So, Muscovites - we ourselves have a mustache.

Vladimir Pinegov

"Remember Russia"

The history of Ukraine begins in the 10th century BC, with the settlement of the Cimmerians. However, we will concentrate on the origins of Kievan Rus.

Kievan Rus was superior to modern Ukraine territorially and covered the entire Great Russian Plain. It was formed as a centralized state entity in 882. Developed agriculture and the development of crafts made the Kiev state rich. The Kyiv princes pursued a policy aimed at strengthening their authority and expanding trade to the west. In order to achieve success, it was necessary to abandon paganism. Prince Vladimir Yaroslavovich decided to convert to Christianity in 988. In 988, the residents of Kyiv were baptized in the waters of the Dnieper.

In 1051, the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery (Lavra) was founded in Kyiv. From this time on, the period of the establishment of Christianity began, which continued until the expulsion of the Mongol-Tatars.

In 1239-1240 Batu Khan captured most of the territory of Kievan Rus. Kyiv was destroyed in 1240 and lost its importance with the transfer of the capital to Suzdal.

In the 14th century, the Right Bank part of Ukraine came under the control of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In the 15th century, the Crimean Khanate was formed in the southern territories, including Crimea. The next, 16th century, brought a change in the situation. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was conquered by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Zaporozhye Sich was formed on the Dnieper.
In 1648, the war of liberation with Poland began under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The war ended with the Pereyaslovskaya Rada in 1654 and the annexation of Ukraine to Russian Empire.

In 1667, Poland was forced to confirm the entry of Left-Bank Ukraine into the Russian Empire during the Andrusovo truce with Russia. In 1707, the army of the Swedish king Charles XII invaded the territory of Ukraine. In 1709, the Swedes were defeated in the Battle of Poltava. In the same year, Hetman Mazepa made an attempt to remove Ukraine from Russian rule.

In 1772, Russian troops liquidated the Zaporozhye Sich. After the war with Turkey, in 1783 the Crimean Peninsula went to Russia. In 1793-1795 Right Bank Ukraine and Volyn went to Russia after the liquidation of Poland as an independent state.

After the October 1917 revolution in Petrograd, Ukraine declared independence and formed the government of the Central Rada. The first president of Ukraine was the scientist-historian Mikhail Grushevsky.

After the civil war of 1917-1920, the Western Ukrainian lands went to Poland, and in 1922 the Ukrainian SSR was formed, which became part of the USSR.

In 1939-1940 According to the Molotov-Ribbentrop secret protocol, Western Ukraine and Northern Bukovina were annexed to the USSR. In 1945, the Transcarpathian region was included in the USSR. Since 1945, the Ukrainian USSR has had a permanent representative at the UN.

In 1954, the Crimean region was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR with the alienation of eastern territories equal to the territory of Crimea from the latter. The transfer act was signed by G. Malenkov and S. Voroshilov.

In April 1986, a man-made disaster occurred at Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The city of Pripyat ceased to exist.

On August 24, 1991, a referendum was held on declaring the independence of Ukraine within the USSR. In December 1991, at a meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, it was decided to refuse to sign a new Union Treaty. The USSR collapsed, and Ukraine gained full independence.

The first president of the new Independent Ukraine was L.M. Kravchuk.

Short stories about people who determined the course of the country's history from the times of Kievan Rus to the present day

Project 100 outstanding personalities in the history of Ukraine— an attempt to create an accessible reference book on the history of the country for the most different people- from students to businessmen. This is the history of Ukraine, concentrated on 32 pages. This project clearly tells the story of the people who determined the course of Ukrainian history from Kievan Rus to the present day.

Many will discover new names here or learn more about people they have heard about more than once. I have long wanted to do a project in which it would be possible to find out in 30 seconds what outstanding Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky did and why Cardinal Joseph Slipy was imprisoned in Soviet camps. Knowing our history helps us understand who we are and why we became the way we are. This knowledge provides free lessons and requires you not to repeat mistakes that you may have already made. This is the case when the hackneyed phrase is appropriate Without knowledge of the past there is no present and future.

Even after scrolling through this small appendix, one can understand that it was not only the struggle for freedom and statehood that determined the course of the country’s history. Ukraine has given the world many talented people - physicists, thinkers, architects, microbiologists, writers.

This list is subjective, like any other. However, we made every effort not to forget anyone: over several months we interviewed 75 experts and opinion leaders. Then they collected the results together and wrote briefly about each of these hundred iconic people.

So-called popular - not academic - history is in demand, for example, among our neighbors in Poland. Historical supplements to weekly magazines are sold there in huge circulations. A wide demand for history is just emerging in Ukraine. I wish you could tear out this supplement to the magazine, put it somewhere nearby and have it always at hand.

Vitaly Sych,
Chief Editor NV

Duchess Olga

(c. 920-969)

Politician,
head of the Old Russian state

After the death of her husband, Prince Igor, Olga became the first woman to rule the Old Russian state. She pursued a tough policy towards the tribes subordinate to Kyiv. From the chronicles the story of Olga’s reprisal against the nobility of the Drevlyans is known - in the lands of this tribe, Igor was killed while collecting tribute. After this, by order of the princess, the then fiscal system was improved: strong points for collecting tribute - graveyards - were built throughout the state.

In 957, the princess made a diplomatic mission to Constantinople, the capital of Byzantium. There she met with Emperor Constantine and signed an agreement - apparently a trade one. Having stayed in Byzantium for more than six months, Olga became imbued with the achievements of the most powerful Christian state at that time. In the same year, she converted to Christianity, but she failed to spread the new religion in her homeland.

GREAT WRATH: The burning of the Drevlyan ambassadors in Kyiv on the orders of Princess Olga in revenge for the murder of her husband, Prince Igor. 13th century drawing

Svyatoslav Igorevich

(c. 942-972)

Old Russian prince

Having seized the throne of Kiev, Svyatoslav significantly expanded the possessions of the Old Russian state in the northeast and defeated the centuries-old enemy of Rus' - the Khazar Khaganate. The Volga Bulgarians, the lands in the lower reaches of the Volga, the Taman and Kerch peninsulas (Tmutarakan) came under the rule of Kyiv. And since the main trade routes passed through the annexed territories, this strengthened the economy Ancient Rus'.

Svyatoslav successfully fought with Byzantium. Constantinople paid off his first campaign against the empire with 15 centinarii of gold (480 kg). However, this briefly stopped the Kyiv prince, who planned to create his own large empire with lands in the Balkans and move the capital to the Danube.

He approached his goal in 971, when he occupied several Bulgarian cities and entered Thrace, a province of Byzantium. Then the Byzantine Emperor John I Tzimiskes himself arrived at peace negotiations with the prince and offered Svyatoslav a large tribute. Having concluded a peace treaty with Byzantium, Svyatoslav turned his horses towards Kyiv. At the Dnieper rapids he was ambushed by the Pecheneg Khan Kuri and was killed.

Vladimir Svyatoslavich (Great)

(c. 960-1015)

Politician,

Prince Vladimir introduced the Old Russian state into the orbit of world politics and culture. In the conquered Crimea, he adopted Christianity and made it the state religion. This allowed Kyiv to establish close relations with Byzantine Empire, the largest and most developed state in the vastness of Europe and the Middle East.

Religious reform also contributed to government reforms. The power of Kyiv at the head of vast territories at the administrative level increased, which was not the case under Vladimir’s father Svyatoslav, who rarely visited Kiev and spent his entire life on campaigns.

Vladimir created a state council, which, in addition to the boyars - the old hereditary nobility, also included representatives of large cities. The council was an instrument of legislative and executive power.

Vladimir is the first head of Ancient Rus' who began minting his own coins: zlatniks and silver coins. The prince ordered to put his sign on them, as well as on objects of state significance - a trident, the prototype of the current coat of arms of Ukraine.

OWN CURRENCY: Srebrenik of Vladimir Svyatoslavich

Yaroslav Vladimirovich (Wise)

(c. 978-1054)

Politician,
head of the Old Russian state

Under the Grand Duke of Kiev Yaroslav Vladimirovich, the territory of the Old Russian state expanded as much as possible. The power of Kyiv extended from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea - from south to north - and from the Carpathians to the Volga - from west to east. The political and military power of the Old Russian state was recognized in Europe. Yaroslav's daughters were married to the kings of France, Hungary, Norway, Denmark, and England, which in those days was considered a kind of agreement of friendship and cooperation.

The prince compiled the first written set of laws in Eastern Europe - Yaroslav's Truth. For several centuries it became the basis for the legal system of neighboring states, for example the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Yaroslav weakened the power of the Varangian elite that ruled before him, giving state powers to representatives of the local Slavic elites.

The prince was known among the people as wise due to the fact that he raised culture and education to the world level. Under him, schools of painting, stone construction and chronicle writing arose, and educational institutions were opened. An extensive library was collected at the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.

Nestor the Chronicler

(1056-1114)

Monk of the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery, chronicler

The writing of events from the time of the founding of the Old Russian state has reached our days thanks to the Kyiv monk of the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery Nestor. He is considered the only famous intellectual of his time. He had a thorough command of the Greek language, which allowed him to study the literature of the Orthodox world.

Nestor is considered the compiler of the Tale of Bygone Years - a collection of chronicles available at that time that have not survived. It is known that the monk made trips to Vladimir-Volynsky, where he studied the works of local chroniclers. Thus, the Volyn Chronicle became part of the Tale.

Daniil Galitsky

(1201-1264 )

Politician,
statesman

During the period of fragmentation of the Old Russian state, Prince Daniel was the most successful ruler in the lands of modern Ukraine. His reign coincided with dramatic events - the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars. Daniel had to conduct a subtle policy in order to protect his lands from complete ruin. He made a long trip to the headquarters of Khan Batu, where he received guarantees of the security of the Galician-Volyn state.

In 1253, Daniil of Galicia, who sought military and political support in the West, received a royal title from the Pope.

During his reign, he founded a number of cities on his lands that still exist today. Among them are Holm (present-day Chelm in Poland) and Lvov.

HARD REFLECTION: The defeat of the crusader detachments by the army of Daniil of Galicia near Dorogochin in 1238. Artist - Stanislav Servetnik, 20th century

Roksolana
(Anastasia Lisovskaya)

(1505-1558)

First lady Ottoman Empire

As the wife of Sultan Suleiman I, Roksolana influenced the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, the most powerful Asian-European state at that time. She opened schools and caravanserais and financed the construction of mosques. It is believed that, remembering her homeland, Roksolana restrained the aggression of the Ottoman army towards the Ukrainian lands and took care of the fate of the Slavic slaves and Cossacks.

According to the main version, Roksolana was the daughter of an Orthodox priest from Rohatyn (now Ivano-Frankivsk region). As a teenager, she was captured during a Crimean Tatar raid and was sold at the slave market in Istanbul. So she ended up in the Sultan's harem.

Having withstood fierce competition among concubines, the Ukrainian woman became the main wife of the padishah. During the long military campaigns of Suleiman I, she corresponded with her husband in Arabic and Persian.

Many European ambassadors, before negotiations with the Sultan, sought to meet with Roksolana to present the requests of their rulers. This often influenced Suleiman’s plans in foreign policy.

Roksolana was buried in the mausoleum of the Suleymaniye Jami Mosque along with her husband.

Dmitry Vishnevetsky
(Baida)

(c. 1517-1564)

While in the service of the Polish king Sigismund II Augustus, Prince Dmitry Vishnevetsky built several fortresses in the lower reaches of the Dnieper. Around 1552, with his own money, he laid out fortifications on the island of Malaya Khortytsia, which marked the beginning of the Zaporozhye Sich. At the same time, the local Cossacks elected Vishnevetsky as their hetman.

At the head of Cossack detachments, Prince Dmitry made campaigns against the Crimea and Tatar fortresses located on the Black Sea. Vishnevetsky's military campaigns were so effective that the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire himself took up the task of eliminating him. The Cossack hetman was nevertheless caught on the territory of modern Moldova and then executed. Prince Dmitry was very popular among the people and became a hero of folklore, which has survived to this day.

VOLNITSIA: Zaporozhye Sich during the heyday of the Cossacks. Drawing by unknown artist

Ivan Fedorovich (Fedorov)

(1520-1583)

Printer

And van Fedorovich is one of the first masters who laid the foundation for printing in the Old Church Slavonic language. He received his education at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, then took part in the creation of the first printing house in Moscow. It is believed that here Fedorovich, together with his comrade Peter Mstislavets, published the Apostle - the first printed book in the Moscow state. However, the master’s enterprise was burned down by the monks, and he himself barely escaped with his feet.

In 1572, Fedorovich moved to Lviv, where two years later he published an Apostle, similar to the Moscow one, and the first East Slavic Primer. For six years he was in the service of Prince Konstantin Ostrozhsky. At this time, the printer created the New Testament, the Psalter, and the Ostrog Bible.

In addition to religious books, Fedorovich published the first secular work - The Legend of the Writings of the Bulgarian author Khrabr, which sets out the history of Slavic writing.

NEW TECHNOLOGY: Pages first printed book Ivan Fedorovich Apostol

Konstantin-Vasily Ostrozhsky

(1526-1608)

Military and political figure, philanthropist

Prince Konstantin Ostrozhsky is the richest and most influential figure in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the founder of the first higher educational institution in the territory of modern Ukraine and Eastern Europe - the Ostroh Academy.

After the Union of Lublin in 1569, he owned many lands in Volyn, Galicia, the Kiev region, as well as castles in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the annual income from which brought the prince a million zlotys.

Having become the head of the Kyiv Voivodeship, Prince Constantine built cities and castles on the borders with the steppe and successfully repelled the raids of the Crimean Tatars. King Sigismund III granted him privileges in defending the rights of the Orthodox Church and nominating candidates for episcopal positions.

In his native Ostrog, the prince gathered a circle of Orthodox intellectuals, who had a large library at their disposal. This is how the powerful cultural and educational center Ostroh Academy was created. Here, with the financial support of the prince, pioneer printer Ivan Fedorovich, publisher of the complete text of the Bible in the Slavic language, founded a printing house.

FORMER GREATNESS: Ruins of the castle in Ostrog. Drawing by Zygmunt Vogel, turn of the 18th-19th centuries

Petr Konashevich-Sagaidachny

(c. 1582-1622)

Military and political figure

The brilliant commander Peter Konashevich had such a strong influence in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that he was able to achieve a status akin to autonomy for Ukraine, which was part of Poland. Moreover, he became Sagaidachny in the Zaporozhye Sich: so, from the word sagaidak (quiver for arrows), the Cossacks nicknamed him for his accuracy in archery and then elected him several times as their leader.

Beginning in 1603, Sagaidachny, at the head of the Cossack troops, carried out a series of sea campaigns against the Turks. He created the largest flotilla of 150 small seagull ships in the history of the Zaporozhye Sich. With their help, he occupied the Turkish port of Trebizond, carried out raids on cities at the mouth of the Danube, and even burned part of the Turkish fleet in the suburbs of Istanbul.

In 1618, the Polish prince Vladislav decided to capture Moscow in order to be crowned on the throne there. Sagaidachny and the Cossack regiments also went on a campaign against Belokamennaya. And before the start of the campaign, he demanded from the king full administrative autonomy for the Ukrainian lands as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. And the king agreed.

Later, the hetman made another political move - he obtained episcopal rank for several Ukrainian priests from the Patriarch of Jerusalem and restored the Kyiv Metropolis.

Sagaidachny died in battle: during the Polish-Turkish War in 1622, in the battle of Khotyn, he received injuries incompatible with life.

BLACK SEA THUNDER: The Cossack flotilla under the command of Pyotr Konashevich-Sagaidachny storms Kafa (present-day Feodosia), which housed the largest slave market in Crimea. The work of modern battle painter Arthur Orlenov

Bohdan Khmelnytsky

(1595-1657)

Politician, hetman

Bogdan Khmelnytsky led the first successful Cossack uprising, the goal of which was the independence of Ukrainian lands. He is the first hetman of the Ukrainian state that separated from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The son of the mayor of the city of Chigirin, he was educated at the Lvov Jesuit College. Having entered the royal service, he took part in many military campaigns against the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire and the Moscow State. In the battle of Tsetsora he was captured by the Turks, from where he escaped two years later.

Khmelnitsky had a long conflict with the princes of Konetspolsky, who ruled the Chigirin lands on behalf of the Polish king. After the ancestral village of Subotov was taken away from Khmelnytsky, he went to the Zaporozhye Sich, where the Cossacks elected him hetman. From there he sent out station wagons to the people calling for an uprising, which began in 1648. And the very next year, Khmelnytsky signed the Zboriv Agreement with the king, which defined the territory of the Ukrainian state within the borders of the Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernigov voivodeships.

During the War of Independence, Khmelnitsky concluded a temporary coalition agreement with Tsar Alexei, which for a long time was considered an act of annexation of Ukraine to the Moscow state.

FIRST HETMAN: Bogdan Khmelnitsky enters Kyiv on a white horse. Canvas by Nikolai Ivasyuk, 1912

Peter Mogila

(1596-1647)

Church and political figure, educator

The efforts of Peter Mohyla achieved reconciliation in society, which split after the Berestey Union, when some Orthodox church hierarchs recognized the supremacy of the Pope. Although Mogila was a Moldavian boyar and received his education in Catholic schools in Poland, Holland and France, he was devoted to Orthodoxy. Mogila received tonsure at the Kiev Pechersk Lavra and at the age of 30 became its head - archimandrite. Here he established book printing and founded a school, which later transformed into the Kiev-Mohyla Academy - one of the oldest universities in Ukraine. Already in the 18th century, the academy became one of the best universities in Europe, where many hetmans, philosophers, architects and composers of that time studied.

Over time, Mohyla was elected Metropolitan of Kyiv, and before his death he bequeathed all his property - ten villages, a library and 81 thousand zlotys - to the future Kiev-Mohyla Academy.

Ivan Vygovsky

(c. 1608-1664)

Hetman

The Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Vygovsky, who received the mace after Bohdan Khmelnytsky, is famous for his desire to achieve the independence of the Ukrainian Cossack state from the influence of Moscow. The greatest of it feat of arms- defeat of Russian troops in the famous Battle of Konotop.

Vygovsky was educated at the Kyiv fraternal school, worked for some time in the courts, and then entered service in the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He took part in many battles, was captured by the Tatars, from where Khmelnitsky ransomed him. He made a brilliant career in the Cossack army - from the hetman's clerk to the head of the General Military Chancellery - the Cossack cabinet of ministers under the hetman.

Already as hetman in 1658, Vygovsky concluded the Gadyach Treaty, which was beneficial for Ukraine: the Cossack lands were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a Russian principality, along with Poland and Lithuania.

However, he gradually loses the support of his comrades-in-arms and is forced to transfer the hetman’s mace to Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s son, Yuri. Later he tries to return to power, but loses the election to Pavel Tetere. His last political action was the organization of an anti-Polish uprising in Right Bank Ukraine, which ended tragically for Vygovsky.

MOSCOW HORROR: Vygovsky, at the head of the Cossacks, defeated the Moscow army near Konotop

Ivan Mazepa

(1639-1709)

Politician, hetman

And van Mazepa ruled Ukraine - part or all of its territory, which was part of the Moscow state - for 22 years. Thus, he was the Ukrainian hetman for the longest period. Although Mazepa received the hetman's mace thanks to the direct intervention of Russian troops, he achieved virtually independent rule of the country.

Under Mazepa, many buildings were restored and built in Ukraine in the Baroque style that reigned in Europe at that time. Money for this was allocated from the hetman's treasury.

Mazepa also sponsored educational institutions and achieved academy status for the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium. For a long time it was the only university in the Orthodox world where, in addition to theology, science courses were taught on the model of European universities.

The Hetman pursued a subtle foreign policy with the goal of finally dissociating Ukraine from the Muscovite kingdom. But the concluded alliance with the Swedish king Charles XII led to the defeat of the coalition forces near Poltava and Mazepa’s imminent death in exile.

The hetman's biography served as material for many writers, artists and composers, such as George Byron, Eugene Delacroix, Franz Liszt.

Pilip Orlik

(1672-1742)

Politician, hetman

Having received the hetman's mace after the death of Ivan Mazepa, Orlik signed the document Treaties and Resolutions, which is called the first Ukrainian Constitution.

He was elected hetman in 1710 - after a year earlier the coalition forces of the Swedish king Charles XII and hetman Ivan Mazepa were defeated by Russian troops near Poltava. Then more than 4.5 thousand Cossacks followed their leader to Moldova, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire.

The Orlik Constitution is an agreement between the hetman and the Cossacks and their elders subordinate to him. According to the document, the hetman limited his power and pledged to regulate relations between social groups, as well as fight for the political and ecclesiastical separation of Ukraine from Muscovy.

GRAINS OF DEMOCRACY: Pages of the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk

Feofan Prokopovich

(1681-1736)

Writer, scientist, theologian

Feofan Prokopovich, a prominent Ukrainian intellectual of the Baroque era, became famous not only in his homeland - he became one of the most influential persons at the court of Russian Tsar Peter I.

Prokopovich received an excellent education - first at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium and the Uniate Collegium in Vladimir-Volynsky, and then at the Vatican and educational institutions in France and Germany.

Returning to Ukraine, Prokopovich forever renounced Catholicism and began teaching at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium, for which he created a course on rhetoric and literature. His oratory skills were highly appreciated by Hetman Ivan Mazepa, as well as the Kyiv dignitaries of Peter I. Moreover, the Russian Tsar invited Prokopovich to St. Petersburg, where he began writing scientific treatises on astronomy, geography and physics.

Peter contributed to the appointment of Prokopovich as head of the Holy Synod - essentially, the Russian Orthodox Church. This position does not prevent the scientist from participating in the creation Russian Academy sciences and the so-called scientific squad - a kind of collegium of the first Russian secular intellectuals.

IDEOLOGY OF THE EMPIRE: Prokopovich's treatise, in which he substantiated royal rights, was published in 1722

Grigory Skovoroda

(1722-1794)

Philosopher

Grigory Skovoroda was the first to adapt the works of ancient Greek philosophers for Ukrainian culture and academic education. Having studied the works of Plato and his followers at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, he created his own system of views on their basis and became one of the most prominent Ukrainian philosophers.

Skovoroda’s works were published after his death, but during the thinker’s lifetime they were copied by hand - this is how they became popular. And his poems The city of leather has its morals and rights, everyone has their own mind and head, were in the repertoire of traveling kobza musicians.

Srodna pratsa is the most popular topic of Skovoroda’s thoughts. The philosopher believed that every person should find his purpose in life and do what he is most inclined towards. Then he can be in harmony with himself and the world. Otherwise, when people engage in “unnatural activities,” the earth is filled with evil.

Another theme - unequal equality - is depicted on the modern 500 hryvnia banknote. The philosopher compares God to a fountain that bubbles with water and fills the vessels standing around with it. Although the vessels have an equal opportunity to receive enough water, everyone gets it depending on their volume, and it is different for everyone. In this metaphor, the vessels are people. To overcome such inequality, you need to know your volume, in other words, find “akin to your work.”

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNTAIN: With this drawing Grigory Skovoroda illustrated his theory of unequal equality

Maxim Berezovsky

(1745-1777)

Composer

And the co-author of the first Ukrainian opera, Demofont, and the creator of the classical choral concert, was born in Glukhov, which was then the capital of Hetman Ukraine. At a very young age, Berezovsky mastered several musical instruments and received his education at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, where he began writing music.

Berezovsky developed a clear, colorful bass early on, and he was selected for the court chapel of the Russian Grand Duke Peter Fedorovich, who lived on the outskirts of St. Petersburg. Here the talented Ukrainian sang solo roles in Italian operas for the Russian aristocracy.

In 1769 he was sent to study at the Bologna Academy of Music. Berezovsky spent five years in Italy, and right there, in Livorno, the premiere of his famous opera took place. He graduated from the Academy with honors and returned to St. Petersburg to lead the court chapel. However, the contrast between the attitude towards musicians in Europe and Russia caused Berezovsky a nervous breakdown, which is why he died early. Only a small part of his works has survived to this day, however, all of them are known in the world.

Dmitry Bortnyansky

(1751-1825)

Composer

Dmitry Bortnyansky, a classic of Ukrainian music, is considered a pioneer in this area: he was the first to write large classical concerts for two choirs. Bortnyansky is also the author of six operas and is famous as a talented singer and conductor.

He was born in the hetman's capital, Glukhov, and received his primary musical education at a school founded by the nominal ruler of Ukraine, Kirill Razumovsky. For his excellent vocal abilities, he was selected to join the chapel at the court of Prince Paul, the son of Catherine II. He lived for several years in Italy, where he studied music with local composers. At the Venetian Teatro San Benedetto, his first operas Creon and Alcides were a great success.

Returning to St. Petersburg, Bortnyansky became the court conductor, and was also appointed censor of all spiritual works created on the territory of the Russian Empire. His opera Sokol is the first one written by a Ukrainian and staged in St. Petersburg.

Russian musicologists believe that Bortnyansky’s musical techniques would later be used in their works by Mikhail Glinka, Alexander Borodin and Pyotr Tchaikovsky. Moreover, the latter will become the editor of the complete 10-volume edition of Bortnyansky’s works.

ONE OF THE FIRST: Title page of the printed libretto of Dmitry Bortnyansky's opera Creon, staged in Venice, at the San Benedetto Theater in 1776

Artem Vedel

(1767-1808)

Composer, conductor, singer

Ukrainian resident Artem Vedel is one of the few world-class composers who has not written a single secular work. All of his music - about 80 works, including 20 spiritual concerts - has a religious component. Moreover, according to experts, it was Wedel who elevated Ukrainian polyphonic choral singing to the heights of world musical art.

He received a musical education at the Kiev-Mohyla Academy and, while still a student, led the academic choir. And Wedel wrote his first major work - the Liturgy of John Chrysostom - when he was barely 18 years old.

After completing his studies, Wedel was invited to Moscow, where he directed church chapels under the authority of the Governor General. Then the composer headed the chapel at the headquarters of the Ukrainian Infantry Corps in Kyiv, and then organized the choir and orchestra of the Kharkov governorship.

In Kyiv, he continued to write music and reflect on God - for some time he even became a novice of the Kiev Pechersk Lavra. The measured life of the musician-monk was changed by the unsubstantiated accusation that Wedel called Tsar Paul I a murderer. Then Wedel was declared mentally ill, and the musician spent the last nine years of his life in a mental home. Only at the end of his life did his father manage to take him home.

Ivan Kotlyarevsky

(1769-1838)

Poet, playwright

Ivan Kotlyarevsky's poem Aeneid is the first work written in the Poltava dialect, which became the basis for the formation of Ukrainian literary language. In the Aeneid, ancient heroes are depicted as Cossacks, which contributed to the wide popularity of the poem.

In 1796, the writer, who graduated from theological seminary and was a home teacher, entered the military service to the Seversky Carabinieri Regiment. He then participates in the Russo-Turkish War, and during Napoleon's campaign against Russia he was tasked with forming the 5th Ukrainian Cossack Regiment, for which he received the rank of major.

Moreover, Kotlyarevsky set the condition that this unit would remain a permanent Ukrainian military formation after the war. However, the condition was not met.

Later, Kotlyarevsky directed the Poltava Free Theater and even wrote for it the play Natalka Poltavka and the vaudeville Moskal the Sorcerer, which laid the foundation for the Ukrainian musical and dramatic theater.

UKRAINIAN HUMOR IN ST. Petersburg: The first edition of Kotlyarevsky's Aeneid was published without the author's knowledge

Nikolay Gogol

(1809-1852)

Writer

Nikolai Gogol outlined the main themes of Russian-language literature for two centuries to come - bribery in power, the feeblemindedness of officials, the provincial narrow-mindedness of society. A native of Sorochintsi in the Poltava region, Gogol introduced Ukrainian romantic folklore, primarily demonology, into world culture by publishing a collection of short stories, Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka.

The first work of Gogol that Emperor Nicholas I became acquainted with was the comedy The Inspector General, staged in 1836. The author himself was dissatisfied with the performance. His idea was almost avant-garde. After all, the final silent scene, when all the characters freeze upon learning that a real auditor has arrived in town, is planned to last at least ten minutes. Thus, the audience was supposed to become confused, reflective and understand that corruption - the main theme of the play - is everyone's problem.

But even without this, the Tsar liked the Inspector, who after watching said: “What a play! Everyone got it, and I got it more than anyone!” The autocrat ordered all his ministers to watch the comedy.

Gogol's main work is the poem Dead Souls- no less sharp satire, still relevant today. Consider the remark about an official who “lo and behold, a house appeared somewhere at the end of the city, bought in the name of his wife.”

PROSE POEM: Second edition of Nikolai Gogol's Dead Souls

Taras Shevchenko

(1814-1861)

Poet, novelist, artist

And the name of Taras Shevchenko has become a symbol of freedom for many generations of Ukrainians, his philosophy a national idea, and his works a mandatory part of humanitarian education. In terms of significance for his compatriots, literary scholars equate his poetic collection Kobzar with the Gospel.

Many songs based on Shevchenko’s poems have become popular, among them - Reve ta stogne Dnieper wide, which in Soviet times was considered an informal national anthem. Shevchenko also created a poetic interpretation of the history of Ukraine: in poetic form and prose he wrote many works about real life of their contemporaries.

The great Ukrainian poet left his homeland at the age of 15, spoke Russian for most of his life, and returned to Ukraine only for a short time - 2.5 years. He graduated from the Art Academy in St. Petersburg and gained fame in the Russian Empire as a painter and graphic artist.

At that time, Shevchenko was a serf, and the St. Petersburg artist Karl Bryullov, together with the writer Vasily Zhukovsky, organized a lottery, the proceeds of which allowed Shevchenko to gain freedom.

Today the great Ukrainian is one of the most published authors in the world. His Kobzar has been translated into more than 100 languages, and monuments to Shevchenko stand in 35 countries. There are 1,384 of them in total. Exactly this a large number of monuments erected to a cultural figure.

Platon Simirenko

(1821-1863)

Entrepreneur, philanthropist

For yours short life- only 42 years old - Platon Simirenko managed to make a scientific and technological revolution on an all-Ukrainian scale. A graduate of the Paris Polytechnic Institute, Simirenko took over the management of the trading company Brothers Yakhnenko and Simirenko from his father and turned it, by modern standards, into an exemplary industrial holding.

INDUSTRIAL POWER: Sugar factory of the brothers Yakhnenko and Simirenko in Gorodishche in the Cherkasy region

Having bet on the sugar industry, the young entrepreneur built the first steam plant in the Russian Empire, equipped with the latest technologies. He attracted Western European engineers to service it, and provided the Ukrainians who worked at the enterprise with a “social package” unprecedented for the times of serfdom.

Developing his business, Simirenko built the first steamships in Ukraine - Ukrainets and Yaroslav, opening export routes for Ukrainian sugar. He also went down in history as one of the most iconic domestic philanthropists - it was with Simirenko’s money that the first Kobzar of Taras Shevchenko was published.

COMPANY LOGO: Label of sugar products from the plant of the brothers Yakhnenko and Simirenko

Mikhail Drahomanov

(1841-1895)

Historian, folklorist, public figure

Mikhail Drahomanov is the first Ukrainian scientist to tell the world community about the oppression of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Russian Empire. This was the subject of his report at the Paris Literary Congress in 1878. Two years earlier, Emperor Alexander II signed the so-called Em Decree, according to which it was forbidden to import into the Russian Empire and publish books in Ukrainian, stage Ukrainian theatrical performances, print notes with Ukrainian texts and teach in Ukrainian.

Drahomanov graduated from Kiev University and later taught history there. He organized the cultural and educational society Staraya Hromada. For his participation in it, he was expelled from the university and forced to emigrate to Europe.

Drahomanov spent the last years of his life in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia, where he was invited to the local university as a professor of history.

FOR THE RIGHTS OF UKRAINIANS: Monument to Mikhail Drahomanov in Kyiv in front of the university bearing his name

Nikolay Lysenko

(1842-1912)

Composer, pianist

The pens of Natalka Poltavka and Taras Bulba, written by Nikolai Lysenko, have not left the stages of Ukrainian theaters for a century and a half, and their author is the founder of Ukrainian opera and symphonic music.

Although Lysenko graduated from the Faculty of Natural History at Kyiv University, his abilities as a virtuoso pianist led him to pursue a career as a musician. However, he received a musical education in Leipzig, and studied opera in St. Petersburg with Rimsky-Korsakov.

The composer was a member of cultural and educational organizations that promoted Ukrainian culture at home and in Europe. During his trips abroad, he gave concerts, performing his own adaptations of folk songs. Criticism at the time compared his playing style to such virtuosos as Franz Liszt and Frederic Chopin.

In 1872, when the first performance of the Ukrainian musical theater took place in Kyiv, the opera Chernomortsy, the music for which was written by Lysenko, was chosen for the premiere.

Ivan Pulyuy

(1845-1918)

Physicist, public figure, translator

And van Pului invented a device for medical research using x-rays. Author of this innovative technology born in Grymailovo near Ternopil on the territory of Austria-Hungary, graduated from the University of Vienna and then worked there. Corresponding with his German colleague Wilhelm Roentgen, he shared his scientific experiments. As a result, the German patented a device with X-rays, although he knew that a Ukrainian had invented it 12 years earlier.

Pulyuy communicated closely with Ukrainian writers. Together with Panteleimon Kulish and Ivan Nechuy-Levitsky, he translated the Gospel from ancient Greek into Ukrainian, which, with the help of Pulyuy, was published in Lvov.

As a student, he created one of the first public organizations of Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary - the Vienna Sich. And when he became a professor at the University of Prague, he opened a fund to support Ukrainian students. He was the first to formulate the thesis: “Independent Ukraine is the key to the hall of a peaceful Europe.” In the twentieth century, it will be repeated by US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski, and it will become one of the principles of global international relations.

Two years before his death, Pulyu received an invitation to become the Minister of Education of Austria-Hungary, but refused due to health conditions.

COMMON INVENTION: Device for determining body heat, designed by Pulyuy

Ilya Mechnikov

(1845-1916)

Biologist

The Obel Prize of Ilya Mechnikov, received by him in 1908 for the discovery of immunity mechanisms, became the first Nobel Prize in history that Ukraine can chalk up to its own account. An outstanding biologist was born in the Kharkov province, graduated from a local university and for a long time worked in Odessa as a professor at the university (now he bears the name of Mechnikov) and headed the first bacteriological station in the Russian Empire.

In 1883, it was in Odessa that Mechnikov made a report on his main discovery - phagocytosis, the process of absorption of foreign objects by a cell, through which immunity is formed. In addition, the scientist left the world the most important developments in the field of microbiology, embryology, cytology, the fight against tuberculosis, and also created his own theory about the aging of the body.

When Mechnikov decided to leave Russia in 1887, all doors were open to him in Europe: until the end of his life, the scientist worked at the Louis Pasteur Institute in Paris.

ALL FOR SCIENCE: Before his death, Ilya Mechnikov bequeathed his body for medical research

Bogdan Khanenko

(1849-1917)

Patron, collector

A descendant of a glorious family of Cossack elders, Bogdan Khanenko managed to occupy an even more significant place in Ukrainian history. Domestic museums owe him a rich collection of art objects and archaeological finds, which Khanenko, together with his wife Varvara, collected throughout his life and bequeathed to Ukraine. Moreover, Varvara Khanenko’s maiden name is Tereshchenko, she comes from a family of famous Ukrainian sugar producers and philanthropists.

A successful businessman and certified lawyer who worked for a long time in St. Petersburg and Warsaw, Khanenko methodically bought world masterpieces of painting not only in the Russian Empire, but also in Austria, Italy, Spain, France, and Germany. It was he who became the main ideologist and “engine” of the creation of the Kyiv art-industrial and science museum- now it is the National Art Museum of Ukraine. During his lifetime, he gave him his entire unique archaeological collection - the philanthropist, at his own expense, carried out excavations in the Kyiv province.

Today, the National Museum of Art named after Bohdan and Varvara Khanenko, located in the center of Kyiv in the house where the couple lived (pictured), is the largest collection of foreign art in Ukraine.

Maria Zankovetskaya

(1854-1934)

Actress

The flourishing of Ukrainian drama at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries required vivid images on stage. The face of the new theater was Maria Zankovetskaya, one of the best actresses in the history of Ukraine and all of Eastern Europe. Over the years of working in the leading Ukrainian troupes of that time - with Mark Kropivnitsky, Mikhail Staritsky, Nikolai Sadovsky, Panas Saksagansky - Zankovetskaya played more than 30 roles, almost all of them not in the classics, but in plays by Ukrainian playwrights written in those years.

Despite the difficult censorship conditions for the domestic theater in Tsarist Russia, the actress was very popular, and her tours in Moscow and St. Petersburg were a great success. Zankovetskaya’s performance captivated even Emperor Alexander III, and for many years leading Russian theaters invited the actress to join them, but to no avail.

She made a huge contribution to the development of theater in Ukraine: together with Sadovsky, she created the first Ukrainian stationary theater in Kiev (1907), directed the People's Theater in Nizhyn (1918), and participated in the founding of the People's Theater in Kyiv (1918).

Mezzo-Soprano: Maria Zankovetskaya in Nikolai Lysenko's operetta Chernomorets

Ivan Franko

(1856-1916)

Writer, publicist, public figure

For Ukrainian culture, which has been developing for a long time not thanks to, but in spite of, Ivan Franko has become an unprecedented iconic figure. A talented poet, prose writer and playwright who almost received the Nobel Prize in Literature, Franco, in fact, created a Ukrainian analogue of Balzac’s Human Comedy - he reflected the Ukraine of his time in a whole series of socio-psychological works. Also, many of his poetic works for supporters of independent Ukraine became programmatic. And Franco’s historical prose is classified as a national classic of the first echelon.

Fluent in many languages, he translated dozens of world literary classics into Ukrainian, and many of them received Ukrainian translation for the first time: from Homer, Dante and Shakespeare to Goethe, Mickiewicz and Zola. As an ethnographer, Franko organized tons of folklore, published a number of important works on the theory of literature, history, economics of Ukraine and philosophy, and was one of the leading publicists of his time.

The Franco-politician stood at the origins of the first Ukrainian parties, insisting on expanding the political rights of Ukrainians and their culture - it was not without reason that he was arrested three times in his youth. And contrary to the opinion of many Galician compatriots, the writer insisted on the commonality of all Ukrainian lands and called not to divide Ukrainians into “Galician” or “Bukovinian”.

Nikolay Pymonenko

(1862-1912)

Artist

The talent of Nikolai Pymonenko was lucky to be appreciated during his lifetime. A master of everyday painting, in his paintings he displayed not a static landscape, but living Ukraine, Pimonenko was the most famous artist in the entire Russian Empire.

An academician of the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts, he became a member of the famous association of “Itinerant” artists, regularly participated in international exhibitions - in Berlin, Paris, Munich, London. At one of the Parisian art salons, his work Gopak was awarded a gold medal, and was even bought by the Louvre.

Pimonenko, who received his primary art education at the Kyiv Drawing School famous Nicholas Murashko spent most of his life in Kyiv, traveling to the outskirts of the city to sketch. He did a lot for the development of art in Ukraine - he stood at the origins of the Kyiv Art School, and also taught graphics at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute.

VICTIM OF FANATISM: Pymonenko’s work from 1899, in which the artist depicted a real conflict in the Jewish community of Kremenets - where fellow believers beat up a girl who fell in love with a Ukrainian guy

Vladimir Vernadsky

(1863-1945)

Natural scientist, philosopher

In Ladimir, Vernadsky became the first president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (UAS), created in 1918 in Kyiv under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. He headed the UAN for three years. During this time, the main institutes of the academy were created and science Library- the largest in present-day Ukraine.

Although scientific activity Vernadsky took place mainly in Russia, he enthusiastically accepted the independence of Ukraine in 1917.

Vernadsky organized many geological expeditions - from the Urals to the south of Ukraine - to study natural resources. He was the first in the Russian Empire to draw attention to the need for research into radioactive minerals, which is why he is considered the ideologist and founder of nuclear energy in Ukraine and Russia.

The doctrine of the noosphere - the most important scientific and philosophical theory of Vernadsky - remains relevant to this day. The noosphere is the totality of all minds on the planet that exist in interaction. This teaching is important for understanding how humanity can use the sphere of inanimate nature and the biosphere in order to renew them and live in harmony.

SCIENTIFIC AWARD: Modern Russian Order of the Star of Vernadsky

Vladislav Gorodetsky

(1863-1930)

Architect

Ladislav Gorodetsky lived in Kyiv for three decades, designing and constructing buildings for this city that made it unique. Among his works are the National Bank, the Art Museum, the Church of St. Nicholas, the House of Chimeras and other buildings that today have become the most striking landmarks of Kyiv in the field of architecture.

Moreover, Gorodetsky had his own cement factory Faure, which allowed him to freely implement the most innovative ideas.

The architect also headed the urban planning department of the Kyiv City Duma. He was responsible for designing streets and approving designs for original buildings for Kyiv. In addition, Gorodetsky designed buildings for Uman, Cherkassy, ​​and several cities in Poland. Then he was invited to work in Tehran, and for this city he created his last buildings.

CHARM OF CHIMERAS: House built by Vladislav Gorodetsky for his family in 1901-1903

Olga Kobylyanskaya

(1863-1942)

Writer

One of the first feminists in Ukrainian literature and public life, Olga Kobylyanska was a recognized master of psychological prose. In her short stories, short stories and tales, Kobylyanskaya reflected the problems of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of her generation and the picture of life in Bukovinian villages.

Her story Earth was admired by the best writers of the time, including Mykhailo Kotsyubinsky, Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko. Moreover, the latter called this work “a document of the way of thinking of our people.”

The writer’s personal life did not work out. Her affair with the writer Osip Makovey lasted for a long time - mainly in letters. However, this story never ended in marriage.

FROM GERMAN TO UKRAINIAN: Publication of the novella Nature in 1897. It was first published in German

Mikhail Kotsyubinsky

(1864-1913)

Writer

Among domestic classics, experts consider Mikhail Kotsyubinsky one of the most underestimated by the mass reader. In addition to Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors - a masterpiece about the soul and life of the Ukrainian Hutsuls, Kotsyubynsky also introduced a completely new, modernist style of writing into Ukrainian literature.

The writer had an excellent education and knew nine languages, including Gypsy. He knew many celebrities of his time, was friends with the composer Nikolai Lysenko, and when he went to Capri to treat tuberculosis, he stayed there with Maxim Gorky.

Kotsiubynsky was called an impressionist writer - like the artists of this movement, he created his stories and novellas (Apple Flower, Intermezzo, etc.) from dozens of moments, brush strokes, sensations, which was fresh and new for the writers of that time. In addition, Kotsiubynsky was a brilliant master of psychological storytelling and, in addition to plots from the history of Ukraine (Fata Morgana, At a High Price), he turned to topics rare for Ukrainian literature - for example, he explored the personality of the executioner in the story Persona grata.

PREMIERE OF THE STORY: First edition of Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors

Andrey Sheptytsky

(1865-1944)

Primate of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

Heading the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) during the most difficult years for Ukraine, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky managed to make it not only a religious, but also a cultural, social and economic center.

A descendant of a famous noble Galician family and a doctor of law, Sheptytsky was ordained a monk in 1888. Church activities allowed him to become one of the most authoritative figures in all of Eastern Europe.

He carried out a reform of theological education, founded the Lviv Theological Academy (the only Ukrainian university in Poland at that time), from where he sent the best students to study abroad. Under Sheptytsky, the UGCC for the first time began to use the living Ukrainian language in liturgies.

Possessing considerable wealth, Sheptytsky became a philanthropist. With his money or with his assistance, the National Museum in Lviv with a huge collection of icons, a library, a people's hospital, several gymnasiums, a Land Bank and a credit union were opened. Sheptytsky also patronized young Ukrainian artists, establishing a special scholarship for them.

BLESSING: Sheptytsky’s letter of welcome regarding the resumption of the Ukrainian state in Lviv on July 13, 1941

Mikhail Grushevsky

(1866-1934)

Historian, political activist

Mikhail Grushevsky is famous as the creator of the first basic research By national history— History of Ukraine-Rus. This work took Grushevsky three decades, and these years also included the creation of the Ukrainian Independent Republic, when the scientist was the head of the first national parliament - the Central Rada.

Grushevsky graduated from Kiev University and at the age of 28 became a professor of world history at Lvov University. Two years later, he was elected head of the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society, a kind of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences on the territory of Austria-Hungary.

With the outbreak of World War I, the scientist finds himself in Kyiv, where he is arrested for his pro-Austrian views. He spent three years in exile in Kazan and Simbirsk, and then left for Moscow.

In 1917, Grushevsky was given the opportunity to return to Kyiv, where by that time he had already been elected head of the Central Rada in absentia. In this position, he worked on the Constitution of Ukraine and signed four universal laws - the last one proclaimed the country's independence.

When the Bolsheviks came to Kyiv, Grushevsky was already living in Prague and then in Vienna. But in 1924 he returned to Kyiv again. With the beginning Stalin's repressions the authorities begin to suspect him of leading the non-existent Ukrainian Nationalist Center. A scientist is not shot just because he dies of an illness.

NEW CHRONICLE: Illustrated History of Ukraine by Grushevsky, 1913

Bogdan Kistyakovsky

(1868-1920)

Lawyer, philosopher, sociologist

Bogdan Kistyakovsky is a brilliant representative of the Ukrainian intelligentsia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, whose professional enthusiasm and national consciousness were many years ahead of their time. Treatises in the field of legal theory and sociology and philosophical works of Kistyakovsky became the most important milestone in Russian and European science. His concept of the rule of law, ideas about civil society and national sovereignty are still relevant today.

For his pro-Ukrainian views and participation in underground student circles, Kistyakovsky was expelled from three universities in the Russian Empire, but he received an excellent education at the Universities of Berlin and Strasbourg. In the latter he defended his dissertation “Society and Individuality,” which became famous in the German philosophical community.

In addition, Kistyakovsky was one of the founders of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, taught at Kiev University and headed the Kiev branch of the Liberation Union, a secret organization intended to limit autocracy in the Russian Empire.

Lesya Ukrainka

(1871-1913)

Poetess

Ivan Franko once called Lesya Ukrainka the only man in all of Ukraine, noting that she has no equal among domestic contemporary poets. The classic was not exaggerating. Lesya Ukrainka, whom fate allotted only 42 years of life, enriched Ukrainian poetry with absolute perfection of form, a variety of universal themes and a variety of poetic genres.

Her dramatic poems (Kaminny Gospodar, Obsessed, Cassandra and others) are staged again and again on the stages of domestic theaters, and the famous extravaganza drama Lisova Song gave Ukraine a whole cultural layer - a ballet and many theatrical versions were staged based on it, and several film adaptations were filmed.

Despite a serious illness - bone tuberculosis - the poetess was distinguished by her enormous capacity for work and fortitude, which became one of the main motives of her lyrics. Lesya Ukrainka spoke several languages ​​and was one of the best translators in Ukrainian literature: translated Heinrich Heine, Adam Mickiewicz, Victor Hugo, Homer and other world classics.

ITALIAN TRAIL: Memorial plaque on the house in San Remo where Lesya Ukrainka lived

Vasily Stefanik

(1871-1936)

Writer

Vasyl Stefanik's novellas stunned the Ukrainian literary environment at the beginning of the twentieth century. He became the first Russian expressionist writer: his laconic, piercing sketches and tragedies from the life of Ukrainian peasants simultaneously reflected the drama of the entire people and the tragedy of the human personality.

During his lifetime, the writer published five collections of stories, and all of them aroused the amazement of critics of the time, and were published in Canada and the Czech Republic.

Stefanik was an active member of the Russian-Ukrainian Radical Party (RURP), the first domestic political force that united the entire color of the intelligentsia and insisted on self-government for Ukraine. As a delegate from the RURP, the writer in 1908-1918 was a deputy of the Austrian parliament, where he defended the rights of Ukrainians and other peoples to self-determination.

Ivan Piddubny

(1871-1949)

Wrestler, athlete, artist

Coming from a family of Zaporozhye Cossacks, Ivan Piddubny glorified his ancestors throughout the planet. An epic strongman, the first six-time world champion in Greco-Roman wrestling, he was known as a phenomenal athlete and did not lose a single tournament in his life, although he retired at the age of 70.

Both on the wrestling mat, and in the circus arena, and during personal tours, Piddubny was a huge success with the public. The Ukrainian strongman, who defeated the strongest wrestlers in the world, conquered four continents and more than fifty cities, including in the USA and Western Europe.

By the way, when in the USSR he was given a passport with the nationality “Russian” and a surname written in Russian, the athlete, born in the Poltava region, personally changed his data in the document to “Piddubny” and “Ukrainian”.

BOGATYR: No one in the world could defeat Piddubny on the wrestling mat for 25 years

Solomiya Krushelnitskaya

(1872-1952)

Opera singer

Her voice was applauded by the best concert halls of the world and several continents: at the height of her fame, Ukrainian Solomiya Krushelnitskaya conquered opera houses throughout Western Europe, Poland, Russia and even exotic Egypt, Chile and Argentina. Her repertoire included the main roles in the most iconic operas - Giuseppe Verdi's Aida, Georges Bizet's Carmen, Eugene Onegin and Pyotr Tchaikovsky's Queen of Spades.

In 1904, it was Krushelnitskaya who saved the famous Madama Butterfly by Giacomo Puccini - after the debut failure on stage, the composer finalized the opera and entrusted the Ukrainian with the main role. This time the work was a huge success and has not left the world stage since then.

After leaving the opera, Krushelnitskaya also successfully performed concerts in Europe and America, invariably including Ukrainian songs in her programs. In recent years, the singer has lived in Lvov, the city of her youth, where she graduated from the conservatory and achieved her first stage success.

Pavel Skoropadsky

(1873-1945)

Political figure

Pavel Skoropadsky, heir to an old Ukrainian noble family, built a brilliant military career, participating in the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars. And during the revolutionary events in Ukraine in 1917, delegates to the Free Cossacks Congress in Chigirin elected him as their chieftain.

The socialist ideas of the Central Rada, the first Ukrainian parliament, were alien to him. And after the Bolshevik coup in St. Petersburg, he agreed with the first generalists of the new government on the independence of Ukraine.

In February-March 1918, Russian Bolsheviks invaded Ukraine and occupied Kyiv for three weeks. The Central Rada was evacuated from the city, and soon German troops entered there, with the support of which Skoropadsky proclaimed himself hetman of Ukraine.

During seven and a half months of the hetmanate, economic stability was established in the country. Skoropodasky opened the Academy of Sciences, the National Historical Museum, a library, Ukrainian universities in Kyiv and Kamenets-Podolsk, 150 Ukrainian schools, for which several million textbooks were published in their native language.

COSSACK KIND: Skoropadsky family coat of arms

Alexander Murashko

(1875-1919)

Painter

One of the first Ukrainian impressionists, Alexander Murashko was a celebrity not only in his homeland, but also in Europe, where before the October Revolution of 1917 he often traveled and even lived there for several years. However, he received his initial art education at the drawing school of his uncle, the famous artist Nikolai Murashko. This allowed him to enter the St. Petersburg Art Academy in the class of Ilya Repin, who was very sympathetic to Ukraine.

Then he became acquainted with world painting in Europe, and upon returning to Kyiv, his works attracted the attention of the general public and aspiring artists. In 1913, Murashko opened a studio in the attic of the first “skyscraper” in the Russian Empire - the 11-story Ginzburg building on Institutskaya Street in Kyiv. Many young artists dream of becoming his students.

With the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Murashko took part in the creation of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts - he had long dreamed of this. He died from a bullet from a Bolshevik patrolman because he violated curfew.

RURAL FAMILY: Painting by Murashko from 1914

Nikolay Leontovich

(1877-1921)

Composer

Thanks to Nikolai Leontovich, the whole world sings the Ukrainian Shchedryk at Christmas, known in English as Carol of the Bells. The composer pondered its treatment throughout his life—five editions of the song’s choral chants are known.

Leontovich received his musical education at the Kamenets-Podolsky Seminary. Then he worked as a teacher in the village of Chukovo (now Nemirovsky district, Vinnytsia region). There he created an amateur symphony orchestra, which performed folk melodies he arranged.

In 1904, the composer went to work as a school teacher in Donbass. railway station Grishino (now Krasnoarmeysk, Donetsk region). Here he creates a choir of workers, for which he writes his first works.

In 1917, with the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Leontovich moved to Kyiv. Here he created his first symphonic works and began writing the opera On the Mermaid Velikden. And after the Bolsheviks came to power, he left for Tulchin (now the regional center of the Vinnitsa region), where he founded a music school. In 1921, his life ended tragically: a security officer who asked to spend the night with the composer robbed the house and shot the owner.

SHCHEDRIK IN METAL: Commemorative coin with notes of a famous carol

Kazimir Malevich

(1879-1935)

Artist

Kyiv-born Kazimir Malevich is considered by art historians to be among the highest echelon of avant-garde artists, his exhibitions are accepted by the best museums on the planet, and his paintings become top lots at auctions. Thus, in 2014, a retrospective of Malevich’s works was held at the famous British gallery Tate Modern, and a few years ago his canvas Suprematist Composition was auctioned at Sotheby’s for $60 million. This is one of the record sales for the artist in the post-Soviet space.

Malevich, who extolled non-objective painting, founded a new direction - Suprematism - and became an influential art theorist. He devoted no less time to substantiating his works than to creating them, and during his lifetime he was recognized as one of the world's leading avant-garde artists. His exhibitions took place in Warsaw, Berlin, and Vienna.

The artist, who often called himself a Ukrainian, was born into a Polish family in Kyiv and worked for part of his life in the Ukrainian capital, where he first studied at the Kyiv Drawing School and later taught at the Kiev Art Institute. However, Malevich’s most famous work, Black Square, is located in the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow.

BLACK SQUARE: Work by Kazimir Malevich 1915

Simon Petlyura

(1879-1926)

Political figure

Symon Petlyura, once a literary and theater critic, made a dizzying career: he became the head of the first revolutionary government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). Previously, he headed the Ministry of Military Affairs of the UPR and was the organizer of the armed forces of the republic in 1918.

Petliura began his political career with journalism. During the First World War, he wrote a programmatic article, War and Ukrainians, in which he defended the need to obtain greater political and cultural rights for compatriots within the Russian Empire.

“He is from the breed of leaders, a man from the same mold that once upon a time, in the old days, they founded dynasties, and in our democratic times they become national heroes,” a contemporary wrote about Petliura.

During the peak of his political power, the unification of the UPR and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic took place. However, this political union soon fell apart. At the same time, Petliura himself began a subtle diplomatic game with neighboring Poland, in which he saw an ally in the fight against Bolshevik Russia.

However, his plans were not destined to come true: he was forced to emigrate and ended up in Paris. On a sunny May day in 1926, he was shot on the street by an unknown person, presumably an NKVD agent.

Vladimir Vinnichenko

(1880-1951)

Political and public figure, writer

The three-volume memoirs of Vladimir Vinnychenko, The Rebirth of the Nation, are considered the most valuable source on the events of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1919. Vinnichenko held in his hands its most important threads.

He headed the first Ukrainian government, created in 1917 by the Central Rada, and was the main author of all declarations, universals and legislative acts of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). Vinnychenko also headed the directory of the UPR, which replaced the hetmanate of Pavel Skoropadsky. Even after emigrating in 1919 and never returning to Ukraine, Vinnychenko spent a long time looking for ways to influence what was happening in the country.

However, he himself often called literature, not politics, his life’s work. Vinnichenko, who worked in the style of psychological realism, masterfully succeeded not only in small genres - stories and novellas, but also novels and dramas. The most famous of his plays, Black Panther and White Bear, was filmed in Germany during the writer’s lifetime, and also staged on the theater stage by his great contemporary, director Les Kurbas.

REVIVAL OF A NATION: The first edition of Vinnychenko’s book, in which he analyzed the events in Ukraine in 1917-1919 and proposed further paths for the country’s development

Alexandra Exter

(1882-1949)

Artist, set designer, graphic artist

Paris, London, Berlin, New York, Prague are just some of the cities where Alexandra Exter’s personal exhibitions were held during her lifetime. She was one of the most notable avant-garde artists of her time, her bold experiments delighted the world and were among the best examples of Suprematism and Cubo-Futurism.

The artist, who received her education at the Kiev Art School, continued it in Paris, where she entered the circle of the European creative elite. Since then, she has been a full participant in all first-class art shows in France and Italy, and since 1924 she has lived constantly abroad.

Exter is also known as a talented film and theater artist. As a set designer, she was the first to utilize the entire space of the theatrical stage, and the costumes she designed were in keeping with the innovative spirit of stage and film productions of the early twentieth century.

VANGUARD: Costume design for the play Famira the Kifared based on the play by Innokenty Annensky

Mikhail Boychuk

(1882-1937)

Artist

Mikhail Boychuk, the founder of the school of Ukrainian monumental painting, was born in the village of Romanovka near Ternopil into a family of simple peasants. However, he managed to get an excellent education: with money from the Taras Shevchenko Society and personally from Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, he went to study at the Vienna Academy of Art, and then graduated from Krakow. Then there was the Munich Academy, life in Paris and travels in Italy, where he also studied art.

In 2011, Boychuk returned to Ukraine, where he was invited to paint ancient churches after restoration. In 1917, Boychuk took part in the creation of the Kyiv Art Academy and restored mosaics in the St. Sophia Cathedral. However, the energy of the revolution brings the artist out of the church and onto the street: he gets involved in street agitation, decorating the central squares of large cities and party congresses for the holidays.

At this time, Boychuk began to be called the Ukrainian Siqueiros - in honor of the great Mexican monumentalist. He has students and followers.

With the beginning of Stalin's repressions, the authorities accused the artist of bourgeois nationalism, since in his works he gravitated towards Ukrainian themes. In 1937, Boychuk was arrested and executed for “espionage.” Almost all of his works were destroyed.

YOUNG WOMAN: The work of Mikhail Boychuk miraculously survived, although it was cut up after the arrest and execution of the artist